

**DOCUMENTS
ON THE
MINDSZENTY CASE**

BUDAPEST
JANUARY 1949

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490392: ATHENAEUM, BUDAPEST, – RESPONSIBLE DIRECTOR: TIVADAR GORSEKY

On December the 29th, 1948, the Press Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Home Affairs announced that the police authorities had arrested Jozsef Mindszenty, archbishop of Esztergom, charged with treason, espionage, crimes directed at the overthrow of the Republic, and foreign exchange speculation. They also arrested, apart from Andras Zakar, the Primate's secretary, who had already been taken into custody on charges of treason and anti-democratic activity, Miklos Nagy, the secretary of Actio Catholica, charged with treason and smuggling people across the frontier, Bela Ispanky a priest, charged with treason, Janos Varadi, a Jesuit monk, charged with treason and foreign exchange speculation, Jozsef Vid, a Jesuit monk, charged with foreign exchange speculation and failure to report a crime, Miklos Beresztoczy, the Budapest director of Actio Catholica, charged with antidemocratic activities and failure to report a crime, Zoltan Endredy, a chaplain, charged with smuggling people across the frontier, Janos Fabian, the archbishop's archivist, charged with being an accomplice to treason, Imre Boka, an archiepiscopal councillor. Prince Pal Eszterhazy, a landowner, dr. Gabor Horvath, a lawyer, and Tivadar Wydler, a bank director, charged with foreign currency speculation, and Jusztin Baranyai, a University professor, charged with treason.

The unmasking of Mindszenty and his accomplices, and their arrest, caused the greatest confusion among those whom he served, the western imperialists. Their press, their radio propaganda, and, moreover, statements by certain statesmen and bishops, tried by slander and denial, to whitewash Mindszenty, their accomplice.

The Hungarian Government wishes to publish in this book a few of those many proofs it has at its disposal, the greater part of which are from Mindszenty's secret buried files, which will prove tangibly and irrefutably to any unbiased man that Mindszenty and his company were guilty.



1. Mindszenty sets out for Rome on the airplane put at his disposal by the American mission.



2. Mindszenty's secretary Andras Zakar, and Janos Fabian, the Archbishop's archivist, with the metal case in which the Primate kept his most confidential documents and which they buried a yard deep in the cellar of the Archbishop's palace at Esztergom.

MINDSZENTY'S PAST

Mindszenty in a confession he has written in his own hand (Appendix 3.) summarizes his political attitude and past as follows:

“I am a Hungarian nobleman. My original surname was Pehm. The Pehm family was declared noble in 1732. On my mother’s side I am descended from the Hungarian noble family of Kovacs which was raised to the rank of nobility in 1663.

In February 1917, I was sent to Zalaegerszeg as a teacher of religion. In 1919 I was appointed parson of that same place and I worked there in that capacity until March 29th, 1944, when I became bishop of Veszprem. I was appointed Prince Primate in October 1945. Recalling my public activities I declare that I have always considered myself a royalist. That is why I have always supported to the greatest possible extent those political tendencies that helped to realize that aim. After my appointment as Prince Primate I could serve my aims all the more efficiently. My aim is the aim of the monarchist movement in Hungary; a Federative Central European Monarchy, with a personal union between Hungary and Austria, and with other Catholic states, in the first place Bavaria, that might perhaps join it, and with Otto Hapsburg on the throne. I only thought this possible after the overthrow of the Hungarian Republic with foreign, and in the first place, American aid. It was in the interests of this that I did everything to support American politics in Hungary, partly by my activity against the Hungarian Republic, and partly by constantly urging their interference, by a regular service of facts, and by espionage.

[illegible]

3. Mindszenty's handwritten statement on his political attitude.

I did not rely only on the Americans for my purpose; I organized all those forces, both in Hungary and abroad, whose interest it was to overthrow the Republic, and with it its institutions and accomplishments, such as the land reform and nationalisation.

I expected the restoration of the Monarchy after the conclusion of a third world war by an American victory. For the transition period, until such time as Otto should return, I would have been the temporary head of state. I wanted to crown Otto myself because it would have secured for me all those privileges that are granted to one who is foremost in the peerage.

I acknowledge that from the days of my youth I opposed every democratic policy of the Hungarian people and supported right-wing movements”.

HIS CONNECTION WITH THE HUNGARIAN NAZIS

Jozsef Mindszenty (Pehm) had already drawn attention to himself before the war by his frequent political action of a fascist type and by his outrageous behaviour. He was known as one of those “political priests” whose political activities the faithful looked upon with incomprehension and estrangement. It was all the more surprising when after the liberation of the country in 1945 Mindszenty, with his fascist past, asked for 300 holds* of his land to be exempted from the land reform on the basis of his alleged merits in the resistance movement. Certain reactionary circles in Hungary, and even more so the western imperialists, have since then too, several times tried to make Mindszenty appear as a hero of the Hungarian resistance movement. The truth, however, is that at the end of 1944, at the time of Szalasi’s reign of terror a certain Nazi lawyer from the town of Veszprem called Ferenc Schiberna wanted, in his capacity of county prefect to requisition a part of the bishop’s palace at Veszprem, and to take over the 1,800 new men’s shirts and drawers which he found there. Mindszenty, as bishop of Veszprom, protested against this. Schiberna thereupon had him arrested and had the clothes taken away. That is how Mindszenty came to be a prisoner of the Nazis, and in one month he addressed four petitions to various members of the Nazi government asking for his liberation.

In his letter written to Jenő Szollosy, the Nazi deputy premier, on January 12th, 1945, he emphasized that there were no political reasons for his arrest, that the only charge against him was of hoarding, of trying to save his property, and that he had a long-standing personal disagreement with Schiberna. Of the Nazi county prefect he writes among other things: “his religious behaviour does not befit a government headed by that head of the state (Szalasi) who takes part in retreat and leads the life of a devout Catholic”.

In another letter written to the Nazi Minister of Home Affairs, Gabor Vajna, from Sopron, on January 16th, 1945, he boasts of the fact that “it was the Apostolic Holy See that was the first to recognize the present order”. On February 11th, 1945, Dr. Robert Medgyessy-Schwartz was commissioned by Mindszenty to write a petition to the government in which he gave the following reasons for liberating the bishop: “It was just yesterday that I heard that the government wants to make records in every village liberated from Russian occupation, and wants to have these signed by the bishop concerned, because people abroad, thinking of everything as propaganda, would only believe the church authorities on this matter. Our bishop could be of very great service in this way, but of course only if he is free, because it is in any case his plan immediately to visit the villages concerned, to console the faithful and urge them to steadfastness”.

This is how he offered his services to the Nazi terroristic regime which, at this time had been driven back to the western frontiers where it was living its last days, a regime which he considered a “Christian state”.

And after the liberation he tried to make political capital of his personal conflicts of financial origin, of the enmities that had arisen through his hoarding and speculation, very much like his present dollar deals. And in this way he tried to exempt his land from the land reform.

* 1 Hungarian hold — 1.42 acres.

Mindszenty himself admits his conflict with the Nazis: "My arrest on October the 21st, 1944, was not for political reasons but because Ferenc Schiberna, county prefect for the county of Veszprem, had found 1,800 shirts and drawers nearly 100,000 pengo's worth, hoarded in my palace, and because I had a disagreement with him over the requisitioning of accommodation. For this reason they interned me."

A characteristic proof of his sympathy for and interest in the cause of the Hungarian Hitlerites is a letter written to him by the Jesuit monk, Tibor Revay, in which he gives an account of Szalasi's behaviour at the time of his retreat at the Jesuits' Manreza house. The letter dated April 16th, 1938, reads:

"My dear honoured Sir! Szalasi was here in devout retreat. He behaved extremely well. He has also been here since. He was glad to make contact with one or two of the fathers. Whether he is suited to national leadership I do not know. I consider him reliable from the Catholic point of view. Whether he can influence his colleagues I do not know. He promised he would send them to me for devout retreat. It seems he has not yet been able to fulfill his promise.

I am sorry I was not able to get the *answer* in time" (Appendix 4).

Mindszenty, however, has declared in his statement not only that he sympathized with National Socialism in Hungary in 1938, but also that he gave active help to Szalasi and Co. in their political progress:

"On April 19th, 1938, Viktor Zoltan Toth, the dean of Devavanya who was a great sympathizer of the Fascists, and I convoked a conference of priests in Budapest. After the deliberations of the conference we issued a memorandum. The memorandum was worked out by a committee of three members under my chairmanship. The other members were Viktor Zoltan Toth and Zoltan Nyisztor. The conference committed itself to follow a national, social line. We decided that we thought the Jewish problem ought to be solved by way of racial laws in the same way as the fascists wanted it. We emphasized that it was the party we supported, the Christian Party (Wolff-Party), that had so far introduced the only laws of racial protection and the Numerus Clausus. With this memorandum of ours, which by means of deans' conferences we spread to every parish in the country, we helped the advance of the fascists," says Mindszenty in his statement which together with the other statements and facts shows clearly that his internment in 1944 was not the result of political resistance to fascism of the Szalasi type, but of a quarrel with a local authority over financial matters.

Bppest 1938. 7/16.

Kedves méltóságos Uram!

Nálam volt az L. 21-on. Tizen jól
viselte magát. Bőve is mag-
fordult itt: L. 21-ket párossal sze-
ren érezteték. Hogy orvagos veres-
se van-e vártatásig, nem tudom.
Látok, hogy nemcsak itt, hanem
határozottan tudom. Tudja-e munka-
körüit így befolyásolni, nem tudom.
Megjött, hogy ezeket L. 21-ra
hosszú kider. Hogy lehet, hogy
saj nem birta megvalósítani
szándékát, hogy kiderítse
nem birtam a vártatás alatt.

meőnek B. 21. K.

hálás hívő
Revay Tibor 22

4. Report of the Jesuit monk Tibor Revay of Szalasi's devout retreat addressed to Mindszenty (from Mindszenty's secret files).

MONARCHIST CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE REPUBLIC

After the liberation, Jozsef Mindszenty was appointed to the chair of Archbishop of Esztergom that had become vacant with the death of Jusztinian Seredi. Right from the very beginning he openly interfered in political life. It can already be seen in the minutes of the Episcopal Conference held on October 17th, 1945, where he said in his speech of welcome: "The main thing in our programme must be to lead our flock, but I also attribute great importance to participation in public life". And in answer to greetings from the prime minister he sent the following telegram: 'I gratefully thank you for your warm congratulations — the first public dignitary of the land is at his country's service. Prince Primate'. (Appendix 5.)

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TAVIRAT

PAAPA 1945.10.22.0812

MINISZTERELNÖK
UR BUDAPEST

HERCEGPRINCE

MELEB GRATULACIOJAAT MAALASAN KOESZOENOEK AZ ORSZAG
ELSOE KOEZZOBI MEELTOSAGA HAZAJA RENDELKEZSEERE AALL

So, in his very first official act, Mindszenty already appeared with the demand that he should be looked upon, not as the head of the Catholic Church, but in the spirit of the old feudal times as the "first public dignitary" of the land or as he later called himself its "first peer".

Since 1945 he has used his high ecclesiastical position to fight with all the forces at his disposal against democracy in Hungary, against the measures of the Republic, against the land reform and against nationalization. With his speeches, pastoral letters and directives, he has more than once seriously sinned against the foreign political interests of the country.

Apart from his open anti-democratic activities Josef Mindszenty stood at the head of the monarchist organization for restoring the House of Hapsburg. Mindszenty's monarchist politics are by no means new in origin. He himself says, in his statement:

"I have been a monarchist from my early youth, and I attribute my political conviction mainly to the influence of Count Janos Mikes, the county bishop of Szombathely. In this question it is my conviction that a correct form of state for the Hungarian people is the monarchy whose legal representative was Charles IV and after his death Otto Hapsburg. I gave voice to this conviction of mine after the liberation too, and I accordingly protested at the time against the proclamation of the Republic".

When the question of a republican form of state was put on the agenda in Hungary the Prince Primate sent a letter to the government on December 31st, 1945, in which he declared:

"I am informed that the National Assembly wishes in the near future to put constitutional reforms on its agenda, including the establishment of a Republic, and with it a plan for abolishing the thousand year

old Hungarian monarchy. If this news corresponds to the truth, even though I have not had official information, then with the right of public office exercised by the primates of Hungary continuously for more than 900 years I do protest against these plans”.

Of the way this letter came to be written Mindszenty states: “At this time I regularly had talks with Jusztin Baranyai, and we were mainly concerned with the changes to be expected in the constitution of the country. My point of view, which I later developed in writing, was that I would protest against the introduction of a republic”.

But this time Mindszenty was already not content with protests sent to the government but began illegal organization.

“Immediately after the liberation,” — he admits — “I tried to direct the internal political life of the country in accordance with monarchist aims. Thus before the general elections held in autumn 1945 I decided that in the given political situation the monarchists would have to be introduced into the National Assembly through the Independent Smallholders’ Party. Bela Varga played a leading part in the Smallholders’ Party and with his help we had reliable monarchists like Margit Slachta, Pal Zeoke, Ferenc Kovacs and others nominated.

“Concrete aid to the Smallholders’ Party was given through a pastoral letter dated October 18th, 1945, in which, after attacks on the order that had developed after the liberation, I unequivocally instructed Catholics to vote against the Marxist parties for the Independent Smallholders’ Party.” His secretary, Dr. Andras Zakar, states the following:

“In spring 1945, in the course of the general search for a political solution, the Prince Primate paid special attention to the person of Dezso Sulyok. This was because he knew his monarchist point of view.”

At the 1945 elections Mindszenty openly supported the Independent Smallholders’ Party because, — as Zakar says, — “The ‘group for the defence of the constitution’, of the Smallholders’ Party under the leadership of Bela Varga and with the knowledge of the Prince Primate did propaganda work among the priests of the country. The object of the Primate was the organisation of the leading monarchist personalities within the Smallholders’ Party, and getting them into suitable positions.”

“I know,” — continues Zakar, — “that before these events, Marquis Pallavicini, Jr., had gone to France, before and after which he had had talks with Mindszenty at his palace in Buda. There is no doubt that at the talks before his departure the question discussed was that of establishing contact with Otto. This is substantiated by my information from Miklos Boer who told me that when Pallavicini returned he had reported to the Prince-Primate to give an account of his visit in France and had said that he had met Otto in Paris and had talked with him about Hungary. It is a fact that after Pallavicini’s return to Hungary it was noticeable that the exponents of monarchism visited the Prince Primate one after the other.” Mindszenty himself admits; “In 1945 in the course of the shaping of political life I had a talk with George Pallavicini Jr., who had previously gone to France where he had had a conversation with Otto. Pallavicini’s journey was important because he had established contact with Otto Hapsburg, so that it was then already possible to assume certain points of view.”

Mindszenty established his further contact with Otto in accordance with these “points of view”. Until his journey to America in 1947 he seized every opportunity to secure permanent contact with Otto Hapsburg. “In February 1946 I went to Rome for my consecration as Cardinal. There I met Cardinal Van Roey of Belgium, who, I knew, had good relations with the royal family. On this occasion Van Roey gave me a letter of greeting in which Otto congratulated me on my appointment as Cardinal” admits Mindszenty in his handwritten statement, and continues, “I also had contact with Van Roey later on.” Of the essence of this contact Zakar says: “Mindszenty asked Van Roey, for he knew that Otto would look him up during his stay in Belgium, that in so far as he needed a contact with Otto, Van Roey should be so kind as to undertake that role. The Belgian Archbishop did undertake it. In spring 1947 the Prince Primate sent a letter to Van Roey and in this he writes as follows. ‘I ask your Eminence to give the enclosed letter to the gentleman from whom you brought a letter to Rome.’ These lines were written

But it was not only Pallavicini and Bishop Van Roey who acted as intermediaries between Mindszenty and Otto. He had Jozsef Kozi-Horvath, a papal chamberlain, flee the country illegally with the same task. And of him he says, "At the end of January 1947 he sent me a confidential report in which he describes in detail among other things his talks on December 12th and 14th, 1946, with His Highness Otto. At the talks Otto pointed to the possibilities of a restoration."

It was after such preliminaries that Mindszenty travelled to America in June 1947. The *pretext* for the journey was the Mary Congress at Ottawa but its real concealed object was a personal meeting with Otto. Among other things Mindszenty said this of his American journey (Appendix 6): “At the beginning of the festivities we were joined by Pal Zsamboki, the former confessor to Charles IV, and an old friend of the royal family. Towards the end of the Congress, Zsamboki reported that Queen Zita and her youngest daughter asked for an audience. I did not think it would be good to meet publicly in the palace of the archbishop, so Zsamboki recommended a nunnery. The meeting lasted about 45 minutes. After the end of the festivities of Mary we travelled to the United States. At the beginning of July

6. Mindszenty's handwritten statement on his American journey and his meeting with Otto.

we arrived in Chicago where we stayed at Cardinal Archbishop Stritch's. Shortly after this Zsamboki prepared a meeting between Otto and me which took place in secret at a nunnery. I was accompanied on that journey by my secretary and Zsamboki. The two of us had about an hour's talk. Otto inquired about the political situation in Hungary and about the approaching elections. I gave him an accurate account of the political situation. Otto gave detailed instructions that the monarchists should not form a separate party but should work carefully and quietly and should take as few risks as possible. They should as far as possible gain parliamentary seats through the suitable existing parties and they should acquire positions. Of his ideas for the future he said that, though he separated the question of Austria from that of Hungary, he nevertheless thought of a personal union in which Austria as an industrial state would continue to develop her industry while Hungary would perfect her agriculture. This dual form, said Otto, would be a bastion of defence against materialism, all the more so, as it would be built on an evangelic basis. In connection with foreign political questions he directed my attention to the new Budapest Minister of the United States, Mr. Selden Chapin, whom he knew personally. Finally he sent his greetings to Jusztin Baranyai and we agreed to keep the meeting a secret. Then, at my hotel, on three pages — so far as I remember — I wrote down the instructions he had given. I put the notes in an envelope, and for safe-keeping I sent them by means of Pal Zsamboki to Cicognani, the apostolic nuncio, in Washington.

“Shortly afterwards we went to New York where we spent a few days as guests of Cardinal Spellman because of some trouble with the air service. There, in the course of our conversation we spoke among other things also of Otto Hapsburg. I told the Cardinal about our meeting and Spellman said that he knew Otto, had met him twice, and thought very highly of him. About Otto he knew that his father had been King of Hungary and that I therefore had to have something to do with him. Spellman then said that he thought it necessary that I should give a letter of commission to Otto which would entitle him abroad to represent Hungarian Catholics. I then gave a short letter of commission to say that, in case I was prevented from doing so, Otto would be entitled to represent the Catholics of Hungary. After writing the letter I gave it to Cardinal Spellman.

On the day of my departure, at 11 a. m., I had a short talk with Tibor Eckhardt in the anteroom to the vestry at St. Patrick's Cathedral. This meeting, too, was prepared by Pal Zsamboki. The conversation was short — it lasted about 20 minutes — as Spellman was waiting outside in a car. I warned Eckhardt to put aside quarrels and accursed disunity and to organize unity for the Hungarians. He promised this. Finally he mentioned preparations that were going on for war.” (Appendix 6.)

Zakar says of the details of the conversation with Otto: “The Prince-Primate told Cardinal Spellman of New York about the details of his talk with Otto in my presence. The Prince Primate had given a detailed report to Otto on how the monarchists were working here in Hungary. He emphasized that they were organizing and would go on organizing until they had accomplished their goal. Otto declared that the international political situation was tense. They would have to be ready because in America too, there were supporters of the monarch. He was in contact with high-ranking officials of the State Department, and said that the United States of America would support a Federative Central European Monarchy after the war. For the future, Otto gave instructions that the monarchist forces were to be rallied, that they were to enter existing parties and to occupy posts of importance. They should maintain an organisation but carefully, lest the movement be exposed to danger. The feeling of the Hungarian people towards the monarchy must be kept alive. Mr. Chapin, the new minister of the United States of America to Hungary, was then mentioned. Of him, Otto said that he had a more forceful line than his predecessor. He stated, moreover, that he had already met him, with the intention of arranging a meeting between Mr. Chapin and the Prince Primate while he was still in the United States, so that his person should also be known to him. Mr. Chapin and the Prince Primate while the latter was still in the United States. He had, at the same time, told Chapin about the Prince Primate both personally and about his role in Hungarian political life. He had said that Mindszenty was the leader of the monarchists, who was organizing their camp and upon whom they looked in Hungary as the main representative of this trend

of thought. Otto asked the Prince Primate to maintain contact with him by means of the new United States minister in Budapest and he therefore recommended that Mindszenty find a way of meeting the minister before returning home. The minister would be glad to receive him and would be at his disposal in questions which the Prince Primate wanted to discuss with him. Otto emphasized that there was great tension in world politics, but that war was not yet imminent because American public opinion would first have to be shaped. According to his information, agreement among the great powers was not probable, and war therefore seemed inevitable. In these difficult times there was still much suffering ahead for the monarchists. But they in the United States would give information of such a nature to political and military circles in America as to make it possible for the work of the monarchists to develop in Hungary because their cause would become important and urgent when as a result of the change in foreign political factors there would be a change in the system in Hungary. Finally Otto expressed his respect for the Prince Primate and his affection for him and asked him to continue his work for the monarchy. The Prince Primate answered that he had long been a follower of this trend and he would continue to do everything he could in the interests of this aim. That brought this conversation of about an hour's length to an end. Summarizing the above part of my statement I declare that the Prince Primate on the occasion of his American journey was completely aware of the way his conversations were directed against the democratic order. He knew that this was in effect activity directed towards the overthrow of the Hungarian Republic and he therefore warned Zsomboki, who prepared the various meetings with a special care, to organize these in a completely secret way, because it would certainly do no good if anyone got to know of them".

Mindszenty, in fact, discussed the organization of the illegal monarchist movement in Hungary in detail with Otto during his visit to America. He hoped for the overthrow of the Hungarian Republic as a result of the approaching outbreak of a new world war and they agreed to use the Budapest Legation of the United States of America as intermediary in their conspiracy against the people, and came to the conclusion that they had found their highest American patron in the person of Cardinal Spellman of New York.

MONARCHIST ORGANIZATION

What happened when Mindszenty came home? This is what he says in his statement:

"I returned to Hungary in the middle of July. At home I had secret political talks and I only reported to the monarchist leaders I convened in secret: to Jusztin Baranyai, Miklos Gruber, Baron Kray, Count Jozsef Cziraky and Margit Schlachta."

He then continues: "After my return home, I wrote a letter to Mr. Chapin, the United States Minister, on September 20th, 1947, in which I recommended that 'the United States should buy up all Russian assets in Hungary, and one of the demands that would be a condition of the purchase would be the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops. In this way the United States, which is anyway interested in oil, would through these purchases acquire an economic and political basis in Central Europe.' After dispatching this, as far as I remember, I soon got an answer saying that they had sent my letter to Washington. Jusztin Baranyai had exact knowledge of this correspondence but wider Catholic circles also had heard of it and this aroused a hope that the time for a change in the system of government was not far off. It was this that prompted Jusztin Baranyai to prepare his memorandum on a provisional government and his list of the people who were to be its members." (Appendix 7.)

Baranyai in his plan, which Mindszenty accepted, talked of a "transition" period which would last from the entry of Anglo American occupation troops to the coronation of the king.

"There can be no doubt," — writes Baranyai, — "that public opinion will, when the time comes, greet the temporary taking over of the post of head of state by the Prince Primate with enthusiastic joy and full agreement. After this there would be no further obstacle to the Prince Primate forming a state council of wise politicians with suitable connections abroad and of people prominent in public life.

answered that it was the opinion of leading American politicians that monarchism could be restored in Hungary and that of course involved Otto's person too. He himself thought Otto a very serious and talented man. My opinion and impression of the whole conservation was, that Chapin was actually showing the way for Mindszenty's further activities and indicating support for him".

8. Part of the original handwritten plan by Prof. Jusztin Baranyai.

Mindszenty, encouraged by his successes, continued organizing with still greater energy. Lajos Shvoy, the county bishop of Szekesfehrvar, says: "Mindszenty after his American voyage admitted at an episcopal conference that he had had talks with Otto in America." Jozsef Petery, the bishop of Vac, says the same in his statement.

situation more energetically than ever after his visit to America. “I influenced the results of the 1947 elections,” he says in his statement, “in a decisive way, to the benefit of the right-wing parties. At the episcopal conference on July 26th, 1945, I explained why it was necessary for the clergy to interfere in the electoral campaign. It is true that this episcopal conference publicly proclaimed through the *Magyar Kurir* that we would not interfere with the elections, and left the choice of parties to the consciences of the faithful. In actual fact I laid it down at this conference that we would in practice urgently have to give direction through the deans that votes should be cast mainly for the candidates of the bourgeois parties, first of all, for those of the Christian Women’s Camp and the Pfeiffer Party. As the Christian Women’s Camp only nominated candidates in a small number of constituencies, in practice I therefore supported Pfeiffer’s Party. In accordance with the secret resolution of the episcopal conference, we directed through the vicars and deans, the faithful to do this. I also supported Margit Schlachta financially and gave her 20,000 forint for her election expenses.”

THE CASE OF THE HOLY CROWN


Mindszenty's attitude on the question of bringing home the Holy Crown is also part of his monarchistic manoeuvring. From the documents to be listed below it is clearly evident that Mindszenty considered the Crown, not as a religious relic, a valuable national object of art, but as a constitutional symbol, which, according to the old constitution embodied the State power and the Sovereignty of the country. He was supported in this attitude by those circles, first of all the American imperialists, the Austrian and Bavarian bishops and the Vatican, whose plans include the establishment of the kind of reactionary Catholic Monarchy under Habsburg rule also desired by Mindszenty.

The first step taken by Mindszenty in the case of the Holy Crown, which had been taken by the Arrow Cross* to the West, was a letter written to Mr. Chapin. The hand-written draft of this letter was found in the secret files discovered at Esztergom. The letter contains the following:

"Your Excellency, dear Minister,

The United States returned, and her soldiers brought back, the holy right hand of Saint Stephen, our first King, which has been preserved for 909 years. His Holy Crown, our most valued constitutional and historical relic, is also in the hands of the United States Army, in Wiesbaden, Germany.

My request to you is to obtain an order from your Government, for the transportation of the Crown by the Army and its transfer to the same Apostolic Power, His Holiness the Pope, whose predecessor presented the Holy Crown to Saint Stephen in the year 1000.



A kéziratos vázlat Mindszenty levele Mr. Chapin felé a Szent Koronáról. A kézírás magyar nyelven van, és a papíron látható a levelezési cím: Esztergom. A levél szövege a következő:

Tisztelettel, kedves Miniszter,
 Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok katonái hozták haza Szent István királyunk szent jobb kezét, amelyet 909 évvel ezelőtt a Szent István királyunk kezébe adtak. A Szent Korona, a legvalóságosabb alkotmányunk, a legfontosabb történelmi és jogi emlékeink, szintén az Amerikai Egyesült Államok katonái kezében van, Wiesbadenben, Németországban.
 Kérem, hogy a Kormányzatán keresztül kérjék meg az Egyesült Államok Kormányát, hogy a Szent Koronát az Amerikai Egyesült Államok Katonái kezéből átadják az Apostoli Hatalomnak, azaz a Pápának, aki előzőleg a Szent Koronát Szent István királynak adta át az évezredes időközökben.

9. Mindszenty's handwritten draft of his letter to Mr. Chapin on the question of the holy crown.

* Hungarian Nazis.

Since this cause is a very important one for our nation, and since demands for its return or military advances, might be fatal for the Crown, only Rome could reassure us.

By the “demands for its (the Crown’s) return” mentioned in the letter, Mindszenty means of course the request of the Hungarian Government addressed to the Government of the U. S. for the return of the Crown. The “military advances” allude to Mindszenty’s political dream, a third world war.

“My Dear Cardinal Mindszenty:

Permit me to assure you, my dear Cardinal, that your suggestion will be given due consideration at such time as the disposition of this relic is brought to the attention of this Legation.

His Eminence ep. Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty
Arch Primate of Hungary
Arch bishop of Esztergom
Esztergom, Hungary”.

[illegible]

a Kővellesé, eljárnak volna a Kővellesé:
 Eminenciát, mint a beküldött
 a jelen helyrebbi egyedül kővellesé.
 Canonicus beküldött kővellesé, eljárnak
 az illam amiről Kővellesé, hogy
 a nómáskorajj illetékes amiről
 halálom rendelkezett attól, hogy
 a Szászország Wiesbadenben ordálko-
 sít, az Pórnok s adarát át megör-
 zőre annak, attól a kővellesé, a ró-
 mai pépa kővellesé.

A kővellesé kővellesé
 zolt beküldött arra, Kővellesé Sz-
 zond (Strecke) kővellesé, hogy, kővellesé
 az adarát Esztergom, Eminenciát
 kővellesé. Kővellesé Kővellesé, kővellesé
 kővellesé.

Eminenciát kővellesé kővellesé
 veggát mindenkör

Budapest, 1847. aug. 26. Kővellesé kővellesé
 Juszti Baranyai

11. Juszti Baranyai's letter in which he recommends Count Zoltan Csaky to Mindszenty.

"Most High and Very-Reverend Prince Primate,
 Your Eminence,

Erno Sigmond (Strecke) presented to me his spiritual child. Count Zoltan Csaky, who is a nephew to General Erno Pajtas, Commander of the Crown Guard. He not only has very interesting first hand information on the Crown, but is also a person suited to take directions concerning the further fate of this our greatest treasure. In my humble opinion the following procedure would be necessary for the sake of the absolute security of the Crown: Your Eminence, as the only person to be considered competent in the present situation, should persuade the American authorities to give instructions to the competent American authorities in Germany to have the Crown transported from Wiesbaden to Rome and handed over for safe-keeping to the One it came from, His Holiness the Pope of Rome.

Considering the extraordinary importance of the matter, I asked Erno Sigmond (Strecke) to visit your Eminence in Esztergom along with count Csaky. I beg you to receive them graciously.

Kissing the Holy Purple of your Robe I remain ever your obedient servant,

Juszti Baranyai". (Appendix 11.)

Feis. Salzburg
fugyi Zibáros, György
fugyi "

Egy kérelem is nem-
teleltse rendelkezési
főnökségét, megbeszél,
~~mindet~~ ~~mindet~~ ~~mindet~~
valamennyi helyi
levegőt is megbeszél
készen fel - fegy-
veléssel. Ezzel
Ezzel

Készen, megbeszél-
és egyáltalán
fogadja is lesz
ben a miniszter
fogadja

947. IX. 1.

12. Handwritten draft of a letter of recommendation from Mindszenty. It is with this letter, that he sent Count Casky to Cardinal Innitzer and Bishop Rohrer.

Mindszenty accepted Baranyai's advice. In a letter written in his own hand he recommended Csaky to the attention of the Archbishops of Vienna and Salzburg and gave him instructions to ask their support in seeing that the American authorities did not hand over the Crown to the Hungarian State (Appendix 12.) So it is evident that Mindszenty was not satisfied with the exchange of letters between himself and Mr. Chapin, but sent a special courier too, on this affair, to Wiesbaden.

Csaky gave an account of the results of his mission in a letter written on May 1st, 1948. The letter tells that he was in Vienna, Munich, and Salzburg to see Innitzer, Faulhaber and Rohrer respectively, and that on April 2nd, he paid a visit in Weilheim to Horthy, too. His visits had a good result. Rohrer, inspired by Mindszenty sent the following letter, written in German to Cardinal Spellman of New York (Appendix 13.):

"Your Eminence,

His Eminence, the most reverend Primate of Hungary, Cardinal Mindszenty, has just sent to me an authorized courier who submitted the following request.

The Crown of Saint Stephen of Hungary, which was received over one thousand years ago from the Apostolic See, is to be found in Wiesbaden, Germany, in the American zone. Ever since that time

Ihrer Eminenz
Hochwürdigster Herr Kardinal !

Seine Eminenz, der hochwürdigste Herr Fürstprimas von Ungarn
Kardinal Mindszenty schickt oben einen Kurier mit Beglaubigungs-
schreiben an mich, der mir folgendes Anliegen vorbringt:

In Siebuden, Deutsches Reich, amerikanische Zone, befindet
sich die Krone des hl. Stephan von Ungarn, die er vor mehr als 1000
Jahren vom apostolischen Stuhl erhalten hat. Im Namen dieser Krone
werden seit jeher alle Richtersprüche in Ungarn gefällt. Sie ver-
körpert gleichsam die Staatsebene und Souveränität Ungarns in sich.
Daher ist sie nicht nur den Katholiken Ungarns, sondern auch den
anderegläubigen ein heiliges und unerschätzbares Erbe.

Diese hl. ungarische Krone gilt es nun, der ungarischen Nation
zu retten. Es scheint Gefahr zu bestehen, dass sie an Ungarn jetzt
schon ausgeliefert wird, was bei der gegenwärtigen politischen Situa-
tion in Ungarn den Verluste dieses heiligtums gleichkäme.

Aus diesem Grunde ersucht mich der von Ihrer Eminenz, dem hoch-
würdigsten Herrn Kardinal entsandte Kurier, Ihre Eminenz um folgendes
zu bitten:

1.) zu veranlassen, dass diese hl. Krone unter keinen Umständen
nach Ungarn ausgeliefert, sondern dieselbe an den hl. Vater in Rom
überbracht wird.

An Seine Eminenz,
den hochwürdigsten Herrn
Kardinal Spellman

13. Copy of a letter from Archbishop Rohrer of Salzburg to Cardinal Spellman of New York, which the archbishop of Salzburg had sent to Mindszenty.

2.) Dass die Krone entweder von der amerikanischen Militärbe-
hörde offiziell oder wenigstens unter ihrem Schutz inoffiziell dem
hl. Vater übergeben wird.

3.) Dass an dieser Überbringung der Nachbarn der hl. Krone Oberst
armut Graf von Pálffy, St. Grafenstadt St. Oberbayern und dessen Beglei-
ter Graf Johann von Csaky beteiligt sind.

Um diese Bitten der Katholiken Ungarns durchzusetzen, dürfte
es notwendig sein, sich direkt mit dem Herrn Präsidenten der Verei-
nigten Staaten in Verbindung zu setzen. Ein eigenes Empfehlungsschrei-
ben an den Herrn General Kluge von Ihrer Seite würde die Durchführung
dieser Aktion, durch die dem ungarischen Volk, soweit es möglich ist,
die größte Freude gemacht würde, wohl sicher ermöglichen.

Gemeinhin Ihrer Eminenz den Ausdruck besonderer Verehrung
seitens

Jhrs

ergebensten

+ *Arch. Rohrer*
Fürstbischof.

13. Copy of a letter from Archbishop Rohrer of Salzburg to Cardinal Spellman of New York, which the archbishop of Salzburg had sent to Mindszenty.

all legal decisions in Hungary have been made in the name of this Crown. It embodies both the power of the State and the sovereignty of Hungary. So it is a holy relic and an invaluable treasure, not only in the eyes of Catholics, but also in those of people of other religions of Hungary.

Now our concern is to save this Holy Crown for the Hungarian nation. There seems to be a danger

that it will soon be handed over to Hungary, which under the present political situation in Hungary would mean literally the loss of this holy object.

Therefore the courier sent to me by His Eminence the Cardinal asks me to request the following from Your Eminence:

1. To take measures against the surrender of the Holy Crown to Hungary under any circumstances, and for its transfer to the Holy Father in Rome.

2. The Crown should be handed over to the Holy Father by the American authorities, either officially, or at least under their unofficial protection.

3. At this transfer the Guardian of the Holy Crown the Colonel Count Erno Pajtas, (at present at Grabenstott, 32, Upper Bavaria), and his escort, Count Janos Csaky, should be present.

To fulfil this request of the Hungarian Catholics, it seems necessary to get in touch directly with the President of the United States. A separate letter of recommendation, written by Your Eminence to General Clay would surely make this effort successful and engender the greatest joy among Hungarian believers.

Please let me express my special esteem,

Yours most faithfully.

Signed: Andr. Rohracher, Archbishop

To His Eminence the Reverend Cardinal Spellman.”

A letter in the same tone was written by Cardinal Faulhaber to Spellman on November 21st, 1947. In this he wrote, among others things the following: “This letter includes the humble request that you should help us to save the Crown of Saint Stephen.”

Cardinal Innitzer made the following statement on March 1st, 1948, for the use of the American State Department, “I confirm that on November 26, 1947, in Castelgandolfo, I spoke before his Holiness about the plan to declare the Crown of Saint Stephen a holy relic of the Catholic Church and that this plan was received with sympathy.”

Horthy, too, did his part, addressing from Weilheim, on April 3rd, 1948, the following letter to Pope Pius XII:

“Holy Father,

I am taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the fact that in a few hours Count Csaky will set out for Rome, to address a few lines to Your Holiness.

It gives me infinite pleasure to inform you that the Americans will hand over the Holy Crown, along with the Coronation emblems, to the Apostolic See. A weight was lifted off my mind. This cannot be done all at once, and the Italian elections are coming on, too. I trust in God the latter will turn out favourably. Lately the eyes of the people have opened: so I think it impossible that the Italians should not foresee the menace represented by the communists taking over power. I hope also that Prime Minister De Gasperi will make all possible efforts for the sake of his country and his people in order that the power should get into the hands of the Christian and patriotic elements. I should be infinitely grateful if Colonel Pajtas, commander of the Crown Guard were allowed to remain in Rome—even for political reasons — after the handing over of the Crown in order to preserve the tradition according to which the Holy Crown has always had a Hungarian Guard. On this occasion I would like to express again the immense gratitude felt by me and my family for Your Holiness’s infinite grace. Thank God, the mood both of the Americans and of other nations has completely changed towards us and we have every reason to believe that our Status will soon be settled. In these hard times our thoughts are often with Your Holiness, we wish for all the best and the full victory of the true cause. I remain, with indomitable loyalty,

most faithfully Yours,
(Appendix 14.)

4.

Weilheim, den 3. April 1948.

Euerer Heiligkeit!

Ich benütze die Gelegenheit dass Graf Csaky in einer Stunde nach Rom abgeht, um Euerer Heiligkeit mit einigen Zeilen aufzusuchen.

Ich habe mit unendlicher Freude gehört, dass unsere heilige Krone samt den Krönungsinsignien von Amerikanern den Heiligen Stuhle übergeben wird. Damit ist ein Stein von meinem Herzen gefallen. Nachdem das nicht von heute auf Morgen geschehen kann, werden bis dahin die Wahlen in Italien vorüber sein, und ich hoffe zu Gott, dass sie günstig ausfallen werden. Allen Menschen sind die Augen in letzter Zeit aufgegangen und es ist unvorstellbar, dass die Italiener die Folgen einer Machtergreifung durch die Kommunisten nicht voraussehen würden. Ich hoffe auch, dass der Ministerpräsident de Gasperi die Energie aufbringen wird, im Interesse seiner Heimat und seines Volkes alles aufzubieten, um die Machtergreifung durch christliche und patriotische Elemente zu versuchen.

Ich wäre unendlich dankbar, wenn - schon aus politischen Gründen - der bisherige Kommandant der Kronwache, Oberst Pajtas, nach der Übergabe in Rom bleiben dürfte, um die Tradition, dass immer ein ungarischer Kronhüter die Krone zu bewachen hat, zu wahren.

Meine und meiner Familie unsagbaren Dank für die unendliche Güte die wir immer von Seiten Eurer Heiligkeit verspüren können, möchte ich auch bei dieser Gelegenheit wiederholen.

Die Stimmung sowohl der Amerikaner, wie der übrigen Welt uns gegenüber hat, sich Gott sei Dank gründlich geändert und ich habe allen Grund anzunehmen, dass unser Status in Kürze geregelt wird.

Unsere Gedanken weilen in dieser schweren Zeit sehr viel bei Eurer Heiligkeit und wünschen für die Zukunft alles erdenklich Gute und den vollen Sieg der guten Sache.

In unwandelbarer Anhänglichkeit verbleibe ich Eurer Heiligkeit

treu ergebenster

14. Copy brought to Mindszenty by Count Csaky, of a letter written in German by Horthy, and addressed to Pope Pius XII.

The last link in the series of documents concerning the Holy Crown is a letter in Latin from Cardinal Montini, Under Secretary of State to the Vatican, in charge of Foreign Affairs. The letter was written on September 9th, 1947, to the Archbishop of Esztergom and runs as follows:



Rom Vaticano, 9 Septembris 1947

Ex. no ad Rev. no Dominus,

Apostolicus Delegatus Foederatarum Aemulae Civitatum
ad me misit exemplum epistulae, quam Dominus Kenneth C. Royall
ad Eminentissimum Cardinalem Spellman reddidit: id ad Sacram
Hungariae Coronam spectat.

Haec adianctum, id Tibi mittere studeo, cum de re agatur,
quae Tibi cordi est.

Sacram Parpam Tuam humillime Assculatus, summi qui
per est observantis, me profiteor

Eminentiae Tuae
addictissimus ac deditissimus

J. B. Montini

Ex. no ad Rev. no Dominus
Card. Josepho Mindszenty
Archiepiscopo Strigoniensi

(adiecto documento)

15. Letter by the Vatican Under-Secretary of State, Montini, to Mindszenty.

“Most Reverend Father, Your Eminence.

The representative of the Vatican in the United States sent me a copy of the letter which had been given by Mr. Kenneth Royall to his Eminence, Cardinal Spellman. This letter concerns the Hungarian Holy Crown. I take the liberty to enclose it here for you, for it deals with a matter dear to your heart.

Kissing the hem of your Holy Robe with humility, I remain with the deepest respect.


Yours most loyally and faithfully.

Signed: J. B. Montini.” (Appendix 15.)

According to the copy of the letter written by Kenneth C. Royall, U. S. Secretary for War, on August 11th, 1947, the Secretary takes notice of the fact that Cardinal Spellman wrote the letter at the request of the Hungarian Primate and at the same time Mr; Royall informs Cardinal Spellman that a copy of the letter had been forwarded for consideration to the State Department. (Appendix 16.)

The fate of the Holy Crown was indeed “dear to the heart” of Mindszenty. His own words tell why:

“For the coronation of Otto I wanted to secure the Hungarian Holy Crown by all means. I, therefore, did everything possible to prevent the Holy Crown being surrendered by the American authorities to the present Hungarian Government. On August 31st, 1947, I wrote a letter to U.S. Minister Chapin in Budapest and asked him to persuade his government to order the American Army to transfer the Holy Crown to Rome. As explanation for my letter I state that I wanted by all means to thwart the steps taken by the Hungarian Government for the return of the Crown. I referred to military advances because I expected the outbreak of the third world war. The premise underlying all our plans was the hope that the Hungarian Democracy would be defeated in a third world war soon to occur, even at the price of the country becoming a battleground.”



16. Copy of the letter from Kenneth C. Royall, the American Secretary of War, to Cardinal Spellman of New York.

The Primate’s confidential secretary and closest associate, Andras Zakar, characterized Mindszenty’s role in the monarchist movement as follows: Primate Mindszenty is the most outstanding representative of monarchism, who since his appointment as Prince Primate, has not stopped discussing these questions, but has applied them to the concrete Hungarian political situation, to the parties and to the international situation, too. As a high priest who bore the highest ecclesiastical dignity in Hungary he had, and has, undoubted prestige among monarchist factors and individuals. They look to him as leader.”

The statement made by Juszti Baranyai agrees essentially with the above characterisation: “I admit

that the head of the Hungarian monarchist movement is Prince Primate Jozsef Mindszenty and that I was considered next in rank among the Hungarian leaders of the movement. The monarchist idea inspired both the Prince Primate's and my own political viewpoint."

Mindszenty's monarchistic activities and his leading role in the illegal movement, were inspired by two main factors. First there was his attitude, basically anti-democratic and against the people. After putting an end to the people's government with foreign intervention he wanted to put the yoke of the Hapsburg dynasty on the people. Second there was his unlimited personal ambition and vanity, feeding on the notion that in a transition period of uncertain duration, as "First Peer of the Land", he would exercise supreme authority which, when he wished, he would graciously cede to the King.

With these activities of his, as leader of the Hungarian monarchist movement, Jozsef Mindszenty committed a crime defined in Article 1., Act VII of 1946, for he lead and organized a movement directed at the overthrow of the Hungarian Democratic Republic.

Fentiek alapján kitágítván közzé kiad-
nanti propagandát a legitimizmus legitimizmus
kapcsolatára Magyarországon, aki azelőtt tudomá-
ságot nem mint a propagandisták, történt
későbbiek óta érkező a kérdésével tárgyalni,
előadásra, azt a konkrét magyar politika leg-
zetes és partokla a nemzeti helyre-
v. mint olyan éppenséggé a legitimizmus egy-
z. mellett, így is a Magyarországon, vitatottat
ban tekintve, volt is van a legitimizmus tény-
rök és egyenlőre törté. Vastörtek tekintet.

Összefoglalva vallomások partitörését, ki-
jeleníttem, hogy a karcagpusztai amerikai újsá-
gáltnakról teljesen tisztában voltam, hogy a tár-
gyalásainak a demokratikus rendszer ellen i-
rányuló tendenciájával, tudatosan volt annak,
hogy ez kétségbeesés a magyar kitartható re-
gionális iránnyal szemben, a nyitottsággal
és éppen ezért különös gondokkal figyelemmel
szemléltem, aki az egyes bíróságok találat-
os elítélésével, hogy teljesen bíróságok jelleg-
gel nemcsak meg lehet, mert semmilyen
nem volna jó, ha bárki arról tudomást ne-
vezne.

Tudomásom van arról, hogy a magyar
Szent Korona helyzete, illetve más román idők
mentén minden foglalkoztatott a keresztény
Erdélyi és délebbi többirányú lapoktól, amelyek
különülnek az életet, hogy az amerikai
katolikus hatóságok biztosítanak, hogy magyar
Koronát ne kerüljen vissza az országba, hanem
adja át Rómába a Vatikánba.

Dr Zakaria Andrao

17. Part of the statement by Zakar, Mindszenty's secretary, in which he tells of Mindszenty's monarchist activities.


See English translation on p. 53.

TREASON AND ESPIONAGE

“My connections with the Western Powers and with their representatives here were determined by the political plan of accomplishing the withdrawal of the Russian occupation forces with the help of these powers, in the first place of the United States of America; after which I wished to accomplish a change of regime, with American help. For this reason I kept up regular connections with the Budapest legations of the western powers, in the first place of the U.S.A.; I frequently addressed various memoranda, letters, and reports on the situation in Hungary to them and urged them to intervene”. That is how Mindszenty himself described the basic reasons for his treacherous activities. (Appendix 18.)

It is a fact that for four years Mindszenty poured out various memoranda, letters and appeals to the leaders and representatives of the Western Powers, in which he solicited their immediate and direct interference in Hungarian home affairs. “In April 1945 I called on the heads of the English and American Missions with whom I then continued to keep in touch. I had connections with Schoenfeld, Admiral Key, Captain Diettrich, and Gascoigne. I furnished data on Hungarian home politics, economic questions and on the troops of the third member of the Allied Control Commission, that is on the Soviet Army, to the heads of the English and American missions. I submitted copies of the text of the Hungarian-Soviet Economic Agreement concluded on August 27th, 1945 to both the English and the American Legations.


On May 3rd, 1946, Mindszenty wrote a letter to W. Mitchel-Carse, a member of the British Mission asking that “the Russians should go home within a year and that a small number of English and American troops should come here.”




18. Mindszenty's statement on his espionage.

In another letter written in 1947 he asked the head of the American military mission, Weems, to persuade his government to get the Hungarian elections postponed. On April 20th, 1946 he appealed to the King of England and to President Truman. On August 25th, 1947, he asked in a letter that the British minister intervene to stop the transfer of the German minority from Hungary. He ended his letter with the following insistent and insolent remark: “I ask of your Excellency not to be reluctant to remedy this situation on the grounds that it is an internal matter.”

His continuous urging and demands finally compelled Schoenfeld who was then U. S. Minister to Hungary to send him the following letter (Appendix 19.):



19. Answer by Schoenfeld the Budapest Minister of the United States of America to Mindszenty's appeals.



19. Answer by Schoenfeld the Budapest Minister of the United States of America to Mindszenty's appeals.

Budapest, Hungary, December 27, 1946

"Your Eminence:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 22, concerning certain actions taken by the Czechoslovak Government affecting the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, as well as your letter of December 12, concerning the program for retrenchment of the Hungarian civil service and your letter of December 16 containing observations on general matters of political interest in Hungary at the present time.

Copies of your letters have been forwarded to the Department of State.

It is noted that your letters of December 12 and December 16, touching on internal political problems of Hungary, requested the assistance of the United States Government in altering certain conditions which Your Eminence deplors. In this connection you are of course aware of my Government's long standing policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. This

policy has proven over a long period of time and through many trying situations the best guarantee of spontaneous, vigorous and-genuine democratic development. It will be clear to Your Eminence that it necessarily precludes action by this Legation which could properly be construed as interference in Hungarian domestic affairs or which lies outside the normal functions of diplomatic missions.

I should like to take this opportunity to assure Your Eminence that I shall continue to welcome the expression of your views on any matters to which you may desire to draw my attention.

In conveying to Your Eminence my best wishes for the holiday season, I take the opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld
American Minister.

His Eminence

Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty,
Prince Primate of Hungary,
Esztergom, Hungary.”

But this “polite refusal” was not enough for Mindszenty, he could not resign himself to being hampered in his treachery and so in his reply he strongly reproached Schoenfeld for not having fulfilled his demands urging “immediate and urgent intervention”. He was so little able to accept Schoenfeld’s refusal of open and direct intervention that at the end of his letter he wrote the following words: “If, however, your Excellency gave this answer only for the outside, I comply.”

In connection with the conspiracy of the so-called “Hungarian Community” Mindszenty gave detailed reports to the Americans — of course, completely misrepresenting the facts. For instance, this is how he wrote on January 3rd, 1947: “The conspiracy is nothing but a pretext.” On May 2nd he wrote again to the American and English Missions.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MINDSZENTY AND MINISTER CHAPIN

Mindszenty’s ties with the American legation became particularly close when Selden Chapin took charge of the U. S. Legation in Budapest. Chapin asked Mindszenty at their very first meeting to furnish data on Communist activities. The Primate promised to obtain the data required, and from this time on sent regular reports to Mr. Chapin. At Mindszenty’s invitation, Minister Chapin went to Esztergom in February 1948. Mindszenty gave the following account of this meeting. “In the course of our talk, lasting half an hour, I expressed my dissatisfaction and urged their more forceful intervention. Chapin had often asked me to give him concrete data on the Communists and on the Russian troops stationed in Hungary, and in general, any facts I came by, relating to the Hungarian political and economic situation and the democratic parties. I ordered my secretary, Dr. Andras Zakar, to give to Koczak who was to come for them. From this time on, Koczak became a regular visitor in Esztergom and my secretary handed him the collected data.”

“About a month after Chapin’s visit”, states Zakar, “Koczak, secretary to the U.S. Legation, came to Esztergom without an appointment, for it had been arranged that the Primate would order me to keep in touch with Koczak. About a month later at the end of April, 1948, I met Koczak at the Central Seminary, as we had arranged with Sandor Cseto, secretary to the Archbishop. Here I handed over to Koczak circulars, notes, and a political summary by the Primate. We parted agreeing that some time later we would meet again; then I would hand over the further news collected for him. We did not set a time for this meeting. Returning to Esztergom, one or two days later, I informed the Primate of my interview with Koczak and made him familiar with the substance of our conversations. After this, Koczak appeared in Esztergom again at the end of May, saying that he was about to go to Rome. He offered to do anything he could. I gave him the circulars, and older information material; and asked him to give letters to Gedeon Peterffy. In one of his letters to Peterffy the Primate reported to Tardini on the Hungarian political situation. I know that Sandor Csarto, Secretary to the Cardinal’s Budapest Office, also played a connecting role between the Primate and the American, English and Swiss Legations. This

consisted mainly of getting letters to the Legations at Budapest at the Cardinal's behest. This was usually done in the following way: the letters were taken from Esztergom by a Church courier to the Budapest Office from where Cserto took them or had them taken by a trustworthy messenger to the Legations concerned."

Schoenfeld beszámolója után
1947. augusztusában érkezett meg Chapin
amerikai követ, aki megkérte a miniszter
röviddel jelentette a miniszter Eszter-
gomban bemutatkozó látogatásán.
Szeptember hónapban a látogatás
munkálataira a karcagprímás, a Szabolcs-
vári V.S.A. Követsége ment Budapesten.
Tudomásom van arról, hogy erről már
a karcagprímás ismertette a követtel ar-
lene irányuló megközelítést és azt, hogy
tudomásom szerint a templom, mint be-
deket a boldog névvel megfigyelt. A
karcagprímás erről megkérte a köve-
tet, hogy várható-e a követségben a nem-
zetközi helyet alakítása. Természetesen a
karcagprímásnak az a kérdése, hogy az
art elvonta, hogy várható-e a követség
név a követségben vagy sem - amit a
jelenlevők meg is írtak. Chapin vála-
miban kifejtette, hogy a helyet fenn-
a kérdés kérés a miniszternek belsőben
van és ha az nem kerül megfigyelés
előre, akkor a követség névvel való
Továbbá megkérte Chapint, hogy mi a
valamennyi ottól, illetve ismer-e őt.
Chapin azt válaszolta, hogy komoly ameri-
kai vezető politikusok mint a követség
a legitimizációs feltételeit Magyarorszá-
gon, amikor természetesen korlátozott
ott nemcsak is. A maga ott nagy ko-
moly, tehát az amerikai tartja Chapin
kérdése, hogy kit a vezető a legitimizá-
ciónak Magyarországon, a miniszter a követke-
ző megfigyelést sorolta fel: Erősen, gróf Ban-
nyai József, Esterházy Károly és a követség
itt egy látogatásról az volt a ve-
leményem és véleményem, hogy Chapin le-
gyszerint bemutatott adott.

20. Statement by secretary Zakar on the connections between Mindszenty and minister Chapin.

See English translation on p. 54.

parts of the country the political, economic and industrial data which I authorised my secretary regularly to give the Americans”, confessed Mindszenty. So it is evident that Mindszenty used his station as Archbishop of Esztergom for putting the clergy and the Catholic organisations of the country into the service of his espionage.

ZSIGMOND MIHALOVICS’S ESPIONAGE CENTRE

His most devoted help-mate was the Prelate Zsigmond Mihalovics, director of the Actio Catholica. The detailed political and economic reports sent by Zsigmond Mihalovics between May 25th, 1946, and March 16th, 1948, to Mindszenty came into the hands of police authorities in the course of the search of the cellar of the Primate’s Palace at Esztergom. It is clear from the letters that Mindszenty knew that these same reports had also been turned over to foreign intelligence agents by Mihalovics. In his report of July 14th, 1946, for instance, Mihalovics wrote the following: “At the house of Mrs. Varasdy, née Countess Henriette Zichy, we held a concert for the Swiss and Danish Missions. We talked to them and found that their way of thinking is quite reactionary. I think that we were able to give them very valuable and confidential information not only in regard to relief but on other matters too”. On March 27th, 1947, he wrote the following: “I was visited by Carl Bratved, a Guards’ Captain from Copenhagen, acting on behalf of the Danish Red Cross whose uniform he wore. He spent one and a half hours with me and I gave him information. He asked me to talk quite frankly with him. To-day I shall be visited by a Frenchman from the Foreign Relations Department of the Office of Information. He has already given me the points. He said that he would come himself and make his own notes. Mr. Brumst too, often comes up to us; now he has talked over everything thoroughly with the people at the *Magyar Kurir*.*” On March 21st, 1947, part of the report contained the following: “I have quickly collected 'information material on the Catholic grievances for Mr. Stassen. Unfortunately I had to work fast; therefore it is not quite complete. But we prepared the whole material and translated it in twenty-four hours and our Mr. received it. As I understand he not only read it with interest, but he was also very grateful for what it contained.”

In the first days of July after the uncovering of his subversive activities in Actio Catholica, Mihalovics fled from Hungary- with the consent of Mindszenty, but in secret he remained in regular touch with Mindszenty and Miklos Nagy, Secretary of the Actio Catholica.

Mihalovics gives an exact account of the circumstances of his flight in a nine page letter written to Mindszenty from Rome (parts in Appendix 21.), and tells how the representatives of the American Intelligence Service received him. “I arrived at Salzburg”, he wrote among other things, “on July 12th. I immediately visited the office of the CIC†. Since I was then living under an alias, the CIC told me not to make any statements and not to show myself.” With the help of the Americans, Mihalovics arrived at Rome on August 2nd. Here he immediately established contact with various representatives of the Horthy reaction, Endre Hlatty, Baron Gabor Apor, and Gyula Magyary, and then he wrote the following to Mindszenty: “I am very much interested in the question of informing the foreign countries. One would really have to make a collection of the things happening at home. We must show foreigners that the tactics of Evil are different with us from what they think abroad. How good it would be to gather now the data in proof of the heroism of the Hungarian people. For this a small office should be established where the material could be digested and from where it could be disseminated. Of course, for this, money is needed for translators, postage, etc. But most of all it would be necessary to have the material regularly collected at home. And what is the most important problem — to get this material abroad regularly. I see a great chance for the accomplishment of this important work. I am just starting to build up my connections with the big foreign press agencies. I see also that wherever I talk of Hungarian conditions, I meet with great attention. Now there is a possibility for making excellent use of

* The Catholic Organ.

† American Counter Intelligence Corps.

the news and points of view coming from home. Perhaps these were the thoughts which brought me to the conclusion that I should not stay here in Europe but go to America. There I could work more freely than on this poor Continent. And there perhaps I could by personal effort raise funds too. In impoverished Europe there is no chance that such a campaign, however useful, would gain financial support.

“That is why I agreed to be taken to the U.S. by the N.C.W.C.* I understand that they are dealing with my case in Washington itself and that I can sail in the fall. There they consider using me in the American Actio Catholica. This is why for the present I am satisfied to stay in Rome. Since my personal affairs are to be settled, I can prepare for deciding what to do with the rest of my life. I throw myself into the fight against Communism and I shall take advantage of the interest in my person aroused because of my flight.

“It would not be good, however, if the N.C.W.C. would limit my freedom of activity, that is, if it would interfere with what I may write or say, once I belong to them. I can imagine that the N.C.W.C. may not permit some activity which would bring difficulties to it. If for instance I take a relentless stand against Communism at home in let us say, a memorandum or article sharply sketching the situation, and I do this under the auspices of the N.C.W.C., then Moscow may take revenge by, for instance, stopping the operation of the W.R.S. in Poland too, as it has done in Hungary. It is interesting that New York still maintains that we need not bring before the public the methods used in Hungary, lest the situation be aggravated.

“Would it not be too much to beg you to write a letter to Cardinal Spellman, calling his high attention to me. Would Your Eminence please recommend that they should not place me in some department of the N.C.W.C. but that they should support me somehow, leaving me seemingly independent so that I should take the responsibility for everything, and to favour my proposals — in the fight against the greatest menace of our age. I feel that such a letter could easily settle my problems in New York.

“If possible, be so gracious as also to give me a letter to the effect that Your Eminence is glad to see the organization of such information activity, and also that it is Your pleasure that this be managed by me.

“Be pleased, Your Grace, to effect measures for starting the collection of data and for getting fresh material to me as soon as possible. Your Eminence anyway receives much information, and that in itself would mean a lot if You could make this material available to me. It would also mean much to me if I could get points of view on how to act and what to stress. I think that by now I am in circumstances which allow me to do worthy service to this cause which I consider very important. Be pleased, Your Eminence, to permit me to take the initial steps for the establishment of a permanent information bureau and that for that purpose I should try to obtain material aid in America.

“I am able to send this letter through *English official channels* in a week. The courier will return and will be ready to bring me the material which I can obtain, if Mr. Zakar would prepare for me all that is available. I ask You *to give the material five days after the receipt of this letter to Miklos Nagy, not however, writing anything on the well-sealed envelope.*

“Considering my negotiations with the English, it is possible that this service can be made regular. On this, however, I cannot give You details, perhaps in two or three weeks I will. In any case I am in a position to transfer important information to both of the most important places.”

* National Catholic Welfare Conference.

Eminenciás Uram!

Kegyelmes pasztorom!

Meghatódva kezdem el írását ezen levélnek, melyről tudom, hogy biztosan eljut Eminenciához. Nme könnyű annak a lelkiállapota, aki az élet ut közepének túl ~~a-tól~~ futott ki a nagyvilágba s nem tudja, hogy teszik majd örök pihenőre. Még mindig úgy érzem magamat, aki fel sem ébredt a való-ságra. Még nem kintzott meg, hogy hontalan vagyok s börtöntöltelék. Nappalaim nem okoznak még kínlódásokat, csak almáimban térnek vissza - Eminenciád és jó embereim, kedves helyeim, - de oly élénken, mintha a szobámban lettek volna. Hosszu ideig töprengék így az éjszakákban s érzem magamon a meleg tekintetet. Halát adok különben a Gondviselésnek, fizikumom semmi bajt sem okoz s minden gyengeség, fejfájás, vagy más hasonló gátló körülmény nélkül vittem át a menekülés és bujkálás napjait. A romai forró, siroccos levegőt, az olajos ételeket is megszoktam már. Ugy látszik, sokan imádkoznak érttem, hogy a legcse kélyebb bajom sincsen.

Engedelmet kérek majd a hibás írásért, de csak magam kopogtatom a sorokat, bizonyára sok hibát fogok majd ejteni.

Útközben 2 ízben tettem jelentést Eminenciádnak s amikor augusztus 2-án Romába érkeztem, azonnal küldhettem pár sort Főpásztoromhoz. Vajjon meg méltóztatott-e kapni e soraimat?

[2] Biztonság kedvéért röviden összefoglalom eddigi utamat.

Julius 11-ig tartózkodtam a Pázmáneumban, azonban az I. emeleti szoba-t nem hagytam el s még a portás sem tudta, hogy az épületben tartózkodom. Átment a Pázmáneumon Bánás püspök úr is, de ő sem tudta, hogy ott vagyok. Az elöljárók attól tartottak, hogy utánam küldenek és Bécsben fognak el. E városban ugyanis minden bizonytalan. Levélcenzúra van, a telefont figyelik s akkor is tüntek el az utcáról emberek, amikor ott voltam. Még a Nuntiatúra-ra sem mentem el, márcsak azért sem, mert az orosz zonában fekszik és tözsom szédja a GÉPEU. Az időt jegyzetek készítésére és angol tanulásra fordítottam.

Father Flynn azonnal jött és hozott ruhát, valamint pénzt is. Hamarosan azt jelentette, hogy az Amerikai Követség nem tud nekem segíteni. Pestem sem tudtak. A Father erre elment Münchenbe s onnát telefonált MSGR. Swanstrom-nak. Tőle azzal jött vissza, hogy várnak Amerikában, de egy hónapba betelik, míg mehetnek, ellenben Romába azonnal indulhatok. Ez utóbbit választottam. Akkor elvitt az amerikai titkos rendőrségre s ott azonnal adtak nekem Sigmond Michler névre egy 4 nyelvű személyazonossági bizonyítványt, hogy azzal menjek le Salzburgba. Oda utánam jó majd egyik bécsi főemberük és a salzburgi vezetővel megcsinálják utamat Romába. Így utaztam el július 11-én éjjelkor. A Enns folyón könnyen átjöttem, az orosz csak belepillantott hamis igazolványomba s ezzel a vasfüggönyön kívülre érkeztem - az amerikai zonába.

Bécsben nagy orosz ellenességet tapasztaltam. Valamint Burgenlandban is. Lelkendezve szoktam olvasni a Wiener Tageszeitungnak renek számait. Bátran, okosan mernek írni az oroszok jelenlétében. Hozta a lap vezető helyen Eminenciád nyilatkozatát, amelyért a gyalázatos Magyar Nemzet úgy neki támadt Eminenciádnak. Míg a városban voltam, a szociálisták nagy plakátot ragasztottak ki a kommunisták ellen a Tito ügy kezdetekor. Gruber belügyminiszter bátor és elszánt beszédeit nagy örömmel olvastattam. Az élelmezés is javult - a Marschal-akció következtében. A Pázmáneumban elég vékony élelmezést láttam, még ez is a W.R.S. jószágából. Az elöljárók renek renek emberek, úgy Lepold prelátus úr, akinek szelleme nekem a lehető legnagyobb élvezetet jelentette, mint Ádám spirituális úr, akinek okos és a lélek mélyére érő működését tisztelettel szemléltem. A kispapoknak két ízben ismertettem a helyzetet otthon.

[3] Salzburgba tehát július 12.-én érkeztem. Már az állomásra kilépve felismertek s később is lépten nyomon. Sok ezer magyar vergődik itt. Itt értesültem, hogy elkészült ellenem a vádlevel és hogy körözést bocsájtott ki ellenem a belügyminiszter.

Mindjárt felkerestem a C.I.C. irodáját, a bécsi emberük azonban nem jött még le, csak szombaton várják. Hétfő volt, amikor bementem hozzájuk. Szerdán megjött Father Flynn is, de hamarosan visszament Bécsbe, mert úgy látta, hogy hamarosan Romába indulhatok. Szombaton valóban beszéltem a bécsi leküldöttel, valamint Mr. Greennel is, a salzburgi vezetővel s úgy lát-ták, hogy legkésőbb 5 nap múlva indulhatok. El is indult az ügyem, nem tet-szett azonban nekem, hogy jugoszláv vonalra akartak atvinni. Az 5 nap elmúlt sőt már július 25 lett s még semmi sem történt.

Rohracher hercegérsek úr palotájában helyeztek el. Az érsek

21 Part of the report to Mindszenty written by Zsigmond Mihalovics from Rome.

See English translation on p. 55-56

8.

nem engedélyez nekem olyan működést, amely miatt neki valahol akadálya támadhatna. Ha például kérlelhetetlenül fellepek - mondjuk egy emlékiratban, vagy a helyzetet élesebb bemutató cikkben a hazai kommunizmus ellen, s ezt mint az N.C.W.C. embere teszem, akkor Moszkva bosszút állhat pl. az által, hogy Lengyelországban is leállítja a W.R.S működését, mint nálunk. Érdekes hogy New York most is azon állásponton van, hogy nem kell publikálni a magyarországi eljárást, nehogy a helyzet még jobban elmérgesedjék.

Már is azt kértem azért, hogy ne kössenek egészen szorosan magukhoz. Dátuszólag ne is tartozzak hozzájuk, adjanak nekem teljes működési szabadságot. Már is akadályozva vagyok. Egyik igen nagy világújság, több milliós példányban, jelentkezett nálam s hajlandó 3 cikket lehozni. S dolgozatom emlékeimre, amit szeretnék a szorosan vett katolikus közönség elé bocsájtani. De nem dolgozhatom, nehogy megakadályozzam Amerikába való kimenetelemet és ne hosszám kellően helyetbe leendő gazdaimat.

A római sajtóemberükkel, egy Sullivan nevű pappal már részletesen átbeszéltem ezt a kérdést, ő maga is jelentő sajtó vonalon haza a kérdést, én pedig Father Flynnt kértem, hogy hivatalosan vigye az N.C.W.C. vezetősége elé. De magam sem nyugodtam, s magam sajátos vonalán is írtam már ki Amerikába és javasoltam a megfelelő megoldást.

Ki kell mennem Amerikába, hogy ezt a sajtó szolgálatot meg lehessen szervezni.

De azért is, hogy a világon széthulló magyarjainknak segítséget bírhajk szerezni.

As volna a szívem vágya, hogy Amerikában úgy lehessenek, hogy fél évenként visszatérhessenek Európába és Romában, Parisban, Brüsszelben és Szeisban beszélgethessenek.

[7.] Aláíratosan kérem e tervekhez - amennyiben megnyerik Eminenciás Urunk jóváhagyását a Pápasztorom hathatós támogatását.

a/ Nem volna-e sok, ha azt kérelmezném, hogy méltóztatnék egy levelet intézni Spillmann kardinális urhoz s felhívni az ő magas figyelmét reám azt méltóztatnék javasolni, hogy ne helyessenek el az N.C.W.C. valamelyik osztályán, hanem látszólag függetlenül maradva, hogy magam viselhessem mindezt a felelősséget, gondoskodjanak valahogyan rólam, és támogassák javaslataimat, korunk legnagyobb veszedelme elleni küzdelemben. Úgy érzem, hogy a levél könnyen eldönti kérdésemet New Yorkban.

b/ Ha lehetséges, kegyeskedjék számomra is adni egy olyan tárgyú levelet, hogy ezen információk tevékenység megteremtését szívesen méltóztatik látni és azt is, hogy én tartsam a kezemben.

c/ Kegyeskedjék intézkedéseket fogantatni, hogy az adatgyűjtő tevékenység azonnal meginduljon és hogy hozzám a friss anyag minél sürgettebb kijűhessen. Eminenciás Urunkhoz Milánóban sok adat fut be, már az is nagy dolog, ha ezt az anyagot megkaphatnám. Az is nagy dolog volna nekem, ha megkaphatnám a szempontokat, hogyan járjak el, mire felelődjek rá. Úgy érzem, hogy most már olyan körülmények között vagyok, hogy érdemesen tudom ezt az ügyet, amit igen fontosnak tartok, szolgálni.

d/ Méltóztatnék megengedni, hogy állandó jellegű információk irtoda felállításához a kezdő lépéseket megtehessem s erre a célra Amerikában anyagi segítséget próbáljak szerezni.

[8.] Visszatérve a külföldön élő magyarok kérdéseire, legyen szabad javasolnom, hogy lelkipásztori, kulturális és szociális megsegítésük céljából kegyeskedjék valakit megbízni, aki a vaticáni lelkesek felett is állanána. Ezt az intézkedést azonban a Vatican tudomására is kellene hozni, illetve a Vatican hozzájárulását ehhez kérészköszölni. S azt is kérni, hogy a vessendő magyar lelkek megmentéséhez a Szentséges Atya adja legmagasabb támogatását.

Hogy ki legyen e személy? Amikor kijöttem, mindenki, még a vaticáni misszió lelkesei is azt hitték, hogy most én vessem át a direktiót egész Európában. Ezt persze nem tehettem s ki is tértem minden ilyen alól. Bizonys azonban, hogy a kimenekültek között én vagyok a legnagyobb egyházi méltóság s üldöztetésem is bizonyos presztízst kölcsönöz személyemnek. Nem proponálom, de ha reám esne a választás, azt én elfogadnám. Még akkor is, ha kimenekül Amerikába. Repülőgéppel már nem távolság Amerika és a repülő postán 4 nap a küldés és 4 nap a válasz. S ha Amerikában megértenék

21. Part of the report to Mindszenty written by Zsigmond Mihalovics from Rome.

See English translation on p. 57-58

9.

e tervek fontosságát és megadják a mozgási szabadságot és mellette s lehető
ségek, akkor félétvenként vissza lehetne térnem Európába.

As anyagi segítség terén Der Ivan tudna segíteni.

A lelkipásztorkodásnál pedig ~~ugyis~~ a Vatikáni Misszió lelkesedni; a poli
tika/nem én csinálnám, hanem Kózi Horváth, de vele tudnék értekezni.

Mind Ezeket Eminenciás Urunk döntése alá bocsajtom. Mindenben úgy cselek
szem, ahogy megszabni méltóztatik. Semmi sem vágyódom, ha nem lesz más lehet
tőségem, szívesen vállalom egy kis plébános tisztséget valahol a világon.

A körülmények vittek ezen javaslatok megtételéhez. Magam is kínosan látom
hogy érdekes személyiség lettem, mindenütt ismerik nevemet, - gondoltam, hogy
ki kellenehasználni ezt a adottságot.

9. Ezen leveletem az angol hivatalos úton tudom küldeni. Egy hét lefor
gása után visszatér e kurír, s kész elhozni az anyagot, amit kaphatok. Ha Zakar
titkar ur elkészítene számomra, ami csak rendelkezésre áll, úgy azt kérelmezem
hogy e levelem vétele után 5 napra a küldeményt adja át Nagy Miklósnak, de a
jól lezárt borítékra nem írjon fel semmit sem.

Olyan tárgyalásaim folynak az angolokkal, hogy rendszeresíteni lehet
ezt a szolgálatot, Ennek részleteit azonban még nem tudom közölni, talán majd
2-3 hét múlva. Mindenesetre olyan vonalon járok már, hogy a fontos tudnivaló
kat mindkét legfontosabb helyen kézbe tudom juttatni.

10. A magam részére alázatosan kérelmeznek egy celebritet és egy gyontatan
facultást.

11. Most veszem fel újból a kapcsolatot a megszakadt Caritas vonalon és
arra kérem e szervezetet, hogy továbbra is segítség a magyar katolikusokat.
Gondolom, hogy intézetek és személyek címére még mindig lehet külföldi segílyt
irányítani. S pénst is.

A hazaiak segélye mellett azonban arra akarom kérni e szervezetet, hogy
nyújtssanak segítséget az Európában szétszort magyarság megsegítésére is.

Nagyon elnyúlott a levelem. Eminenciás Urunk elnézését kérem.

Asop hő reményben, hogy az általam megjelölt biztos vonalon már nem
sokára megnyerhetem Eminenciás Urunk választát és kapok becses anyagot, maradok
Eminenciád szent biborát innát a messzeségből is megindult lélekkel csókolva

a legmélyebb tisztelettel

7

Mihalovics

21. Part of the report to Mindszenty written by Zsigmond Mihalovics from Rome.

See English translation on p. 57-58

From Salzburg already, Mihalovics wrote had written to Miklos Nagy, Secretary of the Actio Catholica on July 17th; "I submitted to His Eminence the plan for the bureau in the service of European unity today, putting the idea before him in the same form as You brought it up, and I asked for his consent. I recommended that the bureau be set up in Bruxelles. I would direct it even if I went to America. The secretary of the bureau would be Dr. Ivan Der. He is on good terms with Cardinal Van Roey who may support us.

"I should be happy if you would let me know your further thoughts. And what we need now is the material and good stuff at that. Provide yourself with helpers. If fees must be paid, take it from the 5000 you should get from Janko."

His letter of September 3rd, starts in the following way: "Dear Miklos, The person who hands you this letter is an official trusted agent of the British power. Through him all necessary material can be sent to me. I asked you to undertake this for the great cause. Employ associates who need not know any of the details, just let them work and collect usable material. If this costs money, that does not matter, that can be solved. Just let me know. The hearer of my letter will give you the means to eliminate trouble even in case of a technical hitch. Obtain the usable material from Laci, of the same kind he has given me before."

His orders of August 29th, are the following: "You got this letter some way, do not ask from where, and in what way. Pay close attention when a week after receipt of my letter someone will come to you and say, 'Did we not meet before the war?' to which you answer, 'No, before the war'. Then he will take from you what you have ready for him but will say nothing more. You should not say anything either.

After this exchange of words he will take from you the pack of letter and will leave.

“Do not count upon a week, better just five days. By that time have ready 1. Laci’s summary of data. There is serious need for information on the political and on the economic situation; the schools issue. 2. All other data which I can use. Get prepared for this systematically and send to me all that you can collect in five days. 3. All the files on the martyrs, everything. Do you understand me? I could find the widest publicity for these I have the means to do this and so I should be able really to serve the cause of the unity of European Christianity. But I need material, material, and again material. 4. I need everything, everything that refers characteristically to our fight. Data. What is going on against the clergy. Details. 5. You may get material from Bandi also. Put this together with the material prepared by you into an envelope, but do not write anything on it except this: ‘San Francesco’. 6. Engage people for collecting and working up the material. They should not know for what purpose. Should it cost money, I will pay it. Laci and people of that sort must get something for their work. We must have the utmost secrecy.”

The following will serve as a key to the persons named in the letter: Laci = Laszlo Toth, ex-editor in chief of the former Catholic organ *Nemzeti Ujsag*; Bandi = Andras Zakar; Janko = Janos Varady.

In the letter written to Laszlo Toth on September 3rd, Mihalovics said: “I need the kind of material you used to prepare for me. I trust you to talk of this with, at the most, Miklos. To no one else. And give it to him. He will pay you, too. But there is another matter too, which is not to be mixed up with this one. He who gives you my letter is the official trusted agent of the British power. Information is required on everything, not only on the political but also on the economic and spiritual-cultural life. Not long theorizing, but data, are needed. The more tangible the better. Will you do it? The man who gives you my letter is familiar with the subject, still do not speak of it, he could only give you details of technique. There are means of making sure against any kind of trouble, even in case of a technical hitch. He would tell you of this, that is, of the know-how of getting the letters to their destinations. Tell him, however, or if you do not want to, write to me, your demands. If your material is good and can be used, everything will be granted that you ask for.

“So there are two matters in question, that which you give to Miklos and that for which I pay you.

“And another thing also very important — you understand that I do not write any details — what you used to say to me. Although you are to send this also to me, your payment for this will be guaranteed by the organization, as much as you wish if you send good material.”

The letter to Andras Zakar, (Appendix 22), reads: “Dear Bandi, I send you and E.* my letter by a very safe route. After receiving this letter please answer me in about five days and in your answer give me all the material that I can use well. Be good, put everything into an envelope on which you write only ‘San Francesco.’ Then have it sent to M. Nagy.

“Soon I shall write you again and hope to tell you that there is already a safe route for further exchanges and I shall give you the details.

“Please do send all the material you can and now. I have already established valuable routes and connections; I believe that I can do valuable, useful work.

“I often meet Mihaly. He, however, has no such channels which can he used. It was not easy to find out everything here in the outside world, but now I have even this.

“My way up to now was not easy but by now Providence has given security and faith.

“In all probability toward the end of October I shall go to America. Ask His Eminence that you may read my lines written to Him.

“I am often at home in thought and think of you with great fondness.

“I ask your help in obtaining material and valuable points of view through your efforts.

“I am writing these lines in a happy moment of my life, for I was today at a private audience with the Holy Father and I still feel upon me the warmth of His fatherly regard.

* E = Eminence.

“Asking for your prayers I remain,

with brotherly love,
Sigismundus.”

Mihalovics’s underground correspondence was through Bela Ispanky, a College headmaster, who was a regular agent of the British Intelligence Service. Ispanky described the essentials of his role as intermediary in the following statement:

“On September 15th, 1948, Madame Pomrelot, a woman of about 45-50, rather tall, wearing spectacles, looked me up in my flat. She gave me a letter written by K. Janos Toth a former clerk at the Ministry of Home Affairs. In this letter Toth asked me to help the person who would come to me with her “spiritual problems”. On September 26th, Mme Pomrelot visited me again and gave me a packet of letters whose envelope had been removed. She asked me to read the letters. They had been written by Mihalovics and they appealed to the addressees to forward through him information and news for one of the Great Powers.

“I looked through the letters carefully and I ascertained that besides the letter to Miklos Nagy there were letters addressed to the following: Prince Primate J6zsef Mindszenty, the most extensive one of all the letters, and to editor in chief Laszlo Toth. In the letter to Primate Mindszenty, there was, among other enclosures, also a letter to Dr. Andras Zakar, Secretary to the Primacy. I forwarded Mihalovics’s letter to Mindszenty, which included also a letter to Andras Zakar, taking it out of its envelope and putting it into another envelope together with an accompanying note of my own.

“In a few days I went to see Laszlo Toth in his flat at the corner of Szent Istvan Avenue and Pozsonyi Street. Our conversation started with Toth’s statement that he was sincerely afraid of what was asked in Zsiga’s letter. He emphasized that as long as Mihalovics was at home he regularly prepared and handed to him a report on the situation, once a week. Every month he forwarded a summary of the whole month’s material. For this work he received 5-600 forints per month from Mihalovics.

“In the course of the above conversation Toth declared that if he continued to receive pay for this type of work, he would be willing to fulfill Mihalovics’s request. I told him that the sum he asked for would be given him if he prepared one page of news material once or twice a week. As compensation he asked for 500 forints right away. Since I did not have 500 forints with me, I could give him only 300 forints, with the promise that he would get the rest of the 500 forints at our next meeting. We arranged to meet on Tuesday, October 5th, on Ferencziek Square, when he would already bring some news material.

“This meeting took place on October 5th, at 11 a. m., on Ferencziek Square. In the gateway of the house at Ferencziek Square 8, Toth handed me the material collected by him, half a page, on half a sheet of coloured copy paper. I looked over the material and told him that I considered it satisfactory in that form.”

Bela Ispanky also collected information himself. On seven different occasions he communicated this and the information obtained from Laszlo Toth in letters to given Italian addresses.

We have given some of the most important details of the complicated operations of the Mindszenty—Mihalovics espionage organization. There is another issue we should like to point out in this connection.

Roma 1948 augusztus 30.

Kedves Bándi!

Egészen bizotts vonalon juttatom el Ő.hoz és hozzád soraimat. E levelem vétele után 5 napra kérlek, adjál nekem választ és benne küldjél el minden anyagot, amit jól felhasználhatsz. Légy jó, mindenféleg egy borítékba és csak annyit írd rá: San Francisco. Aztán juttasd el Nagy M.hoz.

Nem sokára ismét írok és közlöm, hogy most már rendelkezésre áll a további érintkezéshez is egy biztos út s közlöm majd a részleteket. Ami anyagot csak tudsz most küldeni, megkérlek, tedd meg. Már kiegészítettem értékes vonalakat és szálat, hiszem, hogy értékesen és hasznosan tudok dolgozni.

Mihállyal sűrűn találkozom, neki azonban nincs olyan vonala, amit használni lehetne. Nem volt könnyű tájékozódni, itt, kívülágban, de nekem most már megvan ez is.

Nem volt könnyű eddigi utam, de most már a Gondviselés megadta az egyensúlyt és bizakodást.

Minden valószínűség szerint október vége felé Amerikaába megyek. Kérd meg Geminenciáját, hogy átfutassa a neki írt soraimat.

Sokszor vagyok otthon lélekben és rád nagy szeretettel gondolok. Segítségedet kérem, hogy anyagot és becses szempontokat kaphassak a Te révén.

Életem boldog pillanataiban írom e soraimat, mert ma voltam magán kihallgatáson a Szentséges Atyánál és még magamon érzem Atyai tekintetnek melegségét.

Imádságodat kéreve maradok

testvéri szeretettel

Zsigmond Mihalovics

22. Letter to Zakar by Zsigmond Mihalovics, Canon Protonotary, and formerly national director of the Actio Catholica.

This is the financial resources of the espionage net. Although Ispanky admitted that in September 1948 he received 200 dollars from Mme Pomrelot, it is evident that this covered only part of his own activities and those of Laszlo Toth. Mindszenty himself intended to spend much bigger sums for this purpose. He admitted in his confession: "I got a larger sum in dollars from Mr. Fox during his stay in Budapest and later from Father Flynn when he paid a visit here. If I remember correctly one of them left 12,000 and the other 20,000 dollars. I handed over both sums, as soon as I received them, to Zsigmond Mihalovics who was present." As a matter of fact, the name of Feather Flynn occurs in the letter written by Mihalovics from Rome to Mindszenty. Flynn, an agent of the CIC, who worked in Hungary in the American Relief Agency hut whose role of charity served only to cloak his real activities of espionage, took charge in Vienna of Mihalovics who had fled from Hungary. Fox, to whom Mihalovics, according to Zakar's confession, gave regular information on Hungarian economic and political conditions, was also a representative of the American Relief Agency in Hungary.

From the money offered by Fox and Flynn, Mihalovics created a secret fund to finance the collection of news. This was done with Mindszenty's mediation and with his agreement. Before his flight he gave the money to Janos Varady. This is why in his illegally sent letter he called Miklos Nagy's attention to the fact that the money is in "Janko's" possession.

The guardian of the secret fund, Janos Varady, a Jesuit, confessed the following: "About the middle of June, 1948, Mihalovics came to my house and gave me 200,000 forints for safe keeping. Mihalovics said to me, 'I am prepared for a search of my house and since this is illegally obtained money, I am afraid to have it found; therefore I give it to you for safe-keeping.' A few days later he looked me up again at my flat and told me that he must take flight because the police had searched the premises of Actio Catholica and he was afraid that he too might be taken into custody because of the things that had happened. He also declared that the police had obtained possession of much compromising evidence and that it was therefore better for him to flee. Mihalovics then told me that Miklos Nagy would regularly draw on the sum in my keeping and I should give him the required sum without further question when

he needed money and asked for it.” After Mihalovics’s departure Miklos Nagy came to me several times to draw various sums from the illegal fund in my keeping. The sums drawn by him totalled 106,000 forints. I had knowledge of the fact that Mihalovics obtained the foreign currency and the forint sum he gave me from foreign countries to use for collecting news.

SECRET REPORTS ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE VATICAN BY GEDEON PETERFFY.

Mindszenty’s most active informer and intermediary, apart from Mihalovics, was Gedeon Peterffy whom he sent to Rome at the beginning of 1947. Peterffy was the director in charge of the Hungarian Papal Church Institute in Rome and as such he was a paid servant of the Hungarian Republic. In fact, however, this was only a blind for Peterffy’s real work. Shortly after his arrival, in a letter dated March 6th, 1947, Peterffy agreed with Mindszenty on how they were to conspire:

“I would with the deepest respect ask you”, he writes in his letter, “to instruct me whether I should use the post seeing that the privacy of the mail is under present day circumstances no longer guaranteed. As I have until now received documents on ordinary church administrative matters by post I have myself in these cases also used the ordinary mail for my answers. I would also think it right to use the post because if I sent all my correspondence secretly this would give rise to more suspicion and would make my position more difficult. I humbly beg your Eminence to accept this practice and to permit it for the future. Apart from this, Monsignore Verolino has today informed us that the Swiss Government has agreed to forward mail regularly by way of the Swiss messenger and that your Eminence may also use this channel.” In his letter of May 19th, 1947, Peterffy adds on this question:

In connection with the forwarding of mail by the messenger, may I with deep respect beg of your Eminence that you be pleased to give the strictest instructions to maintain complete discretion on this contact because it must not become known that I am able to contact your Eminence by a confidential route... I am just sending the secretary a letter in which I am asked through the ordinary post what has happened to a letter sent by messenger.”

That was what the Mindszenty—Peterffy “double correspondence” looked like. Peterffy had every reason emphatically to draw his boss’s attention to complete discretion and to reproach him for his lack of precautions because in his report of March 13th 1947, he had among other things written:

“The Western Courier (the duplicated paper of the dissident Paris press attaché Imre Mikes) reports in a prominent place in a March number that his Holiness received Dezso Sulyok* at a private audience lasting of an hour. That was the main item of that page and under it they published in one column Your Eminence’s speech at the St. Steven’s Academy and the letter of His Holiness to Your Eminence. When this news appeared, the Minister, Mr. Velics, immediately asked me to call on him and to give him more detailed information on the matter. The question interested me very much because the presentation of the whole thing at a time when the left wing had started attacks by accusing us of cooperation with the émigrés in America was such as to give a basis for still further attacks.

“I was informed of the following by the minister, Mr. Apor: Sulyok was in Rome between February 15-20th, whence he returned to Austria, He was received in audience for some 20 minutes, and the Vatican of course wanted to keep this secret. Sulyok nevertheless gave the news to a French semi-official news agency, which, however, did not publish it because they have sufficient respect for the Vatican not to publish what they have not announced. That is how the news came to the Western Courier.”

Of course Peterffy could not know that his secret correspondence would be found together with the rest in Mindszenty’s files. So he wrote his reports freely and without reserve. And they clearly show the consistently anti-Hungarian and anti-democratic behaviour of the Vatican. The Vatican cooperated with the enemies of Hungary, (the reception of Sulyok, the affair of the Holy Crown) and they looked on Hungarian Catholicism as nothing but a political instrument in their anti-Soviet intrigues. On March

* Sulyok who later went to the United States.

31st, 1947, Peterffy himself in a letter defines the Vatican's relation to Hungary as follows:

"In connection with the position of Hungary, there has in the last few weeks been a considerable change in the interest shown by Vatican press circles. While they were before not willing to publish any political article at all, they have now, in connection with the American note, and after that too, as you may be pleased to see, published news of this type in profusion, in the Osservatore. The Vatican has now substituted for that certain timorous reserve that has so far characterised their behaviour towards us, an ever more serious interest. Unfortunately I can not say the same of the question of the Hungarians in Slovakia. The third lesson to be learned from this is that we are only interesting insofar as we fall within the sphere of interest of one of the great powers".

It therefore appears that Hungary only became interesting for the Vatican: "in connection with the American note".

After that, they did everything in Rome to stand in the way, and prevent, as far as they could, the settlement of relations between the State and Church. Parts of two letters by Peterffy, photographic copies of which are reproduced, bear further witness to this. One dated April 30th, 1947, reads:

"In connection with the estimate formed here of the political position of the Church at home, I can report that the news that had spread in the press about Easter time, *that agreement between Church and State was being brought about, caused a certain amount of disquiet*. It is characteristic that when I was with Parsons, he immediately began to inquire what was going on at home because he had heard of the talks Archbishop Czapik had had. When he asked me why agreement was so important for the Communists I said that this was surely so that they should win the struggle without a fight. When he asked why it was so urgent for them I could but say that international political tension was constantly growing, but that it would of course be a sad counsel of despair to expect the questions to be solved by a new world war. Monsignore Barbetta also talked with me at length and he said that *it unfortunately looked as though the Catholics of Hungary were getting tired of resistance, though it had been with us that the Communists had found the strongest resistance*". (Appendix 23.)

AGENTIA DIOECESIIUM
HUNGARIAE

ROMA - VIA GIULIA, 1
TEL. 52.052

PROT. N.

Az otthoni egyházpolitikai helyzet it-
teni megítélésével kapcsolatban jelenthetem azt, hogy
a húsvét körül elterjedt hírek a sajtóban, hogy meg-
indult a kiegyezés az Egyház és állam között, bizo-
nyos nyugtalanságot keltett. Jellemző, hogy amikor
Parsonsnál voltam, rögtön azután kezdett érdeklődni,
hogy mi van otthon, hallott Csapik érsek ur megbeszé-
léseiről. Mikor azt kérdezte tőlem, hogy miért olyan
fontos a kommunistáknak a kibékülés, akkor azt mondtam, hogy bizonyára
azért, hogy küzdelem nélkül nyerjék meg a harcot. Mikor azt kérdezte, hogy
miért olyan sürgős nekik, akkor nem mondhattam mást, mint hogy a világpö-
litikai feszültség állandóan fokozódik, de természetesen szomorú és két-
ségbeesett dolog lenne egy újabb világháborútól várni a kérdések megoldá-
sát. Mons. Barbetta is hosszasan beszélt velem és azt mondta, hogy sajnos
úgy látszik a magyar katolikusok kifáradnak az ellenállásban, mikor ná-
lunk találtak legerősebb ellenállásra a kommunisták. Az itteni körök tájé-
koztatására a következő összefoglalásokat készítettem a Magyar Kurirban:
először a kormány tárgyalásairól ~~beszámoltam~~ a protestánsokkal egy beszámo-
lót, ennek általában olyan értelmezést adtam, hogy ugyanazt a taktikát
csinálják az egyházakkal, mint tették a pártokkal, a divide et impera
elv alapján. Az Új Emberben megjelent legutóbbi cikket az illetékesség
kérdéséről egy másik számban bőven ismertettem, azt hiszem ez megnyugvást
fog kelteni itten, mert kitűnik, hogy katolikus Egyházzal nincsenek tárgya-
lások folyamatban. A most készülő számban az ifjúság, cserkészlet, iskolák
ügyét fogjuk ismertetni. Kíváncsi vagyok, hogy az Osservatore ebből mit
fog leközölni, a sajtóiroda vezetője azt mondta, hogy most várja az állam-
titkárságtól, hogy mit közölhet le. Ugy mint Eminenciátat ért támadásokkal
kapcsolatban a leközlés elfogadást is jelent, illetve hogy az Osservatore
a maga tekintélyével is fedezi a dolgot.

23. Part of the report to Mindszenty written from Rome by Gedeon Peterffy, the director of the Hungarian Papal Church Institute in Rome.

A part of the other letter dated June 12th, 1948, reads:

“Most High and Most Reverend Cardinal Archbishop,

Prince Primate!

Your Excellency!

“I waited till His Excellency Bishop Hamvas was going before writing my report, and now I beg to report on a few events and developments.

“I think Bishop Hamvas will bring you quite a clear picture of the attitude of the Holy See on that burning question of the schools. And I think that I cannot add anything to his experiences. Apart from this, the speech of the Holy Father to the Hungarians, his speech on the day of Saint Eugen, the way in which the Osservatore Romano published both Your Eminence’s pastoral letters in a prominent place, and the material of the Hungarian language service of the Vatican Radio show beyond doubt that in the present situation they would consider *all attempt at bargaining or agreement* to be both immoral and also futile from the political point of view. The whole struggle around the schools, and the determination with which your Eminence defends the rights of the church, aroused here the greatest admiration in everybody, and they speak of us with honest enthusiasm.” (App. 24.)

AGENTIA DIOECESIIUM
HUNGARIAE

ROMA - VIA GIULIA, 1

TEL. 52.052

Roma, 1948 junius 12.

PROT. N. Pr.x.7/1948.

Főmagasságu és Főtisztelendő Biboros Érsek, Hercegsprimás Ur!

Kegyelmes Atyám!

Jelentésem megírásával Hamvas püspök ur Excellenciájának elutazásáig vártam és most vagyok bátor beszámolni néhány újabb eseményről és fejleményről.

Azt hiszem Hamvas püspök ur teljesen tiszta képet vihetett haza magával a Szentszék felfogásáról éppen az annyira égető iskolakerdesben és azt gondolom, hogy az ő tapasztalataihoz a magam részéről hozzáadni semmit sem tudok. Ezenkívül is a Szentatyának a magyarokhoz intézett beszéde, Szent Jenő napi beszéde, ahogyan az Osservatore Romano felülnő helyt adott Eminenciád mindkét pásztorlevelének és a vatikáni rádió magyar adásainak az anyaga minden kétséget kizárólag megmutatta, hogy ebben a helyzetben erkölcsstelennek és politikai számítások szerint is hiábavalónak tartana minden alkudozást vagy megengedési kísérletet. Az egész iskolaharc és az az elszántság, amellyel Eminenciád az Egyház jogait védelmezi itt mindenkiben a legnagyobb csodálatot kelti és őszinte lelkesedéssel beszélnek rólunk.

Gedeon
anyany
Mindszenty
Joi-4

24. Part of a letter written by Gedeon Peterffy to Mindszenty

ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

To complete the catalogue of Mindszenty’s espionage activity it must be pointed out that he was not content with the “honour” of leading the espionage organisation in Hungary, but aspired to international laurels. In his secret files there was a rough draft in his own hand dated January 12th, 1947, and addressed to the Pope, in which he offers no less than that “a bishop consecrated in complete secrecy should in some way or other be sent to the Subcarpathian Ukraine. *The same procedure could be used*

all over the Western Ukraine. According to the information of the bishop in Hajdudorog there are in Rome several Ruthenian and Ukrainian monks and celibate lay priests who would by virtue of their martyr's spirit be suitable for this task."

In a letter from Mindszenty dated January 22nd, 1946, and addressed to the American minister Schoenfeld, he forwards to the minister his monthly communiqué of slanderous news from the Carpathian Ukraine. In the secret files bedded in the cellar at Esztergom there was a special dossier numbered 3090 and headed "Report on the present situation of the Carpathian Ukraine". In this dossier there are 8 partly handwritten reports on the Carpathian Ukraine. Mindszenty distributed part of the dollars he brought back from America among missionary priests sent to Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, whose task it was to gather information and to stir up unrest.

MINDSZENTY AND THE HUNGARIAN ÉMIGRÉS

Mindszenty's treachery was completed by the political contact he had with enemies of democracy in Hungary of every type and rank, as well as with Otto and Eckhardt, but mainly with the Hungarian émigrés.

"I used my visits abroad," — states Mindszenty, — "to have talks with Hungarian politicians in emigration. Thus in the course of my visit to Rome in 1946, I had had conversations with Miklos Kallay, the ex-prime minister, whom I called upon to take a more active stand against democracy. Our talk lasted about 3/4 of an hour. When we parted he asked me to give a message to his son, that he should travel out to him. Upon my return home I forwarded this message. In the course of my other journey to Rome, Miklos Horthy Jr. sent his secretary to me, or rather to my secretary, asking for an interview.

"It was either in 1947 or 1948", he goes on, "I no longer remember the exact date, though I do know that it was in the month of May, that a messenger arrived from Ex-Regent Miklos Horthy. Aladar Kovacs, the former director of the National Theatre, applied at my palace in Buda for an audience. He told me he had been sent to me by Miklos Horthy. The regent sent his greetings and asked me to continue to regard him as regent. He then told me in detail of the life of the Horthy family. Answering Horthy's message, I told Kovacs that I had not yet had an opportunity to look at the documents connected with his resignation, and that I could therefore not yet see the question clearly from the point of view of constitutional law. He also told me that the Americans had a favorable attitude to Horthy."

Mindszenty received from Saalbach his first letter from Dezso Sulyok after the latter escaped on September 28th, 1945. On October 27th the ex M. P.-s Lajos Hajdu-Nemeth and Balint Czupy, who had also gone abroad, wrote to Esztergom. Janos Toth, a former official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regularly informed Mindszenty of the life of the émigrés.

What did Mindszenty do to deserve this undivided trust of every treacherous reactionary? It was his actions which lead them to regard him as the leader of Hungarian reaction. There are great volumes of letters, plans and manifestos that members of the transferred German minority, soldiers of the SS, dismissed fascists, former landowners and industrialists wrote to Mindszenty. Of these, he put those which he considered particularly important and valuable in his secret file. This also is where he kept the sheaf marked "land reform". In it, there is a plan approved by Mindszenty in which he wished to restore landed estates up to between 500-1,000 *holds* and forest property up to 2,000 *holds*.

Here are Mindszenty's notes in his own handwriting on the land reform.

"They bribed the farming people by giving them presents of land. Great difficulties are already apparent. It is not the sufferers who say this but the "beneficiaries". In Parliament the dividers of the land have brought up these complaints: that the vineyards and orchards that have been divided (400,000 *holds*) are showing an ever smaller yield for lack of capital, skill, and hard work. The orchards are being devoured by pests." (Appendix 25.)

From Mindszenty's description it would appear as though the land reform had been a blow the like of which had never yet struck the Hungarian people. That is how this arrogant feudal landowner thought of a reform that gave land to more than 600,000 Hungarian peasant families. He branded the Hungarian

“They have taken radical measures that affect the whole future of the country, above all they have taken over the Nazi slogan that “the land belongs to him who works it” and that at the very worst time. On the threshold of a threatening famine they have thrown the idea of division of the land before public opinion, thus thoroughly upsetting the course of agricultural work. Then, without asking the people, that is, abandoning the democratic principles they always talk about, they have passed an order to divide the land. When that part of the population that loves the land and has always lived on it did not react to this, they put it through by force. And they gave land to those who have *neither the knowledge nor the material resources for its cultivation*.

[illegible]

Az ország egész elvét érintő mélyreható intézkedéseket tettek. Mindenek előtt átvették a nyilas jelzést, hogy "a föld azé, aki megmunkálja" és a legrosszabb időben: egy fenyegető éhínség kíséretében beledobták a közvéleménybe a földosztás gondolatát, amivel alaposan megzavarták a munkaadási munka menetét. Azután a nép megkérdésére nélkül, tehát az államdan hangostatott demokratikus elv felragasztásával, megalkották egy földosztó rendeletet és amikor az ország lakosságának az a rétege, amely szereti a földet és eddig is abból élt, nem reagált rá, erőszakkal keresztülhajtották azt és adomták a földet olyanoknak, akiknek a megmunkáláshoz sem tudásuk, sem anyagi erejük nincs.

Ez a rendelet - törvénytelenége és egyéb igazságtalanságai mellett - a legulyosabban érinti a kat. egyházat, melynek összes intézményei márol holnapra elvesztették anyagi bázisukat. Az a 100 hold, amelyet a plébániáknak meghagy, megjelölésre is kevés;

So they begrudged the Hungarian peasant his 5 holds, while to the bishops even 100 were insufficient for a living. That is why they opposed the land reform. In a file marked 3969 which describes Hungary's economic life we found the following:

46

Among the plans, there is, of course, also a recommendation to settle the Jewish question, in which we find, among other things:

“It is our good fortune that the great ‘reservoir’ of Galician and Bukovinian Jews, the millions of the Jewish masses in the ghetto, have as a result of the German war of destruction been reduced to some 500,000”. Mindszenty and Co. called Auschwitz and the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, the massacre of several millions of people, “our good fortune”. To solve the Jewish problem of Hungary the plan recommends “by restoring the legal status quo as of the 19th of March, 1944, everyone appointed to public office after that date can be dismissed. Therefore all Jews and half-breeds can and must be dismissed”.

That is how they wanted to restore Horthy’s anti-Jewish laws, but with cynical cunning they add, “They are not of course to be dismissed because they are Jewish, but because they were appointed after March 19th, 1944”.

The data in this chapter are merely a few details of the espionage, treachery and reactionary political deals of Mindszenty. But on the basis of these facts, anyone can convince himself that democratic Hungary resorted to the weapon of justifiable self-defence, when it made Mindszenty and his accomplices harmless. Mindszenty has for four years committed a whole series of common crimes under the cloak of the church, taking advantage of the patience of democratic Hungary. On the basis of the proofs available, the accusations levelled against him cannot be denied. If, nevertheless, when he is brought to account, his foreign bosses speak of the imprisonment of innocent priests, they do this to divert attention from the truth, which is a heavy accusation not only against Mindszenty but against his foreign accomplices.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEALS BY JOSEPH MINDSZENTY AND HIS ACCOMPLICES

Mindszenty had quite considerable financial resources at his disposal to realise his political aim. As we have already mentioned, an illegal monetary fund of various foreign currencies accumulated in the hands of Zsigmond Mihalovics, the director of the Actio Catholica. This could happen because Jozsef Mindszenty and his colleagues committed a whole series of acts contrary to the criminal code of the land. They sold dollars on the black-market, they built up a veritable network criminally to obtain foreign currency abroad by paying over Hungarian currency here. They smuggled great sums of foreign exchange into the country and kept them here without reporting them; they used many thousands of dollars abroad for political purposes. Apart from this, the secret fund was also considerably boosted by the levy of usurious interest rates on those to whom Mindszenty's economic agents gave loans.

Since 1945 Mindszenty had brought back considerable sums in dollars from all his trips abroad. According to existing regulations, he ought to have reported these.

In 1945 Mindszenty visited Rome and took 10,000 dollars from Montini, Undersecretary of State to the Vatican. He also appropriated 5,000 dollars of the money that Hungarians living in America had collected for the people of their old country who had suffered from the war. Apart from an item of 800 dollars, Mindszenty did not report these 15,000 dollars, to the Hungarian National Bank. He distributed 10,000 dollars among his bishops and gave 3,000 dollars to the most active executor of his political plans, Zsigmond Mihalovics. 2,000 dollars he sold on the black market.

In 1946 Mindszenty again went to Rome. On this occasion he came back with 19,000 dollars, the greater part of which he had been given by the American Cardinal Spellman. Once again 5,000 dollars were collected from the Hungarian colony in America. Mindszenty spent 7,000 dollars straight away in Rome. He bought himself two cars and gave a third as a present to the director of Vatican Radio. The explanation for this is, that the introduction of a suitable Hungarian language programme on the Vatican Radio depended on this director. And Mindszenty attached understandable importance to this question from political considerations. Since his conversations on this matter had not been successful, he thought to achieve his purpose by bribing the director of Vatican Radio. It was in such circumstances that the gift of this car was made. Mindszenty, of course, had no right to use the dollars, accumulated through contributions by spending them abroad without the consent of the Hungarian National Bank. The remaining 12,000 dollars after the cars had been bought, Mindszenty brought home. He kept 2,000 dollars of this sum for himself and Zsigmond Mihalovics got another 2,000. 4,000 dollars they kept for the time being in the Archbishop's treasury and they only reported a fraction of the sum — 4,000 dollars to be exact — to the National Bank.

In 1947 Mindszenty went to the United States of America. From the financial point of view this trip was more successful than any he had yet made. He came back to Hungary with 30,000 dollars. According to his own statement he collected this sum from the donations of Hungarians in America, although he did not do any collecting during his short American stay. It is therefore certain that he got a good part of his sum from other sources. The result of the "collection" was divided into cheques for 15,000 dollars and notes for another 15,000, but Mindszenty concealed practically the whole sum from the authorities. It turned out that there was some difficulty about cashing the cheques in Hungary. For one thing, it was improbable that anyone would buy the cheques, whose security would after a time become risky. Another thing was that the cheques were signed by Mindszenty himself so that if they were circulating and one got into the hands of the authorities it could easily have led to discovery.

Mindszenty had by this time already been in contact for some time with Tivadar Wydler, director of the First Home Savings Bank, through his estate manager, Imre Boka. Wydler sold the dollars Mindszenty had swindled on the black market. Up to the summer of 1947 the banker Wydler had taken some 4,000 dollars from Mindszenty, and had found a very "reliable" buyer for them in the person of Pal Eszterhazy. The cheques, too, which had also found their way to Wydler, he offered to Pal Eszterhazy. Eszterhazy and his adviser, Dr. Gabor Horvath, gave between 35 and 40 forints for a dollar instead of the legal rate of 11.72 forints. Eszterhazy wanted to give financial support to Mindszenty's

monarchist movement for political reasons. And that is why he paid such a price for the cheques. “It is impossible to imagine”, said Eszterhazy in his confession, “that there should have been a businessman in Hungary who would pay the price I paid for these cheques and banknotes. I bought these dollars because I wanted financially to help Jozsef Mindszenty, the Archbishop of Esztergom and the recognized leader of the Hungarian monarchist movement. As I saw it, Mindszenty’s well known ideas on monarchism made it necessary for me to give as much financial help as I could to the political line he represented. It was in my interests to do so, because I had hopes of considerable material advantages from the enthronement of the Habsburg dynasty in Hungary — in the first place of my important estates which had been requisitioned for the land reform.” That is why the man who had once been Hungary’s greatest landlord, the owner of 210,000 holds, Prince Pal Eszterhazy, took part in Mindszenty’s foreign exchange speculations. Pal Eszterhazy’s complete discretion was of course guaranteed, all the more so because Wydler reported to Mindszenty via Imre Boka that Eszterhazy would smuggle the cheques out of Hungary, so that they would not be circulated in Budapest. Eszterhazy, again motivated by political considerations, took 5,000 dollars in one thousand dollar bills from Mindszenty by way of Wydler. He was afraid that these high denomination notes might be false but political considerations again triumphed. Mindszenty himself admits in his confession that “Imre Boka sold the cheques and dollar bills at the black-market rate to Prince Pal Eszterhazy with my previous knowledge and consent.”

Mindszenty only disposed of a part of the cheques and dollar notes he had, through Pal Eszterhazy. Eszterhazy smuggled the cheques and notes he had bought from Mindszenty to Austria to his lawyer in Vienna. At the same time of his deal with Pal Eszterhazy, Mindszenty smuggled a 5,000 dollar cheque out to Rome. Mindszenty had a personal representative, Gedeon Peterffy, who had gained practice in foreign currency deals of the Mindszenty type. On one occasion, when Peterffy was still vice-rector of the Budapest Theological Seminary, he sold 1,300 dollars on the black market on Mindszenty’s behalf. The 5,000 dollar cheque came into Peterffy’s hands who handed it over to the appropriate office of the Vatican. This currency swindle was connected with those collections which the bishops had started at Mindszenty’s behest on behalf of the missions and for the contribution known as “Peter’s pence” (the financial support given by the churches of the various countries to the Vatican). Mindszenty used the sum that had been accumulated this way in Hungary, and by way of compensation he sent the 5,000 dollars, of which Hungary’s economy had been deprived, to the Vatican in the form of a cheque. This procedure was again repeated later. On this occasion Mindszenty used for a similar purpose a sum of 5,300 dollars that had accumulated in Rome from the Hungarians of America.

Mindszenty only sold part of the dollar bills he had brought back from his American trip to Pal Eszterhazy. He cashed 4,700 dollar at the official rate to avert possible suspicion from himself. Mindszenty distributed 3,000 dollars among “missionary priests” sent to Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

According to the statement by Andras Zakar, Mindszenty sent 2,000 dollars to the Fascist Hungarian priests at Landshut and Munich in the summer of 1947. This sum was divided amongst clericals, who had fled from the liberating Soviet troops to Germany and were there actively agitating against democracy in Hungary.

Mindszenty gave Zsigmond Mihalovics a total of 23,000 dollars, partly of foreign exchange he had brought with him and concealed from the National Bank, and partly from large dollar donations from Americans who had been to Esztergom (e.g. Mr. Fox, Mr. Brown and Mr. Flynn). Jozsef Mindszenty himself admits that he got at least 60,000 dollars, from these three Americans at Esztergom.

Miklos Nagy, the leader of the Religious Department of Actio Catholica, who was in charge of the illegal monetary fund of that organisation after Mihalovics’s flight, admits that the latter had definitely given financial support to the enemies of democracy in Hungary. It also appears from the statements of Miklos Nagy and Laszlo Toth that Mihalovics devoted part of this illegal fund to paying people who supplied him with news items.

Mihalovics did his foreign currency deals through Karoly Foldes, a Budapest tradesman, who had

for a long time supplied Mindszenty. His statement shows, that apart from the 27,000 dollars he got from Mindszenty, Mihalovics deprived Hungary's National Economy of at least a further 20,000 dollars and 15,000 Swiss francs. Zsigmond Mihalovics had regularly paid the dollar aid sent by Hungarians in America into the account of Sandor Prager, a Budapest oil merchant who had left the country. Sandor Prager on the other hand paid the black market rate for these sums in forint. Karoly Foldes further reveals, that in 1947 he sold 15,000 dollars on the black market on behalf of Mihalovics. After the departure of Zsigmond Mihalovics, Miklos Nagy took charge of the illegal monetary fund of the Actio Catholica.

According to Miklos Nagy's statement Mihalovics had at this time left 24,000 dollars and 15,000 Swiss francs with Janos Varadi. Janos Varadi confirms this. Varadi, in obedience to the instructions of Miklos Nagy, sold 4 000 dollars on the black market and Nagy accordingly received 106,000 forint.

After the flight of Zsigmond Mihalovics, Miklos Nagy and, with the knowledge and consent of his superior authorities (Zakar, Mindszenty), Janos Varadi dealt with those currency offences that Zsigmond Mihalovics had formerly himself conducted. It is characteristic of these transactions that Janos Varadi did not find even usury incompatible with his position as a monk. Through his confidential agent, Gyorgy Nagy, Varadi lent 200,000 forint at the usurious rate of 2% per week. This lending business was financed by the illegal fund and was meant to increase that fund.

Varadi also continued Mihalovics's affairs in other respects. He has admitted that the Jesuit monk, Jacob Raile, a trusted agent of Mihalovics, always reported in cypher in his letters to Budapest what dollar aid he disposed of. He then paid this sum into the account that Dr. Dezso Tolnai, director of the Hungarian National Savings Bank, had in the United States of America. Tolnai, on the other hand, paid the black market equivalent in forint to Varadi. Tolnai has admitted that he was preparing to flee the country and that is why he was trying to accumulate a considerable dollar account abroad. He was connected with Varadi and Jacob Raile because Raile had been the vice-president of the National Savings Bank. Up to now Raile deposited 5,000 dollars of the foreign aid meant for Hungary in Tolnai's account. Co-operation between the banker, Dezso Tolnai, and the Jesuit monk, Janos Varadi, also proved fruitful to them in other ways. Varadi gave Tolnai 50,000 forints of the illegal fund in September 1948. This sum was lent to the furrier, Sandor Gosztonyi, who paid in return for the loan a usurious rate of 2,500 forints a month to Varadi.

The facts of the police investigation prove that through these various foreign exchange offences described in detail above, Jozsef Mindszenty deprived Hungary's national economy of about 97,000 dollars. Further it was with his knowledge and consent that Zsigmond Mihalovics and Janos Varadi concealed another 25,000 dollars and 15,000 Swiss francs from the authorities. The participants in the Mindszenty case have been proved to have caused something like 120,000 dollars worth of damage to the Hungarian State.

Mindszenty in order to emphasize his hostility towards democracy in Hungary refused in 1945 to accept his pay from the state which had been fixed at three times that of the prime minister. At the same time he has pocketed about 4 million forints from the dollars he has so far been found to have sold in the black market, a great part of which sum was "fees" for his "information" activities.

The Hungarian police authorities arrested Jozsef Mindszenty, who, together with his accomplices: organised an illegal monarchist movement in which he played a leading part; prepared regular espionage reports on political, economic and military questions in Hungary for the Budapest representatives of a foreign Great Power; was leader of the international espionage organisation inside the Actio Catholica; and gave it enormous financial support, causing Hungary's economic life some 4 million forints worth of damage by his foreign exchange speculations: — they arrested him on a charge of having committed treason, espionage, crimes aimed at overthrowing the republic, and foreign exchange speculation.

The above documents convincingly and undeniably justify the charges against Mindszenty, and the trial that is soon to begin will cast light on every aspect of Mindszenty's list of crimes. But even on the basis of the documents, every objective observer must recognise that there is no question of persecuting the church or the priests, or of infringing the freedom of worship, as some have falsely and tendentiously tried to make out, but of bringing a determined enemy of the Hungarian people to account.

APPENDICES

PART OF THE ORIGINAL HANDWRITTEN PLAN BY PROF. JUSZTIN BARANYAI

He appears to be the only acceptable authority to appoint a new government, just as the Metropolitan of Athens was two years ago.

He would have to appoint the new government at the beginning of an American occupation. He would, of course, form a new government on the broadest possible bases, that is, excluding the Communists, through the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Radicals to the Social Democrats, he would justly draw in every political factor.

(See page 17)

PART OF THE STATEMENT BY ZAKAR, MINDSZENTY'S SECRETARY

On the basis of the above there can be no doubt that Mindszenty is the most outstanding representative of monarchism in Hungary, who since his appointment as Prince Primate has to the best of my knowledge not stopped discussing these questions, but has applied them to the concrete Hungarian political situation, to the parties and to the international situation too. As a high priest who held the highest ecclesiastical dignity in Hungary, he had, and has, undoubted prestige among monarchist factors and individuals. They look on him as leader.

Summarising the above part of my statement I declare that the Prince Primate, on the occasion of his American journey, was fully aware of the way his conversations were directed towards the overthrow of the Hungarian Republic, and he therefore warned Zsamboki, who prepared the various meetings with special care, to organise them in a completely secret way, because it would certainly do no good if anyone got to know of them.

I know that the position or rather, the fate, of the Hungarian Holy Crown had for a long time been a matter of great concern to the Prince Primate. He had taken a number of measures which were all aimed at seeing that they should not bring back to this country the Hungarian Holy Crown which was in the possession of the American military authorities, but that they should give it to Rome, to the Vatican.

Dr. Andras Zakar.

(See page 28)

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ZAKAR

After Schoenfeld's farewell visit in August, 1947, there arrived the American minister Chapin, who shortly after called on the Primate at Esztergom to introduce himself.

In September, the Prince Primate accompanied by me, went to the United States Legation in Szabadsag Square to return the visit. I know that in the course of this the Prince Primate told the minister of the press attacks against him, and that as far as he knew, the left-wing watched church sermons. The Prince Primate then asked the minister whether a change in the international situation could be expected in the near future. This question by the Prince Primate was of course really meant to find out whether the outbreak of war could be expected in the near future or not — and those present understood this. Chapin, in his answer, explained that the situation was tense, and that the key to the question was a German peace. If this could not be satisfactorily solved, the outbreak of war was probable. He further asked Chapin what was his opinion of Otto, and whether he knew him. Chapin answered that according to serious leading politicians in America, it would be possible to resurrect monarchism in Hungary, which would, of course, involve Otto's person too. He himself thought Otto a very serious and talented man. In answer to Chapin's question as to who were the leaders of monarchism in Hungary, the Primate enumerated the following people: Count Cziraky, Jusztin Baranyai, Moric Eszterhazy, and Margit Slachta.

It was my opinion and impression of the whole conversation that Chapin was in essence pointing the way for the Primate's further behaviour, and indicating support for him.

As far as I can remember, Chapin asked for facts on the activities of the Communists in the course of this talk. The Primate declared that we too, played our part in this difficult struggle partly by enlightening and strengthening the faithful (e.g. by way of circulars), and partly by strong organisational work.

Chapin declared that he thought the Primate's pastoral letters effective weapons in the fight against Communism, and that it was absolutely necessary to continue issuing pastoral letters in this tone.

It was not long after this meeting, in September, 1947, that the Prince Primate sent Chapin his known letter on the question of sending the Holy Crown of Hungary to the Vatican.

At the end of 1947, about December, I personally took an invitation to minister Chapin, in which the Primate invited him and his family to Esztergom.

Chapin answered this invitation in writing, and said whom he would bring with him, and in February, 1948, accompanied by Koczak and his wife, Chapin paid his visit.

I do not know of the contents of this talk, because the Primate did not tell me about it, but from his words I would point out that he was not satisfied with the visit of the Americans, and that he thought they lacked forcefulness in facing the Hungarian democracy, and in not taking stronger steps in the interests of the Church. (See pages 32, 33)

Dr. Andras Zakar.

ZSIGMOND MIHALOVICS'S LETTER TO MINDSZENTY

Your Eminence!
My Gracious High Pastor!

I am moved now when I start to write this letter to you, one I know for sure will get to Your Eminence. Heavy is one's state of mind when one has gone out into the world after the middle of life and does not know when he will be put to everlasting rest. Even now I feel as someone who has not yet awakened to reality. I have not been tortured as yet by the idea that I am homeless and a jailbird. My days are devoid of suffering. In my dreams, however, I remember Your Eminence, my friends, my favourite spots, but as vividly as if they had turned up in my very room. I brood long in this fashion and feel warm regards to me. As a matter of fact, I am grateful to Providence that my body is no trouble to me ; I went through the days of flight and hiding without any physical suffering headaches or other similar ailing conditions. I have even got used to the warm air and sirocco of Rome and the oily dishes. It seems many people must be praying for me for I do not suffer even the slightest discomfort.

Pardon the faulty typing but I am tapping these lines myself and I shall surely make many mistakes.

On the way I made two reports to Your Eminence and when on August 2nd, I arrived at Rome I was immediately able to send a few lines to you, my dear high pastor. I wonder whether you have received these lines of mine.

2. Just to be safe I shall give a brief summary of my journey.

I stayed until July 11th, at the Pazmanaeum. I did not however, leave my room on the 1st floor; not even the porter knew that I was in the building. Bishop Binds went through the Pazmaneum too but he did not know either that I was there. The principals were afraid that I would be followed and captured in Vienna, for everything is uncertain in this city. There is a censorship of mail, telephone lines are tapped, and people disappeared from the street even during my stay there. I did not even visit the nunciature if for no other reason than because it is situated in the Russian zone and it is in the immediate neighbourhood of the GPU. I spend the time making notes and studying English.

Father Flynn came right away and brought clothes as well as money. Soon he reported to me that the American Legation cannot be of help to me. They could not in Budapest either. Then the Father went to Munich and phoned from there to Mgr. Swanstrom. He came back from him with the information that I am expected in America but that it may take a month before I can go. To Rome, however, I can start immediately. I chose the latter alternative. Then he took me to the American Secret Police where I was immediately given an identity card in four languages in the name of Sigmond Michler with which I was to go to Salzburg. There I will be met by one of the chief agents from Vienna and they, with the Salzburg agent, will prepare my way to Rome. This is how I left at midnight on July 11th. It was easy to cross the river Enns, the Russians just glanced at my forged identity papers, and so I was outside the iron curtain, in the American zone.

In Vienna I experienced a strong feeling against the Russians. I had the same experience in the Burgenland. I used to read with enthusiasm the excellent numbers of the *Wiener Tageszeitung*. They have the courage to write, and boldly, in a clever way though the Russians are there. The paper carried Your Eminence's statement on the front page, the same article for which the abominable *Magyar Nemzet* so badly attacked Your Eminence. While I was in town, the Socialists stuck up huge posters against the Communists at the beginning of the Tito affair. I read the courageous and determined speeches of the Minister of Home Affairs, Gruber, with great pleasure. Food, too, has improved as a result of the Marshall Plan. In the Pazmaneum food was scanty enough and even that was from the charity of the W.R.S. The principals are wonderful people, both Prelate Leopold whose spirit was a great source of inspiration for me, and Father Adam whose clever insight into the depths of the soul I viewed with respect. I talked to the seminarists about the situation at home on two occasions.

3. So I arrived at Salzburg on July 12th. As soon as I got out at the station I was recognized, as frequently happened later too. Many thousands of Hungarians are struggling along here. This is where I

found out that the indictment against me had been drawn up and that the Minister of Home Affairs had issued a general warrant of arrest.

I immediately visited the office of the CIC, the Viennese agent, however, had not yet arrived, he was only expected on Saturday. It was Monday when I went up there. On Wednesday Father Flynn arrived too, but he soon returned to Vienna because he thought that I could start for Rome. On Saturday I was really able to talk with the Viennese deputy and also with Mr. Green, the head at Salzburg, who both thought that I could start within five days at the latest. My case really got started. I was not pleased, however, that they wanted to take me by way of Yugoslavia. The five days passed; and even by July 25th nothing had happened.

I was put up at the Palace of Archbishop Rohrer. The Archbishop...

...may not permit some activity which would bring difficulties to it. If, for instance, I take a relentless stand against Communism at home in, let us say, a memorandum or article sharply sketching the situation and I do this under the auspices of the N.C.W.C., then Moscow may take revenge by, for instance, stopping the operation of the W.R.S. in Poland, too, as it has done in Hungary. It is interesting that New York still maintains that we need not bring before the public the methods used in Hungary, lest the situation be aggravated.

I have therefore already asked them not to bind me too closely to their organization. I should not seem to belong to them at all; I should be given complete freedom of activity. I am being hampered already. One of the big papers appearing in millions of copies offered to publish three of my articles. Now and then I work on my memoirs, which I should like to present to that part of the public that can properly be regarded as Catholic. But I cannot work, lest I ruin the chances for my journey to America and bring discomfort to my future employers.

I have had detailed talks with a priest called Sullivan, our press agent in Rome. He himself will report the matter to the press people at home and I asked Father Flynn to put it before the authorities on the N.C.W.C. But I did not consider this sufficient and sent some letters to my own acquaintances in America proposing an adequate solution.

I must go to America to settle this problem of a press service and also to get help to our Hungarians who are being dispersed all over the world.

My heart's desire is to settle down in America and to have in the meantime an opportunity to return to Europe every half year to be able to talk over matters in Rome, Paris, Bruxelles and in Switzerland.

To this plan I beg my Chief Pastor's efficient support if it meet with Your Eminence's approval.

a) Would it not be too much to beg you to write a letter to Cardinal Spellman, and, calling his high attention to me, would Your Eminence please recommend that they should not place me in some department of the N.C.W.C. but that they should support me somehow, leaving me seemingly independent so that I should take the responsibility for everything which would favour my proposals in the fight against the greatest menace of our age. I feel that such a letter could easily settle my problems in New York.

b) If possible be so gracious as also to give me a letter to the effect that Your Eminence is glad to see the organisation of such information activity and also that it is your pleasure that this be managed by me.

c) Be pleased, Your Grace, to effect measures for starting the collection of data and for getting fresh material to me as soon as possible. Your Eminence anyway receives much information and that in itself would mean a lot if you could make this material available to me. It would also mean much to me if I could get points of view on how to act and what to stress. I think that by now I am in circumstances which allow me to do worthy service to this cause which I consider very important.

d) Be pleased, Your Eminence, to permit me to take the initial steps for the establishment of a permanent information bureau and that for that purpose I should try to obtain material aid in America. Returning to the question of Hungarians living abroad let me propose that You should commission somebody with the task of helping them spiritually, culturally and socially. The person doing this would have to be above the priests of the Vatican.

These measures would have to be brought to the knowledge of the Vatican, too, or rather the approval of the Vatican would also have to be sought. Also we should ask that the Holy Father should give his highest support for the saving of the Hungarian souls in danger of perdition.

Who should this person be? When I arrived, everybody, even the priests of the Vatican Mission thought that now I should take over direction in all Europe. Of course I could not have done this and so I avoided all such suggestions. It is certain, however, that among the émigrés I am the highest Church dignitary and my persecution also lends a certain prestige to my person. It is not I who propose it but should I be chosen, I would accept it, even if I went to America. America is no distance at all by plane and letters arrive at their destination in four days by air mail and the answer comes back in another four.

(See page 36)

And if the importance of the plans were understood in America and freedom of movement as well as the means were given, then I could return to Europe at half yearly intervals.

As far as material support is concerned, Ivan Der might be of help.

In pastoral duties the priests of the Vatican Mission could be of help. The policy is not set by me but by Kozi-Horvath and I could talk with him.

All this I leave to Your Eminence. In all I shall do as You order me. I do not desire anything. If I have no other possibility I shall gladly take a small parish anywhere in the world.

Circumstances made me make these recommendations. I myself see with consternation that I have become an interesting personage whose name is known everywhere. I think that this circumstance should be taken advantage of.

I am able to send this letter through *English official channels* in a week. The courier will return and will be ready to bring me the material which I can obtain. If Mr. Zakar would prepare for me all that is available, I ask you to give the material *five days after the receipt of this letter to Miklos Nagy, not, however, writing anything on the well-sealed envelope.*

Considering my negotiations with the English, it is possible that this service can be made regular. On this, however, I cannot give you details, perhaps in two or three weeks I will. In any case I am in a position to transfer important information to both of the most important places.

For myself, I humbly ask for authorisation to say mass and hear confession.

I am just re-establishing my temporarily broken connections with the 'Caritas' and asking this organization to go on helping Hungarian Catholics. I imagine that it is still possible to direct foreign aid, including money, to the addresses of institutions and persons.

Besides giving help to those at home I also want to ask these organisations to offer their support to help the Hungarians dispersed in Europe.

My letter has become quite long. I ask Your Eminence's pardon.

In the fervent hope that I can soon receive Your Eminence's answer through the safe channel I pointed out, and that I shall, receive valuable material therein, I remain, deeply moved in soul kissing Your Eminence's Holy Scarlet even from this distance,

with the highest esteem.
Signed: Zsigmond Mihalovics.

(See pages 37, 38)