

The History of the USSR & the Peoples' Democracies

Part 4, Chapters 16-20

by
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Table of Contents for Chapters

Note: In ‘C#S#’, the ‘C’ represents the Chapter and the ‘S’ represents the Section of the Chapter.

Chapter 0: Acknowledgements, Methodology, and How to Use the Book	Page 1
C0S1. Acknowledgements	
C0S2. Methodology Outline	
C0S3. Citation Format / Titles Format	
C0S4. The Screenshots / Photos Corresponding to the Sources Cited	
C0S5. On Grammatical / Mechanical Errors in Writing	
Chapter 1: The Blueprint of History	Page 5
C1S1. The Foundations of Historical Materialism	
C1S2. The Nature of Imperialism and Fascism / Revolutionary Class Struggles against Fascist Reaction	
C1S3. The Quasi-Myth of the Third Force & the Tendency for Class Allies to Cooperate in all Spatial Directions	
C1S4. The Relationship between Military Victories and Secret Service Victories	
C1S5. The Proletarian Revolutionary Overthrow of Capitalism	
C1S6. Economic Centralization vs. the Proliferation of Bureaucracy	
C1S7. The Dialectics of Secret Service Conflict	
C1S8. The Structure of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat	
C1S9. On the ‘Intermediate-Stage’ State	
C1S10. On Dealings with Hostile States	
C1S11. People’s Democracy	
Chapter 2	Page 48
C2S1. The Eve of the Revolution / Bolshevik Popularity	
C2S2. The ‘First’ Anti-Socialist Treason of Zinoviev-Kamenev Group	
C2S3. The Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly	
C2S4. The Proletarian Composition of the Membership of the Bolshevik Party	
C2S5. The Popularity of the Bolshevik Governance in the Territory of the Former Russian Empire	
C2S6. Trotskyite Provocative ‘Red’ Terror: A Wedge between the People and the Party	
C2S7. Trotskyite Secret Service Activities for the British Empire	
C2S8. Merger into One Party	
C2S9. The Roots of Trotskyism in MI6-backed Fascism and Kautskyism / Trotsky’s ties to Ze’ev Jabotinsky	
C2S10. The ‘Permanent Revolution’, a Technique of Provoking an Imperialist Invasion / Trotskyite-Bukharinite Sabotage against Brest-Litovsk Peace / Bukharin’s Terror Plot against Lenin and Sverdlov	
C2S11. Cooperatives in the Civil War / War Communism vs. Trotskyite Terror and Excesses	
C2S12. The Spread of the Revolution to Germany, France, Czechoslovakia / The Case of Hungary’s ‘Soviet’ Republic	
Chapter 3	Page 72
C3S1. Bolshevism in Murmansk	
C3S2. The Progressive Bourgeois-Democratic State in Bulgaria	
C3S3. The War in Poland / Trotskyite and Luxembourguite Sabotage / The so-called ‘Communist Party of Poland’	
C3S4. Ukraine’s Russian Population	
C3S5. Tambov	
C3S6. Spreading the Revolution to Latvia, Lithuania, and Byelorussia	
C3S7. The Anarchist Colour Revolution in Kronstadt	
C3S8. Strengthening Democratic Governance / The Further Demotion of the Trotsky Faction	
C3S9. The Intelligentsia Temporarily ‘Supported’ the Soviet State	
Chapter 4	Page 88
C4S1. The Establishment of Soviet Power in the Predominantly-Muslim Regions of the former Russian Empire	
C4S2. The Gilan SSR / Soviet Presence in Azerbaijan (Iran) / Baha’i-Trotskyite agents of the MI6	
C4S3. On the Russian Bourgeois-Nationalist Argument ‘Bolsheviks surrendered Russian territory!’	
C4S4. Soviet Involvement in Georgia / Lavrenti Beria, an Agent of the MI6	
C4S5. The Struggles of the Emir of Afghanistan	
C4S6. Soviet Support for Kemalists in Turkey	
C4S7. Soviet Support for Democratic Anti-Colonial Movements in the Arab World (Egypt, Syria, and Hejaz)	

C4S8. USSR and the Faysal Faction of Saudi Arabia
C4S9. The Mongolian Revolution
C4S10. Japanese Occupation of Sakhalin
C4S11. Soviet Assistance to China
C4S12. The Founding of the Comintern
C4S13. Soviet Aid to General Sandino's Campaign

Chapter 5

Page 117

C5S1. The Onset of the NEP and Moves against the Trotskyite Left-Deviation / The End of the NEP and Onset of Campaign against Bukharinite Right-Deviation / Trotskyites and Bukharinites ally with MI6-backed Nazi Germany
C5S2. Sabotage in and Purges of the Red Army
C5S3. Agricultural Collectivization / Ukraine and Kazakhstan Famine / Death Toll
C5S4. The Truth about the Corrective Labour Camps ('Gulag')
C5S5. Wage Differentiation in the Soviet Union
C5S6. CIA: Virtually No Physical Torture in USSR / Soviet Interrogation Techniques
C5S7.1 Democratization: The Cleansing of the Party and State Apparatuses
C5S7.2. Criticism and Media Freedom in the USSR
C5S7.3 The Anti-Soviet Agitation Law
C5S7.4. Condemnation of Discrimination based on Class Origin
C5S7.5 Structure of the Party
C5S8. On the Cults of Personality

Chapter 6

Page 206

C6S1. Women's Rights in the USSR
C6S2. Abortion and Contraception in the USSR
C6S3. Fashion in the Soviet Union
C6S4. The Soviet State Attitude towards Sexual Relations
C6S5. Nudity in the USSR
C6S6. Soviet Architecture
C6S7. Soviet Painting, Sculpting, and Music
C6S8. Housing in the USSR – Personal Property
C6S9. On Alcohol Consumption
C6S10.1. On Homosexuality
C6S10.2. Sodomy and Global Fascism
C6S11. Soviet Environmentalism

Chapter 7

Page 265

C7S1.1. On 'Nation'
C7S1.2. National Cultures in the USSR
C7S1.3. On the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and the 'Jewish Nation'
C7S2.1. The Opium of the Masses
C7S2.2. Persuasion, rather than Terror, for Campaign against Religion
C7S3.1. Dialectical Materialism; What the 'Materialism' Means
C7S3.2. 'God'? / Dialectical Materialism and the Infinite Oneness
C7S3.3. From Dialectical Materialism onto Historical Materialism
C7S3.4. Anti-Dialectical Atheism
C7S3.5. On 'Souls'
C7S3.6. Ethics
C7S4. Science in the Soviet Union
C7S5. Zhdanov on Big Bang

Chapter 8

Page 289

C8S1. Soviet Peace Offensives
C8S2. The MI6 Supports Nazi Germany against USSR
C8S3. Rootless Cosmopolitanism: Pan-Europeanist Propaganda and the Cultural War against USSR
C8S4. Soviet Relations with Czechoslovakia (1930s)
C8S5. Soviet Aid to the Spanish Republic

Chapter 9

- C9S1. Yezhovschina
- C9S2.1. Statistics on the Great Purge in the CPSU in USSR
- C9S2.2. Statistics on Purges throughout the Soviet Society during the Great Purge
- C9S3. The Rise of the Beria Network
- C9S4. The Assassination of Trotsky
- C9S5. Soviet Response to Nazi Invasion of Poland
- C9S6. The Winter War
- C9S7. The Quasi-Mythical ‘Operation PIKE’
- C9S8. Nazi German invasion of France
- C9S9. The Baltics
- C9S10. Romanian Petroleum Flow Disruption / Regaining Bessarabia and Bukovina
- C9S11. Volume of Soviet-Nazi Trade 1939-1941
- C9S12. Development of the Soviet Military
- C9S13. Disrupting the Finnish Nickel Flow to the Reich
- C9S14. Soviet Policy on Xinjiang
- C9S15. Class Struggles in and Soviet Economic Aid to Mongolia
- C9S16. Deportations of Koreans
- C9S17. Soviet Aid to China 1939-1941
- C9S18. The Ustase Regime

Chapter 10

- C10S1. The Communist-Led French Resistance
- C10S2. Danish and Swedish Communist-led anti-Nazi Resistance
- C10S3. MI6 Encourages Operation Barbarossa
- C10S4. USSR and Nazi Germany were not Allies / Stalin Did Expect War / USSR was Ready for War
- C10S5. The Soviet Intervention into Iran 1941
- C10S6. Soviet Germans oppose Nazism
- C10S7. The Strasserite and Schleicherite agents and the Soviet Intelligence Service
- C10S8. The Anglo-American Finance Capital allies with the Proletariat and Anti-Colonial National Bourgeoisie even in its own Colonies
- C10S9. The Anti-Fascists from Among the German Soldiers
- C10S10. Soviet Red Army ‘Rape’ of Germany?

Chapter 11

- C11S1. Submerging Below the River Saleph?: The Nazis Establish an Underground State
- C11S2. Anglo-American Imperialists form an Alliance with Nazi Germany
- C11S3. A More Aggressive Approach by the United States
- C11S4. The Roosevelt Faction
- C11S5. Soviet Campaign against American Imperialist Hawks
- C11S6. Francoist Spain
- C11S7. Fascist Italy
- C11S8. The Cold War in Music
- C11S9. Rejection of Marshall Plan ‘Aid’
- C11S10.1. The Strategic Importance of France
- C11S10.2. Communist influence in France since ‘de-Nazification’
- C11S10.3. French Imperialism, the Ally of the Socialist Forces / The Subjugation of France by the West German Imperialists
- C11S11. USA for a New Order in a New Europe
- C11S12. German Proletarian Resistance against Pan-Europeanism and for German Reunion / The Soviet-SED Peace Offensive

Chapter 12

- C12S1. Tito’s Gang, Agents of the Nazis
- C12S2. Yugoslavia, Anti-Soviet Quantitative Changes for pro-American Qualitative Changes
- C12S3. Setting Yugoslavia on the Path for War against the Peoples’ Democracies / Slavery, not capitalism and not socialism, as the Main Mode of Production in Yugoslavia / Reign of Terror / Farical Elections / Kulak-owned ‘Collectivization’ / Yugoslav Communist Resistance /

Proletarian and Peasant Resistance

C12S4. The Yugoslav Regime, a Trotskyite State

C12S5. CIA Support for the Titoist Current

C12S6. Titoists unleash Serbian Settler-Colonialism and Apartheid against Kosovar Albanians

Chapter 13

Page 519

C13S1.1. The People's Liberation War in Albania

C13S1.2. Titoist Conspiracies against People's Democratic Albania

C13S1.3. People's Democratic Development in Albania

C13S2. Titoist Regime Oppression in Bosnia

C13S3. The Massacre at Katyn

C13S4.1 The Home Army (AK) was funded by Nazi Germany's Japanese Fascist Allies /

The AK was an Anti-Semitic Group that did Not fight the Nazis

C13S4.2. The Gestapo Spy Spsychalski, with Gomulka's Support, Denounces the Communists and

Non-Communist Anti-Fascists to the Nazi Secret Service

C13S4.3. The AK Receives Arms from the Nazi Germans, Italian Fascists, and Hungarian fascists /

AK Anti-Semitic Terrorism

C13S4.4. The Warsaw Rebellion of 1944, a Case of AK Collaboration with the Nazis in the Desertification

of Poland / Soviets Wanted to, but were unable to, Assist the 1944 Warsaw Rebels

C13S4.5. The AK Steps Up Nazi-style Anti-Semitic Pogroms

C13S4.6. The Conspiracies of the Polish 'Underground' against the New Poland / Home Army Terror and

the Titoist Betrayals by the Gomulka-Spsychalski Group

C13S5.1. Economic Growth in the New, People's Democratic Poland / The Communist-Led Forces in

Poland were Popular during and after 1947 Elections

C13S5.2. Soviet Economic Aid to Poland in Exchange for Polish Coal

C13S6. The Nazi-Backed Terror Gangs in the Baltics

C13S7. Ukraine

C13S8. The 1946-1947 Polish and Soviet Deportations of some Reactionaries among the Ukrainians

C13S9. Carpatho-Ukraine's People Join the USSR

C13S10. Contact with Civilians Forbidden in Operation BAGRATION / Some Deportations from Latvia

Chapter 14

Page 584

C14S1. Beriaite-Nazi Activities in Georgia and the Stalin Faction's Purge of the

Georgian Bourgeois-Nationalists

C14S2. Deportations of the Reactionary Kalmyks, Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, and Kabardinians

C14S3. Beria Military Sabotage against Soviet Power / Communist-Coopted Beriaite Agent Abakumov

Clashes with the Beria-Malenkov Network / Beria pursues an Alliance with Nazi Germany

Chapter 15

Page 593

C15S1. Romanian Resistance against the Axis and the Monarchy / The People's Democratic Revolution

in Romania / Class Struggles and Economic Development in Romania / From Trotskyite

pro-Nazi Elements to Titoist agents of the Mossad; the Threat against the Romanian Proletariat

C15S2. The Rajk Network; Yugoslav Intelligence and UDB Terror in Hungary

C15S3. People's Democratic Hungary; Economic Development

C15S4. Bulgarian Resistance

C15S5. People's Democratic Bulgaria vs. Titoist Fascist Yugoslavia / The Yugoslav Regime's Plans for

Conquest of Bulgaria / Ethnocide and Reign of Terror against the People of Macedonia /

Bulgarian Communist Purge of the Gang of Kostov, the Agents of Titoist Yugoslavia /

Yugoslav Regime Supports the Goryani Terror Network

C15S6. Soviet Support for the Greek Communist-led Revolutionary Rebellion / Yugoslav Regime Stabs

in the Back of Greece's Communists and Progressives

C15S7. Destroying Christianity by Supporting 'Christianity'; Orthodox Christianity Coopted as a Tool of

Soviet Intelligence / USSR support for Islam / Romanian Communist use of Orthodoxy,

Judaism, and Protestantism against Catholic Church

C15S8. Czechoslovak anti-Axis Resistance / The Communist Proletarian Revolution in Czechoslovakia /

People's Democratic Development / Soviet Economic Aid / Titoist Stabs in the Back

C15S9. East Germany / The German Proletariat's Support for Communist anti-Nazi Underground / The Removal

of German Industries / Soviet Aid / Class Struggles and Economic Development in People's

- Chapter 16 Page 673
C16S1. The Joint Distribution Committee, an intelligence front for the American Imperialists and Israeli Reactionaries, Collaborates with the Nazis in Holocaust and against Soviet State
C16S2. The Soviet-Led Bloc and Zionist Migration
C16S3. On Britain's fake 'Opposition' to Zionism
C16S4. On the 1947 Soviet Vote in the UN regarding Palestine
C16S5. The 1948 War and the Soviet Union
C16S6. The Mapam Faction in Israel
- Chapter 17 Page 795
C17S1. Via Iran and Turkey, the Anglo-American Plan for the Nuclear Annihilation of the Soviet Union
C17S2. Introduction to the Tudeh Party
C17S3. The Rise and Struggles of People's Democratic Azerbaijan in Iran / Use of Turkey and Iran as a Route for a Nuclear Holocaust in Baku / The Assassination of Ja'far Pishevari
C17S4. The Mahabad Republic
C17S5. MI6 Satellite Turkey's Collaboration with the Nazi Germans during the Great Patriotic War / Turkey as an Avenue for an Anglo-American Assault on the Soviet Union / USSR Defending itself by Demanding Turkish Territory
C17S6. Soviets Strengthen Defenses
C17S7. Iran's Titoist Movement, a CIA Creation / The Razmara Administration / Stalin-era Soviet Aid to Mosaddeq Administration / Khrushchev-Malenkov-Beria Betrayals of Iran Cause 1953 CIA Coup / Yugoslav-linked Titoists help 1953 Iran Coup
- Chapter 18 Page 826
C18S1. Soviet Military Aid for the Communists in China
C18S2. Sino-Soviet Economic Relations
C18S3. The War against Fascist Japan / The Nuclear Strikes on Japan
C18S4. The Arrest of Yoshio Kodama
C18S5. The Korean Resistance During the Great Patriotic War / Roosevelt's Plans for Korea / Soviet Industrial Aid to North Korea / The North Korea System / South Korea Invasion of North Korea / US Bombs Soviet Air Bases in the Far East
C18S6. Soviet Relations with India
- Chapter 19 Page 848
C19S1. Class Warfare and the Secret Service Conflict to Hijack the CPSU and the Soviet State Apparatus
C19S2. Exploiting Contradictions in Parallel Comprador Networks; The Soviet Communist Faction's Handling of the Comprador Pincer Assault
C19S3.1. The Jewish Bourgeois-Nationalists and the Kremlin Doctors
C19S3.2. The Assassination of Andrei Zhdanov
C19S3.3. The Cases of Shcherbakov, Kalinin, Dimitrov, and Choibalsan / The 'Treatment' of Thorez
C19S3.4. Etinger Dead
C19S3.5. 'Anti-Semitism'? / The Alleged 'Hate America' Campaign
C19S4. The 1949 Leningrad Purge
C19S5. The Demotion of Molotov and the Purge of Polina Zhemchuzhina
C19S6. The Titoist Faction led by Beria Undermines the Soviet Military-Industrial Backbone / CIA Stance on Consumer Goods vs. Producer Goods
C19S7.1. Some Purges Prior to the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952
C19S7.2. The 19th CPSU Congress in 1952 & the Ascendancy of the Titoists to Dominance / The Physical Elimination of Stalin and the Suspicious Deaths of Red Army Commanders
C19S8. The Vigilance Campaign
C19S9. The Rise of the Beriaite Titoists
C19S10. Deepening Links with the CIA-MI6
C19S11. Deepening Ties with the UDB C19S12. Zionists Rehabilitated – 1953
- Chapter 20 Page 908
C20S1. The Colour Revolution in East Germany – June 1953
C20S2. Austria

C20S3. Hungary – 1953
 C20S4. Beriaite Conspiracies in Poland
 C20S5. Khrushchev and Moscow Titoists Rehabilitate Nazi German Troops – 1954-1956
 C20S6. The Promotion of Idealistic Military Theories as Pretext for Military Sabotage
 C20S7. Titoists Expand Influence over Red Army, De-Fund Soviet Military, Capitulate to American Imperialism / CIA Coup against Mosaddeq ‘Thanks’ to Stalin Death
 C20S8. A Reply to the ‘1991 Capitalist Restoration’ Argument
 C20S9. The Secret Speech
 C20S10. Criminalizing the Soviet Intelligence Service
 C20S11. The Further Decline of the Economy Since 1956
 C20S12. Regarding Criticism of Stalin and Stalin-era USSR
 C20S13. The Nazi Rebellion in Hungary / Yugoslavia supports Nazi rebels / The Role of the Intelligentsia in the Rebellion / Yuri Andropov was a Trotskyist-Titoist agent of the MI6, UDB, and Horthyite Rebels
 C20S14. Economic Revisionism in Hungary
 C20S15. Economic Titoization in Poland / Bierut’s Suspicious Death / On Gierek’s Views / The Gestapo agents Spychalski and Kaczorowska Rise to Power in Gomulka Era
 C20S16. Economic Revisionist Policies in Poland
 C20S17. The 1956 Titoization Speech; The Effects on East Germany
 C20S18. On the Construction of the Berlin Wall
 C20S19. Titoization in Bulgaria
 C20S20. Why the Cold War Continued
 C20S21. Why it is Impossible to Lose Hope
 C20S22. Revisionism in Mongolia

Chapter 21

Page 961

C21S1. The New Titoization Drive in France’s Communist Movement
 C21S2.1. Abdel-Nasser Faction wages Cold War against Moscow Titoists
 C21S2.2. Khrushchev Faction on Sukarno and Indonesia
 C21S2.3. The Khrushchev Faction Promotes Zionist Migration
 C21S3. Slight Proletarian Dominance or Slight Comprador Dominance?
 C21S4. The ‘Anti-Party’ Group / On Voroshilov
 C21S5. Khrushchev (Again) Sabotages the Economy on a Large-Scale through Decentralization / Kosygin Reforms
 C21S6. Bulgaria’s Revisionist Economic Reform
 C21S7. ‘Peaceful Coexistence’
 C21S8. Dictatorial Khrushchev Fosters Cult of Personality Around Himself
 C21S9. Confessing the End of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat / The Terror Attack in Novocherkassk

Chapter 22

Page 983

C22S1. The Partial Resurgence of the Communists via Brezhnev Group
 C22S2. East Germany Transitions to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat
 C22S3. Libyan Jamahiriyyah against Yugoslavia / Yugoslav Trouble-Making against Syria
 C22S4. Yugoslav, Romanian, and Chinese Support for Saddamite Iraq against the Republic of Iran
 C22S5. The Titoist Yugoslav regime on the British Occupation of Ireland and Apartheid South Africa
 C22S6.1. Revolutionary Cuba against Titoist Yugoslavia
 C22S6.2. Revolutionary Cuba against the Moscow Titoists / People’s Democratic Development in Cuba with Brezhnev-era Eurasian Assistance / The Struggle for Establishing a Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Cuba / Some Theoretical Errors of Cuban Leadership
 C22S7. People’s Democratic Development in Albania / Titoization and Anti-Titoist Resistance in Albania
 C22S8. The Demotion of Rankovic
 C22S9. Counter-Revolutionary Stabs in the Back of Socialist Czechoslovakia
 C22S10. Struggles in Poland, the Ouster of the Gomulka Group
 C22S11. The 1981 Military Coup in Poland

Chapter 23

Page 1047

C23S1. People’s Democratic Development in Romania / Resisting Titoization / On Zionist Migration
 C23S2. Setting Romania on the Path of Titoization
 C23S3. Class Struggles in the People’s Republic of Korea in the era of Titoization
 C23S4. The Titoist-Imperialist Cooperation in Afghanistan

C23 S5.1. Titoism in China / Mao Zedong, a Titoist agent of Anglo-American imperialism / Ties to American agent Anna Louise Strong / The Purge of the Kao Kang faction / The Deng faction, fascist agents of Anglo-American Imperialism
C23S5.2. Mao-era Chinese Economic Revisionism Decimates China's Economy
C23S5.3. The Great Anti-Proletarian Anti-Cultural Counter-Revolution
C23S5.4. The Sino-Eurasian Split / China's Social-Chauvinist Aggression against Eurasia
C23S5.5. Deng Faction Sabotages China's Economy
C23S5.6. CIA agent Deng Supports CIA-backed Tiananmen Colour Revolutionaries
C23S6. The Shehu Faction after Official Sino-Albanian 'Split'
C23S7. The Vietnamese Freedom-Fighters against Titoism / Pol Pot, a Yugoslav agent

Chapter 24

Page 1132

C24S1. The Titoist Role in the Fall of Yugoslavia as a Country
C24S2. Some Last Remarks on Titoist Yugoslavia in this Book
C24S3. The Titoists' Second Coming
C24S4. Anglo-American Spy Gorbachev and his Henchpeople

Screenshots & Photos of Sources Used

Page 1144

How to Navigate the Screenshots Section
Table of Contents for the Screenshots
Screenshots

Chapter 16

C16S1. The Joint Distribution Committee, an intelligence front for the American Imperialists and Israeli Reactionaries, Collaborates with the Nazis in Holocaust and against Soviet State

*** IMG-All-{Israel}

The employment of ‘Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGOs) ostensibly devoted to ‘humanitarian relief or ‘human rights’ remains an infamous technique of American and Israeli espionage services. Among such NGOs was the ‘American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee’ – variously also called the ‘Joint Distribution Committee’, ‘American Joint Distribution Committee’, ‘the Joint’, ‘AJDC’, ‘AJJDC’, ‘JDC’, etc. Disguised as a ‘Jewish human rights’ organization:

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was formed in 1914 to help Palestinian Jews suffering under the Ottoman Empire during World War I. (‘CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001’, Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 7) (IMG)

A report by the European Union’s EHRI noted that the Joint was established upon the initiative of US ambassador Henry Morgenthau:

The AJDC was founded in the autumn of 1914 in New York when Henry Morgenthau, US ambassador to Turkey, approached Louis Marshall and Jacob H. Schiff with a request for \$50,000 in support for the Jews in Palestine, who were suffering from famine. (Guide to the Sources on the Holocaust in Occupied Poland, European Holocaust Research Infrastructure (EHRI), Alina Skibinska, Translator: Jessica Taylor-Kucia, 2014, p. 243) (IMG)

With the assistance of the imperial powers, the ‘Jewish Agency’ in Palestine was founded, serving as the representative regime of the collectivity of Zionist settler-colonies in Palestine until 1948, the date of Israel’s official founding. In this context however, and for the purpose of simplicity, the term ‘Israel’ will sometimes be used to refer not only to the post-1948 regime, but also to the ‘Jewish Agency’. Hence, the terms ‘Israel’ and the ‘Jewish Agency’ will be used interchangeably.

Over the years, the American finance capital began to share the British imperialist view that supporting the Zionist movement in the Israel-Palestine region would allow for an Anglo-American base wars against the Arab proletarians and the Arab anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, using the pro-communist Yiddish citizens of Eastern Europe as cannon-fodder. To this end, American finance capital invested greatly in the elevation of the US-backed Zionist settlements. Founded in 1939, Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet was the intelligence branch of Israel’s ‘Haganah’ (‘Defense’) forces and acted as a predecessor to the modern Mossad founded in 1949. The Joint played a critical role in financing and operationally assisting the Mossad:

During the Second World War, the Joint, under Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz worked with Shaul Meyerov (later known as Shaul Avigur), the head of the clandestine *ha-Mossad le-Aliyah Bet*, to smuggle Jews from Europe to Palestine. In 1939, the *Haganah*, and the *Histadrut*, the General Foundation of Jewish Labor, formed the *Aliyah Bet* (interchangeably called the *Mossad*) .. The Joint raised its funds from American Jews to finance the escape movement. The Joint and the *Aliyah Bet* worked with the Jewish Agency to establish their main posts in Lisbon, Marseilles, Istanbul, and later in Paris. As early as 1939, *Aliyah Bet* agents were in contact with Adolf Eichmann, the SS officer in charge of “Jewish Affairs” in an unsuccessful attempt to arrange the release of some 1,000 Jews from Austria. In 1944, Saly Mayer, the Joint’s representative in Switzerland, provided funds to “buy” the release of over 1,500 Jews from Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Other rescue missions, including that of Raoul Wallenberg, were the results of efforts by the Joint and *Aliyah Bet*. (‘CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001’, Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 7) (IMG)

The JDC played a very important role during the Great Patriotic War. The imperialist United States expanded financial support for the JDC via the War Refugee Board (WRB). The pervasive authority of the WRB is corroborated by a post-war report published by the WRB itself:

The functions of the Board ... included without limitation “the development of plans and programs and the inauguration of effective measures for (a) the rescue, transportation, maintenance and relief of the victims of enemy oppression, and (b) the establishment of havens of temporary refuge for such victims”

The Board was directed to enlist through appropriate channels the cooperation and participation of foreign governments and to cooperate with existing international refugee, relief and rescue organizations in the execution of such plans and programs.

The State, Treasury, and War Departments were directed to execute at the request of the Board such parts of the Board’s plans, programs and measures falling within their respective spheres. All agencies and

departments were directed to supply or obtain such information, assistance, and facilities as the Board might require in carrying out the provisions of the Order.

(‘Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board’, United States War Refugee Board, William O’Dwyer, September 15, 1945, p. 3) (IMG)

It is worth noting also that US President Roosevelt was reluctant to establish an all-powerful War Refugee Board for Zionist organizations. As he opposed the establishment of a “Jewish state,” FDR’s views regarding Palestine no doubt clashed with Zionist interests. A few months prior to the establishment of the WRB, in “a memorandum by Colonel Harold B. Hoskins of a conversation he had with the President on September 27, 1943,” it was stated:

As to a solution of the Palestine problem, the President stated that his own thinking leaned toward a wider use of the idea of trusteeship for Palestine – of making Palestine a real Holy Land for all three religions, with a Jew, a Christian, and a Moslem as the three responsible trustees. He said he realized it might be difficult to get the agreement of the Jews to such a plan but if Moslems and Christians of the world were agreed he hoped the Jews could also be persuaded. This concept to be successful would, he also realized, have to be presented as a solution larger and more inclusive than the establishment of an Arab state or a Jewish state. He realized that this idea of course required further thought and needed to be worked out in greater detail, but at least that was the line along which his mind was running. (867N.01/2068, Palestine Question, Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam), Washington, October 15, 1943. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,” US State Department, Vol. 4, p. 816.) (IMG)

Although the US President Roosevelt was officially responsible for the establishment of the WRB, the President was basically forced to do so as the result of the lobbying campaign of the Jabotinskyite Irgun, which had roots in the Italian Fascists, and the pro-Irgun officials such as Secretary Morgenthau. Yehuda Bauer, a prominent scholar from the Yad Vashem and a former Mapam activist, remarked:

The president yielded to a combination of public pressure, organized largely by the Emergency Committee of the Irgun and, quite independently, by a small group of non-Jewish Treasury officials exercising constant pressure on Secretary Morgenthau. On January 22, 1944, Presidential Executive Order No. 9417 established a War Refugee Board to deal with attempts to rescue victims of the Nazis. (‘American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939-1945’, Yehuda Bauer, 2017) (IMG)

The US government, through its War Refugee Board (WRB), backed the projects of the American imperialist intelligence organization, JDC, by issuing licenses that permitted the JDC to, on behalf of the US government, transfer funds abroad. According to a document published by the War Refugee Board itself, the Board’s

operations were financed and carried out by private American and [Zionist Jewish] Palestinian agencies, under the direction of the Board’s representatives in Ankara. By far the largest number were rescued by the Jewish Agency for Palestine working with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. (‘Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board’, United States War Refugee Board, William O’Dwyer, September 15, 1945, p. 21) (IMG)

From then on, the Joint/JDC was also covertly funded by the US government’s WRB via “the Intergovernmental Committee of the Red Cross”:

In addition, the Board obtained an allocation of \$2,000,000 from the President’s Emergency Fund for payment to the Committee as the United States Government’s share of the Committee’s 1944 operational budget. The Committee spent the bulk of these funds ... in France, Hungary and Rumania, using the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee as its agent. (‘Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board’, United States War Refugee Board, William O’Dwyer, September 15, 1945, p. 21) (IMG)

As with everywhere else, the head of the Joint in Europe worked closely with Israel’s regime, known back then as the ‘Jewish Agency’:

The JDC director [Schwartz] added that he was working in close cooperation with the Jewish Agency. (‘Dr. Joseph Schwartz, J.D.C. Director, Reaches Palestine on Relief Mission’, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, August 8, 1943, p. 3. In: JTA Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 183.) (IMG)

The relationship between the Joint/Mossad and American intelligence is confirmed also by a prominent American intelligence official named:

Capt. Jules Koenig, a member of X-2’s small base in Vienna.. (‘CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001’, Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 6) (IMG)

The X-2 was one of the:

Three branches of OSS.. (‘CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001’, Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 8) (IMG)

It served as the OSS's counter-espionage and liaison activities. According to Koenig, the Joint worked for the Western intelligence services as a liaison and as the financier of the intelligence network in Europe:

Funded by outside groups, including the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (commonly called the "Joint" or the JDC), the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the Political Section of the Jewish Agency, and the Aliyah Bet, Jewish agents penetrated the Third Reich both to rescue the refugees and to collect intelligence during the war. These personnel later formed the basis for the Brichah in numerous European countries during 1945-46. According to Koenig, "the various British Intelligence Services freely used the emissaries of this section [i.e. the Jewish Agency] for penetration, intelligence and DA [double agent] purposes. The representatives of the AJDC acted as a liaison with the Allied intelligence services and eventually financed this courier-cum-intelligence service." ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 7-8. Square brackets are original. The CIA paper cites: 'SCI/A, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S), in DO Records, 1L 3, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC) (IMG)

As confirmed by Uri Bialer, a senior anti-Soviet official in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, this close financial and operational relationship between the Joint and Mossad continued well after the Great Patriotic War:

This method required a great deal of financing and here, too, the experience acquired during the course of aliyah activities in Eastern Europe prior to May 1948 proved to be useful and significant. The organization of aliyah involved numerous other expenses, notably payment for land and sea transportation and maintenance of the refugees from their departure until their disembarkation in Palestine. Despite efforts to finance these activities independently after the Second World War, the Jewish Agency managed to raise only one-quarter of the tremendous costs involved; the bulk came from the American Jewish organization known as "the Joint" (the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee). The Joint's support was clandestine, reflecting its ambivalence to Mossad activities: the organization's leaders were sensitive to the preservation of the Joint's posture of legality and to the absence of direct links with the Zionist movement. They also felt uncomfortable about contributing to illegal activities which were directly harmful to Britain, America's ally. Under these circumstances, the Joint's assistance to the Mossad had to be secret; indeed, it was not defined in any official document. Nevertheless, opponents of aliyah were certainly aware of the Joint's role. When British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin reviewed the Palestinian problem in parliament early in December 1947, he strongly alleged that illegal immigration into Palestine would not be possible were it not financed by the Jews of America through the Joint. Historical evidence now available entirely supports Bevin's claim. (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 82) (IMG)

An Israeli journal on military and intelligence affairs confirmed that until long after World War II:

the State of Israel [was] assisted and sometimes funded by the US Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC or 'Joint').. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

As confirmed by Ya'akov Kedmi ('Yasha Kedmi') – an important leader of the Israeli intelligence front 'Nativ', and a prominent Mossad operative – the Joint was, until 1967, responsible for almost all of the financing of the Mossad, the Nativ, as well as Israel's nuclear program in Dimona:

"The Romanians set the price, and we said that Jews have no price and that we would pay for everything. The money [for paying for Jewish migration] came from the JDC, like the financing for Dimona [nuclear project]. Until 1967, the Mossad and 'Nativ' were financed by funds provided by the JDC, not by Israeli national funds," says Yasha Kedmi. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

In brief, the JDC/Joint was an American-Israeli intelligence and special operations organization. The Mossad was a part of Joint. The subordinate character of the Mossad to the American intelligence is demonstrated in the fact that for instance, in:

August 1944, OSS agreed to accept reports from the Jewish Agency, but refused to exchange American intelligence or even acknowledge the Jewish reporting. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 8) (IMG)

Israel, or the 'Jewish Agency in Palestine', held a subordinate position vis-a-vis the United States, which makes sense because American finance capital obviously had more historical-material factors under its control than Israel.

From December 1941 to December 1942, the Nazi regime pursued a hostile policy towards American imperialism, and hence Israel's regime, the partner of American intelligence in the Middle East. Only for this one year, solely for this very brief period of time can it be said that the Nazis were genuinely opposed to Israel's regime. The shift began with the turn of the tide against the Nazi war machine in Stalingrad and the Caucasus in December 1942. **As the Axis forces began to gradually retreat, the Anglo-American imperialists had no other choice than to aid the Axis as a bulwark against**

the victorious USSR and the Eastern European Peoples' Democratic forces. The result would be a historic alliance between the Axis and the Anglo-American Allied forces documented in all the previous chapters on the Cold War.

Of the covert channels through which American intelligence supplied economic support for the Nazi forces, the most fascinating was the attempt by American intelligence in providing donations and grants to the SS under the cover of supplying 'humanitarian' funds for the Ashkenazim and the Sfaradim. The calls for the rescue of the Yiddish people from Nazi extermination were misused by the American imperialist secret service as a means of materially sponsoring the Nazis in the war against the USSR. In exchange for 'rescuing' a rather small number of 'biologically valuable' Zionist Jews from Nazi-occupied Europe to move to Palestine, the American secret service and its recruited traitors to the Yiddish people would assist the Nazis in using Yiddish slave labour for the anti-Soviet war effort, and would – with the approval of the Mossad – 'calm down' one million Jews so that they do not resist extermination by the Nazis. These facts will be evidenced in this chapter. Noteworthy is that the Soviet media relentlessly exposed the alliance between the dominant US-backed faction of Israel's regime and the Nazis. In a January 1953 article for the Soviet press titled 'Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service', a Soviet intelligence analyst wrote:

In supporting the American imperialists' policy of launching another world war aimed at establishing U.S. world supremacy, the Zionists are in fact supporting everything that goes with it, in particular, the revival of nazism and the implantation of bloodthirsty fascist regimes imbued with the spirit of race hatred, including anti-semitism. By supporting this policy and assisting its implementation, the Zionists expose themselves as enemies not only of peace and democracy, but also of the labouring sections of the Jewish people. (Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service, New Times, Vladislav Minayev, January 21, 1953, p. 6. Re-printed in: CIA archives)

The dawn of this Nazi-Zionist alliance was in December 1942, as documented by Yehuda Bauer. 'Himmler', he said, succeeded in:

obtaining Hitler's agreement in December 1942 to sell Jews for hard currency and, by implication, for real advantages to the Reich. ('Jews for Sale?: Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-1945', Yale University Press, Yehuda Bauer, 1994, p. 255) (IMG)

Some would accuse Bauer of having too much of a 'pro-Soviet' 'bias'. However, reinforcing the claims of Bauer is Shlomo Aronson, who has been a Brookings Institute scholar, an IDF correspondent, a Ben-Gurion faction loyalist, a henchman of Moshe Dayan in the Telam Party in Israel, and a very prominent historian of the Holocaust. Aronson corroborated:

Hitler himself had authorized ransoming of "rich Jews" in exchange for "large sums of foreign currency" at the end of 1942. ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, p. 172) (IMG)

It could be speculated that Himmler saw in such exchange deals an opening toward negotiations with the West on a separate peace, capitalizing on Hitler's limited permission to exchange a few Jews for much money. The requested sum was thus an opening for much more in terms of the very connection thereby created between Himmler and the West using Jews for his genuine political purpose, separate peace, following El Alamein and mainly due to the German defeat at Stalingrad, as argued by several parties involved such as Pomeranz in his postwar memoir and by some scholars ex post facto. ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, pp. 172-173) (IMG)

Such negotiations in practice were not limited to saving the Yiddish proletarians from annihilation. Make no mistakes! On the surface, that is surely what they appeared as; in practice, they served as the noble mask to a sinister alliance.

The Moshe Dayan henchman Shlomo Aronson wrote about the financing of the Nazi SS via Slovakia. Dieter Wisliceny, the Nazi SS leader who served as a deputy to Adolf Eichmann, played an instrumental role in the negotiations between the SS and the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist agents of the American intelligence service. The JDC, the Zionist leadership of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, and perhaps even 'more so' the Judaic extremist Rabbi Weissmandel all had a role in providing financial aid to the SS:

The so-called "rescue debate" seemed to have found here a solid ground. This was especially true when Rabbi Weissmandel's view of its chances, **Wisliceny's alleged serious intentions, and Wisliceny's superiors' alleged willingness to negotiate** (if the Slovak Rescue Committee at least had something serious to show in terms of money) were shared by other rescue workers, even if with less bitterness and crusade-like emotions. Some kept repeating that a chance was missed and that rescue in general could have been enhanced if more money had been appropriated by the "conventional" Jewish leadership. **In fact, the Zionist leadership and AJDC representatives in Europe invested much thought and energy in regard to the Plan**, and in spite of their grave doubts about its origins and purposes, **they invested in it the requested advances..** The Plan and its collapse became a combined religious and emotional case personally for Weissmandel, whose accusations were posthumously published by ultraorthodox leaders in order to explain the Holocaust their way as a result of the secularization process among Jews, which led on the one hand to the catastrophe of the European Jews as divine punishment and on the other to the alleged betrayal of Jews at the hands of secular Jews. ('Hitler, the Allies, and

the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, p. 174. Bold added.) (IMG)

The finances provided to the Nazi military and intelligence bodies were not really 'bribes' to have the Nazis end the systematic extermination of the Ashkenazim and the Sfaradim but rather served as a tool through which the American intelligence, using the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist traitors to the Yiddish people, financially sponsored the mass-killers of the Ashkenazim and the Sfaradim. This was why, contrary to the assertions of the fascist Rabbi Weissmandel, the deportations of the Yiddish continued to happen for several months after the time they were supposed to 'stop' due to the supposed 'bribe' deal:

About 60,000 of the 95,000 Slovak Jews were deported to death camps in Poland until August 1942, when the SD branch (Abschnitt) in Bratislava advised its head office (Leitabschnitt) in Vienna that about 59,000 had been deported, about 8,000 had fled to Hungary, and the lives of the remaining 22,000 had been spared by the Slovak authorities. **In fact, the deportations continued for several months afterward and then were finally stopped.** Indeed, said the report, the number of Jews had shrunk by 67,000 but it should be noted that most of the deported Jews were "small Jews," who had few connections, whereas the rich and influential Jews to a large extent remained in the country. **This argument entirely refutes Weissmandel's assumption, and his posthumous allegation, that the Germans were successfully bribed to stop the killings.** ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, p. 175. Bold added.) (IMG)

The 'secular' Kautskyite leaders such as Kastner, the henchman of David Ben-Gurion, was on board with Rabbi Weissmandel:

Pomeranz in Istanbul, Schwalb in Geneva, and several members of a Zionist "Rescue Committee" in Budapest, among them Joel Brand and Rezso Kasztner, came to share a similar concept, or at least adopted for various reasons a similar hope, that a deal (or several separate deals) with the Germans was possible. Such deals depended on outside funding or on the delivery of Allied goods. Once Wisliceny appeared in occupied Budapest with a letter of recommendation from Rabbi Weissmandel in Bratislava and was approached by the Hungarian Rescue Committee to renew negotiations he had broken off in August 1943, telling his Slovak counterparts that he might renew them in the future, these rescue advocates sincerely believed or at least argued that such deals should be pursued. Thus, the ensuing Gestapo Deal concerning the ransoming of the Hungarian Jewry might have been born first in their minds, then returned to them by the Germans as a "real" possibility.. ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, pp. 173-174) (IMG)

Given that the SS did not fulfill its 'promise' to stop the deportations of the Yiddish detainees to Auschwitz, the Joint had every reason to cease all financial support for the SS. Saving the Yiddish was no longer an excuse for financing the SS, since the SS sent children of Yiddish background to extermination regardless. And yet, the Joint continued to finance the SS, in manners far more treasonous. Herein comes the Kastner case. In Hungary, the American-Israeli intelligence was headed by Rezso 'Rudolph' Kastner. A US intelligence document listing the members of the Joint. 'In December 1943', the document stated, Kastner became the:

JOINT contact in Budapest. (PERSONS CONNECTED WITH JOINT AGENCY OR AMERICAN JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE "JOINT" IN HUNGARY AND AUSTRIA DURING THE WAR AND THROUGH JUNE 1946 AS NOTED IN THE SYMPHONY FILE, CIA, February 1950, p. 5) (IMG)

A report by the SSU – a US intelligence agency and an immediate predecessor of the CIA in the postwar years – confirmed that Kastner was indeed the leader of the Joint in Budapest since November 1943:

Samuel SPRINGMAN was leader of the JOINT in Budapest until November 1943. In December 1944 he, and his wife left for Palestine and transmitted his duties to KASTNER (alias Dr. KRASZNER) who worked together with Joel BRANDT. ('SUBJECT: GENERAL: Project SYMPHONY, SPECIFIC: Dr. KASTNERR and Eng BYESZ', SECRET CONTROL, Office of Origin: Vienna, Austria, SCI/A, Field Hq. File No. LVX 230, Report Made At: Vienna, Headquarters of the United States Forces Austria, Made By: DD 110, SSU, May 1, 1946, p. 2. In: SYMPHONY VOL. 1_0023, CIA) (IMG)

Kastner was also one of the:

members of the Jewish Agency.. (Reference to Kastner Before and During Eichmann Trial, Memorandum, CIA, January 25, 1961, p. 1) (IMG)

The top-ranking SS leader in Hungary Kurt Becher listed Rudolf Kastner as one of the:

leading personalities of the Jewish agency and the Joint Distribution Committee.. (Affidavit of SS Standartenfuehrer Kurt Becher, On His and Rank's Attitude Toward Jews, Translation of Document Frank 17, Frank Defense Exhibit 16, June 12, 1947, Trial of War Criminals Before the Nuremburg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremburg Military Tribunals, October 1946 to April 1949, p. 684) (IMG)

Becher also listed Kastner as the representative of the Jewish Agency and the Joint Distribution Committee in Hungary, as well as the President of the Zionist Organization of Hungary:

Shortly after I arrived in Budapest, I began negotiations with ... the President of the Zionist Organization of

Hungary, who was at the same time the representative of the Jewish Agency and the Joint D. C., Dr. Rudolf Kasztner.. (Statutory Declaration, Kurt Becher, April 12, 1948, p. 1. Affidavit Recorded by: U.S. War Department, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, Benno H. Selcke. US.Civ.AGO-D 433012) (IMG)

Dieter Wisliceny, another high-level Nazi official and friend of Eichmann, confirmed that:

Dr. Rudolph Kastner [belonged to] the Joint Distribution Committee.. (NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, Vol. 8, United States Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946, p. 614) (IMG)

Much has been revealed about Kastner by Adolf Eichmann's memoirs. Under Eichmann, the camps in Hungary were set up for the aim of:

deportations to Auschwitz.. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART I, p. 31. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

As the official representative of Israel, and as the number one American-Israeli intelligence operative in wartime Hungary, Kastner also served as the kapo-in-chief, helping the Nazis in the pacification of the Jews in deportation camps:

This Dr. Kastner was a young man about my age, an ice-cold lawyer and a fanatical Zionist. He agreed to help keep the Jews from resisting deportation – and even keep order in the camps – if I ... let a few hundred or a few thousand young Jews emigrate illegally to Palestine. It was a good bargain. For keeping order in the camps, the price of 15,000 to 20,000 Jews – in the end there may have been more – was not too high for me.

Except perhaps for the first few sessions, Kastner never came to me fearful of the Gestapo strong man. We negotiated entirely as equals. People forget that. We ... trusted each other perfectly. When he was with me, Kastner smoked cigarets as though he were in a coffee house. While we talked he would smoke one aromatic cigaret after another, taking them from a silver case and lighting them with a little silver lighter. With his great polish and reserve he would have made an ideal Gestapo officer himself.

Dr. Kastner's main concern was to make it possible for a select group of Hungarian Jews to emigrate to Israel. (...). As a matter of fact, there was a very strong similarity between our attitudes in the SS and the viewpoint of this immensely idealistic Zionist leader [i.e. Kastner].. As I told Kastner: "We, too, are idealists and we, too, had to sacrifice our own blood before we came to power."

Kastner would sacrifice a thousand or a hundred thousand of his blood to achieve his goal. He was not interested in old Jews who had become assimilated into Hungarian society. But he was incredibly persistent in trying to save biologically valuable Jewish blood, that is, human material that was capable of reproduction and hard work. "You can have the others," he would say, "but let me have this group here." And because Kastner rendered us a great service by helping keep the deportation camps peaceful, I would let his groups escape. After all, I was not connected with small groups of a thousand or so Jews. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 2-4. Recorded by: CIA. Bold added) (IMG)

In other words, the American-Israeli intelligence official Kastner assisted the Germans in the extermination of approximately one million Ashkenazim and Sfaradim, in exchange for the 'biologically valuable' among them who could become cannon-fodder for the aggressive Zionist anti-Arab wars in the Israel-Palestine region. Years later, the Kastner Case came up and the Mossad operative Kastner was, not at all incorrectly, accused of having helped the Nazis murder one million Jews. A CIA memorandum stated:

Dr. Rudolf KASTNER's wartime activities were rather thoroughly, though not entirely, exposed at a court trial in Tel Aviv. Kastner had initiated a libel case against a fellow Israeli who had accused him of making a deal with Eichmann in Hungary which resulted in the death of a million Jews. (Reference to Kastner Before and During Eichmann Trial, Memorandum, CIA, January 25, 1961, p. 1) (IMG)

People have to understand that many elderly Ashkenazim and Sfaradim were ideologically not favorable towards Zionism, not necessarily because they felt sympathies for the Arab nation, but because they found giving up their homes in Eastern Europe and farming in kibbutzim in Palestine ridiculous. Furthermore, they could not be very useful for the Ben-Gurion regime even if they were sympathizers, since they were old. A significant number of them were not specialists. Had they traveled to Israel, the Ben-Gurion regime would have had to pay heavy costs to provide a pension plan for people who were not even going to work. As such, as migrants to Israel, even if they were true believers in Zionism, they would have de facto operated more like an anti-Zionist weapon of mass migration, creating costs for the Zionist 'welfare' state, and hence undermining Zionism rather than serving it. It follows that the Mossad could not care about their lives, and was willing to sell them for cheap in exchange for more Nazi cooperation with the Mossad against USSR, and in exchange for younger, 'more useful' Jews. Indeed, these relatively few Jews whom Kastner or other Joint officials selected would then be covertly transported to Zionist areas in Palestine:

This is how most of the illegal emigrations were arranged: a group of special Jews was taken into custody and brought together in a place designated by Kastner and his men, where they were put under SS guard to keep them from harm. After the Jewish political organizations arranged transportation out of the country, I instructed

the border police to let their transports pass unhindered. They traveled generally by night. That was the “gentleman’s agreement” I had with Kastner.

After leaving Hungary, the Jews could then travel through neutral foreign countries or stay hidden, usually in Rumania, until the necessary steamships arrived to take them on board. When they reached Israel, the ships waited off shore until a few courageous Jews helped the passengers land against the orders of the British mandate authorities. (...). All these minor shipments – a matter of 700 here, 2,000 there, and so forth – were made with Himmler’s permission. I would never have dared dance to my own waltz. If I demanded rigid obedience from my own subordinates, I had to be just as rigid in carrying out my superiors’ orders. Otherwise I would have been a bad SS commander, and I pride myself on having been a good one. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 5-6. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

Kastner also negotiated with Kurt Becher in order to release his own ‘biologically useful’ family:

At the same time Kastner was bargaining with another SS official, a Lieut. Col. Becher. Becher was bartering Jews for foreign exchange and material on direct orders from Himmler. (...). There were other agencies, German and Hungarian, which tapped Kastner for foreign exchange in return for Jews, but I held aloof from all money affairs and left the material transactions to Becher.

Men under Becher’s command guarded a special group of 700 Jews whom Kastner had requested from a list. They were mostly young people, although the group also included Kastner’s entire family. I did not care if Kastner took his relatives along; he could take them wherever he wanted to.

(MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 4-5. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

As the Soviet Red Army forces were advancing against the Axis forces, Kastner, the representative of Israeli intelligence and regime, provided Jewish slave labour for the Nazi war effort against the Soviets:

With the Russian advance westwards, conditions in Hungary became more and more chaotic. After the deportations stopped, I was called upon forcibly to deport 10,000 ethnic Germans before the Russians overran their homeland in eastern Hungary. When I returned to Budapest the situation was tense. My old friend and comrade, General Zehender, commander of the 22nd SS Cavalry division which we had hoped to motorize, was defending Budapest as the Russians drew nearer. Then his artillery ran out of shells. Zehender’s position was near a street-car station on the east side of the city, but his ammunition depot was several kilometers beyond the last streetcar stop to the west. He told me in despair that the Russians were about to attack his division and he had no ammunition for his hundred guns.

I proposed a living chain of Jews to carry shells from the depot and load them on streetcars at the west and station. The streetcars could carry them through the center of Budapest to the eastern end of the line where his own units could move them to the front line. My idea worked. I told Kastner the plan and he furnished the necessary number of Jews. We made a living chain of them, six or eight kilometers long to carry the shells from the depot to the station. Then dozens of streetcars, one after the other, sped across Budapest to meet Zehender’s men in the east. The guns blazed away.

(MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 12-13. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

In mid-1944, Eichmann began:

following the second basic order of Reichsführer Himmler: to arrange if possible for a million Jews to go free in exchange for 10,000 winterized trucks, with trailers, which we needed to use against the Russians on the Eastern Front. (MEMOIRS PART I, CIA, November 1, 1960, PART I, p. 31) (IMG)

Himmler’s gang needed America and Israel to supply the SS with trucks in order to motorize their divisions:

I do remember Himmler’s specifically saying to me, “Eichmann, motorize the 8th and 22nd SS Cavalry Divisions.”

This indicated the personal concern of Himmler, as head of the “replacement army,” in receiving those trucks. They were far more important than the lives of individual Jews. What did he care about a million Jews? His concern was his division. He apparently did not want to motorize these two divisions but rather to equip them as a sort of fast-moving task force.

(MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 7-8. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

Dieter Wisliceny, the top-ranking Nazi SS official and friend of Eichmann, remarked:

While detailed preparations were being made and actions taken to prepare all Hungarian Jews for evacuation, Dr. Rudolph Kastner of the Joint Distribution Committee gave me 3,000,000 pengoe [i.e. Hungarian currency] for Eichmann to induce him to grant a first interview on the Jewish question. This money was carefully counted and taken over by Geschke’s treasurer. About 8 or 10 April, a meeting was arranged at the Hotel Majestic in

Eichmann's office between Dr. Kastner, Mr. Brand another representative of the Committee, and Eichmann. There followed a series of conversations in which Eichmann was implored to leave Hungarian Jews alone upon an offer to pay any amount to stop further action. Eichmann reported the situation to Himmler who sent Standartenfuehrer Becher to continue negotiations in Budapest. (NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, Vol. 8, United States Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946, p. 614) (IMG)

The Nazis would use the vehicles exclusively for fighting the Soviet Red Army, and not the Anglo-Americans:

Only Heinrich Himmler could turn off the liquidation machine. It was after the July 20th assassination attempt on Hitler, when Reichsfuehrer Himmler had taken over as commander of the Replacement Army and Minister of the Interior, that he authorized me to propose an exchange: one million Jews for 10,000 trucks and trailers, equipped for winter. The world Jewish organization could choose for itself what Jews it wanted to save. We asked only that they get us 10,000 trucks. Thanks to Himmler's directive, I could assure them, on my word of honor, that these trucks would be used only on the Eastern front. As I said at the time, "When the 10,000 trucks with trailers are here, then the liquidation machine in Auschwitz will be stopped." (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 1-2. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

Indeed, American-Israeli intelligence began the shipment of tractors to the SS. Kastner was not one of the rogue elements in the American-Israeli intelligence. Kastner's ideas were backed by his superiors in the American-Israeli intelligence service in Europe. All of these facts are confirmed by the memoirs and work of Dr. Isaac Lewin – the member and Israeli representative of the Zionist 'Agudath Israel' movement in the United Nations and member of the UN Human Rights Commission – who was involved in the American-Israeli funding of the SS with vehicles during the War. As an official in the Agudas Israel, Isaac Lewin describes the operations by:

Jacob Rosenheim, president of the "Agudas Israel" World Organization. (ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, p. 46) (IMG)

HIJEFS, Lewin said, was:

a committee established in Montreux, Switzerland, in 1941 for the purpose of helping students of rabbinical academies in Poland and Lithuania who had escaped to Shanghai. The name is an abbreviation of "Hilfsverein fur jtidische Fluchtlinge in Shanghai." Its founders were Isaac and Recha Sternbuch. The committee extended its activities and became the counterpart of the "Vaad Hatzala" in New York. (ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, p. 56. Citing his own book: Nuch'n Churban, Isaac Lewin, 1950, pp. 87-94.) (IMG)

Thus, 'Isaac Sternbuch', said a report by the executive director of the War Refugee Board, was the:

Swiss representative of the American Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee.. ('Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board', United States War Refugee Board, William O'Dwyer, September 15, 1945, p. 43) (IMG)

Vaad Hahatzala and HIJEFS were therefore practically different wings of the same organization. The latter was located in Europe, whereas the former was in New York.

Lewin noted that a:

convoy [containing the Yiddish] which was to be sent to a neutral country as a sign of the [Nazi] murderers' "good will," after a lengthy journey from Klausenburg via Budapest and Bergen Belsen, eventually (on August 21, 1944) reached ... the Swiss border. Thus 318 persons were saved..

According to information from Sternbuch neither he nor his "Hijefs" organization had initiated this convoy. But the final act should be credited to them. To this very day it has been a mystery why Eichmann and his gang eventually released this convoy. Can it be assumed that this was gratuitous? In Eichmann's first meeting with Brand he distinctly told him: "Ware fur Blut? Blut fur Ware" (Merchandise for blood? blood for merchandise). For the [life] of 318 Jews something had to be given.

But what was given and who gave it?

(ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, p. 56) (IMG)

Based on documents from Sternbuch, Lewin found that indeed vehicles were being sent to the Nazis as part of the effort to assist the motorization of the SS Cavalry, in exchange for the release of the 318 Ashkenazis:

Sternbuch has transmitted to us original documents according to which his committee had sent to Budapest a letter of credit for a certain number of tractors. On July 5, 1944 Intercommerz Aktirngesellschaft in Zurich, Talstrasse 15, notified Simon Ascher in Bex that an order for thirty tractors had come from Budapest with the advice that the letter of credit in free currency was to be delivered by Ascher who collaborated with Sternbuch.

Immediately feverish negotiations were started. The price was 519,000 Swiss francs.

The orthodox representative in Budapest, Philip von Freudiger, cabled on July 7 to Sternbuch:

Communicate urgently with Intercommerz Zurich Talstrasse 15 concerning credits for 30 Willy [Wisliceny] tractors exportable 17,300 francs each according to offer of 15 June payable to Buchs Budapest on presenting documents.

Sternbuch of course immediately solicited the money and obtained consent to send the letter of credit in free currency. At that time the convoy was to be sent to Spain. Freudiger cabled Sternbuch on July 20:

Settle immediately in agreement with Rosenheim the ordered tractors for final settlement of the Spanish compensation depends on it. Failure of tractor delivery endanger entire solution. Don't delay to cable start of delivery.

Sternbuch replied on July 23:

Rosenheim's announcement temporarily dispatching 400 kilograms wool (Zell wolle) received.

Opening on Monday letter of credit for ten tractors.

The expression "400 kg. Zellwolle" was an agreed-upon sign. It meant that Rosenheim (i.e. America) placed at "Hijefs" disposal 400,000 Swiss francs. The letter of credit in the Zurich firm was effected, although only for the initial ten tractors.

In the light of these telegrams it becomes clear why the group of 318 persons was eventually sent from Bergen-Belsen (not to Spain but to Switzerland). Apparently Freudiger was able to prove that such a letter of credit was in Zurich; therefore Eichmann's devilish principle "Ware für Blut ? Blut für Ware" had been satisfied.

(ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, pp. 56-57) (IMG)

Thus:

On August 26, Sternbuch cabled to Bratislava (because communication with Budapest had been temporarily interrupted):

First dispatch of 320 arrived..

(...). On August 25 Sternbuch cabled us via the Polish Legation in Bern:

320 persons arrived by train to Basel. Among them many personalities and Rabbis. Other transports are said to be on the way, with them probably also Satmarer will come.

On September 26 Sternbuch cabled us via the Polish Legation about an action connected with the second group of this convoy:

Recently we deposited 260,000 Swiss fr. in the Swiss Bank for the Gestapo trustees in Budapest.

It's a great pity we were not allowed to do it two months ago for we deposited on our own 170,000, saving in this way 320 persons. The merchandise and the money remained in Switzerland and probably will not be sent.

These cables explain the puzzle connected with the rescue of the first convoy from Bergen-Belsen. The letter of credit in the amount of 170,000 Sw. fr. for the shipment of ten tractors deposited by "Hijefs" at the end of July 1944 saved the first part of the convoy. Sternbuch, thanks to his contact with us via the Polish Legation in Bern and the Embassy in Washington, continued to work. The second much larger part of the convoy was also saved when the sum of 5 million Sw. fr. was deposited by "Joint" or McLelland from the American Legation in Bern as a down payment towards the 20 million Sw. fr. agreed upon. The second train from Bergen-Belsen arrived in Switzerland on December 8, 1944. Among those rescued was Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum of Satmar, one of the greatest "Tzadiks" of the present time, who now lives in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, N.Y.

(ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, pp. 57-58) (IMG)

After the arrival of those trains, a new series of negotiations began a few days later. In these negotiations, documented by USA's War Refugee Board, the US Treasury Department issued a license to Joint allowing the latter to loan \$1,000,000 to Sternbuch's network which in turn would transfer that money covertly to the SS in early March 1945:

A second series of meetings between high Nazi circles and a Swiss citizen for the release of Jewish deportees came to the attention of the Board in December 1944. The negotiations were conducted in Germany by Jean-Marie Musy, a former Swiss Federal Counselor acting as a private citizen, with Himmler and other high S.S. officers. Whatever his motives, Musy, who claimed to be an old personal friend of Himmler, succeeded in obtaining the release to Switzerland of 1200 Jews from the Theresienstadt concentration camp in early February 1945. Shortly before the arrival of these refugees in Switzerland, Musy had approached Isaac Sternbuch, Swiss representative of the American Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee, whom Musy had kept advised of his dealings with the Nazis, for a payment of one million dollars. Sternbuch cabled his organization in the United

States urging that this sum be transferred to Switzerland at once stating that the German release of additional convoys of Jews depended upon the receipt of this sum by Musy. The Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee, after having arranged to borrow the million dollars from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, immediately requested the Board to recommend that the United States Treasury issue the necessary license permitting the transfer as specified by Sternbuch. A special meeting of the members of the Board was called to consider the matter. The Board unanimously decided that under no circumstances would it authorize the payment of ransom which might result from payment of the sum to Musy. However, since the mere presence of the money in Switzerland might serve to continue the negotiations, the Board agreed to recommend that the Treasury issue a license permitting the Vaad Hahatzala to transfer the sum to a joint account in the names of Sternbuch and the Board's representative in Bern, Roswell D. McClelland, and providing that no payments be permitted from the account except as authorized by the Board. The Treasury issued such a license and the transfer was made in early March 1945. The fund was kept, intact for the remainder of the war except for a small payment authorized for relief supplies and the maintenance of refugees. The unexpected balance of this fund was returned after hostilities ceased to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. ('Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board', United States War Refugee Board, William O'Dwyer, September 15, 1945, pp. 42-44) (IMG)

Again, these funds to the SS were used exclusively for fighting the Soviets on the Eastern Front. In 1945, just as the Anglo-American forces and the Red Army were marching towards Germany's heartland, Himmler ordered Eichmann's gang not to shoot at the Anglo-Americans:

In the middle of our move an orderly arrived from Kaltenbrunner with a directive from Reichsführer Himmler ordering us not to shoot at Americans or Englishmen. I countersigned it and ... I conveyed this order to the men.

(MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 24 -25. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

The rescue of the refugees could happen through using funds for financing a network of agents that both sabotage the Nazi war effort and provide illegal channels for allowing the escape of the refugees; funding the Nazi SS as a whole, not some rogue officials of the SS, and assisting it in the anti-Soviet war effort was no positive contribution to the liberation of the Yiddish inmates. Had the US intelligence and the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist agents been serious about rescuing the Yiddish inmates, the US intelligence would not have funded the Nazis and directly assisted the anti-Soviet war effort. As in the case of the funding of the SS via Slovakia, there is very little evidence to suggest that funds provided to the Nazis were agreed upon to be in exchange for the release of more than a thousand Ashkenazi or Sfaradi inmates. Rather, they constituted the use of the Nazis' so-called 'good will' gestures – such as the alleged release of 1,200 refugees – as an excuse to fund the Nazis. And for the record, the Soviets opposed the transfer of such funds to Nazi Germany. Another US diplomatic document, while providing details on the funds to Nazi Germany, admitted that such funds were provided without the authorization of their wartime 'ally' the Soviet Union:

On February 7, 1945, 1,200 refugees arrived in Switzerland from Germany. Their release was arranged by Musy, a former Federal Councilor of Switzerland, who had made a number of trips to Germany at the instigation of Sternbuch, the representative in Switzerland of the Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada. Musy returned to Switzerland in advance of the refugees announcing that he had secured their release by direct negotiation with Himmler, whom he had seen on his previous trips to Germany. He stated that additional groups of refugees would arrive weekly in Switzerland dependent upon German transportation facilities. He advised Sternbuch that he would require a deposit of 5,000,000 Swiss francs in his (Musy's) name in the Swiss National Bank immediately after the arrival of the 1,200. This money he suggested might later be paid over by the Germans to the International Committee of the Red Cross as a further gesture of good faith.

The Rabbis are now pressing the War Refugee Board and the Treasury Department for a license to transmit 4,000,000 Swiss francs to Switzerland to be paid to Musy. They have on deposit in Switzerland 1,000,000 Swiss francs under a previous license. The Department has been asked by Brigadier General O'Dwyer, Executive Director of the War Refugee Board, if it will approve the transaction. He has advised the Rabbis that he will issue the license if the Department agrees.

There are two other negotiations of this character in process. One, originating in a ransom proposal last June, has been shifted by Saly Mayer, the Swiss negotiator and a responsible person, to a proposal that in return for a German promise to cease exterminations, relief supplies might be furnished to feed surviving Jews in concentration camps. Mayer has conducted these negotiations with the Germans since August 1944. Early in January 1945 he requested the deposit of 20,000,000 Swiss francs in Switzerland in order to maintain his position in the negotiations. The Board and the Department authorized the transmission of these funds to a joint account in the names of Saly Mayer and McClelland, the representative of the War Refugee Board at Bern, with the stipulation that no commitment or payment be made without express authority from this Government. The

transfer of these funds was reported to the British and Soviet Governments. An earlier report on these negotiations brought a reply from the Soviet Government that they were neither feasible nor permissible.

(840.48 Refugees/2-1545, Memorandum by the Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons (Warren) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, February 15, 1945. In: Foreign Relations of The United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Vol. 2, pp. 1131-1132.) (IMG)

Describing Himmler in the final days of the Third Reich, Eichmann remarked:

I made my last report to Himmler less than a month before the final surrender of Germany. The Reichsführer had been for some time negotiating with Count Bernadotte about the Jews. He wanted to make sure that at least 100 of the most prominent Jews we could lay our hands on would be held in a safe place. Thus he hoped to strengthen our hand, for almost to the end Himmler was optimistic about making separate peace terms. "We'll get a better treaty than the ones at Hubertusburg," he said to me, slapping his thighs. We'll lose a few feathers, but it will be a better one." It was then mid-April 1945. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 14-15. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

Years later, when the Kastner Case came about, Kastner was believed to be about to give confessions regarding the Mossad's sponsorship of the Nazi Germans in Hungary. Just when he was believed to be about to give confessions regarding the Mossad's role in killing the Jews, he was assassinated:

The trial became a cause celebre among the parties in opposition to Ben Gurion. Kastner was faring very badly against the attacks of the defense lawyers and is reported to have been on the verge of divulging sensational revelations when he was cruelly murdered in front of his apartment in Tel Aviv. The opposition accused the government of murdering him to prevent a revelation of the true facts; the government in turn accused the terrorist groups of having slaughtered Kastner for political reasons. (Reference to Kastner Before and During Eichmann Trial, Memorandum, CIA, January 25, 1961, p. 1)

The criminals who murdered Kastner belonged to an infamous terrorist organization known as the 'Kingdom of Israel' (Hebrew: Malchut Yisrael):

In 1957, Kasztner was murdered by a far-right group, Malchut Yisrael.. (Holocaust hero or villain who collaborated with Nazis?, The Jerusalem Post, Colin Shindler, November 19, 2016) (IMG)

Note that the trials were happening in the mid-1950s. A few years prior, in February 1953, the 'Kingdom of Israel' terror group had launched a terrorist attack against the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv. Although the Israeli regime paid lip service against the terrorist attack and the 'Kingdom of Israel' terrorists were sentenced to up to 12 years, their sentences were commuted by the Ben-Gurion gang and they were quickly released (see C16S6). As such, they had the support of the Ben-Gurion group. Furthermore, with the knowledge of Shin Bet, Israel's counter-intelligence and internal security service, Kastner was targeted for assassination and the person who murdered Kastner was a Shin Bet operative:

Declassified: Shin Bet knew Israel Kastner was targeted

[Just-released 1956 cabinet minutes on his assassination]...could strengthen the conjecture of some that the Shin Bet security service was involved in the murder of Kastner

The minutes raise difficult questions...[GSS head Isser] Harel told the cabinet that the intelligence services knew of the plan to kill Kastner and had arrested eight people who were "among potential terrorists." One of them, who was convicted of the murder and imprisoned, was Eckstein. Harel told the cabinet that Eckstein had taken part in a 1955 plan to assassinate Kastner that did not go forward.... Kastner was given a bodyguard by the Shin Bet, who "for some reason was pulled off a few days before the murder," Katzir said, adding that this fact encouraged those who believed in a conspiracy theory involving the Shin Bet.

And a related, even more explosive question is whether the organization itself was involved with various conspiracy theories promulgated over the years. To understand them, it must be recalled that Eckstein, the assassin, worked as an informant for the Shin Bet before the murder.

Harel told the cabinet, according to the minutes, that ties with Eckstein were cut off before the murder...[According to Eckstein]...in his recent book "Smichat Tla'im" ("Quilt Blanket") (Carmel Publishing House, 2014). "Little by little, without feeling how the change was taking place in my thoughts, in my opinions – and finally in my desires as well – the understanding grew stronger in me that when I spy and inform for 'ours' against 'them,' I am lying in my soul," Eckstein wrote. He described how he became entranced with the underground against whom he was sent to spy. "They knew they were surrounded by agents and provocateurs, and I understood that if I wanted to be part of them, I had to bring them a suitable 'dowry' and thus – woe is me – I became the servant of two masters." ...Harel told the ministers that the reason Eckstein was not tried was a lack of evidence, and because the justice minister feared people would say he was a provocateur.

...Eckstein, in his book, alludes to another person's involvement in the murder. "Another shot thundered at the very instant of my third shot, followed by agonizing cries. Apparently someone was there, in any event, carried out confirmation of the kill and, as a true professional, did not miss even in the dark."

Kastner's daughter told a similar story...of another person who was involved in the shooting. That person was never arrested.

"My father got out of the car. Eckstein tried to shoot him and it didn't work. My father fled, ran into the building, but somebody prevented him from going in. He ran out again, and took a bullet in the back,"

Suzi Kastner says, recalling her father's words... Suzi Kastner says she believes the mysterious other man, who confirmed the kill, was a Shin Bet agent, and that a senior Shin Bet official was behind the murder, to take revenge on Kastner for not saving his family in the Holocaust.

...Did [Police Minister Shalom] Sheerit doubt that Eckstein and his accomplices, Dan Shemer and Yosef Menkes, were the actual murderers, and raise the possibility that the Shin Bet had assassinated Kastner? ('BTW, where is Avishai Raviv?', The Jerusalem Post, Yisrael Medad, January 9, 2015. Presenting excerpts of a Haaretz article. The square brackets are original to the Jerusalem Post article.) (IMG)

Through this process, Kastner was duly eliminated and was not able to give confessions regarding the tinier details of the Mossad support for Hitler gang. At the time of his death, Kastner was a government official in the Ben-Gurion cabinet.

The Nazi SS also founded a fake 'humanitarian' group ostensibly to 'save the Jews' when in fact it was for the purpose of allowing the JDC, the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist arm of the US intelligence, to fund the Nazis in the war effort against the Soviets. The fake 'humanitarian' group ostensibly meant to 'save the Jews', was headed by a JDC operative and prominent Gestapo-collaborationist Michael Weichert. The operations of this fake humanitarian group were until 1941, when the JDC agents of US intelligence were still allied to the Nazis, and was renewed in 1943, shortly after the Battle of Stalingrad when the American intelligence renewed its alliance with the Nazis. In a letter describing the JUS, Weichert confirmed that its establishment was due to authorization by 'the Superior SS' and the 'Police Chiefs in the General Government':

The Jewish Relief Agency for the General Government "JUS" renewed, at the end of April, its activities by the authorization of the Superior SS and Police Chiefs in the General Government under the supervision of the General Government's Administration, main department of Internal Administration, section of Population and Welfare. The authorities assigned to it the building at No 2a Jozefinska where offices, drug distribution service and stores have been.

The main purpose of "JUS" consists in distributing to Jewish labour camps, to districts inhabited by Jews and factories where Jews are employed, drugs, food as well as clothes and linen received as gift packages from abroad or obtained through exchange or by supplementary purchase.

('BRIEF REPORT OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE "JUS": From May 12 to July 31, 1943', Jewish Relief Agency for the General Government (JUS), Letter by: Dr. Michael Weichert, Krakow, August 1, 1943, p. 1) (IMG)

Lucy S. Dawidowicz, a WWII-era JDC operative, confirmed that Weichert was a JDC agent and had been funded by the JDC well until 1941:

All through German-occupied Poland ZSS branches came into being, many already operating spontaneously as skeletons of the prewar service agencies. Within a year, the ZSS had 118 branches, in large cities. By the beginning of 1942, it had 412 branches. ZSS personnel was recruited from the recognized social-service agencies and other communal institutions. **Its founder and head was Michal Weichert (1890-1967)**, a man of many talents, trained in law, the theater, and literature. A teacher in a Jewish gymnasium in Warsaw, **he served as legal adviser to the JDC and ORT**, and enjoyed a career as journalist, actor, and director before the war. In mid-1942 the Germans dissolved the ZSS, but **later reconstituted it as the Judische Unterstutzungsstelle (JUS; Jewish Relief Office)**. Technically still under the Interior Department's jurisdiction, **JUS in fact fell under SS control**. The Jewish underground thereafter regarded JUS in the same light as the Judenrate. (After the war, Weichert was tried in Poland on charges of collaboration, but was exonerated. He spent the last years of his life in Israel.)

ZSS's basic strategy was to rescue what could be rescued. (...). **ZSS funding came largely from the JDC**, which spent about \$1 million a year in Poland until America's entry into the war, on December 7, 1941, halted the legal transfer of funds. Some moneys were obtained by voluntary donations, fund-raising drives, theater and concert benefits. (...). ZSS funding came also from the Judenrate, some of which subcontracted part or most of their welfare programs to the ZSS.

('The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945', Lucy S. Dawidowicz, p. 244) (IMG)

Concerning the case of the collaborationism of Weichert with the Nazi Germans, Yitzhak Zuckerman, the commander who betrayed the Jewish Fighting Organization and served as an apologist and supporter of Weichert, wrote:

Now the episode of Michael Weichert. He was one of the greatest theatrical talents of Polish Jewry. Professionally he was a lawyer. As I recall, **he cooperated with the Germans during World War I**; but that was a totally different and positive cooperation. In any case, he had close contacts with them.

He was a devotee of German culture, the representative of the Jewish Social Self-Help (YISA), and later the Yidisher hilfs komitet (YHK, whose initials were also YSS, but the Germans ordered the name changed because of the "SS"). That was an umbrella organization of welfare operations. I never heard anything good about Weichert, but that's not to censure him. I heard that he wasn't an easy or a friendly person; but that doesn't say anything against Weichert either.

The Weichert incident began after we picked up on the intensive social activity he was carrying out in 1943, after the Uprising. We realized that just when the Germans were taking the Jews of Warsaw, the Jews of Poland, even the Jews of Krakow, to death, Weichert, following orders from the Germans, formed JUS (Judische Unterstutzungsstelle) to replace the YHK. At the same time that the Germans were executing Jews, they assigned him to summon the Jewish world abroad to send material aid: medicine, food, and so forth. **And the simple question arose of what was the purpose of these letters of appeal sent by a well-known figure of the prewar era, and during the war as well, a man who led welfare operations and represented the Jews vis-a-vis the German institutions?**

His letters abroad, sent in those very months of bloodshed and mass murder, created the impression abroad that this money was needed for the hungry. True, Jews were dying of starvation, in 1941-1942 and in 1943; but in 1944, that was no longer the problem. The difference between him and Ringelblum, and even between him and Kirshenbaum, was that those Jews did everything to alarm the world to the fact that **the Germans were killing us – simple murder! Whereas Weichert requested material aid in his letters;** and, if material aid was requested, it was requested for live Jews! So we suspected this activity as a **first class deceit. This assessment didn't come only from Jewish sources, we heard it from Polish sources too, for example, the Polish Committee for Welfare in Warsaw (RGO), a few of whose members cooperated with us in ZEGOTA; one of these was Marek Arczyfiski, the democrats' representative. (He was in Israel a few years ago and we entertained him.)** Everyone felt that Weichert was a traitor, that he was doing the work of the Germans.

Weichert was the only Jew who didn't wear the Magen-David armband. He lived in his own house on the Aryan side, when there were no more Jews in Krakow. The remnants of Krakow Jewry were gathered in the Plaszow concentration camp, whereas he lived in Krakow under German protection and ran their errands. He received several shipments of food from abroad. When we learned that, we did two things: we wrote to London condemning the letters published in his name in order to expose Weichert and proclaim that he was not the representative of the Jews; the second thing was to send Marek Arczyfiski to Weichert to persuade him to give up that disgraceful work and to suggest he go underground. We were willing to accept responsibility for his safety under the circumstances. At that time it didn't occur to us to issue a death sentence against him. We thought we would hide him in Krakow or someplace else and support him, although I'm sure he didn't need our money. We said we would provide an Aryan document for him; but he rejected our proposals. (We had a branch of self-help in Krakow led by Marianska, who is now head of Yad Vashem in Tel Aviv.)

When changes occurred in the status of the Plaszow concentration camp, Weichert announced he was willing to accept our offer; but when he realized that **his position with the Germans was as firm as it had been,** he again avoided accepting our judgment. He had two "forced" assistants, Dr. Eliahu Tish and Dr. Haim Hilfstein, in the Plaszow camp. **Weichert, as I said, was the only person in Krakow who operated freely.** Those two were well-known public figures, honest men, members of Et Livnot (the right-wing faction of the General Zionists). But we couldn't say anything to Tish and Hilfstein since they were both prisoners in the camp. Not Weichert. Ultimately, he disappeared.

There were meetings and discussions that resulted in a death sentence against him. He survived only because of our weakness.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 450 -452.

Bold added.) (IMG)

After the war, in Poland, the trial of Weichert began. Zuckerman then goes on to explain in his memoirs that since the start, he opposed the trial of Weichert because the trial against that Nazi-collaborationist would have involved the execution of a Jew, whereas the Gestapo agent Weichert tried to promote Zuckerman as a hero. During the days of Weichert's trial in Poland, Zuckerman was living in a luxurious apartment provided to him by the infamous Gestapo spy Spychalski, who was a close friend of Zuckerman. The judge that was supposed to purge Weichert in Poland was murdered, and Weichert was released and went to Israel. In Israel too, Weichert was judged as 'innocent'. These facts about Weichert are all mentioned in the Zuckerman memoirs. In the memoirs, Zuckerman also provides an excuse for not having killed off the Gestapo spy Weichert; if the story which Zuckerman provided was true, then perhaps the rebels under Zuckerman's influence were unable to kill Weichert, but there are reasons to, in the first place, doubt the story about the difficult conditions which Zuckerman's team faced in killing off that Nazi agent. Zuckerman was a traitor to

the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1942-1943, and had been a rival of the Hashomer Hatzair martyr, General Mordechai Anielewicz. Once the Nazis exterminated Anielewicz, Zuckerman was catapulted into leadership but managed to never be hit by the Nazis. More details on the Hashomer Hatzair and Mordechai Anielewicz will be provided later.

Jaroslav Andrzej Piekalkiewicz, a commander affiliated with the London Poles and the Home Army (AK), wrote that Michael Weichert was an agent of the Nazis and that since 1943, by the time of which the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was continuing, the JDC continued to fund the JUS even in spite of the warnings issued to the JDC by Warsaw's Yiddish rebels. The JDC leaders knew very well that only a small part of the medical and food aid sent by the JDC to the JUS went for the Yiddish inmates, who were already being directly murdered rather than being starved to death, and that anywhere between 80% to 90% of the aid was actually going to the SS:

Another very harmful operation was run by Dr. Michal Weichert, a Jew, in cooperation with the Germans. The Germans permitted a Jewish welfare organization to function in the GG, the Judische Unterstutzungsstelle (JUS), headed by Weichert, to appeal for help from international Jewry. Weichert first operated from Warsaw, but then transferred his office to Krakow, where he lived in his own house outside the Krakow Ghetto, moved freely around the city, and was not required to wear the Star of David armband. He wrote letters to international Jewish Organizations claiming that Jews were not being exterminated, but only interned in work camps. His efforts led to shipments of food and medicines being sent from Switzerland through the International Red Cross for distribution to Jews in need. It is calculated that only about 10 percent of all these shipments reached their Jewish recipients in the camps the rest was robbed by Germans, with the full knowledge and collaboration of Weichert. The letters and shipments continued even after most of the Jews, including those in the labor camps, had been exterminated. International Jewish organizations chose to believe Weichert, who had been highly respected before the war, rather than the information provided on the Holocaust by the Underground State, the ZKN (Jewish National Committee), and the Bund through the Polish Government-in-Exile. (Dance with Death: A Holistic View of Saving Polish Jews during the Holocaust, author: Jaroslav Andrzej Piekalkiewicz, edited by Joanna Drzewieniecki, 2020, p. 261) (IMG)

Tragically, the constant stream of information about the murder of Jews provided by the Polish Underground State to the Polish Government-in-Exile, which in turn passed it on to the Allied governments and to the Western media was not believed. It was often viewed as exaggerated propaganda stemming from Poles deep hatred of the Germans. Even the desperate appeals from Polish Jewish underground organizations, which confirmed this information, was ignored not only by the Western governments, but also by many Jews in Western countries (see below). To those who wanted to help, the only open avenue appeared to be through the International Red Cross (IRC) and its affiliate the German Red Cross. The latter was completely controlled by the Nazis and thus making it the guardian of aid to Jews was the same as putting a fox in charge of protecting a chicken coop. JOINT's branch in Lisbon, Portugal, a neutral country, sent food and medicine parcels through the IRC, addressed either to the JUS in Krakow (see chapter 8), or other addresses in Poland. Between February and April 1943, 12,559 parcels were sent. Of this number only 925, or 7.36 percent were received by the addressees. The rest was obviously stolen by Germans. (Dance with Death: A Holistic View of Saving Polish Jews during the Holocaust, author: Jaroslav Andrzej Piekalkiewicz, edited by Joanna Drzewieniecki, 2020, pp. 247) (IMG)

For another case, Piekalkiewicz, citing the Yad Vashem prominent Holocaust researcher Yehuda Bauer, wrote:

Even more disastrous was the shipment of 7,226 parcels late in 1943 when only 42, or a bare 0.58 percent, were delivered to their destinations (Bauer 1981, 331). The other German scam (discussed in chapter 8) was the permission for JOINT and the World Jewish Congress, with the assistance of the German Red Cross, to send whole train cars with food and medicine from Switzerland to the Michal Weichert's JUS operation in Krakow. Despite constant warnings from the Jewish Underground in Poland that Weichert was a German agent and that most of the shipments went to the SS, Jewish leaders in the West felt that even if a small amount reached the camps, it was worth the effort.

Eventually, JOINT did discover its error.... (Dance with Death: A Holistic View of Saving Polish Jews during the Holocaust, author: Jaroslav Andrzej Piekalkiewicz, edited by Joanna Drzewieniecki, 2020, pp. 247-248) (IMG)

Yehuda Bauer, it is worth mentioning, had been affiliated with a pro-communist organization called 'Mapam', which acted as the Israel branch of the Soviet intelligence service. Bauer, as a leading figure in the Yad Vashem and IHRA, has done plenty of research. However, in keeping with the purpose of this book, which is to use confessions by anti-Soviet sources for pro-Soviet truth, Bauer cannot be cited. Nowadays, Bauer does denounce communism and the Soviets, but even his anti-Soviet rhetoric is a very soft 'anti-Sovietism', and contains many pro-Soviet 'confessions', naturally coming from a Mapam-affiliated historian. In any case, if the reader is further interested in JDC-Nazi collaboration, the reader can refer to his works. Piekalkiewicz, a commander affiliated with the anti-Soviet London Poles, acknowledged the correctness of Bauer's claims.

The rhetoric of even the JDC operative Dawidowicz reflects the excuse, promoted by the JDC leaders, that however tiny the amount of aid going to the Yiddish inmates, it was still worth it:

Since the ZSS was accredited to the German civil administration, it had access to supplementary supplies of food, clothing, and medicine that were not available to the Judenrate. Quantities were small, to be sure, but in the economy of scarcity prevailing in the ghettos, even small amounts extracted from the Germans were beyond price. The very fact that the ZSS received supplies from the Germans heightened the contrast in the Jewish public mind between the Judenrat and the ZSS. ('The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945', Lucy S. Dawidowicz, p. 244) (IMG)

The JDC leaders refused to mention the fact that when the rest of the aid, the 80% to 90% would go for the Nazi Wehrmacht and the SS, that would actually help the Nazis fight the Soviet Red Army more easily, thus preventing millions of Yiddish inmates from quicker liberation. That was the point after all; the JDC operatives serving the American intelligence, had no reason not to support the Nazis, and what a more useful propaganda cover – from the lens of the JDC – to misuse the call for the liberation of the Yiddish captives for such an agenda.

Lastly, a few things deserved to be mentioned concerning the 'Nazi-Zionist' connection. It is not the case that Nazi-collaborationism came primarily from the Zionist networks alone, nor is it the case that all 'Zionist' activists were affiliated with Nazi-collaborationist organizations. There were 'Zionist Jews' who genuinely opposed the Nazis, 'anti-Zionist Jews' who genuinely opposed the Nazis, and there were 'Zionist Jews' who collaborated with the Nazis and 'anti-Zionist Jews' who collaborated with the Nazis. While it is true that the mainstream of the Zionist movement, the tools of Anglo-American imperialism, were responsible for funding the Nazi SS, so is it also true that the rogue tendency in the Zionist movement, the 'Socialist Zionist' tendency, bravely fought against the Nazi SS. The case in point is the involvement of the 'Stalinist' 'Socialist Zionists' of the Hashomer Hatzair which were greatly involved in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising against the Nazi occupation. **The Hashomer Hatzair combined 'Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism' with Kibbutzism and Zionism, were opposed to the partition of the territory of historic Palestine and the chauvinist terror against the Arabs, instead favouring a bi-ethnic state of the Israelis and Palestinian Arabs, a state socialist-leaning, kibbutzist, and allied to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies against the Anglo-American imperialists. The Hashomer Hatzair was an entirely different kind of a 'Zionist' movement than most of the rest of the Zionist current.** The second thing about the 'Nazi-Zionist' connection is that Nazi-collaborationists were not solely concentrated in the Zionist movement, but could be found among the 'anti-Zionist Jews' as well. The reactionary Menshevik 'Bundists' refused to engage in armed struggle against the Nazis (see C13S4) and instead advocated pacifistic reformist politics in the Nazi regime to stop the Nazi persecution of the Ashkenazim during the Holocaust. Many of the Ultra-Orthodox 'anti-Zionist' Jewish rabbis, Rabbi Weissmandel chief among them (as indicated previously), were very active in funding the Nazi SS and claimed that the Holocaust was the due divine punishment for the irreligiosity of most of the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim. Traitorous was the bulk of the leadership of the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim who lived outside of the USSR; years of Nazi terror against the Yiddish revolutionaries, added to the constant lobbying campaigns and pressures imposed by the Anglo-American intelligence agencies, had resulted in the rise of such traitors to the high ranks of the 'Jewish leadership', just like the traitors in the high ranks of the leadership of most of the rest of the other peoples living outside the USSR. All of those Bundist or Ultra-Orthodox leaders who served as agents of the American intelligence service, were fighting on the same side as the Zionist settler-colonizers in Palestine, even if they 'condemned' Zionism. The pro-Soviet or pro-communist elements in the Bundist, Zionist, etc. organizations were naturally inclined towards cooperation with the communist forces and a sincere struggle against Nazism. Simply put, the question of Nazi-collaborationism vs. anti-Nazism was actually a question not of Bundism vs. Zionism, but of loyal service to American imperialism vs. being friends of the USSR. The question of Jewish supremacism bore the same kind of a character. The Zionist agents of American imperialism wanted to carry out a genocide against the Arabs, whereas the Bundist agents of the Anglo-Americans would have established separate 'Jewish states' in the territories of the USSR and would have carried out a genocide against the citizens of the USSR if given the chance. The 'Socialist Zionist' agents of the USSR, very different than the Zionist mainstream, opposed the genocide against the Arabs of Palestine.

C16S2. The Soviet-Led Bloc and Zionist Migration

*** IMG-All- {Israel}

The USSR, prior to and during the Great Patriotic War, became the place of refuge for the Yiddish people fleeing Axis persecution. Already, in the USSR:

the number of synagogues in 1941 was 1,011.. (CA Propaganda Perspectives May 1972, The protestants, CIA, May 1972, p. 5.) (IMG)

The due assistance by the USSR in saving the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim from extermination has been acknowledged by none other than the American-Israeli intelligence agent and head of the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, James Rosenberg:

RUSSIA HELPED 1,750,000 JEWS TO ESCAPE NAZIS, SAYS JAMES N. ROSENBERG "Russia has

saved over ten times as many Jews from Nazi extermination as all the rest of the world put together,” James N. Rosenberg, American Jewish leader, declared here today in an address of welcome which he delivered at a reception given at the Astor Hotel to Solomon Mikhoels and Itzik Feffer, the Jewish cultural delegation from Russia. The reception was attended by several hundred representatives of various Jewish organizations.

Emphasizing that he based his estimate of those saved on facts gathered by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mr. Rosenberg quoted the organization’s journal as reporting that “of some 1,750,000 Jews who succeeded in escaping the Axis since the outbreak of hostilities, about 1,600,000 were evacuated by the Soviet Government from Eastern Poland and subsequently occupied Soviet territory and transported far into the Russian interior and beyond the Urals. About 150,000 others managed to reach Palestine, the United States, and other countries beyond the seas.”

“We Jews,” Mr. Rosenberg said, “rightly give thanks for the innumerable resolutions of sympathy for Jews, adopted by well-meaning men and groups horrified by the hideous tragedy which has befallen our people. Russia has chosen deeds. She has given life, asylum, bread, and shelter to a vast Jewish population. These facts are not sufficiently known. To make them known to every Jew in this country is a task of supreme importance for the Jewish Council for Russian War Relief. Need I ask what would have happened to those Jews had Russia left them where they were?”

(‘Russia Helped 1,750,000 Jews to Escape Nazis, Says James N. Rosenberg’. In: JTA Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 153, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), July 2, 1943, pp. 3-4.) (IMG)

Approximately two million Yiddish people were saved by the USSR from Axis reaction.

In this setting, the Mossad agents of the American secret service were working to force the Yiddish people out of Europe into Palestine. The Zionist spy networks attempted to rob the Soviet Union of the Yiddish refugees residing in it in 1943 when the top Israeli military and intelligence official Munya Meir Mardor visited Iran. He recalled:

Naturally, meeting the Russians in Tehran gave us the opportunity to raise the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. But we ran up against a blank wall every time. We met Russian Jews among the Soviet Army units in Persia; but most of them had lost touch with Jewish traditions and few of them had retained any knowledge even of Yiddish. On the basis of these encounters it seemed to us that Russian Jews were well on the way towards complete assimilation, and that unless there came some radical change in Soviet policy, this process would continue until Russian Jewry had ceased utterly to exist as a distinctive community. The Soviet authorities in Tehran made it clear to us that the Soviet Government was opposed even to our taking homeless Polish Jewish children from the USSR. (Strictly Illegal, Munya Mardor, 1957, p. 105) (IMG)

The inability of American-Israeli intelligence to remove the Yiddish people of the Soviet Union and transfer them to Palestine was the consistent theme for the next decade as well. The USSR, in its agreement with the Polish government-in-exile – and not Israel’s regime – permitted thousands of former Polish settler-colonizers who had for long occupied Western USSR (‘Eastern Poland’) to leave the USSR through the Middle East en route to Europe eventually. Some of these Polish settler-colonizers expelled from the USSR were Yiddish in origin. Nonetheless, the Yiddish among the Polish settler-colonizers expelled were not released particularly for the purpose of assisting Zionism or expelling the Yiddish from the USSR, but rather as a part of a general agreement between the Soviet Union and the Polish government-in-exile for sending the Polish settler-colonizers – be they Yiddish or not – out of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union up until mid-1953, the time of Joseph Stalin’s death, strictly banned the migration of the Yiddish people to Israel. Citing various Israeli government sources, Bialer acknowledged:

Between 1948 and mid-1955, only 131 Jews left the U.S.S.R. for Israel, 9 of them before 1953. (Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, New Publication: November 2009, p. 63. Citing: Material for a meeting of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset on 31.12.1950, ISA 2514/8; Debates of the American Section of the World Jewish Congress on 22.2.1950, ISA 2498/5; a despatch from the Eastern Europe Section of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to Michael Arnon on 10.8.1952, *ibid.*; Bentsur’s despatch to Arnon on 13.10.1952, ISA 2498/5; and Bentsur’s letter to the Foreign Minister on 12.7.1955, ISA 2502/8.) (IMG)

The Soviet Union did, however, permit the Yiddish people who had taken refuge in the Soviet Union during the War to return to their home countries. While the Yiddish refugees departed the USSR, the number of Jews who remained in the Soviet Union was:

1,700,000 (Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, New Publication: November 2009, p. 63. Citing: Material for a meeting of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset on 31.12.1950, ISA 2514/8; Debates of the American Section of the World Jewish Congress on 22.2.1950, ISA 2498/5; a despatch from the Eastern Europe Section of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to Michael Arnon on 10.8.1952, *ibid.*; Bentsur’s despatch to Arnon on 13.10.1952, ISA 2498/5; and Bentsur’s letter to the Foreign Minister on 12.7.1955, ISA 2502/8.) (IMG)

The USSR:

permitted a large number of Polish Jews who had reached the U.S.S.R. during the course of the Second World War to return to Poland.. (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948 -1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 68) (IMG)

That these Yiddish people were able to return to their Polish homeland, in-itself would have been a positive event. However, the problem with this was that once they returned to Poland:

their aliyah to Israel was facilitated. Before this process [of Jews in USSR returning to Poland] began, in the summer of 1945, some 50,000 Jews still lived in Poland; a year later some 150,000 left the country, for Germany and Austria. In 1947, 90,000 Jews remained in Poland. Thus, of the 250,000 to 300,000 Polish Jews resident in the U.S.S.R at the end of the Second World War, some 200,000 were permitted to return to their homeland.. (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 68) (IMG)

What if the Soviet Union would have banned the Polish Jews from returning to Poland? That may have had some temporary 'benefits' insofar as it would have weakened Zionist migration, but it would have actually benefited the Zionists more in the long-run. Not allowing the Yiddish refugees to return to their Polish homeland would have served as an excellent propaganda weapon with which to portray the USSR as a country that held 'Polish citizens' as 'captives'. This would have given greater leverage for CIA-Mossad agents to deepen the wedge between the USSR and Poland, hence to reduce Soviet intelligence presence in exchange for extended CIA-Mossad presence. All of that was in addition to the legal issues arising concerning the repatriation of citizens.

For some time, I have come to wonder: if the United States cared so much about fulfilling Israel's manpower quotas, why did it not first promote Zionist migration from the United States and its satellites and colonies first, and then, once the Jews and 'Jews' in the USA and most of its satellites and colonies had been 'depleted' in their original countries, focus on getting the Yiddish people of Eastern Europe to migrate to Israel? Why did the CIA prioritize the migration of the Yiddish citizens of the socialist camp over migration from the pro-fascist camp? After all, the CIA-Mossad covert operations for agitating and propagating for migration, for secretly smuggling these Yiddish people of the socialist camp was far more expensive and faced far many more obstacles than the mass migration of the people of Jewish background from North America, Western Europe, and other non-Israeli areas under US domination. True, the Great Purges in Eastern Europe were yet to occur, the CIA-MI6 agents had not yet been fully purged and the period before such purges was the optimum time for such undercover human-smuggling activity. That, however, does not answer the question: if the real deal is fulfilling the manpower quotas, why not send the North American and Western European ones? Why care at all about spending so much money about the Yiddish citizens of territories not under US control? Why such an order of priority, and why the preference of such an expensive migration from Eastern Europe over a much cheaper migration from Western Europe and North America, for the purpose of fulfilling Israel's manpower quotas? I believe that the United States so greatly focused on the Eastern European Yiddish citizens because it aimed to rid the socialist camp of many of its loyal citizens – the supporters of 'Shemesh HaAmim' ('Sun of the Peoples', often translated as 'the Sun of Nations' – Ashkenazi reference to 'Uncle Yossi', Joseph Stalin) – and send them to the Middle East so that they provide mandatory military service as pawns for an army dominated by the Anglo-American intelligence agents David Ben-Gurion, Shimon Peres, Ariel Sharon, Menachem Begin, and Moshe Dayan, in wars against the USSR's Arab allies. By the time these communist-influenced Eastern European Yiddish citizens have been spent as pawns dead in battle, the non-communistic or less-communistic Mizrahi and North American Jews and 'secular Jews' go and fill up Israel's manpower quotas. In the end, the fascist question 'Which people should get exterminated?' is a question of soft power influence and political culture; the people who were susceptible to the soft power influence of the USSR or Soviet allies were, from a fascist perspective, the main people whose extermination to prioritize. Why did the Nazis focus on the Yiddish people after all? In the Middle East, the Arabs of Palestine were planned to be annihilated because the Arabs of Palestine were going to come under the soft power influence of a Syria allied to the USSR, and the Eastern European Yiddish migrants were to be sent by the Ben-Gurion regime as pawns to die so that the number of Israeli citizens with a pro-communist cultural orientation would decline and the number of the loyal citizens of the socialist-led camp would reduce. Ultimately, the big reason was to reduce pro-communist manpower in the Soviet-led camp and to use these progressive-minded people as 'cannon-fodder' for an Anglo-American agenda. The CIA reported that the state media of People's Democratic Romania pointed to this fact when:

The Bucharest transmission declared that the Israeli Government attempted to persuade Rumanian Jews to emigrate to Israel largely because they needed "cheap labor and cannon fodder." (THE JEWISH QUESTION IN SOVIET AND SATELLITE PROPAGANDA, CIA, February 10, 1953, p. 19) (IMG)

The Zionist regime was set up as a counter-weight to the Soviet Yiddish Autonomous Oblast. Few, except the Soviets and the Mapam in Israel, mentioned the USSR as the 'Homeland of the Jewish People', even though the USSR had the Yiddish Autonomous Oblast that had, as a matter of incontrovertible fact, been the hub and the main place of refuge for

those fleeing anti-Semitic persecution.

Had a socialist or progressive anti-fascist state been established in Israel, the migration of Jews and 'secular Jews' to Israel from countries which were (1) geographically more proximate to Israel than to the USSR and Popular-Democratic Eastern Europe, and (2) which were dominated by pro-fascist regimes, could cause those Jews and 'secular Jews' to no longer be subjects of a pro-fascist state and to instead serve in the economy and the military of an anti-fascist Israel. In other words, through migration to Israel, these pro-fascist regimes would be deprived of a significant portion of their potential taxpayers, military pawns, skilled or unskilled laborers, and human shields, whereas the troop count and the labour force of an Israel belonging to the camp of anti-imperialist states would increase. For some of the anti-fascist Jews and 'Jews', anti-fascist resistance would be equally or more effective if they stay in their home countries as stay-behind guerrilla resistance and as members of an anti-fascist intelligence service with members in the pro-fascist regime apparatus. However, for some of them, it would make more sense that they take refuge in an anti-fascist state and to serve in the labour force of this anti-fascist state; a genius of military engineering would be far more fit serving in the upgrading and improvement of the weaponry of an anti-fascist army than to die and be wasted as a stay-behind guerrilla in a fascist-occupied country; or even an anti-fascist musician or singer would be far more useful boosting the morale of anti-fascist troops than to produce music not undermining the fascist regime. There is a reason why military forces set up separate brigades based on the category to which their troops belong – 'All-Women' brigades, 'All-Hungarian' brigades, etc. Armed forces set up separate groupings for different ethnic or gender categories of individuals because they correctly understand that troops can become more effective if they share a common language, psychology, and/or culture, for that facilitates communication between units. In the case of migration to an anti-fascist Israel, the same concept applies, except that service would not be limited to being troops in brigades but would also include service in the rear of the military, in the economic backbone that supports the military, and in the cultural warfare sector.

The Mossad/Joint operation to remove the Yiddish people and ship them to Palestine had tremendous value for American-Israeli intelligence, of course. In fact, in 1946 American intelligence, represented in Vienna by Captain Jules Koenig of the X-2, noted that Israeli intelligence utilized the 'Brichah' (Zionist 'flight') as a means of gaining intelligence on the Eastern European states:

Capt. Koenig ... outlined the structure of the Jewish refugee groups in Austria and the various international organizations that supported the immigrants as they passed through the country. In particular, Koenig commented on the role of a young Austrian-born Jew, Arthur Pier, who represented the Jewish Agency in Vienna, but actually served as the head of the Brichah in Austria. Pier, according to Koenig, claimed to represent several Jewish newspapers, including the [Zionist] Palestinian Telegraphic Agency. "Officially Pier is here to collect items of Jewish interest for his newspaper employer, principally items on atrocities against Jews during the war and after," the American intelligence officer wrote. "Actually he runs a highly efficient intelligence net, through couriers into Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. He is also running another net," Koenig reported, "which tracks down Germans either free or in captivity in Allied-occupied zones of Germany or Austria, who are suspected or proven to have been committing atrocities against Jews during the war." Pier ... also collected evidence for the Jewish Agency. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11 -21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 10) (IMG)

Avinoam Patt, a researcher for the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, wrote of the fact that the Brichah and its Poland branch leader Zuckerman, were sponsored by and worked for the JDC:

As Zuckerman noted later, he took advantage of his position on the Central Committee of Polish Jews to secure funds for the HeHalutz activities." He was also successful in tapping connections in the JDC as a source for Bricha funding. Zuckerman leveraged his close wartime relationship with the JDC representative in Warsaw, David Guzik (who had helped finance the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and worked with the Jewish National Committee after the revolt), to continue JDC support for his efforts after Guzik reestablished the JDC office in Warsaw after the war. As Zuckerman recalled in his memoirs, his early connections with the Joint were vital not only in securing money for Dror, but in assisting the Joint in establishing connections in Poland. Zuckerman's networking enabled him to obtain funding not only for his own movement (Dror), for Hehalutz in general, but also to make requests on behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine as needed — all through his close connections to Guzik and Joe Schwartz, director of European operations for the JDC." (The Jewish Heroes of Warsaw: The Afterlife of the Revolt, Avinoam Patt, 2021) (IMG)

Hence, the migration of the Yiddish people from Eastern Europe served the Mossad and the Joint, two highly-overlapping fronts of the American imperialist secret service. The Zionist weapon of mass migration would serve as a basis for the continuation of the American-Israeli intelligence cooperation against the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies:

In effect, Koenig saw the project, which he dubbed SYMPHONY, as a continuation of earlier wartime

collaboration between the Allies and the [Zionist] Jews, ... facing a new threat – the Soviet Union. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 8) (IMG)

Among the aims of the American intelligence listed by Koenig were:

"to use the influx of Jewish refugees into Austria from Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland for sources of CI information, for exact data on the intelligence service of the Jewish Agency in Austria, and for all intelligence activities run by any persons or organizations who use this influx into Austria for such purpose." ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 6) (IMG)

- Immediate Aims (overt): To extract information of CI [i.e. counter-intelligence] value from refugees escaping from Russian-occupied countries: composition, trends and activities of the Communist parties in those countries; location and identification of concentration camps in Russia and Russian-dominated countries; identification of NKVD deserters or NKGB deserters; identification of NKVD agents or Communist agents sent among the refugees; (...).
- Immediate Aims (covert): To ascertain and locate the agents of the Jewish Agency in Austria who run both the emigration of Jews from Russian-dominated countries and a highly-efficient intelligence service into those countries;

('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 8-9) (IMG)

The US intelligence also aimed:

to ascertain and spot those persons who smuggle Jews out of those countries for high sums of money and who, being in contact with NKVD officials, also smuggle war criminals and agents into the Allied-occupied zones, to work either in Austria or in Palestine. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 9)

Indeed, among the most prominent officials assisting the Joint/Mossad in the smuggling of Jews out of Eastern Europe, were 'former' Nazi spies and Home Army units who had infiltrated the Soviet intelligence-backed communist-led popular fronts and organizations.

The American intelligence also kept an eye for:

Nazi elements, infiltrating amongst the refugees to escape punishment from the authorities of their respective countries. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 9) (IMG)

The Nazi war criminals would be surveiled in order to be 'arrested' by the Americans as a cover for protection by the Americans. The Mossad was to assist US intelligence in this regard. The local American-Israeli intelligence spy ring chief also acknowledged Brichah's role in sponsoring terrorist organizations:

the Brichah "has been more and more associated with, if not actually sponsoring, certain terroristic groups in a desperate effort to attain its aims." ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11 -21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 26. Citing: Acting Chief, FBM and DH-136 [believed to be Evelyn M. Williams] to Commanding Officer, War Department SSU Mission to Austria, "SYMPHONY Project," 19 September 1946, (S), enclosing Project Review, in DO Records, IL 2, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. This same document is found in DO Records, C Box 1, Folder 11, CIA ARC.) (IMG)

The kinds of terrorists the Brichah was supporting is known. The Mossad was supporting the Gestapo spy Spychalski, the Gestapo agent Tito, the Home Army (AK), the Gehlen organization, and all the related networks standing up against Soviet power and the Peoples' Democracies.

In his memoirs, the American imperialist secret service operative Yitzhak Zimmerman – a long-time close friend of the Gestapo agent Gomulka since the Great Patriotic War – admitted many things about the subversive and treasonous activities of Polish officials. He said, for instance, that Spychalski, keen on 'calculating' a special relationship between Poland and Britain, promoted the illegal mass migration of the Yiddish to Israel in collaboration with Zuckerman's intelligence network. He further implied that Spychalski did all of this without authorization from many of the other Party and state bodies from which he was supposed to secure authorization. **Spychalski, furthermore, proved to be in fact a spy for Zuckerman, hence a spy for the American intelligence and the Mossad, providing Zuckerman military intelligence on the routes to take and allowing him to be briefed by Spychalski's henchman Czerwinski on the presence and coordinates of a Soviet military base that would have blocked the Zionist mass migration.** Spychalski, after informing Zuckerman of this, warned them against using such a route. Referring to his efforts to secure the illegal Zionist mass migration of the Jews to Israel, the American-Israeli intelligence agent Zuckerman wrote:

But within forty-eight hours, I got a phone call at the Committee of the Jews in Poland ... from one of the senior members of UB, asking to meet with me. We made an appointment at a certain cafe.

That meeting began with a friendly conversation. I won't mention that man's name because I don't know exactly what his situation and fate are today, and I prefer to be cautious. And I don't know the real names of those who were involved, one of whom was a Jew. The two men I talked with said they had been told what I said on the plane, and they had a few questions about it and a few difficulties with it. First of all, even if they were sympathetic to the departure of the Jews for Palestine, they couldn't give permission for such a departure unless they had government support; and their question was whether I could meet with the foreign minister, since the support should be given by the Foreign Ministry. And if the Foreign Ministry adopted such a policy, they would make sure it was carried out. The foreign minister was Zygmunt Modzelewski.

They didn't deal with foreign relations, but it wasn't hard for me to tell them what Modzelewski had told me, and I knew that despite his sympathy, he would give me the same answer connecting this with Polish interests and relations with Britain. And I knew that even if he knew about the departure of the Jews, he would have to say he didn't. Then they started listing names of other members of the government. Maybe Osobka-Morawski, the prime minister? I told them about my meeting with him on the day of the Kielce pogrom. Then one of them asked how my relations were with [Gestapo spy] **Marian Spychalski, who was then – if I'm not mistaken – deputy minister of defense. He was my friend from the underground when, even if we weren't seeing one another, each one knew what the other was doing. More precisely, I knew more about him than he knew about me** since he and his friend, the engineer Turbyfiski, who was later mayor of Warsaw, were close friends of Wacek Folman, Havka's older brother, an architect. They had known one another before the war; and during the war, Turbyfiski had helped Folman when he came to the Aryan side. After the war, we had several meetings both about restoring the farm in Grochow and about the apartment I got, thanks to him. There were all kinds of things between us of no great importance; at any rate, I was sure of his sympathy and I said we could try that direction.

The second question was which one of us would be in charge of the departure. I had to give an immediate answer. I said I personally would take responsibility. And I added I had reliable people with me. Until the last minute, I didn't know if this was a trap. It wasn't simple, since the UB was in charge of the borders and if I said the He-Halutz organization was responsible (I don't remember if He-Halutz was legitimate then) – even if it was all right legally – if the authorities decided one day that someone on the border wasn't proper, He-Halutz would have to take the responsibility. So I answered that I personally would be responsible.

Two things stood out in their position: first, that they needed support and without it they couldn't help; and the support had to be political, from someone in the government. And in consultation, the lot fell to Marian Spychalski. The second thing was who on the Jewish side would take responsibility. It didn't occur to anyone on the Central Committee of the Jews in Poland that we confronted operations of such a nature and scope. However, I couldn't give He-Halutz that responsibility for fear we would be swallowed up. That was what motivated me to assume the responsibility myself.

They wrote down the summary and I said immediately that as soon as I got an answer from Spychalski, I would get in touch with them. After first and second thoughts, I decided to let Dr. Adolf Berman in on the secret. I already said that toward the end of the war, before the Polish Uprising, in a conversation about what would happen in the future, I realized we had differences of opinion. He was a "legalist," and he declared that. He also believed in some delusions, like the establishment of a Communist State of Israel; and he also believed in the new relationship of world and Polish communism to the Zionist enterprise, if and when everything was done legally. That was his reservation. I didn't believe in those things. I told him that our people and I had already worked illegally on the borders of the Communist zone in 1939 and 1940, but I imagined that wouldn't be simple for us now. And I said that legalism couldn't be the reservation for our acts. When we met after the war, we didn't continue that discussion. In 1944, that was a theoretical question, because we didn't know if we'd survive. Then there was the Polish Uprising. Nothing practical was to be decided, and the decision wasn't in our hands; the Germans were still in Warsaw. Even though I knew Berman's world, his points of view, I had no reason in January, after the Liberation, to start an argument with him on precisely that Zionist point and to reveal to him what we were or weren't doing. We confronted certain areas of activity where we had to work together, in the issues of Polish Jewry, in things done legally; but now we confronted the illegal departure, which we had started in January and February 1945; and Berman didn't know about those things since I never talked to him about them. I would meet with him at the Committee of the Jews in Poland and would also come to his home. After the Polish parliament was established, he was a member of it, we would meet in all kinds of places, as well as with the family, and we were friends. We talked about everything except Brikha and our illegal work.

Now I decided to talk with him. I saw him as the person closest to us on the Committee of the Jews in Poland. Moreover, to his credit or not, among the gallery of Zionist activists, he was best known among the

Polish leaders because of his brother, Jakub Berman, the Communist. Yosef Sak, member of Po'alei Zion-Z.S., was also there; but at that decisive period of the underground, on the Aryan side of Warsaw, for various reasons, he was remote from issues and sat at home while the political representative on the Jewish National Committee was Dr. Berman. **He knew the people I knew, like Gomulka and Spychalski, and had contacts with many others I didn't know.**

Now in that conversation I initiated, I told him of how things had evolved. I also told him what **Modzelewski, the foreign minister had told me and about my last conversation with the members of UB. I told him I had concluded, along with them, that** the only one who might be able to consider these things globally and calculate Poland's relations with England and what that required was Marian Spychalski, and we knew him from the underground; he was reliable and imaginative. **"Maybe that will work," I told Berman.**

Berman agreed immediately. We got in touch with Spychalski and were accepted without delay. I'll never forget Spychalski's reaction – the meeting with him was warm. Like us, he was shocked by the pogrom in Kielce. As far as I'm concerned, all **Spychalski's later sins in general issues and Jewish matters** cannot obscure **his sympathy toward us** in this case. We didn't tell him about our conversations or the replies we had gotten from the prime minister.

On the spot, he called the general in charge of the borders, a Soviet military man whose name was Czerwinski. I realized immediately that he was a Russian of Polish origin. His Polish was very "Russified." He was commander of the border patrol, the military patrol in charge of all the borders of Poland.

Spychalski said one thing to Czerwinski in our presence: Do not under any circumstances use the northern borders, that is, toward Berlin; use the southern route, across the Czech border. Czerwinski told him, if I'm not mistaken, that the distance between the new Polish border (the Oder- Neisse line) and Berlin was only seventy kilometers and there was a Soviet garrison there, whereas the Polish army was on the southern border. A few of our comrades in Brikha didn't accept that warning and later cost us lives. Some of them behaved irresponsibly at a certain moment when they were under pressure; they thought they should and could "open" the northern border, too. **This time, in terms of the army, the arrangement was completely legal. When we received the positive reply, a meeting was arranged with Czerwinski. I assumed a certain pretense and, as someone who dealt with people of ministerial rank, I said I would send my man to meet with Czerwinski.**

That man was Stefan Grajek. We also wanted to demonstrate that there was no need to negotiate with Czerwinski, but simply to fix border crossings. So Stefan Grajek was selected as the liaison with General Czerwinski. Right after I got Spychalski's positive answer and after he appointed the commander of the border patrol, Czerwinski, to deal with the matter, I gathered our members of Brikha, Isser Ben-Zvi, Zvi Netzer, and Yohanan Cohen, a member of the Labor Zionists, one of the independent liberals, who was also a Shaliah from Eretz Israel. Without going into details, I proposed to them to indicate border crossings we would suggest to Czerwinski. I also suggested we not expose the places we had secretly used thus far; and, if this was a trap, or some day they decided to stop, we would always have the crossings we had used.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 665 -668) (IMG)

It is worth mentioning that Czerwinski was under the authority of the Polish military, not the Red Army. He had been 'assigned on loan' to the Polish Government, meaning that he no longer served the Red Army:

General Czerwinski, commander of the Polish border patrol and a Soviet officer of Polish extraction, was assigned on loan to the Polish Government. (The American Joint Distribution Committee and Polish Jewry 1944-1949, Yosef Litvak. In: 'Organizing Rescue: National Jewish Solidarity in the Modern Period', edited by Selwyn Ilan Troen, Benjamin Pinkus, p. 285) (IMG)

Backing up Yehuda Bauer's assessments, and supporting the belief that Spychalski was behaving as a rogue element of the Soviet bloc rather than in total coherence with the general policies of the communists at the time, Zuckerman further wrote:

At a symposium on Yehuda Bauer's book at Efal, Leviteh asked me to take issue with a few things. He claimed that allowing Jews to leave en masse couldn't possibly remain the property of one branch of government and not be known to the general government institutions; and that it couldn't be concealed from the citizens of Poland, because the day after the agreement, the Jews began selling their possessions and moving and all Poland knew about it. No doubt such a thing couldn't have been done underground, vis-a-vis other branches of the administration. But as far as I know, the Foreign Ministry was cautious about giving the issue official public approval, which could have damaged Poland.

I must also say that as far as I know, there wasn't an agreement between various branches of government.

I don't know what authority Leviteh had for his remarks. I must say that in that position, **Spychalski didn't ask the Foreign Ministry.** True, those things couldn't be kept secret. In fact, a person in a key position soon

responded sharply to the issue. But at first, nothing was known about it. For a few days or weeks, it was kept secret – I don't know.

Leviteh also claimed there couldn't have been such an agreement without the knowledge of the Soviet authorities. Did the Russians know about Brikha, and what was their attitude? I don't know what happened at the cabinet meeting, what Modzelewski said, what they said among themselves, or what Moscow said. There may be all kinds of speculations, but I don't know the facts. What I can do is reconstruct the course of things. And I state here that the decision came at that stage, within a few minutes, in the conversation Dr. Berman and I had with Spychalski. If the Polish government wanted to ruin it, they would have. Jakub Berman knew about it, too. Not at that moment, but a few days later. If he had wanted, he could have ruined it. The same goes for Moscow. Jakub Berman certainly didn't keep quiet without asking Moscow. I reject Leviteh's thesis, at least in regard to the first stage, and I can't say how long it went on—one day or two weeks. I think that there was an historical, fateful decision here, made by Spychalski. If we hadn't gone to him, if we had gone to the minister or to another ministry that would have considered the case from another angle, I don't know if the Jews would have crossed the borders as they did.

Could Spychalski, who was acting Minister of Defense, have decided such a thing on his own? At any rate, the fact is that, when he accepted Berman and me, he didn't know why we had come.

And when he gave his positive answer – I'm certain of it – he didn't pick up the telephone to call the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any other element in the government. He gave the approval of his own, without asking. Before I came to him, I sat with members of the UB, who gave me all kinds of advice: to appeal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister – and I rejected it; and only then did Spychalski's name come up. So, Spychalski didn't know in advance why we came to him. At that time, there was not yet a bureaucracy that obliged Dr. Berman and Yitzhak Zuckerman to inform Spychalski in advance what they wanted to discuss with him. We asked for an audience and he agreed.

And, in our presence, he didn't ask anyone for permission; and, on the spot, he called the man in charge of the borders. **He didn't ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he didn't ask the Party, nor did he ask the opinion of the Prime Minister.** True, it was impossible to hide it, either from the Polish public or from the circles of Polish leadership. But **the fact is they didn't know.** For example, the "great Berman" (**Jakub Berman**) didn't know. Zvi Netzer could testify to that too.

So, it is conceivable to me that Spychalski did it on his own, perhaps out of naivete, perhaps because of his attitude toward Jews, perhaps because of the proximity to the Kielce incident, or because of the clash between his Communist theory and the Polish reality. These things and God knows what else might have caused that. At any rate, he accepted it openly and immediately gave permission right then and there. True, nothing was written and no agreement, no document was signed; it was all an oral conversation.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 671-672.

Bold added.) (IMG)

Recall that Yitzhak Zuckerman had said: "Spychalski said one thing ... in our presence: Do not under any circumstances use the northern borders, that is, toward Berlin; use the southern route, across the Czech border. Czerwinski told him, if I'm not mistaken, that the distance between the new Polish border (the Oder-Neisse line) and Berlin was only seventy kilometers and there was a Soviet garrison there, whereas the Polish army was on the southern border. A few of our comrades in Brikha didn't accept that warning and later cost us lives. Some of them behaved irresponsibly at a certain moment when they were under pressure; they thought they should and could 'open' the northern border, too." This was important not just because of the fact that it exposes Spychalski espionage for the Mossad – he told them of which routes to take and which routes were unsafe, and allowed Czerwinski to disclose such top secret information about the military base – but also sheds light, in passing, on the clashes that occurred between those Mossad operatives that refused to heed the warnings and the Soviet Red Army. Yehuda Bauer reveals the details of some of these clashes. En route to Berlin, the Red Army captured numerous Zionist emigres, and arrested and imprisoned Joint/Mossad leaders:

In the meantime, the old truck route was renewed and additional sea routes were operated out of Stettin; all these passed Berlin and therefore were affected by what was happening in that city. The major problem of transportation concerned the trucks; these had formerly been Russian or Polish Army vehicles whose drivers had been bribed to take refugees on their empty runs into Berlin (on the way back they would bring equipment and goods that the Russian forces were dismantling and taking out of defeated Germany). This had been proved unsatisfactory because cases had multiplied where the drivers handed over the refugees to the Russian police, and kept the bribe. Brichah therefore bought their own trucks in Poland and used Brichah drivers for them, under a variety of pretexts. This was very expensive, however, and there was of course always the risk that trucks that were caught would be confiscated by the Soviets. In Berlin, trucks were much cheaper, and so Brichah began using Berlin vehicles, for which the Berlin Brichah paid.. (Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, pp.

236-237) (IMG)

In one case, the Red Army even opened fire on the American-Israeli intelligence operatives, killing one of them:

On a small scale, Brichah attempted a number of other subterfuges to get Jews out of Poland. One of these was the transport by boat. At the end of July a boatload of children was sent to the small port of Ueckermunde, and from there the train took them to Berlin. One more boat was sent in this way, and then increased Russian control over the port made the route impossible. (...). Also, at the end of August, another incident had occurred which was typical of the hazards of the Stettin operations. Yitzhak Ram and Yosef Nissenbaum, both from the Berlin Brichah, decided to try another boat route and entered into negotiations with some Russian sailors on one of the river boats. After reaching an agreement with them, they took the boat ride to Berlin together with ten refugees, mainly teachers, from Stettin. Before they reached German territory, the Russian sailors said they needed fuel and asked the passengers to wait for them on shore because they could not ask for fuel with Jewish refugees on board. Nissenbaum and two other Brichah men stayed on board. As they were moving away from the shore, three armed Russians who had hidden themselves in the engine room came up and forced the three men at gunpoint into the Oder. When the three hit the water, the Russians opened fire on them and Nissenbaum was killed. (Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, pp. 237-238) (IMG)

As a result of this large scale mass migration project by the American-Israeli intelligence service, plenty of data on the USSR and the future Peoples' Democracies were collected:

Koenig told Headquarters that Pier was the key link to facilitating the movement of Jews from the Russian-dominated countries, and he gave him the operational codename of CONDUCTOR. After organizing the Jews into small groups, Pier's agents led them surreptitiously across the border into Austria. The groups made their way to Vienna where the Joint initially placed them in the city's Rothschild Hospital. Pier screened the refugees for information desired by the Jewish Agency and then prepared to move them to other DP camps in the American zone. Those refugees intended for Palestine were placed in a camp near Salzburg while those who could not or did not want to go to the Middle East were sent to other camps in Germany. Koenig calculated that Pier was responsible for the smuggling of hundreds, if not thousands, of Jews on a monthly basis into Austria and eventually toward Italy and Palestine.

At first, Koenig posed as a journalist seeking information about the Brichah. As his questions became more of an intelligence nature, Koenig admitted to Pier that he was an American intelligence officer. In the meantime, Koenig also wanted to place American personnel in the Jewish camps in Vienna, principally the Rothschild Hospital and the Jewish Agency's interrogation center on Alserbacherstrasse.

These agents, also posing as American journalists, would collect intelligence on Soviet order of battle as well as economic and political information behind the Iron Curtain. US contact with the Jewish Agency, Koenig believed, would expand SSU's understanding of the personalities involved in the illicit smuggling of refugees. This aspect of the project, however, proved the most difficult given the lack of Americans who could speak Yiddish or Hebrew.

(‘CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001’, Chapter

Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 10-12) (IMG)

At the time, Israel had not grown to become its own imperialist power, and was thus a mere settler-colony serving the United States, and covertly, also the British. As such, the Mossad was correctly regarded by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies as having been a front for the CIA, as opposed to an independent organization of its own. This was highlighted during the media campaigns of the Doctors' Plot case and the Slansky trials. This is why the Israeli secret service agents were consistently denounced as American agents. Furthermore, in the 1949 resolution of the Cominform, it was explicitly stated:

The Tito clique transformed Belgrade into an American center for espionage and anti-Communist propaganda. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the ‘Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India’ archives section) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

The accusation was absolutely correct, because there were numerous CIA-Mossad bases in Yugoslavia. Uri Bialer, an official researcher for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, remarked:

Yugoslavia had always been the location of one of the most important Mossad centers in Eastern Europe. This situation was the result of the special relationship which the Yugoslavs had developed in the course of the Second World War and thereafter with representatives of the Yishuv who had operated in the framework of the British war effort. After the war, it seems to have been buttressed by ideological perceptions. As one of the Mossad emissaries in the Balkans phrased it: “The Yugoslavs saw in the [Mossad] an embodiment of the struggle against imperialism. The Yugoslavs ... as former partisans, ... felt an emotional affinity for the small nation struggling against an [Arab] enemy that vastly outnumbered and overpowered it.” (Between East and West:

Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948 -1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 114) (IMG)
Yugoslavia was the most important center of the Mossad activity in the bloc of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The ties of Tito's group to the Israeli military goes back to World War II, when Tito's group established liaison with Dan Lerner, a commander of and traitor to the 'Palmach', which was the military force of the communist- led 'Socialist Zionist' popular front party, Mapam. The Palmach had many communist revolutionaries in it but there obviously existed some Titoist elements within it, collaborating with the Mossad official Ehud Avriel. Avriel wrote in his memoirs:

The third and most spectacular assault was on the main radar station on Mount Carmel. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the Palmach, then stationed in the vicinity of Haifa, had received instructions in the beginning of November to prepare for the eventuality of the 'related struggle'. His name was Dan Lerner, although once it had been Ernest Loehner, the son of the exclusive Vienna shopkeeper, Rudolf Loehner, who at the last moment and by pure chance had been plucked from the doomed at Cladovo to accompany a small, lucky group of youngsters to Palestine. Since then he had served as a parachutist- liaison officer in Tito's headquarters during the Yugoslav partisans' war of liberation, and from a Palmach commander he was to rise to the rank of general in Israel's army. The young man who only a few years earlier had been an 'illegal immigrant' himself was now commanding an operation to help secure the arrival of what was left of the victims of Nazi Europe. ('Open the Gates!: A Personal Story of "Illegal" Immigration to Israel', Ehud Avriel, 1975, p. 230) (IMG)

No doubt during the period 1941 to late 1942, an alliance with the Zionist agents of the British intelligence service against the Third Reich was necessary. In the early stages of World War II, Israel – as the settler-colony of American imperialism – had to contribute some of its resources to engage in an intelligence war with Nazi Germany. Involving the "Jewish Agency in Palestine" into fighting the Nazis would have certainly been progressive in the first stages of the Great Patriotic War, (1) because it contributed resources to fighting the Nazis, and (2) because for fighting the Nazis, it was forced to reallocate some of its resources away from slaughtering the Arabs and onto helping in the fight against the Nazis. Of course, the Jewish Agency in Palestine contributed so little to the fight against the Nazis, but insofar as it did, it did a correct thing. From late 1942 onwards, the Zionist leadership of the Jewish Agency in Palestine began to sponsor the Nazis as a bulwark against the Soviets, and so from then on, Israel played a reactionary role. Hence, the Mossad began to support Tito's group in 1943. Recall that as stated previously:

Some 240 Palestinian Jews volunteered to parachute into the Balkans in 1943 and the British established training camps in Cairo and Haifa. The following year, 32 men and women were, in fact, dispatched in joint British-Allyah Bet missions into Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Slovakia, Austria, and Yugoslavia. (...). The most successful of the Palestinian agents, Yesheyahu Trachtenberg, better known as Shaikhe Dan, had a remarkable wartime and postwar intelligence career and is remembered as the savior of thousands of Romanian Jews. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 7-8) (IMG)

The IsraelDefense magazine – an Israeli magazine, which as the name suggests, is concerned with military and intelligence affairs – stated that Shaikhe Dan was the founder of the 'Nativ', an Israeli espionage organization that also facilitated that process of illegal migration to Israel:

This decades-long enterprise was the responsibility of the people of "Nativ" – the intelligence agency in charge of maintaining connections with and providing assistance and protection to Jews in the USSR and Eastern Europe. At the head of this enterprise stood Shaikhe Dan, one of the 'Volunteer Paratroopers' and a major operative of the Escape movement, who was among the founders of "Nativ" and who, for many years, served as the most senior representative of that agency in Eastern Europe.

"We reached an agreement with them for a certain quota of Jews each year. We were the primary source of foreign currency for the Romanian intelligence services. We sometimes paid by cheque, other times in cash – all from Swiss banks," recalled Yacov ("Yasha") Kedmi in a recent interview for IsraelDefense. Kedmi served as the head of "Nativ" between 1992 and 1999, immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

The first "Nativ" station was established in Vienna by Mike Harari, a veteran Mossad hand who subsequently became the head of 'Caesarea', the Mossad's field operations division. Harari had established stations in Moscow and in Vienna. In those years, Austria was also divided into four zones controlled by the Soviet Union, US, France and the UK, and served as a playground for overt and covert activities by all of the superpowers. Israel took advantage of this situation, and Shaikhe Dan decided to set up his forward command post in Vienna. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

Indeed, 'Shaikhe Dan ... managed to establish a close friendship with the head of the Yugoslav secret police':

Shaikhe Dan was born in 1909 in the town of Lipkani, Bessarabia. He immigrated to Palestine in 1935 and settled at Kibbutz Nir-Am. During WWII, he volunteered to serve in the British Army and was dropped by

parachute, along with his friend Yitzhak (Mano) Ben-Ephraim, in Romania, to help rescue British pilots whose aircraft had been shot down. Before departing for his parachute jumps, he would take a handful of earth from the Kibbutz to keep in his pocket.

Even during the War, Shaike Dan and Yitzhak Ben-Ephraim were already involved in saving Jews and helping immigration to Palestine. After the War ended, they continued to operate in Romania for a number of years. When Israel was established, Shaike Dan was sent to Yugoslavia to help organize Jewish immigration to Palestine from there. After he was apprehended during his activity, he managed to establish a close friendship with the head of the Yugoslav secret police. Subsequently, this agency helped Israel in connection with various activities, including arms smuggling to Israel and by serving as a transit point for immigrants from Romania.

Yugoslavia was a part of the Eastern bloc, but it had been cut off from the ComInform (Communist Information Bureau), and was fairly isolated, caught between the Soviet threat and the embargo imposed by the West. As it was rich in natural resources, but lacked the appropriate infrastructure, it needed Israeli assistance in order to develop its industry.

(‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

The head of the Yugoslav regime’s fascist secret police was Rankovic, the anti-communist mass murderer who tried to do to Kosovo what Israel did to Palestine. Note also that the above-cited document confirmed that the UDB:

helped Israel in connection with various activities, including arms smuggling to Israel and by serving as a transit point for immigrants from Romania. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

Another major channel of liaison between the Mossad and the Yugoslav regime was between the prominent Mossad operative Ehud Avriel and the Tito henchman, Moshe Pijade. Throughout his memoirs, Ehud Avriel several times implied that he was a Mossad operative. His service for the Mossad is explicitly confirmed by Francis Nicosia of the US ‘Peace Corps’ who said:

Ehud Avriel [was] a former Mossad agent in Vienna.. (The Third Reich and the Palestine Question, Francis R. Nicosia, p. 161) (IMG)

Moshe Pijade proudly assisted the Mossad in its operations in Eastern Europe. Top Mossad operative Ehud Avriel wrote in his memoirs:

My 'journalistic' work brought me into contact with the officials of the Yugoslav Government Press Office. Not surprisingly, I met a few who had a sincere respect for our struggle in Palestine, about which they received quite one-sided reports from British sources. But after the war they regarded their former British Allies as having reverted to the stance of imperialist suppressors, and they felt the partisans' affinity for a small people fighting against a superior enemy.

In consultation with Alkalay, I decided to ask for an interview with Moshe Piade, the Speaker of the Federal Parliament and one of the chiefs of the Communist Party. Piade was a Jew, and Alkalay had been in touch with him on matters concerning the revival of Jewish communal life after the war. Alkalay had found him friendly and sympathetic, although he hardly regarded himself as a member of the Jewish community about to be re-established. When I was finally told that Piade was ready to receive me, he asked that I come to see him informally at his home.

A stoutly built man with the face of a scholar and intellectual, Piade opened the door for me himself when I arrived at his villa for our talk. Completely dispensing with formality, he brought me into his drawing-room.

'Here you can speak absolutely freely. I have switched off all the microphones and we are alone,' he said with a sarcastic reference to rumours, then current in Belgrade, that even top leaders of the Communist Party were closely watched by the Secret Service.

As we settled down for a long talk, Piade told me of his curiosity about everything concerning the 'Zionist effort in Palestine'.

'I am, as you may know, of Jewish descent,' he said, 'but I regard myself as a Yugoslav communist and nothing else. This is my country and my people; among them I have grown up and fought my political battles. Till recently I was with them in the mountains fighting against the Nazis. But I want to hear from a primary source about your work, your ideas, your life.'

Moshe Piade's manner made me think he might well be called 'Tito's Berl Katznelson.' He listened with sympathy, interrupting with keen questions as I tried to explain our way of life and our thinking. The organization of the kibbutz — a collective 'from below', as he defined it — interested him most. It was obvious that he pondered the possibilities of a similar movement in the new social reality of the 'People's Democracy'. At the end of the long and stimulating evening I knew we had won a friend.

'You will hear from me again, both directly and indirectly,' Piade said as we parted, and I knew by his tone

that I would receive an affirmative reply to my request for permission to organize illegal immigration to Palestine from the shores of the Adriatic.

Leibl returned from his exploration of the Hungarian track full of hopes and more than pleased when he heard that on the diplomatic level things looked good too. But he was not satisfied with one link: he knew, and he had been told once again in Budapest, that many Jews from Poland had moved to Rumania.

So he decided to 'open the border' between Rumania and Yugoslavia too. At the frontier post of Kikinda, again by speaking Russian and showing his Polish refugee card, he received assurances from the Rumanian frontier guard that any Jewish refugees wanting to cross into Yugoslavia would be helped.

A few days after my talk with Piade, Slavko Radej, the head of the emaciated Jewish community of Zagreb, came to meet with me. He had survived the war with his vigour and optimism fully intact and had visions of streams of Jewish refugees from Hungary and Rumania on their way to the Dalmatian coast. Slavko was glad to discover the existence of the Mossad. He had already hoarded food, blankets and boots and had made arrangements for transit quarters on the outskirts of Zagreb. His contacts with the Yugoslav communist administration had been forged while he lived with many of the new leaders as partisans in the mountains, and these friendships facilitated his new task as host to the expected refugees from beyond the Yugoslav borders. As we ate breakfast together in the dining-room of the Majestic, he told me about the arrangements he had made with Leibl for transient refugees from Rumania.

Suddenly the hall-porter came up to me with a telegram. It was from Paris and it read: 'Chief Editor needs you for urgent discussion at once. Ruth'. I turned the telegram over in my hand. There was absolutely no indication of what it was all about, and Slavko shared my curiosity. I explained to him that it could mean that Ben Gurion — who I knew was in Paris — wanted to see me urgently. Or was I imagining things? The quiet atmosphere of our talk suddenly vanished. Slavko suggested that I try to telephone Paris and find out for sure before I made any decisions.

This time the telephone connection worked reasonably fast. I was able to distinguish Ruth's voice faintly over the line, and she confirmed my interpretation of the message. I left with Slavko on the train to Zagreb, after having taken leave of Leibl and of Alkalay.

After a short stop in Zagreb for a visit to Slavko's home and to take up food supplies, I continued on to Vienna. From Zagreb through the snow-covered mountains of Slovenia, as far as I could make out I was the only passenger on the unlit train. It moved with great effort up the steep ascents, and I wondered how long I would be stuck in the bitter cold of the unheated carriage.

(‘Open the Gates!: A Personal Story of “Illegal” Immigration to Israel’, Ehud Avriel, 1975, pp. 245 -247) (IMG)

Under Pijade, Yugoslavia became the pathway through which the Jews were transported by Zionist organizations clandestinely to Israel. CIA reports confirmed:

Young Hungarian and Rumanian Jews who have been forbidden by their respective governments to emigrate to Israel, continue to cross into Yugoslavia clandestinely. The Yugoslav authorities incarcerate them but by a tacit agreement with JOINT they are released for emigration as soon as shipping space is available for Israel. Ninety of such emigres were included in a shipment of approximately 5,000 persons to Israel from Fiume during the last week of May.

About three weeks ago Moshe Pijade personally arranged a release from prison of all minor Jewish political prisoners for emigration to Israel.

(Emigration of Hungarian and Rumanian Jews through Yugoslavia to Israel, CIA, June 14, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

These were done in active collaboration with the United States, the Tito-Pijade Regime in Yugoslavia, as well as the American-Israeli intelligence organization known as the ‘Joint’:

The final exodus of approximately 30,000 Jews in Yugoslavia from Fiume Haifa for on SS RADNIK and PARTIZANKA, will be complete by the end of July 1949.

Passages on vessels will be paid to the Yugoslavia government by the Joint Distribution Committee in dollar credits in the United States and through dummy corporation “American Lloyd” in Paris. Thus far, the Yugoslav Government has received \$200,000 in the United States for passengers shipped to Israel. (Exodus of Jews from Yugoslavia, CIA, March 21, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Against the laws of Romania, Ana Pauker, the Titoist Romanian agent of the Mossad, assisted Israeli agent Mordechai Namir in promoting the clandestine Zionist migration. However, the Romanian government, the laws of which were being violated by the Israeli agent and Titoist lobbyist Pauker, sought to re-enforce such laws. Uri Bialer, the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s official historical researcher admitted:

Although virtually no emigration was permitted from Rumania between late 1948 and November 1949, agreement had been reached between Mordechai Namir, representing the Jewish Agency, and the Rumanian

Foreign Minister Anna Pauker (herself a Jewess), early in 1948. This allowed for the clandestine emigration and aliyah of some 5,000 Rumanian Jews per month.

Rumanian renunciation of this agreement in mid-1949 was accompanied by the severe imposition of intensive anti-Zionist measures, which included the imprisonment of local Zionist leaders and the destruction of most of the movement's organizational frameworks. In return Israel stepped up her own efforts to bring to fruition the Rumanian promises regarding aliyah.

(Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 61) (IMG)

Since Zionist migration was banned, the Mossad had to launch these operations illegally, clandestinely, and through its agents in Romania's state apparatus. The Israeli embassy in Bucharest, which was subordinate to the Nativ and in turn subordinate to the Mossad, would provide bribes so to promote migration:

"Over the years, Shaike Dan developed excellent connections with senior officials in the governments and intelligence services of the Eastern European countries, and succeeded in establishing a solid connection with the Romanians as well. In Eastern Europe, it was impossible to do anything without being monitored by the security services. It was therefore logical to go ahead and contact them, instead of waiting, and if they wanted it to happen – it would."

"Shaike would sometimes fetch a suitcase containing two million dollars and head for Bucharest. The entire Israeli embassy in Bucharest was a "Nativ" station. At the beginning of each year, we would go to Bucharest, sit down with them and finalize the quotas and prices – how much a child would go for, how much an adult would go for, how much extra should be paid according to the person's professional qualifications and status and so forth. It ranged between less than one hundred dollars to a few thousands.

The price for a doctor could be as high as \$10,000.

"Throughout the year, we would make all kinds of adjustments, and we would hold a summation meeting at the end of the year – compare, balance the budget and make the necessary complementary adjustments.

The management of funds was perfect – strictly in accordance with the tariff."

(‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

A paper published by the CIA front think tank ‘Wilson Center’ admitted that the negotiations between Pauker and the Mossad went back to as early as 1946:

In mid-1946, the agents of the Mossad opened negotiations with the Romanian authorities, in particular with Ana Pauker, unofficial leader of the Romanian Communist Party, in order to gain consent for large-scale Jewish emigration. Bucharest agreed to allow 50,000 Jews to leave, on the condition that the emigrants give up their property and their money. (Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 29) (IMG)

The Wilson Center document stated that Pauker:

was the most fervent advocate of unrestricted Jewish emigration from Romania. (Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG)

Again, lest we forget the Mossad-backed faction's ties to the Yugoslav intelligence. Indeed, Rankovic's UDB:

helped Israel in connection with various activities, including arms smuggling to Israel and by serving as a transit point for immigrants from Romania. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

Hence, Ana Pauker's faction was allied to the Yugoslav regime's fascist secret service. Referring to Ana Pauker, the CIA also reported:

Between 1944 and 1948, she opened a private bank account in Switzerland for her father and brother. This is the principal charge preferred against her. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p.3) (IMG{Romania})

The Swiss banks were the banks through which the CIA, MI6, Mossad, and Nazi German secret service operated their financial transactions, and assisted their agents in carrying out financial sabotage and money laundering. Since Pauker was an agent of the Mossad, and since the Mossad was subordinate to the US intelligence back then, it is not improbable that she got CIA-Mossad payments through those bank accounts.

The faction countering the CIA-Mossad influence in Romania was centered around Gheorghiu-Dej, the close friend of Joseph Stalin. In the words of a document published by the Woodrow Wilson Center:

The faction of the general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, Gheorghiu Dej, stood against the emigration of Jews.. (Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Woodrow Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 31) (IMG)

In fact thanks to the influence of the communist faction headed by Dej:

Romanian emigration ceased at the end of 1948 .. (Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Woodrow Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 31) (IMG)

Zionist migration to Israel was banned, the 'Joint' assets were liquidated, and the supposedly 'Communist-led' Jewish Democratic Committee was thoroughly purged. A 1949 CIA document explained:

with the assistance of various international Jewish charitable agencies, thousands were able, after being screened by the Communist-dominated Jewish Democratic Committee, to emigrate to Israel. However, following their attack against "Zionist nationalism" in the Workers Party Resolution of 12 December 1948, the Communists began early in 1949 to restrict the number of Jews permitted to leave the country. This has amounted to virtual cessation of all emigration to Israel. (...). On 4 March 1949, Rumanian Jewry's most valuable tie with the West was severed through the forced liquidation of the American Joint Distribution Committee's assets in Rumania. The Jewish Democratic Committee, thoroughly purged and reorganized under the direction of ... Bercu Feldman, and the Federation of Jewish Communities are now the twin instruments of Communist [the anti-Zionist leadership] of the Rumanian Jewish population. (RUMANIA, CIA, October 5, 1949, pp. 9-10) (IMG)

The document continued:

Strenuous efforts have been made to "integrate" the Jewish population in the framework of a sovietized Rumania. (RUMANIA, CIA, October 5, 1949, p. 9) (IMG)

Note that the migration ceased in 1948, a few months after the expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform. This makes much sense since the migration was to happen via Yugoslavia through a joint collaboration of the UDB and Mossad. With the expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform came the severing of ties with fascist Yugoslavia and the decline in Yugoslav influence in Romania, hence a decline in CIA-Mossad influence.

Subsequent Mossad attempts to lure the Romanian government into collaboration with the Ben-Gurion regime pretty consistently failed. Describing the situation with the Mossad's attempt to promote Zionist migration, Shmuel Friedman, who was:

Director of the Eastern European Section of the [Israeli] Foreign Ministry.. (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 2009, p. 86) (IMG)

reported that (as Bialer rightly stated) the anti-Zionist faction of the Romanian government stepped up its resistance against the Zionist conspiracies. According to the Israeli foreign ministry document dated February 22, 1949, Friedman reported that:

In Rumania the situation is deteriorating. The emissaries have not been released and three more have been detained. The directors of the Zionist Funds are still under arrest and awaiting trial. The Rumanians have refused to receive a delegation from the Jewish Agency. (...). The negotiations on Aliya from Rumania have had no results. The Jewish community is on the verge of panic and thousands have been gathering near the Legation in Bucharest demanding to be allowed to emigrate. The Israeli Minister was summoned to the Deputy Foreign Minister and asked to put a halt to the demonstrations.. (...). The Minister in Rumania wishes to contact the Russians in this matter, but Golda Meyerson thinks there is no possibility of holding talks of such sort in Moscow. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow), February 22, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 79) (IMG)

In late February of 1949, Rubin, the head of the Israeli legation in Bucharest, Romania, made the following points in his report to Moshe Sharett:

1. For the last four days the entire local press has been attacking with growing intensity the Zionist enterprise in Israel and the aliya.
2. No reply has been received from the authorities on the aliya; on the contrary, pressure has increased on the Jews to take employment and to be absorbed in the Rumanian economy.
3. The pressure to close down the preparatory training farms is continuing and all the children's homes maintained by the Zionist Organization have been taken over by the government.
4. There has been no progress on the release of the directors of the Zionist Funds.
5. There has been no response to Israel's protest over the detention of the emissaries.
6. The leaders of the regime refuse to meeting the Minister and refer him to second or third grade officials.
7. In the Minister's estimate the situation has reached a critical stage and there is a feeling of an impending catastrophe. The impression is that there is no prospect of a solution locally and it is suggested that the Russians be energetically approached in this matter.

(R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett, February 27, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 80-81) (IMG)

While the Mossad agent Ana Pauker was very kind towards the Mossad, her deputy minister did not appear as favorable to Israel's regime. According to an Israeli legation report to Sharett:

Rubin has been received by the Deputy Foreign Minister from whom he demanded the release of the seven emissaries and requested an answer on the aliya. The Deputy Minister replied that the emissaries were under interrogation on the charge of interfering with internal affairs of the Rumanian state. He also said he had no reply on the aliya. When Rubin asked whether this should be construed as a reply, he said: "As you wish". Rubin replied that he would have to go back to Israel to report. The Deputy Minister responded only by asking when Rubin was planning to leave. (...). In Rubin's opinion further negotiations on the aliya are of no use as an unfavourable decision on this matter has apparently already been taken. The content and tone of the conversation seem to underline this state of affairs. Rubin thinks he should be recalled to Israel for consultations. (R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett, March 1, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 81) (IMG)

Romania's counter-intelligence chief, responsible for many of the anti-Zionist purges, had an even tougher rhetoric against Zionist subversion:

Reporting on a meeting between the Minister of the Interior, the Deputy Minister, and 20 Zionist leaders. According to the Minister: the Zionist Organization had to be abolished. The State of Israel was a lackey of the United States. Israeli emissaries in Rumania had engaged in subversive activity, organized demonstrations, and agitated against the government. The [Zionist] agricultural training farms had to be shut down, and the [Zionist] youth movements disbanded. No promise had been given that Zionists would be permitted to emigrate to Israel – this had simply been the Zionists' interpretation. To the extent that aliya would be feasible in the future, it was the government which would determine who would be allowed to leave. All other Jews would have to take their place in the labour force. Thus far, the Minister's statement. (R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett, March 3, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 82) (IMG)

As such, the Mossad operative Avriel reported that:

In Rumania, defeat [of the Zionists] was total. (E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman, March 7, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 83) (IMG)

Indeed, Avriel rightly believed that:

direct negotiations with the Rumanians will prove fruitless.. (E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman, March 7, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 83) (IMG)

Ana Pauker tried to release the Israeli agents in Romania. According to a report by the Israeli legation in Romania to Friedman:

Rubin had been granted an interview with Ana Pauker, the Rumanian Foreign minister, and had delivered the letter from Israel's Minister for Foreign Affairs.. They had discussed the problems of aliya, the imprisonment of the emissaries, and trade relations. The emissaries were to be released and sent back to Israel. Rubin asked that all public meetings relating to the emissaries be postponed, and that the press be muted on the matter. With respect to immigration, there was a possibility that negotiations would be resumed; nevertheless, the action agreed upon with Agami should not be deferred at this stage. Israel's purchases in Rumania should certainly be expedited, and a meeting had already been arranged for him with the Minister of Commerce. (R. Rubin (Bucharest) to S. Friedman, March 18., 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 85) (IMG)

According to the Israeli foreign ministry's report on the meeting between Rubin and Pauker:

Ana Pauker received the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs ... and read it in Rubin's presence.

She said that she had initiated steps to have the imprisoned emissaries released, but the demonstrations outside the Legation had sabotaged her efforts. They had also interfered with further work on the question of immigration. (...).

Ana Pauker raised the question of trade between Rumania and Israel. Rubin replied that he had requested an interview with the Minister of Commerce, but had met with no response. She telephoned the Minister then and there, and the interview was arranged.

In the matter of the directors of the Zionist Funds, she promised to consider a meeting between Rubin and the Rumanian Finance Minister, in order to reach some financial arrangement. Rubin proposed the sum of \$400,000 to resolve the dispute between the Funds and the Rumanian government. He also suggested that a

special meeting be called between officials of the Israeli Legation and the Rumanian government commission dealing with immigration to Israel, so that Israel could present her views more clearly. She said that she would study the question.

In Rubin's opinion, the Rumanian government, was divided in its attitude towards Israel, with Ana Pauker, among others, being in favour of permitting emigration to Israel.

(Meeting: R. Rubin – Ana Pauker, Bucharest, March 18, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 86) (IMG)

Zionist plans in Romania indeed proved quite fruitless as predicted by the Mossad agent Avriel. Later on, Ana Pauker was arrested for her activities for the Mossad:

Ana Pauker was arrested in February 1953 and accused of serving as an agent of international Zionism. (Moscow's Surprise, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG)

Anti-corruption purges in Romania also were directed against Zamfir, who had been in charge of passports and hence certain aspects of migration, and who had allowed comprador bourgeois elements among Hungary's Jews/'Jews' to launder money out of Romania:

Colonel Zamfir, Director of Surveillance and Passports ... had obtained huge sums of money by granting passports to people not entitled to them, such as former aliens who had acquired Rumanian citizenship or Jews who had smuggled large amounts of foreign currencies out of the country. Zamfir's wife and mother-in-law were his agents in these transactions. (Political Situation in Rumania from June 1952 to August 1954, CIA, January 27, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Colonel Zamfir, Director of Surveillance and Passports, his wife, and his mother-in-law were arrested, and he was sent to work on the Danube-Black Sea Canal.. (Political Situation in Rumania from June 1952 to August 1954, CIA, January 27, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

In Hungary, parallel events were occurring. Zionist migration was prohibited in Hungary. There was a power struggle between the pro-Zionist faction represented mainly by Zoltan Vas, and the communist anti-Zionist faction led by Rakosi, a comrade of Stalin. A CIA document stated:

Unlike the other Satellites, Hungary had never completely halted the operations of the Jewish welfare organization, the American Joint Distribution Committee (known as Joint). the agreement with Joint was made by Zoltan Vas.. (...). Vas, as chief of the Supreme Economic Council until June 1949 had been associated with a number of shady deals calculated to turn a quick forint to save the financially hard pressed regime. Gero, as chief of the Peoples Economic Council established in 1949 appeared to follow more orthodox methods of industrialization. Vas, an opportunist of many skills and amazing political agility, probably was personally antipathetic to the rigidly puritanical Gero. Vas, moreover, was personally vulnerable: he had been closely related to several high-level defectors and was directly involved in the security police purge through his connection with the Joint agreement. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957 pp. 37-38) (IMG)

The gradual decline of Yugoslav influence in Hungary as a result of the Cominform resolution and the firm stand of the communist parties against Titoism, there came about a decline in the power of the Israeli intelligence service as well, by extension. At this point, therefore:

In Hungary Israeli diplomats failed to negotiate the mass departure of Jews. (Moscow's Surprise, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG)

The mass migration from Hungary therefore saw a sharp decline to approximately 555 people per month during the period mid-1948 to the end of 1949:

From mid-1948 to the end of 1949, only about 10,000 Jews emigrated illegally to Israel. (Moscow's Surprise, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG)

The anti-Zionist purges by the communist faction though were just beginning, and Zionist migration was to decline even further. As early as February 1949, Israeli intelligence reported that Rakosi had opposed the migration of the Yiddish from Hungary. A Mossad document written by the Mossad operative Avriel provided the following details: Avriel discussed the problem of aliya with Rakosi, the Secretary-General of the Hungarian Communist Party, stressing the necessity of aliya from Hungary and asking for 50,000 exit permits within six months, promising in exchange to put a stop to the illegal emigration and to use his influence to pacify the Jewish public.

Rakosi refused the request, claiming that the Jews were an integral and useful component of the Hungarian nation. They included many professionals, whose emigration would harm the stability of the state. (...). The Hungarian government is putting pressure on the Zionist Organization to dissolve of itself. Emissaries from Israel are being deported on the charge of Zionist activities. Avriel advised the Zionist leaders not to dissolve the organization but also not indulge in provocative acts. The emissaries will leave Hungary only if forced to do

so. (E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman, February 21, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 78-79) (IMG)

The result of such a power struggle was a ‘compromise’ between the Zionist faction of Zoltan Vas and the anti-Zionist communist faction centered around Rakosi. Indeed, considering the greater pressure by the Mossad lobby in Hungary:

Rakosi ... nevertheless agreed on the need for some sort of compromise and promised to have the problem discussed anew in the Cabinet and to consult the neighbouring countries. (E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman, February 21, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 78-79) (IMG)

The ‘compromise’ actually favored the anti-Zionist faction more than may at first appear. The ‘compromise’ in the Hungarian Party was that Israel would have to pay for the legal migration (as opposed to kidnapping) of the elderly Yiddish. Note that the older Jews were predominantly unenthusiastic about the Zionist project, nor were they particularly ‘biologically useful’ for entrenching an Israeli Kautskyite terror state that required energetic young men and women in the labour force or the military. Legal migration of the elderly to Israel would have meant that the migration of the elderly Jews was going to be limited to the Zionist elderly Jews/’Jews’, as opposed to any random elderly Jew/’Jew’ being captured. Beyond the older Jews for whose legal migration (as opposed to kidnapping) money was to be paid, no Zionist migration would be allowed. For all practical purposes, the legal mass migration of the elderly and the less-literate to Israel would have boosted costs for Israel’s regime while contributing little in favor of the Zionist settler-colonial project. Hence the launching of a mass migration of Zionist elderly to Israel would have served as an anti-Zionist weapon of mass migration, forcing the Ben-Gurion regime to spend its funds in accommodating the elderly rather than spend its funds for terrorizing Arabs. This circumstance really dissatisfied Ehud Avriel (whose original name was ‘Ueberall’, later Hebraicized into Avriel), the top Mossad operative responsible for Zionist migration affairs. These facts have been corroborated in a CIA document, some excerpts of which are as follows:

Ueberall, the Israeli minister in Prague, is currently in Budapest conferring with the Hungarian Government on the release of 20,000 Hungarian Jews for emigration to Israel.

The Hungarian Government is demanding two million U.S. dollars from the Joint Distribution Committee, ostensibly to cover “fees” for processing emigrants. The Government will release only older and, by Israeli standards, unassimilable elements for emigration.

Ueberall, regarding the sum demanded as “hostage money”, is opposed to payment and to accepting older people. He has already conferred with Matyas Rakosi, Secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party, who has proved uncooperative and refused to permit young Hungarian Jews, to emigrate on the grounds that they are a “literate element” and are needed by the State.

(HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO RELEASE PRO-ZIONIST JEWISH YOUTH, CIA, April 26, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Rakosi ‘compromised’ with the Zionist forces in a manner that undermined the Zionist forces, and led anti-Zionist purges, and actively worked to undermine CIA-Mossad presence in Hungary. Shmuel Friedman, Director of the Eastern European Section of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, reported that:

There is complete stalemate in Hungary, and E. Avriel is continuing his negotiations. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow), February 22, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 80) (IMG)

Thus, due to the influence of the Rakosi faction:

The Hungarian government has once again renewed its resistance to the emigration of Hungarian Jews to Israel. Consequently, “clandestine methods” are now being used to remove Hungarian Jews from Hungary. (Exodus of Jews from Yugoslavia, CIA, March 21, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

After this phase of the ‘compromise’, which undermined Zionist interests, anti-Zionist purges began; those responsible for assisting the illegal migration were duly prosecuted, and a Hungarian Zionist organization was dismantled. This is corroborated by Karel Kaplan, a West German spy who stole many of the archives of the Czechoslovak government in his defection to the camp of the US-led countries in the mid-1970s. Subsequently, he closely collaborated with the CIA’s Radio Free Europe, as well as with the ‘Federal Institute for East European and International Studies’, the official research wing of the Interior Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany. Kaplan wrote:

One could, however, observe a note of anti-Zionism.. The official Hungarian attitude toward Jews, particularly toward efforts to emigrate to Israel, had dramatically changed in the course of 1949. Emigration passports were no longer granted as liberally as before, and later were no longer granted at all. February negotiations of Israel’s envoy in Prague with leading Hungarian authorities were fruitless in this regard. On March 24, the interior

ministry disbanded the Hungarian Zionist Union (with perhaps a hundred thousand members), stating that it had been organized by a foreign power. Those who assisted people in getting abroad illegally, via Czechoslovakia, were prosecuted. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 29) (IMG)

Rakosi was aware of the extensive lobby of the CIA-Mossad in Czechoslovakia, and as will be revealed later in C15S8, Rakosi would assist Gottwald in the purge of American agents in Czechoslovakia. The Israeli legation in Prague, in its monthly report to Tel Aviv, stated that:

With respect to aliya from Eastern Europe in general, the Legation [in Prague] had learned that the Hungarian Communist Party had lodged a complaint with the Cominform against the Czechoslovak Communist Party concerning the immigration from Czechoslovakia, asking for a uniform decision in this field. The report had not been corroborated by other sources. (Monthly Report of the Israeli Legation in Prague, March 10, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 85) (IMG)

The report was later corroborated in another Israeli foreign ministry document by Friedman which stated:

The Cominform was to convene at the end of April and, among other issues, would discuss the question of immigration to Israel. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in Warsaw, March 30, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 89) (IMG)

The April 26 CIA document continued:

no matter what the attitude of the Hungarian Government might be, the Hungarian Jewish youth is dominantly pro-Zionist and is determined to emigrate, clandestinely if necessary.*

*Comment: Presumably through Yugoslavia

(HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO RELEASE PRO-ZIONIST JEWISH YOUTH, CIA,

April 26, 1949, p. 1. Underline original) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Israeli secret service agents were losing ground in Poland as well. Friedman, the Director of the Eastern European Section of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, reported that:

In Poland the situation is also difficult. The Palestine Office, which dealt with immigration to Israel, has been closed down and its functions have been transferred to the Legation, whose staff is consequently under great pressure. The Polish government allows only a small number to emigrate, as it sees fit. Apparently only those are permitted to leave who have relatives in Israel, who are over 50 and who are not in an essential occupation. The report which has been recently appeared in an Israeli newspaper that there would be great concessions in the matter of emigration is apparently groundless. The Israeli Minister in Warsaw finds it difficult to reconcile himself to this state of affairs and transmits continuous reports on “friendly” negotiations, on an unclear situation and on possible developments in either direction. There are good prospects of aliya from Czechoslovakia. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow), February 22, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 79-80) (IMG)

However:

In Bulgaria, on the other hand, emigration is continuing. The Bulgarians have requested to postpone the dispatch of an official representative from Israel till the end of March, when the emigration of the Jews will have been completed. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow), February 22, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 79-80) (IMG)

Also:

The movement of Bulgarian Jews on Israeli ships to Israel was recently completed. (Exodus of Jews from Yugoslavia, CIA, March 21, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

As a result of the powerful Zionist lobby that existed in the Peoples’ Democracies, and despite the communist resistance, these Mossad operations were largely successful.

C16S3. On Britain’s fake ‘Opposition’ to Zionism

*** IMG-All- {Israel}

During the 1940s, the British and the Israeli regime pretended to be viciously at war with each other. Surely, there existed Mapamite/Palmachnik who genuinely aimed to combat the British imperial presence in the region (more on this later) but the dominant faction in the Zionist movement held a favorable stance towards the British Empire, despite pretending to ‘oppose’ it. The dominant faction in Israel and the British ferociously denounced each other. Hence, on the surface, Britain would appear as ‘opposed’ to the Zionist ‘Jewish Agency’ and Israel, and hence opposed to US projects in Palestine since Israel was actively and openly backed by the United States.

Depending on the balance of power as determined by the extent of the development of the productive forces, two or more imperialist powers can be rivals or can be allies. The Anglo-Americans, however, had strictly convergent finance capital interests at the time. To think that the British were seriously going to oppose the US colony Israel, is to be profoundly mistaken.

The CIA collaborated with the MI6 on virtually every corner of the planet; simultaneously, the CIA also collaborated with the Mossad on virtually every corner of the planet, and since the Mossad was the junior partner in this collaboration, the Mossad was controlled by the CIA back then through the Joint Distribution Committee. The MI6 and Mossad both so extensively collaborated with the CIA, and yet both managed to avoid each other or wage wars against each other? Such a 'love triangle' war between the MI6 and Mossad, two partners of the CIA, is totally implausible. It is so obviously a fraud, disproven not only by dialectical logic, but also by empirical evidence of the thorough collaboration of numerous MI6 agents with the Mossad and numerous Mossad agents with the MI6 during this period. Some of the evidence of the services rendered by the British and the Israelis to one another will be mentioned in this chapter.

For start, the whole purpose of promoting the myth of British colonial 'opposition' to Zionism goes back to 1910s and 1920s with the alliance of the MI6 with both the Zionists and the Hashemites of Jordan. Since the Palestinians are regarded as ethno-racially more similar to the Jordanians than they are to the other Levantine Arabs of the Levant, it would have been awkward for Jordan's Hashemites to openly collaborate with the colonial power that promoted the Zionist terror against the Palestinian Arabs. As such, the British decided to, on the covert level, ally with the Jordanian Hashemites and the Zionist settlers, while being 'hostile' to Israeli regime on the overt level and supporting Zionist settler-colonialism's fake 'enemy', the Hashemite Jordan. So much for the Anglo-Hashemite 'hostility' to Zionist settler-colonialism, the Anglo-Hashemites stabbed the Arab armies in the back during the 1948 War.

The MI6 puppet Hashemite regimes in Iraq and Jordan and the infamous British General Glubb who ran the Hashemite Jordanian army on behalf of the British military, stabbed the Arab armies in the back during the war against Israel. This fact is extensively documented and books have been written about this, but I will present the remarks of the Saudi King Faysal, who years after the 1948 War, in a conversation with Gamal Abdel-Nasser, recalled the Anglo-Hashemite stab in the back:

That Glubb was a pig! At the time, he was preventing the Jordanian army – even if Abdullah wanted to be with him – he would stop them, and he had instructions from the British to not go beyond the boundaries of the division.

The Iraqi army remained in the triangle there and did not move. Its front reached Latania, between Haifa and Tel Aviv, and then they returned to it, like the battle.

(Minutes of the Discussions of President Gamal Abdel-Nasser with King Faysal, Second Session, December 19, 1969) (IMG)

Throughout most of the years of the colonial occupation of Palestine, the British Empire pretended to 'oppose' Zionist migration and Zionist settler-colonialism. The Israelis and the British launched 'wars' of words against each other. Yet, that same Britain opened up Palestine for Zionist migration even during the years in which it 'denounced' Zionist projects. Arnold Toynbee, who worked for the intelligence department of the British Foreign Office, stated that decades of British military rule over Palestine is what led to Zionist migration to that territory, whereas an independent Arab state in Palestine would have prevented the flooding of Palestine with Jews:

Arnold J. Toynbee who, before becoming recognized as an eminent world historian had dealt directly with the Palestine Mandate in the British Foreign Office, wrote in 1968:

"All through those 30 years, Britain (admitted) into Palestine, year by year, a quota of Jewish immigrants that varied according to the strength of the respective pressures of the Arabs and Jews at the time. These immigrants could not have come in if they had not been shielded by a British chevaux-de-frise. If Palestine had remained under Ottoman Turkish rule, or if it had become an independent Arab state in 1918, Jewish immigrants would never have been admitted into Palestine in large enough numbers to enable them to overwhelm the Palestinian Arabs in this Arab people's own country. The reason why the State of Israel exists today and why today 1,500,000 Palestinian Arabs are refugees is that, for 30 years, Jewish immigration was imposed on the Palestinian Arabs by British military power until the immigrants were sufficiently numerous and sufficiently well-armed to be able to fend for themselves with tanks and planes of their own. The tragedy in Palestine is not just a local one; it is a tragedy for the world, because it is an injustice that is a menace to the world's peace."

(History of the Question of Palestine, Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part I (1917 -1947), United Nations (UN)) (IMG)

In 1939, the British established the 'White Paper' supposedly to restrict Zionist migration, but during that same period from 1939 to 1944, when the Ashkenazi and Sfaradi refugees were escaping Nazi persecution, the British relaxed their own 'White Paper' restrictions. In other words, the 'White Paper' only nominally 'restricted' Zionist migration. The UN reported:

The clauses of the 1939 White Paper relating to immigration were also implemented, but at the end of the five-year period in 1944, only 51,000 of the 75,000 immigration certificates provided for had been utilized. In circumstances where Jewish refugees from Europe were fleeing violence and persecution, the White Paper's limits were relaxed and legal immigration was permitted to continue indefinitely at the rate of 18,000 a year. (History of the Question of Palestine, Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part I (1917-1947), United Nations (UN)) (IMG)

Furthermore, and as a matter of fact, recall that Britain actively collaborated with Israel during World War II: According to [OSS official] Koenig, "the various British Intelligence Services freely used the emissaries of this section [i.e. the Jewish Agency] for penetration, intelligence and DA [double agent] purposes.

The representatives of the AJDC acted as a liaison with the Allied intelligence services and eventually financed this courier-cum-intelligence service." ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 7-8. **Square brackets are original.** The CIA paper cites: 'SCI/A, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S), in DO Records, 1L 3, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC.) (IMG)

Although the Mossad and the MI6 pretended to have ceased cooperation since 1945, that claim is completely implausible for so many reasons. It is anti-dialectical to assume that the British imperialists were simultaneously (1) genuinely allied to the American imperialists and (2) genuinely opposed to the regime of Israel, the ally of American imperialism. It goes against another of the dialectical laws of history: the tendency for two states/organizations to form an alliance with each other if there is a state/organization that is allied to these two states/organizations. The alliance of the British with the Americans and the alliance of the Americans with the Israelis would have meant that the British too were allied to Israel, despite the outwardly pretensions of 'hostility' between the British and the Israelis. The outwardly pretensions of 'hostility' actually was an excellent propaganda and intelligence weapon of the MI6, the CIA, and the Mossad, because it gave the Anglo-Israeli agents in Eastern Europe the required excuse to support Israel so to assist Israel in ostensibly 'fighting' the British imperialists, when in fact Israel was going to fight the Arabs instead of the British.

C16S4. On the 1947 Soviet Vote in the UN regarding Palestine

*** IMG-All- {Israel}

In 1946, the USSR signed a secret treaty with Syria calling for the removal of British troops from the region:

The USSR agree to support the Syrian government in all steps which the latter may undertake in order to establish complete independence. The USSR will back Syrian demands for immediate evacuation of all French and British troops. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-55, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 70. Citing: From Encroachment to Involvement, a Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945 -1973. Israel University Press, Yaacov Ro'i, 1974, pp. 29-30) (IMG)

The same type of deal was made with Lebanon:

A secret treaty between the USSR and the Lebanese government based on these [above] clauses, was signed two days later. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-55, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 70) (IMG)

The first significant political dialogue between the Soviet Union and the Arab governments occurred at the beginning of 1946. In an attempt to increase their influence in the Middle East, the USSR approached the President of Lebanon, Bishara al-Khuri, on 10 January 1946 with a proposal to negotiate a secret treaty. After consultations and discussions between the Lebanese and Syrian governments, both agreed to receive the first formal proposal of a treaty from the USSR. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955, Rami Ginat, 1993, pp. 69-70) (IMG)

Therefore, the USSR had an international obligation to strive towards the reduction of British imperial influence in the Levant – and the Soviets stayed true to their words. As the world's superpower, the USSR took the initiative in the UN by starting the discussions on the independence of Palestine, a topic which the Anglo-Americans surely sought to avoid:

The efforts of the United Kingdom and United States to avoid discussion of the substance of the Palestine problem at the special session, and to create a neutral committee without Great Power participation, provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to gain credit for a certain degree of leadership in the Palestine question. Gromyko exploited this opportunity by (1) appearing to champion the principle of full discussion; (2) generally favoring immediate independence and termination of the Mandate.. The course pursued by the Soviets appears to leave the USSR in an excellent tactical position for the future. (Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at Special Session of United Nations General Assembly, May 27, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1089) (IMG)

In early 1947, thanks to the efforts of Palmachnik Israeli freedom-fighters, the question on the fate of Palestine was brought forth to the United Nations::

in February 1947 ... the British Government, under the pressure of violence in Palestine, requested a special

session of the General Assembly to consider the appointment of a special committee “to make recommendations ... concerning the future government of Palestine”. (The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, The Palestine Question in the United Nations; underline added) (IMG)

The official goal of the UNSCOP was to:

prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine. (Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, 56th meeting, p. 314. Cited in: The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977) (IMG)

However, the UNSCOP member states were:

Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. (‘UN Partition Plan, 1947: Paving the Way to the Impending Nakba’, Palquest: The Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question) (IMG)

Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia were all firmly entrenched in the imperialist camp. The latter in particular is noteworthy as will be seen later in this chapter. In spite of its anti-imperialist pretensions, Yugoslavia was a pro-imperialist spy-state, serving as one of the hubs of CIA, MI6, and most importantly for this case, Mossad activity.

India was openly sympathetic to the USSR.

The situation in Czechoslovakia was mixed. The influence of the communist and anti-communist forces in Czechoslovakia was quasi-equal in 1947. Note that Czechoslovakia’s communist revolution did not happen until 1948. Nor did the Red Army have a strong presence in Czechoslovakia to create the pressure for non-socialist Czechoslovakia to adopt Soviet lines. While the Communist Party (KSC) maintained a strong popular representation in the Czechoslovak government, they still were not yet in power. As a matter of fact, Czechoslovakia was back then led by such openly pro-Western capitalist leaders as President Edvard Benes and the pro-Western ‘Christian Zionist’ Foreign Minister and millionaire Jan Masaryk. Subordinated to Masaryk was his Under Secretary, Vladimir Clementis who was ostensibly a ‘communist’ and officially belonged to the KSC, but, as a member of a ring of Anglo-American agents, was secretly betraying Czechoslovakia by promoting Slovak separatism and anti-state Zionist activity. The communists did have a significant influence over the Czechoslovak state, but still not enough. Clearly, the majority of the states in UNSCOP were satellites or neo-colonies of the United States. In the UNSCOP, a key:

question in the discussion on the Special Committee was whether the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe should be linked with the Palestine problem. A European delegate stressed the importance of separating the two:

“the difficulty of finding a just and satisfactory solution to the Palestine question are increased by the linking together of two problems which are not necessarily interdependent.

“The first problem is the question of the future status of Palestine; the second problem is the question of the homeless Jews in Europe. These two problems are usually linked together in every discussion of the Palestine question. It is taken for granted that the only solution of the humanitarian problem of Jewish homelessness is immigration to Palestine and it is thus dependent upon a solution of the political question of the future status of Palestine.

(The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, Citing: Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, First Committee, vol. III, 48th meeting, pp. 88-91.) (IMG)

In the end, Washington was able to lobby for the imposition of its will, and the issue of Jewish refugees was linked to the future of Palestine:

The United States draft (somewhat amended) was approved ... and the mission of the Special Committee was approved in broad terms:

“The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine”.

While avoiding specific reference to the refugee situation in Europe, the Special Committee was authorized to conduct investigations anywhere it considered necessary, thus assuring an indirect linkage of the Jewish refugee issue to the future of Palestine.

(The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, Cited: Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, 56th meeting, p. 314.) (IMG)

Throughout the sessions of the United Nations, the USSR consistently supported the establishment of a single state of Palestine, an independent bi-ethnic democratic state in which the rights of the Israelis and Palestinian Arabs were respected. Indeed, as early as April 15, 1947, the Middle East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued firmly for a single, independent, democratic Palestine. One prominent legal scholar at Harvard University has

noted:

With the United Nations moving to take up Britain's request, the government of the Soviet Union moved toward formulating a stance. To many in the Soviet foreign affairs establishment, the logical choice was to oppose Zionism and support the Arabs. On April 15, 1947, an internal document was drafted titled "Memorandum by the Middle East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Palestine Question (for the forthcoming discussion of the Palestine question at the United Nations)." The Memorandum, circulated within the Ministry only, stated: "The United Nations must draw up a constitution for a single, independent and democratic Palestine which will ensure that all the peoples living there will enjoy equal national and democratic rights." Continuing, it recited, "The United Nations must also act as guarantor for the implementation of its own prerequisites for an independent and democratic Palestine state. The independent and democratic State of Palestine shall be included [as a member] in the United Nations." (The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders, Cambridge University Press, John Quigley, pp. 47-48) (IMG)

Clearly, this position of the Soviets:

was support for the Arab position. The Arabs wanted a Palestine state upon Britain's withdrawal. That was the view of the Arab Higher Committee, which regarded itself as a government-in-waiting for Palestine. The Soviet position, as yet confidential, was moving away from the trusteeship proposed in the earlier Soviet paper, in the direction of outright independence for Palestine. Under this approach, the Arab-Jewish hostility would be resolved through democratic processes. Migration to Palestine would presumably require the consent of the Arabs, so the USSR would oppose the Zionist desire for a Jewish state. (The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders, Cambridge University Press, John Quigley, p. 48) (IMG)

A US diplomatic document confirmed that the USSR was pursuing a policy in support of the Arab cause and against the creation of Israel's regime:

Recent press articles (Embets 1636, April 30 and 1670, May 6) as well as Gromyko's conduct in special GA [General Assembly] meeting provide further indication that Soviet policy toward Palestine is based upon:

1. Opposition to formation in all or part of Palestine of Jewish State, which USSR would regard as Zionist tool of West, inevitably hostile to Soviet Union.

2. Support of ... independence of Palestine with present Arab majority population. Chambrinski in Red Fleet article was undoubtedly speaking for Soviet Union in declaring "progressive circles of entire world consider entirely just [the] demand of Palestinian people for independence and democratic path to development.^"]

(867N.01/5-1047: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Dubrow) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, Moscow, May 10, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, pp. 1081-1082) (IMG)

During the discussions of the UNSCOP, the USSR and Poland argued for an independent and democratic Palestinian state. Dominated by a pro-Zionist and pro-imperialist bias, the UNSCOP rejected these proposals:

During the discussion in the Committee, the Soviet and Polish representatives proposed amendments to its terms of reference requiring it to submit proposals on the question of establishing "the independent democratic State of Palestine", both amendments being defeated. (The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, The Palestine Question in the United Nations) (IMG)

Instead, the UNSCOP had developed a 'majority' plan. The 'majority' who supported this of course belonged to or leaned towards the Western Bloc and thus supported the Zionist project:

The Special Committee, however, had been unable to agree on recommendations. A majority of members (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) recommended the partition of Palestine into two States that would be politically separate and independent, but would administer a unified economy. Jerusalem would be an international city. The minority (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) proposed an independent Palestine as a federated State with Jerusalem as its capital. Australia did not support either proposal. (The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977) (IMG)

Notice that Czechoslovakia belonged to this 'majority' faction. It seems unlikely that Czechoslovakia was supporting the 'majority' faction as a result of Soviet influence, because the Soviets were openly on the side of the single independent democratic state instead of the partition. The UNSCOP members did agree on the termination of the British occupation of Palestine, however. This inter-imperialist conflict was manifested in the fact that the:

The only unanimous agreement [in UNSCOP] was on the termination of the Mandate, the principle of independence, and a United Nations role:

"The Mandate for Palestine shall be terminated at the earliest practicable date .

"Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date .

(The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977) (IMG)

In short, the decision of the UNSCOP was to support the partition and to terminate the British mandate. The UNSCOP majority therefore adopted the line officially held by the Zionists. Note that during this period, the Zionist mainstream was supportive of a strategic partnership with the United States but also pretended to be militantly hostile to the British Empire. Recall also that Britain was the force behind the Zionist mass migration, even though it presented itself as hostile to Zionist mass migration. Recall further that the reason behind this ostensible ‘hostility’ of the Zionists towards the British Empire was rooted in Britain’s strategic alliance with the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, ‘the Arabs’, hence resulting in Britain’s ‘hostility’ the Ben-Gurion network, Zionist migration, etc. No informed observer would have ever seriously doubted the fact that the Ben-Gurion group, fascist agents of American intelligence as they were, would have been – and were – also allies of Britain.

None of that is to imply that the superficiality of the ‘hostility’ of Israel and Britain was insignificant, since after all the UNSCOP majority line officially supported the withdrawal of Britain in favor of the establishment of Israel. This outwardly pretension of hostility was something that the USSR exploited excellently so to undermine British imperial and Zionist settler-colonial interests in Palestine.

Let us analyze the situation. **If Britain was to stay in Palestine, then the Israeli settler-colonies would have expanded gradually but surely, even if Israel would have not been officially established. If the British were to leave Palestine, there was a strong probability that the Israeli settler-colonies would have swiftly expanded through a successful Israeli war against the Arabs, but there was also a good probability that Israel would not have won the war and hence the Zionist settler-colonial project of expelling the Palestinian Arabs would have failed.** If Britain would have officially stayed in Palestine, British presence in Palestine would have been both covert and overt. If, on the other hand, the British would have left Palestine, British imperial presence in Palestine would have been reduced to mere covert presence for the while, thus relatively weakening British imperial presence. In sum, continued official British presence in Palestine would have guaranteed the expansion of Israeli settler colonies against the Arabs living under British rule, and would have maintained covert and overt British presence in Palestine. On the other hand, the official withdrawal of the British would have ended the guarantee on Israel’s settler-colonial expansion and would have reduced British presence to covert presence only. The choice between these two options is a no-brainer: (1) Britain leaving Palestine and ending the guarantee on Israel’s settler-colonial expansion, and (2) Britain staying in Palestine thereby guaranteeing Israel’s settler-colonial expansion. Option 1 was definitely the correct choice, and that was the choice of the USSR. The Arab states should have supported the USSR’s pragmatic line on this matter, because it would have damaged Zionist colonial interests in spite of the appearance of it being a ‘pro-Zionist’ line. However, the Arab states did not do so officially, because they were under the pressure of the Arab masses who, understandably, were not necessarily aware of the strategic situation described above.

One question that may be raised is: if one is to choose between these covert allies Britain and Israel, why choose to side with the Zionists against British colonialism in the UN vote? In other words, why not side with British colonialism against the Zionist delegates in the UN? The reason is that at the time, the British controlled all of Palestine whereas the Ben-Gurion faction of the Jewish Agency controlled only a part of Palestine; the balance of power in this British-Israeli ‘conflict’ was in the favor of the British. The British held much more material factors under their influence than did the Zionist settler-colonizers in Palestine. In order to exploit this superficial ‘conflict’ between Zionists and British imperialists, it was necessary to coopt and ‘support’ the weaker reactionary – those delegates to the UN who voiced support for Zionist settler-colonialism – against the stronger evil, the British Empire. Had Britain stayed in Palestine, nothing would have been left of Arab Gaza and Arab West Bank since those territories would have been fully settler-colonized by the Israeli regime. British withdrawal put those efforts into jeopardy. Even now, the reason why the West Bank is colonized is because of Anglo-Hashemite betrayals. In short, although the decision to ‘favor’ the Zionist settler-colonists at the expense of the British Empire would superficially appear as ‘support’ for Zionist settler-colonialism, the truth was that Zionist settler-colonialism itself fed from and was fueled with the support of British colonialism, and without British colonialism, the Zionist settler-colonial project too would have weakened.

The United States would have definitely benefited from both the continued presence of the British in Palestine and the continued expansion of the Israeli settler-colonies. The US therefore covertly supported both Britain and Israel. However, publicly, it had to make a choice between Britain and Israel. Publicly choosing Britain over Israel would have been a ‘strategy’ of utmost foolishness on the part of the American imperialists, since the Americans had spent so many years cultivating soft power influence among a significant percentage of the Israeli population. The tasks were divided between the Americans and the British; Britain would increase influence in Jordan through British colonial ‘anti-Zionism’, whereas America would aim to steal the USSR’s soft power influence among the Ashkenazim by supporting the establishment of a Zionist state as a rival to the Yiddish Autonomous Oblast in the USSR. Furthermore, had the US publicly sided with Britain over Israel, the USSR – already armed with tremendous soft-power influence among the Yiddish population due to its heroic war against the Nazis – could easily use this decision of the United States as a propaganda tool to drive a deep wedge between Israel and USA. In effect, the USSR would have been able to not only

dramatically undermine the British, but also to pull Israel away from America so to liberate Israel from American imperialism and to pave the way for Israel to ally with the progressive anti-imperialist Arab organizations and states in the region. The result would have been damage to British, American, and Zionist settler-colonial interests. The US would have been monumentally foolish not to publicly side with Israel against Britain. Hence, as yet another evidence of the success of Soviet maneuvering, the US was compelled to join the USSR in supporting the resolution to expel Britain from Palestine.

The USSR also correctly calculated that despite the reactionary character of the Zionist regime, the Soviet soft power among the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim would greatly pay off. Many individuals harbor the false view that almost all of those who migrated to Palestine migrated wanted to terrorize the Arabs of Palestine. That is not true. Although a large percentage of the Ashkenazi/Sfaradi migrants to Palestine harbored anti-Arab chauvinist views, another large percentage opposed such anti-Arab chauvinism, favoring instead coexistence with the Arabs and alliance with the progressive Arab forces against the British Empire, the American imperialists and the anti-Arab chauvinist mainstream tendency in the 'Jewish Agency' led by Ben-Gurion. The Soviets were aware of such a current among the people of Israel. More on this will be mentioned later.

In any case, the Soviet decision regarding Palestine was not a choice between the lesser evils, but was a strong step forward against the imperialist-fascist presence in Palestine. Thus, after the UNSCOP rejected the Soviet and Polish delegations' call for a single state of Palestine, the Soviets reiterated their support for a single state solution, but toned down their line by describing it as a 'more noteworthy' option:

Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the establishment of a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for the Jews and the Arabs may be considered as one of the possibilities and one of the more noteworthy methods for the solution of this complicated problem ... (Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, Plenary Meetings, vol. I, 77th meeting, pp. 132-134. Cited in: *The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947 -1977*) (IMG)

Reflecting the Soviet confrontation with the pro-Zionist majority in the UN and the aforementioned dilemma associated with it, the Soviet representative in the United Nations Andrei Gromyko added:

If this plan proved impossible to implement, ... then it would be necessary to consider the second plan ... which provides for the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab. (Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, Plenary Meetings, vol. I, 77th meeting, pp. 132-134. Cited in: *The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977*) (IMG)

It is essential to emphasize, as confirmed by US diplomatic and intelligence documents, that the USSR surely preferred the establishment of a single, integral, independent, democratic Palestinian state, hence opposing the establishment of Israel's regime. A May 27, 1947 US diplomatic report cited a memorandum that was:

Dated May 27, ... [and] drafted by officers of EUR.. (Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at Special Session of United Nations General Assembly, May 27, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1088) (IMG)

The EUR was and remains the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, a special branch of analysis for the US State Department, focusing, as the name suggests, on Eurasian affairs. The memorandum, the US diplomatic report stated, analyzed the stance of the USSR on the partition of Palestine:

The attached memorandum, prepared at your request, and reviewed in EUR and NEA, analyzes the statements on various aspects of the Palestine problem made by the Soviet Delegation at the special session of the General Assembly. The voting record of the Soviet bloc, the Arab States, and the United States on the principal roll call votes taken at the special session is also appended. (Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at Special Session of United Nations General Assembly, May 27, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, pp. 1088-1089) (IMG)

The US State Department memorandum stated that while on the surface, it appeared as though the Soviet delegation had a shift its stance to a Zionist one, in reality there had been no change in the Soviet stance. This was, the memorandum confirmed, because the USSR supported the establishment of a single, integral, non-partitioned, multi-ethnic, democratic, independent Palestine as its first choice:

The memorandum indicates that, despite an apparent shift in the Soviet position at the final meeting of the Assembly, there is no real inconsistency in the various statements of position made by the Soviet Delegation. Throughout, the statements seem designed to straddle the fundamental issue. The Soviets supported ... independence after partition if a bi-national state proved to be impracticable; and representation for the Great Powers on the special investigating committee. (Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at Special Session of United Nations General Assembly, May 27, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1089) (IMG)

On September 1947, in a meeting of the US delegation to the UN General Assembly, the Soviet position on Palestine was discussed. Indeed, regarding the specific issue of Palestine, the former Assistant Chief of Staff of the US Army and Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, General John Hilldring confirmed that the USSR's number one choice for Palestine was a federal state:

General Hilldring said that the Russians had already made their position clear. Their first choice was a federal state. (10 Files: US/A/AC.14/205, Position on Palestine, Excerpts From the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly, New York, September 15, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1148) (IMG)

Another US diplomatic document stated that the:

UNSCOP majority recommendation ... though second-choice, would serve Soviet interest in softening up area by ... [s]ecuring withdrawal of British and ensuring against their replacement by other great – power influence; (...). Soviet offense in Arab eyes would be minimized by prior endorsement [of] partition by UNSCOP majority and USA and by Soviet record in support [for] Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt (already being propagandized, see Embtel [Embassy Telegram] 3205, November 131). (867N.01/11-1447: Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, Moscow, November 14, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1264) (IMG)

This reality, along with the consistent Soviet support for Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt 'minimized', in the words of the US diplomatic document, the negative view of the USSR 'in Arab eyes'. In his speech at the founding of the Cominform in September 1947, Zhdanov reaffirmed the Soviet Union's alliance with Egypt and Syria as two countries aligned with 'anti-imperialist and democratic camp' 'and anti-fascist forces':

A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become two major trends in post-war international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating in the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France. ... The imperialist camp is also supported by colony-owning countries, such as Belgium and Holland, by countries with reactionary anti-democratic regimes, such as Turkey and Greece, and by countries politically and economically dependent on the United States, such as Near-Eastern and South American countries and China.

The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere.

The anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria.

(Speech by Andrei Zhdanov (member of the Soviet Politburo) at the founding of the Cominform (a Communist International Organization) in September 1947, James Madison University) (IMG)

On November 29, 1947, along with the overwhelming majority of the UN, the Soviets voted for the 'majority' plan. However:

While the Soviet Union also voted for partition ... the original Soviet stand was in favour of a unified state in Palestine, if it was possible. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1947-1955, Rami Ginat, 1991, p.

107. Citing: Interpretative Report on Soviet Foreign Policy based on the Press for November 1947, prepared by the American Embassy, Moscow, 23 December, 1947, W.N.R.C., RG 84, Cairo Embassy General Documents, File Subject-1947: 800, box 167.) (IMG)

The Soviet policy on Palestine, opposed to both British and US-backed Zionist settler-colonialism, was correct and just, indeed. The explanation for the Soviet line in the UN was also reflected in the Soviet media at the time:

In an article entitled "The Arab East and the Palestine Question" New Times attempted to indicate the consistency of Soviet policy regarding the solution of the Palestine problem. It asserted that, although Soviet representatives in the U.N. had affirmed the advantages of the minority recommendations for a single state, they considered the proposals for division the only course possible under existing conditions and had only one purpose, namely, to hand Palestine over to the peoples inhabiting it. New Times accused "British propaganda" of working on Arab fears of isolation. It promised the Arabs the support of the anti-imperialist camp. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1947-1955, Rami Ginat, 1991, p. 108. Citing: Interpretative Report on Soviet Foreign Policy based on the Press for November 1947, prepared by the American Embassy, Moscow, 23 December, 1947, W.N.R.C., RG 84, Cairo Embassy General Documents, File Subject-1947: 800, box 167.) (IMG)

Therefore, as evidenced by the facts enumerated above, while the USSR voted for the resolution that resulted in the

partition of Palestine, it did not pursue the partition of Palestine as its real goal. It supported the UN resolution in order to expel the British colonists from Palestinian territories. The Soviet opposition to the British presence in the Levant, however, gave the Soviets no delusion about the American imperialists represented in Palestine by Israel's regime. Given the covert alliance of Britain with Israel, the expulsion of the British from Palestine would have meant a weakening of the Zionist hold over Palestine. The US ambassador to Moscow wrote to his boss in Washington:

Despite lack info GA developments except from Soviet press and fragmentary radio news, we feel obliged register our conviction Soviet policy and tactics toward Palestine question are deliberately calculated to ensure unsettlement, rather than settlement, and to create maximum difficulties for British and Americans in Near East. (867N.01/11-1447: Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, Moscow, November 14, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1263) (IMG)

After the 1947 Palestine vote, in the UN, the Soviet Union undertook complex diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at sowing division in the Anglo-American-Zionist camp. Obviously, the UN resolution involved both the expulsion of Britain from Palestine, a positive outcome, along with the partition of Palestine, the negative outcome. The Soviets remained consistent with their support for the former outcome. Regarding the latter, they remained consistent with their official vote only nominally. In practice, they did nothing to implement partition and instead worked to make America's position in Palestine to 'go from bad to worse', to use the CIA's words. The following is an excerpt of a major CIA document on Palestine:

the USSR voted for the UN partition of Palestine. From November to May it consistently supported partition but **took no initiative in urging effective action to implement partition.** Officially the Soviet position was unimpeachable; unofficially, the Kremlin was content to sit back and watch matters go from bad to worse in Palestine. (POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE, ORE 38-48, CIA, July 27, 1948, p. 7. Bold added.) (IMG)

The American attempts to establish trusteeship over Palestine and the efforts to 'mediate' 'peace' between the Arabs and the Zionist regime would have rendered the US-backed Ben-Gurion faction far stronger in Palestine. The USSR blocked such American efforts. As American intelligence put it:

The Soviet delegation loudly denounced and obstructed the US proposals for a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, the one possibility which might have prevented an Arab-Jewish war after 15 May. Since 15 May the delegation has been lukewarm on truce attempts and has obstructed mediation efforts. On 7 July it abstained in the Security Council from voting on the resolution to extend the four weeks' truce. Although it voted for the resolution on 15 July ordering the belligerents to cease hostilities, it abstained from voting on the proposal to give the UN Mediator authority to negotiate a settlement between Jews and Arabs. (POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE, ORE 38-48, CIA, July 27, 1948, p. 7) (IMG)

The Soviets also worked against the Bernadotte Plan, which was aimed towards restoring British colonial rule in Palestine. An American diplomatic document noted the:

British emphasis on Bernadotte's recommendation for merging two areas rather than on his statement that disposition Arab Palestine should be left to government of Arab States; (2) recent pressure on Arab States ... against recognition [of] Arab Government Palestine interpreted by most Arab leaders as rising less from reasons advanced than from British desire promote Transjordan and their interests. (501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram, The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p. 1471) (IMG)

There was also:

British argument that greatly enlarged Transjordan necessary to security of ME. (501.BB Palestine/10 -1348: Telegram, The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, pp. 1471-1472) (IMG)

An untitled US intelligence document also stated:

US Ambassador Douglas in London transmits a message sent by the UK Foreign Office to British Representatives in the Arab capitals strongly urging Arab acceptance of UN Mediator Bernadotte's recommendations for Palestine. The Foreign Office endorses the Mediator's proposal that Arab Palestine be incorporated in Transjordan because of the British view that Arab Palestine ... could not maintain itself as a separate state military, economically, or politically.. ("(UNTITLED)", CIA, September 23, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

The 'British Charge Chapman-Andrews', the US ambassador to Egypt said, was:

inclined [to] believe (1) destruction of AGP [is] of overriding importance and; (2) that British emphasis on Bernadotte proposal re[garding the] disposition of Arab Palestine by Arab States would encourage Arab Government's support AGP with adverse effects. He also maintained enlarged Transjordan would enhance

British ability maintain security of ME. (501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram, The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p. 1471) (IMG)

To summarize, the British plans was to establish a Greater Jordanian state over what little remained of Palestine, so to establish a neo-colony of Britain. This British plan was also endorsed by the United States:

Secretary Marshall had publicly expressed this Government's [i.e. USA's] support of the Bernadotte plan in its entirety, and that the Department was in complete agreement that the most logical disposition of Arab Palestine would be its incorporation in Transjordan. (501.BB Palestine/10-148, Subject: Developments concerning the Bernadotte Report and situation in Palestine. Memorandum. of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite), CONFIDENTIAL, WASHINGTON, October 1, 1948. Participants: Mr. T. E. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy. NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite. UNA—Mr. McClintock NE—Mr. Rockwell. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, pp. 1445 -1446) (IMG)

The increase in the influence of the Anglo-American imperialists, via the Hashemite Jordanians, in the West Bank would have blocked the progressive Arab forces from increasing their influence in the West Bank, thus further weakening the already weak Palestinian Arab revolutionary resistance in the West Bank, while strengthening the fascist forces in the West Bank. In time, MI6-backed Jordanian control over the West Bank could allow for an easy Zionist conquest of the West Bank, as happened in the 1967 War. The 'Arab' face, the Jordanian mask, which the Anglo-American imperialists were using to take control of the West Bank was a trap in favour of Zionist settler- colonialism. The Egyptians, strategically aligned with the Soviets, disagreed with such plans:

Egyptian opposition to Bernadotte Plan has greatly increased due to widely held belief that British support for plan is based principally on desire secure merger Arab Palestine and Transjordan as step in enlarging their sphere of influence and toward creation Greater Syria. (501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram, The Ambassador ;n Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p. 1471) (IMG)

So did the Syrians, also strategically aligned with the Soviets. Under the influence of the pro-Soviet (see C4S8) Prince Faysal faction, Saudi Arabia ended up denouncing such an agenda too:

Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia also opposed Bernadotte's plan.. (Jerusalem: Some Aspects Of a Complex Problem, RP 78-10212, National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, May 1947, p. 22) (IMG)

Referring to the Arab states, the US House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs stated:

In the fall of 1948, at the Paris session of the General Assembly, they rejected the Bernadotte plan which would have turned over the entire Negev, the Palestine desert, to Jordan. (THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in House of Representatives, p. 1495) (IMG)

The Palestinian government, headed at the time by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Al-Husseini, was also opposed to Jordanian plots to take over Palestine:

On the 10th August, the Mufti of Palestine made a violent attack on the Hashemites in the Sadat Mosque in Damascus, calling them the slaves of British imperialism, and terming Abdallah the "number one Zionist agent" and the man responsible for the catastrophe in Palestine. (Anti-Hashemite Activity, Source: RLB-606, CIA, Date of Document: August 17, 1948, Cross Filed on: January 2, 1953, p. 1)

(IMG)

Palestine has been represented at meetings of the Arab League, first by independent individuals and then by the representatives of the new Arab Higher Committee, formed in 1945. At the conference of the Political Committee of the Arab League in October 1947 it is significant that the Mufti, as Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, played a leading role. (THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE, ORE 55, CIA, November 28, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Of course, there can be no doubt that the Mufti, himself a Nazi Muslim Brotherhood terrorist agent of the Italian Fascist secret service and the MI6, would have hailed a Hashemite Jordanian conquest of Palestine behind the scenes. Nonetheless, outwardly, because he had to officially represent the Palestinian Arabs, he opposed the Jordanian plots on the overt level. Along with the Arabs, and in line with 1946 Soviet treaties with Lebanon and Syria, the Soviets opposed the Bernadotte Plan on the ground that it was a British attempt to regain control over the Levant through an aggressive expansionist Jordanian Hashemite regime:

the Arab coalition rejected the plan. So did the Soviet bloc. (...). The Soviet bloc was also vehemently opposed to Bernadotte's plan, considering it an attempt to reestablish British control over parts of Palestine. ('The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979', Princeton University Press, Saadia Touval, p. 48) (IMG)

In the meantime, the Amir Abdallah of Transjordan, under the stimulus of Iraq's Arab unity plan, had

intensified his own campaign for a Greater Syria oriented toward Jordan. This project of Abdallah's - like that of Iraq -- was motivated by a long-standing resolution to restore the Hashimite rule over Syria which had collapsed when the French drove Abdallah's brother Faysal from Damascus in July 1920. (Disunity Among the Arab States: The Hashemite Controversy and Arab Palestine, Intelligence Report,

Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, November 24, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

Soviet propaganda against Greater Syria was particularly strong and stressed that it was "foreign circles" which were behind Abdallah. (Disunity Among the Arab States: The Hashemite Controversy and Arab Palestine, Intelligence Report, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, November 24, 1954, p. 7) (IMG)

The Ben-Gurion faction, agents of Anglo-American intelligence, inevitably would have supported the Bernadotte Plan behind the scenes, but publicly had no choice but to continue to stick to the ostensibly 'hostility' of the Zionists to the British Empire.

C16S5. The 1948 War and the Soviet Union

*** IMG-All- {Israel}

Anti-dialectical is the assumption that the USSR would oppose the Anglo-American imperialists thoroughly but that it would also support an Israeli regime which was aligned with the American imperialists and covertly also with the British imperialists. It would be anti-dialectical to assume so, because such an assumption would contradict a major dialectical-historical-material law of history: the alliance of the proletariat. The USSR was a dictatorship of the proletariat, whereas the anti-imperialist states of the Arab world were the dictatorship of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, closely allied with the proletariat of the Arab countries. Such states did have the national bourgeoisie as the main force dominating the state but secondarily also incorporated the proletariat into the state, which was why these Arab states were democratic – Egypt was a constitutional monarchy, Syria was a democratic republic, and Lebanon was a multi-confessional parliamentary democracy. The interests of the Soviet proletariat were the same as the interests of the Egyptian, Lebanese, and Syrian proletariat. **It makes little sense to say that the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR would materially contradict the progressive bourgeois-democratic alliance of the proletariat and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie in the Arab countries because that would mean the contradiction of the class interests of the Soviet proletariat with the class interests of the Arab proletariat.** One can therefore calculate that the Soviets would never betray the anti-colonial Arab forces, even if, at face-value, appearing to betray it. And it unsurprisingly turns out that such a calculation is backed up immensely by historical empirical evidence – namely **the military and economic support of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies for the Arab anti-colonial war effort during the 1948 War.**

The Soviet media stated that the anti-imperialist bloc would support the just cause of the Arabs; these were by no means empty promises. Throughout the 1948 War, the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies of Eastern Europe covertly furnished the Arabs with military assistance. With respect to military aid to the Arabs, however, another excerpt of the previously mentioned Soviet-Syrian and Soviet-Lebanese secret treaties in 1946 was as follows:

The Soviet Union agrees to send a sufficient number of military personnel to Syria, comprising military instructors and high-ranking officers, in order to help Syria to build up as rapidly as possible a national army of some strength. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-55, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 70. Citing: From Encroachment to Involvement, a Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973. Israel University Press, Yaacov Ro'i, 1974, pp. 29-30) (IMG)

And the same type of deal was made in the secret treaty with Lebanon:

A secret treaty between the USSR and the Lebanese government based on these [above] clauses, was signed two days later. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-55, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 70) (IMG)

With regards to Soviet military support for Syria, the well-known Syrian politician Akram Howrani, who would later hold prominent positions in Nasserist and Ba'athist governments in Syria, confirmed that the Soviets were 'offering military equipment in exchange for a pledge that we will not participate in any international agreements against it', and that a female colleague of his received a special telegram regarding the details of a Soviet offer of military and economic aid:

Then, on October 2, 1946, I published the following comment on the possibility of establishing our relations with the Soviet Union.

"When Radio Moscow, quoting the correspondent of the Russian newspaper "Pravda", broadcast the news of the British offer to conclude a military alliance treaty between England and Syria. When this news was broadcast, the Syrian government rushed and issued a statement saying, "This news is not true." It is necessary to clarify all the internal and external circumstances regarding our current situation, but this certainty disappears little by little when other news is published and broadcasted that is closely related to our situation and our situation.

"A female colleague published a few days ago what a Jewish newspaper said in a special telegram she

received from Beirut: ‘The government of the Soviet Union submitted proposals to Syria and Lebanon in which it presented to the two countries a guarantee of their independence and safety, and that it was ready to support the two countries’ international stance and support their respective steps in the United Nations Council. In every other international conference, support for Syria’s demands from Turkey on the Alexandretta issue, the provision of tractors, agricultural machinery and building materials, the conclusion of commercial treaties with them, and the provision of military equipment at a fixed price for a long period.’

“This is what was published last Sunday morning. The official circles met him only with complete silence, as if the matter did not concern them in a little or a lot... But we cannot stand idly by on this issue. Rather, the nation wants to know the facts. The facts are detailed. Because our country has become, by virtue of its geographical location, a field of competition between the major powers with influence. We must take advantage of this dangerous circumstance as much as we can.

“Our independence is guaranteed by the United Nations.

“As for providing military equipment to our army. What we know is British. And before that, French.

You did not agree to give us enough weapons for this young army. Then the opposition of these two countries to us was clear in our purchase of arms from America. And here is a Russian offering military equipment in exchange for a pledge that we will not participate in any international agreements against it. What is our position also on this offer?

“That’s the logic. And our international position, and our interest. All of this requires us not to be hostile to any country, unless it tries to detract from our independence and sovereignty.”

(Akram Al-Howrani Memoirs, 2000, pp. 586-587. Bold original) (IMG)

The support of the USSR for Syria was not limited to the period before the 1948 War but continued well afterwards onto during the 1948 War. Indeed the USSR – along with the Eastern European Peoples’ Democracies – militarily and economically backed Syria and Lebanon during the 1948 War. As material support for the Arab fighters, the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak People’s Democracy provided weapons whereas Romania supplied the petroleum:

Some of the Arab League countries have purchased arms from Czechoslovakia; the largest shipments to the Arabs from that country have gone to Syria and Lebanon. Small shipments from the USSR or Balkan ports are also reported to have landed on the Syrian and Lebanese coasts; also, petroleum products are now being shipped to Lebanon by Rumania. (POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE, ORE 38-48, CIA, July 27, 1948, p. 9) (IMG)

As a result of Soviet military aid, the position of the Arabs improved significantly:

The armament position of the Arabs has been notably improved by ... a \$2,035,000 contract for small arms, ammunitions, and other materiel just negotiated by Syria with the Skoda works of Czechoslovakia ... and ... the reported arrival of Soviet shipments of small arms in Lebanon and Syria. (Book III – Weekly Summary – 3 July 1947 (#55) thru 30 December 1947 (#79), CIA, pp. III-IV) (IMG)

According to the above report, Britain also provided some token arms to the MI6 puppet regime in Iraq, the government which did not really contribute seriously to the fight against the IDF. The fact that the CIA documents used the word ‘reported’ – referring to reports which the CIA itself received – may make it appear as though the reports of Soviet shipment of weapons were not necessarily true. The reports were indeed true. A study published by the RAND Corporation confirmed that the USSR indeed sent arms to Syria:

The USSR was hedging its bets by sending some Czech arms from a remote air field to ... Syria through Rijeka and Beirut.. (‘The Evolution of the Soviet Use of Surrogates in Military Relations with the Third World, with Particular Emphasis on Cuban Participation in Africa’, RAND Corporation, Gavriel D. Ra’anan, December 1979, p. 3) (IMG)

Also documenting the Soviet military aid to Syria is the ‘American Jewish Committee’ (AJC). To show the importance of the AJC as a source on this matter, the following is a description:

Prior to the establishment of the state of Israel and for more than a decade thereafter, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) was the Jewish organization to whose views Israeli leaders were most sensitive. Israeli and Zionist leaders perceived the AJC as the Jewish organization with the best access to U.S. policy-makers and as most representative of wealthy American Jews. Thus, the AJC was an important link in securing political and economic support from the American government and financial assistance from the American Jewish community.

AJC leaders had participated in the expanded Jewish Agency when Zionist leaders had sought the cooperation of leading non-Zionists in the 1920s. Indeed, the agreement between Zionists and non- Zionists whereby the latter joined the expanded Jewish Agency was largely the result of an agreement reached between Chaim Weizmann and Louis Marshall, leader of the AJC.

(DIASPORA INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL: THE BEN-GURION-BLAUSTEIN “EXCHANGE” AND ITS AFTERMATH, American Jewish Committee Archives. Reprinted from: Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 to No. 4 (July 1974 to October 1974), Charles S. Liebman, pp. 271-272) (IMG)

According to the AJC, Riad Al-Solh, Lebanon’s first Prime Minister after independence, stated that the USSR, covertly through Czechoslovakia, was providing arms to the Arabs even though it superficially ‘sided’ ‘with’ Israel in the UN in 1947:

On February 25, Riad-es-Solh, the Premier of Lebanon, declared in Cairo: “Russia voted with you [Israel] on the Palestine question, but where do you think we are getting our arms? From Czechoslovakia. And who is Czechoslovakia but Russia herself?” (Jews in the Soviet Satellites, The American Jewish Committee, edited/authored by: Peter Meyer, Bernard Dov Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky, Nicolas Sylvain, 1953, p. 128) (IMG)

Note again that in 1946, the USSR formed a military alliance with Lebanon. Well into the 1948 War, the progressive Arab forces were continuing to be furnished with arms by the Soviets. Also, as confirmed by Ra’anan, who had written the RAND Corporation paper, the USSR rejected the Israeli call for the purchase of Soviet arms:

at the time, negotiations were proceeding in Moscow regarding the possibility of *Soviet* arms supplies to Israel. This topic led to a meeting, on October 5, 1948, between the Israeli Major-General Yochanan Rattner and General Antonov, representing the Soviet chief of staff, Marshal Vasilevskii. Later in October, Mrs. Meir spoke to Mr. Bakulin of the Middle East Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and submitted a detailed list of requests (including T-34 tanks, fighter planes, artillery, and anti-aircraft guns), stressing the urgency of an answer. However, she never received a reply, and the request was never fulfilled. (International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional “Debates” during the Zhdanovschina, Gavriel Ra’anan, with a foreword by Robert Conquest, 1983, p. 83) (IMG)

An excerpt of a CIA document concerning this matter is as follows:

POSSIBLE OUTSIDE SOURCES OF SUPPLY. (Countries from which Israel is receiving material.)

a. The USSR and its satellites

No reliable evidence exists of purchases of arms from the USSR..

(Probable Effects on Israel and the Arab States of a UN Arms Embargo, ORE-48-48, CIA, August 5, 1948, p. 15) (IMG)

The following is an excerpt of a research paper from the Wilson Center:

No Soviet Arms

As soon as they arrived in Moscow in September 1948, Israeli diplomats opened talks with Soviet authorities about providing direct military aid. On 5 October 1948 Israeli military attache Yohanan Ratner discussed training questions with General Seraev, asking about Soviet military textbooks and possibilities for Israeli officers to take advanced courses in the Soviet Union. A few days later, during a conversation with Red Army General Aleksei Antonov, Ratner suggested officer-training courses and the supply of German equipment that had fallen into Soviet hands. Antonov replied by asking for a detailed list of the Israeli needs.

On 7 November Ben Gurion sent such a list to Ratner, who submitted it on 11 November to Ivan Bakulin.

The Jewish state wanted to purchase 45 T-34 tanks, 50 fighter planes, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Bakulin stated that he would transmit the Israeli requests but emphasized the difficulties due to the UN embargo: "True, others are violating this resolution," he stated. "But if arms supplies from us are discovered, there will be an uproar." After this meeting, Bakulin sent a memorandum to Zorin suggesting that they officially reject the request because of the UN embargo. (...).

The Israeli request was in fact not sent to Stalin. As Bakulin explained to Gromyko, the requests “had been raised by the Jews during the war in Palestine. At present, since the end of the war and the stabilization of the situation in Palestine, the Jews have not renewed them. Reckoning that the Jews did not make these military requests seriously, we think it advisable to delay replying to them, and to raise with the higher authorities [Stalin] only the matter of credit.” In actuality, however, the Soviet Union did not want to be involved in direct military cooperation with Israel.

(Moscow’s Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Wilson Center, Laurant Rucker, pp. 27-28. Bold original.) (IMG)

Along with the USSR, the Peoples’ Democracies militarily assisted Syria. The CIA confirmed:

Determined efforts were made to obtain arms and ammunition. Syria signed a contract with Skoda [a Czechoslovak military and automobile company], and a first delivery is known to have been made. (Possible Developments in Palestine. ORE 7-48. Report by the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Files, Secret, Washington, February 28, 1948. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1948 THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, Vol. 5, Part 2, p. 671) (IMG)

The War in Palestine continued till March 1949. Czechoslovakia continued to provide military support for the Arab cause, in particular Egypt. Citing various intelligence and government sources, a research work financially sponsored by the 'Anglo-Jewish Association' – the association which had a long history of promoting Jewish-bourgeois nationalism and British colonialism – stated:

Since the beginning of 1949, there had been many reports of Czech arms going via Poland to the Eastern Mediterranean. According to a senior official in the Egyptian government, the U.S.S.R was pressing offers of tanks, guns, ammunition and agricultural implements on the Egyptian government. On 5 July, the Israeli Minister to Czechoslovakia told his British counterpart that he knew for certain that the Egyptian government was making considerable purchases of arms mostly small arms and automatic weapons in Czechoslovakia for export to Egypt. E.A. Chapman-Andrews of the British Embassy in Egypt, confirmed that according to the Joint Intelligence Board's quarterly report on the arms trade for the period mid-January to mid-April 1949, arms to the value of a few thousand dollars, originating in Czechoslovakia had been delivered to Egypt.

(The Soviet Union and Egypt – 1947-1955, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 102. Citing: On the Soviet position concerning the arms embargo, see minute by Beith, F.O., 7 July 1949, F0371/75104, E8780/1192/65. On the supply of Czech arms to Egypt see, Telegram No. 278 from P. Dixon, British Embassy, Prague, 12 May 1950, F0371/81958, E1192/84; Letter from H. Gresswell, Ministry of Defence, to F.O. and War Office, 23 March 1949, F0371/73549, J3020/1194/16; On the conversation between the Israeli Minister and P. Dixon, the British Ambassador to Prague, see, Telegram No. 148 from Dixon, 8 July 1949, F0371/73561, J5640/11919/16; Telegram No. 461 from Chapman-Andrews, Alexandria, 31 August 1948 *ibid*, J7094/11919/16.) (IMG)

Referring to the 1948 War in Palestine, the research work corroborated:

The issue of arms sales was not at all new. Arms from Soviet bloc countries had arrived in Egypt and Syria during the Palestine war and soon after. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 241) (IMG)

According to the American Jewish Committee – which for a long time served as the main lobbying organization for Israel and hence played a predecessor role to AIPAC in this respect – Czechoslovakia also provided arms to the Palestinian Arab forces combatting Israel:

On March 19 [1948], a shipment of Czechoslovak rifles and machine guns for the Palestinian Arab army arrived at the small Lebanese port of Djounish in a large schooner from Genoa. (Jews in the Soviet Satellites, The American Jewish Committee, edited/authored by: Peter Meyer, Bernard Dov Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky, Nicolas Sylvain, 1953, p. 128) (IMG)

Again, the evidence, which was previously shown, overwhelmingly indicates that the Czechoslovak supply of such arms was under Soviet military direction. Some people in the Soviet Foreign Ministry found out about such arms shipments to the Arab countries only later. A message by Soviet Foreign Ministry official Zorin to Molotov confirmed that Czechoslovakia indeed sold arms to Syria but not to Israel back in early 1948:

Comrade V.M. Molotov,

According to a report by Comrade Bodrov, the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak government has sold weapons to the Syrian government (mortars, mortar shells and cartridges). At the same time, the Czechs have refused to sell weapons to the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which made this request in November 1947.

On this matter Agence France-Presse reported from Cairo on 13 December that the British are trying to foil the supply of Czech weapons to the Arab countries and that the British government has, allegedly, held up the remittance which the Syrian government made through London in payment for weapons bought from Czechoslovakia. This report is confirmed by an appeal to the State Insurance Company of the USSR (Gosstrakh) from the Czechoslovak Insurance Company Slavye which has a contract with Gosstrakh for its cooperation should the British obstruct insurance for the cargo of weapons sent from Czechoslovakia to Beirut for the Arabs.

('V.A. Zorin to V.M. Molotov (Moscow)', COPY: AVP RF, F.0118, OP.2, P.3, D.11, LL.60-1, Moscow, January 22, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 256) (IMG)

A specific faction within Czechoslovakia, the Slansky faction, did use its influence to provide arms to Israel. The shipments were illegal and part of the treasonous activity of the Titoist faction in the Czechoslovak state. However, the communist faction, the Gottwald faction, was responsible for the arms shipments to Syria.

Hence, the USSR and People's Democratic Czechoslovakia provided arms to Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon to combat the regime of Israel. People's Democratic Romania also provided the petroleum resources crucial for the war effort. The USSR also increased its economic ties to Egypt during this time. The two states signed two trade agreements, giving each other highly-favored-nation statuses:

Egypt and the Soviet Union signed a barter agreement on March 3, calling for the exchange of 38,000 metric

tons of long staple cotton for 216,000 tons of wheat and 19,000 tons of corn cereals. A protocol, signed simultaneously with the agreement, granted both parties most-favored-nation treatment in trade relations with the exceptions of countries adjacent to the Soviet Union and of the Arab countries (telegram 228, March 4, from Cairo). ('INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE REVISIONIST OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY OF AUGUST 26, 1936, AND THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE SUDAN; THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN BARTER AGREEMENT'. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p. 86) (IMG)

Note that the Anglo-American imperialists had regarded Egypt as a zone from which to bomb the USSR:

During the spring and summer of 1946, prior to the Soviet note on the straits, strategic planners decided that other than Great Britain, the Cairo-Suez area was the most desirable place on the globe from which to launch an air attack against Soviet targets. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 173) (IMG)

From air bases in Turkey, fighter bombers and attack planes could not only aid Turkish ground forces inside Turkey but also interdict Soviet troops moving through Iran and Iraq toward Persian Gulf Oil or sweeping widely toward Cairo-Suez. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 177) (IMG)

The reason that Egypt was chosen was that the Soviet Red Army, the strongest part of the Soviet military, was far away from Egypt and at the same time, the American air force, the strongest part of US military, could be stationed there and get sent to bomb the Caucasus oil fields.

The Zorin report to Molotov, cited above, stated that the Czechoslovak government had armed Syria but had refused to arm Israel. Zorin was not lying when he said that a faction of the Czechoslovak state had refused arms for Israel and had armed the Syrians. Yet, we know that Czechoslovak arms reached Israel. How, then, is this blatant contradiction to be explained, if not by the calculation that this must have been done by rogue elements of the Czechoslovak state, a CIA-MI6 faction in the Czechoslovak state, responsible for such armaments of Israel, in contradiction with and devoid of coordination with the anti-imperialist faction of the Czechoslovak state? And indeed, it was done by the CIA-MI6 faction led by Slansky. The Mossad operative Ehud Avriel and several other Israeli intelligence agents had been deployed to Europe to obtain military assistance for the fight against the Arabs. Alongside Avriel, Mordechai Oren was tasked with the recruitment of European Ashkenazim into the Israeli military. Howard Sachar, the head of the Hiatt Institute funded by the US State Department, wrote:

Mordechai Oren, a member of Israel's far-left Mapam party [to which Oren was a traitor], and Nahum Shadmi, a senior Haganah training officer based in Paris, traveled through Eastern Europe, seeking to recruit young Jews for military service in Israel. (Israel and Europe: An Appraisal in History, Howard M. Sachar, 1998, p. 58) (IMG)

Details of such a project have been exposed by Karel Kaplan, an imperialist spy who stole many of the archives of the Czechoslovak government in his defection to the West in the mid-1970s. Subsequently, he closely collaborated with the CIA's Radio Free Europe, as well as with the 'Federal Institute for East European and International Studies' which was and remains an the official research wing of the Interior Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany. With such a background, he wrote a book titled 'The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary', after the 1989 collapse of the Czechoslovak government. Kaplan wrote:

Ehud Avriel (formerly Uberall) was one of Ben Gurion's people sent to Europe with this mission [of obtaining arms]. Avriel met in Paris with Robert Adam Abramovici who represented the import-export firm of Joseph Nash. Before the war, this firm had operated in Romania representing, among others, Czechoslovakia's Zbrojovka Arms Works. General Heliodor Pika, at the time Czechoslovakia's military attache in Bucharest, had met both Nash and Abramovici, who in 1939 funneled financial support to Czechoslovakia's anti-Nazi resistance through him (Pika). After the war, General Pika, appointed deputy Chief of General Staff, was responsible for Czechoslovakia's arms industry. He renewed his contacts with Nash and Abramovici, who were now in Paris, again representing the Zbrojovka Arms Works.

Bedrich Reicin, commander of defense intelligence, recommended the sale of arms to Haganah via the Nash firm. The Czechoslovak government approved. General Pika was very instrumental in arranging this. The arms in question were nonmoving inventory: weapons built for the Germans during the war but which were now useless. The Prague government was happy to unload them. On December 1, 1947, the Zbrojovka Arms Works signed a contract to sell more weapons than Haganah's entire arsenal at the time. The next task was to deliver the weapons to Israel. This was the job of Pika, Reicin, Clementis, and Masaryk. The Polish government refused to allow transshipment, and the weapons were therefore sent down the Danube River through Hungary to Yugoslavia, and then clandestinely through Italy to Tel-Aviv. They arrived in April 1948.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, pp. 239-241) (IMG)

Back in 1947, Czechoslovakia had not undergone a socialist revolution and that Czechoslovakia was still a bourgeois

state. It was headed by a non-communist. The Czechoslovak Communists had gained increased influence throughout the state apparatus via the democratic elections, but the communist revolution had not yet happened. The prominent Mossad official Ehud Avriel remembered in his memoirs that Masaryk told him that Vladimir Clementis supported Israel using the excuse of combating British imperialism. Avriel also noted that Joseph Nash and Robert Adam Abramovici militarily aided the Mossad for free, which would have not only helped the Israelis win their war against the Arab forces for cheap, but also would have sabotaged Czechoslovakia's economy. Avriel wrote:

Robert Adam and Joseph Nash, at that time business partners, never accepted a penny or even the smallest gift in return for the services they rendered to the Haganah. It was their way of expressing their feeling of responsibility for the fate of Jewish Palestine.

The representative of the Czech armworks was at the airport to meet us. So was my friend Felix Doron, the Haganah man in Prague, who came with us in the black, official-looking limousine to the head office of Adam's business friends.

'Have we emerged from the underground?' Doron whispered to me in the car.

'I hope we have,' I replied. 'Otherwise we shall be wiped off the ground altogether.'

Less than an hour after we entered the offices of the Zbrojovka, Brno – permeated with an air of solid authority and reliable politeness we had concluded the deal. Adam was at home in these offices; and the younger of the two Czech directors had been at school with Felix Doron, who was born in Prague and had left for Palestine just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The two sides in the negotiation understood each other perfectly.

(...). Doron and I rushed to the Czech Foreign Office with a letter of introduction to Jan Masaryk, the son of the founder of the Czech republic and then Czech Foreign Minister, as well as a warm friend of Zionism. When I telephoned his office from the armworks, he agreed to see me at once. I explained the situation to Masaryk, who was visibly delighted that his country could help us and pleased that we were able to overcome 'technical difficulties'. He was certain that his communist deputy, Vlado Clementis, would likewise favour assisting our war effort. 'For me, it is enough that you defend yourself against your enemies. But Clementis will be happy to know that by fighting for your life you undermine British imperialism in the Middle East.'

(‘Open the Gates!': A Personal Story of “Illegal” Immigration to Israel’, Ehud Avriel, 1975, p. 335)

(IMG)

Clementis, an imperialist-fascist agent, was documented in C15S8_ to have been a staunch supporter of Slovak separatism and the partition of People's Democratic Czechoslovakia. Clearly, Clementis was not from the mainstream of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC), and rather belonged to the Titoist elements that had infiltrated it. The superficial 'hostility' of Israel and Britain was undoubtedly useful for Clementis and the Yugoslav intelligence service, for it portrayed the military armament of Israel, the sabotage of the Soviet efforts to bring military victory for the Arabs, as a supposed struggle against British colonialism. Anyways, Kaplan continued:

Meanwhile, further arms negotiations had started in March. Czechoslovakia suffered a dire shortage of hard currencies and offered Haganah a considerable additional amount of hardware from its own surplus, valued at about \$18 million. **One of the main instigators of this project was Antonin Zapotocky**, then a deputy premier. He discussed the possibility of **additional weapon sales with Mordechai Oren**, an officer of the left-leaning socialist Mapam party. Zapotocky even promised to train Israeli fliers and paratroopers in Czechoslovakia. The government presidium had Reicin negotiate details of the arrangement with Avriel, who represented the Haganah. The military airport in Zatec was put at Haganah's disposal for moving the weapons. The transport, ostensibly a sale of scrap metal to an Addis Ababa company, was taken care of by a Panamanian air company, under code name Operation Balak.

In April and May, the Prague government released eighty-five aircraft to Haganah but refused to sell tanks and cannons. The aircraft were flown via an air-bridge from Czechoslovakia's Zatec to Yugoslavia's Titograd (then called Podgorica) to Ekron in Palestine. Some eighty Haganah fliers were trained in military schools, and another group was undergoing paratroop training at the training center in [the Czechoslovak town of] Straz pod Ralskem.

At this time, too, a Czechoslovak military brigade for Israel was being formed. Its members were being trained in Velka Strelna, in the Libava military area. Its formation was proposed by **Shmuel Mikunis**, general secretary of the Communist Party of Israel. He originally wanted to create an international brigade from Jews of the people's democracies. Moscow approved, and Mikunis, **armed with Malenkov's approval**, visited Communist leaders of the bloc. **In Prague he dealt with Slansky and Geminder** who were, however, not particularly enthused by his requests.

Mikunis calculated that the presence of this brigade would strengthen his party's influence in Israel. He assumed that most members of the brigade would be Communists. However, the entire plan changed after the split with **Yugoslavia, which had been particularly receptive to it**. Only a Czechoslovak brigade was created,

which included a few dozen Hungarian and Romanian Jews. Instructors and commanders **were selected by Svab's** records department of the CC KSC secretariat, particularly Osvald Zavodsky. (...). The transport took place in parts, starting in December 1948, with the last contingent of some five hundred people leaving in April 1949. By then the Arab-Israeli war was over, and the brigade was not needed.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, pp. 239-241. Bold added)
(IMG)

It deserves to be further noted that:

Czechoslovakia was the only member of the Soviet bloc to provide Israel with military assistance.. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 241) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that, as confirmed also by the Slovak National Newspaper (SNN), the prominent Anglo-Israeli intelligence operative Robert Maxwell was a key negotiator in the matter as well. The SNN, both in its print and online versions, is the organ/media of the "Matica Slovenska", the Slovak government's official anti-communist institution for promoting bourgeois-nationalism in Slovakia. It receives financial support through the Slovak government budget. Discussing the history of the arms deals with Israel, the newspaper revealed:

the main mediator of this huge supply of weapons from the Czechoslovak Republic for Israel was the Israeli agent Robert Maxwell (real name Jan Ludvik Hoch, a native of Subcarpathian Ukraine), later a well-known media mogul. ("Sest' desiat rokov po poprave o osudovych okolnostiach nasilnej smrti V. Clementisa II: Bez diskusie..., jedenast povrazov a tri dozivotia!" ["Sixty years after the execution of the fateful circumstances of the violent death of V. Clementis II: Without Discussion ... eleven ropes and three lifetimes!"], Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), Peter Strelinger, December 15, 2012, p. 10. In: Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), December 15, 2012) (IMG)

So much for the British Empire's supposed 'opposition' to the Zionist regime, the top MI6 operative Maxwell was arming the regime of Israel. The above-mentioned network of Mossad agents in Czechoslovakia were also close to the MI6 spy Lavrenti Beria. In fact, the British agent Beria was a major culprit of the arms sales to the Zionist regime. Without Joseph Stalin's knowledge or approval, the MI6 agent Beria:

succeeded in giving military aid to Israel. Stalin did not know everything and did not necessarily approve of everything that my father [Beria] did in this connection, in a sphere where he [Beria] could act discreetly and without asking for permission, by using his personal network of agents. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 208) (IMG)

Beria's channel for arming Israel's regime involved a vast network of Titoist spies in the top ranks of the Peoples' Democracies. The most important channel for funnelling weapons to the Zionist state was Czechoslovakia. In particular, Beria conducted the operation thanks to the active support and involvement of other Anglo-American agents Rudolph Slansky and Bedrich Geminder:

Although arrests of some high-level [officials] had been occurring as far back as 1949, the first sign that this might develop into a widespread purge came on 27 November 1951, with the arrest of Rudolph Slansky, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and his deputy Bedrich Geminder, both ... associated with Beria and the MGB. Indeed, acting with Beria's sanction, they [i.e. Slansky and Geminder] had made Czechoslovakia a center for funneling aid and weapons to Israel in its conflict with the Arabs after the war. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 169) (IMG)

In the drive to arm the regime of Israel, added to such big 'chess pieces' as the MI6 spy Beria and MI6 spy Maxwell, there was the MI6 spy Tito. Recall the fact that prominent Mossad operative Shaikhe Dan:

Shaikhe Dan ... managed to establish a close friendship with the head of the Yugoslav secret police. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG {Romania})

It is also worth noting that Tito personally approved the activities of the Mossad in Yugoslavia and hailed Zionist migration:

The Joint Distribution Committee was lauded yesterday by Premier Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia for the successful conclusion of its rehabilitation program in that country and for aiding in the emigration of Yugoslav Jews wishing to go to Israel, the New York Times reported today from Belgrade.

Marshal Tito told Frederick C. White, J.D.C. director for Yugoslavia, in his villa on Dedinje Hill that it was only just and proper that special efforts were made to aid Yugoslavia's Jews. The Premier stated he felt the Jews had a right to emigrate to a country for which they had longed for over 2,000 years. Following his visit with Tito, Mr. White was decorated with the Order of the Yugoslav Banner, third degree.

Mr. White, who will leave Belgrade for Israel this week-end after spending more than four years in this country during which time the J.D.C. expended some \$3,500,000 for the relief and rehabilitation of the decimated Jewish community, had high praise for the "generous cooperation and sympathy received from Yugoslav authorities." Some 500 Jews are expected to leave for Israel March 10, it was revealed, leaving some 5,000 Jews

in this country who wish to remain. Two hundred Yugoslav Jewish physicians who wish to leave for the Jewish state have not been allowed to do so until additional graduates of medical schools are available to take over their duties.

(‘Tito Lauds J.D.C. Work in Yugoslavia; Decorates U.S. Jewish Relief Official’, The Jewish Telegraphic Agency, February 28, 1950. In: JTA Bulletin, March 1, 1950, p. 4) (IMG)

After the 1948 War, the Yugoslav regime rushed in to finance the Israeli intelligence front organization ‘World Jewish Congress’:

Yugoslav authorities have turned over to the Israel representative in Belgrade 4,500,000 dinars collected by Yugoslav Jews in a special fund-raising campaign for Israel, it is revealed in a report received here today by the World Jewish Congress from the Federation of Jewish Communities in Yugoslavia.

The Federation, which is affiliated with the World Jewish Congress, emphasized in the report that the Jews of Yugoslavia are ready to re-establish contact with the Jewish communities throughout the world. (Yugoslav Jewish Communities Seek Contact with Jews Abroad; Inform Jewish Congress, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December 1, 1949, p. 5) (IMG)

Anyways, during the 1948 War, the UDB, the Tito regime’s fascist secret service:

helped Israel in connection with various activities, including arms smuggling to Israel and by serving as a transit point for immigrants from Romania. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Therefore, Beria, Slansky, Geminder, and the entire network of renegades who assisted Israel were also treasonously allied to the Yugoslav intelligence service. Beria had longed been a collaborator with the Tito-Rankovic faction in Yugoslavia. In addition to facilitating the process of transferring arms from Czechoslovakia to Israel, Yugoslavia itself also provided military support for the Israeli state during the 1948 War, as revealed by the CIA. We know for a fact that the only country from the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies that sold weapons to Israel was Czechoslovakia, and such arms sales were done by Yugoslav agents. Hence, the ‘possibility’ of the USSR and Poland providing Israel with arms simply did not materialize. On the other hand, the United States provided high-quality military equipment to Israel, while Yugoslavia furnished Israel with arms, as confirmed by the following CIA document:

The efforts of Zionist agents abroad have resulted in the stockpiling of quantities of small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition in various eastern European countries for eventual shipment to Palestine. Most of these stocks come from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and possibly from Poland and the USSR. Jewish acquisitions from the US consist mainly of machinery, motor vehicles, and air transport. The Israeli forces are much more concerned with obtaining such heavier equipment than in acquiring small arms. (PROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES OF A UN ARMS EMBARGO, CIA, ORE 48-48, Washington, August 5, 1948. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1948, Vol. 5, p. 1279) (IMG)

That the prominent MI6 agent Beria, the top MI6 operative Maxwell, as well as the intelligence service of the British spy Tito (see C12S5) all supported the arms sales to Israel is further evidence of the fake character of the British imperial ‘hostility’ to Israel. One could calculate, based on dialectics, that since the interests of the comprador reactionary class dominating Israel converged with the interests of British finance capital, Israel and Britain would be allied despite pretending the contrary. The 1948 War was called the ‘War of Independence’ because the IDF was allegedly ‘liberating’ Israel from the British Empire and the Arab ‘mercenaries’ of the MI6. At the time, British ‘anti-Zionism’ was a means of facilitating contact with the Hashemite monarcho-fascist Arabs. Recall that even during the 1956 invasion of Egypt, Britain was only unofficially allied to the IDF. Officially, back then, Britain branded itself as a ‘peacekeeper’ seeking to limit Israeli ‘excesses’. All observers called the British Empire’s bluff, and it was clear to all that the British military was allied to the IDF despite pretending otherwise. Only a while later, when the Israeli regime stabilized, and when the British imperialist alliance had become far too exposed and well-known, did the British Empire begin to openly support both Jordan and Israel. Hence, even in the 1956 War, the Ben-Gurion, who owed his whole career to the British Empire, and Moshe Dayan, who had lost his eye fighting as a military intelligence officer of the British Army during the Great Patriotic War, pretended to be contradicting the British Empire. Why is the disproof of the ‘hostility’ of the Ben-Gurion faction to Britain so significant? It is significant firstly because it reaffirms the dialectical thesis that classes with the same interests would have a natural tendency to ally with each other, and when the political actors serving as agents of these classes ‘oppose’ each other, it is either a deception operation, or out of a temporary small misunderstanding that can be resolved quickly. This is important because it debunks the ‘realist’ school of International Relations theory, which aims to explain strategic relations on the narrative of separate geopolitical entities competing with each other and behaving directly according to the shape of their borders, rather than according to the class alliances. Secondly, it reaffirms the thesis that the Soviet call for the removal of the British occupation in 1947, even if ostensibly ‘at the expense’ of the partition of

Palestine, was a move that undermined the British Empire and hence the ally of the British Empire, the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel, even though it may have appeared as giving the Ben-Gurion faction a state with which to slaughter Arab civilians.

Recall the excerpt of the report by the Soviet Foreign Ministry official Zorin to Molotov: “the Czechoslovak government has sold weapons to the Syrian government (mortars, mortar shells and cartridges). At the same time, the Czechs have refused to sell weapons to the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which made this request in November 1947.” The fact that this report states that the Czechoslovak government had refused to sell weapons to the Israeli regime – the ‘Jewish Agency in Palestine’ – shows that rogue elements of the Czechoslovak government had been involved in the arming and funding of the regime of Israel. And we know that these were indeed rogue elements, for they were agents of the British and Yugoslav intelligence services.

Once Stalin found out about the secret arms sales, he reported the Czechoslovak arms sales to Czechoslovakia’s anti-Zionist leader Klement Gottwald. By all indications, Gottwald had been unaware of such Mossad influence in his own country. Indeed:

Alexej Cepicka discussed Gottwald's anxiety and surprise when he learned about the extent of Czechoslovakia's economic contacts with Israel. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 244) (IMG)

Gottwald subsequently blocked the arms sales. Stalin agreed that the arms shipments should be stopped in Czechoslovakia. This has been revealed by the Slovak National Newspaper (SNN), the organ/media of the “Matica Slovenska”, the Slovak government’s official state-budgeted anti-communist institution for promoting bourgeois-nationalism in Slovakia. Discussing the history of the arms deals with Israel, the newspaper revealed:

As Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Clementis also solved the problem of arms transfers to Palestine. The route led by rail through Hungary to Yugoslav ports and from there by ship to Palestine. It is worth mentioning that on May 15, 1949, an employee of the Central Committee of the KSb negotiated with Klement Gottwald and Rudolf Slansky about Matyas Rakosi’s complaint to Stalin about Czechoslovak arms supplies to Yugoslavia, which were in fact intended for Israel. Stalin agreed to their detention in Hungary. (“Sest’desiat rokov po poprave o osudovych okolnostiach nasilnej smrti V. Clementisa II: Bez diskusie..., jedenast povrazov a tri dozivotia!” [“Sixty years after the execution of the fateful circumstances of the violent death of V. Clementis II: Without Discussion ... eleven ropes and three lifetimes!”], Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), Peter Strelinger, December 15, 2012, p. 10. In: Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), December 15, 2012) (IMG)

Note again that Stalin initially was unaware of the Czechoslovak military aid to the IDF. Recall that Sergo Beria had said that Lavrenti Beria:

succeeded in giving military aid to Israel. Stalin did not know everything and did not necessarily approve of everything that my father [Beria] did in this connection, in a sphere where he [Beria] could act discreetly and without asking for permission, by using his personal network of agents. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 208) (IMG)

In Moscow, Beria was the primary agent assisting Geminder and Slansky in the provision of arms to the Israeli armed forces:

Although arrests of some high-level [officials] had been occurring as far back as 1949, the first sign that this might develop into a widespread purge came on 27 November 1951, with the arrest of Rudolph Slansky, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and his deputy Bedrich Geminder, both ... associated with Beria and the MGB. Indeed, acting with Beria's sanction, they [i.e. Slansky and Geminder] had made Czechoslovakia a center for funneling aid and weapons to Israel in its conflict with the Arabs after the war. (Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 169) (IMG)

By the time of Rakosi’s complaint to Stalin, however, the latter had come to know much more about the conspiracy to arm the IDF and supported efforts to purge those responsible for such sales. In its usual anti-Soviet propaganda language, the SNN, itself the Slovak regime’s notoriously anti-Semitic media outlet, stated:

Stalin knew very well about Czechoslovak military aid to Israel, and who was responsible for it. Stalin's "papal infallibility" probably played a role here. Czechoslovakia allowed itself to "do business on its own" and, without the Kremlin's knowledge, supported the establishment of a Jewish state. The main culprits had to be found and visibly punished as soon as possible". It was the period of Stalin's sickening anti-Semitism.. (“Sest’desiat rokov po poprave o osudovych okolnostiach nasilnej smrti V. Clementisa II: Bez diskusie..., jedenast povrazov a tri dozivotia!” [“Sixty years after the execution of the fateful circumstances of the violent death of V. Clementis II: Without Discussion ... eleven ropes and three lifetimes!”], Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), Peter Strelinger, December 15, 2012, p. 10. In: Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), December 15, 2012) (IMG)

Hence the purges against those responsible for the arms sales began:

The campaign against Zionism ... culminated in the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia, the country which militarily

helped Israel the most. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 242) (IMG)

During the Slansky trials, the accused were accused of being simultaneously agents of Israel and of Yugoslavia. This was true since the Yugoslav and Israeli secret services were allied and the Slansky group had collaborated with both of them in the arms sales. In what became famously known as the 'Prague Trials' and the 'Slansky Purge', Slansky, Geminder, Zavodsky, Reicin, Svab, and Clementis were interrogated, tried for intelligence activities on behalf of the Mossad, and executed. The close associates of these individuals were duly investigated and purged. General Heliodor Pika, who had been responsible for assisting Mossad in the arms sales, was identified as an imperialist spy and he too was executed well before the other Zionist agents were. His collaborators Robert Adam and Joseph Nash were, as far as I am aware, not executed however, because they were in Paris and not in Czechoslovakia. Most of the Slovak separatists were purged as well; among them survived the Mossad-backed Slovak separatist leader Husak, who later became the head of the Czechoslovak state from 1969 onwards, thanks to the assistance of the Yugoslav agent Dubcek. Zapotocky who opportunistically placed himself at the forefront of the anti-Zionist campaign and who pretended to be anti-Israel, was able to survive the purges. Unfortunately, the faction headed by Beria and Malenkov eventually succeeded in the power struggle against the Stalin faction, and thus their Titoist network was able to release Mordechai Oren from jail after Stalin's death.

The purges of the Zionist agents occurred thanks to the assistance provided by Rakosi to Gottwald, as revealed throughout the book by Karel Kaplan (see C15S8). Several Czechoslovak officials serving as agents of American intelligence, were allied to these individuals and the details of their purges are explained in C15S8. In addition, Mossad operative Oren was jailed; Mikunis as the head of the Israeli 'communist' movement was denounced for his bourgeois-nationalist defection. Officially, the purges were due to the mentioned network's large-scale systematic economic sabotage on behalf of the Mossad as well as their Slovak separatist conspiracies. Another reason though, was of course the arms sales to Israel. The Zionist Israeli anti-communist historian Gilboa admits:

One of the aims of the Prague trial was to indicate to the Arab world of the readiness of the Soviet bloc to join it in an anti-Israel campaign. From the accusations against Slansky and his friends the Arabs were to reach the conclusion that they and Czechoslovakia had the same enemy, for these traitors had weakened the defensive power of Czechoslovakia in handing over to the Jews of Palestine important military equipment for waging war against the Arabs. By affording assistance to the emigration of Jews, by aiding Jewish displaced persons reached Palestine, by helping out in the transfer of capital, and by similar acts, they had simultaneously sabotaged Czechoslovakia and increased the power of the Israeli aggressors. Part of the plan of the traitors standing trial was to harm the relations between the Democratic People's Republic [of Czechoslovakia] and the Arab states. They alone are responsible for the support given to Israel several years before, backing which was actually one of their destructive plots. (...). In other words, Prague made a concentrated and spectacular effort in November 1952, to clear herself once and for all of the "stigma" of her position and behavior with respect to Palestine in 1947-1948. It is quite certain that parallel to these overt verbal gestures in the court intensive action was taken at approximately the same time to wing sympathy by generous offers (by Moscow and Prague) of military equipment and weapons to the Arab countries from the famous armaments industries of Czechoslovakia. (The Black Years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, pp. 274-275) (IMG)

It is beyond the scope of this work to explain this particular matter in depth but the Czechoslovak communists and the Soviets did not publicly speak much about the role of the Slansky group in funding and arming of Israel, because the Mapam, the communist-led 'Socialist Zionist' popular front in Israel, used the armament of Israel 'by Czechoslovakia' as a talking point for why Israel should be strategically aligned with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Indeed, the Mapam agents in Israel – from Haganah Commander Moshe Sneh to former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to Mapam deputy leader Ya'akov Riftin – spoke of the 'Czechoslovak aid' to Israel during the 'War of Independence' against the Arabs as a talking point to persuade the Israeli audience towards the objective of strategically aligning Israel with the Soviet Union against the Anglo-American imperialists and against the Ben-Gurion faction.

The purges of the Slansky gang were also reflected several times in the Soviet media. One of the articles previously stated explained aspects of the trial. Vladislav Minayev, a top Soviet media figure and pundit, wrote for the New Times, the following:

The Zionist leaders, having sold themselves to American imperialism, have placed their organizations and associations at the disposal of the American secret service. This was clearly brought out at the recent trial of Slansky and his gang of conspirators in Prague. Ornstein, Zionist and American spy, stated at the trial that in 1947 Truman, Acheson and Morgenthau (then Secretary of Treasury) had a secret conference with the Zionist leaders Ben-Gurion and Sharett in Washington, where the so-called "Morgenthau-Acheson plan" was adopted, defining the conditions on which the United States would render support and assistance to Israel. A sequel to this plan was the wide-scale utilization of the Zionist organizations by the American secret service. All these "cultural," "philanthropic" and other societies have been turned into centres of espionage and sabotage activities

against the countries of the democratic camp, and of the supply of agents for this purpose. For this criminal work, too, the Zionists have placed at the disposal of the American secret service the members of their organization working in the diplomatic service. It was revealed at the trial of the Slansky gang, for instance, that Avriel (Uberall) and Kubovy, former Israeli Ministers in Prague, worked in close contact with the spies and saboteurs, gave them instructions, protected them from discovery, etc. (Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service, New Times, Vladislav Minayev, January 21, 1953, p. 6. Re-published in: CIA)

The antithesis of Slansky's pro-Zionist position was Czechoslovakia's pro-Arab policy and the sale of arms to Wafd- led government in Egypt. Indeed, a declassified Israeli intelligence document referring to the Israeli representative (minister) in Prague, stated:

In the [Israeli] minister's opinion, Slansky had perhaps opposed Czechoslovakia's pro-Arab policy and the sale of weapons to Egypt, and this opposition had led to his indictment as a Zionist, the description of Israel as a "country working against the national movements which are freeing themselves from colonial regimes".. The minister adds that some reaction to these phenomena is necessary. He proposes condemnation of the new line in the press in London and in Paris.. (Coded Tel. P325, Inc.: 130.09/2343/1, Israel Legation in Prague to the East European Division, December 21, 1951. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 6, 1951, Edited by Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, p. 366) (IMG)

For quite a number of times, Czechoslovakia sent arms to the Arabs during the 1948 War. In one of these waves of transfers however, the transfer was sabotaged by the Mossad, 'thanks' to the intelligence provided to the Mossad by the Yugoslav regime. Since Shaiké Dan had the support of Yugoslav intelligence in sending arms to Israel, he was residing in a Yugoslav hotel at the time. The person helping them in this affair was a Yugoslav regime officer 'responsible for contacts between [Israeli] procurement personnel and the [Yugoslav] authorities'. The Yugoslav regime officer provided highly critical and sensitive intelligence that Czechoslovakia was sending weapons to Syria, and promised to provide further intelligence materials on 'the vessel, its crew, the time it would sail, its speed and declared destination'. In a memoir published by the Israel Defense Army Publication, the Mossad operative Amnon Yona (or Amnon Jonah) who was there at the time, recalled:

Procurement and Aliya Bet operative **Shaiké Dan sat in his Yugoslavian hotel** waiting for news about Nora: had the ship managed to bring its cargo of weapons to the Hagana armories, despite the British Army and the UN observers who were trying to prevent it? Late on Friday night, a **Yugoslav officer who was responsible for contacts between procurement personnel and the authorities came into Shaiké's room. His message was brief: "The ship that is to load the weapons from Czechoslovakia has entered Fiume port."** Shaiké, being fully aware of our shipment plans, immediately understood that the weapons and the ship had nothing to do with us. He immediately phoned Ehud Avriel in Prague. Ehud was no less surprised than Shaiké, and he promised to check the story and its implications. Two days later Ehud responded that the Czech armaments plant Zabřiovka had sold arms and ammunition to the Arabs: the Fiume shipment included 8,000 rifles and six million rounds of ammunition, intended for Syria. By sheer coincidence, the route from Czechoslovakia to Fiume in Yugoslavia was exactly that used for our shipments. The significance of this secret supply was earthshaking. Clearly, everything possible had to be done to prevent the weapons from reaching the Syrians. Shaiké tried to persuade the Yugoslavs to impound the weapons since the shipment documents listed machine parts not weapons. He promised that we would purchase the shipment immediately at full price. The response was negative. The Yugoslavs contended that such an act would adversely affect their relations with Czechoslovakia. Shaiké's other proposals for action against the ship were also rejected, but the **Yugoslavs did agree to supply information about the vessel, its crew, the time it would sail, its speed and declared destination.** (Missions with No Traces: Sixty Years of Israeli Underground National Security, Israel Defense Army Publication, Amnon Yona, originally published 2001, p. 99. Bold added) (IMG)


In this situation, backed by Yugoslav intelligence, the Mossad plotted to cause the explosion of the Lino ship and to capture those weapons that were destined for the Arabs. Munya Mardor, the prominent Israeli military official in charge of securing military supplies, wrote in his memoirs (and the introduction of the memoirs was written by Ben- Gurion since the book had the Prime Minister's blessing):

The casing of the mine was the inner tube of a motor-cycle, filled with TNT, and resistant to water. The detonators were contained in rubber contraceptive sheaths, again as a water resistance, and had potash powder distributed about them. When the time came, one of the bottles would be fitted to the inner tube, upside down, so that the acid would begin eating through the paper until it reached the potash and could generate sufficient heat to touch off the detonator and **so explode the TNT – and sink the Lino.** (...). There were no incidents on the way. **Amnon Jonah** [i.e. Amnon Yona], with Mrs. Grossman consoling at his side, was at his post. As we came up he gave the signal that all was clear. (Strictly Illegal, Munya Mardor, 1957, p. 208. Bold added.) (IMG)

The operation was successful. Hence, although previously some arms from Czechoslovakia had been successfully

transferred to the Arab troops, one of the transfers was successfully sabotaged:

On March 19 [1948], a shipment of Czechoslovak rifles and machine guns for the Palestinian Arab army arrived at the small Lebanese port of Djounish in a large schooner from Genoa. In April, a Syrian government official declared that 8,000 rifles and 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition had been lost en route from Czechoslovakia to Syria in a recent explosion aboard a ship in Bari, Italy; this was said to be the second shipment from Czechoslovakia of arms of a total value of \$2,085,000. Both shipments were consigned to the Syrian army. (Jews in the Soviet Satellites, The American Jewish Committee, edited/authored by: Peter Meyer, Bernard Dov Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky, Nicolas Sylvain, 1953, p. 128) (IMG)



(Strictly Illegal, Munya Mardor, 1957, p. 209) (IMG)

Munya Mardor provides an image of the *Lino* ship, which the Mossad destroyed with the assistance of Tito's fascist secret service. It was Yugoslav intelligence that was mainly responsible for transfer of arms to Israel, it was Yugoslavia that provided so much arms to the regime of Israel, and it was Yugoslav intelligence that sabotaged a part of the arms transfers to the Arab forces. Behind the Mossad lied the UDB, and behind the UDB lied the CIA and MI6, the latter being ostensibly an 'enemy' of the Ben-Gurion regime but actually a friend of the Ben-Gurion regime. Some of the high-ranking leaders in the Arab world advocated a covert military intervention by cross-border infiltration against Israel so that the Arab states would not be condemned as 'aggressors' and so that the Arab states could have plausible deniability. According to this school of thought, it was better to send an army of volunteers from each Arab country to the battlefield and these armies of volunteers would in turn be militarily sponsored by the official armies of the Arab states. A guerrilla war by the Palestinian Arab and non-Palestinian Arab volunteer commandos, backed by the official Arab militaries, would have inflicted higher costs on the IDF at a cheaper price for the Arab armies. The application of this covert war against the Israeli regime was also going to be within the boundaries of international law, a factor which could permit the Soviets and Czechoslovaks to less secretively, and hence at a lower cost and with much less difficulty, provide arms to the Arab militaries destined for the fighters against the Israeli regime. A consequence of such difficulties en route to the Levant was the theft of a significant part of these arms by the Mossad and the UDB en route to the Levant, and the inability of the USSR and Czechoslovakia to hold the Mossad and UDB to account for such an operation because the arms transfer was supposed to be kept a secret. Although the progressive anti-imperialist Arab states launched the military invasion to save the Arabs of Palestine from Zionist terror, it is a fact that back then, the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect' was not so entrenched in international law. The 1948 Arab League military invasion of Israel constituted an 'act of aggression' by the standards of international law. Arab armed struggle against the Israeli regime was necessary no doubt, but there are many indications that an Arab armed struggle in the form of an invasion was a very unwise move. In the eyes of the mainstream of the Arab public, an invasion against Israel was considered necessary and a no-brainer, but among the Arab leaders, it was actually quite controversial. According to Sami Moubayed of the American University of Beirut, Syrian President Shukri Al-Quwatli and Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Al-Solh, both pro-Soviet in strategic orientation, opposed the direct military invasion against Israel by Syria, Lebanon, and the rest of the Arab League

countries, on the grounds that the Arab armies were militarily weaker, whereas the Egyptian King Farouk, an MI6 agent, and the Mufti of Jerusalem, pro-Nazi, both supported a direct military invasion of Israel by the Arab League:

Knowing perfectly well the inferiority of the Arab armies, Kuwaiti and Lebanese Prime Minister Riad al-Solh summoned the Secretary General of the Arab League Abdul Rahman Azzam and asked him to refrain from advancing into Palestine. Under the impression that a fully organized Arab force could easily defeat a few Jewish fighters, Azzam was shocked to hear what both men were saying. They added that they would be willing to provide the Palestinians with all possible arms and funds, but had reservations on involving their own forces in combat. A head on collision with the Jews would only mean certain defeat for all the Arab forces. Running on popular demand and assurances from King Farouk that the war could easily be won, Azzam ignored their plea and continued in his diplomatic mission to enlist support for the Arab army. The ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, who had led an uprising against the Jews in 1936, began touring Syria and Lebanon to elevate public support for Palestine. The people needed little encouragement, they were already asking for a full-scale war with the Jews. Both Kuwaiti and Solh were now facing a dilemma; refusing to participate would have meant isolation among political circles and alienation within the Arab community. Likewise, sending their troops would most probably mean military defeat, yet an elevated standing among the masses. Both leaders took the second alternative. (Damascus Between Democracy and Dictatorship, Sami M. Moubayed, 2000, p. 2) (IMG)

To Solh and Quwwatli was added Egypt's Wafdist Prime Minister Noqrashi, also aligned with the Soviet-led bloc just like most other Wafdist politicians. Haajj Amin Al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and the chief of the Palestinian regime at the time, recalled:

It is fair to mention here that the late King Abdul Aziz Al Saud and the late Noqrashi were not willing to enter the Arab armies into Palestine. Al-Naqrashi was of the opinion that Egypt could not enter the war while the English army was perched on the Suez Canal. But the late King Farouk responded to the heads of the Arab ministries who met him and convinced him that the matter is nothing more than a "military picnic." (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al -Omar, 1999, pp. 392-393) (IMG)

That the Arab armies' invasion of Israel was wrong does not negate the irrefutable correctness of Arab armed struggle aimed at overthrowing a CIA-MI6 satellite regime, an anti-Arab settler-colonial terror regime serving as a base for Anglo-American aggression. Armed struggle against the Israeli regime was absolutely necessary, be it done by Arabs or by Israelis themselves. If the Arabs were not to engage in operations against Israel's regime, the Israelis themselves should have done so. If the Arabs were to handle the bulk of the armed struggle, and at the same time not to invade Israel, then the Arab states should have organized armies of volunteers. Armed struggle was a constant, the real question was the form. Arab armed struggle for overthrowing the CIA-MI6 satellite puppet regime of Israel was righteous, but the Arab masses' call for the overthrow of Israel as a country or society was and remains a moral and strategic error resulting from a lack of an understanding of the class struggles in Israel, and a lack of an understanding of a major socialist/anti-imperialist current in that country. The behaviour of Moscow lines up with this, for Moscow denounced the invasion for the abolition of Israel's existence as a country but of course, the Soviets and their Czechoslovak and Romanian allies funded the Arab armies during their war against the Ben-Gurion regime. Yet, it was not just Moscow that opposed this invasion but also Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Al-Solh, Syrian President Shukri Quwwatli, and Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud El-Noqrashi.

The defeat of the Arab armies in the war against Israel's regime rolled back the progressive factions in the Arab armies while strengthening the reactionary factions in these armies. In Jordan, this meant the greater entrenchment of the reactionary forces over the military. In Syria, by contrast, this meant the weakening of the progressive forces dominating the Syrian state apparatus and greater leverage for the fascist spies. A CIA coup occurred in Syria a few days after the defeat of the Syrian Arab Army by the IDF. The weakening of the Syrian state, and the rise of the reactionary elements in the command of the means of violence in Syria created the ample opportunity for the CIA to launch a military coup against the Soviet-backed government of Syria. Some time in March or April of 1948, the US intelligence activated the coup plots it had hatched against the multi-partisan parliamentary Syrian bourgeois- democracy:

I had been sent to Damascus in September 1947, with instructions to make unofficial contact with President Quwwatli and other key officials in the Syrian Government, and to probe for means of persuading them, on their own, to liberalise the political system. The first part of the assignment was easy. By the time Keeley reported for duty, some six months later [i.e. March 1948], I had established an easy personal relationship with the President and with most of those around him who were worth persuading. The probe, however, produced only negative results: it was clear to Keeley, upon reading my report, that Quwwatli and his establishment had no intention of liberalising anything, and that they would remain blind to the increasingly apparent fact: that a serious political explosion was looming. 'We have before us only two alternatives', said Keeley, 'both of them undesirable' – by which he meant that either political opportunists, with covert Soviet support, would shortly stage a bloody uprising, or that the Syrian army, with our covert support, would take over the government and maintain order..

(The Game of Nations: The Amoral of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 41) (IMG)

Thus, the steps for a military coup against the Syrian democratic republic were taken by the US intelligence:

A 'political action team' under Major Meade systematically developed a friendship with Za'im, then chief of staff of the Syrian Army, suggested to him the idea of a coup d'état, advised him how to go about it, and guided him through the intricate preparations in laying the groundwork for it – a degree of participation which was only suspected by Syria's leading politicians, and which was later written off as 'typical Syrian suspicion' by Western journalists and students who interviewed the principal participants and examined the relevant documents. So far as the outside world knew, the coup was strictly a Syrian affair, although it was afterwards assumed, fairly generally, that Za'im was 'the Americans' boy'.

Details of the coup itself ... are [as follows] in order:

First, the State Department was informed of the coming coup as soon as it became a serious possibility.

If details were not reported it was because the Department made it clear enough that it preferred not to have the details. References to the pre-coup involvement of Meade's political action team were ignored.

The tenor of the Department's replies was 'If Za'im seems bent on changing the Government the Department sees no reason to discourage him..' Za'im, it happened. would ... institute much needed [pro-American] social and economic reforms, and ... 'do something constructive' about the Arab-Israel problem – this last being what neutralised any inclination the Department might have had to give us explicit instructions to lay off.

Second, the attitude of the Minister, Jim Keeley, should be recorded. (...). Overestimating our influence on Za'im ... [Keeley] thought that once Za'im ruled the country by sheer 'naked power', as Bertrand Russell calls it, our persuasiveness, sweetened by a little military aid, would result in his introducing democratic [i.e. pro-CIA] processes as rapidly as the society would permit. (...). [Keeley] believed that a short period of dictatorship might quarantine [Syrians] from 'foreign [i.e. Soviet] influences'..

(The Game of Nations: The Amoral of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, pp. 42-43) (IMG)

Less than three weeks after the end of the 1948 War, with the active backing of the United States, Colonel Za'im launched a military coup against the democratic state:

The operation was the Husni Za'im coup of 30 March 1949. (The Game of Nations: The Amoral of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 42) (IMG)

A tyrannical military junta was installed into leadership. Copeland provides some details of Za'im's behaviour as the new leader of Syria:

He hadn't learned the modern theory of command – that is, that the commander's principal function is to maintain conditions in which subordinates have no alternative but to accept them. A military man who had lived all his life under such conditions, Za'im took them for granted. He treated his immediate subordinates, his fellow colonels who should have been the shoulders of his 'command structure', as though they had no choice but to carry out his instructions, and without question. (The Game of Nations: The Amoral of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 44) (IMG)

The new tyrannical regime that the United States installed in Syria was, in Copeland's words:

a stooge of the most powerful government on earth.. (The Game of Nations: The Amoral of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 44) (IMG)

Za'im had been so 'amenable to suggestion' (as we said in our reports) before the coup.. (...). Outrageous though it may sound, Meade spent the second day of Za'im's era telling the new dictator who should be Ambassador to the Court of St James, which officers should be promoted into diplomatic positions, and what diet should be given deposed President Quwwatli by his jailer so as not to irritate his ulcer. (The Game of Nations: The Amoral of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 44) (IMG)

As a result, the Syrian-American:

relations remained friendly enough for the rest of [Za'im's] tenure.. (The Game of Nations: The Amoral of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 44) (IMG)

After an intensive power struggle, there came about a democratic restoration in Syria. In this midst, the USSR began to fund the Syrian progressive bourgeois-democratic forces again. Hence in 1950:

Dwalibi confirmed that the U.S.S.R offered arms to Syria and talks about a treaty of friendship and commerce had been going on between Farid Zain al-Din, the Syrian Minister to Moscow and Vyshinskyii, the Soviet Foreign Minister. Dwalibi was reported as saying that the Syrian Government had not made any decision about Soviet proposals to supply all Syria's requirements from arms manufactured in the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia; (The Soviet Union and Egypt – 1947-1955, Rami Ginat, 1991, p. 150. Citing: Telegram 206 from F.O. to Damascus, 13 May 1950, F0371/82794, EY10338/2. Khalid al-Azm, the Syrian Prime Minister, said that Syria would obtain its arms from any available sources; see telegram 128 from Damascus, 17 May 1950, F0371/82814, EY11338/2.) (IMG)

The deal did go through. That the USSR furnished Syria with arms in 1950 is confirmed by the interview-memoirs of Dr. Ma'rouf Al-Dwalibi, the prominent Syrian official at the time. Although a staunch anti-communist and anti-Soviet slanderer, he was nonetheless one of the officials of a progressive and Soviet-friendly government in Syria. As a minister of the Hashim Al-Attasi administration, he was tasked with negotiating arms with the USSR. In his interview-memoirs, Al-Dwalibi recalled his 1950 negotiations with the Soviet ambassador as follows:

I also told him: 'You participated in planting the Jews in our country, and this [Israel] is the result. And now I want a weapon from you, because we are threatened.' He said: 'We cannot give you a weapon, because we just got out of the [Great Patriotic] War. All of our arms production should be for our country.' He asked me for a copy of the peace agreement, and I sent it to him; and he sent it to Stalin. And he went crazy, and after four days, he issued an order to give us whatever weapons we wanted. Thus, the door to the weapon was opened. Three months later, I became Speaker of Parliament. (Memoirs of Dr. Ma'rouf Al-Dwalibi, interviewed by: Mohammad Ali Hashemi, interviewee: Dr. Ma'rouf Al-Dwalibi, 2005, p. 146) (IMG)

Dwalibi was someone who tried to portray the USSR as problematic, but he did admit that four days after the Soviet ambassador sent the letter to Stalin, the Soviet state ordered that Syria be given 'whatever weapons [she] wanted' and thus 'the door to the weapon was opened'.

Although the Abdel-Nasser faction managed to complete the process of the Egyptianization ('Tamsir') and nationalization of the Suez Canal, the process for such Egyptianization and nationalization actually began during the era of the Soviet-backed Wafd Party. Recall from C4S7 that the Wafd Party, a progressive bourgeois-democratic party, had established close ties to the Bolshevik intelligence service. The relationship continued well into the 1950s. According to Ya'akov Ro'i – one of the most prominent Israeli researchers working for the Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Research Department of the Intelligence Corps – the USSR supported the Egyptian Arab struggle for control over the Suez Canal as early as 1946, so unequivocally that some attributed the proposal for British evacuation not to the Egyptian government but to the USSR:

As early as December 1946, when it was suggested that Egypt's demand to abrogate the 1936 Treaty be brought before the Security Council, the Egyptian minister in Moscow announced at a press conference there that Egypt could rely on the USSR's adopting a favorable position. The Soviet media, quoting the minister, said that the Egyptian people was disgusted with its government's hateful policy of confusion and error and that the protection of the Suez Canal should be given to Egypt. Soviet support for the proposal to bring the matter before the Security Council and for the British evacuation of Egypt was so unequivocal that certain Egyptian sources attributed the very proposal to the USSR government. ('Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947-1954', The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Yaacov Ro'i, 1980, p. 78) (IMG)

Again, so much for the 'hostility' of the Ben-Gurion faction to the British Empire, these two 'enemies' sided with each other against Egypt on the Suez Canal. Against Britain and Israel in the UN, the USSR firmly sided with the much-isolated Egypt:

On 26 July 1951, Israel and Britain complained to the Security Council against Egypt's long-term policy of imposing restrictions on Suez Canal traffic to Israel. Egypt found itself almost completely isolated during six weeks of UN debates on this complaint for the Soviet Union was the only power to support Egypt. Soviet officials regarded Egyptian policy as legal. For instance, on 25 July 1951 during a conversation between Gromyko and Eliashiv, the Israeli Minister to Moscow, Gromyko said that Egyptian assertions that Egypt and Israel were in a state of war were in line with international law. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 119) (IMG)

During this period, said the CIA, the:

USSR also expressed its sympathy with ... Egypt's demand for the cancellation of its 1936 agreement with England concerning the Suez Canal Zone [which had allowed Britain to military control the Canal], and of the Agreement of 1899, which calls for the two countries' joint exercise of government in the Sudan. (THE SOVIET BLOC (SURVEY 1950 AND 1951), CIA, May 7, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The friendly remarks between Egypt, Syria, and the USSR were well-reflected in the media and official statements: In February 1950 the Egyptian and Soviet governments agreed to accept each other's envoys. Semen P. Kozyrev became the Soviet Minister to Cairo and Anis al-Azr the Egyptian Minister to Moscow." As early as April 1950, statements advocating a neutral policy and calling for improved relations with the Soviet Union were made by senior officials in the Syrian and Egyptian governments. On 8 April, al-Ahram reported that Egypt had informed the Western powers that it was not prepared to commit itself in support of them in the cold war." On 9 April, during the Arab League session in Cairo, the Syrian Minister of National Economy, Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the USSR. On 12 April, Dawalibi stressed that such a pact would 'protect the Arab states in case a third world war should break out'. He was opposed to reliance on the policy of the Western powers.

Khalid al-'Azm, the Syrian Prime Minister who was also attending the Arab League session, stressed that

he knew nothing of Dawalibi's move. He claimed that Dawalibi had co-ordinated his move with Salah al-Din, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and that the latter had taken part in the formulation of Dawalibi's statement." From the Soviet reaction to Dawalibi's statement it was impossible to conclude whether the statement was approved by the Soviets or if they had been informed of its content. Indeed, before and after Dawalibi made his statement, he had had several talks with Daniil Solod, the Soviet Minister to Damascus, about the conclusion of commercial agreements between their countries. In fact, Dawalibi's move was welcomed by the Soviet Union. Daniil Solod told the Arab News Agency: 'Syria has extended her hand to us so we extended to her both our hands. Later on, a statement made in New Times on Dawalibi's speech said: 'The whole democratic camp has sincere sympathy for the Arab states.'

The statement showed 'on whose side the sympathy of the Arab peoples lies in the struggle between the camp of democracy and the camp of imperialism'. In connection with Dawalibi's statement, 'Azzam Pasha, the Arab League's Secretary General, said that he believed that many Arabs had had enough of US pro-Jewish policy and had received al-Dawalibi's remarks with satisfaction'. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 109) (IMG)

The Soviet official line of supporting the Wafd government's struggle against Britain continued until the government's collapse on 27 January 1952. The Soviet press expressed its sympathy with the Egyptian government and people for their justified struggle against the 'barbaric British attack' in the Suez Canal zone. Radio Moscow commented that 'the anti-imperialist struggle was merging all sections of the population ... highest spiritual leaders and lecturers of al-Azhar, the Muslim University, and the Egyptian Government'. The Soviet government's notes, said Radio Moscow, 'had been received with satisfaction by the varied classes in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries'. Now it was clear that the Egyptian people would not be frightened 'by the aggression launched by Great Britain with the assistance of other imperialist powers'. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 128) (IMG)

Whereas the Soviets supported Egypt on the Suez issue, Tito personally supported the MI6-backed Ben-Gurion regime which was hostile to the Egyptian intentions concerning the Suez Canal. An Israeli foreign ministry document, referring to a conversation between the Israeli diplomat to Yugoslavia, Ezra Yoran, and Tito, stated:

Yoran reports on a forty-minute meeting with Tito on 18 August. Tito emphasized Yugoslavia's friendship with Israel. He asked about aliyah from Eastern Europe, assured Yoran of Yugoslavia's support on the Suez blockade issue, and promised to speak to his foreign minister about it. He asked Yoran to forward best wishes to the Prime Minister [David Ben-Gurion]. (E. Yoran (Belgrade) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 18, 1951. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 6, 1951, Edited by Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, p. 241) (IMG)

Approximately three years later, Yugoslavia also began to push for the Ben-Gurion regime's inclusion in the anti-Soviet 'Balkan Pact' alliance, a military alliance of Yugoslavia, monarcho-fascist Greece, and Turkey. As a matter of fact, as confirmed by Jacob Abadi, a professor of history at the US Air Force Academy, in 1954:

In his conversation with Ezra Yoran, Israel's Minister in Yugoslavia, a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official argued ... that his country was willing to support Israel's candidacy to the Balkan Alliance. (Israel and the Balkan States, Middle Eastern Studies, Jacob Abadi, 1996, p. 298) (IMG)

More important than the Soviet diplomatic gestures were the economic and military relations between Egypt and the Soviet-led camp. Indeed:

From 1948, commercial relations between Egypt and the Soviet bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, had steadily increased. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 241) (IMG)

The expanding relations were also in the military sphere:

During April and May 1950, there were many reports, some considered reliable, indicating Soviet offers of arms to Egypt and Syria. On 27 April, the CIA reported to President Truman that, according to information given by a senior Syrian official, Syria had signed a secret non-aggression and economic agreement with the USSR by which Syria was to receive Soviet arms via the port of Latakia. Reports from Caffery spoke of rumours that the Soviet government was prepared to furnish arms to Arab countries by way of new barter agreements." According to al-Ahram, the Soviet Union offered Egypt arms for cotton on liberal terms including barter. The paper said that the Egyptian government 'is not unfavourably disposed to purchasing these necessary defensive weapons' from the Soviet Union and stressed that, owing to the American and British refusal to sell arms to Egypt, the Egyptian government would consider positively the Soviet offer; the arms were necessary to help Egypt realize its national aspirations." Later, on 22 May, this information was confirmed by the Department of State, which informed President Truman that the Egyptian government 'have indicated recently that, if necessary, it could secure arms and assistance from the USSR.' ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p.

110. Citing: Telegram 821 from American Embassy, Cairo, 20 April 1950, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Documents, 1950-1952: 320, box 219. Al-Ahram (Cairo), 3 May 1950. The American Embassy and Service Attaches could not confirm or reject this information; see Dispatch 983 from Caffery, Cairo, 3 May 1950, RG 84, Moscow Embassy-Confidential File, 1950: 320 Egypt, box 143. According to the daily paper Al-Asas, a high ranking Soviet diplomat who was asked, what would be the Soviet Government attitude should Egypt or any other Arab state apply to the Soviet bloc for arms? replied, that his country would welcome any cooperation with the Arab states; see telegram 1150 from Caffery, Cairo, 20 May 1950, Cairo Embassy- General Documents, 1950-1952: 320, box 219. Papers of Harry S. Truman-Naval Aide Files, 22 May 1950, File Subject: State Dept. Briefs, May-July 1950, box 22.) (IMG)

Stalin-era USSR thus laid the foundations to a Soviet alliance with the anti-imperialist Egyptian Arab state:

As we have already seen, Soviet interest in the area had been steadily increasing since the second half of the 1940s. Towards the end of Stalin's period in power, many attempts were made by the Soviets to improve relations with Arab governments which conducted an anti-Western policy or declared neutralism. This was the case with the Wafdist government (1950-52), when Salah al-Din, the Wafdist Foreign Minister, shaped and implemented Egypt's new policy of neutralism. He resolutely rejected Western proposals for establishing a Middle East Command, and was the motive power behind his government's decision to abrogate the treaty of 1936 with Britain. As a result of his policy, the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union significantly improved; several commercial agreements were concluded and more understanding and co-operation found expression at the UN. During the second half of 1951 the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact between the two countries had been seriously considered. In fact, the roots of the later Soviet-Egyptian honeymoon originated in this period. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 240) (IMG)

As mentioned previously (in C17S3), the Anglo-American imperialists, in their aggression plans against the USSR, were plotting to drop a nuclear bomb on Baku in particular to destroy Soviet oilfields, as part of the World War III scheme. They were seeking to travel via Iran and Turkey for this purpose. Soviet sponsorship of Arab patriots helped contain Anglo-American influence in the Middle East and strengthen the defenses of the anti-imperialist camp against Anglo-American plots. A CIA document stated:

Soviet interest in the Arab states is still directed rather toward ... undermining the British position in the Middle East.. Their principal asset, the oil of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, would be economically inaccessible, although its denial to Britain and the United States in the event of war would be of important consequent. But, by fomenting local demands for the withdrawal of British troops, the Soviet Union can hope to deny effective British support to Turkey and Iran. To this end the Soviet Union will exploit anti-British sentiment among the Arabs, and particularly the vexing Palestine issue. (Soviet Foreign and Military Policy, ORE 1, Central Intelligence Group (CIA Predecessor), July 23, 1946, p. 7) (IMG)

In 1952, at the instigation of the MI6, the Egyptian King Farouq launched a campaign to overthrow the constitutional monarchy and to establish a monarcho-fascist regime. This entailed a systematic purge of the Soviet-backed Wafd Party and other progressive bourgeois-democratic elements allied to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. It also entailed a purge of the military. In this midst, when the democratic order was already on the verge of elimination, when the constitutional monarchy was being abolished, Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the Free Officers took action to overthrow the King Farouq. As such, the Free Officers launched not a coup, but a counter-coup against a monarcho- fascist coup. Some of the aspects of the Free Officer counter-coup were suspicious: how is it that Abdel-Nasser was the leader of the Free Officers, but Naguib, the traitor to the Free Officers, ended up as the leader of the new Egyptian government? It is often explained that Abdel-Nasser promoted Naguib as a puppet; but we know that Naguib ended up not being a puppet at all. During the Free Officer coup, Abdel-Nasser himself was briefly detained by the troops affiliated with the Free Officer coup plotter network. These are suspicious aspects of the coup. Anyways, the imperialist-fascist secret service agent General Naguib, who was an enemy of Abdel-Nasser, managed to be installed as the main leader of the Free Officers and hence the leader of the newly-installed regime, with Abdel-Nasser as vice leader. Upon seizing power, General Naguib and his gang dramatically boosted the intelligence influence of the BND and the remaining Nazi officials inside Egypt's intelligence service. Naguib and his gang supported the reactionary fascist elements inside the Muslim Brotherhood. Naguib and his gang launched a campaign of terror against ordinary workers, and brutally suppressed dissent. All of these measures were opposed by Abdel-Nasser either directly or indirectly. Naguib and his gang plotted the assassination of Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Behind the scenes, the Ben-Gurion faction of Israel enthusiastically welcomed General Naguib's rise to power and the establishment of such a fascist state:

The tensions and conflicts inside the UN deprive the community of nations of the ability and authority to decree peace, and the situation in the different countries of the Middle East foreshadows not stability, quiet development, and projects of peace, but the opposites. Apart from two stable and strong countries in the Middle

East – Israel and Turkey – all Near Eastern countries are immersed in a whirlpool of disturbances, revolts, political chaos, political assassinations, deposition of monarchs, and constant contests for power between adventurers and dictators.

It is possible that these stormy developments may also contain some positive trends for recovery and progress. Wherever such trends exist, we view them with favour. **No doubt some of the events in Egypt in recent weeks in connection with the seizure of power by Mohammed Naguib may be welcomed.**

We can accept the testimony of Mohammed Naguib, the head of the military revolution, who declared that he and many of his colleagues in the Army had been opposed to the invasion of our country..

(Israel welcomes the Egyptian revolution – statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, August 18, 1952. In: Historical Documents, Volumes 1-2: 1947-1974, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bold added) (IMG)

Gamal Abdel-Nasser did have a favorable view of ‘the other Israel’ – the progressive faction of Israel led by the Mapam, the Soviet-backed communist-led ‘Socialist Zionist’ popular front party that operated also as a Soviet intelligence network. The Mapam Party’s military force was the Palmach (pronounced Paal-Maakh); the Palmach commanders were often members of the Mapam. As will be explored in greater detail later in C16S6, Abdel-Nasser had befriended the Palmach commanders Yitzhak Rabin, Yigal Allon, and Yeruham Cohen during the 1948 War. In the 1948 War Diaries Abdel-Nasser had made a truly interesting remark: “We ... went to Gat, and we were well- treated. There was a vast difference between Gat and Iraq al-Manshiyyeh. One feels that one is among civilized people – mechanized agricultural means, hygiene, and the women in bright clothes wearing shorts.” More about Abdel-Nasser’s Mapam connection will be said later in the upcoming chapter. Abdel-Nasser’s ‘pro-American’ views were of a similar nature. He was ‘pro-American’ if the term ‘pro-American’ is to mean that he supported ‘the other America’, the pro-Soviet faction of America. In a letter to his good friend John F. Kennedy, he frankly condemned American imperialism, US policies in the region, and many US presidents including Eisenhower and ‘Democratic Party’ President Woodrow Wilson, but indicated regrets that US President Roosevelt died too early to pursue his anti-colonial program. However, in contrast to Abdel-Nasser, Mohammad Naguib was aligned with the mainstream – the reactionary – factions of America and Israel, which earned him Ben-Gurion’s love.

It is a well-documented fact that the USSR denounced the Israel-backed Naguib gang as ‘fascist’ ‘agents of American imperialism’. Indeed:

Joseph Stalin rejected cooperation with the new Arab leaders such as General Mohammed Naguib, precursor of Colonel Nasser, who headed the Egyptian revolutionary junta in July 1952. (Arab-Israeli Dispute, Howard C. Reese, April 1966. In: United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Commandant: Major General Harry J. Lemley, Jr. Assistant Commandant: Brigadier General Robert C. Taber, Vol. XLVI, April 1966, No. 4, p. 62.) (IMG)

Somehow, the fact that the USSR was hostile to the Naguib regime – the regime that plotted Abdel-Nasser’s assassination – has been interpreted by some as to mean that the Stalin-era USSR was hostile to Abdel-Nasser and the true Free Officers. That is an absurd claim, to say the least. On the contrary, through such hostility to the Naguib regime, the Stalin-era USSR helped to systematically destabilize the Naguib regime, thus indirectly assisting Abdel-Nasser in overthrowing the Naguib gang. Furthermore, Soviet hostility to the Naguib regime could not possibly be Soviet hostility towards the rise of the secular Arab liberation struggle. As confirmed by the CIA, the Stalin-era USSR promoted secular pan-Arabism (‘Arab Nationalism’) as an ideological trend that could undermine Anglo- American imperialism in the Middle East region:

The Arab nationalism of the Middle and Near East countries exploded in conflicts with the old colonial powers. The Soviet Union, which supported these actions with adroit propaganda, made use of the same tactics it applied in Southeast Asia to create the impression that it is a friend of these countries. Although the Moslem countries are hardly fertile soil for communism, the development of extreme nationalist groups, into various of which the MGB [i.e. Soviet intelligence], well disguised, has apparently succeeded in penetrating, has created a favorable situation for the eastern bloc and a correspondingly unfavorable situation for the western powers. It will take all the skill of Western diplomacy, a broad understanding of the problems of the oriental countries and peoples, to take action, within the confines of neutrality, to prevent the Near East from becoming dominated by the eastern bloc, not just for the moment, but for a long time to come. The significance of this source of danger can hardly be overestimated. (THE SOVIET BLOC (SURVEY 1950 AND 1951), CIA, May 7, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

By early 1953, thanks to Soviet pressures, the Naguib regime too had been weakened, though not to the point of being ‘ready’ to be overthrown yet. This was correlated with the fact that (as confirmed by the American spy Sa’id Aburish in ‘Nasser; The Last Arab’) in early 1953, Abdel-Nasser was able to convince elements within the military to lobby for a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. From 1950 until the ‘Islamic Revolution’ in Iran, the progressive elements inside

the Muslim Brotherhood were a small minority, and the reactionary terrorist agents of the CIA and MI6 an overwhelming majority, thus making the organization an Anglo-American intelligence front. The ruthless crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in early 1953 reduced CIA-MI6 influence and slightly tilted Egypt towards the anti-imperialist camp. This could not have gone unnoticed and unappreciated by the Soviets; indeed, according to Rami Ginat, the Stalin-era USSR slightly toned down its opposition to Egypt's government and was to some extent satisfied by the maneuvers of Egypt:

The downfall of the Wafd government in January 1952 generated a period of mutual suspicion and distrust in Soviet-Egyptian relations. In his last months, however, Stalin moderated his negative attitude towards the Free Officers' regime in Egypt. The Soviets now adopted a wait-and-see tactic. Eventually, the Free Officers' position vis-a-vis the Western powers did, to some extent, satisfy Soviet policy-makers. They believed that Western failure in the region would serve Soviet interests. In the meantime, the Soviet media supported Egypt and the Arabs in their 'just struggle' and their 'right' to full independence. (The Origins of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal: A Reappraisal, Rami Ginat. In: 'The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East', edited by: David Tal, 2001, p. 148) (IMG)

The USSR should not have fully supported – and indeed did not fully support – the Egyptian regime during this time period, because the Naguib faction was still dominant. However, the elevation of the Abdel-Nasser faction, which was correlated with the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood terror group, was also correlated with a less unfavorable approach to Egypt by the USSR. After the 1948 War, Abdel-Nasser retained secret contacts with the Soviet-backed Mapam-Palmach faction in Israel. Upon ascending to the position of the President (Al-Ra'is) of Egypt in 1954, Abdel-Nasser retained contacts with the faction of Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin, via the Palmach officer and Allon aide, Yeruham Cohen. This fact is well-documented. The prominent journalist Eric Rouleau for one wrote: The friendship between Nasser and Cohen lasted well after the war. Having ascended to the presidency of the republic, the Rais invited Cohen more than once to visit him in Cairo, something the Israeli was unable to do because the Israeli government refused permission. The two men corresponded with each other and exchanged gifts for their respective birthdays. Besides Cohen, Yigal Allon, commander of the forces besieging al-Faluja and later a leader of the Labor Party, also had courteous conversations with Nasser and excellent memories of their encounters, according to the statements he made to the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth. ('Truths and Lies in the Middle East: Memoirs of a Veteran Journalist, 1952 -2012', Eric Rouleau, 2019) (IMG)

C16S6. The Mapam Faction in Israel ***

IMG-All-{Mapam}

The history of the Soviet and Czechoslovak support for the Arab armed struggle against the regime of Israel is only the Arabic part of the story of the Soviet stance on Israel. The Hebrew part of the story, studied by few outside of Israel, is one of the most fascinating aspects of the history of the region. The alpha and the omega – or rather, the Alef and the Tav – of the 'Israeli side' of the story can be summarized by one word: Mapam. Mapam, in partnership with the Maki, was to rise to dominance in Israel, leading the way to a new a revolutionary socialist Israel.

Due to the discrimination against the Yiddish people of Europe, most of them became proletarians involved in the socialist class struggles. On this point, Engels stated:

In addition, the anti-Semite presents the facts in an entirely false light. He doesn't even know the Jews he decries, otherwise he would be aware that, thanks to anti-Semitism in eastern Europe, and to the Spanish Inquisition in Turkey, there are here in England and in America thousands upon thousands of Jewish proletarians; and it is precisely, these Jewish workers who are the worst exploited and the most poverty-stricken. In England during the past twelve months we have had three strikes by Jewish workers. Are we then expected to engage in anti-Semitism in our struggle against capital?

Furthermore, we are far too deeply indebted to the Jews. Leaving aside Heine and Borne, Marx was a full-blooded Jew; Lassalle was a Jew. Many of our best people are Jews. My friend Victor Adler, who is now atoning in a Viennese prison for his devotion to the cause of the proletariat, ... Paul Singer, one of our best men in the Reichstag – people whom I am proud to call my friends, and all of them Jewish! After all, I myself was dubbed a Jew by the Gartenlaube.!

(On Anti-Semitism, Frederick Engels, April 19, 1890)

When using the term 'Jew', he was so obviously speaking not of the religion of Judaism which Engels and Marx greatly disliked and frequently ridiculed, but of the Ashkenazim, Sfaradim, the secular 'Jews', or the Yiddish. When the USSR was established, there came the special relationship between the Yiddish nation and the Soviet state. Time and time again, the Yiddish proletarians, among whom the USSR held a high level of soft power influence, had been strongly influenced by communist ideas, and from among them rose agents who actively pushed for the expansion of Soviet and Comintern influence. Such was the case in the days of the October Revolution, when the Yiddish proletarians formed much of the Bolshevik cadres and sought to expand Bolshevik influence in Byelorussia and the Baltics. Such was the case in Moldova

and Bessarabia, when the Yiddish population there supported the efforts to hand that territory back to the USSR. Such was the case when the Yiddish proletarians in Warsaw launched that heroic uprising against the Nazi occupation. Such was the case when the Yiddish proletarians – Rakosi among them – formed many of the cadres of the communist party activists in Hungary and Poland, the agents of the Comintern in the Middle East, the fighters of the Spanish Civil War, etc.

Understandably, the vast majority of the observers incorrectly believed that upon joining Zionist organizations or migrating to Israel, these Yiddish activists no longer had a significant revolutionary potential. The Soviets, on the other hand, had the vision to understand that this was not as true as one may have thought. While Zionism did most certainly diminish tremendously the revolutionary potential of the Ashkenazim, by sending the children of the People's Democratic Eastern Europe to become the subjects of an aggressive pro-fascist Anglo-American satellite state in the Middle East, the potential was not as badly reduced as many assumed. The heroism of the sons and daughters of the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Hashomer Hatzair and the Mapam and very importantly the fact that these socialist anti-fascist saboteurs had a powerful socio-economic base, the kibbutz lobby and the proletariat, all serve to show the incorrectness of this thesis that the rise of Israel was almost the end of the Ashkenazi revolutionary potential.

The population of Israel had a high revolutionary potential, but such a revolutionary potential was suppressed as a result of the intensive Anglo-American investment into preventing the 'fall' of Israel into the hands of the Israeli proletariat. Even in spite of the general upper hand which the Anglo-American agents obtained in Israel, the communist intelligence network in Israel had enough influence over the military, intelligence, and security bodies of the Israeli state, to produce wonders. The USSR supported Arab armed struggle not at all for the Rejectionist-style destruction of the society of Israel but for militarily decimating the CIA-MI6 faction in Israel, the Mapai-Irgun alliance, so that the way could be paved for the establishment of a socialist state in Israel.

As mentioned before, contrary to what is often believed, many of the migrants who went to the territory that is called Israel actually were serious believers in a democratic peace and fraternal coexistence with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. No doubt Zionism is a reactionary pro-fascist ideology that supports settler-colonial terror against the Arab proletarians, and favours strategic partnership and 'peace' treaties with the fascist Arabs, the bad Arabs. Yet, not everyone who self-described as 'Zionist' defined that term in such a way, at all. For many of them, 'Zionism' was redefined so as to mean life in a socialist-leaning bi-ethnic state in Israel-Palestine-Jordan region in a joint struggle of the Yiddish migrants, Hebrew 'sabras', and the Arabs against Anglo-American imperialism – no ethnic cleansing against Arabs, no settler-colonialism, no Ashkenazi supremacy.

In Israel, there existed three main 'Socialist Zionist' political parties that closely cooperated with the Soviet intelligence, Comintern, the communist parties, or other communist-linked organizations. These parties were: Achdut Ha-Avoda (to which Yitzhak Rabin and Yigal Allon belonged), Hashomer Hatzair (to which Meir Ya'ari, Ya'akov Hazan, and the martyr commander of the 1942 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Mordechai Anielewicz, belonged), and Poale Zion Smol. With the encouragement of **the Soviet intelligence fronts, the consulates of the Peoples' Democracies and the Soviet officials in Moscow** – possibly even Stalin himself personally – the Israeli pro-Soviet 'Socialist Zionist' parties which closely cooperated with Moscow, merged to form the political party, Mapam. The CIA reported:

The 2,000 workers of the Socialist League plus 500 former members of the Hashomer Hatzair Youth Movement brought total adult membership of the Hashomer Hatzair up to 8,500 in 1946. Its newspaper, Mishmar, was the third most widely circulated in Palestine. In 1946 the party came out against terrorism and was reported to be trying to gain strength in the rural areas. In July 1946 there was a reorganization of the political executive. **Sections were designated for cooperation with the USSR**, the V-League (Friendship for Soviet Russia), **and the Arabs**. (...). During the fall of 1947 negotiations were in progress in Palestine and abroad, particularly in Poland, for a union of all pro-Soviet left-wing groups in the Jewish Agency to counter-balance MAPAI's "dictatorship" and to oppose the "fascism" of the Irgun-Revisionist bloc. Such **pro-Soviet institutions as the Society for Israeli-Soviet Friendship, (the former V-League) the Soviet section of the Pan Slav Union, and the satellite consulates lent encouragement**. By January 1948, Achdut Avoda-Poale Zion Smol's fear of being swallowed up by the better organized communities of Hashomer Hatzair was assuaged, and these three parties united to form MAPAM. In the 1946 elections to the Histadruth the parties combined in MAPAM received 25% of the vote as opposed to 35% received by MAPAI. (POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 8) (IMG)

In April 1946, Achdut Avoda merged with Poale Zion Smol to form the Mefleget Achdut Avoda, although (as in the merger of other Jewish parties) it remained its own party organization. (...). **After the visit of two of its members to Moscow in February 1948**, this party merged with the Hashomer Hatzair to form MAPAM.

(POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 7) (IMG)

The Mapam, a 'Socialist Zionist' party that was created with the support of the Soviets and cooperated closely with the Soviets, was to serve as the vehicle for socialist intelligence service work in Israel. In some ways, the Mapam back then was an equivalent of the Tudeh Party of Iran in the sense that it was so designed to be a communist-led popular front party. In other words, it was designed to be a progressive bourgeois-democratic party led by communists and oriented towards communism, but not exactly a communist party per se. The Mapam was actively sponsored by the Soviet military intelligence and the Soviet political intelligence via the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv well until 1949 and well beyond. In a Soviet Foreign Ministry instructions document sent to the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv, the legation was instructed to gather military and political intelligence in Israel, but also, importantly, instructed the legation to support the Mapam and the Maki in the struggle for bringing about a socialist-leaning state in Israel:

In relations with the opposition parties – the United Party (Mapam) and the Communist Party of Israel [Maki] – the legation must confine itself to acquiring information and, without interfering in these parties' internal affairs or the relations between them, support their actions in their struggle to establish friendly relations between Israel and the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. (INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE USSR IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, Secret, Ershov. Part of: COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow), Moscow, 29 September 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 534 -538) (IMG)

Supporting the one-state solution, the Mapam opposed the partition of Palestine on the grounds that it would prevent a democratic peace between the Yiddish/Hebrews and the Arabs and would result in both countries – Israel and the Arab part of Palestine – to be economically weak. Along Soviet lines however, since the expulsion of the British was a priority for the Party, the Mapam supported the UN plan on Palestine which entailed the expulsion of the British and at the same time the partition of Palestine. "An article in the 25 January 1948 edition of the Palestine Post," reported the CIA, "contains excerpts from the new party's platform":

"The independent nation is to forge its socialist future by striving for a pact with the toiling Arab masses in the country.. The party sees itself an inseparable part of the revolutionary workers' movement and the work against capitalist reaction.. It will foster contacts with revolutionary movements all over the world and favors agreement between the workers of the world and the USSR which is the first workers' state.. Complete equality and cooperation between the Jewish people returning to its land and the Arab masses living there will be sought.. Regarding the UN decision, the platform has determined the establishment of the Jewish state and its defense under present conditions despite its rejection, in principle, of the partition solution." (POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 5) (IMG)

The Mapam had a long history of arguing for a bi-ethnic state in Palestine and opposition to the partition:

From its inception, this movement understood that two peoples are living in the Land of Israel, and they both have the right to national self-determination. At its founding convention in 1929, the Kibbutz 'Artzi Federation resolved: "...the historic Land of Israel is the common homeland of two peoples, the Jewish people returning to it and the Palestinian people living in it."

This kibbutz federation, and its youth movement, strove to create a bi-national state in Israel, in which both peoples would have equal national and political rights while preserving the Zionist principle that the country must be open to all Jews persecuted by anti-Semitic forces and all Jews who choose to manifest their national existence.

(The Independent Socialist Party of Israel – MAPAM, International Department of the MAPAM, January 1986, p. 1) (IMG)

Nonetheless, even after the partition of Palestine, the Mapam made every effort to undo the damage of the partition of Palestine. To undo the economic damage of the partition, the Mapam called for economic cooperation and an eventual economic union between Israel and Arab Palestine. To block settler-colonial terror against the Arab civilians, the Mapam opposed the expulsion of the Arab civilians from Israel and supported the right of return. The Mapam also called for a democratic peace and extensive cooperation with Arab Palestine, as well as a military alliance with the progressive forces in the other Arab states.

In a report to the Soviet intelligence service, top Mapam officials Levite and Ya'akov Riftin reaffirmed the Party line in support of the Palestinian Arab right of return, the support for and pursuit of an alliance with the revolutionary Arabs in the neighbouring states, the establishment of a democratic peace, an Israeli alliance with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies against Anglo-American imperialism, and strengthening the socialist forces in Israel's state apparatus and mode of production:

Speaking about the forthcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly and the prospects for development of the State of Israel, Riftin told me that their pre-election platform [of the Mapam] had been approved and consisted

of the following: in foreign policy, orientation towards the Soviet Union and the new democracies; strengthening links with the Arab democratic movement. On the issue of Arab refugees, Levite said that the party's position included the following: return of refugees after the war, with the exception of 'warmongers'. In the: sphere of domestic policy, a resolute struggle against fascist and terrorist organizations. At present the government was pursuing only the Stern group, while members of other fascist and terrorist groups were still at liberty. Legislation to institute a progressive tax, the burden of which would be borne by the bourgeoisie, and not by the broad masses of the population; a struggle against clericalism, while retaining freedom of conviction; defence of [Mapam] positions in the army, because 'with the support of the army, the party can be a significant force'; officials who served the British to be dismissed from the civil service. (DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363-365) (IMG)

Dr. Moshe Sneh, the prominent Haganah commander who was the leader of the Mapam and was a top Soviet spy in Israel, said in an interview that the Party supported an economic union between Palestine and Israel and the return of the non-revanchist Arab refugees, and an alliance with progressive Arabs:

We have always demanded the right of peaceful Arab refugees to return to the country. We have connected this with our demand that in the Arab part of Palestine there should be created a democratic independent Arab state, which would be linked with Israel by an economic union and a treaty of friendship. In the framework of such a democratic solution the question of refugees could no longer be used as an instrument for foreign intrigues. It is characteristic that, when we proposed a year ago that the right of peaceful Arab refugees to return be proclaimed as part of a democratic entente between Jews and Arabs, the majority parties just about denounced us as traitors. (...). According to our proposal of a year ago, the return of Arab refugees could have been an act of good will on the part of Israel on the path to Jewish-Arab friendship; (INTERVIEW WITH DR. SNEH, Neie Presse (a Paris Yiddish daily), Interviewer: L. Bruck, interviewee: Moshe Sneh, November 1949, p. 1. MIA) (IMG)

In a conversation with the Soviet diplomat in Tel Aviv, Levite, a leader of the Mapam, said:

On the issue of Arab refugees, Levite said that the party's position included the following: return of refugees after the war, with the exception of 'warmongers'. (DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363-365) (IMG)

It should be obvious enough that the Arab right of return, the economic union, and comprehensive cooperation between these states would have undone every 'anti-Palestinian' thing that Israel is known for.

The Mapam also correctly claimed responsibility for promoting the rights of the Arab workers in the Histadrut: MAPAM did not forego its desire for an accommodation with the Palestinian-Arab people and opened its ranks to Arab members, within the framework of a common political party. MAPAM fought against all restrictions on freedom of movement for the Arab population of Israel imposed by the Military Administration. MAPAM demanded – and achieved – the acceptance of Arab workers into the General Labour Federation of Israel (Histadrut). (The Independent Socialist Party of Israel – MAPAM, International Department of the MAPAM, January 1986, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The Mapam ideologically held a strongly communistic orientation and almost half, if not more, of its members held communist stances on almost all issues except for 'Socialist Zionism':

According to a press dispatch of 25 April from Tel Aviv, an extremist group advocating stricter compliance with the Cominform line has gained control of MAPAM, a left-wing socialist party which was second only to MAPAI (Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's party) in 1949 general elections. In a countrywide election this week of delegates to next month's MAPAM party conference, the extremist group, which maintains that there is no ideological difference between Communist and MAPAM party aims other than Communist opposition to Zionism, had a 50% voice in the party's rule. MAPAM's moderate groups, which have reportedly elected but 40% of the party delegates, have stressed the importance of Zionism and of ideological independence. (U New York Times, Tel Aviv, 26 April [19]51). (...). Such a development could present Israel with a more serious Communism problem than the present political set-up provides. ('Israel. Reported Leftist Gains in the MAPAM Party'. In: 'Daily Digest', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), April 26, 1951, p. 5) (IMG)

According to a "Reuters" broadcast from London, Israel's left-wing socialist party, MAPAM, dodged a threatened party split on the issue of how closely the party should follow the Cominform line when the party concluded its political convention at Haifa. A contradictory mixture of Zionist pioneering and pro -Soviet tendencies was revealed by the convention's directive that MAPAM move toward "the socialist revolutionary camp, against Titoism, and for Jewish pioneering". MAPAM ... generally follows along Communist lines.

(‘Israel. Pro-Soviet MAPAM Avoids Threatened Party Split’. In: ‘Daily Digest’, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), June 4, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

Again, the ‘Zionism’ of the Mapam was very different than the mainstream Zionist tendencies, in that it had opposed the partition of Palestine, opposed the terror and expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs, and supported an alliance with the progressive Arab forces. They were ‘Zionists’ in the sense that they supported the migration and regarded ‘Eretz Yisrael’ as the homeland of the ‘Jewish people’ (in addition to being the homeland of the Palestinian Arabs). Many anti-Zionists do not even know that a significant minority of the individuals who self-describe as ‘Zionist’ oppose the reign of terror and expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs, because most anti-Zionists assume that practically all of those self-describing as ‘Zionists’ would agree that the term ‘Zionism’ ipso facto and by definition means support for the settlement of the Jews and ‘Jews’ in replacement of Arabs and not alongside Arabs. Because of the existence of this ‘Socialist Zionism’ which called for Zionist migration to Palestine under the conditions of a democratic peace and a bi-ethnic state, rather than the partition and the settler-colonization of Palestine, Zionism was seen as an umbrella term that included both the Arab-friendly ‘progressive Zionists’ and the anti-Arab child-killers and fascist assassins of which many are reminded every time the word ‘Zionist’ is uttered. This is why in many worker organizations, unions, and parties in Europe, Zionism was in some contexts denounced as a fascist terror ideology and was sometimes denounced as merely ‘foolish’ or ‘erroneous’ but not as criminal or colonial. They who denounced this non-fascistic ‘Socialist Zionism’ as ‘foolish’ ridiculed it by arguing that it was calling for Ashkenazi lawyers and doctors in Europe to go the Negev desert and farm in an ultra-egalitarian cooperative. This contextual difference emanated from the different connotations of the term ‘Zionist’ and the recognition that some of those who self-described as ‘Zionists’ opposed anti-Arab terror and extermination projects.

The HaShomer HaTzair, ‘the Young Guards’, was one of the most prominent of these ‘Socialist Zionist’ organizations. Initially affiliated with the Kautskyite and Trotskyite circles slanderously campaigning against the USSR, it came increasingly under the influence of the communistic elements thanks to the soft power influence of the USSR among the Yiddish during the Great Patriotic War and thanks to the contacts established with the communist resistance forces as a result of the popular front policies. The cracks in the Hashomer Hatzair began to widen in the late 1930s, when, increasingly, it was made up of a ‘Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist Zionist’ majority faction that triumphed over the ‘Trotskyist Zionist’ minority faction. Whereas the mainstream of the Zionist movement – the tools of Anglo-American intelligence as they were – collaborated with the Axis forces from 1943 as part of the effort to contain Soviet influence, the Hashomer Hatzair opposed the Nazi regime and the latter’s Anglo-American backers, and supported Soviet efforts. Naturally, as with all communistic anti-Nazi resistance organizations, there were some suspicious elements – Trotskyite and Titoist agents – in its ranks, much as how there were high-ranking Gestapo agents inside the communist parties. However, just like the Comintern-affiliated parties, the general trend in the Hashomer Hatzair was genuinely anti-Nazi. A top case in point of Hashomer Hatzair heroism in the anti-Nazi struggles is the case of the well-known martyr Mordechai Anielewicz. Anielewicz was the commander in chief of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, the Yiddish uprising against the Nazi German occupation. A HaShomer HaTzair ‘Socialist Zionist’ activist, he was a true friend of the Soviet Union even though the imperialist media and right-wing Israeli media try to steal and coopt his image for their own reactionary agenda by portraying Anielewicz as anti-Soviet and as best of friends with the MI6-backed anti-Semitic ‘Home Army’ terrorists. Yitzhak Zuckerman, the second most prominent commander of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, recalled in his memoirs:

For example, Mordechai Anielewicz – he was a brilliant lecturer – said that if the Red Army (this was back in 1940) went into the Middle East and occupied Eretz Israel, we would welcome them with open arms. They would occasionally invite me to attend the sort of conferences we attend today in Israel. I said then that the entrance of the Red Army into Eretz Israel could be the end of Zionism, so I wouldn’t welcome them gladly; naturally, I said, we might not have the strength to resist them. That was the big difference in conception. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 504) (IMG)

Anielewicz was a leftist, so was Braslaw. If they had remained alive in Poland after the war, they would have gone with [the Soviet spy Ya’akov] Riftin. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 258) (IMG)

Yitzhak Zuckerman’s role in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is dubious, but it is true that he had a prominent position in it. In other parts of his memoirs, Yitzhak Zuckerman confirmed – in vast contrast to mainstream media accounts – that the anti-Semitic terrorist organization, the MI6-backed Home Army, contributed nothing positive to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (see C13S4.1). Note that Zuckerman was admitting this a pro-American, pro-British, anti-Soviet Zionist – not as a Hashomer Hatzair ‘Stalinist’. Once again, pay attention to the difference of the Hashomer Hatzair mentality with that of the rest of the Zionist movement, when Zuckerman said “Mordechai Anielewicz ... said that if the Red Army (this was back in 1940) went into the Middle East and occupied Eretz Israel, **we would welcome them with open arms.** (...). I said then that the entrance of **the Red Army into Eretz Israel** could be **the end of Zionism**, so I wouldn’t welcome

them gladly;” Hence, the Hashomer Hatzair’s ‘Socialist Zionism’ was a kind of a ‘Zionism’ that did not match the mainstream anti-Arabist and pro-imperialist faction of the Zionist movement to which Zuckerman belonged.

It is said that the Israeli military conducted research on the crimes that it committed against Arab civilians. This fact about the Israeli military is cited by the right-wing Israeli historiographers as 'evidence' that the Israeli army was a 'moral' army. What such right-wing historiographers deliberately leave out in such excerpts is that such research on the Israeli armed forces' crimes against Arab civilians was done by the Soviet spies and Mapamite opponents of the Israeli regime. The Riftin report, which was written by the Mapam leader and top Soviet spy Ya'akov Riftin, is a very famous case in point. Yes, the criticism of the IDF terror against Arabs did come from the high ranks of the Israeli military and intelligence bodies but these individuals belonged to the dissident tendency, the pro-Soviet tendency, in the Israeli regime and they were exposing the crimes against humanity by the dominant tendency, the pro-American fascist tendency, in the Israeli regime. The IDF as a whole has been a fascist army of terror, but thanks to the existence of class struggles, it has never been a monolith. Thanks to Arab armed struggle and the struggles of the Israeli proletariat, the fascists dominating the IDF have been rolled back at times and moral people have been catapulted to its high ranks. Some of the prominent Israeli leaders who did official government research about the IDF terrorism, typically tended to belong to the Soviet intelligence network in Israel and they owed their positions thanks precisely to such Arab anti-fascist armed struggle and the Israeli proletariat.

Norman Finkelstein, a prominent anti-Zionist Ashkenazi scholar on Arab-Israeli relations and a critic of the Mapam, wrote:

Mapam was unusually well placed to follow the unfolding of events in 1948. **Much of the Haganah/IDF’s officer corps was recruited from Mapam — e.g. Galili, Camel, Rabin and Allon. Moreover, committed as it was to achieving a modus vivendi with the Arab world, Mapam enjoyed atypically close relations with the Palestinian Arabs.** Finally, Hashomer Hatzair, which together with Ahdut Ha'avodah formed Mapam in January 1948, managed to accumulate an extensive archive on the Arab flight. (...). In early May, **Aharon Cohen, director of Mapam’s Arab Department, wrote that ‘a deliberate eviction [of the Arabs] is taking place. ... Others may rejoice — I, as a socialist, am ashamed and afraid’.** A few days later he repeated that the Arabs were being expelled — a "transfer" of the Arabs from the area of the Jewish state' was being executed — 'out of certain political goals and not only out of military necessity'. And at a Mapam meeting in June, Cohen charged that 'it had depended on us whether the Arabs stayed or fled. [They had fled] and this was [the implementation of] Ben-Gurion's line in which our comrades are [also] active'. At a late May Mapam Political Committee meeting, Eliezer Prai, the editor of the party's daily paper, accused elements of the Yishuv — e.g. Weitz — of carrying out a 'transfer policy' by 'blood and fire', aimed at emptying the Jewish state of its Arab inhabitants. In July, Mapam leader Ya'acov Hazan threatened that 'the robbery, killing, expulsion, and rape of the Arabs could reach such proportions that we would [no longer] be able to stand' belonging to a coalition with Ben-Gurion's Mapai. (In May 1948, Mapam had joined the newly formed government as a junior partner.) (Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, Norman G. Finkelstein, 2003. Bold added.) (IMG)

In addition to Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin, the two IDF commanders Haim Bar-Lev and David Elazar too were prominent members of a Mapam that identified with Stalin-era USSR:

Mapam members who had stayed in the IDF, like Yitzhak Rabin, Haim Barlev, David Elazar and others, were mostly appointed in the first few years of statehood to staff and training posts, and only slowly obtained commands over fighting units.

Although Mapam's strength inside the army was broken, Ben Gurion's apprehensions did not diminish. Mapam's wholehearted identification with Stalin's Soviet Union and its claim to belong to the Soviet bloc sounded alarms in Mapai Headquarters.

(Between Battle and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics, Cambridge University Press, Yoram Peri, 1983, p. 62) (IMG)

They who have studied the reasons for the defeat of Israel by the Arab armies during 1973 War would surely find it very telling to be reminded, if not already remembering, that Eleazar and Bar-Lev were both agents of the Mapam, both close comrades of Yitzhak Rabin – and both Chiefs of Staff of the IDF during the 1970s.

Until midway through the 1948 War, different political parties had their own military forces. The Mapai had the Haganah, which was the main military force and the core of the IDC, although the Mapam had a significant influence over the Haganah as well. The Mapam itself had the ‘Palmach’, the military force arising out of the kibbutzim and headed almost exclusively by Mapam-affiliated commanders. The ‘Fighters for the Freedom of Israel’ (Lehi), the Nazi Zionist party that had over the years come under the partial influence of the Hashomer Hatzair anti-Nazis, had its own military force. The Herut (later called ‘Likud’), the party of the Italian Fascist agent Ze’ev Jabotinsky and his henchman Menachem Begin, had the ‘Irgun’.

Ya’akov Riftin and Liova Levite, **Mapam’s political secretaries and Soviet spies**, provided an intelligence briefing

to the local Soviet intelligence service station in Israel. In this report, they made some critically important remarks which I have bolded below:

Riftin and Levite came to see me at their request. Levite said that the United Workers' Party [Mapam] was playing an important role in the political life of Israel. In the last elections to the Histadrut, it received about 40 per cent of the votes. At least a hundred collective settlements, out of a total of 300 Jewish agricultural colonies, are under its influence. Since many of this party's settlements are located near the frontiers of Israel they bore the main thrust of the Arab forces. Before the formation of the Jewish army, units of the Palmah, which consists mainly of supporters of this party, formed the basis of the Jewish armed forces. **At present a large number of the military commanders, including some generals, belong to Mapam. However this is not true of the general staff or other central military departments, where Mapai members predominate.**

Riftin said that he had recently returned from America, where he had met Comrade A.A. Gromyko. He believes that the United Workers' Party is the most progressive party in Israel, where it is 'following the path laid down by the Great October Revolution'. At present, the party considers its main task to be winning the war, because only when it has defended its territory from the enemy, will it be possible to build a democratic state.

At first the party favoured the establishment of international trusteeship over Palestine (America, Britain, the USSR), but later gave full support to the United Nations' resolution on partition. It is a staunch supporter of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, since it sees them as the main international support, which will be needed in order to build a democratic socialist state. It is therefore trying to arrange practical links with the Soviet Union in the hope of receiving some advice. For their part, they offer comprehensive information about Israel and the Arab countries. In addition, it would be desirable for the Soviet Union to give moral support to the United [Workers'] Party.

(DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.I, P.I, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363 -365. Bold added.) (IMG)

The Mapam was a strong force because, as stated in Riftin's report, it had a large level of influence over Israel's means of violence. However, the general staff and the central departments of the military were controlled by Ben-Gurion and other Kautskyite agents of the Anglo-American secret services. As a result of the CIA-MI6 Kautskyite control over the Israeli armed forces' topmost ranks, the general strategic orientation of Israel was in favor of the anti-Arab Kautskyites and Anglo-American agents. Nonetheless, the Arab-friendly socialist Mapamite (or 'Mapamnik') intelligence agents in the ranks of the Israeli army had enough strength to sabotage the Israeli regime's anti-Arab wars with the aim of ultimately rising to take control over the central departments and the general staff as well, and hence the Israeli means of violence in general. The class character and the strategic orientation of a government is indeed determined by the question of which class forces control the means of violence. Upon taking decisive control over the means of violence in Israel, the Mapam could transition Israel swiftly into a progressive state strategically aligned with the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies and the progressive Arab states and organizations.

The Mapam could also utilize its influence in the Israeli military in order to provide top secret military intelligence to the USSR. The Mapam did indeed prove to be a Soviet spy front, providing not only political intelligence but also using its position in the armed forces to provide top secret military intelligence to the Soviets. The Mapamite intelligence agents in the Israeli army also sabotaged the anti-Arab policies of the Israeli military. Assisting the Arabs in waging wars against the Israeli regime would inflict financial costs upon the pro-fascist tendency, the dominant tendency, in the staff of the Israeli armed forces, thus reducing the lobbying power of this pro-fascist tendency. Reduced lobbying power for this pro-fascist tendency in turn would increase the leverage of the Mapamite dissidents in the staff of the Israeli armed forces. This would result in the elevation of the Mapamite dissident elements within the Israeli armed forces, so that eventually, a leap from quantity to quality occurs and Israel's means of violence would be firmly under Mapamite control. This would cause Israel to transition into becoming an anti-imperialist socialist-oriented state willing to ally with the progressive Arab states and hostile to the reactionary CIA-backed regimes in the Arab world. And the military alliance of the new Israel with the progressive Arab states would yield a democratic peace with the Arab people of Palestine. Hence, the USSR did provide the Mapam with extensive support; it provided such support by (1) promoting the unification of the 'Socialist Zionist' groupings into the Mapam, (2) promoting the soft power influence of the Mapam among the Israeli population, (3) arming the Arab armies that waged war against the Israeli regime's military, thus severely damaging the Ben-Gurion faction that stood in the way of the Mapam, hence providing greater lobbying power to the Mapamite elements that had infiltrated the Israeli military so to yield this elevation and rise of the Mapam faction in the Israeli armed forces.

While supporting the Mapam through arming the Arabs during the 1948-1949 War, the USSR also sponsored the Mapam morally. As stated in the Riftin-Levite report to Ershov, it was indeed desirable that the USSR would provide

moral support to the United Workers' Party, the Mapam, for it would have helped promote the Mapam's positions in the Israeli electoral campaigns. In fact, a CIA report indicated the USSR may have promoted the Mapam over the Israel's communist party, the Palestine Communist Party. The communists had minimal chance for recruitment because the majority of Israelis would have opposed the communist line against the Zionist mass migration, the kind of the migration that benefited settler-colonialism. Hence, according to the CIA:

An unconfirmed report states that the Palestine Communist Party had been ordered by Moscow to recruit Communists among European immigrants for the MAPAM parties, not for the weak and discredited Palestine Communist Party. Moscow has long had ties with the component parties of the MAPAM through such pro-Soviet groups as the League for Soviet Friendship and the Kremlin is aware that MAPAM is the only strong party which favors the formation of an anti-US-UK bloc in Israel. (POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 6) (IMG)

In the rise of the Mapam there existed the potential for the rise of the Red Star over Tzion, the establishment of a socialist Israel on the strategic Mediterranean coastline, allied unofficially or officially with the anti-imperialist forces reigning over Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. This the Soviets sought to achieve – or at least get as close as possible to achieving – through the highly secretive armament of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, so that Arab armed struggle may weaken the enemies of the Mapam and elevate the position of the Mapam intelligence agents in the struggle for control over Israel's means of violence. History proved that the Soviet method paid off very well. The positive effects of such policy can be traced as far as the late 1990s.

During the period 1948 to 1949, while arming the Arab foes of the Israeli regime, the USSR officially showered Israel with moral support so to yield an electoral elevation of the Mapam:

The most optimistic estimate of MAPAM strength in the coming elections gives this party 25% of the vote. Most recent estimates from Goldman in London and the Press Club in Tel Aviv, give MAPAM only 18% and predict another MAPAI-led coalition. In that case, MAPAM would probably continue in very much its present role; it would maintain its [socio-]economic power in the Histaduth and seek to gain prestige by taking credit for any Soviet action favorable to Israel. (POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 6) (IMG)

The Israeli Constituent Assembly, delegates of which were chosen numerically in the 25 January [1949] election with each delegate representing 2,500 votes, will open 14 February in Jerusalem. MAPAI, the winning party in the election, will control 49 of the 120 seats in the Assembly. MAPAM, the second party, has 19 seats, the United Religious Bloc 16, and Menachem Begin's extremely nationalist Freedom Party 14. (...). MAPAM, the leftist labor party which is closest to MAPAI in views and second to it in strength, will probably also be included in the coalition. Although relatively weak in the country as a whole, its influence in the coalition and the Constituent Assembly may be much greater because of its strong position in Histaduth, the powerful labor organization to which more than 40% of the population belongs. In the last Histaduth election in 1944, MAPAM obtained 43% of the vote to MAPAI's 53%. Should this ratio be maintained in the 13 February Histaduth elections, MAPAM will be in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis MAPAI and can be expected to demand greater influence in the coalition government and the Constituent Assembly than its 15% vote in the general election would warrant.

(INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 9 FEBRUARY 1949, CIA, Near East / Africa Branch, p. 4) (IMG)

The USSR could and should have utilized its soft power influence in order to assist its Mapamite allies to gain as much control over the Israeli government apparatus, so to yield a socialist Israel, an Arab-friendly Israel, on the coast of the Mediterranean, at the intersection of North Africa and the Middle East, as a base for spreading socialist influence throughout the region. Stalin came to unequivocally support this view. Sergo Beria wrote:

At the start Stalin said neither yes [n]or no. But he soon gave preference to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine – a Socialist state, which, as he saw it, would become an advanced satellite of the USSR in the Middle East and enable Moscow to expand its influence forward in this oil-rich region. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 110) (IMG)

Even at the time of its official vocal support for Israel, the USSR made it clear that it opposed Zionism and hence the concept of a 'Jewish state' in the supremacist sense of the term. The Soviets rather supported a socialist Israeli state, not a 'Jewish state' as in a Judaic-theocratic state, nor a Jewish supremacist state. The British, while supportive of the dominant tendency, the pro-fascist tendency, of the Israeli government, feared that the high level of Soviet soft power influence and the significant strength of the Mapamite intelligence agents at the high ranks of the Israeli military and state apparatus could agitate for movements that would transition Israel towards this agenda of an Arab-friendly progressive Israel, or even a socialist Israel. A US State Department document recording the remarks of the British Foreign Affairs Minister Bevin, states:

Bevin said Pal settlement at the earliest possible date is essential. UK does not intend to "hold out" against recognition PGI and at proper time when UK knows location Israeli frontiers, UK will extend promptly full recognition to Israel. However, UK believes prospects for UK obtaining its strategic requirements from Israel in the foreseeable future are poor and possibility must be faced that "within five years" Israel may be Communist state. Bevin infers this from fact that new Jewish immigrants come largely from countries behind Iron Curtain where they have been exposed to Communist philosophy. There was no great exodus to Israel from the US and UK where democratic philosophy could have been absorbed. To have communist Israel lying athwart vital strategic roads in ME such as Auja-Beersheba, Gaza-Beersheba and El Kuntilla-Aqaba, would be serious blow to UK strategic plans for area. ('Subject: Appeal of British Government for US-UK understanding with regard to forthcoming Arab-Jewish negotiations re frontiers in Palestine', The Charge in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State, LONDON, December 22, 1949. 501 .BB Palestine/12-2248: Algram) (IMG)

It is said that the majority of the Israelis were vicious anti-Arab chauvinists. For historical circumstances beyond the scope of this work, that claim is very true of the 21st century majority of Israelis, but is not so true of Israeli public opinion during the 20th century, even well until the late 1990s, when socialistic ideas had a worldwide appeal including in an Israel governed by an anti-communist regime. The fact that the Mapai, not the Herut/Irgun, was the most powerful reactionary party in Israel says much about the attitudes of the people of Israel. The Herut/Irgun was very explicit in its fascist, anti-Soviet, anti-Arab chauvinist, and anti-socialist stance. By contrast, the anti-socialist anti-kibbutznik anti-Arabist Mapai presented itself as 'Soviet-friendly', 'socialist', 'pro-kibbutz', and even 'Arab-friendly'. Take a look at the following excerpt of a CIA document:

The formation of Israel's first non-provisional government is notable for the strong control exercised by MAPAI throughout. When Prime Minister Ben-Gurion invited the other Israeli parties to join MAPAI in the new coalition, he made it clear that those accepting must accept the principle of collective responsibility and MAPAI's major policies – friendship and cooperation with both the US and the USSR, an Israeli-Arab alliance, a majority of constructive labor elements in the government, and complete civic equality for women, Christians, and Moslems. This point was emphasized when MAPAM, the left socialist party which had played a part second only to MAPAI in the provisional government, demanded as a condition to its joining the new cabinet that Ben-Gurion: (1) to decline any Marshall Plan aid offered Israel; (2) to refuse bases to the Western powers; and (3) to balance trade between Eastern and Western blocs. Although Ben-Gurion is still holding four portfolios open for MAPAM and General Zionists (who wanted more than the single post offered [to] them) he refused to commit itself on MAPAM's demands, and the MAPAM Council has voted 150-33 to remain in opposition. (...). Although without MAPAM the government will be generally more conservative than it was expected to be, its policy will be comparatively clear cut and predictable, and it will continue to maintain theoretic neutrality while actually leaning towards the West. (INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 9 MARCH 1949, CIA, Near East / Africa Branch, March 9, 1949, pp. 3-4. Bold and underline added) (IMG)

The top CIA party in Israel was calling for 'friendship and cooperation with ... the USSR', and, almost a year after having carried out a genocide against the Arabs of Palestine, had the audacity to officially call for 'an Israeli-Arab alliance' and 'complete civic equality for ... Christians, and Moslems'. The fact that the CIA-backed pro-fascist reactionary party was disguising itself with such rhetoric to appeal to the Israeli electorate is demonstrative of the progressive attitudes of the Israeli population. The majority of the Israelis harboured pro-communist attitudes.

The fact that the Mapai had to demagogically present itself as 'pro-Arab' and 'pro-Soviet' once again is reflective of the political attitudes of the Israeli population. The argument that the Ashkenazi and Sfaradi proletarians of Europe went to Israel with the objective of stealing Arab lands and helping the IDF burn Arab villages has no basis in facts concerning that time period. The people of Israel were Arab-friendly and sympathetic to the Soviet-led forces. The fact that the Ben-Gurion gang was elected into power by the largest minority of them does not mean they were supporters of the Ben-Gurion group's ethnic cleansing and genocide projects. Does voting for Obama, who ran on a so-called 'anti-war' platform, necessarily mean support for rendering Libya into a hellhole? Not just the Mapai, Mapam, and Maki but also the Lehi preached cooperation with the Arabs and the Soviets (see C16S7). The Mapai was very dishonest, the factionalism-stricken Lehi was semi-dishonest, and Mapam and Maki were honest in calls for international fraternal cooperation with the Arab people and the Soviet-led forces. The Herut-Irgun was the only major Israeli party that, blatantly enough, spread hate against Arabs – the Herut-Irgun represented a minority in Israeli society. The Arab-friendly attitude shown by all the major parties minus Herut is reflective of the attitude of the Israeli electorate.

Some harbour the delusion that the awareness of the masses is on its own enough to mobilize them for anti-imperialist action. To begin with, the predominance of a progressive political culture in a society, on its own, is not enough to stop the reactionary projects of the reactionary class forces ruling such a society, for it is not by consciousness (alone) that history is determined but by the control over the means of violence. Even if the majority of a population are anti -

imperialist but ruled by pro-imperialist reactionaries, the ruling reactionaries would still be able to pursue their sinister agenda while minimizing the material manifestation of the progressive people's dissent to such reactionary agendas. Minimizing dissent could take the form of suppression or using the media and intelligence bodies to foment dissension in the anti-imperialist movement thus to lead to the implosion of the anti-imperialist movement. Therefore, let there be no doubt that the consciousness of the masses can be a serious force against imperialism only if the progressive forces have enough historical-material factors under their sway to be able to mobilize the conscious masses towards translating their revolutionary mindset into revolutionary action; and since in some societies, the reactionary classes have the vast majority of the historical-material factors under their control, there are not enough historical-material factors under the control of the progressive forces for the latter to be able to translate such a progressive mass consciousness into a progressive mass action. It follows that even though the majority of the Israeli population was Arab-friendly and pro-Soviet, the fact that Israel's progressive forces did not have enough historical-material factors to overthrow finance capital and the comprador classes in Israel inevitably assisted the comprador and imperialist agents in the drive to sow dissension amongst the progressive forces and to engineer the elections in their own favour.

Details on the methods of sowing dissension among the progressive forces in Israel will be provided later. However, to put the matter briefly, here is some information which will be discussed in greater detail later in this work: the imperialist forces in Israel sowed dissension by (1) having the Mapai, the imperialist party that launched the ethnic cleansing against the Arabs of Palestine, present itself as 'pro-Soviet' and 'Arab-friendly' so that the Kautskyite agents of fascism can steal votes from the Mapam, (2) working tirelessly to engineer the split of the Mapam into Achdut HaAvoda, post-split Mapam, and the 'Left Faction', and (3) promoting the left-opportunist Mikunis faction in the Maki as a counterweight against the communist forces in the Maki and against the Mapam. By contrast, had the socialist forces had enough historical-material factors under their sway, they would have been able to (1) use the Mapam agents in the Shin Bet and the Mossad to finance the electoral engineering campaign to ensure that the Herut- Irgun voters feel no motivation to vote and that Mapai voters are attracted to Mapam, (2) ensure that the proletariat more firmly dominate the Achdut HaAvoda, Mapam, and 'Left Faction' so that the proletariat glues these three groupings more firmly together and re-merges them, and (3) use the Mapam agents in the Mossad and Shin Bet to compromise Mikunis, compel the demotion of his faction in the Maki while elevating his real communist rivals, so that the potential for the Maki's cooperation with the Mapam increases. That type of a situation would have yielded a mass movement for utterly destabilizing the Zionist regime and paving the way for a People's Democratic Israel that would undo the Zionist reign of terror.

The Zionist reign of terror occurred not because the people of Israel were "anti-Arab chauvinist savages" who migrated to Israel out of love for stealing land and burning down Palestinian villages but because the Anglo-American imperialists had fortified their material presence in Israel enough to not only sow dissension in the ranks of the opponents of anti-Arab chauvinism but to even use the conscription law to force the socialist activists to become cannon-fodder for the aggressive imperialist war drive. In those years, the opposition to ethnic cleansing did not manifest strongly not because the Israeli population had a love for colonial terror but because historical circumstances blocked the formation of an effective opposition by them.

Some would argue that the strategic reorientation of Israel into an alliance with Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, the USSR, and the Peoples' Democracies would have caused the 'forgetting' of the issue of the Palestinian refugees; such an argument, which keeps getting raised by some left-opportunist commentators, is very stupid. Strategic realignment is not merely a change in the political geography but constitutes a change in the class character of the state. The strategic reorientation of Israel would have come along with the increased influence of the proletariat over the Israeli state apparatus and the dominance of the proletariat and collectivist peasantry over the state. Such dominance of the proletariat over the state would have naturally generated a dominant proletarian internationalist tendency in Israel, causing Israel to (1) strive for the rise of the progressive forces in the Arab countries in which reactionary forces to dominate, and (2) to strive for the military-industrial development of Arab countries in which the progressive forces already dominate. That is, the new revolutionary Israel would have strived to overthrow the reactionary regimes of Saudi Arabia and Hashemite Jordan while assisting the efforts to industrialize the progressive governments of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. An Israel dominated by the Mapai-Irgun alliance pursued and continues to pursue more and more terror against the Arabs of Palestine as an endless trajectory; an Israel dominated by the Mapam, the socialistic forces, would have pursued, as an endless trajectory, the further and further elevation of the proletariat and hence the further and further political and economic advancement of the peoples of the region including the Arabs of Palestine and the Palestinian refugees, thus paying far more than just reparations to the Palestinian refugees. And such an advancement of the peoples of the region would have benefited the new revolutionary Israel strategically as well. The overthrow of Anglo-American-backed reactionary Arab regimes was a matter of national security for a socialist-oriented Israel, whereas strategic cooperation with the progressive Arab states would have yielded a stronger regional security network for blocking Anglo-American assaults aimed at destroying the socialist-oriented Israel. Some would argue that the population of Israel, ideologically influenced deeply by Zionism, even if 'Socialist Zionism', would not have been willing to give up on the call for Zionist mass migration. First of all, let it be clarified that the primary reason that Zionist migration was reactionary was that

those Jews and 'Jews' would become the labour force and troops serving, willingly or unwillingly, a reactionary aggressive warmonger state allied with Anglo- American-German finance capital. The migration to Israel, if a socialist state had been established in Israel, would not have been reactionary because then that would have increased the labour force and troop count of a socialist anti -imperialist state. The persecuted Jews and 'Jews' proximate to the mainland of the USSR and the Eastern European and East Asian Peoples' Democracies could take refuge in the mainland of the Soviet-led camp, whereas the persecuted Jews and 'Jews' proximate to socialistic Israel could take refuge in People's Democratic Israel. Asylum- seeking is really the core aspect of the 'Zionism' part of 'Socialist Zionism'. The peripheral problem of the 'Zionism' part of 'Socialist Zionism' is that it calls for an ultra-liberal migration policy in favour of the 'Jewish people', and just like the other kinds of Zionisms, advocates allowing any Jew/'Jew' who travels to Israel to very quickly, almost immediately, become a citizen. It is one thing to argue that people with a culture similar to that of Israel should have some advantage when applying for citizenship to socialist Israel; it is another thing to say that this person should be able to immediately become a citizen of Israel just because of belief that this person's ancestors thousands of years ago lived in that land. Although 'Socialist Zionism' had this problem, the relatively positive thing about it was that it did not obsess over Ancient Israel or ultra-liberal migration, and the core argument behind its call for ultra-liberal migration was that Israel and the USSR should be places of refuge from anti-Semitic persecution. Therefore persecution, not obsession with the presence of one's ancestors in that land in the ancient times, was the core reason behind such an argument. Had this hypothetical socialistic Israel been established, the 'Socialist Zionist' culture among the masses would have in time evolved to Israeli socialist patriotism, the devotion to socialist fatherland Israel.

Unlike Rejectionist anti-Zionism, the more common and less mature version of 'anti-Zionism', the Soviet anti-Zionism had doses of Post-Zionism to it, in that the USSR supported the right of existence of Israel as a country while opposing the Zionism. The Soviet stance was not full-on 'Post-Zionist', but it did contain aspects of it. Such incorrect assertions as 'Stalin supported Zionism' rest on the fact of the existence of the Post-Zionist element to Soviet behaviour regarding Israel. When the partition did happen, the USSR recognized Israel – for the better. Any regime that is allied with the United States cannot be and was not recognized as a legitimate state; however, diplomatic recognition of a state is different than the recognition of a state as morally legitimate. No doubt Israel's regime should not have been recognized as legitimate in the moral sense because of its pro-American and pro-fascist character; however, the refusal to recognize Israel diplomatically has always been an infantile move. The Arab states fight against Israel's regime, but then when making truces, they would use a Zionist non-Israeli intermediary for indirect truce negotiations; in other words, according to this mentality, it is bad to negotiate with the Zionist Israeli representatives but it is fine to negotiate via the Zionist non-Israeli representatives; such a mentality only creates additional bureaucracy and is actually ridiculous. Some of the secular pan-Arab anti-Zionist leaders themselves wished to negotiate truces with Israel directly, but the petit-bourgeois emotions of some people has always put an obstacle to such a process, and made truces inefficient. In the case of the USSR, a Soviet failure to diplomatically recognize Israel would have caused the USSR to lose access to Mapam-Maki progressive elements in Israel, thus benefiting the dominant pro-fascist tendency backed by the Anglo-American intelligence in Israel. For Soviet intelligence activities against Israel to take place, the recognition of the Zionist regime would have facilitated the process. Noting the reactionary character of Zionism and the pro-imperialist and anti-Soviet character of the Israeli regime, the Soviet Foreign Ministry directive to the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv called for espionage against Israeli officials and Anglo-American military presence in Palestine:

1. Since the government of Israel relies on the US in its foreign policy, the Soviet legation must show a reserved attitude to the **government and its representatives and must keep a close watch on its foreign and domestic policy** and promptly inform the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. While showing due respect to the sovereignty of the state, the legation must at the same time explain and emphasize that the decisive factor in the creation and establishment of the State of Israel was the Soviet Union's attitude to the Palestinian question at the UN and subsequently to Israel.

3. Since **reactionary Zionism tries to smooth over class contradictions among the Jewish population and is a direct agent of Anglo-American imperialism**, the legation must refrain from taking part in purely Zionist functions arranged by the government and political parties.

4. On the question of immigration to Israel of Jews from the USSR, we should bear in mind that this involves the renunciation of Soviet citizenship and is decided in each individual case by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in light of citizens' personal applications. As for the departure of Jews from the People's Democracies, that is their business and the legation cannot discuss it.

5. **In relations with the opposition parties – the United Party (Mapam) and the Communist Party of Israel – the legation must confine itself to acquiring information and, without interfering in these parties' internal affairs or the relations between them, support their actions in their struggle to establish friendly relations between Israel and the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.**

(...).

9. The legation must help the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in strengthening and spreading the influence

of the **Russian Orthodox Church in Palestine and in its struggle. conducted jointly with the Jerusalem Patriarchate, against the increased activity of the Vatican.**

10. The legation must follow closely policies and **practices of the US and Britain, especially of a military nature, and must keep the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed.**

(INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE USSR IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, Secret, Ershov.

Part of: COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow), Moscow, 29 September 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1 -2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 534-538. Bold added.) (IMG)

The idea that Israel should not be recognized as a country takes root from the Palestinian chauvinist and revanchist ideological tendencies. It also arises from the Third-Worldist belief that Israel does not really have a proletariat, that Israel has had no revolutionary potential whatsoever, and that the entire Israeli population, including the proletarians and the kibbutzniks, constituted a 'bourgeoisie' to be violently overthrown by the allegedly-'proletarian' Palestinian revanchist terrorists who massacred civilians instead of fighting against the IDF. It is good to support armed struggle against the IDF and to impose certain kinds of economic sanctions that decimate the pro-fascist tendency in Israel while elevating the progressive elements among the Hebrews. However, the Third-Worldists went farther. The Third-Worldist call for the violent elimination of the 'bourgeois' Israeli proletarians and kibbutzniks was used to 'justify' military operations that constituted terror attacks against civilian targets. They 'justified' the economic-terroristic boycott of almost everything Israeli, and the absolute rejection of any, even indirect, recognition of Israel. Third-Worldism in turn fed Palestinian Rejectionism and the 'logic' that 'justifies' Palestinian chauvinist terror. Fortunately, the Soviets did not harbour such reactionary Rejectionist views.

The USSR, as shown in the above excerpt, supported establishing closer relations with the Mapam and the Maki for bringing about their rise to dominance in Israel, while obtaining intelligence to undermine Anglo-American imperialists in Israel and spying on the influence of the Anglo-American intelligence agents there. Without a Soviet Embassy, without a Soviet intelligence station in Tel Aviv, these kinds of measures would have undoubtedly become much more difficult. While the Soviet Union instructed its legation in Israel to engage in anti-regime espionage, the Soviet government had worked to limited the possibility of Israeli intelligence activities in Soviet territory. This is corroborated in an Israeli intelligence document written by Israeli Foreign Ministry official Friedman, in his report to the top Mossad operative Ehud Avriel. Dated February 23, 1949, the document's remarks are as follows:

There have been discouraging developments in the Soviet Union. The Israeli representatives have been forbidden to have any contact with Soviet citizens, whom they have been accused of encouraging to renounce their nationality and to emigrate to Israel. The Legation has been forbidden to distribute its Bulletin to institutions, to kolkhozes, and to Jewish communities, and have been ordered to transmit messages to Soviet citizens solely through the intermediacy of the Foreign Ministry, while the Bulletin may be distributed only to members of the diplomatic corps and to the Foreign Ministry.

The Legation has moved from its temporary quarters in the hotel to a permanent residence, which has probably put an end to the visits by local Jews who used to come to the hotel.

(S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to E. Avriel (Prague), February 23, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 80) (IMG)

Thus, the Soviet recognition of Israel could not be out of any sympathy for the Zionist settler-colonization of Palestine. Hence, as stated by the journal of the US Army:

Although the Soviets recognized Israel in 1948, the move was neither out of sympathy for [the regime of] Israel nor hostility for the Arabs. Before liquidation of the British mandate, the Soviets advocated British withdrawal from Palestine.. (Arab-Israeli Dispute, Howard C. Reese, April 1966. In: "Military Review: Professional Journal of the US Army", United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Commandant: Major General Harry J. Lemley, Jr. Assistant Commandant: Brigadier General Robert C. Taber, Vol. XLVI, April 1966, No. 4, p. 62.) (IMG)

The USSR sympathized with the struggles of the Israeli people and the Arab nation. Its recognition of Israel, however, as the above excerpt confirms, did not mean sympathy with the regime of Israel nor hostility to the Arab nation.

The Mapam was an intelligence front of the Soviet Union. Note that the Soviet intelligence station in Tel Aviv had reported to Moscow, in reference to the Mapam, that:

they [i.e. Mapam] offer comprehensive information about Israel and the Arab countries.

(DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363 -365) (IMG)

To be a high-ranking loyalist agent of the Mapam amounted to service to international communism spearheaded and led by the Soviet Union. Not every Muslim Brotherhood operative was directly connected to the MI6 but the Muslim Brotherhood was an MI6 front and a Muslim Brotherhood loyalist officer was serving the British intelligence service; analogously, not every Mapamite general had a direct link with Moscow, but every Mapam loyalist agent in the high ranks of the Israeli regime apparatus was working for a Soviet espionage network and was knowingly allied to the Soviet state. The Mapam had a pervasive intelligence network in Israel. Isser Harel, the Shin Bet chief and a Mossad founder, warned:

“Mapam had set up an underground network which was operating out of the very bosom of the Defense Ministry, the army, and the Foreign Ministry.” (Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, pp. 130-131) (IMG)

The Mapam's intelligence penetration into the different areas of Israel's state apparatus was truly remarkable. That many of the politicians, diplomats, and generals were agents of the Mapam is well-known. The Mapam also had agents in of the ranks of the right-wing parties. Ze'ev Tzahor was a high ranking IDF official, a Ben-Gurion aide and research assistant, and a researcher of the Mapam who interviewed many Mapam affiliates. Tzahor wrote:

In 1950, Mapam's secret cells operated in the security service, the military administration, the Ministry of Defense and the army. (...). Some of the cell members later made an impressive security career. Of those, there were generals, ambassadors and Members of the Knesset who were not necessarily [officially affiliated with the] Mapam. One of them was a minister in a right-wing party. This is based on several sources. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 197) (IMG)

Now that the general characteristics of the Mapam, the general party line and relations of the Mapam, have been explained, it is high time to delve into the many operations of the Mapam. The most fascinating military operation by the Mapamite intelligence agents at the high ranks of the Israeli regime apparatus was in the Altalena bombing. The Mapam-affiliated generals of whom the Palmach was composed were regarded as dangerous subversives by the Ben-Gurion clique. Forget not that the agenda of the Ben-Gurion group was to transition Israel from a Kautskyite 'social democracy' of the settler-colonial type to a Pinochet-style fascist dictatorship backed by the MI6 and the CIA, a regime politically authoritarian and theocratic, and economically neoliberal, not just exterminating the local Arabs but overtly and blatantly terrorizing the Israelis themselves. Such a regime was the long-term goal. To this end, the Kautskyite Ben-Gurion gang aimed to covertly sponsor the Irgun fascists. The sponsoring of the Irgun fascists also had a short-term benefit for the Ben-Gurion faction for it would have created a powerful bloc rivaling the Palmach freedom-fighters. Totally unlike the Palmach freedom-fighters, the Irgun terrorists were very serious about fighting against the Arab people and Arab anti-fascist forces. Thus, funding the Irgun terrorists would have tremendously assisted the anti-Arab war of terror. In an intelligence report to the Soviet secret service, the Moshe Sneh, Soviet spy and former high-ranking Haganah commander, confirmed that the Irgun Zvi Leumi (IZL – pronounced in Hebrew as 'Etsel') was secretly backed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion:

the extreme nationalists, revisionists and the IZL [are] secretly supported by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, who ... are trying to reach an agreement with the US to obtain the annexation of part of the Arab territories of Palestine in order to hand them over later as concessions to American [finance] capital. Ben-Gurion's view is expressed in the press by the journalist Liebenstein [Livneh] in the newspaper Davar. 'What Liebenstein writes, Ben-Gurion thinks, or the other way round' said Sneh; [T]he United Workers' Party and the Communist Party of Israel are against any sort of concessions to, or compromises with, the US and Britain, but in favour of 'a just compromise' with the Arabs, and of the closest possible relations with the USSR and the People's Democracies. (DIARY: AVP RF. F.089, OP.1, P.1. D3, LL.5-6, Secret, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – M. Sneh, Tel Aviv, October 9, 1948. In: “Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2”, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 381) (IMG)

Uri Milstein was an IDF commander who was later designated by former IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan of the Ariel Sharon faction to write a history of the 1948 War. Milstein was a Jabotinskyite right-wing Zionist enemy of the Mapam, and a viciously violent foe of Yitzhak Rabin. Milstein wrote that the Mapai-controlled Haganah and the Irgun/Etsel were to form an alliance, but that the Mapam, its military force the Palmach, and Mapam's top representative in the Haganah, Yisrael Galili, aimed to sabotage such an agreement between the Irgun and the Haganah. The Ben-Gurion faction Kautskyites also aimed to form a coalition cabinet with Menachem Begin and his Herutniks/Likudniks, but this agreement was indeed sabotaged by the Mapam:

According to the agreement, the Irgun was supposed to coordinate its activities with the Haganah, until the declaration of independence, and to join the IDF after the establishment of the state, as a cohesive military framework, in a position that the Palmach had in the Haganah and at the beginning of the IDF. Most of the senior commanders in the Palmach, including Yitzhak Rabin, were under the influence of the Marxist Mapam. Through

the fame of the commanders, Mapam leaders sought to shape the IDF in their spirit, and to become the dominant political factor in Israel. The plot of Deir Yassin was also intended to thwart, after the declaration of independence, the establishment of a national unity government, one of whose members was supposed to be Begin. Most of all, Galili and Mapam, his party, feared that a coalition between Ben-Gurion and Begin would push them to the margins of the political system, completely nullify their influence on the future state, and harm their economic and social interests. (...). Galili and his comrades' first goal was not achieved: the Zionist General Council approved the agreement between Etzel [i.e. IZL] and Haganah – by a majority of 39 to 32 – at five in the morning on April 13, 1948. The agreement was approved after bitter struggles, heated debates and attempts by Mapam representatives to postpone the vote in order to cancel it, since after a few hours most of the delegates from abroad were supposed to take off back to their countries. Their other goal was fully achieved – Begin and his friends remained out of the political system until after the War of Independence until the first elections in 1949. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Menachem Begin himself confirmed years later that David Ben-Gurion harbored a positive opinion of the Irgun and that Ben-Gurion, rather than ban those terrorists as the agents of the former Fascist Italy, harbored them and assisted them in operating in the ranks of the armed forces of Israel:

When independence was declared on the 14th May, 1948, there was no immediate formation of a unified army. Haganah continued to exist; and the Irgun, whose soldiers were stationed on various fronts and in some sectors were fighting together with Haganah men, also continued to exist. The well-known journalist, Dr. Azriel Karlibach, at that time published an open letter to me, brimming with enthusiasm and demanding that ... we should work for establishment of a unified Israel Army. I replied on our radio that several days earlier we had publicly called for the establishment of a unified Army to replace the military organisations. But it depended on the Government, not on us.

When the creation of the Army was announced we continued as a recognised military organisation until the integration of our forces into the Army was completed. In the operational orders of the Front Line and Brigade Commanders, Irgun units appeared as an inseparable part of the Army forces. In liberated Jaffa which, at our request, had been divided into two sectors, one sector was garrisoned by the Irgun.

The Prime Minister, Mr. David Ben Gurion, one day visited Jaffa and also inspected Irgun units, who presented arms. I was told that Mr. Ben Gurion, moved at the incident, said to the escort: "I didn't know they had such boys."

Afterwards the Prime Minister sent the following letter to Sergeant Haim, the officer in command of our occupying force in Jaffa:

State of Israel

Provisional Government 22 May, 1948

To the Commander of the Irgun soldiers in Jaffa. Until further instructions you and your men are at the sole orders of the Military Governor of Jaffa, I Chizik.

(signed) David Ben Gurion

Head of the Provisional Government and Minister of Security.

We pointed out to Mr. Ben Gurion's aide-de-camp that it was not customary for a Prime Minister to communicate directly with a local officer. We were gratified at the official recognition of "the Irgun Zvai Leumi soldiers in Jaffa," but out of concern for the tender growth of our State we wished to uphold the status of the Prime Minister as such.

With his aide and his colleagues we continued to discuss the creation of a unified army. The details of the discussion are related elsewhere. Here it is sufficient to mention that we agreed that the Irgun should bring into the Army complete battalions with their officers. But as the organisation of battalions required time, it was agreed between us that we would set up a temporary Staff of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, approved by the Prime Minister and Minister of Security. By the time the "Altalena" arrived we had organized and integrated several battalions into the Army. Other regiments were still in process of organisation, their men being still dispersed in smaller units on various fronts. Our Staff was thus an official and recognised body, when it was called to discuss with the representatives of the Ministry of Security the unloading of the "Altalena" arms.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 217-219) (IMG)

With the full support of the Ben-Gurion faction, the Irgun terrorists were to be funded militarily by the US-led bloc. The Irgun was to be handed a ship filled with all the arms which Israel needed for a decisive victory early on in the War. Menachem Begin, the commander of the Irgun terrorists, recalled that the amounts of arms to be provided were so numerous that in fact Israel would have won control of pretty much all of Palestine, not to mention inflicting a far more crushing defeat on all of the Arab armies. 900 Irgun soldiers were to guard it. General Begin wrote:

The "Altalena" with her nine hundred soldiers, five thousand rifles, four million rounds of ammunition, three

hundred Bren guns, 150 spandaus, five caterpillar-track armoured vehicles, thousands of air- combat bombs, and the rest of her war equipment, was ready to sail not in the middle of May but only in the second week of June. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 215) (IMG)

The tragic fact was that the "Altalena" was late in coming. Had this landing-craft arrived off the shores of Eretz Israel immediately on the liquidation of British rule, that is, in the middle of May, 1948, the whole condition of the nation would have been radically changed. We should then have placed at the disposal of the Government and the Army eight or ten battalions, fully equipped with arms and ammunition — instead of their customary equipment, unlimited readiness for self-sacrifice and short- ranged Sten-guns. At our first attack we should have captured Ramleh. This Arab town, besieged by the Irgun Zvai Leumi at the request of the Haganah in order to draw away enemy forces from the Latrun front, was on the point of falling when we had to withdraw. The morale of the inhabitants had been lowered, mainly by the shelling of our 3 inch mortars. Our boys stormed the approaches to the town and in the opening stages captured large parts of it. But lack of arms and ammunition proved fatal. They needed only a few hundred rifles and additional ammunition, but on the Ramleh front that quantity was not available either to us or to the Haganah Command. Three hundred rifles, or six per cent of the number loaded in the hold of the "Altalena"....

Had we been able to capture Ramleh at that time – and its conquest depended solely on these additional arms – the united Jewish forces would have broken the Arab front at Latrun and our strategic situation would have been changed fundamentally, its effects being felt as far as Jerusalem, as far as the Old City.

With the fall of Ramleh, the fate of Lydda would have been sealed. Thus we should have smashed the enemy on the central front in the first stage of his invasion, instead of only after the first "truce." And the Jewish forces would have been free in the second stage for a full-scale attack on the 'Triangle.' In a word, we should today have held the Western bank of the Jordan – at least.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 214-215) (IMG)

The war materiel ship was sent during the truce, when the pace of the Arab armies in defeating Israel was forcibly slowed down. BBC radio, which was the media outlet of the MI6, informed the Irgun terror command with a coded message in its broadcast, telling the Irgun that the Altalena war ship was moving from the coasts of France to Israel. As often, Menachem Begin nonsensically implied that the British, who provided the codes, were opposed to arming the Irgun and that they sought to alert the UN observers. Nonetheless, it was clear that BBC was signalling to the Irgun that the war ship had started travel. Begin wrote:

The "Altalena" with her nine hundred soldiers, five thousand rifles, four million rounds of ammunition, three hundred Bren guns, 150 spandaus, five caterpillar-track armoured vehicles, thousands of air- combat bombs, and the rest of her war equipment, was ready to sail ... only in the second week of June. We received first news of her departure from a French port on the London radio. (...). That very day the "truce" had come into force. Whatever our attitude to the truce might be, I explained to my comrades, we were not entitled to bear the responsibility for the possible consequences of a breach. All the Jewish forces were very tired; the enemy had superior armament. This was no longer an underground partisan- political fight. This was a fight in the open field and the consequences of defeat might be destruction for our people. (...). We did not, of course, place absolute credence in the B.B.C. report. Perhaps the boat had not yet sailed and the British Government only wanted to alert the UNO observers? (...). [Then], late at night, we communicated with the Israel Department of Security and gave them detailed information about the boat and its cargo of munitions. Now – we said to the representatives of the Security Ministry – it is for you to decide whether to permit the boat to come, or divert her. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 215-216) (IMG)

Not a shred of reason exists to believe that the BBC ever seriously opposed the Irgun. Begin's track record was full of MI6 connections. In the 1930s, Menachem Begin emerged as a member of the Betar movement, headquartered in MI6-backed Fascist Italy. Arrested by the Soviet NKVD on charges of being an MI6 agent, Begin was released only during Soviet negotiations with the British Empire against Nazi Germany with the onset of the Great Patriotic War. Then, Begin emerged as a corporal cadet officer of the MI6-run Anders Army, the Polish military force created by the MI6 agent Beria (see C13S4) and loyal to the London-based Polish government-in-exile. When the Anders Army was deployed into British-colonized Palestine, Menachem was allowed to ostensibly 'leave' the Anders Army to form the Irgun. In a speech to the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, Polish President Andrzej Duda said:

I am particularly pleased to be able to meet you in this very centre, named after Menachem Begin, born in Brest on the Bug River as Mieczyslaw Biegun; then in the rank of officer cadet of the Polish Army he came to Israel in 1943 as one of Polish army soldiers under command of general Wladyslaw Anders. And it was here, on this soil at his own request he was dismissed from the service in order to be able to join the struggle for a Jewish state of Israel, whose member of Knesset he was for next ten terms in office, from 1949, the state that he ruled then for six years as prime minister. (Poles and Jews stood shoulder to shoulder in defence of the Republic of

Poland, President.PL January 18, 2017) (IMG)

Anyways, The Ministry of Security, of which David Ben-Gurion was the Minister, conveyed the message to the Irgun terrorists that they shall proceed smoothly with the arrival of the war materiel for arming the Irgun fascists:

The decision of the Government – or the Security Ministry – was that the arms-ship of the Irgun must be brought in, and as quickly as possible. The decision was conveyed to me by Israel Galili the day after our late-night conversation at Irgun Headquarters. Anxiety gave way to joy. We were all delighted. The burden of responsibility had been taken off our shoulders. The Government, after all, knew the situation and its requirements. There was apparently no choice. Arms were lacking. In particular, there was a shortage of rifles – yes, ordinary rifles, the basic weapons in the Eretz Israel battles – and there was a shortage of British .303 ammunition, for lack of which a large part of the Haganah arms was out of action. All these urgent requirements would be brought in the "Altalena." (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 216-217) (IMG)

Mr. Galili writes: "I reported to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister, at every stage, both orally and in writing, fully, on the meetings with the heads of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, including the night meeting, the conversation on the morrow, and subsequent meetings."

"The night meeting" is the discussion at Irgun headquarters, on June 14, 1948, in which we relayed to the representatives of the Provisional Government, Mr. Galili and Mr. Eshkol, all the details of the ship, its means, and its arms. That night, four days before the Altalena approached the shores of Eretz Israel, we announced that the arrival of the ship depended on the decision of the government. The next morning, at ten o'clock, Mr. Galili, the authorized representative of the Defence Minister, relayed to me the following announcement:

"We have decided that the Altalena is to come, and with all possible speed." Thus was it confirmed for the first time that the Irgun, which had been accused for an entire generation of bringing the Altalena, in order to seize control of the government, had prepared its rebellion with the knowledge, consent, and even the command, of the Provisional Government....

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 22-24) (IMG)

Mr. Ben Gurion ... was then Prime Minister and Defence Minister.. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

As for the UNO prohibitions [of arms shipments during truce], we would manage somehow. After all, the Government knew. In the circumstances this was no question of morals. Nobody was helping our attacked people; the situation was one of life and death; and we thanked God that the Government understood the situation, weighed what had to be weighed and disregarded what in the circumstances it was forbidden to take into account. At once a code message went out to the "Altalena" where, as we later learnt, it aroused even greater joy. Instead of "Keep Away" it was now "Full steam ahead." (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 217) (IMG)

That Eshkol relayed the message that the Altalena ship must be brought in leaves no doubt that the Ben-Gurion faction, if not Ben-Gurion himself, definitely approved of bringing the war materiel ship, for Eshkol, the Kautskyite Mapai terrorist, was the well-known agent, protege, and successor of David Ben-Gurion. It was Eshkol who continued Ben-Gurion's hostility to the Mapam at home and the Abdel-Nasser faction abroad. True, Eshkol was a weak personality whom the Mapam had an easier time pressuring. However, in this context, Eshkol truly represented the Defense Minister, Security Minister, and Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. As a matter of fact, the Irgun high command and the Security Ministry had conferences in which the distribution of the arms and their allocations were decided with the Irgun:

I must therefore repeat: the Provisional Government knew about the arms ship sailing towards our shores.. And it was the Government that decided to bring the "Altalena" in during the truce period. Otherwise she would not have come.

After the Government had ordered the boat to be landed without delay, a conference began between the Security Ministry and our Staff concerning the unloading of the arms and their distribution. The Irgun Zvai Leumi was then an open military force recognised by the official institutions. Before the declaration of the State, the Greater Council of the Zionist Organisation had confirmed the agreement for military co-operation between us and the Haganah. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 217-219) (IMG)

We [the Irgun and the Ben-Gurion faction of the government] decided jointly on the point on the coast at which the boat should be brought in. This involved a change in the instruction we had given the captain in April. The "Altalena" as she waited for her men, her arms and her instructions, had been plying for some months between European ports and the north coast of Africa. She had been acquired by the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and the American League for a Free Palestine, and we had intended bringing her in while the British forces were still ruling – with men or arms or both.

At that time we had decided that she should anchor off Tel Aviv, because by then (the end of 1947) the British forces had left the Tel Aviv-Petah Tikvah area as the first instalment of evacuation. The precise spot we

had fixed for landing was Frishman Street. This detail too must be remembered well if the smokescreen of subsequent distortion is to be dissipated.

A Ministry of Security expert proposed that the boat should not come in at Tel Aviv but at Givat Olga or Kfar Vitkin near Nathanya, and so avoid the attention of U.N.O. observers. Our experts agreed; to them it made no difference at what point on the coast the boat arrived. The essential thing was the unloading of the arms. We, who suspected nothing because we plotted nothing, never imagined there were other motives than those affecting the unloading. So that day a further message went out to the "Altalena": to alter course and proceed to Kfar Vitkin.

The discussion then proceeded on the distribution of the arms. We proposed that one-fifth of the arms should be sent to Jerusalem to the Irgun Zvai Leumi units there, while the rest should be distributed throughout the unified army, among battalions consisting of Irgun men as well as among other battalions. Our proposal was just and justified. There were most serious reasons for it.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 219-220) (IMG)

Yisrael Galili transmitted to the Irgun terror chief Menachem Begin, the Ben-Gurion regime's approval of the transfer of the arms to the Jerusalem front:

Israel Galili, previously Commander of the Haganah, and at that time Deputy to the Minister of Security, informed me on the telephone that the Ministry had agreed to our proposal about Jerusalem. Twenty per cent of the arms from the "Altalena" were to be allotted to that front. We were overjoyed.. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 231) (IMG)

The arms were to go to a military force that would mark the merger of the Irgun with the Haganah. As is well-known, the predecessor of the IDF was the Haganah. The Haganah was the military organization whose general staff oversaw not just the Haganah itself but also the militaries affiliated with the non-Mapai parties – the Palmach, the Lehi, and the Irgun. The Haganah staff were the staff of the Israeli armed forces in general. The Haganah was to be the unified Israeli Army and did emerge such. Menachem Begin admitted that the arms and the Irgun terrorists on board were to join the unified Israeli Army and to fight for it most loyally:

And what would have happened if ... we had unloaded all the arms and all the ammunition from the boat?

The evilly-disposed whispered that we intended then to convey the arms to our underground armouries. But the truth is that by that time we had no more secret armouries. We had given the army all our arms and equipment, and they had full knowledge of where all our concentration points had been. (...) No less enlightening is the fact that in all our conversations we emphasised that the full supervision of the arms, after they were unloaded, would be handed over to the Army. All this was apparently part of the "secret preparations" for a "revolt against the Government!" Had we unloaded all the arms from the "Altalena" all of them would have gone into the hands of the unified army whose establishment we had called for from the moment the State was set up. Twenty per cent of the arms would have been despatched with the Government's consent, to Jerusalem—to Jerusalem as such and not to any particular force there—and the Old City might still, in spite of Shaltiel's "dilatatoriness" have been regained from the enemy.

(...) And not only her arms. "Altalena" brought over a battalion fighters. These young people were overwhelmed with joy when they reached the shores of their Homeland. I saw many of them kneeling and kissing the salty, damp sand on the shore. In my ears I still hear the echo of their joyful cries as their boats ran on to the beach.

How their joy was silenced, how they were welcomed is known. Nevertheless they came, and they entered the Army. And in the Army they served faithfully and fought courageously. The boys of the "Altalena" served on many fronts, participated in many victories, from Tarshiha to Eylat. Many of them distinguished themselves by their outstanding gallantry. Not a few fell in battle. Subjected to the most terrible and most trying of tribulations, they yet knew how to pass the supreme test of love for their country.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 234-235. Bold added.) (IMG)

In his diaries, Ben-Gurion admitted that he knew that the Altalena ship was to arrive in Israel, that he knew that the Altalena ship contained plenty of arms and units for Israel, that he believed that the Altalena should be welcomed rather than be sent back, and that it should be disembarked in a secret shore rather than a zone so highly populated as Tel Aviv. In the June 16, 1948 entry of the War Diaries, Ben-Gurion wrote:

Yisrael Galili and Skolnik [i.e. Levi Eshkol] met yesterday with Begin. Tomorrow or the next day their ship is due to arrive: 4,500 tons, bringing 800-900 men, 5,000 rifles, 250 Bren guns, 5 million bullets, 5 bazookas, 10 Bren carriers. Ze'evstein [the director of the Tel Aviv port] assumes that at night it will be possible to unload it all. I believe we should not endanger the Tel Aviv port. They should not be sent back. They should be disembarked at an unknown shore. ('War Diaries, 1947-1949', David Ben-Gurion, 1947-1949, p. 411. Edited by Gershon Rivlin & Elhanan Orren, Translated to Arabic by: Samir Jabbour) (IMG)

In other words, far from opposing the transfer of arms and soldiers to Israel's side of the war, Ben-Gurion supported such efforts. It also disproves the ridiculous narrative, promoted by Ben-Gurion in his 'Memoirs' book (not to be confused with the War Diaries cited here) years later, that he opposed the arrival of Altalena on the grounds that Israel should adhere to international law which called for the arms embargo.

The above quote from the Ben-Gurion diaries also eliminates possible doubts over Yisrael Galili's role in transmitting the message of the Ben-Gurion faction to the Irgun terrorists. General Yisrael Galili was a prominent Mapam member with long-standing ties to the Soviet spy Moshe Sneh. Along with Levi Eshkol, who was a Mapai general from the Ben-Gurion faction, he was tasked with transmitting the orders and messages of the Ben-Gurion faction to the Irgun terror command. In this midst, some may raise suspicion that Yisrael Galili was totally deceiving the Irgun, that Ben-Gurion's faction did not approve of the arrival of arms at all and that Galili was trolling Begin and conspiring to get the ship disembarked on a coast so that the Palmach would be able to hunt down the ship. Such an assertion, however, is unfounded, for Galili, while in the staff of the Haganah, and while having the decimation of Irgun as his agenda, was in one of the negotiation phases being surveilled by the Ben-Gurion faction agent Levi Eshkol; note that he carried out some of his missions of transmitting Ben-Gurion faction messages along with Levi Eshkol, who was able to spy on Yisrael Galili on Ben-Gurion's behalf, so to ensure that Galili gets the job done properly enough. Furthermore, again, the quote from Ben-Gurion shows that Ben-Gurion was aware of the arrival of the ship full of arms and that he approved of its arrival and unloading. Therefore, no, Galili's official approval of the unloading and arrival of Altalena really did represent the government and did not represent the Mapam.

Ben-Gurion definitely approved of the arrival of arms. Having said that, it is true, however, that Galili used his position to skillfully mislead Ben-Gurion's gang and Begin's terror group on some critical matters in the Altalena Affair. Yisrael Galili, it must be noted, was an intelligence agent of the Mapam faction at the high ranks of the Israeli military apparatus. Naturally, Ben-Gurion had for long been viciously hostile to him and had spared no chance to demote him. Nonetheless, thanks to the lobbying power of the Mapam in the Israeli government, Ben-Gurion was not able to totally dismiss him:

Galili – Mapam's senior security man – was the head of the Haganah's national headquarters from mid- 1947 until he was fired by Ben-Gurion, creating a serious crisis, shortly before the declaration of independence. In order to resolve the "Galili Crisis," Ben-Gurion agreed to return Galili to his senior position in the defense establishment, but not to his previous position. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

As such, Galili gained the lobbying power to influence some of the major tactical decisions in warfare in Israel. Yigal Yadin, the IDF's Acting Chief of Staff, had been promoted by Ben-Gurion as a means of reducing the influence of the Mapam generals, but the influence of the Mapam agents in the Israeli military had been enough to encircle and coopt Yadin into 'getting into line' and cooperating with the Mapam. As such:

Yigal Yadin, head of the IDF's Operations Division and acting chief of staff, ... was then under the dominant influence of Yisrael Galili.. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

As planned by Ben-Gurion, Altalena was originally intended to disembark in Kfar Vitkin, a zone farther away from the UN observers, but the General Yisrael Galili, through his then-coopted yes-man Yigal Yadin, was able to lobby for the deployment of IDF troops to attack the Altalena and force it to move away from the Kfar Vitkin shores. Shimon Peres, back then Ben-Gurion's third most important henchman in the military, recalled:

Altalena anchored off Kfar Vitkin, a moshav between Tel Aviv and Haifa, and hopefully far from the prying eyes of UN observers, and began off-loading the weapons with the help of hundreds of supporters who had gathered at the site. Galili and Yadin deployed troops to surround the beach and ordered Begin to surrender. Some of the troops with Etzel [i.e. IZL] sympathies crossed the lines and joined the Altalena crew and its enthusiastic sympathizers. The ship, with Begin and other Revisionist leaders now on board, weighed anchor and put out to sea, chased by IDF craft. ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 123) (iMG)

In any case, the Altalena war materiel ship ended up in Tel Aviv:

At midnight, on Tuesday, June 22, the guard noticed at the Palmach headquarters that an unidentified ship was approaching the shore. Nathaniel Hitron, the Palmach training officer, who was the officer on duty, immediately reported to the General Staff in Ramat Gan. Yigal Yadin, head of the IDF's Operations Division and acting chief of staff, who was then under the dominant influence of Yisrael Galili, consulted with him. Galili – Mapam's senior security man – was ... a contractor for special missions in the defense establishment, including everything related to the Irgun and the Lehi. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Ehud Sprinzak, the advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on right-wing violence, the topic about which he was a professor and a scholar, wrote extensively on the Altalena affair. Sprinzak wrote that Begin got the ship as close to the Tel Aviv beach, convinced that Ben-Gurion would not approve of any shooting:

Altalena's last day started with the midnight arrival of the ship at Tel Aviv beach. Irgun supreme commander Menachem Begin and a few of his officers were aboard, as well as the ship's crew, several overseas volunteers,

and about forty Irgun fighters. Convinced that Ben-Gurion would not order the army to attack Altalena ... Begin ordered the former World War II ship to get as close to the beach as possible.. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 25) (IMG)

In this midst, the Palmach fighters went towards the Altalena in order to 'help' the Irgun terrorists. Actually, such 'help' was aimed towards Mapam-Palmach espionage against the Irgun fascists with the objective of eventually demolishing the Altalena and killing its terrorists on board. For the purpose of espionage and maintaining the cover of 'helping' the Irgun, the Palmach did not vigorously oppose the travel of the first boat from the ship:

Altalena's command [decided] to begin unloading the cargo. A boat carrying arms and a dozen armed men was sent to the beach with the additional purpose of starting negotiations with the government. While announcing their intention to unload and asking their supporters in the area for help, Altalena's loudspeakers called upon the soldiers to hold their fire. The announcement was accompanied by a warning that if fired at, Altalena men would respond in kind. The first boat made its way to the beach safely. and the men quickly took combat positions the army. Palmach and Irgun soldiers spoke to one another and even agreed on informal boundaries that would hold as long as there was no firing from the other side. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 28) (IMG)

Menachem Begin himself confirmed that the Palmach fighters that were there to 'help' the Irgun were actually anti- Irgun spies:

On the spot we were helped by a number of Palmach men in a boat. Today I have no doubt that they were sent not so much to help as to spy on us. At the time we accepted their help ... without a shadow of suspicion. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 233) (IMG)

After the first Irgun boat was unloaded:

The situation changed dramatically with the arrival of the second boat, however. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 28) (IMG)

According to Milstein:

At 1:15 AM, "Altalena" sent a boat to shore. Hitron, who saw himself as the last protector of Israeli democracy, warned the ship's commanders to return the boat. When left unanswered, the Palmach fired several shots. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

In this scenario:

Palmach commanders ordered the second boat to return to the ship. When the Irgun sailors refused, gunfire broke out for the first time and both sides suffered casualties. Fire was also directed at the ship. Short cease-fires were negotiated by the local commanders to evacuate the wounded. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 28) (IMG)

These Palmach strikes at the Irgun terrorists in Tel Aviv too were at the behest of Galili:

Galili advised to respond very firmly – to the point of opening fire. At 12:30 AM, Yadin ordered to Hitron on the phone: "In case of an attempt to break out of the ship, open fire. In case of people going ashore, warn not to go ashore. If they continue to descend, open fire on them." Yadin will inform Hitron that the command for the operation against Altalena has been assigned to the Kiryati Brigade, and that the members of the Palmach headquarters will be subordinate to it. In other words, they ordered Palmach members to open fire, at their discretion, without Yadin himself, without another senior commander directly commanding IDF forces on the line of contact, without Ben-Gurion, and without a senior official representative on his behalf, being present. This is how they determined the nature of the events that day on the shores of Tel Aviv, which reached the brink of civil war, and determined the nature of the political system in Israel from then until now. To give security into the hands of the Palmach training officer is to give permission to detonate all explosives immediately.

After passing the order to the Palmach men, Yadin imposed the command of the "Akhdut" ['Unity'] operation against the "Altalena" on the Kiryat Mishmar Battalion of the Kiryati Brigade. Zvi Orbach, the battalion commander, established his headquarters on the second floor balcony of the Kata Dan Hotel at 101 Hayarkon Street. The battalion lacked operational capability because its men refused to act against Etzel members.

(Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

The clashes with the Irgun were not seen by the public as clashes between the Mapam and the Likudniks, but were rather seen as a conflict between the Provisional Government of Israel headed by Ben-Gurion/Mapai and the Irgun forces. Haganah clashes with the Irgun would have agitated the Jabotinskyite elements of the public into mob action against Ben-Gurion's headquarters, not knowing that Ben-Gurion was an ally of the Jabotinskyites. At that time, recalled Shimon Peres, Ben-Gurion's team in the headquarters compound were bogged down to ensuring that Ben-Gurion's office would not be stormed by the demonstrators. This forced the Ben-Gurion faction to reduce attention to the Altalena Affair and

to pay more attention to saving themselves from potential mob storming. Through one chess move, Galili had sabotaged Ben-Gurion's plan form armaments for the Irgun while also bogging down Ben-Gurion's terror gang into worrying about clashes with demonstrators:

It sailed south toward Tel Aviv and eventually ran aground close to the shore. At army headquarters in Ramat Gan, I spent that night with a rifle in my hand in Ben-Gurion's office, in case the headquarters compound was stormed by demonstrators. ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 123) (IMG)

Bogged down in his own office, Ben-Gurion clearly did not have enough access to information to be able to lead Israel's military in this crisis. Utilizing this opportunity, Galili assured Ben-Gurion that the ship had surrendered after a brief naval battle:

At 2:00 AM, the naval headquarters reported to Ben-Gurion that the ship had surrendered in the middle of the sea, after a naval battle. This was almost the only detail from the events of that day that Ben-Gurion mentioned in his diary. This ... false report reassured Ben-Gurion, leaving Galili more than an hour and a half free to 'cook the stew' – until Ben-Gurion took over the management of the crisis. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion was misled and 'carried away' by the reality of having to deal with potential mob storming. Hence: About twenty years after the tragedy, one of the people closest to Mr. Ben Gurion came to me and told me, on his own initiative, the following words: "We have arrived at the conclusion that in the Altalena matter Ben Gurion was misled." (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 22-23) (IMG)

The person who stated so to Begin was Shimon Peres:

In May 1967, in the midst of discussions on the formation of a national unity government, MK Shimon Peres – then Rafi's secretary and Ben-Gurion's associate – visited Begin's home in Tel Aviv several times.

At one of these meetings, Peres said: "We investigated the Altalena case, and came to the conclusion that they misled Ben-Gurion." (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Menachem Begin further specified that a particular person had misled Ben-Gurion:

Immediately after the Likud 1977 election victory, Begin attended the remembrance ceremony for the 16 comrades who died on board the ill-fated Altalena. [Among the dead was Abraham Stavsky]. In his address to the gathering he stated: "Ben-Gurion was misled [sic; meant 'misled'] concerning the matter of the Altalena. Someone misled him and told him that the ship arrived to help Etzel [i.e. IZL, or Irgun Zvi Leumi] take control of the State. On this information, an order was given to shell the ship." He said that he heard this from a member of the Labour Party who had stated: "We investigated the Altalena incident and came to the conclusion ... [ellipsis original] that Ben-Gurion was misled." (The Politics of Memory: The Israeli Underground's Struggle for Inclusion in the National and Military Commemorialization, Routledge, Udi Lebel, 2012 p. 236) (IMG)

In fact, it was Galili who misled Ben-Gurion by providing minimal intelligence, and where having to provide intelligence, he provided false intelligence to Ben-Gurion and the cabinet ministers from the Ben-Gurion faction:

In the Altalena affair, too, Galili played the role of the false-information provider. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Yitzhak Greenbaum, a member of the General Zionists, Minister of the Interior in the Ben-Gurion government, was already suspicious on June 22, 1948 of Galili's manipulative game. Greenbaum said that a report by Galili to the government was inaccurate, and after hearing the Irgun's version from Haim Landau, he thought "one should always synthesize from two sides, and only then get a little closer to the truth." (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

To project confidence, Ben-Gurion pretended to have known nothing about the Altalena at all, and to have opposed the violation of international law by the Israeli regime! Begin recalled:

In the summer of 1971, the internal debate on dissidence, the "season" and Altalena, broke out, or was renewed. It has, of course, not yet ended. It demonstrated beyond all doubt that there is a contradiction which cannot be bridged between the public statements of Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Galili. (...). Counter to Mr. Galili, Mr. Ben Gurion, who was then Prime Minister and Defence Minister, reasserts that he knew nothing of the Altalena's arrival until June 19, 1948. What happened then during those four fateful days? In whose name did the authorized representative of the Defence Minister make the positive statement following that night meeting? But if he had been empowered by the Prime Minister to relay to me this decision, for the Altalena to come with all possible speed, how can Mr. Ben Gurion claim that he heard of the arms ship only four whole day later? (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 22 -24) (IMG)

The diaries of David Ben-Gurion leave no doubt that he was well aware of the Altalena as early as June 16th. Thus, Ben-Gurion was blatantly lying when he said that he did not know about the ship's arrival until the 19th. Furthermore, note that Menachem Begin had expressed sympathies with Ben-Gurion by reiterating Shimon Peres's claim that Ben-Gurion

was misled in the Altalena Affair. It follows that if having to lay the blame upon either of Ben-Gurion or Galili, Begin would have blamed Galili. Such was Begin's insinuation/implication from the above excerpts from his memoirs. Menachem Begin also wrote:

The Palmach commander then offered to "cease fire" provided we unloaded no more arms. To this we agreed. The fire ceased and the unloading ceased. We informed the commander that we had a number of wounded on board. Our small boat had been damaged and could not be used to land them. We asked for a boat to take them off, as there was now no doctor on board and many of them were in a very serious condition.

The Palmach officer promised to send a boat immediately from Tel Aviv port. We waited. One hour, two hours. But no boat came. The condition of the wounded grew worse.

Suddenly ... something whistled over our heads. Munroe Fine exclaimed: "That's a shell! They'll set the ship on fire!" We called to the Palmach commander, reminding him that he had promised a complete cessation of fire. He did not reply. A second shell, a third, a fourth. They had bracketed the ship and were creeping up to their target. Munroe was in despair. I proposed that he and his American colleagues who were engaged as navigators and not as soldiers, should leave the ship and that the rest of us should remain. He would not hear of it. He pointed out that the ship would inevitably blow up if the shelling continued, in view of her cargo of explosives and that the only way to save her was to hoist a white flag.

This he did. But that symbol of surrender amongst civilized combatants did not help. The shells kept on coming. We called again to the Palmach commander. "You undertook to stop firing. Why are you shelling us?" His answer came after a pause. His actual words deserve to go on record:

"There is a general 'cease fire' but the order has not yet reached all the units of the Army."

A few minutes later a shell penetrated the belly of the ship. Fire broke out and smoke poured forth.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 239-240) (IMG)

The sentence "There is a general 'cease fire' but the order has not yet reached all the units of the Army" deserves attention, for it could imply that the Palmach commander – either Yitzhak Rabin or Yigal Allon – had refused to obey the ceasefire directive sent from above. Anyways, shortly after the first series of clashes with the Irgun terrorists, the Palmach forces commanded by the Mapam-affiliated commanders, Yigal Allon and his protegee Yitzhak Rabin, launched a military operation sinking the Altalena ship, destroying the plentiful war materiel – the thousands of units of arms – that existed in it, and killing Irgun terrorists, including the infamous Irgun terrorist leader Abraham Stavsky, even when the Irgun terrorists wanted to stop the fighting with the Palmach:

Palmach's command post was manned by auxiliary and support units with only a few fit combatants.

One of these was Palmach operations chief, Colonel Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin came to Tel Aviv for a meeting and made an early detour to meet his girlfriend, Lea, who was serving in the Palmach communications center. Instantly the senior officer in the building, Rabin understood the potential danger of Irgun men storming the Palmach headquarters. Rabin reacted quickly, throwing hand grenades at Irgun men who approached the building and ordering several Palmach off-duty combat units to report immediately to the scene. Rabin's superior, Palmach commander Yigal Alon, soon took over. Replacing the incompetent Kiriyati commander, Alon ordered full mobilization. The situation was getting out of hand and casualties were mounting. The men aboard Altalena, who showed no intention of surrendering, were not allowed to carry their wounded to the beach for fear they would bring in more guns and ammunition.

The ensuing explosion on Altalena, which forced its people to evacuate the ship, was not the only ordeal.

Some Palmach and army units continued to shoot at the swimming survivors despite a number of white flags flown on the ship's deck to indicate surrender. Not all the fire was meant to kill, but there were egregious exceptions.

(Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 28-29) (IMG)

In this midst, the Palmach freedom-fighters' bombing of Altalena placed David Ben-Gurion and his Kautskyite gang at a difficult position. Ben-Gurion no doubt covertly and secretly sympathized with the Irgun terrorists. The bombing of Altalena was done by the Palmach, the military force of the Soviet spy front Mapam, the party which held many ministers in the Provisional Government of Israel. At a time in which Israel had been defeated in its battles with the Arabs in the first phase of the 1948 War, the Ben-Gurion faction held much reduced leverage whereas the Arab-friendly Mapam/Palmach had gained greater leverage in the Israeli regime thanks to Arab successes in the first phase of the War. Ben-Gurion could not so vigorously oppose the Mapam. Furthermore, the shipment of arms to Israel and the violation of international embargo was to be a top secret, not something which Ben-Gurion could do openly. Although Ben-Gurion and the Israeli regime leaders have repeatedly violated internal law rather blatantly, certainly international law did reinforce the Mapam lobby in Israel. Furthermore, the unloading of the arms was being done in Tel Aviv and the bombing of:

Altalena [was] in front of thousands of Tel Avivans.. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 28)

(IMG)

Ben-Gurion could condemn Arabs very easily but he could not condemn Israeli generals and Israeli fighters for observing international law and destroying an arms shipment that violated the international arms embargo. For these reasons, Ben-Gurion had no choice but to pretend to be fully in line with the Palmach freedom-fighters that destroyed the Irgun terror ship. Moshe Dayan wrote in his memoirs:

When the first U.N. cease-fire went into effect on June 11, 1948, Israel and the Arab states agreed not to introduce new arms into their territories. Both sides, of course, violated this agreement, but covertly. However, the Irgun resolved to bring in an arms shipment openly on the Altalena. This act could only be viewed as an irresponsible and wanton defiance of government authority, and it had to be vigorously and speedily dealt with. (The Story of My Life, Moshe Dayan, 1976, p. 95) (IMG)

Moshe Dayan violated international law many times throughout his life. He therefore could not have cared about international law banning arms shipments, and he was correct to say that the Arabs too violated the international law on this matter, which was why Czechoslovak and Soviet arms shipments to the Arabs were done in secret. Nonetheless, reading in between the lines of the above statements by Moshe, one can see a reason behind Dayan's and Ben-Gurion's feeling of compulsion to publicly voice 'support' for the Palmach freedom-fighters' operation against Altalena: 'the Irgun resolved to bring in an arms shipment **openly** on the Altalena'. The Irgun had no intention of bringing the arms shipment openly but the scheduling difficulties, created by General Yisrael Galili, caused the secret to be revealed, and the Palmach used this opportunity.

No, Ben-Gurion did not mind that there would be a moral backlash against Israel for the violation of international law. Throughout its existence, the Ben-Gurion faction got 'the job' done without regard for international law. The diplomatic isolation of Israel mattered so little for the Ben-Gurion faction because the Ben-Gurion faction was fighting for its self-entrenchment and fuller establishment in Israel against the Arab armies. Surely, the diplomatic isolation of Israel was going to force the American armament of Israel to be even more secretive and more covert. Covert/secretive operations are generally far costlier. However, the strategic and tactical benefits to be gained through such massive arms supply to Israel far outweighed any considerations of such petty costs as the increased cost of keeping the armament of Israel secret, and such even pettier issues as 'diplomatic isolation'. Diplomatic isolation and the cost of armaments were to be won through battles. An Israeli military conquest of Arab territory would have delivered Israel's regime so much leverage as to render it a voice so loud in the international matters that it could no longer be ignored and hence no longer feasible to diplomatically isolate. An Israeli military conquest of Arab territory would have brought so much economic benefit as to outweigh the costs of increasing the secretiveness of the secret arms sales to Israel. Hence, the real matter for the Ben-Gurion faction was neither the question of the diplomatic isolation nor the increased cost of the armament of Israel. Rather, the real issue at stake, which led Ben-Gurion to publicly endorse the Palmach's heroic operation against Altalena, was that such a heroic operation was a *fait accompli*. After the operation was launched and the secrets were revealed, Ben-Gurion had no better choice than to pretend to be in line with international law and hence to support the crackdown on the Israeli terrorist materiel ship. In a similar spirit as with Moshe Dayan's words, Begin wrote:

This fact must be re-emphasized, for it is from this point onwards in this sad history that the black smokescreen has been thrown up. The Provisional Government later published sanctimonious statements that while the Irgun had tried to disregard the UNO truce orders, the Government, in observance of international law, was compelled to destroy the arms brought to Eretz Israel in contravention of the truce. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 217-219) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion could not publicly reveal the real force behind the operation against Altalena, which was the Mapam/Palmach:

To avoid bloody civil war at all costs – this principle, tempered in the sufferings of the "season," we observed years later in the test of blood and fire of the "Altalena."

It is no longer a secret that this famous arms-ship served as the instrument of a sinister plot. When Mr.

Ben Gurion, on the rostrum of the first Israel parliament, modestly boasted "I have some part in that ship lying not far away from here," he was interrupted by a question from a member of Mapai: "But who was it who urged you to do it?"

Mr. Ben Gurion was silent. His silence was perhaps even more eloquent than any words.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 214) (IMG)

For the bombing of Altalena however, it was not the Palmach that was blamed. Rather, the Irgun was blamed and accused by the Mapam of seeking to overthrow the State of Israel through a military coup:

Official propaganda, hiding behind the smokescreen, pretended that the Irgun had brought over the "Altalena" in order to prepare an armed revolt against the Government of Israel. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p.

216) (IMG)

The "Altalena" affair took place about a month after the declaration of independence, during the first truce, and was intended to empty the agreement of its contents, dismantle Etzel [i.e. IZL, or Irgun] units in the IDF, remove Etzel commanders from command positions, and further damage the reputation of Begin and his comrades. According to the provocation, the Irgun planned to carry out a "putsch" against the Ben-Gurion government. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Palmach General Yigal Allon, the master of cover-up operations, propagated a highly sensationalized myth that the Irgun was taking over the Tel Aviv and street clashes would have soon occurred, as a part of a supposed Irgun 'coup plot':

Allon ... described an entirely different situation, one where the Irgun fighters had taken control of key points in and around Tel Aviv, stirred up the local people and captured positions along the shore. He also witnessed exchanges of fire between IDF soldiers and Irgun cells from the beach and from the ship.

"It quickly became clear to me that without reinforcements for the IDF in Tel Aviv, we would not be able to quell the rebellion," Allon wrote, adding that he had two alternatives: fire on the ship "and cause heavy losses it its people," or let them come ashore with their arms, "something that would have led to bitter street battles."

(‘The Man Who Jumped Off the Altalena, the Ship That Nearly Caused an Israeli Civil War’, Ha’aretz, Ofer Aderet, June 17, 2018) (IMG)

When the news was leaked to the press that Ben-Gurion was misled in the Altalena Affair, Allon was among the first to react quickly and to assert that the strike on the ship carrying arms for Israel was totally at the behest of Ben-Gurion, and that no, Ben-Gurion was not misled in the matter. Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin had divided their tasks. Allon would be the tactful Israeli official who would always appear to be in line with the will of the Israeli regime apparatus, all the while covertly and behind-the-scenes operating against the Israeli regime. Under the radar, he operated. Diplomatic, reserved, meticulously measured, mysterious in aura, he carefully hid his intents and feelings. Unsurprisingly, Allon emerged as the most prominent anti-regime dissident within the regime. The 2nd most prominent anti-regime dissident inside the regime was designated to support the 1st most prominent anti-regime dissident by blurting out the truth and speaking out loud. Allon's closest protege, Yitzhak Rabin, did go along with the Israeli regime propaganda in many cases, but relative to Allon, he was far less tactful and far less diplomatic – deliberately so. He had a reputation for it. It is no surprise that the Israeli right-wing historiographers, Uri Milstein most infamous among them, always attack Rabin more than Allon even though Allon was always the more important person for them to target insofar as the 'War of Independence' is concerned. They do not have many Yigal Allon quotes to attack Allon for. Later on, by the mid-1960s, Yitzhak Rabin emerged as the 1st most prominent dissident insider of the regime, and Allon the 2nd.

In some ways, the Mapam/Palmach lobby in the Israeli regime was correct to say that an Irgun power group was in the making, because the Irgun sought to transition Israel from a Kautskyite 'social democracy' of the settler-colonial type to a blatantly Mussolinite, Pinochet-style, theocratic, authoritarian, neoliberal, anti-kibbutznik, overtly misogynistic, settler-colonial fascist regime under which the progressive elements in the Israeli regime's armed forces would be purged, pretty much all the Arab citizens would be in slave camps or extermination camps, and the progressive or democratic elements that existed in the Israeli state apparatus would be cleansed away as much as possible by the Irgun fascists. Thus, by maximizing its weapons arsenal, the Irgun was going to gain enough lobbying power to render Israel into such a totalitarian fascist regime; it did seek to overthrow the democratic and progressive elements in the government of Israel. Nonetheless, it should be obvious for any observer that the narrative of full-scale 'military coup' at that specific phase was a sensationalist distortion and exaggeration, far from the full truth – the dominant tendency in the government of Israel was the Ben-Gurion faction, the ally of the Irgun. The Irgun had no reason to overthrow the Ben-Gurion faction, but rather was arming itself and the Haganah to come to the aid of the Ben-Gurion faction in purging the Mapam/Palmach elements – the agents of the Israeli proletariat and the kibbutzim, reinforced in leverage by the anti-imperialist Arab armies armed by the USSR – and rendering Israel into the Mussolinite state envisioned by the Irgun.



The Altalena Ship, the masterpiece of the Mapam and the Palmach.

Image source: 'Forward' magazine.

That sacred-most of the Palmach artillery produced the glorious moment of the Epic of Altalena, and will be remembered in history as a counter-example to the view that the Israeli population was hopelessly reactionary, quasi-monolithically fascist, devoid of class contradictions and united behind the aggressive warmonger agenda of the Anglo-American colonizers. The Altalena Epic, a key moment in the history of Israelite revolutionary class warfare against Israeli fascism, marked a Cold War confrontation between the Soviet-backed Mapam generals and the CIA-MI6 terrorists, Irgun. The Altalena masterpiece was not a fratricidal war between the Israelis, but a case of proletarian and kibbutznik class warfare aimed at rolling back the influence of the agents of Anglo-American finance capital over the Israeli state apparatus, increasing the leverage power of the Mapamite agents of the Israeli proletariat and the kibbutzniks over Israel's means of violence – the armed forces – and to utilize this leverage over the armed forces to transition Israel into a workers' state allied to the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and the progressive Arab forces, against the CIA-MI6 fascist agents in the region.

The arrival of arms to Israel would have strengthened the Mapai-dominated Israeli armed forces, thus further strengthening the Ben-Gurion faction's leverage in their power struggle against the Mapamite generals. Thanks to the Altalena Epic, the pace at which the leverage of the Ben-Gurion faction was to increase, slowed down, and Ben-Gurion did not succeed in purging as many Mapam-affiliated generals as he desired. Nonetheless, arms to Israel came from other sources, such as from Yugoslavia, the United States, and the Slansky faction in Czechoslovakia. Such a large flow of arms strengthened the leverage of the Ben-Gurion faction, reducing costs for it, and allowing it to free up some funds away from the war effort and onto the secret service conflict against the Mapam faction. Hence, Ben-Gurion did succeed in provoking a crisis that led to the demotion of Galili. With the loss of Galili from his key position in the high command, the mantle for leading the Mapamite generals passed onto the brilliant Yigal Allon. Although Allon was an excellent Mapamite general and a struggler against the Ben-Gurion faction, the replacement of Yisrael Galili with Yigal Allon was a setback for the Mapam's intelligence network including for Allon himself, because Galili, a well-connected and highly experienced fighter for the cause of the Mapam, was losing his key position in the Israeli high command. The demotion of Yigal Allon's key ally and comrade, Yisrael Galili, marked a demotion of Yigal Allon as well. Ben-Gurion was one step closer to installing more MI6 generals in the high ranks of the Israeli armed forces. Shimon Peres – the anti-Mapam commander who belonged to the faction of David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, and Ariel Sharon – recalled:

Less than a week [after the Altalena bombing] Ben-Gurion was again facing down what he angrily termed "a political mutiny in the army".. He was determined to bring more ex-British Army/ Jewish Brigade officers

into key posts. And he was determined too to reduce the influence of Mapam (since January, an amalgam of the Hashomer Hatzair and Ahdut HaAvoda parties) in the army, which was exercised primarily through the Palmach commanders, most of them Ahdut HaAvoda adherents. The two aims dovetailed and succeeded in raising the ire of Yigael Yadin, the (non-political) chief of operations (Chief of Staff Yaakov Dori was ill for most of the war), and of the Mapam-affiliated generals, who now tendered their collective resignation. Ben-Gurion accused Yadin of mutiny. Yadin said he was prepared to serve as a simple soldier but not to take responsibility for decisions that he found unjustifiable. At a cabinet meeting, Ben-Gurion threatened to resign. And he again demanded Galili's dismissal as the sine qua non for any new arrangement.

A five-man ministerial committee was set up to investigate the charges and countercharges. Yadin testified before it, excoriating Ben-Gurion's incessant interference in operational matters. He restated his profound disagreements with the prime minister and defense minister over the battle for Jerusalem. Galili testified too, also criticizing Ben-Gurion's performance of his duties as defense minister. The ministers recommended the creation of a formal war cabinet. They recommended too that Galili be restored to his old role as head of the national command – effectively interposing him between Defense Minister Ben-Gurion and the general staff. Ben-Gurion promptly resigned, just days before the truce was due to end. With the prime minister demonstratively at home, and the generals no longer at their posts either, the entire political and military establishment went into a paroxysm of negotiations to find some saving formula. (...). Yadin went around to Ben-Gurion's home, braved Paula, and put before the Old Man a compromise scheme designed to get on with the war (once the truce ended) without making an immediate string of controversial appointments. Yigal Allon, the Palmachnik accepted by all, was given command of the key Jerusalem front.

(‘Ben-Gurion : A Political Life’, Shimon Peres, 2011, pp. 124-125) (IMG)

As a part of the compromise, Galili lost his job:

Galili altruistically offered his own head. (‘Ben-Gurion : A Political Life’, Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 125) (IMG)

The affair, to which historians refer as the Generals’ Revolt, is demonstrative of the relative weakness of the position of David Ben-Gurion’s faction. No doubt the Ben-Gurion faction dominated the majority stake in the Israeli armed forces, but it was not so decisively dominant over it. It should therefore come as no surprise that the Mapam generals were able to launch that Altalena bombing operation, blame it on Irgun, and get Ben-Gurion to take responsibility for it.

Naturally, the Ben-Gurion faction’s attempt to weaken the Palmach and Mapamite influence over the military while strengthening the MI6-trained officers angered people such as Rabin:

I could not help objecting to [Ben-Gurion’s] attitude toward the Palmach. Between 1942 and 1947 he showed little regard for the idea of fostering an independent Jewish force and placed an exaggerated stress on enlistment in the British army. Then, upon assuming the defense portfolio, he gave preference to British army veterans..

(The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, p. 19) (IMG)

Operation DANI was the operation in which General Allon had gotten to deploy his forces to Latrun-Jerusalem front. The Operation DANI was midway through, when the Egyptian Arab Army began a large-scale assault, penetrating the territory to the south of Israel and making a deep headway northwards. With the Israeli regime rolled back on the military front, the leverage of the Ben-Gurion faction once again reduced, whereas the Mapamite elements at the high command of the IDF gained greater leverage. Whereas David Ben-Gurion called for transferring the troops under the command of Yigal Allon to the south for combatting the Egyptian forces, Yigal Allon and his team in the Palmach brought up excuses to disobey. The Mapam faction headed by Yigal Allon argued that the Israeli forces should remain in the Latrun-Jerusalem front at the expense of the south. Thanks to the Egyptian advances in the south and the consequent increase in the leverage of Mapam faction in the IDF, the Mapamite elements in the IDF forced Ben-Gurion to back down. Ben-Gurion accepted the notion that Allon’s forces should not be redeployed to the south, but compensated for this retreat by getting other Israeli troops to be deployed to the south. David Tal, an Israeli military research fellow for the NATO command, wrote:

The second point to reckon with was the intensive Egyptian offensive, which was at its height when the first stage of Operation Dani ended.

By 8 July, the Egyptians had launched an attack on the Israeli forces. The whole matter is discussed elsewhere, but it should be recalled here that despite their taking the first initiative, the Egyptians’ intention was defensive, as they intended only to strengthen the positions they were holding and to prevent a Jewish intrusion along their lines. The Jews were unaware of the Egyptians’ intentions, and anyway, the 5th Brigade was put under heavy pressure, which could further affect their chances of regaining the Negev. Another disturbing development was the reports that an Egyptian company and heavy artillery force—the artillery unit was the one that took part in the occupation of Yad Mordechai – had joined the Egyptian and Jordanian forces positioned in ‘Artuf. This joint force constituted a formidable company that, along with the Jordanian soldiers from the 12th company in Hebron, could threaten the Israeli Burma Road, and could even try to join the Jordanian

forces to the north of the Jerusalem-Bab al-Wad road, which were tightening the siege on Jerusalem.

Thus, fearing, on the one hand, that the IDF's ability to act was restricted by limits on time, and worried, on the other hand, about the prospect of an Egyptian offensive, Ben-Gurion and his aides pondered whether to let the Operation Dani forces to proceed with the original plan, adjusted to meet the new time limit, or to send them to the south, where the 5th Brigade was asking for help.

Yadin put forward three options. The first was adhering to the original plan and going to Ramallah and Jerusalem. The other two options signified a departure from the Operation Dani logic, shifting the focus to what seemed to be the grave situation in the south. The first option would involve

sending forces to Bayt Jibrin, and from there breaking through the eastern arm of the Egyptian force to the south. The advantage of this move was that it would prevent an Egyptian advance northward, thus removing the danger of the Egyptian forces joining the Legion forces along the Bab al-Wad-Qastal line.

At the same time, the Israeli progress through Bayt Jibrin would open a new path to the besieged Negev while inserting a wedge between the Egyptian forces in the Hebron-Bethlehem area and the main Egyptian body in the Negev. The other alternative was sending reinforcements to the major combat area which revolved around Negba and the Iraq Suwaydan junction.

The first option was the most disturbing. Going directly to Ramallah meant bypassing Latrun and accomplishing the operational logic of the Operation Dani plan. However, it also meant disregarding the time factor. [The Mapam-coopted General] Yadin was probably ready to ignore the time factor, assuming that even if the truce did come into effect, it would be possible to proceed with their plans in the next cycle of fighting that would surely come. However, Ben-Gurion was much more sensitive to the time factor, and he made his decision on the basis of the assumptions that only a few days of fighting remained, and it was not at all certain that it would be possible to resume the war. (...) Fearing the Legion's counterattack, but more significantly, being aware of the short time remaining, Ben-Gurion shifted the original operational focus of the second stage of Operation Dani from Ramallah to Latrun. He decided that the IDF would occupy Latrun and 'Imwas; while in Jerusalem an effort would be made to conquer the Old City and al-Shaykh Jarrah, with the latter to be razed to the ground. In the south, the Israeli forces would strike at the Egyptian forces at the Iraq Suwaydan junction to secure a free passage between the southern Negev and the north, and to remove any possible Egyptian claim to the Negev. **To make that possible, at least two armored battalions would need to be sent to the south, while some of the remaining forces would be directed against the Egyptian and the Jordanian forces around Jerusalem. If this plan could be carried out successfully, it would be considered as 'a significant improvement in our military situation, and a great political victory', although in Ben-Gurion's eyes it would be less than a total victory.** A total victory would be achieved, so he believed, only if, in addition, Nablus was occupied, and a powerful aerial bombardment was carried out against Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus and Beirut. In the Prime Minister's view, it was important to end the war in a situation where the other side had completely lost its will to fight— and this would be achieved only if the enemy were dealt a crippling blow, with victory to be achieved by means of annihilation. For Ben-Gurion, then, a decisive victory and the destruction of the enemy's armed forces were not only a means to terminate the Arab presence in Israel, but also an essential instrument to avert the renewal of war at a later stage. This was what Ben-Gurion meant when he made reference to 'total victory'.

Yigal Alon, the commander of Operation Dani, was against the transfer of a significant part of his forces to the south. He argued that his men were tired, and that while they continued to fight in their current positions, they would be unable to function in a new place. The more convincing argument, however, was the one heard from the commander of the armored brigade, who said that his tanks were broken down, and that fixing them would take at least a week. The alternative was to send the 11th Brigade, but in that case, the struggle to open the road to Jerusalem would be significantly impaired. A decision had to be postponed until the situation in the south became clearer. By 13 July the Egyptian attack had reached its peak, and the 5th Brigade met the attack successfully. **With that Ben-Gurion met Yadin and the General Staff on the following day to discuss the next steps. Most of the IDF generals thought that priority should be given to the fighting along the Latrun-Jerusalem Front.** Yigal Alon reiterated his conviction that Operation Dani should continue according to the original plan, even at the expense of the Southern Front. **Another general, Fritz Eshet, agreed with him, suggesting that the forces in the south be assisted by reinforcing their fire-power with combat planes and artillery. Zvi Ayalon, the Chief of Staff's deputy, concurred. Moshe Sadok disagreed and recommended giving high priority to the Southern Front, even at Jerusalem's expense.** Ben-Gurion accepted the majority opinion, **claiming that although reinforcements must be sent to the south, it must not be at the expense of the fighting on the central front. He claimed that 'the occupation of Latrun and the liberation of Jerusalem should not be compromised', but at the same time, the Egyptians should not be allowed to cut off the Negev.** Additional forces should be sent to the south, and his solution was to not send in forces that had participated in

Operation Dani, but (as mentioned in Chapter 8) to send in troops from other units. **The only exception was Dayan's 89th Raiders Battalion, which belonged to the 8th Brigade. It had taken part in Operation Dani but was now inoperative.**

(War in Palestine 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy, David Tal, 2004, pp. 314-317. Bold added.) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion was not wrong to say that the southern front should be reinforced. As much as some IDF generals like to pretend otherwise, the truth is that the 'strategic depth' which the conquest of the Jerusalem front has given to Israel has never been as important as securing the 'Southern Front' against the mighty army of Egypt. In the Jerusalem front, the 'central front', the Israeli armed forces had to face primarily the Hashemite Jordanian forces, which were under the influence of the MI6 and thus could not be as serious a threat to the Ben-Gurion regime as the Wafdist Egyptian military, which was under the influence of the Czechoslovak People's Democracy. By implying that a lesser threat, the MI6-run Jordanian army, was a priority over the greater threat, the Egyptian army, Yigal Allon and the many Mapam-affiliated generals in the IDF were stabbing Israel's anti-Arab war in the back. Naturally, Ben-Gurion was utterly outraged yet again at the treasonous activity of the Yigal Allon faction. Yigal Allon and his team had been a factor in slowing down Operation DANI. By the time the Egyptians began striking from the south, Allon was bringing up excuses to not end Operation DANI so that the Israeli troops would not need to go southwards for fighting the Egyptian Arab forces.

By late 1948, Israel's regime was able to rearm thanks to the weapons sales of the Anglo-American imperialists and their agents. This episode spelled the defeat for the Arab armed forces, the Palmach and the Mapam faction for the 1948 War. In October 1948, Ben-Gurion issued the orders to gradually dismantle the Palmach. The Mapam resisted, but so in vain:

The sequel came in October [1948], on the eve of a third round of hostilities against the Egyptians in the Negev. Ben-Gurion issued orders to dismantle the Palmach's separate command structure, explaining that it was anomalous in an integrated army. Mapam appealed the decision before the executive of the Histadrut, and there the arguments raged for two days. Ben-Gurion accused Mapam of endangering "the integrity of the state." A Mapam leader warned that the right was plotting to seize power undemocratically, and that by eliminating the Palmach, Ben-Gurion was heightening the risk that this might succeed. This time Ben-Gurion enjoyed his own party's solid support, and the Mapam appeal was voted down. ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 125) (IMG)

For the while, however, the Palmach was not fully dissolved. Rather it experienced a decline in influence from that time onwards. Allon, Rabin, and other Palmach generals were forced by the Ben-Gurion faction to head southwards and to engage in a fratricidal war with the Egyptian forces. Yet even in the southern front, they spared no chance to assist their Arab comrades.

In November 1948, there were a series of secret meetings between Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Mapam-Palmach generals from Israel, three of whom were Yigal Allon, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yeruham Cohen. Sa'id Aburish, the CIA spy affiliated with the 'Radio Free Europe' (RFE), wrote:

The second truce, in August 1948, left Nasser and his brigade surrounded by Israeli forces. But Nasser refused to surrender. When the Israelis and Egyptians negotiated for the Egyptians to withdraw and cede to Israel the areas they still occupied, Faluga and Iraq al-Manshia, Nasser had his one chance to directly assess the enemy. He met with two Israeli officers, future chief of staff Yigal Allon and a junior officer by the name of [Yeruham] Cohen. Years later both men were to praise the young Egyptian officer they had met and to speak of his curiosity about their organization and the methods they used. Both spoke of Nasser's bravery and dignity. (Nasser: The Last Arab, Sa'id Aburish) (IMG)

A CIA document leaked by the students who captured the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, noted the meeting of Rabin and Abdel-Nasser:

During the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Rabin commanded the brigade that secured the road to Jerusalem. He was also executive staff officer to Alon, then head of Palmach. At one point during the war in the Negev, Rabin and the late Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, then an army officer, met, discussed the military situation and shared a bowl of fruit. ('BIOGRAPHIC REPORT: Yitzhak RABIN, Prime Minister of Israel', CIA, June 1974, p. 4) (IMG)

In his 1948 War Diaries, which were published by Abdel-Nasser's daughter Hoda bint Gamal, Gamal Abdel-Nasser recorded the events:

November 11, 1948

I met with the Jewish officer at hour 10:00 and was informed that the [Egyptian] commander agreed to meet with the Jewish leader between hours 15:00 and 16:00. He said that he regrets that we did not agree on the place, and that this place between the lines in the sun is not suitable. His commander would like us to have a cup of tea together. He asked us to pick between Gat and Beit Jibrin for the place of meeting.

We agreed to meet at Gat. He will meet us at hour 15:15.

We – Al-Sayyid Bey Taha, Rizqellah El-Fasakhani, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ibrahim Baghdadi and Khalil Ibrahim – went to Gat, and we were well-treated. There was a vast difference between Gat and Iraq al-Manshiyyeh. One feels that one is among civilized people – mechanized agricultural means, hygiene, and the women in bright clothes wearing shorts.

And we met with the Jews. And the Jewish commander [probably Allon] spoke and said that he desires to prevent bloodshed, and that our position is hopeless. He asked us to surrender. The Egyptian commander objected and requested the withdrawal to Gaza or Rafah. The Jews objected and said: They agree, on the condition that the Egyptian army out of all of Palestine. We demanded that the wounded be evacuated to Gaza, but they refused that and said that they are ready to give us whatever medicine

we want. Finally, we went out, and they offered us orange juice, oranges, sandwiches, chocolate, canapes, petit fours and biscuits.

The head told us that a convoy would attend. The password is HSAN [Arabic for HORSE]. At hour 11:00, I learned that His Majesty the King sent a telegram in which he thanked and encouraged everyone.

Mr. Taha was promoted to Amiralay with his Bey rank.

(Gamal Abdel-Nasser Special Papers: Vol. 1: Gamal Abdel-Nasser as a Student and as an Officer, Collected by: Hoda Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 2015, p. 178) (IMG)

In one meeting, Rabin argued that the Arabs and the Israelis should be fighting not each other but rather the British Empire. Without naming Rabin, Abdel-Nasser wrote in his memoirs:


November 14, 1948

The enemy continued firing its artillery and mortars throughout the night. At hour 11:00, a chariot with a white flag arrived. We were informed by the Jewish officer that he was ready to give us medicine and take the wounded to their hospitals, to be prisoners of war.

The commander agreed to take the medicines, but he said that he is determined to evacuate the wounded, by means of the Red Cross, to our lines, and we have agreed to communicate at hour 16:00 by radio with the Jews, to receive their response after they received the list of medicines.

The rain is continuous. I met the Jewish officer in the rain. We talked about general topics. He said that he hopes that we will not be tired in the rain. He asked: does it rain like this in Egypt right now? And he said that he wished that peace would prevail, and that we [Egyptian forces] would be able to return safe and sound. And he spoke and said: 'It was Britain that forced us to achieve its goals.' He added that they might be able to expel the British from Palestine, and they hope that we will expel them as well, and that we would cooperate together.

(Gamal Abdel-Nasser Special Papers: Vol. 1: Gamal Abdel-Nasser as a Student and as an Officer, Collected by: Hoda Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 2015, p. 181) (IMG)



Above is an image of Gamal Abdel-Nasser's notebook, recording the November 11th meeting. The more clearly visible version of the text can be found in the 'Screenshots' section, recording a screenshot of the 1948 War Diaries.

Gamal Abdel-Nasser agreed with Yitzhak Rabin regarding the Arab alliance with the Mapamite/Palmachnik Israelis against the Anglo-American imperialist forces in the Middle East. Years later, Yitzhak Rabin recalled his conversation with Abdel-Nasser:

The details emerge in a 1994 interview with Rabin, then prime minister, that is the centerpiece of "Shalom Rabin," director Amos Gitai's new film about Rabin's bid for peace with the Palestinians. (...).

Rabin says Israeli officers invited their Egyptian counterparts after surrounding their brigade at the Faluja enclave. Rabin was a leader of the elite Palmach fighting force.

"He (Nasser) was a major. I was a lieutenant-colonel," Rabin says. "We offered them to come and have lunch at (Israel's) Kibbutz Gat and they came."

The Israelis gave their word the Egyptians would return to their brigade safely.

"Nasser was sitting next to me. He looked at the emblem of the Palmach and asked me what it meant and I explained. Then he told me the war we are fighting is the wrong war against the wrong enemy at the wrong time. And I remembered that, because he didn't say it in private."

"And I believe at that time that we were very close to peace," Rabin says.

"And what happened, and he went the opposite direction. I guess the road is much longer than we would have wished," Rabin says.

(‘When Towering Rivals Rabin and Nasser Met for Lunch – in Rabin’s Own Words’, Ha’aretz. Original article from: Reuters, February 2, 2017) (IMG)

Michael Oren, an Israeli government official with ties to Yitzhak Rabin, wrote:

Rabin was aware of the situation's delicacy, and exceedingly wary of Nasser. He had actually met the man once, at the end of the 1948 war when Rabin helped negotiate the withdrawal of besieged Egyptian soldiers from the Negev. The future Egyptian president had told him, "Our main enemy is the British... We should be fighting the

colonial power rather than you," and had impressed the young Israeli officer. (Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Michael Oren, p. 62) (IMG)

In his 1955 book 'The Philosophy of the Revolution', Abdel-Nasser recalled that while he was fighting in Palestine, he desired to fight in Egypt against the British agents that dominated his homeland, and that while the bullets of the Egyptian troops were being directed against the Israeli forces, his thoughts were for the expulsion of the British from Egypt:

May 16, 1944 ... marked the start of my life in the Palestine War. As I trace the details of our experience in Palestine I feel a strange sensation. We were fighting in Palestine but our dreams were in Egypt. Our bullets were aimed at the enemy lurking in the trenches in front of us, but our hearts were hovering round our distant Mother Country, which was then a prey to the wolves that ravaged it. In Palestine [Free] Officers' cells were meeting in trenches and posts, studying and searching. (...). As I reached that stage in my thinking my feelings would suddenly jump across the battlefield, across frontiers, to Egypt. I found myself saying, "there is our Mother Country, a far, far bigger Falouga. What is happening in Palestine is but a miniature picture of what is happening in Egypt. (...)." (The Philosophy of the Revolution, Book I, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 1955, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

the enemy also played his part in reminding us of our homeland and its difficulties. A few months ago I read some articles written about me by a Jewish officer named Yerdan Cohen. These were published in the Jewish Observer. In those articles he related how he met me during the contacts and discussions of the Armistice. "The subject that Gamal Abdel Nasser discussed with me," he stated, "was Israel's struggle against the English, how we succeeded in mobilizing world public opinion against them." (The Philosophy of the Revolution, Book I, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 1955, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

Cohen, a Yemenite Israeli 'Jew', was another of the Mapamite Palmach commanders with whom Abdel-Nasser spoke. Abdel-Nasser was not implying that he did not wish to struggle against the Israeli regime. Rather, Abdel-Nasser was implying his desire for strategic cooperation with Palmach freedom-fighters against the CIA-MI6 comprador regime of Israel, against the MI6 presence in Egypt, against the British colonial forces throughout the entire region. The Palmach freedom-fighters had been forced against their will by the MI6-backed fascists of the Israeli regime into a fratricidal war against the Arab freedom-fighters. After the 1948 War, Abdel-Nasser retained secret contacts with the Soviet-backed Mapam-Palmach faction in Israel. Upon ascending to the position of the President (Al-Ra'is) of Egypt in 1954, Abdel-Nasser retained contacts with the faction of Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin, via the Palmach officer and Allon aide, Yeruham Cohen. This fact is well-documented. The prominent journalist Eric Rouleau for one wrote:

The friendship between Nasser and Cohen lasted well after the war. Having ascended to the presidency of the republic, the Rais invited Cohen more than once to visit him in Cairo, something the Israeli was unable to do because the Israeli government refused permission. The two men corresponded with each other and exchanged gifts for their respective birthdays. Besides Cohen, Yigal Allon, commander of the forces besieging al-Faluja and later a leader of the Labor Party, also had courteous conversations with Nasser and excellent memories of their encounters, according to the statements he made to the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth. ('Truths and Lies in the Middle East: Memoirs of a Veteran Journalist, 1952 -2012', Eric Rouleau, 2019) (IMG)

The anti-Arab terrorism of the Israeli regime emanates from Israel's strategic alliance with Anglo-American imperialism. An Israel opposed to Anglo-American imperialism and allied with the USSR (or nowadays, with Russia) against the Anglo-American imperialists would cease its anti-Arab terror activities. Armed struggle against the Israeli regime must have been directed not towards the overthrow of Israel as a country but rather towards the strategic realignment of Israel with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies against the Anglo-American imperialists. Most people do not understand this very important point. The Soviets, the Peoples' Democracies, and the Mapamites understood this point. Long before adopting the UNSCR242 as his official program, Gamal Abdel-Nasser demonstrated an understanding of this important point. The other category of people to recognize this point was Hafez Al-Assad and his team. This is why Hafez Al-Assad called for a lasting democratic peace with Israel while also waging bloody wars against the Israeli military. There is neither hypocrisy nor a self-contradiction here. Waging wars against the Israeli regime would inflict financial costs upon the fascist tendency, the dominant tendency, in the staff of the Israeli armed forces, thus reducing the lobbying power of this fascist tendency, while increasing the leverage of the Mapamite dissidents in the staff of the Israeli armed forces. This would result in the elevation of the Mapamite dissident elements within the Israeli armed forces, so that eventually, a leap from quantity to quality occurs and Israel's means of violence would be firmly under Mapamite control. This would cause Israel to transition into becoming an anti-imperialist socialist-oriented state willing to ally with the progressive Arab states and hostile to the reactionary CIA-backed regimes in the Arab world. And the military alliance of the new Israel with the progressive Arab states would yield a democratic peace with the Arab people of Palestine.

By contrast, the Israel that has historically allied with the Anglo-American imperialists has established peace with some Arab states – but what type of peace with which kinds of Arab states? It established a peace and an alliance with

the reactionary Arab regimes, such as the murderous regime of the Nazi agent Anwar Sadat, with the Hashemite Jordan, and with the PLO terrorists, etc. The Mapam faction in Israel – headed by Rabin and Allon – spared no chance to sabotage the fascist ‘peace’ with the Sadatist faction in Egypt, the Hashemite monarcho-fascists in Jordan, and the PLO terrorists. Throughout their lifetimes, they strived to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy and install a pro- Nasserist state in Jordan, and maximized efforts towards undermining the murderous Saudi regime. The issue of Rabin’s role in the Oslo Accords and the deal with the Arafat faction is more complicated than what the mainstream media presents it as.

Anyways, as can be seen with the evidence presented above, even in the case of being forced against their will into the fratricidal campaign against the Egyptian Arab freedom-fighters, the Mapamite Palmach freedom-fighters led by Allon and Rabin ensured that the Egyptian Arab forces would be provided with proper medicine and food. Obviously the campaign against the Arab forces was not for freedom, but the many of the generals and special forces who had been forced to participate in this campaign tried to at least minimize the damage on the Arab freedom forces, while seeking to divert the struggle away from the anti-Arab struggle onto fighting the British Empire. Indeed, insofar as the Egyptians were to be fought, it was necessary to fight the MI6 elements among the Egyptians. One must note that at the superficial level, Israel and Britain continued to be ‘enemies’ even though behind the scenes, Israel’s regime and the MI6 regime were allied. Nonetheless, the superficial contradiction between Britain and Israel’s regime could and should have been exploited. In the 1947 UN voting, the balance was in favor of Britain and ‘against’ Israel’s regime and so the Israelis were to be supported against the British in this superficial conflict. By the latter stages of the war, the regime of Israel had established much of control over Palestine. By the time of the latter stages of the war, the balance had shifted in favor of Israel and ‘against’ Britain. In that case, it was necessary to ‘support’ British imperialists against Israel in this superficial conflict in order to maximize damage both to Israel’s regime and the British imperialists. To this end, Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin decided to get the British involved in the war and get the British to come to fight Israel’s regime. Therefore, Allon and Rabin and the Palmach warriors, without informing the IDF high command entered Egyptian territory, knowing that Britain had threatened to interfere if Israelis get into Egyptian territory. They got into Egyptian territory apparently with minimal casualties on Egyptians. Ben-Gurion, an MI6 agent, strictly ordered Allon and Rabin to return from Egypt but Allon disagreed. Nonetheless, Allon and Rabin were forced by IDF high command to retreat;

The head of the column encountered an Egyptian position about seven miles before Abu Ageila, where our lead armored car was hit and burst into flames. All that night the burning vehicle served to mark the location of the enemy positions, and the strongpoint was taken in a night attack by an infantry unit. Resuming our advance at dawn, we found that the Egyptians had abandoned Abu Ageila, and we took it almost without encountering resistance.

That morning, **without consulting the general staff**, we decided to push on to El Arish. It was probably because of this lack coordination that we found ourselves under attack by Israeli planes, losing several soldiers and jeeps in the raids. When we reached the eastern airfield at El Arish, we were strafed again — this time by Egyptian planes. Just as we were getting over that our own planes appeared once more.

The troops opened up at them with every available weapon. I halted one of our jeeps whose occupants were blazing away at a furious rate. "You never fired like that at the Egyptian planes,"

I commented to one of the soldiers. "Can't you see that they're ours?"

"Sure I can see," he replied. "Our planes are a hundred times more dangerous!" As the force proceeded westward, we received a message from the general staff: "Our planes report you are advancing on El Arish. What's going on? Halt your advance!" **We asked one more night, and moved on to the second airfield, two miles from the town. But the general staff was adamant. Allon flew to Tel Aviv to get the orders rescinded, but at midnight a radioed message from him shattered our last hope:**

"No go. Withdraw from El Arish." We carried out our withdrawal in stages as Allon Ben-Gurion to his vacation spot in Tiberias, dredging up every possible argument for completing the mission. But Ben- Gurion wouldn't budge.

(The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, p. 40. Bold added.) (IMG)

While being forced to leave Sinai, Yigal Allon did ensure that at least yet another provocative measure against the British Empire’s military would happen. The Palmach forces under Yigal Allon’s command shot down five British warplanes:

This first Jewish penetration into Sinai was doomed to failure, however. The British, who were still in Suez, forced the Jews to retire behind the old Mandate border by threatening to enter the war on the side of Egypt. It should be noted, however, that Allon's forces shot down five British Spitfires which were sent to observe their withdrawal. ('Sir Basil Liddell Hart's Disciples in Israel, Jac Weller, p. 13. In: MILITARY REVIEW: The Professional Journal of the United States Army, US Army Command and General Staff College, Vol. LIV, January 1974, No. 1, p. 18) (IMG)

And as stated by Rabin, the Palmach fighters vigorously attacked the Israeli warplanes but not so much the Egyptian warplanes, for they regarded the Israeli air force as ‘a hundred times more dangerous’.

While establishing friendly ties with the revolutionary forces amongst the Arabs, such as Gamal Abdel-Nasser and others, and while waging the war against the reactionary fascist current in Israel during the 1948 War, the Palmach also struck the reactionary fascist currents amongst the Arabs. An example to this is the killing of Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini, which was not by the mainstream pro-fascist tendency in the Israeli armed forces but by the Palmach freedom-fighters. Philip Mattar, a prominent Palestine Studies fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, wrote:

Abd Al-Qadir ... entered Palestine in late 1947 to lead the Army of the Holy Struggle (Jaysh Al-Jihad Al-Muqaddis) of Al-Hajj Amin Al-Husayni against [the] Zionist forces. He was killed fighting with Palmach forces during the Battle of al-Qastal, near Jerusalem. (Encyclopedia of the Palestinians, Philip Mattar, revised edition: 2005, 213) (IMG)

An ally and family relative of the Mufti of Yerushalayim Amin Al-Husseini, Abdel-Qader was a reactionary terrorist who participated in the 1941 Nazi coup in Iraq led by Rashid Al-Gaylani. The Nazis aimed to take over the Soviet Caucasus oil fields in order to render the Soviet war effort ineffective in the face of Operation BARBAROSSA. Turkey, Iran and Iraq served as the major avenues that could facilitate Nazi access to the Soviet Caucasus. Even though Iraq did not share a border with the Soviet Union, it was geographically very close to it nevertheless. In 1941, in order to render Iraq into a base via which the Nazis would proceed through Iran onto the Soviet Caucasus oil fields, Rashid Al-Gaylani and Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini launched a military coup ostensibly against the British Empire, which by the way back then was emerging as a Soviet ally. The new Gaylani regime directly, openly, and without shame, allied with the Nazis, and increased the influence of the Mufti Haajj Amin. Later on, the fascist Gaylani regime was overthrown, and Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini was jailed by the USSR's British imperial allies. Back then, as British finance capital had become allied with the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat and hence with the world proletariat, British finance capital played a very progressive role throughout the world. Back then, hostile action against the British Empire was anti-Soviet action. By the time of the Battle of Stalingrad, when the tide had turned in favour of the Soviets, the British Empire began to favour the Nazis. Such an alliance with the Nazis was manifested in the British imperial policy in all regions of the globe, including in Iraq. As Abdel-Qader was by then useful to the British imperial cause, he was released from jail in 1943, just like most other Nazis who were also released by the British in 1943. Officially, the Saudi agents of the American secret service requested his release by the MI6-aligned comprador monarchy in Iraq. Upon his release, Abdel-Qader travelled to Nazi Germany setting up his base there in 1944 and receiving from the host country support for his military and intelligence efforts. Al-Mayadeen, a Hezbollah-backed pro-Hamas media outlet, reported:

Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini ... was a supporter of the Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani revolution in Iraq in 1941, and he was participating in the fight against British forces, which led to his arrest for three years. He was released in 1943, **with the intervention of King Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud [the independent-minded Saudi king that faced the pressure of the American imperialists]**, and he resided in Saudi Arabia for two years.

With the beginning of 1944, Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini left Saudi Arabia secretly for Germany to receive a military course "on the manufacture and installation of explosives." **His specialization in his university studies in the Department of Chemistry gave him experience in dealing with explosives.**

Then he returned to Saudi Arabia, and moved from it in 1946 to Egypt.. The specter of harassment and deportation continued to haunt him until 1947, when the Palestinian cause entered a critical and dangerous juncture. He prepared a plan for the Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation. He organized training operations and armed the resistance. He also established a secret camp with Egyptian and Libyan national forces. He trained Egyptian elements who participated in the volunteer campaign in the Palestine War and the Canal War against the British occupation.

With the help of sheikhs and leaders in Palestine **and with funding from the Mufti of Palestine, Amin al-Husseini, he** established a wireless station at the headquarters in Birzeit..

(‘He said to the leaders: You have lost Palestine... Who is Abdul Qadir Al-Husseini?’ Al-Mayadeen, Muhammad Ali Faqih, April 18, 2018) (IMG)

Some would naively argue that although Abdel-Qader had the problem of collaborating with the Nazis, killing an Arab during the 1948 War was 'counter-productive'. Yet, so implausible is the narrative that killing a fascist Arab was 'counter-productive' during the 1948 War, as there is no reason to believe that an agent of fascism would not tactically sabotage the Arab war effort against Zionist settler-colonialism. If in 1948 a Palmachnik had killed Anwar Sadat, the Nazi German agent who sabotaged the Arab war effort against IDF, would that have been 'counter-productive'? By 1944, when Abdel-Qader had been training in Nazi Germany and preparing his armed forces there, Nazi Germany had already become a strategic partner of the JDC, the very American Zionist espionage body that promoted the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel. Collaboration with Nazi Germany was collaboration with the Zionist intelligence agents of the United States. And what surprise is there that the Saudis demanded Abdel-Qader's release in 1943? And again, what reason is there to trust a Saudi-backed Nazi German agent to perform well for the Arab cause? Wasting military funds to launch a terror attack

against media offices instead of attacking military targets is a form of tactical sabotage against the Arab war effort. It is also obviously a war crime against Israeli civilian targets. Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini and his personal army, the so-called 'Sacred Struggle Army' or 'Holy Jihad Army', engaged in terror operations. As confirmed by Haajj Amin Al-Husseini, the 'Sacred Struggle Army' 'responded' to Zionist terrorism by responding the 'same way' as how the Zionists had behaved. The 'Sacred Struggle Army' engaged in a disproportionate bombing campaign against 'most of Jewish neighborhood in the Old City' in Jerusalem:

And when the Jews deliberately carried out acts of bombing and destruction in order to terrorize the Arabs, the destruction battallions of the Holy Jihad Army met them in the same way. Rather, they increased them by blowing up Ben Yehuda Street, the Jewish Agency House, the Montefiore neighborhood, the Palestine Post building and its environs, in addition to most of the Jewish neighborhood in the Old City, which forced the Jews to stop acts of destruction because they inflicted great pain and suffering upon them. (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, p. 452) (IMG)

According to the PLO, Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini and his forces blew up the Atlantic Hotel in the Ben-Yehuda Street in Jerusalem which led to the deaths of '49 Zionists':

2/22/1948: The Arab Mujahideen blew up the Atlantic Hotel on Ben Yehuda Street in Jerusalem. This explosion was planned by the Palestinian Mujahid Abdel-Qader al-Husseini, the commander of the Army of Holy Jihad.

This explosion led (according to the enemy's account) to the death of 49 Zionists and wounded 132 others. (State of Palestine website, PLO, February 22, 2017) (IMG)

Whenever Palestinian terrorists kill civilians, in order to 'justify' their non-combat against Israeli combatants and combat against Israeli non-combatants, they refer to the latter category as 'Zionists' so that those civilian targets would appear to 'deserve' being blown up. The overwhelming majority of the casualties reportedly were not Israeli soldiers but civilians ('Zionists'). In addition to the Atlantic Hotel, the so-called 'Sacred Struggle Army' also blew up the 'environs' of the 'Palestine Post building,' 'the Montefiore neighborhood', and 'most of the Jewish neighborhood in the Old City' in Jerusalem. Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini's army wasted the military funds of the Arab armed forces by engaging in terror attacks rather than expanding the fight against the Israeli military targets.

The terror operations of Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini, Amin Al-Husseini, Hasan Salameh, and other 'Sacred Struggle Army' terrorists had the support of the British intelligence service agents. Efraim Karsh, a prominent Israeli military history scholar and a high-ranking IDF intelligence official, wrote:

But the story doesn't end there. British security personnel were also implicated in a series of anti-Jewish outrages in Jerusalem, from the distribution of weapons to Arab rioters in early December, to the bombing of the building of the moderate English-language newspaper the Palestine Post on February 1, . to the February 22 bombing of Ben Yehuda Street in central Jerusalem, in which fifty-two people were killed and another 123 wounded, to shootings on civilian Jewish targets in the Old City, to armed provocations aimed at inflaming Arab-Jewish relations. (Palestine Betrayed, Yale University Press, Efraim Karsh, 2010) (IMG)

There is no reason to doubt MI6 involvement since Abdel-Qader had been released by the British in 1943 when the British allied with the Nazis, and was trained in military and intelligence matters by MI6-backed Nazi Germany during 1944. Such Nazi Palestinian terrorist "resistance" of the 'Sacred Struggle Army' was undoubtedly a British colonial conspiracy aimed at destroying the Palmach freedom-fighters, and massacring Israeli civilians so to give the Israeli fascists the excuse for ethnic cleansing against the Arabs of Palestine. At the same time, by allocating military funds away from combat against the Israeli fascist armed forces and onto massacring Israeli civilians, Abdel-Qader's army of terror was sabotaging the Arab anti-fascist war effort.

The Soviets and the Arab communists accused the Mufti of paving the way towards the partition of Palestine via anti-Semitic terrorism:

Gromyko cautioned the Arabs that by their uncompromising stand they might bring about a very undesirable solution: partition. The Arab communists, who oppose partition no less than the mufti, are directing their full wrath at the extremism and fanaticism of the official Palestinian leadership, which [they say] is helping [bring about] partition by its racist hatred of the Jews and its refusal to recognize the existing Jewish community in Palestine. (Circular of the Mapai Central Committee to its Emissaries Abroad, COPY: CZA S53/12C, Tel Aviv, May 29, 1947. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 202) (IMG)

Unwilling to risk their small businesses by confronting finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie instead choose to submit to imperial rule and refuse to resist it, both materially and ideologically. Insofar as the Palestinian petit-bourgeoisie 'resisted' imperialism, they did so through provocative terror attacks that provided the Zionist agents of Anglo- American imperialism the excuse and pretext for further colonial subjugation. Back then, the vast majority of the Palestinians were petit-bourgeois. Behind the Palestinian fascist leadership stood the majority of the Palestinian people. Undoubtedly, the

Palestinians, through their Rejectionist intransigence and with their sickeningly chauvinistic urge to treat Israeli proletarians and kibbutzniks as ‘colonial’ ‘profiteers’ and ‘legitimate’ military targets, provided the colonizers the excuses sought for and invited Zionist suppressive terror against the revolutionary forces in the Arab world.

The hateful chauvinistic attitudes of many among the Palestinian people towards their Yiddish and Hebrew neighbours, strongly forged with enforcement of such hate through the anti-Semitic terror attacks, all weakened the argument for a single bi-ethnic (Israeli and Arab) Palestinian state. Thus, the Soviet delegation in the UN promoted the partition of Palestine as Plan B, if Plan A – a territorially integral bi-ethnic Palestine – would fail:

The fact that no Western European State has been able to ensure the defence of the elementary rights of the Jewish people, and to safeguard it against the violence of the fascist executioners, explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own State. It would be unjust not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the Jewish people to realize this aspiration.. Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the establishment of a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for the Jews and the Arabs may be considered as one of the possibilities and one of the more noteworthy methods for the solution of this complicated problem.. If this plan proved impossible to implement, in view of the deterioration in the relations between the Jews and the Arabs ... then it would be necessary to consider the second plan which, like the first, has its supporters in Palestine, and which provides for the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab. I repeat that such a solution of the Palestine problem would be justifiable only if relations between the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine indeed proved to be so bad that it would be impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the peaceful co-existence of the Arabs and the Jews.. (The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, The Palestine Question in the United Nations) (IMG {Israel})

Both Israel and Palestine were dominated by the comprador classes allied to finance capital – in Israel, the bureaucrats of the Ben-Gurion faction increased the presence of American finance capital, and in Palestine, the Hashemite Jordanian monarcho-fascist reactionaries brought Anglo-American dominance over the Jordanian-occupied areas. However, the revolutionary potential in Israel was incomparably higher than the ‘revolutionary’ ‘potential’ in Palestine. Both in terms of societal class composition and culture, Israelis were far more advanced. Whereas the majority of the Israelis were proletarians and cooperative farmers sympathetic to socialism and the USSR, the majority of the Palestinians were petit-bourgeois individuals upon whose gullibility and unwisdom thrived the Nazi pogromism of Haajj Amin, Abdel-Qader, and Rashid Al-Gaylani. The Soviets harboured no delusions about the pro -fascist class character of the Zionist terror regime, the outpost of Anglo-American imperialism. However, the Soviets also made neither moral nor strategic mistakes when they appreciated a proletarian and kibbutznik people, whose beloved heroes were Lenin and Stalin, much more than unreliable adventurer petit-bourgeois masses whose beloved ‘heroes’ were the Nazi German agents and fascist mass-murderers Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini and Rashid Al-Gaylani. In 1948, the Palmachniks killed that fascist general Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini along with several of the other terrorists who served him and his Gaylani Nazi agenda. The Palmach generals were militantly opposed to the Israeli regime, and were allied with the good Arabs, but that does not mean that they were to be soft on the fascist Arabs. On the contrary, they had a moral obligation – which they fulfilled – to wage wars against every reactionary fascist Arab they could find, just as how they were to – and did – wage war against the pro-fascist Zionist regime.

Nor was the Palmach alone in the struggle against the fascist gang of Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini. In fact, as confirmed by the Mufti of Yerushalayim, the Wafdist Egyptians led by Nuqrashi confiscated massive loads of weapons belonging to the Arab Higher Committee, the official name of the Mufti’s Palestinian terror regime. Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini’s terror squads were affiliated as the army of the Arab Higher Committee. The Mufti wrote:

Several Arab League countries confiscated weapons depots that were in the possession of the Palestinians, weapons repair laboratories, and ammunition fillings. The Cairo-based “Akhir Sa’ah” [‘The Last Hour’] magazine published pictures of a large number of large transport vehicles, more than thirty cars, full of weapons and equipment that were confiscated [by Egypt] from the Arab Higher Committee warehouses, and that was during the era of the Nuqrashi Administration. Abundant quantities were also confiscated in some other Arab countries. (...). Arab League States wrested the political cause of Palestine from the people of Palestine and removed from it the men who were in charge of its political leadership and conducting its war battles. (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al- Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, pp. 392-393) (IMG)

As the reader may recall, Nuqrashi, Egypt’s Wafdist Prime Minister aligned with the Soviet-led camp, had opposed direct military invasion by the Arab armies into Israel, whereas the MI6 agent King Farouk, keen on decimating the Arab armies through a Trotskyite ‘Permanent Revolutionary’ military adventure, hailed an invasion and claimed that triumph over Israel was as easy as a “military picnic.” Nuqrashi, who confronted MI6 policies in the region, was assassinated in December 1948 by the pro-MI6 faction in the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s direct involvement in the terror attack, Hasan Al-Banna did not have a role in the assassination, but was wrongly blamed and

assassinated by the Farouk gang, ostensibly to combat Muslim Brotherhood terrorism but actually to eliminate a top obstacle to the MI6 current in the Brotherhood. It is worth mentioning that although Abdel-Nasser was rightly vehemently hostile to the Brotherhood, he had fairly positive relations with Hasan Al-Banna, a fact which shows the paradoxical contradiction between the fascist character of the Brotherhood and the personality of its founder. Hasan Salameh, the co-leader of 'Sacred Struggle Army', also knew that the Syrian-created Arab Liberation Army (ALA) pursued the agenda of having the 'Sacred Struggle Army' killed in the battle with the Palmach. After Abdel-Qader died:

I was in the office of the Higher Arab Commission in Damascus when [Arab Liberation Army commander] Taha Pasha [i.e. Taha Al-Hashemi, not to be confused with Egyptian commander Taha Bey] and Major General Ismail Safwah came with the late Shukri al-Quwatli to pay their respects to Abdel-Qader. The late Sheikh Hasan Salama reprimanded Taha for his shortcomings with Abdel-Qader, so Taha patted his back politely. Hasan Salama said to him: "You pat us on our backs and prepare to kill us!!" (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, p. 392) (IMG)

Abdel-Qader too had made the same kind of a remark:

Taha Pasha understood that many of the leaders of the Sacred Struggle [Army], at the forefront of them Abdel-Qader and Hasan Salameh had spent several military courses in Iraq and [Nazi] Germany, but Taha did not agree to give them anything, and so [the ever-fanatical] Abdel-Qader rose and threw the maps in his hands onto the face of Taha, and said to him: "Truly, you [Syrians and Syrian-backed forces] desire to kill us and pave the way for our inexpensive defeat." (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, p. 391) (IMG)

Note that Taha Al-Hashimi was close to President Quwatli, and his words basically represented the rhetoric of the Syrian military. The prominent scholar on Syria, Joshua Landis, wrote:

Taha al-Hashimi ... was an Iraqi pan-Arab nationalist and long-time intimate of Quwwatli, whom the Syrian president wanted to head the Liberation Army rather than General Safwat, Egypt's candidate. Hashimi was ultimately appointed Inspector General of the ALA and placed in charge of recruitment and training of the troops at the Qatana headquarters. His office was in the Syrian Ministry of Defense and he met daily with Syria's political and military leaders. (SYRIA AND THE 1948 WAR IN PALESTINE, Joshua Landis) (IMG)

The progressive Arab armies – from the Egyptian army, to the Lebanese army, to the Syrian army – were all opposed to the Palestinian terror regime of Haajj Amin and the Palestinian terror army of Abdel-Qader. The progressive Arab armies were backed by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, which also were very antagonistic to the Mufti, as indicated previously. Later on, during the Doctors' Plot case, throughout the imperialist media was spread the anti-Soviet libel that the Soviet Union had welcomed the Nazi Mufti. Yet, in a document slanderously denouncing Stalin as an enemy of the 'Jews' and the people of Israel, Ben-Gurion admitted that the rumours of the Mufti being welcomed in the socialist camp were not credible:

Soviet Russia is not antisemitic. (...) Hajj Amin al-Husayni ... was one of Hitler's friends and assistants. I do not believe the reports in the press that Stalin has now invited the mufti, but it is clear that Stalin is not antisemitic. (D. Ben-Gurion to the Members of the Israeli Government, COPY: ISA 130.02/2157/14, Tel Aviv, January 20, 1953. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 858) (IMG)

By waging the heroic war against the death squads of Abdel-Qader, Hasan Salameh, and other fascist Palestinian terrorists, the Palmach freedom-fighters were not waging a war against the Arab people but were rather siding with the Arab people and the progressive Arab armies and with the people of Israel against fascist reaction. Anti-Arabism is not hostility to all Arabs. Anti-Arabism, rather, is the hostility to the advancement of the progressive classes among the Arabs and support for the elevation of the reactionary classes among the Arabs. An Israeli revolutionary soldier's killing of a Palestinian fascist is not "Zionist settler-colonialism" and "anti-Arab chauvinism."

It is said that Yitzhak Rabin ordered the ethnic cleansing to be carried out against the Arabs of certain cities in Palestine. It is true that 'Rabin' ordered it – but more accurately, he was ordered by Ben-Gurion to order it. He was a Mapam faction intelligence agent who, in order to infiltrate the Israeli regime so to combat the pro-fascist forces dominating it, had to partially blend with the policies of the Israeli pro-fascist forces. They who cite the fact of Rabin's order for mass expulsion, tend to sweep under the rug the incontrovertible fact that Rabin did all of this reluctantly. Rabin said that psychologically, this was the toughest thing that he had gone through, and implied that great psychological suffering inflicted on him and his comrades in the Palmach, and that such a move was against the values of international brotherhood and humanness. The same Rabin who 'confessed' to participation in such ethnic cleansing also stated that his participation and 'agreement' with such a genocidal program by Ben-Gurion gang was reluctant:

"Driving out" is a term with a harsh ring. Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook.

The population of Lod did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the ten to fifteen miles to the point where they met up with the legion.

The inhabitants of Rami watched and learned the lesson. Their leaders agreed to evacuate voluntarily, on condition that the evacuation was carried out by vehicles. Buses took them to Latrun, and from there they were evacuated by the legion. (...). Great suffering was inflicted upon the men taking part in the eviction action [and I, Rabin, was one of the men who took part in the eviction action]. Soldiers of the Yiftach Brigade [which was a Brigade of the Palmach] included youth-movement graduates, who had been inculcated with values such as international brotherhood and humanness. The eviction action went beyond the concepts they were used to. There were some fellows who refused to take part in the expulsion action. Prolonged propaganda activities were required after the action to remove the bitterness of these youth-movement groups and to explain why we were obliged to undertake such a harsh and cruel action. (The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, pp. 383-384) (IMG)

There is no reason to doubt the honesty of Rabin insofar as he implied that these crimes were committed by 'him' unwillingly, for the entire legacy of Rabin was filled with socialist and anti-fascist heroism subtly and skillfully disguised as the pursuit of the Zionist fascist agenda.

Throughout this book, there has been an immense effort to not cite the pro-Soviet 'confessions' of those Anglo-American, Israeli, German, etc. security officials who held crypto-pro-Soviet sympathies, unless such pro-Soviet 'confessions' would be backed up by the confessions of the genuinely anti-Soviet security officials. The reader will find throughout this book that the pro-Soviet remarks of US officials affiliated with the Kennedy faction, for example, were either avoided or backed up by the intelligence sources that were genuinely anti-communist. Many of those who cited Yitzhak Rabin's 'confessions' believed that Rabin was a genuine believer in Zionist settler-colonialism, when in fact he was not. His 'confession' that he 'agreed' with the ethnic cleansing against the Palestinian Arabs, along with his condemnation of such ethnic cleansing, was a part of his game. Rabin simply could not stop 'confessing' the truth. He 'confessed' that the Arabs of Palestine left their homeland unwillingly, that Abdel-Nasser had no aggressive intents in 1967, that the Shah was anti-Kurd and an unreliable partner of the people of Israel, that Israel should not ally with the Sadat gang, that the IDF terrorists created a 'Red Line' to protect the PLO terrorists against the Syrian Arab Army peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon in the 1970s and the 1980s, that the 1982 IDF invasion of Lebanon was very wrong (and Nasrallah cited his confession on this one), that the US presence in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War was reactionary, etc. He 'confessed' all such truth because he was never truly loyal to imperialism- fascism in the first place.

After the abolition of the Palmach, the David Ben-Gurion faction took on the next step and further demoted Yigal Allon, replacing him with the Pirate of the Mediterranean Moshe Dayan:

While Allon was still in France, Ben-Gurion, in his capacity as defense minister, announced a series of new appointments, including Yigael Yadin as chief of staff and Moshe Dayan as the head of Southern Command. There could be no doubt that Ben-Gurion's move was a deliberate slap in the face to the former commander of the Palmach, leaving Allon with no choice but to resign from the army. As acting commander of the front, I was in charge of transferring the command to Dayan. Everyone was silent and expressionless when he arrived, and Dayan may have felt ill at ease in the company of all those Palmach men. I transferred the command without any ceremony, and the feeling that Dayan would prefer to be rid of me as well was strengthened by our first talk. He was cold, reserved, and laconic. Moreover, he was frank. "Thank you," he said, "I don't need you any longer." (The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, p. 46) (IMG)

Moshe Dayan, Ben-Gurion's favourite general, had led a reconnaissance squad for the British military, thus assisting in the collection of military intelligence for the British in the Middle East. It was during his official service for the British military that Moshe Dayan had lost an eye, forcing him to wear the piratical eyepatch. Ben-Gurion, keen on promoting the MI6 officers as the generals of the IDF, promoted the Pirate of the Mediterranean as much as he could. By contrast, Yigal Allon had long been despised by Ben-Gurion. Rabin recalled in one case during the 1948 War: Ben-Gurion's anger did not subside. "Why didn't Allon tell me that he doesn't intend to attack Latrun?"

His rage reached its peak as he shouted, "Yigal Allon should be shot!"

I was astounded, barely able to mumble, "Ben-Gurion, what are you saying?" But he did not withdraw his remark. "Yes, you heard me correctly!" This exchange is depicted in Ben-Gurion's book *The State of Israel Resteed*. I have carefully read every word of it, and shooting Yigal Allon is not mentioned. In retrospect, Ben-Gurion must have grasped that he had let his tongue run away with itself.

(The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, pp. 33-34) (IMG)

The defeat of the Arabs in the 1948 War had already reduced the costs for the Ben-Gurion faction thus giving him greater leverage and lobbying power in the factional conflict against the Mapamite generals. The ouster of General Yigal Allon from the leadership of the IDF's Southern Command was a step in this direction. Despite this setback, however, the 'game' was far from over, as the cliché goes. In correlation with the anti-imperialist Arab recoveries and anti-imperialist Arab comebacks against the Ben-Gurion faction dominating the IDF, the Mapam was to also see elevations in its position. Rabin, the protege of Allon since the 1930s, had a long way to go with his comrade:

[in the 1930s] Being the youngest pupils, at first we served as messengers between the defense positions. Then

we were trained in the use of arms. Our instructor was Yigal Allon, one of Kadouri's first graduates and by then the highly respected "King of Galilee." (In time, he and I would go a long way together as soldiers and as politicians.) (The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, p. 8) (IMG)

As a result of the victory of the Israeli regime over the Arab forces in the 1948 War, the Ben-Gurion faction strengthened in leverage, whereas the Mapamite faction had reduced leverage vis-a-vis the Ben-Gurion faction. As such:

After the war Ben-Gurion achieved his goal of a fully integrated army by disbanding the separate Palmach brigades. ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 125) (IMG)

The costs inflicted upon the Arab armies had led an IDF dominated by the Ben-Gurion faction to triumph. Reduced military costs allowed the Ben-Gurion faction to spend its funds for the secret service conflict to oust the Mapam generals in the IDF. With such increased leverage, the Ben-Gurion faction reduced the presence of the Mapam- Palmach agents in the IDF, increased its influence in the security bodies and hence over the Israeli 'non-state' media. The Israeli media then stepped up its propaganda campaign against the USSR, and the USSR retaliated by stepping up its media campaign against the Israeli regime. In a conversation with the US ambassador to Israel, Ben-Gurion made it absolutely clear that the faction he headed regarded the USSR as the gravest threat and the greatest enemy of Israel's regime:

I was in Jerusalem July 28-30. Being info Prime Minister was in Elath, Mrs. McDonald and I had tea his denec with Mrs. Ben-Gurion where to my complete surprise Prime Minister joined us.

He talked to me privately an hour substantially as follows:

Eban is returning Washington with instructions sound out desirability of visit of Prime Minister to US this fall to discuss "on highest level" possibility of USG sponsoring three years program to increase Israeli population through intensified refugee immigration to millions and build with American arms effective Israeli army of 250,000 men "capable and anxious aid US and UK and Turkey to resist Russian aggression".

Prime Minister hopes he "can convince President Truman, Secretary Acheson and US military that America's vital interest would be served by proposed strengthening of Israel as only country other than Turkey in [western] Asia willing to fight Russian aggression to limit of strength". Prime Minister feels American Jews would give or lend money required beyond USG possible loans only if USG first sponsors intensified Israel efforts speed up immigration.

Prime Minister praised President Truman's Korean decision as "bold and vital step to block Communist expansion and hence may prove turning point in history." Russia, he added, is regime "based on fear, deceit, force and repression". It "must be stopped if freedom is to live in world".

In answer my question re Israel left-wing labor, Prime Minister said confidently. "Israeli people would support crushing any form Communist collaboration in event world conflict. Only few Mapam could possibly cause embarrassment and this locally". Re-equipped and enlarged Israeli army "would guarantee Israeli unity in support of West". If Russia attacked Israel's strategic air fields "Israel's new army could and would hold until US and UK forces could arrive".

(...). Prime Minister could not have been more explicit in willingness commit Israel unreservedly to West. His statement is doubly significant because it follows and doubtless represents con[s]ensus opinion Foreign Office and diplomats whose fortnight conference Tel Aviv and Jerusalem he attended. Although Israel's attitude strengthened by increasing difficulties internal economy, I believe it basically represents culmination of realization by Israeli leaders that Israel can survive only in world freed from menace of Communist aggression. To defend itself Israel would fight against Russian invaders as desperately as against Arabs.

(784A.13/7-3150: Telegram, The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State, Top Secret, Priority, Tel Aviv, July 31, 1950. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 5, United States Department of State, pp. 960-961. Note: many US diplomatic documents are written deliberately in an abbreviated or note form as means of making the document brief.) (IMG)

One of Ben-Gurion's close friends and ministers described Ben-Gurion as such:

He is unwilling to be neutral; he regards the Soviet Union as the number one enemy of Zionism and the entire world. He is prepared to accept only one thing – that there be no anti-neutrality expressions. (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 2009, p. 225. Citing: FRUS, 5, 1950, pp. 960-1. See also M. Gazit, "Ben Gurion's Efforts to Create Military Ties with the U.S.A.," Geshet, 32, 1986/7, pp. 57-63 (Hebrew).)

As part of the Morgenthau Plan to strengthen Israel, in January 1950, the US also provided a 100 million Dollar loan for Israel:

\$100,000,000 credit made available by the Export-Import Bank. (Developments Affecting Israel, Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: The Secretary Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Mr. Rockwell, January 9, 1950, p. 2)

The Soviet support military operations against the Israeli regime not for the destruction of Israel as a country but for using military conflict as a means of giving greater lobbying power, leverage, and operational room for the Mapamite

officials. The military conflict was used to achieve victory in the secret service conflict. Soviet use of warfare was for political change in Israel – the establishment of a socialist-oriented state – rather than for the destruction of Israel as a country and a society. How would the anti-imperialist Arab forces have reacted if the Mapam faction had won the power struggle during and as a result of the 1948 War? Would these Arab anti-imperialist forces have continued to wage war for the 'destruction' of the 'Zionist Entity'? Cowardly academics condemn these kinds of 'what if' questions as anti-historicist. They who hold a scientific view of history, on the other hand, use the laws of historical materialism and dialectics to determine the changes in dependent variables resultant from the changes in independent variables in history.

The laws of history dictate that if two forces both belong to the same class alliance and are thus strategically aligned with the same camp, and if these two forces are being pressured to fight each other, these two forces would seek to tokenize the struggles against one another so to minimize fratricidal damage against one another. The Saudi regime and Hashemite Jordan were both regimes aligned with the camp of Anglo-American imperialism, just like Israel. It is no surprise that the struggles of these regimes against Israel has been consistently tokenized and insofar as the struggle has been serious, it has emanated from rogue/anti-imperialist infiltrators in these regimes. The Soviet-backed forces in the Arab world – the Syrians, the Lebanese, and the Egyptians – contributed to the bulk of the fighting against the CIA-backed regime of Israel. While the USSR supported armed struggle to overthrow the Ben-Gurion regime, the USSR rightly denounced armed struggle in the form of an invasion against Israel. That the invasion against Israel was wrong, however, does not negate the general correctness of support for such Arab armed struggle against the CIA-MI6 puppet regime of Israel. The USSR supported the Arab armed struggle against the Ben-Gurion regime in order to give greater leverage in Mapam's factional conflict against the Mapai and Irgun. **Had the Mapam faction emerged victorious in the power struggle against the Ben-Gurion faction during the 1948 War, the Soviet-backed elements in the Arab forces – predominantly concentrated among the Syrians, the Lebanese, and the Egyptians – would have tokenized and de facto ceased military operations against the new socialist-oriented and Arab-friendly Israel. Why? It was because the new socialist-oriented Israel was allied to the same Soviet state to which these Arab states were allied. These Soviet-aligned Arab states would have launched token military operations with no serious results and would have sworn at the 'Zionist Entity', but would have focused the bulk of their forces towards covertly backstabbing the CIA-MI6 puppet regime forces such as the gang of General Glubb from Jordanian regime, the regime which by then was actually going to engage in real serious fighting against the new Israel in order to re-install the Anglo-American-backed faction there. In that scenario, the new Soviet-aligned Israeli People's Democracy would have concentrated its forces onto combatting the Jordanian monarcho-fascists in order to overthrow the regime there and to establish a Soviet-aligned Arab state in Jordan. And the very Soviet-aligned Arab forces that had waged war against the ancient regime in Israel, the Ben-Gurion regime, would have covertly assisted People's Democratic Israel in this war against Jordan.** Later on, if the plots to undermine the Jordanian regime efforts against the new Israel would have succeeded, the new Mapamite state in Israel would have been stabilized in its position. A while later, these Soviet-aligned Arab states would have signed a friendship treaty with the new Israel. Such calculations based on dialectics and historical materialism are reinforced by the empirical evidence of the behaviour of the Syrian, Egyptian, and Lebanese leaders – all Soviet-aligned, violently opposed by the CIA, rightly supporting Arab armed struggle against the Israeli regime, and rightly opposed to an invasion against Israel. The Syrian leadership – and the Lebanese counterparts probably agreed – was favourable to a democratic peace with the Israelis but oppose to an Israeli supremacist or Zionist terror state:

Both Jamil Mardam Bey and Shukri al-Kuwatly had been closely following up on the Zionist affair since the Palestinian uprising of 1936. Back then, during a state visit to Paris, **Mardam Bey had met Chaim Weizman, head of the Zionist agency, in hopes of working out a peaceful solution to the crisis.** In discussing the Jewish affair Mardam Bey had conveyed a Syrian desire of achieving a solution that would please both parties. **To assure Weizman that war was not what the Syrian government wanted, he called for a Syrian-Jewish Conference in Damascus later that year.** Heading a delegation of the Zionist agency's most active figures, Weizman traveled to Syria to meet Shukri al-Kuwatly, Jamil Mardam Bey, and other politicians from the national movement. In Damascus, the Zionists made it clear that they would not cease their activities until the state of Israel was created. **Kuwatly declared that if the Zionist objective was to establish a home for themselves in Palestine, then they were welcome to live in harmony and peace with the local Arabs. However, if they were thinking of making of Palestine a Jewish home, then they would face immense Arab wrath and start a bitter hostility that would never end.** (...) Knowing perfectly well the inferiority of the Arab armies, **Kuwatly and Lebanese Prime Minister Riad al-Solh** summoned the Secretary General of the Arab League Abdul Rahman Azzam and asked him to refrain from advancing into Palestine. Under the impression that a fully organized Arab force could easily defeat a few Jewish fighters, Azzam was shocked to hear what both men were saying. **They added that they would be willing to provide the Palestinians with all possible arms and funds, but had reservations on involving their own forces in combat.** A head on collision with the

Jews would only mean certain defeat for all the Arab forces. Running on popular demand and **assurances from King Farouk that the war could easily be won**, Azzam ignored their plea and continued in his diplomatic mission to enlist support for the Arab army. The ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, who had led an uprising against the Jews in 1936, began touring Syria and Lebanon to elevate public support for Palestine. The people needed little encouragement, they were already asking for a full-scale war with the Jews. Both Kuwaty and Solh were now facing a dilemma; refusing to participate would have meant isolation among political circles and alienation within the Arab community. Likewise, sending their troops would most probably mean military defeat, yet an elevated standing among the masses. Both leaders took the second alternative. (Damascus Between Democracy and Dictatorship, Sami M. Moubayed, 2000, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The Egyptian Wafdist leader Noqrashi, a strategic ally of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, held similar opinions: It is fair to mention here that the late King Abdul Aziz Al Saud and the late Noqrashi were not willing to enter the Arab armies into Palestine. Al-Naqrashi was of the opinion that Egypt could not enter the war while the English army was perched on the Suez Canal. But the late King Farouk responded to the heads of the Arab ministries who met him and convinced him that the matter is nothing more than a "military picnic." (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al -Omar, 1999, pp. 392-393) (IMG)

Had a People's Democratic Israel been established, it was the failure to sign a friendship treaty with Israel that was going to be a stab in the back of the Arab nation because the new Israel was going to be friendly and favorable to the Arab people of Palestine. This is the reverse analogy of how the reactionary CIA-aligned Arab regimes established an official friendship with the CIA-aligned regime of Israel. On the other hand, the same Mapamite Palmach officials who sought to wreck the Israeli regime's military would have, upon assuming decisive control over the means of violence, sought to render the new Israel into a military superpower and rightly so. By contrast, the remnants of the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel, the agents of Ariel Sharon and Moshe Dayan, would have done everything they could to sabotage the military of the socialist-oriented Israel, so that the Anglo-American-backed faction would be re-installed back to power. Basically, the strategic realignment of Israel out of US orbit and onto an alliance with the USSR, would have completely reversed the situation.

Whereas the Arab war to overthrow of Israel's Kautskyite regime was progressive, a war to overthrow Israel as a country and society would have been reactionary. The Yiddish and Hebrew people who lived in Israel held a highly favorable towards the Soviet Union. They also had the collectively-owned agricultural enterprises that constituted important socialistic businesses competing against Anglo-American finance capital in Palestine; agricultural cooperatives are not just socialist cosmetics but materially entrench the anti-imperialist forces. The petit-bourgeoisie, concerned that they may lost their small business through confronting finance capital, do not risk revolutionary struggles; by contrast, when the petit-bourgeoisie unite into cooperatives, they come to have a socialistic version of a big business that can take risks and to compete with finance capital. Hence, the existence of kibbutzim, however flawed and idealistic the kibbutz model was, contributed to the entrenchment of the socialist anti-imperialist tendency, one manifestation of which was the Palmach. There also existed a powerful revolutionary socialist movement in Israel, with pervasive influence over the military and intelligence bodies, a movement so powerful that it never missed a chance to cause serious trouble for the Zionist fascist aggression plots. Among the Arabs of Palestine, by contrast, there were not as many cooperatives, the USSR did not hold as high a soft power, and the socialist movement was not very strong. In this light, it is not difficult to see why the establishment of a socialistic Arab-friendly Israel assisting the Arabs of Palestine would have been a far better option than the Rejectionist concept of ending Israel not just as a regime but also as a country. The United States and Britain wanted the regime of Israel to survive, but if the regime of Israel was to be doomed to be destroyed, the Anglo-Americans would have undoubtedly preferred that the Glubb-commanded Hashemite Jordanian monarcho-fascists would conquer Israel and destroyed Israel as a country – including the pro-Soviet Yiddish and Hebrews, the Kibbutzim, not to mention the Palmach – so that the socialist forces would not establish a powerful base in the Mediterranean coastlines. Volumes of historical evidence prove this fact about Anglo-American objectives. The Soviets wanted the exact opposite of this, which was why their stance was described as 'pro-Israel but anti-Zionist'.

The kibbutzim were cooperatives, albeit a very idealistic left-deviationist version of the cooperatives. Nonetheless, the key positive aspect of the kibbutzim was that it amalgamated the individual farms into larger businesses that were communally-controlled and thus, unlike small businesses that cannot take much the risk of competing against imperialist finance capital, these collectively-owned bigger businesses were more capable of taking risks to compete against the presence of American finance capital in Israel. As a result, many of the kibbutzim emerged as social bases for assisting the proletariat in the combat against Israel's regime. To be sure, there were exceptions in this respect; just like in any kind of a farm, there existed anti-socialist elements in the kibbutzim. Some members of the kibbutzim stole Arab property, other kibbutzim began to function more so like corporations and less so like cooperatives, and still others were multiple private farms that were cooperatives in the name only. However, the point is that the general trend of collectively-controlled business reduced the influence of finance capital thus elevating the Mapam agents of the proletariat. The

Palmach was an Israelite military force originating from the many pro-Soviet elements in the kibbutzim and was dominated by the Mapam officials. The Israeli victory in the 1948 War boosted Ben-Gurion's leverage, thereby allowing him to eliminate the Palmach and to reduce – but by no means wipe out – Mapam influence in the Israeli military. The Soviet objective with regards to Israel in the initial phase was the establishment of a Mapamite state in Israel, a government hostile to the Hashemite regime Jordan, friendly to the Arab population, and friendly to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies.

In an intelligence report to the Soviet secret service, the Soviet spy Moshe Sneh confirmed that the Irgun Zvi Leumi (IZL) was secretly backed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion:

When I asked which parties or political groups were showing an inclination to give ground, Sneh answered that at present there were three currents of thought in political circles: 1) the right wing of the Mapai Party and the representatives of the grande bourgeoisie, whose views were expressed in the government Rosenblueth, by Finance Minister Kaplan and the Minister of Justice and in the press by the newspaper Haaretz: These were all inclined to make territorial concessions in order to gain the agreement and support of the US and Britain; 2) **the extreme nationalists, revisionists and the IZL, secretly supported by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion**, who oppose concessions and are trying to reach an agreement with the US to obtain the annexation of part of the Arab territories of Palestine in order to hand them over later as concessions to American capital. Ben-Gurion's view is expressed in the press by the journalist Liebenstein [Livneh] in the newspaper Davar. 'What Liebenstein writes, Ben-Gurion thinks, or the other way round' said Sneh; 3) the United Workers' Party and the Communist Party of Israel are against any sort of concessions to, or compromises with, the US and Britain, but in favour of 'a just compromise' with the Arabs, and of the closest possible relations with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. (DIARY: AVP RF. F.089, OP.1, P.1. d3, LL.5-6, Secret, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – M. Sneh, Tel Aviv, October 9, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 381) (IMG)

According to the laws of dialectics and historical materialism, it makes sense to state that Ben-Gurion would secretly support IZL. The Irgun or IZL was a terrorist army founded by Ze'ev Jabotinsky from the Italian Fascists' Betar Naval Academy. As the Jerusalem Post, itself a Jabotinskyite media, stated:

Mussolini even took part in the establishment of the future Jewish state's defense force, helping Zionist leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky establish the Betar Naval Academy officer training camp in Civitavecchia for Mandatory Palestine Jews – which would eventually become the Israel Navy more than a decade later.. ("Catholic Italy's 'Promised Land'", The Jerusalem Post, Benjamin Glatt, January 23, 2017) (IMG)

The Italian Fascists were in turn led by a gang of MI6 spies headed by the British intelligence agent Mussolini (see C5S1). Jabotinsky was well-known for his collaboration with the Polish regime and the Petlura gang, both of which were MI6 satellites. It is completely natural that David Ben-Gurion, an agent of the British and American intelligence services, would support the Irgun, an MI6-funded terror army, all the while pretending to be hostile to them. The opposition of Ben-Gurion to Menachem Begin was like the opposition of Obama to McCain.

The influence of the Mapamites and the Palmach, which drew from the Israelite working class and the economically powerful kibbutzim, as well as the generally high soft power influence of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies among the Jews, all meant that it was possible for the progressive and socialist forces, the Arab-friendly Israelis, to take over the Israeli state some day and transition Israel towards a progressive Arab-friendly state, if not a socialist state. David Ben-Gurion's selection as the top candidate for Prime Minister by the Anglo-American intelligence services was obviously a part of the agenda of strengthening the Kautskyite forces as a means of undercutting the support base of the Mapamite socialist forces in Israel. The promotion of Ben-Gurion by the Anglo-Americans, therefore, was a part of the agenda of forming a Kautskyite dam against the tide in favor of socialism in Israel and an Israeli democratic peace with the Arabs. However, the agenda of the Anglo-Americans – secretly supported by Ben-Gurion as well – was to transition Israel towards a Pinochet-style politically totalitarian and economically neoliberal state, rather than a Kautskyite-type pro-fascist settler-colonial 'social democracy'. Such was why Ben-Gurion supported the Irgun. The job of the Kautskyite stay-behind agents is to take leadership of the cooperativists and the proletarians so to ensure the slow-down of these movements, giving time and room for breath to the fascists; the Ben-Gurion team was the Kautskyite team whereas the Jabotinskyite 'Revisionist Zionists' constituted the fascist movement.

Almost all of the other CIA-backed regimes outside of Western Europe and North America have been totalitarian regimes of the Pinochet type. Why has Israel been a top exception? Israel's regime, on behalf of finance capital, established an open terrorist dictatorship of the settler-colonial type over the Arabs such as in the West Bank, but Israel is not a fascist state the way that the Pinochet junta, the Pahlavi regime in Iran, the Hitler regime in Germany were. Inside Israel proper, Israel has some of the standard bourgeois-democratic procedures and it is possible for one to be openly a dissident and condemn the regime. Why the Israeli exception?

Some hold the view that because Israel had many European (particularly, Ashkenazi) faces, the United States and

Britain decided to allow for elections to happen in Israel so that Israel would be propagandistically hailed as 'the only democracy in the Middle East'. This perspective is incorrect. For start, the Anglo-Americans did not care much about playing the 'Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East' card because historically, the Anglo-American propaganda for painting fascist states as 'freedom states' has almost always sufficed. Furthermore, for an 'only democracy in the Middle East' propaganda card, they would have naturally leaned towards promoting Turkey, rather than Israel, as the best choice. Unlike Israel, Turkey had a Latinized de-Semitized alphabet. Unlike Israel, Turkey had a reputation for laicism. Unlike Israel, the Turkish population had not been educated with the communist opinions in the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Unlike in Israel, the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies did not have as much soft power influence among the Turks. Unlike Israel, Turkey could lay territorial claims to all of the Arab world and not just 'all of historic Palestine', and not just 'From the Nile to the Euphrates'. Hence, promoting Turkey would have been a better choice than Israel for the Anglo-Americans, insofar as the 'only democracy in the Middle East' card is concerned. Why then did the Anglo-Americans opt for 'allowing' parliamentary elections and some democratic procedures to exist in Israel but consistently established Pinochet-style fascist military dictatorships in Turkey? Why not elevate Turkey as the big propaganda card? The fact of Turkey being a predominantly Muslim country vs. Israel as a Jewish population cannot be a reason for this, for Turkey had a reputation for Europeanization, Westernization, de-Islamization, and laicism, whereas the European people and the North American people, with the long history of anti-Semitism in their countries, could just as easily be persuaded to continue to ethno-racially hate the Israeli Jewish civilian population all the while being also persuaded to hail Israel as the bastion of anti-Arabism. Some would argue that the migration issue made it necessary for Israel to become democratic, for Israel needed it as a propaganda weapon through which to promote Zionist migration to a 'free society'. Incorrect. Actually, it has never been difficult for the CIA to portray the countries under its influence as free, democratic, and worthy of living in. Fascist Yugoslavia, which was presented as democratic, was migrated to by many of the dissidents of the Peoples' Democracies and these migrants themselves were placed in slave camps by the Yugoslav regime and tortured there. And certainly many of the Mizrahim moved to Israel not out of passion for democracy per se but rather for being ghettoized away from the CIA-MI6-sponsored terror operations and pogroms in the Arab countries. Propaganda about the Jewishness and safety from (CIA-MI6-sponsored) pogroms – rather than propaganda about democracy – was enough to get the Mizrahim there. The CIA could have dressed (and did dress) its agents as 'Communist-backed Arabs' and launched pogroms to encourage Ashkenazi migration to Israel. Through such terror operations, the socialist sympathies among the Ashkenazim could further decline and the 'de-Nazified' Europe would have been portrayed as no safer from Palestinian revanchism than Israel. In sum, terror operations against Jews as a propaganda weapon for migration sufficed and there was no fundamental need for having democracy as a propaganda card, although of course democracy would have been a bonus for the propaganda.

One argument is that the migrations to Israel required a high freedom of travel for the Jews which in turn necessitated a free flow of information. The free flow of information, the argument goes, yielded a more informed citizenry that opposed democracy. The argument is wrong because knowledge about Jews and 'Jews' of other cultures and countries has little intellectual connection to fascism vs. democracy and cannot make a significant impact as to make the citizenry so much more informed that they would become a mighty force to oppose fascism.

Rather, the reason why the Anglo-Americans 'allowed' Israel to have some real democratic procedures was that the Anglo-Americans were forced to accept these democratic procedures. Anti-imperialist Arab armed struggle against the Israeli regime's military and intelligence apparatus – not to be confused with the Arab revanchist terror attacks targeting the civilians – rolled back the pro-fascist faction, the dominant faction, in the Israeli armed forces, thereby reducing the lobbying power of such a faction, while increasing the relative lobbying power and the operational room of the Mapam infiltrators in the ranks of the Israeli armed forces. The Mapam intelligence agents of the socialist forces and the representatives of the Israeli proletariat and the kibbutzim, blocked the agents of the Anglo-American finance capital from being able to transition Israel towards becoming a typical CIA-MI6 puppet dictatorship, and strengthened the political influence of the proletariat and the kibbutzim through entrenching the democratic procedures. Had the persistent anti-imperialist Arab armed struggle against the Israeli regime and in favor of the Mapam agents of the Israeli proletariat and kibbutzim not happened, Israel would have become Jewish version of the Saudi regime or later on, a Jewish version of the Pinochet junta. That is what a Kautskyite democratic state is, after all – a kind of a dictatorship of the fascist financial bourgeoisie that has been forced to accept the incorporation of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat through the forced acceptance of democratic procedures. In addition, the role of the kibbutzim which were largely affiliated with the Hashomer Hatzair or the Mapam should not be underestimated. Israel initially did not have a large proletariat; the collectively-controlled agricultural big businesses, the kibbutzim, competed against the presence of the front companies of Anglo-American finance capital in Israel, and thus reduced the strength of the parasitic class forces dominating that area, while increasing the leverage of the Mapam-Palmachnik agents of the proletariat in the state apparatus of Israel. This is to be contrasted with the agriculture of the countries devoid of a strong predominance of the cooperative mode of agriculture; in those countries, the peasants had small farms, and thus could not risk losing their small farms through such risky action as competing against the businesses controlled by American finance capital; this

facilitated the installation of CIA- backed comprador tyrannical regimes. To summarize, the keys to the exception in Israel were the Arab armed struggle and the kibbutzim, both of which reinforced the influence of the proletariat over the Israeli state. There existed a correlation between how authoritarian an Israeli politician was, how hostile to the kibbutzim he/she was, and how anti-Arab he/she was. The limited space here does not provide room for an in-depth explanation of this but let it be known that the history of Israel proves that there existed a strong positive correlation between (1) Arab anti-imperialist military successes and (2) the political strength of the kibbutzim. By contrast, the reason why America and Britain, two countries that never faced a direct anti-imperialist armed struggle inside their mainland/heartland territories, became democracies was that unlike Israel, America and Britain had a very large proletarian class. The working class in these countries was so large that it could impose democracy in them. Germany's proletariat was mostly concentrated in Prussia whereas the rest of Germany was mostly agrarian, and thus the proletariat was not so populous as to impose democracy upon the rising totalitarian state.

The Mapam leaders analyzed that the Ben-Gurion regime was plotting an alliance with the Irgun terrorists in order to transition Israel from a Kautskyite terrorist state to a fascist state more in line with Anglo-American interests and engaged in combat against the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. Ze'ev Tzahor – a prominent aide to Ben-Gurion, researcher on Mapam and the biographer of Ya'akov Hazan – wrote:

The explanation for the role of the underground is derived from the assumption that Ben-Gurion promised the Western powers military assistance during the impending World War. To confirm this assumption, they analyze Ben-Gurion's leadership and ideological past, in order to determine its future trends. Thus, for example, it was determined that Ben-Gurion decided on the dissolution of the Palmach even before the establishment of the state. Ben-Gurion was compared to Jabotinsky – both only pretended to be fighters against the British while they were really 'Anglophiles'. Ben-Gurion, who had always admired the British, formed a conspiracy with them, based off of which he gave up the conquest of the land [and handed Israel to the Anglo-Americans]. Its goal is to allow Britain to control Jordan and get through it and through Iraq to the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union. It was further determined that there is a written promise by Ben-Gurion to establish British and American military bases, which will turn the State of Israel into a logistical base of attack against the Soviet Union. The discussion included tenure, that Ben-Gurion wants to harm the kibbutz movement and strike a wedge inside the Mapam. A man devoid of such moral inhibitions could forge an alliance with the fascist Right led by Begin and turn the country into an arm of the West in the Middle East. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 198) (IMG)

The Mapam, which already had a powerful intelligence network in the command of the Israeli armed forces, began to prepare for a 'stay-behind' network that would wage armed resistance against the fascist regime of Israel should Israel transition from a Kautskyite state to a fascist state. The armed resistance was to take the form probably of a democratic restorationist counter-coup by the communist generals against the fascist coup, or Israel-wide guerrilla resistance against the regime:

In 1950, Mapam's secret cells operated in the security service, the military administration, the Ministry of Defense and the army. It must be said in advance that the matter of the Mapam Underground in the security system is extremely sensitive. Documentation about it is limited, and most of it is not available to the researcher. (...). Despite the caution and destruction of the evidence, records remain that deal with explaining the need to establish secret cells within the military. They mention two completely different missions: one, which was apparently outlined by Hazan, assumes the possibility that the Right, led by Menachem Begin, will take over the country by force and establish a fascist regime. In such a case, the cells are meant to gather early information to thwart the takeover, or to prepare for an underground struggle, if what has been defined as a 'fascist right-wing plot' succeeds. A completely different task is the one outlined apparently by Sneh, according to which, the cells must prepare for the possibility of war between the 'War-Mongering' West and the socialist 'World of Tomorrow'. An unsigned summary of a discussion in one of the cells indicates a revolutionary underground that will operate in the IDF and actively participate in the "imminent World War." (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 197-198) (IMG)

It is of interest to compare the main theme of the Mapam's internal discussions with Yitzhak Rabin's last speech in 1995. The Mapam harbored the thesis that a CIA-backed coup would transition Israel from a bourgeois-democracy into a Jabotinskyite fascist state. Comparably, Rabin, in his last speech, warned that right-wing extremist violence was posing a serious threat to the democratic tendency in Israel. Rabin said: "Violence is undermining the very foundations of Israeli democracy. It must be condemned, denounced and isolated. This is not the way of the State of Israel [ideally]. Controversies may arise in a democracy but the decision must be reached through democratic elections as happened in 1992 when we were given the mandate to do what we are doing and to continue to do so." Rabin could see what was coming. Within 24 hours, as Rabin predicted, the CIA and its Shin Bet mercenaries initiated the hybrid coup in Israel, first killing Israel's elected Prime Minister and then going on a hunt to purge off the Mapam agents in the high ranks of

the security apparatus of Israel. A fascist state, in the sense of a Pinochet-type junta, was not established, but the fascist forces did gain strength. The Kautskyite group of Shimon Peres then intentionally lost the election and handed the government over to Netanyahu, back then a Jabotinskyite puppet of the CIA's most favored man in Israel at the time, Ariel Sharon.

Anyways, let us return to the 1950s. The plan outlined by Moshe Sneh was that the Mapam operatives in the high ranks of the IDF would utilize their positions to stab the fascist efforts in the back and to sabotage the Israeli regime's war efforts against the USSR and its allies. It is worth reminding that the Mapam-affiliated generals in the IDF had already engaged in such activities, the most remarkable of which was the Altalena Affair during Israel's war against Soviet allies Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

Yet, not only was the Mapam to have such cadres in the IDF for the purpose of backstabbing the IDF's war on the Soviet Union, the Mapam leaders called on their comrades to prepare for the stay-behind guerrilla warfare against the Ben-Gurion regime on the side of the Red Army and its allies in the Middle East:

In 1949, Aharon Cohen, one of the prominent ideologues of the Kibbutz HaArtzi, demanded that they prepare in advance and prepare tools to help the Red Army, which was preparing to occupy the Middle East. The feature leading up to the Great War, which would also be the fulfillment of the 'Class War', spread in various and broad directions, including military preparations in advance against the possibility that Ben-Gurion, in alliance with the Right, would help the enemies of the Soviet Union. Against this background, Hazan dramatically announced from the Knesset podium: 'Here in Eretz Yisrael there lives – as long as we live – a force that will in its lifetime not allow our country to serve as a launching pad for war against the Soviet Union.' (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 199) (IMG)

One of the major IDF figures and Mapam agents to lead the Soviet Union's shadow war for the liberation of Israel from Anglo-American imperialism and the Mapai-Irgun alliance was Yisrael Bar, alternatively known as 'Israel Bar', 'Yisrael Beer', or 'Israel Beer'. Whereas mainstream historiography aims to credit the recruitment of Yisrael Bar to Khrushchev-era KGB in 1956, in actuality the recruitment of Yisrael Bar by the Soviet intelligence went back to long before 1956. Yisrael Bar was an intelligence agent of the USSR since during the Stalin era. Michael Bar-Zohar – an advisor to Moshe Dayan, a Ben-Gurion faction agent, a former Israeli Defense Ministry spokesman – admitted that Yisrael Bar had been a spy for the Soviet intelligence service in fact since long before the Great Patriotic War: Beer's arrest was not made public. On the bulletin board of the University of Tel Aviv was merely a notice that "Dr. Israel Beer's courses will not meet until further notice." His interrogation began in absolute secrecy.

Iser Harel was now convinced that Beer was a Soviet agent who had been installed in Israel over twenty years ago. Iser's case rested on the fact that Beer had fought in the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War.

Only a few officers of that brigade were still alive, the majority having either died during the war or been liquidated in Moscow or elsewhere on Stalin's orders. The few survivors had become faithful servants of the U.S.S.R., and before World War II several had been sent as spies into the West or, like Beer, into Palestine.

(Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, p. 205) (IMG)

Some may question the credibility of the allegation of intelligence activity for the USSR by Yisrael Bar; but is there a point in questioning such a matter? That Yisrael Bar was a top Mapam military man and a Mapam intelligence agent is no secret, nor is it controvertible that the Mapam was not just a Party but also an intelligence organization in Israel, providing top secret intelligence materials to the USSR on all the different aspects of the region. I see very little reason to question the Shin Bet's and Mossad's allegation that Yisrael Bar was a Soviet spy.

The Soviet spy Yisrael Bar was promoted to the high ranks of the Israeli state apparatus by the Mapam:

it was the leaders of Mapam who had "discovered" Beer, linked him to their party, and opened the way for him to the top. (Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, p. 209) (IMG)

The emergence of an Israeli working class base gave rise to the intelligence penetration of the progressive forces in the Israeli military, the foremost among them the organizational predecessors of the Mapam – Moshe Sneh's network among the General Zionists, the Hashomer Hatzair, the forces that made up the Achudt Haavoda, etc. Since the Mapam had a significantly high level of influence in the IDF, with Galili in the top ranks of the Haganah and Palmach as a top Israeli military, Yisrael Bar found it easy to rise upwards in the ranks of the Haganah. The Shin Bet, Israel's FBI equivalent reported:

Bar's publication of articles on military subjects led to his acceptance in 1940 as a permanent member of the "Hagana". There, he took part in training and in planning until the outbreak of the War of Independence. With the establishment of the IDF he was appointed as one of the two assistants to the head of the Operations Division and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff as well as serving as head of the Planning Division for the Operations Division, at the rank of lieutenant colonel. ('Yisrael Bar (1961)', Shabak/Shin-Bet) (IMG)

Again, as mentioned previously, the military victory of Israel's terror regime over the Arabs in the 1948 War gave greater leverage to the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel thus reducing the leverage of the Mapam. This factor was key in causing the demotion of the communist Mapamite generals in the Israeli military. Naturally, Yisrael Bar was among the demoted. His demotion, however, did not stop his intelligence activities. The Shin Bet stated:

He requested discharge from the IDF in 1949, because of his failure to be promoted to a new position in the Operations Division in direct subordination to the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. He bitterly claimed that he was not promoted because his credibility was in question because of his connection with an opposition party, "Mapam". Bar was formally discharged after a leave of absence in July 1950. ('Yisrael Bar (1961)', Shabak/Shin-Bet) (IMG)

Since the ouster of Yisrael Bar from the IDF, the Mapamite general continued his active role in the Mapam's intelligence service. The Mapam had a Military Committee which in turn had an internal committee led by Baruch Rabinov, the Mapam's security chief:

Mapam's official Military Committee was composed of impressive names: Yitzhak Sadeh, Yisrael Bar, Eliyahu Cohen Ben-Hur, Yigal Allon, Moshe Carmel, Shimon Avidan. The Committee was concentrated on Baruch Rabinov. His choice stemmed from his being less known to the public, and mainly due to his absolute loyalty to the movement and its leaders. It was agreed by the recognized security personnel that most of the Committee's action would be done without them, and perhaps even without their knowledge. The lists in our possession show that the plenum of the Committee was seldom convened. The place of the official Security Committee was taken by an internal committee. We know that it had five members, headed by Rabinov, and that among the official Committee only Yisrael Bar was included. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 201) (IMG)

Indeed, so critical was Yisrael Bar's role that he was both in the Military Committee – which included Yigal Allon (and his protegee Yitzhak Rabin, not mentioned above) – and the internal committee of the Military Committee. The Shin Bet too stated:

Bar was politically active in "Mapam" during his service in the IDF ... After his resignation from the IDF he began work in Mapam, as head of its security department. In this position he obtained military intelligence information about the IDF in order to keep party officials, who were in the opposition, informed, and was closely connected with the party's information department which was gathering political non-military intelligence.

During his "Mapam" activity Yisrael Bar was closely associated with [Soviet spy] Moshe Sneh, the leader of the "Left Socialists", a group that identified completely with the USSR, and supported them blindly, even during the Prague Trials and the Moscow Doctors' Plot during the years 1952-1953.

('Yisrael Bar (1961)', Shabak/Shin-Bet) (IMG)

Yigal Allon was an intelligence agent of Yisrael Bar, and Yisrael Bar was a spy for the Soviet Union. According to the Shin Bet, Yisrael Bar also had close ties to Moshe Sneh and belonged to his faction. Yisrael Bar was led in turn by Baruch Rabinov, the Mapam's security chief:

Some of the heroes of the War of Independence, who felt that they had fallen into disgrace from the Army, turned to the [Mapam] Party's leadership and offered their services. It was all for the purpose of making the move to prepare a revolutionary alternative, relying upon on the senior IDF officers who were forced to retire from the very body they had set up and headed to war. Their previous status in the military allowed them to expand the base and secretly, of course, actively serve as officers.

(...). Another source that indicates the activity of the secret cells is a document file by Baruch Rabinov, who was then head of the Security Committee of the Kibbutz Haartzi.

Baruch Rabinov, a member of Beit Alfa, one of the leaders of the Haganah and one of the senior members of the Ministry of Defense at the time of its establishment, is the one who links the issue to Hazan. Rabinov was in the first circle of Hazan's associates, and in matters of security he was his secret man. The relationship between them went beyond the loyalty of the movement's activist to its leader, and developed into a personal and family friendship. In the vicinity of the Palmach Convention [against Ben-Gurion faction's dismantlement of the Palmach], Rabinov was also "fired" from the defense establishment. After many years of activity in senior positions in the security fields in the locality, Beit Alfa expected him to return home. Hazan turned to his kibbutz and asked Rabinov to approve the continuation of the activity. He was called to coordinate the Party's Security Committee. Hazan did not have to ask for much; the members hinted that there were compelling reasons forcing them to give up the principle of rotation [of positions] in this case. The position assigned to Rabinov was not an ordinary movement activity and it [was] advisable not to [expose it to too many members or] talk about it much. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 197) (IMG)

Another noteworthy member of the Mapam's Military Committee, noted by Tzahor, was Shimon Avidan. Avidan was a Yiddish-German and Israeli socialist fighter whose name is not so widely known, despite his major contributions to the

proletariat's struggle. Like Yisrael Bar, he had been a veteran of the Spanish Civil War and thus inevitably came into contact with NKVD intelligence agents. After the Spanish Civil War, he came to Israel and, as mentioned in C16S7, led the Palmach troops in the war to liquidate the Irgun, during 'the Season'. Subsequent to the campaign of semi-liquidating the Irgun, Shimon Avidan became the commander of the famous Givati Brigade. As a result of the Ben-Gurion faction's military victories in the war against the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces, the Ben-Gurion faction was able to expand its share of power at home, at the expense of the Mapam-Palmach faction. Avidan lost his position due to 'his extreme left-wing philosophy ... irreconcilable with Ben-Gurion's policies', recalled Chaim Herzog, the Kautskyite IDF commander who later became the President of Israel and who fathered Israel's current Kautskyite President Yitzhak Herzog. In his memoirs, Chaim Herzog recalled:

The second Israeli brigade was the 'Givati' Brigade, which was unusually large by Israeli standards and consisted of five battalions, totalling over 3,000 men. This had no heavy equipment at its disposal and was responsible for the defence of the southern part of the country immediately north of the Negev Desert (in other words, the area immediately north of the road from Majdal or Ashkelon to Beit Jibrin). It was commanded by one of the more impressive Jewish commanders in the War of Independence, Colonel Shimon Avidan. A native of Germany who had moved to Kibbutz Ein Hashofet in Palestine, he had volunteered for, and served in, the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War. A slight, fair-haired, determined man, with a toothbrush-like moustache, he was a natural leader. After the war, in which he distinguished himself as an outstanding commander, he was to resign from the Army because his extreme left-wing philosophy proved to be irreconcilable with Ben-Gurion's policies. (The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East, Chaim Herzog, Shlomo Gazit, 1982, pp. 69-70) (IMG)

His role in the Spanish Civil War and his association to Yisrael Bar and the Mapam Military Committee were indications of his possible direct ties to Soviet intelligence. By the mid-1970s, when Yitzhak Rabin and Yigal Allon became the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel respectively, Avidan saw a rise in his political influence and gained a high-ranking position in the Ministry of Defense.

As mentioned before, the Mapam utilized its pervasive intelligence presence in Israel as a Soviet intelligence network as well. Note that the Soviet intelligence station in Tel Aviv had reported to Moscow, in reference to the Mapam, that: they [i.e. Mapam] offer comprehensive information [to us] about Israel and the Arab countries. (DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363 -365) (IMG)

The activities of the Mapam's Military Committee were pervasive and were concerned with all aspects of military operations. **Underground weapons caches were to be set up by the Mapam for the purpose of an Israeli revolutionary war against the Mapai-Irgun regime for tackling the scenario of a World War or a transition to fascist statehood.** At least one large transmitter was also set up. Tens of high-ranking IDF officials worked for the Mapam and plans were made regarding the promotions of the generals, the lobbying and the deployment of agents into key positions in the command. Referring to the activities of the Mapam's Military Committee and the latter's internal committee, Tzahor wrote:

It is also possible to learn from the remaining records that the political authority with which they consulted was Hazan. Ran Golan, from Mishmar HaEmek, who compiled lists that upload a kind of group photo of the kibbutz veterans, to explain how from time to time, in the late hours of the night, a senior officer is seen climbing the path leading to Hazan's room. In the secret room in the kibbutz, Ran Golan describes, they talk about issues that are not sensitive to them, that can not be talked about in the Knesset, certainly not over the phone. From time to time, wider meetings were held, two or three officers, Baruch Rabinov and Hazan. Some of the meetings of the internal, limited Committee were held in Mishmar HaEmek. The official, expanding Committee was not involved in the operative issues. It set out the principles of operation, although sometimes operational issues were brought before it. Thus, for example, at its meeting on May 9, 1950, it approved a comprehensive emergency preparedness. A torn page, which is part of the summary, remains in our hands. It can be read as follows:

1. Each farm must carefully separate the weapon that was invented for it by the Haganah and the IDF, and it is in the registration of the IDF armament service, and the weapon that was purchased by the farm directly and is not in the above [IDF/Haganah] registration.

2. The second type of weapon, which is not in the IDF records, must be stored in a special hiding place in accordance with the cache arrangements, with all the provisions of the secrets contained therein.. The subject matter and the location of the hiding place cannot be known to more than three people.

A 'large transmitter' was hidden in one of the kibbutzim.

At other meetings, information was provided on the activities of the 'party cells in each unit', on a plan to

return one hundred officers to the regular army at the party's initiative, and on 'pushing young recruits into positions'. No less than ninety officers in the regular army worked in the secret activities of Mapam cells in the IDF. The lists were marked as top secret. Most were destroyed of course. The information passed on to the members was general, usually without names. The information passed on to the members was general, usually without names. Baruch Rabinov allowed himself to be praised in an anonymous description of the roles held by the secret partners:

1 Commander-in-Chief, 2 Chiefs of Staff, 2 Command Operation Officers, 3 Brigades, 2 Lieutenants, 1 District Commander, 5 Deputy District Commanders, 1 Corps Commander, 2 senior Navy officers, 6 in the Air Force, 7-10 in the General Staff, 6 instructors in the battalion commander course, 20 trainees [in a battalion commander course?] [previous square brackets by Tzahor].

Of the names mentioned in the various lists, 11 are expected to reach the rank of Alufs and above.

(Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 199-200) (IMG)

Note that the term 'Aluf literally means 'Hero', is rooted in the word 'Thousand', and can be regarded as an Israeli equivalent of Major-General. The IDF Chiefs of Staff as well as some Mossad Directors were ranked as 'Aluf. And there were indeed two Mossad Directors – Yitzhak Hofi and Nahum Admoni – and several IDF Chiefs of Staff all operating as agents of the Mapam. The Mapam also had agents in of the ranks of the right-wing parties:

In 1950, Mapam's secret cells operated in the security service, the military administration, the Ministry of Defense and the army. (...). Some of the cell members later made an impressive security career. Of those, there were generals, ambassadors and Members of the Knesset who were not necessarily [officially affiliated with the] Mapam. One of them was a minister in a right-wing party. This is based on several sources. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 197) (IMG)

The secret weapons caches for an armed revolt were to be stored in at least 50 kibbutzim:

The latter include testimonies from members of kibbutzim, who were asked to prepare a weapons depot parallel to the official warehouse, recognized and registered by the authorities. According to them, a secret weapons depot has been prepared in at least fifty kibbutzim. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 197) (IMG)

So securely hidden were some of these weapons caches that they are still in the process of being discovered. An example is a weapons cache that was discovered in 2014. In the Kibbutz Mesilot, affiliated with the Hashomer Hatzair, there existed a hiding place for the weapons that was believed to have been established after the 1948 War – that is after March 1949, most likely in 1950. The Ha'aretz reported:

An old weapons cache containing dozens of rifles was uncovered at Kibbutz Mesilot in the Beit She'an Valley Monday, during excavation for the construction of a new classroom in the local school.

The rifles were found wrapped up in wax paper, outside the kibbutz fence. Kibbutz members said the police had been informed and a police sapper would be dealing with the find. The man who hid the rifles, Ephraim Neubart, passed away and no one knows when he hid them. Neubart's son, Gadi, told Haaretz that no one knew about the cache except two other members, who used to be the kibbutz metal workers.

"We knew more or less where the 'slik' was, Neubart said, using the slang word for such weapons caches, best known for the role they played in the 1948 War of Independence. But Neubart's assumption about the date of the cache is surprising – he believes his father and his confidants hid the weapons after the state was established, and not during the war.

"My father took his secret to the grave with him and was never willing to reveal where the 'slik' was," he said.

('British Mandate-era Arms Cache Found Under Israeli Kibbutz', Ha'aretz, Eli Ashkenazi, January 28, 2014) (IMG)



A photo of one of the Mapam arms caches in Israel. The communist loyalist members of the Mapam decided to take the secret of such arms caches with them to the grave and only six decades later were these arms caches discovered. Source of Image:

(‘British Mandate-era Arms Cache Found Under Israeli Kibbutz’, Ha’aretz, Eli Ashkenazi, January 28, 2014. Credit for photos: Israel Police Spokesperson). (IMG)

Some of these weapons may have been stolen from the IDF itself:

It is possible that in rare cases, weapons were taken from IDF warehouses and stored in hiding places; it is conceivable that maps and information were collected, and that the early stages of the practical preparations for the outbreak of world war also began. The only operative plans dealt with a response to the possibility that the Revisionist [i.e. Jabotinskyite] Right would take power by force over the state. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze’ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 199-201) (IMG)

The cells established by the Mapam Military Committee propagated among the army officers, educating them about communist ideas and/or Hashomer Hatzair ‘Socialist Zionist’ ideas, and instructed them on methods of sabotage:

Little is known about cell activity. From the remaining descriptions one can learn about the influence of the literature of the Russian Revolution on the way the cells were constructed and the method of their operation. The cells were secluded, gathering in secret places outside the base, usually in a nearby kibbutz or in the private home of one of their friends. The cell was egalitarian, with no regard for ranks, and meetings were held without uniforms. They were attended by soldiers in regular service and permanent officers. The management of the cell was entrusted to a secretary, elected by the cell. Sometimes the military rank of the cell secretary was lower than that of the other members. The main function of the cell was to secretly infuse the spirit of the revolution into the tents of the army, and to wait for the day of command. In the cell the unit problems were also discussed, including promotions and roles.

Recruitment to the cell is done in the best underground tradition. A man who was then a cadet in an officers' course says that one day he was secretly approached by a cadet from his friends and invited him to a secret meeting of cadets from his course in a private apartment in Netanya. Yisrael Bar attended the meeting, which convinced them to participate in the cell. The meetings were held once every two weeks, on an evening assigned to After Duty. There were guest lectures, and mostly internal discussions. Thus, for example, the question was discussed, what should the soldier do if he is required to unload a weapon ship intended for the army in the port of Haifa – to attach the weapon to the sea, or whether the needs of the army require him to receive weapons from any source, even American. Apparently, the activity in the cells did not deviate from their social formation, and the ideological and theoretical discussion was emphasized in it.

(Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze’ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 199-201) (IMG)

In the Shin Bet and the Mossad, Mapamite intelligence networks were woven:

The expansion of the secret cell network could have led to their exposure. Indeed, the bustling activity did

not go unnoticed by Isser Harel, especially the one that was woven in his immediate environment. He himself [unintentionally/unwillingly] added to the security service a concentrated group of about thirty Palmach men, led by Gershon Rabinowitz of Ruhama. In the television program "Such a Life" dedicated to the cantor, Isser Harel told about "Mapam's underground, an underground within government ministries, within my organization, within the security service." (Hazan: Movement of Life,

Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 199-201) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion himself had expressed serious concern about this matter. In a conversation with US intelligence representative in Israel, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion remarked:

". in [the] event world conflict ... Mapam could possibly cause embarrassment..". (784A.13/7-3150: Telegram, The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State, Top Secret, Priority, Tel Aviv, July 31, 1950. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 5, United States Department of State, pp. 960-961. Note: many US diplomatic documents are written deliberately in an abbreviated or note form as means of making the document brief.) (IMG)

According to Tzahor, citing the testimonies of people he contacted, Moshe Sneh had established a network of cells made up of handpicked communist and progressive loyalists that would have taken secrets with them to the grave rather than reveal their weapons caches:

Later testimonies relate to the activity that took place in the cells of another leader, Moshe Sneh. Hazan treated with suspicion the brilliant Doctor, who had just replaced stormy Zionist activism with equally stormy revolutionary activism. Sneh's attempt to bypass the 'historical leadership' and build a direct channel of dialogue with the young people of the 'national kibbutz' by virtue of his charisma provoked unrest. Sneh, who wanted to cultivate his relations with the young people of the 'Kibbutz HaArtzi' without provoking the anger of the leadership, preferred that his connection to the cells not be known to Hazan. Sneh's connection to the cells was thus limited to a small and determined part of them, and kept a secret within a secret. In the distance of time it is not possible to determine with certainty the method of activity of the two in the cells and their personal part in their management. There is room for speculation, whose role was limited to shaping the ideological framework of the organization. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 198) (IMG)

As can be seen, there existed a powerful communist resistance network in Israel. Such a communist resistance intelligence network was able to grow and become a force to be reckoned with, lest we forget, thanks first and foremost to the strong presence of the kibbutzim in the Israeli economy in the alliance with the proletariat as well as the high soft power influence of socialism among the Ashkenazim. The Palmach arose out of the kibbutzim although it was commanded by the Achdut Haavoda operatives based in the urban proletarians. The kibbutzim and the proletarians frequently fought for expelling the United States from Israel.

There were other Mapam-affiliated Soviet spies in the high ranks of the Israeli state apparatus. One of them allegedly was 'Wolf Goldstein'. Since the Yiddish migrants to Israel often changed their names to Hebrew names, his name changed to 'Ze'ev Avni'. Avni's case is covered by a fog of Mossad-sponsored sensationalism. Nonetheless, it was said that Ze'ev Avni had been a communist spy of the Soviet intelligence service since 1943, that he had migrated to Israel and linked up with the Mapam, and that he had thereupon been catapulted to the high ranks of the Mossad while actually continuing his service to the Soviet secret service. Christopher Andrew, the official historian of the MI5, wrote:

Potentially the most important KGB agent during Israel's first decade was Ze'ev Avni, born Wolf Goldstein, a multilingual economist and ardent Communist who had spent the Second World War in Switzerland where in 1943 he had been recruited by the GRU. Avni was a committed ideological agent. 'There was no doubt in my mind', he wrote later, 'that I belonged not only to the vanguard of the revolution, but to its very elite.' In 1948 he emigrated to Israel, joined a kibbutz and contacted the Soviet embassy to try to renew his links with the GRU. He was disappointed to receive a lukewarm, non-committal welcome – possibly because of his lack of security at the kibbutz, where he had made no secret of his Communist convictions and told a senior Mapam member that he would be happy to help the Party establish 'a direct link to Moscow'. In 1950 Avni entered the Israeli Foreign Ministry, where he behaved with much greater discretion. A later security enquiry 'had no difficulty finding people who had known Avni as a militant Communist' at his kibbutz but found 'practically universal admiration' for him among his fellow diplomats, who were entirely unaware that his real loyalty was to the Soviet Union.

In 1952 Avni had his first foreign posting as Israeli commercial attache in Brussels, where he was also appointed security officer and given the keys to the legation's only safe, in which classified documents were kept. Having successfully renewed contact with the GRU, he began photographing the contents of the safe. After his arrest four years later, he admitted to his interrogator, 'I gave them everything I had.' Remarkably, Avni's enthusiasm for the Soviet Union survived even the paranoia of the 'Jewish doctors' plot'. He later told his interrogator that Stalin had been a 'genius' and initially refused to believe that Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' of

1956 denouncing Stalin was genuine.

(The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 193) (IMG)

On behalf of the Mossad, Avni was to establish contacts with the West German Nazis (i.e. Gehlen agents) and the regime of the Gestapo agent Tito:

While in Brussels, Avni also began to be employed by Mossad, using his fluent German to pose as a German businessman and make contact with former Nazis. Late in 1953, Avni was offered both a full-time position in Mossad and the post of commercial attache in Belgrade and Athens. It was agreed that during his next posting he would combine espionage for Mossad with work as commercial attache, based chiefly in Belgrade, and thereafter move to a permanent position in Mossad. Once in Belgrade, Avni was assigned a new controller operating under diplomatic cover as first secretary at the Soviet embassy. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 193) (IMG)

According to Christopher Andrew:

In 1955-56 Avni supplied the KGB residency in Belgrade with the ciphers used by Mossad for communications with its Belgrade and Athens stations (probably enabling them to be decrypted), as well as details of Mossad personnel (probably both officers and agents) in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. As in Brussels, he gave his controller 'everything I had'. Avni was caught early in 1956 and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 194) (IMG)

However:

Avni was caught early in 1956 and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 194) (IMG)

The precise date of Avni's arrest was in April, only one month after the 20th CPSU Congress. The 20th CPSU Congress was the Party Congress in which the Great Purge was denounced as 'criminal' and the Soviet intelligence service was condemned as the 'Stalinist' body responsible for such 'crimes'. A course of 'de-Stalinizing' the Soviet intelligence service began. 'De-Stalinizing' the Soviet intelligence service really meant destroying the Soviet intelligence service, elevating MI6 operatives at its high ranks, and most importantly for Avni's case, eliminating the agents of the Stalin faction in the Soviet intelligence. One of those Stalin faction loyalists reportedly was Avni:

Avni ... told his interrogator that Stalin had been a 'genius' and initially refused to believe that Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' of 1956 denouncing Stalin was genuine. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 193) (IMG)

The 'De-Stalinization' of the Israel branch of the Soviet intelligence service seems to have come about in the form of the betrayal of Avni to the Shin-Bet chief, Isser Harel. 1956 was also the year in which the 'Cambridge Five', who were described as the Stalin-era Soviet spies in the high ranks of the MI6, were publicly exposed.

Levi Levi, an alleged Soviet spy in Israel, was captured in 1957:

Zeev Avni, who worked in the Foreign Ministry and carried out special missions for the Mossad, was caught, convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term in 1956. Levi (Lucian) Levi worked for the Operations Unit (today the Operations Branch), of the Shin Bet, which as part of its mission, according to foreign reports from Poland, broke into the embassies of the communist countries, in order to photograph documents and install listening devices. He was arrested and sentenced to prison in 1957. (In Depth: The KGB's long history of running agents in Israel, The Jerusalem Post, Yossi Melman, October 27, 2016) (IMG)

It is interesting to note that Yisrael Bar was hunted down by the Shin-Bet in 1961, the year in which the Khrushchev group launched what Western historians refer to as the 'Second Wave of De-Stalinization'. Paul Lendvai, a Zionist Hungarian defector to Austria and a journalist for the CIA-sponsored Die Presse, wrote

At the Central Committee plenum in November-December 1961, Gheorghiu-Dej coped easily with the repercussions of Khrushchev's second de-Stalinization campaign. The Party leader, who since March 1961 had also been President of the republic, asserted that he had been a helpless prisoner of the Pauker group and, by purging them, had restored "collective leadership." (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 337) (IMG{Romania})

1961 was the year in which the concept of the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' was denounced by the Khrushchev group and the CPSU officially described the Eurasian state as an 'All People's State'. An official split with China and Albania happened and there was an effort to rehabilitate Yugoslavia's role in the 1956 affairs in Hungary. The year 1961 was also the last year of the Syro-Egyptian unity in the United Arab Republic. That was the year in which the leverage of the progressive forces throughout the Middle East went on the decline, and the arrest of Yisrael Bar was undoubtedly influenced by such factors.

The question of boycott, divestment, and sanctions against any reactionary regime in any part of the world is a question of factional conflict, in turn based directly on class conflict. The crippling sanctions and the campaign of

economic warfare shall be directed against the pro-fascist faction, the dominant faction, of the pro-fascist regime. By contrast, economic warfare should be used to sponsor and economically elevate the faction of the progressive infiltrators in the reactionary regime. What does this mean in the context of Israel? It means that economic warfare was to be directed towards sabotaging the Israeli regime's trade ties to the Anglo-American imperialists and their allies while increasing Israel's trade ties to the Soviet Union. The minimum gain that the reorientation of Israeli trade away from Anglo-American imperialists towards the USSR would have yielded was to make Israel less dependent on Anglo-American finance capital and thereby less susceptible to accepting the presence of the CIA-MI6 front companies in Israel; this would have reduced the CIA presence in Israel thus weakening the Ben-Gurion faction. The medium-level gain would be that the Soviets use this trade for purchasing products from the Mapam-affiliated kibbutzim so to increase financial support for the Mapam. The maximum gain would have been that the Soviets would utilize the trade ties to establish their 'Joint-Stock Companies' with Israel for investing there – and for using their front company presence in Israel to furnish the Mapam with all kinds of covert military and financial aid for preparing for the eventual conquest of Israel by Israel's proletariat. The extensive influence of the Israeli proletariat over Israel would have thereupon caused Israel's alliance with the Palestinian Arab proletariat.

For sabotaging Israel's trade ties to the Anglo-American imperialists and economically isolating the Ben-Gurion regime, the Israeli proletariat led by the Mapam took major steps in this direction. In an interview, Mapam leader General Moshe Sneh had said:

Today we are an independent state and we are in a position to reject all American demands. It is evident that our resistance can only succeed if it is supported by help from sincere friends of our independence, that is, in the first place by the help of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. We do not have the least confidence that the present government of Israel will put up effective resistance to the demands of American imperialism. The composition of the government – right-wing social democrats (Mapai), religious front, small bourgeois parties – determines in advance its political line of submission to the policy of the United States. That is why we are conducting a fight of unswerving opposition to the policies of the government inside and outside of the Knesset. (...). Our economic program aims at the following objectives: nationalization of the land, of water sources, of natural resources (the Dead Sea), of electricity, of oil refineries and of foreign trade; radical recasting of the fiscal system by increase of direct taxation and suppression of indirect taxation and creation of the tax on capital; increase in the volume of trade with the USSR and with all European countries which would replace imports solely from Anglo-Saxon countries, which inevitably lead to the increase in the deficit of our trade balance; democratization in general of the whole economic system, as closely as possible in accordance with the example of the popular democracies and in the spirit of the pioneers of our renaissance. (INTERVIEW WITH DR. SNEH, Neie Presse (a Paris Yiddish daily), Interviewer: L. Bruck, interviewee: Moshe Sneh, pp. 1-2. MIA) (IMG)

To this end, the Mapam launched one of the biggest labour strikes in Israel's history. An excerpt of the 'World Communist Movement' document, which was the major document for the McCarthyite US Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, was as follows:

November 16 – Israeli Sailors Union stages strike

In the ports of Haifa and Jaffa 800 seamen of the Israeli Sailors Union staged a "resignation strike against the role of Histadrut, the Israeli trade union federation, in the affairs of the union. The Sailors Union was controlled by the "pro-Soviet" Mapam Party.

(‘The World Communist Movement: Selective Chronology, 1818-1957’, Vol. 3: 1951-1953, the Legislative Reference Services of the US Library of Congress, 1954, p. 562. Printed for the use of the: Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), US Congress.) (IMG)

The Mapam-led strike was prolonged and strong in participant count. It economically isolated the Ben-Gurion regime, nullified Israel's navy, and slowed down the pace of Zionist migration for the while. Howard Sachar, the notorious Ben-Gurion apologist and prominent American-Israeli historian who spoke to the Ben-Gurion agent and Kautskyite trade-unionist Joseph Almogi, wrote:

One fact seemed certain: Almogi would never enter an alliance with the Communists. His reaction to the seamen's strike of 1951 was reassurance enough. That year Israel's Zim Steamship Company listed eight hundred sailors and officers on its rosters. All of them belonged to the seamen's union – and thus

to the Histadrut. At the same time, a few Communists and fellow travelers had penetrated their ranks.

Most of these extreme leftists had fallen under the influence of the pro-Communist Mapam party and of its leader, Dr. Moshe Sneh. Sneh detested the socialist gradualism of the Mapai party, and of the Mapai-controlled Histadrut. Sparing no effort to embarrass the Ben-Gurion administration, he and his followers resorted to such tactics as wildcat strikes and artificial "hunger" demonstrations. These were old Stalinist tricks, of course, but from time to time they seemed likely to produce results within the Israel merchant marine. Sneh's principal

lieutenant in the seamen's union was Nimrod Eshel, a twenty-five-year-old bosun and native-born Israeli who had been deeply influenced by the Communist-controlled seamen's unions of France and Italy.

Gathering a few picked sailors around him, most of them skilled agitators, Eshel concentrated his fire on working conditions in the Zim company. He was on strong ground here, for in those days many of the ships were quite old, and crew facilities on board were far from satisfactory. Instead of bringing his grievances before the local workers' council, however, Eshel initiated a series of wildcat strikes on every one of Zim's freighters in Haifa harbor. Hardly a week went by without a walkout on one vessel or another – and this at the most critical period of Israel's economic development. Eventually, by sheer persistence, Eshel induced most of his fellow seamen to go out on a general strike. And still he refused to meet with the Zim representatives.

Almogi tried to reason with the bosun. "Look here," he said, "we've got a workers' council precisely for the purpose of negotiating with the owners. Give us a chance at least to bargain with them."

"Nothing doing," Eshel insisted, "we want no interference from the Histadrut. We're handling this affair entirely on our own."

As later events made clear, Eshel's ultimate goal was the paralysis of the Israel maritime industry. Almogi suspected this at the time, but could not prove it. He knew only that the fiery young agitator parroted Eshel's line down to the last syllable, that he stubbornly avoided recourse to the very machinery of collective bargaining which was capable of redressing the workers' grievances. Almogi recognized, too, that if the Histadrut surrendered to Eshel's demands for autonomy, Mapam would be in a position to encourage other unions to break away – and thus disrupt altogether the painfully created solidarity of the labor movement. Finally, Zim itself might well fall into the hands of the Communists, and that would mean the end of maritime connections with the most important shippers in the free world.

(Aliyah: The Peoples of Israel, Howard Morley Sachar, 1961, pp. 275-276) (IMG)

Further evidence of attempts to sabotage Israel's trade with the US-led camp lies in the fact that the Israeli workers in New York and Baltimore joined the Mapam-led strike as well, with a Histadrut official in USA warning those workers that such worker action was economically isolating Israel from its Western anti-Arab allies:

The 59 striking Israel seamen who tied up two Israeli ships in New York and Baltimore and were interned on Ellis Island were deported today from the United States to Israel on the Greek vessel Nea Hellas. Their ships – the Yafu and the Haifa – sailed from the ports of New York and Baltimore, respectively, manned by other crews.

Dr. Joseph Burstin, representative of the Histadrut in the United States, told a press conference here today that the Federation of Labor in Israel is opposed to the demands by the striking Israel seamen who are seeking the right to declare strikes in foreign ports and request autonomy for their employment bureaus. Dr. Burstin emphasized that Israel cannot permit the seamen to strike while in foreign ports since this might paralyze normal traffic between the Jewish state and the outside world.

The representative of the Histadrut pointed out that Israel is surrounded by enemies on land and that its only contact with the outside world is by sea. Israel's entire import and export trade would be exposed to sabotage by irresponsible elements if Israeli seamen were permitted to strike in foreign ports, he emphasized.

(Striking Israeli Seamen Deported from U.S. to Israel on Greek Ship, The Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December 21, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Ehud Sprinzak, an advisor to the former Palmach commander Yitzhak Rabin and a potentially pro-Mapam scholar, wrote:

The shutdown of Israel's entire shipping industry was not regarded by the government as a legitimate labor dispute but as a treacherous attempt to paralyze the state fomented by "enemies of the nation and communists." Referring to the conflict in the Knesset, Ben-Gurion asserted, "There was and there is no strike. What is at stake is an effort by the enemies of the state to paralyze the Hebrew navy, an effort strongly supported by several factions for whom the desire to sabotage the state takes first priority.... It is for the working public to decide whether it is a strike, not for the Yevsektzia [a Jewish communist organization in the Soviet Union that always represented the party line] and their collaborators in other factions." (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 81) (IMG)

Meanwhile, as Israel's commercial ties to the US-led camp were being sabotaged, the Soviet Union and Israel continued to foster trade relations with each other. The Israeli long-time career diplomat Yosef Gavrin wrote in the timeline section of book:

9 December 1951

Israeli-Soviet trade negotiations were concluded concerning the exportation of 5,000 tons of citrus fruit from Israel to the USSR.

(Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953-67: From Confrontation to Disruption, Yosef Govrin, 1990, p. 33) (IMG)

This measure by the Soviet Union was interpreted by Israel's Foreign Ministry as a means of strategically reorienting Israel further away from American imperialism:

at the end of 1951, Russia and Israel signed an agreement for the supply of 125,000 crates of citrus fruit worth \$100,000. In the Foreign Ministry this Soviet step was interpreted as a Soviet regional tactic, prompted by rumors of the establishment of a Mideast Command at American initiative; purchases from Israel were perhaps intended to "reinforce neutrality in the Middle East." (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 127)

(IMG)

Almost from the moment the request for [American] credit was submitted Israeli economic activity in Russia did indeed cease until 1950. In his sharp criticism of this policy in February of that year Mordechai Namir, then Israel's Minister in Moscow, pointed out that since the end of 1949 "not a single proposal has come [from Israel] for us to attempt any economic operation an absolute zero in the USSR. paragraph of our trade balance will not keep us going." The figures substantiate Namir's claim: in 1949 Israeli imports from the Soviet Union totaled some \$400,000 and exports some \$26,000; the next year imports were reduced to \$20,000 worth of goods and Israeli exports to Russia were about one-third of that sum. (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 126) (IMG)

As the Israeli Foreign Ministry staff rightly implied, the expansion of the Israeli-Soviet trade that took place during the Sailors' Strike definitely served as a means of reducing the influence of American finance capital in Israel while increasing the influence of the Soviets there. In the context of Israel, that is what so-called 'neutralism' meant: moving away from Israel's ally, USA, and moving towards the Soviets. It is even possible that the Soviet purchase of citric fruits was targeted; it may have been an indirect means of economically supporting the Mapam-affiliated kibbutzim by purchasing their goods via Israel's fruits board.

The Mapam tried to maximize popular front and united front cooperation with the Maki in the struggle against the Ben-Gurion regime. As the Soviet Embassy in Israel reported in 1949:

Mapam and the Communist Party have recently begun to make joint statements on certain questions. (The Situation in Israel, P. I. Ershov. In: I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow) COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, Moscow, September 29, 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 536) (IMG)

In early December of 1951, the Mapam and the Maki actively lobbied for the regime to receive the strikers' delegation in the Knesset. The JTA reported:

The Mapam-Communist demand was turned down by Deputy Speaker M. Shefer who insisted that the Parliament hear an announcement by Police Minister Shitreet on the case of detained religious dissidents involved in the bombing of the Knesset earlier this year. The Mapam and Communist deputies inside Parliament jumped to their feet and began shouting at the Speaker. At the same time, a demonstration of striking seamen and Mapam and Communist representatives outside the building demanded that a strikers' delegation be received by the praesidium of the Parliament.

The disorder lasted for half-an-hour until Speaker Shefer announced that the Police Minister would read his announcement and then the Knesset would adjourn to permit its House Committee to work on the agenda. The deputies calmed down and Minister Shitreet announced that the government had instructed the Inspector General of Police to indict any policeman who broke the regulations. Also, the announcement said that there are no grounds for acting against any of the policemen involved in detaining the religious underground members, who had charged police cruelty during their incarceration.

Later, when the Knesset praesidium promised to receive a delegation of striking seamen, the demonstrators dispersed.

(Leftists Provoke Disorder in Knesset over Seamen's Strike, The Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December 6, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

While the cooperation between the Maki and the Mapam was a positive event, there existed major problems. Back then, the Soviets and the communist forces in Israel had invested more in the Mapam than in the Maki, because unfortunately there was no way that Israel's working class was going to so pervasively be attracted to the Maki, a Party with a long track record of self-describing officially as 'non-Zionist'. Yet, not surprisingly, the lesser investment into improving the situation in the Maki had made it more susceptible to Ben-Gurion faction infiltration than the Mapam. Recall that Shmuel Mikunis, the Maki leader, had with the approval of the Malenkov group in Moscow and with the support of the Yugoslav regime, aimed to mislead some of the progressive-minded Yiddish individuals into serving in the armed forces of the Ben-Gurion regime (see C16S5). The Mikunis group did not represent all of the Israeli Communist Party, and in that Party, there existed what would later become known as the 'Rakah' contingent that formed the Brezhnev-era Moscow-approved Party. However, back then, the Mikunis group dominated the Maki, which was why the Soviets had problems with the dominant faction in the Maki. In the Soviet Embassy in Israel too it was stated that the Maki was making serious

errors:

The Communist Party of Israel is insignificant in numbers and in influence in the country. It makes mistakes both in tactics and in matters of organization. It badly needs help. (The Situation in Israel, P. I, Ershov. In: I N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow) COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, Moscow, September 29, 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 536) (IMG)

Many commentators incorrectly put Sneh and Mikunis into the same category. Sneh and Mikunis did appear to have similar ideologies – eclectic mixtures of Zionism and communism – and they did work in the same Party since the mid-1950s. However, in spite of the appearance of similarity between these two, the differences were fundamental. Sneh was the top face of the trend of communist infiltration into the Zionist movement whereas Mikunis was the top face of the Zionist infiltration into Israel's communist movement. On the surface however, since in their rhetoric, one could observe eclectic mixtures of Zionism and communism, many were led to the confusion that Mikunis and Sneh belonged to the same category.

By December 16, 1951, the Mapam had mobilized a large segment of the proletarian masses as well as some of the revolutionary elements in the intelligentsia into a protest of 3,000 people in support of the sailors' strike. The Maki, the Israeli Communist Party, assisted the Mapam in this effort but Mikunis, the Zionist agent who had risen to the position of the leadership of the Maki, pursued a left-sectarian agenda and tried to cut off Moshe Sneh. A December 17, 1951 document from Israel's high command stated:

On December 16, 1951 at 5:30 PM ... a truck arrived ... at the Maki club.. They mounted a loudspeaker and several dozen teenagers boarded the truck to the Magen David Square, a place crowded with an audience of about 3,000 people. At that time a truck arrived.. It began with the speech of Dr.

Moshe Sneh, who attacks the government in connection with its attack on the sailors.

Maki members arrived at the Magen David Square ... and Shmuel Mikunis gave his speech on the loudspeaker, and the Maki and the Mapam began to compete to have their voices heard louder.

After Moshe Sneh's speech, Pinchas Tobin delivered a speech that would agitate the audience to support the sailors' strike. His speech was occasionally interrupted by shouts of contempt against the government from the assembled crowd.

(SUBJECT: Protest Demonstration by the Committee for the Defense of the Seamen's Association, Tel Aviv Headquarters, General Department, National Headquarters, Memo Tel Aviv, December 17, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

An intelligence document from the Israel police stated:

During the first period of the conflict, the sailors' representatives organized organizing meetings themselves, but later the "Public Committee for Sailors' Aid" convened meetings and organized demonstrations in support of the seafarers' struggle. The organizational origin of the public committee is not clear, but most of the activists who appeared in it all belonged to Mapam. At one point, Maki tried to join the operations, but this joining was apparently undesirable. In one case (a demonstration in Tel Aviv, about December 16, 1951), Mikunis tried to participate over the car with a speaker and was interrupted by the Mapam speaker. Up to 3,000 people took part in the demonstrations. (Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Here was Mikunis again in December 1951 entering a Mapam-led protest, trying to cut off the speaker, Dr. Moshe Sneh, and behaving in a left-sectarian manner that benefited the Ben-Gurion regime. How typical of Mikunis and his left-and-right-opportunist group. In any case, large-scale Mapam-led protests throughout Israel erupted. Ehud Sprinzak, an advisor to the former Palmach commander Yitzhak Rabin, wrote:

The seamen's organization had the support of the entire Israeli radical left of the time, including Mapam activists, former Palmach commander Yigal Alon, and the movement's writers and artists. (...). Massive pro-seamen demonstrations involving former Palmach members and supporters of Mapam erupted all over the country. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

The Ben-Gurion apologist Howard Sachar wrote:

Almogi returned to Haifa and publicly announced the Histadrut's opposition to the seamen's strike. He called for volunteers to man the ships; and within a few days nearly 40 per cent of the men responded to his request and returned to work. But many of the other sailors staged sit-down strikes on the vessels and had to be carried ashore bodily by the police. Even as Almogi had predicted, furious outcries were immediately raised in all parts of the country. Mapam mobilized supporters for the striking seamen from among both union and nonunion members. Thus, in Tel Aviv, doctors, writers, and school teachers paraded through the streets, carrying placards demanding the overthrow of Almogi and Ben-Gurion. Many of the kibbutzim sent Elaganah veterans to remonstrate with Almogi. (Aliyah: The Peoples of Israel, Howard Morley Sachar, 1961, pp. 275-276) (IMG)

The regime imposed mandatory military draft on the sailors:

One of the government's methods of dealing with the seamen was a mandatory military draft. Many of the striking seamen, who were earlier urged to serve in the nation's commercial navy instead of serving in the army, were ordered to report immediately to their army bases. The pretext was that since they were no longer seamen, they were legally obliged to complete their army mandatory service. (...). They had to serve in the army like all other Israelis. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

The police resort to physical force and the drafting of many strikers into the army led to the spread of the strike to all Israeli ships docking in foreign ports. Israel's entire commercial navy was nearly paralyzed. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 82) (IMG)

The murderous Ben-Gurion regime was determined to crack down on the sailors' strike through terror against Israel's proletarians:

Mordechai Namir, the Histadrut's secretary general; Joseph Almogi, Histadrut's Haifa chief; and Ben-Gurion were all determined to use any means necessary to impose the Histadrut's authority on the sailors. Substitute seamen were brought to Haifa to replace the striking sailors, creating violent confrontations. Thousands of former Palmach members also came to show their support. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

The seamen who were considered exemplary Zionist pioneers before the strike were now called "communist agents and black market dealers" by Joseph Almogi. (...). Violence erupted almost from the beginning. As soon as the first ship, the Galila, docked at the Haifa port on October 22, 1951, and declared a strike, substitute seamen tried to board her. A fist fight involving the use of knives ensued and was quickly joined by a large number of policemen. All the company's other ships arrived in Haifa after the Galila strike. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

The Ben-Gurion apologist Sachar who interviewed Joseph Almogi, corroborated the claims of the Rabin advisor:

"I met with Ben-Gurion," Almogi recalled. "He agreed with me; we had no choice but to break the strike.

It was a terribly difficult decision, and we expected it to arouse the protests of many honest laboring men in other unions. But under the circumstances we had no alternative."

"Don't forget that this was the austerity period," Almogi reminded me. "The standard of living of the entire country had fallen drastically – because of the huge immigration, of course. Many well-meaning people viewed this 'betrayal' by Ben-Gurion and myself as the last straw."

Although the strike was the most acrimonious Israel had thus far experienced, within Haifa, at least, Almogi managed to keep a firm grip on his labor followers.

(Aliyah: The Peoples of Israel, Howard Morley Sachar, 1961, pp. 275-276) (IMG)

The Mapam/Palmach could not stand by and watch as the Ben-Gurion regime was terrorizing the people of Israel. Hence a series of special military operations were launched. An intelligence document by the Israel police stated:

In the assembly and demonstration system and especially in the attempt of the masses to storm the port of Haifa, a planning and organizing hand was evident. The port gates were attacked deceptively and the masses were occasionally directed.. The equipment was prepared retrospectively (piles of stones, rubble, fragments of logs, etc.) and command nuclei were evident. In all the demonstrations, calls were made against the government, the Histadrut and especially derogatory calls against the police. The most serious cases were in Haifa during the operation against the ships "Negba" and then "Tel Aviv" in which the protesters roamed for hours, controlled the streets near the port and conducted mass assaults on the port gates. The sailors themselves were a tiny and fragile minority. The composition of the participants in these disturbances can be discussed from the fact that all six injured in Haifa on December 28, 1951 were members of agricultural farms and that 16 of the 29 detainees in Haifa on December 14, 1951 were also from the farms. (Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The party affiliations of these kibbutznik farmers and their squad leaders, while easy to identify, is difficult to prove. However, everyone can infer whom the revolutionary usual suspects were. Meanwhile, the sailors themselves engaged in battles against the terrorist police, thus forcing the police to launch a naval operation in response:

It was known that the "Tel Aviv" team in particular, under the guidance and help of the leaders of the strikes on the coast, valued active resistance against the police's attempt to board the ship, while continuing to continue the battle with all the means at their disposal. Indeed, the sailors on the ship "Tel

Aviv" held a planned and organized battle of resistance in a cohesive planned and organized manner when their means of tackling the police were firing water jets, throwing axes, knives, iron bars, tools, planks, etc. at

the chiefs of policemen approaching the ship. These measures resulted in the injury of 13 policemen and by chance no casualties were caused to the police.

Police were forced to conduct a rather complex naval operation. For this purpose, the boats of the port administration (including the fire boat) were recruited as an addition to the police vessels. (...). The advantage of the sailors was that they were fortified and under cover and above all that they were in a high position about 7 meters above the heads of the policemen in the boats, [and] the policemen maintained substandard and inefficient equipment. The sailors overturned the ladders, damaged them, and hit every policeman who tried to get on them. The strikers did not refrain from knocking down a ladder that had police officers on it, one of whom fell into the sea and others were dropped into a boat.

The number of wounded among the policemen has been growing..

(Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Israel's terrorist police, in its naval operations against the sailors, required the cooperation of the other workers, a cooperation it was largely denied by the workers of Israel:

Knowing these practices, the police were forced to take precautionary measures and stop the service of "anchor" boats, to flee to the concentration of all boats near the dock and to prohibit their voyage to the port area without permission. These restrictions were also imposed on the fishing castles. Customs workers also did not tend to cooperate with the police. A uniformed customs officer was arrested by police for refusing to comply with a police officer's request to render assistance in stopping a storming crowd at the port.

Another example of non-cooperation that could have thwarted the police operation in the "Tel Aviv" ship was discovered among the employees of the port administration who serve its boats. The port manager made available to the police three of his most appropriate dedications for this operation (two tugs and one fire engine equipped with pumps of water) and without which it was difficult to withstand the operation.

(Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

The Position of the Workers of the Haifa Port

In the case of the Haifa Workers' Council, the workers' positive attitude towards the government's position as a seafarers' conflict did not match.

There were many cases in which the Histadrut encountered the refusal of some of the workers to fill positions that the Histadrut had given them, usually involving indifference and unwillingness to cooperate on the part of the workers.

The dismay between the port workers, which was marked by open sympathy for the strikers, apparently had a considerable effect on the entire public.

(Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The Sailors' Strike had done its damage to the pro-fascist Ben-Gurion faction through undermining the anti-Palmach elements in the Israeli navy. It had sabotaged Israel's trade ties to the West, had sabotaged Israel's naval fleet, and inflicted damage on the fascist police. The Mapam thereafter launched the successor campaign to the Seamen's Strike. Major protests of thousands of Israeli workers erupted against the Ben-Gurion regime's subservience to Anglo-American imperialism in the region:

About 3,000 Mapam sympathizers this week-end demonstrated against the Israel Government's new economic policy and assailed Israel's alleged subservience to the United States. The demonstration was preceded by a three-hour "warning strike."

The strike and demonstration, called by the Mapam Party and Communists, was denounced by the Histadrut, the Israel labor federation, as sabotage of the labor movement and misuse of the strike weapon. The Histadrut threatened participants in the strike with dismissal from their jobs.

The strikers marched in a two-mile procession through the streets of Tel Aviv bearing placards denouncing the government and critical of the United States. Women waving empty shopping bags, in protest against the food situation, were prominent in the line of march.

(MAPAM SUPPORTERS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST GOVT'S ECONOMIC POLICY. In: 'JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, INC.: Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 82, 34th year, April 28, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Workers committees in a number of industries here under domination of the left-wing Mapam Party, decided today to call a strike on Thursday in a demonstration of protest against the Government's new economic policy.

Spokesmen for the Mapai, considering counter-measures, warned that every striking worker would be subject to dismissal.

(MAPAM WORKERS TO STRIKE AGAINST GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY. In: 'JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, INC.: Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 79, 34th year, April 28, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Even before the official establishment of Medinat Yisrael, the Soviets had invested in boosting their soft power influence

in Israel. Since great masses of the Yiddish and Hebrew citizens of Israel already were influenced by communism and Soviet ideas, the Soviets already had a presence in Israel in terms of soft power. To lose such soft power would have been a grave error for the Soviets. Hence, in cooperation with the Mapam, the Soviets established, the VOKS – the Soviet-Israeli friendship association, whose task was boosting Soviet cultural influence among the Israelis. The Soviet legation in Israel took on this task. Whereas the Mapai aimed to utilize its ‘Friendship’ association with the USSR as a channel for intelligence penetration into the USSR for anti-Soviet subversion, the Soviets used their Friendship association as a channel for fomenting pro-communist subversion against the Mapai-Irgun forces. In the list of instructions to the Soviet intelligence base in Israel, the following were stated:

6. The legation must work through the leaders of the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR who are loyal to us, and who are under the guidance of Mapam and the Communist Party, in order to guide the league towards activities which will popularize the Soviet Union among the people of Israel. As for the public Israel-USSR Friendship Society, which was formed by the ruling Mapai Party to counterbalance the League for Friendly Relations, the legation must define its attitude to this committee according to the latter's activity, keeping in mind that Mapai organized the committee in order to make contact with the Jews in the USSR rather than to promote friendship with the Soviet Union.

7. The legation must expand the activity in Israel of VOKS, Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga, Sovesportfilm and Sovinformburo, by organizing exhibitions, opening a Soviet bookshop, publishing a popular periodical on behalf of the League for Friendly Relations and increasing the screenings of Soviet films. (INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE USSR IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, Secret, Ershov. Part of: COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow), Moscow, 29 September 1949, Secret. In: “Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1 -2”, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 534-538) (IMG)

In an interview with the Paris-based Yiddish daily *Neie Presse*, Mapam leader General Moshe Sneh stated:

The fight for the independence of Israel is tied to the fight for peace just as the act of dragging Israel into a regional pact under American control would be tied to the preparation for a new war by American imperialists against the Soviet Union, against the people's democracies and against the independence of all peoples. We have just established in Israel a Committee for Peace which has affiliated with the World Congress of the Partisans for Peace. We are also in the process of enlarging the scope and strengthening the activity of the League for Friendship with the USSR. The popular masses have warmly – even enthusiastically – responded to the call of these two organizations. We hope to be able to create a mass movement in support of the fight to promote peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. Mapai recently attempted to split the League for Friendship with the USSR, but the result has been just the opposite. The League has been strengthened and the number of members doubled. Our view is that friendship with the USSR is a touchstone for every individual on the question of world peace; for every Jew who wishes to remain true to the real interests of his people and his country; and for every worker who wishes to remain faithful to the banner of genuine socialism. It is necessary to add that not only the Movement for Peace but also the League for Friendship with the USSR take part in and collaborate harmoniously with all progressive forces in Israel, both Jewish and Arab. (INTERVIEW WITH DR. SNEH, *Neie Presse* (a Paris Yiddish daily), Interviewer: L. Bruck, interviewee: Moshe Sneh, pp. 1-2. MIA) (IMG)

Describing the level of the success of the Soviet soft power program in Israel, a report from the Soviet legation stated:

Thus, on 1 January 1949, an exposition opened in Tel Aviv, 'Upbringing and Education in the USSR', organized jointly by the VOKS representative and the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR. At the exposition, representatives of the Israeli intelligentsia delivered five lectures: 'Lenin, Teacher of Generations', 'Upbringing and Education in the USSR', 'Modern Soviet Literature', 'Soviet Theatre', and 'Soviet Cinema'. Four Soviet films were shown and four musical-literary evenings were organized with the participation of local performers. The exposition and related cultural events attracted the attention of the entire Israeli press. Several newspapers (*Kol haam*, *Al hamishmar*, *Davar*, *Haaretz*, and *Haolam hazeh*) published positive reviews of the exposition and articles about education and upbringing in the Soviet Union.

An exhibition, 'The Military Art of the Red Army', was opened in Haifa on 8 January 1949. It was organized by the VOKS representatives together with the Haifa committee of the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR.

About 5,000 people visited the exhibition in 15 days, more than half of whom were soldiers or officers in the Israeli army. A lecture, 'The Soviet Army in Soviet Literature', was read, and books and journals on the exhibition topic were displayed. Lecturers from the league, chiefly from the ranks of the Israeli army, gave explanations at the exhibition. Large articles with detailed descriptions of the exhibition appeared in several Israeli newspapers (*Al hamishmar*, *Davar*, and others). They noted the heroic struggle of the Soviet army against fascist occupation and expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for defeating Hitler's Germany

On 2 April 1949, this same exhibition was organized in Tel Aviv jointly with the Tel Aviv committee of the league. (...). On the first day about 1,500 visited the exposition. In this connection, Soviet films were shown, lectures were delivered about the Soviet army and concerts of Soviet music were held. All the exhibitions enjoyed great success in Israel.

(The League for Friendly Relations with the USSR: Memorandum, Iu. Kosiakina. In: L. Kislova to Ia.M. Lomakin (Moscow) COPY: GARF, F.5283, OP.22, D.194, LL.39-42 Moscow, July 4, 1949. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 509-510. No Screenshot.)

However, as is well-known, the CIA had launched Operation MOCKINGBIRD for the purpose of anti-Soviet agitation and American soft power influence in various countries. In Israel too, as the influence of the Palmach and the Mapam over the regime apparatus reduced, the agents of the United States were able to gradually raise their voice and agitated libelous content against the Soviets. One of the major targets was the Soviet film industry. The Ben-Gurion faction, having emerged militarily triumphant over the Arab armies in the 1948 War, was able to free up some of its funds to the secret service conflict against the Mapam in the Israeli military bodies, and then the Israeli security and intelligence bodies. Since Israel's 'non-state' media was controlled by the Shin Bet and the Mossad, increased influence by the Ben-Gurion faction over the 'non-state' media allowed him to agitate and propagate heavily against the USSR. A Soviet intelligence report from the legation in Tel Aviv stated:

The leading role in the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign is played by the newspaper Hador, the organ of the main government party Mapai. Hador is joined by Henil (the organ of the fascist party Herut [note: Herut was Menachem Begin's Party and the Likud predecessor]), Haboker, and other bourgeois papers.

Anti-Soviet propaganda in Israel is inspired by the reactionary American press, the American-Jewish bourgeoisie, which has a great deal of influence on life in Israel, and reactionary circles in Israel itself, beginning with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who, in fact, directs all anti-Soviet propaganda in the country, although formally he 'does not interfere' in the affairs of the press, referring to 'freedom of the press' in Israel.

The main methods for implementing anti-Soviet propaganda are the following:

(...). 4) Printing libellous anti-Soviet reviews, mainly of Soviet films;

The reactionary Israeli press gives a slanderous picture of life within the Soviet Union. In particular, it paints an anti-Soviet and Zionist picture of the 'situation of the Jews' in the USSR. Defending the capitalist system, it gives a slanderous impression of the living conditions of the workers in the USSR; it tries to detract from the achievements of Soviet culture, in an effort to paralyze Soviet influence on the workers of Israel.

1. In a review of the film *The Tale of a Real Alan*, Hador (1 June 1949) wrote that 'this is the weakest of films... everything in it is done almost in bureaucratic form... tears and joys are measured out with mathematical precision'.

(Anti-Soviet Propaganda in the Israeli Press: Memorandum, Excerpts from a Memorandum by M. Popov, COPY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.2, P.3, D.13, LL.8-20, Tel Aviv, December 7, 1949. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry,

Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 562-566. No Screenshot.)

In replacement, Israel's ruling Kautskyites promoted the Yugoslav regime films:

At present the Histadrut has taken upon itself the considerable task of distributing Yugoslav films, and under the Histadrut's 'patronage' films from Yugoslavia are to be shown in workers' and agricultural settlements.

All this takes on a certain hue in light of fact that the events organized by the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR not only evoke no sympathy from the Histadrut, but even encounter opposition in such matters as making premises and funds available.

(REPORT OF THE USSR MISSION IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL FOR THE PERIOD FROM THE FORMATION OF THE STATE IN MAY 1948 TO DECEMBER 1949, Excerpts from the Political Report of the USSR Legation in Israel, COPY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.3, P.6, D.8, LL.211-26; 262-4 Tel Aviv, March 10, 1950, In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 612. No Screenshot)

The regime that promoted settler-colonialism against the Albanians of Kosovo was befriended even in the film industry by the regime that promoted settler-colonialism against the Arabs of Palestine. No surprise. The friendly attitude of the Yugoslav regime towards the Ben-Gurion regime does not mean friendship with the people of Israel. Forget not that well into the 1970s, the Tito regime, the stance of which in support of Zionist fascist reaction never changed, funded the PLO terrorist "freedom-fighters" who carried out the numerous terror attacks against civilians in Israel.

By late 1952, the Zionist agents of the Anglo-American secret services had greatly stepped up their media campaign against the USSR via the ostensibly 'private' 'non-state' media outlets. The USSR responded in kind in its media campaign against the regime of Israel culminating in the Soviet media coverage of the Prague Trials and the Doctors'

Plot. At the height of the Stalin-era Soviet media campaigns against Israel in 1953, the Israeli regime launched a campaign of vicious colour revolutionary propaganda, agitating among the 'Jews' and Jews. The Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, Ben-Gurion's henchman, instructed his subordinates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to launch a vicious anti-Soviet slander campaign, explicitly stating that Israel "should not rely on the facts" and instead should "incite" "public tension" for "arousing public opinion constantly and repeatedly" against Moscow. Israel and its agents based in Washington launched a campaign to denounce the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies as hostile to the Israelites. While acknowledging that the doctors' plot case in the USSR is a prelude for a purge of "unreliable elements," the Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett remarked:

Here are my instructions in the matter of Moscow's calumnies

(a) This is not a major line of policy but the result of a general trend to strengthen the regime whether for its own sake or in preparation for war, by means of blood-letting, tightening internal espionage, targeting a scapegoat and laying the groundwork for the mass liquidation of unreliable elements.

(b) Even if for Moscow the libel is of secondary importance, for us it is the crux of the matter.

(c) The libel is the outcome of a deliberate decision, and we should expect more such manifestations and prepare for a prolonged campaign.

(d) We have very few weapons in hand and we should not underestimate the [importance of] arousing public opinion constantly and repeatedly, on the assumption that Moscow is not entirely indifferent to the repercussions of its policy in international public opinion and its influence on people and circles sympathetic to it.

(e) We should not rely on the facts themselves to maintain the level of public tension; we must constantly incite it.

Therefore, I favoured from the beginning the initiative for a world Jewish conference to react to the calumnies. This is now the government's stance. The conference should be convened in Paris for greater resonance in Europe. The government of Israel will not participate in either the initiative or the debates but will send an observer. The conference of the organizations for reparations can serve as a precedent for the composition which should be as broad as possible. The aims of the conference: (1) condemnation and refutation of the calumny in a well-considered, dignified and forceful manner; (2) unification of Jewish public opinion and isolation of the enemies of the Jewish people's (3) an appeal to world public opinion; (4) Let My People Go.

The conference will not go beyond the bounds of demanding rectification of the slander of the Jewish people and its organizations, (voicing) its concern for the safety of the Jewish masses, their protection and the demand for their aliya, the denunciation of hatred of the Jewish people and an appeal to the world to rise up against it. It will not condemn communism as a regime and will not overtly join the political war against the Soviet Union.

(CODED TEE ISA 130.09/2309/12, M. Sharett to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Tel Aviv, February 2, 1953. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", p. 873. Bold added) (IMG)

Through such a massive incitement campaign, Sharett provoked a Zionist terror attack and bombing campaign against the Soviet legation in Israel:

February 9 1953

The Soviet Union's diplomatic outpost in Tel Aviv is bombed, leading the Soviets to break off diplomatic relations a few days later. One Soviet diplomat and the wives of two others are injured by the blast of 70 pounds of explosives in the garden, and the building is damaged. (...). The bombing is blamed on an Israeli terrorist group that calls itself the Kingdom of Israel and is known to the public as the Tzrifin Underground. The leader of the group, former [Lehi](#) member Yaakov Heruti, denies involvement in the explosion, and the government lacks proof. But Heruti and other Kingdom of Israel members are sentenced to prison sentences of one to 12 years for other attacks and plots and for the danger they pose to state security. Prime Minister [David Ben-Gurion](#) commutes the sentences after two years.

(Soviet Embassy Bombed in Tel Aviv, Center for Israel Education) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion freed the 'Kingdom of Israel' terrorists from 'prison' because the latter's activities were godsend for the Israeli secret service. The notorious 'Kingdom of Israel' is known to have had the tacit – if not active – support of the Shin Bet and was later held responsible for assassinating the Mossad operative Rudolf Kastner, just when the latter was believed to be going to reveal secrets of the Mossad support for the Nazis against USSR (see C16S1). Only two weeks prior to the military operation against the Soviet Embassy, Ben-Gurion had asked the rhetorical question 'we permit the enemies of Israel in Moscow to maintain here, overtly and legitimately, agents.?'

What has [Stalin] to do with the Semites? His present political aims require that he attack and accuse the Jews and their state. He is arousing worldwide hatred of Israel. And perhaps we can do nothing against him, but shall we permit the enemies of Israel in Moscow to maintain here, overtly and legitimately, agents of and collaborators with the enemies of Israel? (D. Ben-Gurion to the Members of the Israeli Government, COPY: ISA

130.02/2157/14, Tel Aviv, January 20, 1953. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 858) (IMG)

Anyways on February 12, 1953, the Soviet-Israeli:

diplomatic relations [were] broken off 12 February [1953] after the bombing of the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv.

(The Beria Purge and Subsequent Soviet Policy, Central Intelligence Agency, July 24, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

Certainly, in their attacks on Soviet intelligence presence under 'diplomatic' cover in Israel, the left-deviationist critics of the USSR on this matter are – most of them unintentionally – standing with the Ben-Gurion faction and the Zionist terror organizations against the Arabs. Plus, such an intelligence base could continue to serve as a base for supporting the progressive elements of the Hebrew society, which contrary to left-opportunist propaganda, were not actually so few. The Soviet intelligence base in Tel Aviv would have allowed the USSR to more easily maintain contact with the people of Israel and could pave the way for the establishment of a socialist state in Israel. It was certainly unfortunate to see that such a base was lost and contact with the people of Israel was reduced.

One of the co-founders and leaders of the Mapam was Meir Ya'ari. Ya'ari was an interesting Mapam activist, for his views were generally communistic but also contained doses of Judaism. As Shimon Peres recalled:

Meir Ya'ari, the Mapam – Hashomer Hatzair leader, sat in his kibbutz, Merhavia, and spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat. He insisted on "ideological collectivism." He had a rabbinical air about him, and his followers were like disciples. He quoted from Lenin but still managed to sound like a rabbi! ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 134) (IMG)

To support his arguments, the late Meir Ya'ari used to cite the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin – as well as the Hebrew Bible. Ya'ari pretended to oppose the communist faction of the Mapam but in reality, he himself belonged to the communist faction that dominated the Mapam back then. He opposed the conspiracy of Isser Harel's fascist secret service in causing a split in the Mapam and was famously wiretapped by the Shin Bet:

"A group of extreme Leftists had been set up in heart of Mapam," Iser says, "and ... [t]he Mapam leaders did not know of this group, whose leader was Moshe Sneh, the former chief of Haganah. Apparently the Soviet Embassy was directing by remote control a subversive plan which the ... communist groups inside Mapam were putting into execution.. To me, Mapam was first and foremost a Zionist party, and I made up my mind to stop its drift toward communism. Through a friend I informed Meir Ya'ari about the conspiracy that was going on behind his back."

Meir Ya'ari, however, violently objected to Iser Harel's interference. Shin-Bet, therefore, decided to keep a close watch on the activities of the communist faction inside Mapam, and that was why the mike had been installed in Ya'ari's office [to surveil Ya'ari and his comrades].

(Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, pp. 128-129) (IMG)

Then, in 1952 and 1953, a new series of problems arose in the Mapam. The Prague Trials of 1952 and the Doctors' Plot case in 1952-1953 were absolutely necessary for purging off the Zionist agents of the Anglo-American secret services in Eastern Europe, but such purges, while increasing communist soft power influence in the Arab countries, were also utilized as pretexts by the Ben-Gurion faction for condemning the socialist forces. A vicious propaganda campaign by Israel's regime began, with the partial objective of driving a wedge between the people of Israel and the USSR, and engineering a split within the Mapam. The Mapam leader Dr. Moshe Sneh, the Haganah commander who sided with the USSR against Anglo-American imperialism, supported the anti-Titoist purges of Prague Trials. In an article titled 'Israel is in Danger', Moshe Sneh wrote:

And the Soviet Union, and together with it the people's democracies, and the Czechoslovak People's Democracy among them—they were the ones who extended to the Jewish people full assistance to set up its own state in Israel. In the two most violent and most fateful occurrences in Jewish history—in the attempt to destroy the Jewish people and in the struggle for its establishment—it was the Communist world, and the Soviet Union at its head, which showed and proved that it and only it was a true friend of the Jewish people, as of all the nations of the world. And every "explanation" that the Prague trial shows, so to speak, that "Communism is the enemy of the Jewish people" or of the state of Israel or of the liberation movement of our people, is no more than a malevolent libel and a lying slander.

The fact that the government of Israel has harnessed itself to the chariot of American imperialism, the speeches of Sharett and Eban and Ben Gurion, which are laden with hate, and spread enmity to the Soviet Union and to Communism – could produce no other effect. Therefore, we cannot react to the Prague trial in partnership with the enemies of socialism in Israel. And their attempts by word and deed, to turn those in Israel who are loyal to socialism against the strongholds of socialism in the world and to cut us off from the world revolutionary camp, of which we are an inseparable part, will not succeed.

If you want to know what is the true psychical cause of the anti-Communist outburst in the Knesset, on the "Voice of Israel," and in the bourgeois Mapai press, you have only to listen to the outpouring of love and to the glorification which Ben Gurion, and Namir and Labun and Livneh and Begin pour out to the betrayers of communism: to Trotsky and Bukharin, to Kamenyev and Zinovyev, to Tito, Rykov and Kostov, to Slansky and Clementis. What hymns of praise did the ministers and spokesmen of Mapai sing about each one of these whose liquidation saved a socialist state from destruction!

(‘ISRAEL IS IN DANGER: The hysteria in Israel about socialist “anti-Semitism” is being fed by bourgeois Israeli leaders to cover up the critical situation there’, Dr. Moshe Sneh, March 1953, p. 2)

(IMG)

The Mapam had been waging a revolutionary class struggle on the side of the USSR and the progressive revolutionary forces in the Arab world against the CIA-MI6 puppet regime headed by Ben-Gurion. The Soviets and the Czechoslovaks were hunting down the agents of the Ben-Gurion faction. Was this strike against the Mossad in Eastern Europe not a step towards the liberation of Israel from the Anglo-American puppet regime and the elevation of the socialist forces in Israel? Was this not what the Mapam too would have desired? Alas, the relentless propaganda campaign of the Ben-Gurion faction partially worked, the Prague Trials were denounced as ‘anti-Semitic’ by Mapam’s party organs, the philosophy of Zionism was placed above scientific socialism, and a reactionary tide against the Moshe Sneh faction began. To this anti-Soviet grouping joined Ya’ari and Ya’akov Hazan, neither of whom, to the best of my knowledge, were genuinely anti-Soviet. They joined this grouping as ‘stay-behind’ forces: if you cannot beat the reactionary tide, join the reactionary tide, and take leadership of the reactionary tide, so that you may sabotage and slow down the reactionary tide. Since Sneh was going to be ousted anyways, it was better that people with views similar to those of Sneh take leadership (or mis-leadership) of the movement against Sneh. Ya’ari and Hazan chose to be those individuals. They were to pretend to side with Zionist reaction against the socialist forces. In reality, behind the scenes, Hazan and Ya’ari seem to have been loyal to the socialist forces. Hazan himself had shown the degree of his strategic affiliation with the anti-imperialist forces:

At a concentrated seminar held in the late 1950s, attended by security personnel from Kibbutz HaArtzi and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Hazan said that Mapam sees itself as committed to the Soviet Union. He gave an interesting example: if the Soviet Union requests Israel to refrain, for strategic reasons, from building a deep-water port in Haifa, Mapam must grant the request, even if Israel's economic interest requires the construction of such a port. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze’ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 199) (IMG)

Although Hazan was speaking of the Khrushchev-era ‘Soviet Union’, the above quote was in line with the Mapam’s previous behaviour of blocking the strategic objectives of the Ben-Gurion regime and promoting the cause of the socialist-oriented forces in the region. In response to Khrushchev's 1956 Titoization speech denouncing Stalin, Meir Ya’ari defended the legacy of the Stalin-era purges, stating that some ‘mistakes’ by Stalin do not tarnish the entire legacy of Stalin. Ya’ari expressed these points in his usual rabbinical way. The Israeli Likudnik media outlet ‘Mida’ stated:

The interesting thing is that the shock waves from Khrushchev's speech began operating in Israel within a week or so of the incident; Long before the spies did their thing. Discussions at the top of Mapam, the buzz around the 20th conference, began in the first days of March, and there were also some discussions led by Mapam (Hashomer Hatzair) at the end of March. The shock waves did not wait for the full content of the speech to be published in the New York Times in June.

A strategy of [psychological] containing, denial, and holding the stick at both ends was activated, mainly by Mapam leader Meir Yaari, who refused to draw conclusions [against Stalin and the USSR]. "We have not cultivated ... a blind admiration for Stalin," he claimed. "In any case, do not let [Stalin] be forgotten as one of the fathers of socialism." He reminded ordinary members, especially in the kibbutzim, that "the guillotine also operated in the French Revolution." "An entire generation died in the wilderness to save the tablets of the covenant," he said. (...). "Without the severity of the dictatorship [of the proletariat], it would not have been possible to carry out the revolution and establish it at home and abroad," he continued to justify Stalin's work. And most importantly: "Do not pour the baby with the bath water!"

(The Secret Speech that Shook the Israeli Left, Mida, Amnon Lord, February 24, 2016) (IMG)

In spite of the relentless propaganda campaign, the Mapam members and leaders continued to honor the USSR and expressed hope that the IDF would become an Israeli Red Army in the tradition of the Palmach:

On the anniversary of the October Revolution, November 7, 1952, Mapam’s central committee said in a greeting address to the Israeli soldiers: “Let us remember the Red Army of liberation and fight for the transformation of our own forces into a People’s Red Army in the noble tradition of the Palmach.” Neither the Prague trials, nor the wave of [supposed/alleged] anti-Semitism that followed them in November 1952, nor the trial of the doctors in Moscow in January 1953 could shatter the mystical faith of Mapam. On the day Stalin died, one of Mapam’s leaders delivered a public oration in Tel Aviv, in which he said: “If there is one grave in the world to which the Jewish people ought to make grateful pilgrimage, it is Joseph Stalin’s.” (Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel

and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, pp. 127-128) (IMG)

Nonetheless, the Mapam ceased to be effective as a political party since late 1952 onwards. Indeed, from that time onwards, the Mapam as a party became a small party. Instead, it began to operate more so as a powerful intelligence network with agents in the highest ranks of the Israeli regime apparatus. Yisrael Bar, Shimon Avidan, Moshe Sneh, Yisrael Galili, Shlomo Argov, Haim Bar-Lev, David Eleazar, Yigal Allon, Nahum Admoni, Yitzhak Hofi, and Yitzhak Rabin were among the major Mapam-Palmach agents in Israel's security, intelligence, and military bodies. These individuals had been chiefs of the IDF, Mossad, Israeli embassies, government ministries, Prime Ministry, etc. As indicated elsewhere, their leader was Rabin, who, as Israel's 'Last Stalinist', died in the 1990s, when the communist forces were at their weakest and American imperialism at its strongest.

C16S7. The Lehi-Soviet-Mapam Connection and the Palmach's Armed Struggle against the Irgun

As is well-known, the Lehi, or 'Fighters for the Freedom of Israel', was initially a Nazi Zionist terror gang led by Avram Stern, an Israelite who sought cooperation with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In those years, the Lehi, an eclectic organization, admired Hitler and Gandhi for their 'struggle' 'against' the British colonizers. Yet, during the Second World War, Avram Stern was eliminated and the Lehi cadres were decimated. Such a decimation of the fascist faction allowed the pro-Soviet operatives to penetrate the Lehi and to give the Soviet-backed progressive tendency a significant voice in that fascist terror organization. Nonetheless, a powerful fascist faction remained, capable of carrying out massacres such as the Deir Yassin massacre.

Having come under the partial influence of the pro-Soviet elements, the Lehi denounced the partition of Palestine, to which it referred as the colonial partition of Eretz Yisrael, called for an Israeli alliance with the USSR against the British Empire, played down the hostility with the Arabs, and called for respect for the Arab nation as a friend and ally against British colonialism. Uri Milstein – the prominent Jabotinskyite historian, a genocidally anti-Arab and anti-Soviet author, and an IDF official affiliated with the faction of Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan – did some interesting research on the history of the Lehi. Below are excerpts of his research:

The ideological component was represented by a former member of the center, Dr. Israel Shaiv (Eldad), the chief ideologue and publicist in the HaMaas newspaper. The next day, November 29, Eldad wrote openly: "**The division of the Land of Israel by the UN resolution** – in addition to the first division by Britain in 1922 – is a crime against the geographical and economic truth of the land and a robbery against the Hebrew people." **The sympathy for the "World of Tomorrow"** [i.e. Hebrew euphemism for the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies] was represented by **Natan Friedman-Yellin (Yellin-Mor), who saw the Soviet Union as an ally in the fight against Great Britain**. After all, an excerpt from a booklet published by Lehi, "A Reply to Esther Vilenska" (Vilenska wrote an article condemning Lehi in the communist newspaper "Kol Ha'am"), in Elul 5777 (August – September 1947) was as follows: "Our interests are against war in the world. And therefore the Soviet Union is our ally. **Where does the Soviet Union meet us? In the need to take the entire Middle East, or part of it, out of the hands of imperialism and its feudal servants. The Soviet Union is interested in a free population in a country with developed industrial development, with a free working class, that will not allow the country to be turned into an anti-Soviet imperialist base.** Of all the factors in the Middle East, the Hebrew people are the strongest and most reliable factor for such a guarantee. The Hebrew nation concentrated in the Land of Israel is an objective and necessary ally for Soviet Russia, for its peace and security from the south. It is a strong force against all Arab Quislings. Soviet Russia is interested in world peace and the freedom of nations. It is an objective ally of the Hebrew people." (...). **The heads of the Lehi believed that the Arabs of the Middle East were their potential allies in the anti-imperialist struggle. Even though the rulers of the Arab countries still do not understand the identity of the interests, they will.**

"We do not recognize any Arab-Palestinian people. There is one great Arab nation, which is in the process of awakening and self-recognition. The Arabs of Israel are part of the same nation, just as the Hungarians living in Romania are part of the Hungarian people and not a separate people.... **We recognize the Arabs who live in this land, who are part of the great Arab nation, which resides in the Middle East, in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria....** Admittedly, between us and the Arab leadership, which still dominates the opinion of the Arab public in the overwhelming majority, there is a fight. The quarrel is over the right of political sovereignty over the land.... The Arabs of the land are our rival, for the time being. **But the British in Israel are an enemy to all of us. With the Arabs of the country, we must and are entitled to reach an agreement, a political discussion. With the British in Israel, any agreement, any law, any negotiation, any contact, except contact with arms, are invalid. This position of ours is in complete contrast to the position of the Haganah, which sees England as a rival and the Arabs as an enemy.... Just an Arab is a resident of this country and should not be harmed.** There is no [desire on the part of Lehi for] war against him. Only the Brit is the representative of the enemy. He himself is an enemy, a stranger here. He is not innocent. His very being here is an international crime, a political crime, a moral crime, in addition to the long list of practical crimes committed by him day in and day

out. He is an enemy, his sentence is death. This is the difference, and these are the conclusions.”

(The Truth About the War of Independence, Chapter 31: Was the leader of Lehi a Soviet agent?, Uri Milstein, October 28, 2016. News1. Bold and underline added.) (IMG)

The Lehi, an eclectic organization made up of communist agents, pro-communist progressives, and fascists, was constantly facing internal struggles. On the one hand, shortly prior to the start of the War of Independence, under the influence of the pro-communist contingent led by Yellin-Mor, the Lehi denounced war with the Arabs:

In October 1947, a month before the outbreak of the War of Independence, Yisrael Eldad wrote in “Ha-Maas” that the Land of Israel should be saved from “the fate of India”, that is, from a war between Jews and Arabs: The choice is: British bloodshed today, or Jewish and Arab bloodshed tomorrow”.

Nonetheless, Yisrael Eldad later recounted that after the assassination in Hawaii, in August 1947, he demanded that the Lehi Secretariat expand the organization's news and operations department toward the Arab front. **But Yellin-Moore objected, saying, “There will be no Arab front.”** After years, Eldad hit on a sin: “The idea of neutralizing the Middle East interfered with the realistic vision of our organization's members. It blinded Friedman's eyes. All preparations for the Arab front were not made.”

(The Truth About the War of Independence, Chapter 31: Was the leader of Lehi a Soviet agent?, Uri Milstein, October 28, 2016. News1. Bold and underline added.) (IMG)

Nonetheless, by the time of the War of Independence, the Lehi was factionalized into the pro-Irgun elements and the Lehi soldiers who fought in the Palmach. In April 1948, the fascist faction of the Lehi, to which Yitzhak Shamir and secretly also Yisrael Eldad belonged, committed a major massacre in Deir Yassin in collaboration with Irgun. The US intelligence station in Jerusalem reported:

431. Early morning April 9 combined force Irgun and Stern Gang numbering over 100 attacked Arab village, Deir Yasin, several miles west Jerusalem. Attackers killed 250 persons of whom half, by their own admission to American correspondents, were women and children. Attack carried out in connection battle now still in progress between Arabs Jews on roads leading to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. Arab reaction to attack has been violent and emotions, already at high pitch following death April 8 of Abdul Kader Husseini (Arab Jerusalem commander) during Arab attempt retake village captured by Haganah, now at bursting point. Officer ConGen visiting Hussein Khalidi, secretary Arab Higher Executive, April 11, found him still trembling with rage and emotion and referring to attack as “worst Nazi tactic”. (867N.01/4-1348: Telegram, The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, Jerusalem, April 13, 1948, 5 PM. In: ‘Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Near East, South Asia, and Africa: Part 2’, US State Department, p. 817) (IMG)

Such a major crime by the Lehi’s fascists was condemned by Natan Yellin-Mor, the leader of the pro-communist, pro-Soviet, and Arab-friendly contingent in the Lehi:

Even more significant are his views on the Arab question. Indeed, during the course of his address Friedman-Yellin for the first time revealed his differences with Eldad and Zetler over Deir Yasin. The path to a new age in the Middle East, he implied, was not to be sought by such actions, but by giving encouragement to the establishment of socialist and neutral states in Arab lands. (‘The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949’, Joseph Heller, 1995, p. 276) (IMG)

The voice of Yellin-Mor represented the majority in the Lehi. Indeed, in a party meeting, the majority voted for Yellin-Mor’s program, which envisioned closer ties to the Mapam-Palmach, opposition to the Anglo-American imperialist presence in the Middle East, and the call for an anti-colonial struggle for the eventual establishment of a socialist state in Israel and other Middle Eastern countries. In contradiction to the fascist faction of the Lehi, it did not call for ‘population transfers’, the chauvinist program by which the Arabs of Palestine would be expelled to the Arab countries in ‘exchange’ for the Mizrahim of the Arab world. Set within the context of the post- 1948-war period, when the progressive factions in Syria and Lebanon had been decimated, the majority program in the Lehi called for the revolutionary overthrow of the reactionary regimes of the Arab countries surrounding Israel. Anyways, Heller, the prominent scholar on the Lehi, wrote:

On the organisational question, too, Friedman-Yellin expressed definite views. Convinced that a ‘club’ was not enough (‘we also need an instrument’), Friedman-Yellin was far more optimistic than Eldad. Although he did not, on this occasion, speak of the impending disintegration of the large parties, he did speak of the possibility of an association with Mapam (‘the camp containing the Palmach’). Altogether,

‘even though few in number, we must strive for expansion ... it will bring closer the day of the entire homeland's liberation’.

Although the speakers seem to have been divided more by organisational issues than by those of ideology, the ‘political committee’ of the conference presented two separate resolutions. The first, tabled by Friedman-Yellin, voiced the views of the majority and received 14 votes; the second, tabled by Eldad, received only six votes.

It is interesting to compare these two resolutions with Lehi's previous programme. The majority decision,

for instance, certainly leaned far more to the left wing of the party than had the earlier document. Thus it made no reference to 'historical natural' borders, instead it employed the new phrase 'the entire homeland' (but did retain the reference to Uri Zvi Greenberg's call for Hebrew 'mastery' (adnut)). On the other hand, the resolution was far more specific in its call for the establishment of a 'socialist' regime (whereas the July programme had spoken of 'national ownership of the country's resources and means of production'). Similarly, the new resolution spoke of the 'identity' between the workers' struggle for their true interests and the national fight for political liberation. Some of these changes might have been generated by a wish to draw somewhat closer to Mapam, as may have been also the explicit reference to the Histadrut as 'the sole unit of professional organisation'. Whatever the case, it is also noteworthy that the new resolution had some significant omissions: no mention was made of the pronounced right-wing call for population exchanges; the code-word 'neutralisation' was absent and the notion was only alluded to; similarly dropped (perhaps under Shamir's influence) was the original programme's reference to an alliance with 'the eastern bloc'. (...). In the plenum, too, Eldad was defeated. The majority resolution was passed by 49 votes to 13 (with 25 abstentions); the minority resolution was defeated by 41 to 19 (with 27 abstentions). Eldad took his defeat badly. (. .). The remainder of the conference was devoted to the passage of largely ceremonial resolutions. These spoke of the dangers inherent in the spread of British imperialism and of the American economic monopoly; deplored the UN armistice commission as an imperialist tool and the plan to form regional blocs under NATO influence as a threat which could involve Israel in war; rejected the armistice agreements signed with the neighbouring Arab countries, since they had forfeited portions of the homeland to 'backward' regimes which were tools in the enemy's hands; called on the Arab masses to bring down their 'enslaving' governments; expressed horror at the anti-Jewish persecutions in Arab lands (but did not call for population transfers, only for the free immigration of Jews to Israel); expressed sorrow at the 'impediments' which in the 'People's democracies' lands had been placed on the free emigration of Jews to Israel; supported the settlement of barren land; and protested at the continued retention of the emergency decrees.

(‘The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949’, Joseph Heller, 1995, p. 276-278) (IMG)

Milstein, who claimed to have contacts with Yellin-Mor, wrote:

In the perspective of 68 years, Natan Yellin-Mor functioned in the style of a Soviet agent of influence, his attitudes and behavior were almost identical to the attitudes and behavior of the Soviet agent, Moshe Sneh. No documents in this direction were revealed about Yellin-Mor, neither in the archives of the Soviet Union after its fall, nor in the Israel Defense Forces. Neither did the Shai members testify about suspicions against him, as they testified about suspicions against Sneh. But not only his positions, but also the way in which the Soviets allowed him to reach Israel strengthens these assumptions about him.

For the record, I was friends with Yellin-Mor, and in the 1960s I published lists under the pen name "Uri Sa'ar" in the biweekly Etgar that he edited. I was also in contact with Moshe Sneh, and I had a long conversation with both of them. In light of their intense activity to remove Britain not only from the Land of Israel but also from the Middle East, and in light of their desire for Israel to belong to the Soviet bloc and not the American bloc, at the beginning of the Cold War, the possibility that one of the leaders of the Jewish People served Soviet interests should not be ruled out. The claim in his book that the alternative he proposed had a chance is totally unfounded, if not cynical, because not only would most Israeli Arabs have rejected it, but so would most Jews. And without these two publics it is baseless and delusional speculation. (The Truth About the War of Independence, Chapter 31: Was the leader of Lehi a Soviet agent?, Uri Milstein, October 28, 2016. News1. Bold and underline added.) (IMG)

There has indeed been much speculation and suspicion about ‘the way in which the Soviets allowed [Yellin-Mor] to reach Israel’. The circumstances of his arrival in Israel are unclear. Nonetheless, the CIA and the US State Department regarded the movement which Yellin-Mor as a Soviet-backed cause. According to the US intelligence, the Lehi was funded by the Soviets. In November 1947, the CIA reported:

Recent reports confirm the fact that the Stern gang has connections with the USSR, which is furnishing it with money. The organization has stated that it considers a turn towards Soviet Russia necessary because of the present world situation. It explains that the USSR and the Stern Ganga both desire the creation of a “strong and independent Palestine” which would constitute a rampart against British “imperialist designs” but would “not be hostile” to the Soviet Union. (THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE, ORE 55, CIA, November 28, 1947, p. 14) (IMG)

In June 1948, the US intelligence station in Jerusalem reported:

Various sources indicate that guidance, money and arms were being provided to Stern gang by Russia through Satellites particularly Poland. Polish Consulates in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are believed to be in close touch with Stern gang and its commanders Nathan Friedman Yellin and deputy Dr. Israel Scheib. It is also believed Russia will make every effort widen this support as effective means of gaining subversive foothold in Israel. While

reports have been received that Menachem Begin, Commander of IZL, has ordered his followers to orient themselves toward Russian recognition of [and Russian support of Jewish State, no concrete evidence is available to substantiate report. (867N.01/6-2448: Telegram, The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State, Secret, Jerusalem, June 24, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Near East, South Asia, and Africa: Part 2', US State Department, p. 1142) (IMG)

That Begin was funded by the Soviets was a lie, about which Begin himself joked in his memoirs. It is difficult to confirm how accurate the reports of Soviet funding for the Lehi are. Nonetheless, they have been provided here for reference. Undoubtedly, the Soviets would have liked to support the pro-communist faction of the Lehi, officially headed by Natan Yellin-Mor. Almost a decade later, Yellin-Mor founded the party 'Ha-Peulah Ha-Shemit' or 'Semitic Action', a post-Zionist, pro-Nasserist, communist-inspired organization that called for the unification of the Arab, Hebrew, and Abyssinian peoples into a pan-Semitic federation in 'clash' with the colonial powers. The movement publicly declared support for the FLN and established the 'Israeli Committee for a Free Algeria'. Exotic and sexy though Ha-Peulah Ha-Shemit may sound, one must exercise caution about it, not just because it promoted eclectic and idealistic rhetoric but also for its membership. The movement also had such co-leaders as the Irgun operative Uri Avnery, a rather questionable 'progressive' close to the Palestinian terror godfather Yasser Arafat Abu Ammar and close to the Nazi agent Anwar Sadat. Avnery opposed Hafez Al-Assad's policy of ruthlessly suppressing the Palestinian terrorists and advocated an IDF strike against Syria as assistance to the Palestinian 'freedom-fighter' death squads. These facts of course do not discredit the entirety of the Ha-Peulah Ha-Shemit; Avnery could not, on his own, spoil an entire movement and Yellin-Mor reportedly had conflicts with Uri Avnery. Nonetheless, Avnery's role in this movement is alarming and calls for vigilance.

Back to Lehi in the 1940s. Lord Moyne, a sworn enemy of the Israeli proletariat and kibbutzniks, aimed to establish an ostensibly 'independent' State of Israel which would then be subjugated to a Hashemite monarcho-fascist 'Greater Syrian Federation':

Moyne's reputation amongst the Jews was that he was generally hostile to the Zionist cause. In a debate in the House of Lords in June 1942, Moyne had made a speech which was, indeed, highly antagonistic.

He stated that neither the Mandate nor the Balfour Declaration had intended Palestine 'to be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population'. He opposed 'the racial domination by the newcomers over the original inhabitants', and turned the 'Nazi' epithet back on the Zionists - 'If a comparison is to be made with the Nazis, it is surely those who wish to force an imported regime upon the Arab population who are guilty of aggression and domination.' What is more, Moyne's interest in anthropology seemingly led him to make racist observations, such as when he remarked that the Arabs were the real Semites and referred to the 'Armenoid features' of Sephardi Jews and the 'Slav blood' of the Ashkenazim. Yet privately, Moyne had advocated the establishment of a partitioned Jewish state attached to a Greater Syrian Federation. Several historians have argued that, ironically, if Moyne had lived, the State of Israel may well have come into existence in 1945.

The Labour Zionist leadership were aghast at the assassination, not simply because it marked a different set of mores, but because of the political implications, since Moyne was a minister of state and a close friend of Churchill.

(The Land Beyond Promise: Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, Colin Schindler, 2002, p. 178) (IMG)

Note that the 'Greater Syrian Federation' did not mean mainland-Syrian leadership of the Levant region but rather was aimed at ensuring an MI6-backed Hashemite Jordanian monarcho-fascist domination of the Levant. Hashemite pan-Syrianism had the support of the British Empire:

Egyptian opposition to Bernadotte Plan has greatly increased due to widely held belief that British support for plan is based principally on desire secure merger Arab Palestine and Transjordan as step in enlarging their sphere of influence and toward creation Greater Syria. (501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram, The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p.

1471) (IMG)

In the meantime, the Amir Abdallah of Transjordan, under the stimulus of Iraq's Arab unity plan, had intensified his own campaign for a Greater Syria oriented toward Jordan. This project of Abdallah's - like that of Iraq -- was motivated by a long-standing resolution to restore the Hashemite rule over Syria which had collapsed when the French drove Abdallah's brother Faysal from Damascus in July 1920. (Disunity Among the Arab States: The Hashemite Controversy and Arab Palestine, Intelligence Report, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, November 24, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

The 'independent' State of Israel, which could have come to existence in 1945 through the Churchill-Moyne plan, would have been colonially dependent on Jordan, and thus not bearing real independence. Openly supporting the establishment of even a pseudo-independent Israel, however, would have antagonized Moyne in the Arab public, rendering his contacts with the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan more difficult. As such and as mentioned above, publicly, Moyne pretended to

be on the side of 'the Arabs' – the reactionaries among the Arabs – and 'against' the idea of a pseudo-independent Israel.

The Moyne plan, which was also the Churchill Plan later renamed as the Bernadotte Plan, was an MI6 conspiracy against the region. Nonetheless, the assassination of Lord Moyne was a reckless adventure out of the trouble of which the progressive forces in the Lehi got out solely by fortune. The Mapai, the party of Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan, would have liked to crack down on the perpetrators of the assassination. Had the progressive forces in the Lehi not been so fortunate to receive the Palmach's protection, they would have been quickly crushed. Yet, the Palmach agents protected the Lehi and instead canalized the crackdown away from targeting the Lehi and onto combat against the Jabotinskyite fascist terror group, Irgun, led by Menachem Begin. Thus began 'La saison', 'The Season', the Mapam – Palmach military campaign against the Jabotinskyites. A thesis paper by a scholar affiliated with and writing for the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), drawing from Israel's experience of disbanding such independent militant groups, aimed to present the US military with options for unifying the militia forces in Iraq and 'stabilizing' the Iraqi military. On the campaign against the Irgun, the paper stated, with reference to the period immediately after the Moyne assassination:

In September 1944, Moshe Sneh, the commander of Haganah along with another Haganah leader, Eliyahu Golomb, participated in two meetings with Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun. The Haganah commanders told Begin that the actions of the Irgun and Stern Gang were not sanctioned by the Jewish community, Haganah or the Jewish Agency, and ordered him to cease the attacks immediately or face civil war and military elimination. Begin attempted to dissuade the Haganah leaders for two months from attacking a fellow Jewish militia, but the assassination of Lord Moyne by members of the Stern Gang resulted in immediate offensive actions by Haganah against both the Stern Gang and the Irgun.

Moyne's assassination in Cairo on November 6, 1944 dealt a major blow to ongoing negotiations between British and the Haganah over their possible integration as a legitimate security force in conjunction with the British occupation. Soon after the assassination, Winston Churchill proclaimed:

"If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins' pistols and our labours for its future are to produce a new set of gangsters. many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past." The Haganah also immediately condemned the assassination and produced a plan, which involved the collaboration with British police and military, to capture members of the Irgun and Stern Gang. The Haganah's intelligence branch, the Shai, amassed over 250 names, and the Palmach was employed to kidnap suspects and turn them over to British authorities. The Jewish Agency also established a Department of Special Assignments designed to cooperate with the British Intelligence in collecting information on suspected Irgun members. The Season drew to a close in March 1945, when the Haganah abandoned the kidnapping of Irgun and Stern Gang members in response to condemnation by the Jewish community. Joint British-Haganah operations of the Hunting Season resulted in the detention of over 1,000 suspected members with hundreds deported to detention camps in Africa, while severely limiting offensive operations of the Irgun and Stern Gang. This resulted in seven months of increased security and stability. However they did not eliminate the more radical militias.

('U.S. Post-Conflict Integration Policy of Militias in Iraq', Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) – Monterey, California. Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive, James J. Smith, March 2008, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

Actually, the military campaign of the Haganah was launched almost exclusively against the Irgun, and not the Lehi. This was thanks to the lobby of Haganah General Eliyahu Golomb, a leader of the Achdut Ha-Avoda which would later merge with other parties to constitute the Mapam. The Lehi's commander-in-chief Nathan Friedman, known more commonly as Natan Yellin-Mor, headed a pro-Soviet, Arab-friendly, and pro-communist current in the Lehi. He met Eliyahu Golomb and ostensibly 'threatened' the latter that the Lehi would take action against the Haganah if harmed. Supposedly, Golomb was 'scared' off by this threat and thus was ostensibly 'forced' to lobby for the Haganah campaign to be directed merely against the Irgun and not against the actual planners of the Moyne assassination. A prominent scholar on the Lehi wrote:

On the day of the assassination, the leadership of the Yishuv met in special session, where a decision was taken to co-operate fully with the authorities against the 'dissidents' in what was to be termed the 'saison'. The prime target was the larger organisation, which – after their meeting with Begin – Sneh and Golomb considered to be the greater danger to the 'organised Yishuv'. In fact, the Haganah kidnapped dozens of IZL members and only one Lehi member; moreover, while 700 IZL names were handed over to the authorities, no Lehi name is known to have been communicated. Eldad, who was then in prison, thought (as did the IZL internees) that Friedman Yellin and Shamir had managed to frighten the Haganah. What he did not then know was that Lehi and the Haganah had in fact reached some form of agreement, formulated when Friedman-Yellin met Golomb in the wake of the kidnapping of 'Todi' Pelion 16 December 1944. The meeting had not been an easy one (as is illustrated by the fact that Friedman-Yellin placed a gun on the table); as he was later to recall, Friedman-Yellin

considered himself to be caught in 'an awful dilemma'. He wanted at all costs to avoid a civil war, but nevertheless felt duty-bound to warn Golomb that Lehi would fight to the bitter end if it had to. Ultimately, and contrary to Eldad's later charges, Friedman-Yellin did not mean to implement a full 'union' with the Haganah, and any assurance that he might have given to that effect was merely tactical. He did, however, promise to refrain from further actions while Hakim and Bet Tsouri were still awaiting trial and (in response to a direct question from Golomb) not to make any attempts on Churchill's life. However, there was to be no relaxation in Lehi's ideological struggle. Lehi was even more insistent than the IZL in denouncing the 'saison' and in castigating its perpetrators as 'Quislings', 'collaborators' and 'informers'. ('The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949', Joseph Heller, 1995, p. 138) (IMG)

In reality, contrary to the Lehi narrative, there likely was no real 'threat' against Golomb. Golomb and Yellin-Mor had a 'personal relationship' and 'a common line'. In an interview years later, Natan Yellin-Mor recalled:

Q. Regarding the relationship with the Haganah, the beginning of 1942, from the small video, the persecution of your people and the hunt for them, and then during the great season, the Haganah did not persecute the people of Lehi. In general, we hear and read with great interest about the ... Golomb affair and it seems to us that there is a unique relationship between Lehi and the Haganah.

A. First of all, there were personal relationships between Eliyahu Golomb and me. We both had a common line in that neither of us got into a fight, even the most difficult things we said quietly and anyway we didn't come to a dead end soon. Apart from that, I told in the first book that ... I met with Eliyahu Golomb, it was a rather difficult conversation, but I think this conversation was important. I wasn't interested in the war over existence, on the contrary, it was something that haunted me like a nightmare because I knew that even if we managed to hit the Haganah hard, they would hurt us more, and our damage to the Haganah would weaken the main force that eventually join the war, to fight the British.

Q. You saw in Haganah the military arm of the Jewish Agency's organized settlement of the collaborators with the British.

A. On the other hand, I was very careful not to create in Eliyahu Golomb's heart the impression that if they hurt us, we will pass in silence so that there will not be a fratricidal war. We said the opposite, I said and emphasized and conveyed by message to the defense headquarters in Latrun, that this time and in the future we will not pass by in silence for harming us, that we will fight against the foreign government and whoever stands in our way, we will also fight him because it is our duty to defend ourselves.

(‘Natan Yellin-Mor Tells about His Background’, Interviewer: Yehuda Kaveh (from ‘Kol Yisrael’), Interviewee: Natan Friedman Yellin-Mor, lehi.org.il) (IMG)

Haganah General Eliyahu Golomb was a leader of Achdut Ha-Avoda, which would later merge with the Poale Tzion Smol and Hashomer Hatzair to form the Mapam. Golomb has been described as a leader who drew inspiration both from right-wing circles and from the Soviet Union, making him the Lehi's preferred eclectic candidate to negotiate with. The Lehi itself received financial support from the Soviet secret service, according to the CIA. The pro-communist current in the Lehi, officially headed by Yellin-Mor, called for cooperation with the Palmach and the Mapam. The Mapam and the pro-Soviet faction of the Lehi were de facto allies. In light of such parallels and connections, it is highly unlikely that Yellin-Mor would have ever seriously threatened Golomb. More likely, the case was rather a collusion between the pro-Soviet commanders in the Haganah and the pro-Soviet commanders of the Lehi with the objective of jointly undermining the Irgun. The Irgun command's assessment of the situation as no significantly different. "Lehi's true colours," reported Heller describing the Irgun command's views, "had been shown during the 'saison', when its leadership – unlike the IZL – had bowed to the Haganah's ultimatum and agreed ... effectively maintaining a cease-fire for an entire year" (p. 159).

Thus was unleashed the campaign against the Irgun. The Palmach warriors went ahead for the 'Hunting Season' against the Jabotinskyite terror network. They hunted 'Irgun people, removed Irgun wall posters, protected people who had been threatened by the Irgun, and beat, kidnapped, and arrested Irgun personnel, hiding them in prearranged sites, including kibbutzim':

In the fall of 1944 young men wearing khaki and high boots began appearing in the cities. This marked the beginning of the "hunting season," the saison. They trailed Irgun people, removed Irgun wall posters, protected people who had been threatened by the Irgun, and beat, kidnapped, and arrested Irgun personnel, hiding them in prearranged sites, including kibbutzim. These operations were conducted by the Palmach and the Haganah's security service. More than 200, perhaps 300, Palmach members were recruited for the operation. All the commanders were from the Palmach. In short order the Irgun's archives and arms caches were uncovered. Its apparatus was broken and its ability to raise money dried up.

Palmach members who were involved took pride in their operational ability and military prowess. Allon, the Palmach commander, said that in all the reports from the field there was not a single case in which an operation against the Irgun ended in failure. The Palmach seemed intent on taking the opportunity to demonstrate

at long last its military skills.

(The Making of Israeli Militarism, Indiana University Press, Uri Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p. 120) (IMG)

Subsequently, the Mapai, the party of the Kautskyite agents of the Anglo-American secret services, lobbied to ensure that the Irgun terrorists would be handed over to the British police. This measure was outrageous since Menachem Begin, a member of the Betar, had been commander of the MI6-run Anders Army in the 1940s, and had become the commander of the Irgun only upon allowance by the Anders Army hence by the MI6. Seeking to ensure a real prosecution of the Irgun terrorists, the Palmach was opposed to this measure advocated by the Mapai:

The Palmach at first objected to the idea of turning over Irgun members to the British. Allon, the Palmach commander, proposed a one-time operation to arrest 300 Irgun activists. (...). The Palmach's opposition to handing over Irgun people put to the test the leadership's power and authority. At the heart of the conflict between the Palmach and the leadership were two conflicting principles. (The Making of Israeli Militarism, Indiana University Press, Uri Ben-Eliezer, 1998, pp. 121-122) (IMG)

Although, due to the Mapai lobby, the efforts of the Palmach against the Irgun were being undermined, the Palmach nonetheless successfully continued its campaign of capturing the weapons caches of the Irgun and decimating the latter's capability to propagate their fascist views:

The saison afforded the Palmach an opportunity to show its stuff. Some Palmach personnel were cited for their fine work, and a report of the Haganah's intelligence service enumerated the Palmach's achievements: most Irgun branches were eliminated, its arms caches were depleted, its operational ability was paralyzed, its influence on the young generation declined, its members' arrogance was tempered, and many were turned over to the British police.⁵⁴ The effective blow to the breakaways gave the Palmach a stamp of approval for its military way. So when the order came from above to end the saison, bitter complaints were voiced in the organization: Why? After all, the Irgun has not been totally liquidated. The frustration was palpable in a song aimed at the leadership: "Listen, liquidation is a pipe dream, / Don't believe what you might hear. / This is it, the end of the saison, / You know you have a grand illusion." A controversy developed, pointing to the fact that the right to command and the duty to obey did not yet fully characterize the relations between the young fighters and the political leadership. (The Making of Israeli Militarism, Indiana University Press, Uri Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p. 123) (IMG)

Subsequently, the Mapai successfully lobbied for the end of the 'Season':

To clarify the controversy and to put an end to the saison, representatives from the national institutions and the Haganah attended a meeting of saison activists called by its commander, Shimon Avidan. Palmach members objected to the termination of the saison. The Irgun is not totally liquidated, they claimed, and we should not stop the job before it is completely done. The leadership's answer was surprising. It hinted at the need to stop the operations in order to unify all forces against the British. The activists were not convinced. One of those present later recalled that thirty of them spoke and not one favored calling off the operation. Finally, Sneh's patience ran out. "I have spoken!" he exclaimed, repeating the words four times. This event was supposed to show the young people who really had the power to decide in the Yishuv, but Sneh's pathetic repetition later became a means of derision, part of Palmach folklore that symbolized the problems that accompanied the leadership's attempts to constitute its authority over the armed forces. (The Making of Israeli Militarism, Indiana University Press, Uri Ben-Eliezer, 1998, pp. 123-124) (IMG)

Chapter 17

C17S1. Via Iran and Turkey, the Anglo-American Plan for the Nuclear Annihilation of the Soviet Union

*** IMG- All-{Iran}

The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was regarded as not only an anti-Soviet menace, but also as a prelude for war against the Soviet Union. Approximately a month after the US nuclear destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the US Air Force produced a strategic plan for the nuclear annihilation of the Soviet Union. Written on September 15, 1945, a copy of the document was submitted by US Airforce General Lauris Norstad to Major General Leslie Groves. "It is ... obvious," stated the US Airforce's report:

that during this period Russia and the United States will be the outstanding military powers. (Atomic Bomb Production, Memorandum for Major General, War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, September 15, 1945. p. 2) (IMG)

Thus:

For the purpose of this study the destruction of the Russian capability to wage war has therefore been used as a basis upon which to predicate the United States' atomic bomb requirements. (Atomic Bomb Production, Memorandum for Major General, War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, September 15, 1945. p. 2) (IMG)

Of the Soviet cities, 66 were designated as most strategic:

As a foundation, a list was compiled of all Russian cities having any major strategic importance. These 66 cities were plotted on the map shown as Appendix "A" to TAB "A". This list is quite comprehensive. – The following percentages of total Russian production are accomplished in these cities: Aircraft 95%, tanks 97%, guns 73%, trucks 88%, steel 45%, oil refining 95%, aluminum 100%, lead 48%, nickel 60%, zinc 44%. in addition, the majority of all ball-bearing, synthetic rubber, and machine tools are manufactured in these areas. It is to be noted that the above statistics mainly include basic and heavy industry which is normally more remotely located than those industries engaged in the manufacture of the end products. It is therefore logical to assume that an even greater proportion of Russian total manufacturing is concentrated in these 66 cities, which include all of Russia's large population and industrial concentrations. (Atomic Bomb Production, Memorandum for Major General, War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, September 15, 1945. p. 3. Retrieved from: Alex Wellerstein's 'Nuclear Secrecy') (IMG)

The US army designated:

a group of 15 first priority cities and a group of 25 first and second priority cities.. (...). [T]he bulk of all major industries upon which statistics are available is concentrated in the fifteen first priority targets.

Only in aluminum and oil refining is there any significant increase in percentage produced between the first priority cities and the total list of cities. (Atomic Bomb Production, Memorandum for Major General, War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, September 15, 1945. p. 3. Retrieved from: Alex Wellerstein's 'Nuclear Secrecy') (IMG)


The above-shown map and table, retrieved from the US Airforce document, summarizes the number of atomic bombs for each number of priority-category of cities.

Why is this point about nuclear weapons being mentioned within the context of the Middle East conflict? It is because the USSR's South Caucasus flank was the only area in which there did not exist a geostrategic buffer against Anglo-American aggression. At the same time, it was a very oil-rich area which the Anglo-American imperialists prioritized as the target for the nuclear bombing. After Moscow, Baku was the topmost target for a nuclear strike in the Pentagon planning. Hence, on the one hand, the Soviet Caucasus was essentially critical for the Soviet war effort and on the other hand, it was geostrategically vulnerable to an Anglo-American invasion, in the spirit of Operation PIKE (see C9S7), against the Soviet Caucasus oilfields. That is why the Middle East theatre gained an additional importance for during the Cold War. More will be mentioned about this.

18. In summary, it is computed that the United States requirements for stocks of atomic bombs are as follows:

<u>Minimum</u>		<u>Optimum</u>	
For incapacitation of 15 first priority targets -	39	For destruction of 66 cities of strategic importance -	204
For neutralization of possible enemy bases in the Western Hemisphere -	10	For neutralization of possible enemy bases in the Western Hemisphere -	10
For Strategic isolation of the battlefield -	<u>10</u>	For Strategic isolation of the battlefield -	<u>10</u>
Total	59	Total	224
Probable effectiveness factor -	48%	Probable effectiveness factor -	48%
Minimum requirement = $59 \div .48$ or		Optimum requirement = $224 \div .48$ or	
<u>123</u> bombs		<u>466</u> bombs	

Minimum 15 priority cities and optimum 66 strategic cities for a US nuclear strike on the USSR



September 15, 1945 – US Airforce lays the plan for a US nuclear attack on the USSR
 Source: (Alex Wellerstein's 'Nuclear Secrecy')

Oil Concessions from Iran's Regime

*** IMG-All-{Iran}

Even Stephen L. McFarland – who was a Visiting Professor of Military History at the United States Air Force Air War College, during 1992-1993 – acknowledged that Iran's regime was aiming to hand over Iran's northern petroleum to the Americans. In McFarland's words, the 'Iranian government in April included the northern provinces in the prospective American concession':

In early 1943 the Iranian commercial attache in Washington approached Standard Vacuum to seek an agreement for an oil concession. The American government and firms jumped on the invitation once it was made, in spite of warnings from the U.S. minister in Tehran and from the head of the American economic advisory mission that oil negotiations in Iran might jeopardize Allied unity. In December the Iranian government sent official invitations to Standard Vacuum and Standard Oil of New Jersey. Constant delays in the negotiations over the next year caused the Iranian prime minister to encourage American companies to forestall any Soviet or British interference. In February 1944 the Soviets reminded Iran of their "prior rights" to northern Oil. Disregarding the warning, the Iranian government in April included the northern provinces in the prospective American concession. British oil interests joined the competition in late 1943, but the Soviets did not join until September 1944. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 253) (IMG)

Once again, the regime in Iran was violating the 1921 treaty with the USSR, which stated that the USSR would renounce all Tsarist-era claims over Iranian resources, including oil, provided that Iran does not grant oil concessions to any other foreign power. The Article 13 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty had stated:

The Persian Government, for its part, promises not to cede to a third Power, or to its subjects, the concessions and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present Treaty, and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation. (Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic – Treaty of Friendship, signed at Moscow, February 26, 1921 [1922] LNTSer 69; 9 LNTS 383, p. 5) (IMG)

In other words, the treaty had given Iran's oil exclusively to Iran, while prohibiting it from granting oil concessions to any other foreign country. Since the 1920s, Iran had consistently violated the treaty, and had variously granted Iran's oil to the Americans, the British, and the Nazi Germans. Iran once again was violating the treaty by aiming to grant the northern oil to the American companies. This time around, the Soviet Union could not afford to allow Iran's regime to get away with its violations of international treaties. The Soviets took firm steps and tough measures to prevent Iran's regime from granting the oil to the Americans:

Actual Soviet aggression and interference in Iranian affairs was limited until October 1944, when Iran announced its decision to postpone all negotiations for an oil concession until after the war. The oil crisis of that month became a catalyst for the Soviet-American confrontation over Iran. The apparent anti-Soviet nature of the postponement encouraged the Soviet Union to see an American attempt to seize Iranian oil for itself. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 252) (IMG)

Thus, in accordance with international law, the Soviets demanded a petroleum concession from Iran:

On 2 October 1944 the Soviets made an official offer, followed shortly by demand for an oil concession. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 253) (IMG)

The purpose of this demand for an oil concession was not Soviet 'imperialist' 'ambition' to 'steal' 'Iranian' resources. Rather, in the words of the staunch anti-Soviet Cold Warrior George Kennan, the Soviets undertook this measure in order to force the Persian regime to not grant oil to foreign countries:

The basic motive of recent Soviet action in northern Iran is probably not need for the oil itself but apprehension of potential foreign penetration in that area coupled with the concern for prestige which marks all Soviet policy these days. The oil of northern Iran is important not as something Russia needs but as something it might be dangerous to permit anyone else to exploit. The territory lies near the vital Caucasian oil centers which so closely escaped complete conquest in the present war. The Kremlin deems it essential to Russian security that no other great power should have even the chance of gaining a footing there. It probably sees no other way to assure this than by seeking greater political and economic control for itself and finds this aim consistent with contemporary Soviet conceptions of prestige. (891.6363/11-744: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, November 7, 1944; Received: November 8, 1944. 4266. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA,

THE FAR EAST. Vol 5.) (IMG)

As a result of this Soviet move:

Iran's *movazaneh* strategy had backfired. Instead of attracting the United States as a buffer against Anglo-Soviet participation in oil matters, Iran was left with all three countries simultaneously demanding concessions. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 253) (IMG)

'Movazeneh' in Farsi means 'balancing'; in the context of Iranian strategy, it implies striking a 'balance' between foreign superpowers, much like what the 'non-aligned movement' officially claimed to represent. By demanding an oil concession from Iran, the Iranian government had no other option than to prohibit any further oil concessions to any country – not just the Soviets, but also to the British and the Americans. For the Iranian leaders, as McFarland put it:

The only way out was to deny concessions to all, which Iran did on 8 October. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 253) (IMG)

The Soviets had reached their objective of preventing US infiltration into northern Iran. While preventing Iran's regime from handing over Iranian people's oil resources to the Anglo-Americans was necessary, the fact remains that Iran's regime itself was an Anglo-American puppet state. This meant that the revenue generated by Iran's extraction of the northern oil was not going to go to the Iranian people but rather to the Anglo-American imperialists and their fascist anti-Soviet mercenaries. In this midst therefore, it was necessary to deprive the Anglo-American puppet state from its access to the natural oil resources. The Soviet Union on the other hand represented the interests of the people of Iran's north, people who were opposed to the Anglo-Americans' covert control of their oil through the puppet state. The presence of a Soviet front company, under the cover of oil exploration, in Iran could facilitate the process of funding and arming anti-regime rebels that would bring about a Tudeh-led Iranian People's Democracy.

As such, a large-scale popular unrest took place against the government's decision to not grant oil concessions to the USSR. In Tabriz, the major Turkic and industrial city in Iran, massive demonstrations led by the Tudeh Party erupted against the Persian government over the oil concessions:

About 8 o'clock on October 30 a serious demonstration took place in Tabriz following upon demands made by the Tudeh (Communist) Party on the Iranian Government to reverse its policy on the petroleum concession demanded by the Russians. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, p. 464) (IMG)

Similar events occurred in Rasht, the capital city of Iran's Gilan province:

The shops at Resht have been closed in so-called protest against the Iranian Government's decision not to grant the Russian petroleum concession. Rumors of disorder are trickling in from other points north. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, p. 464) (IMG)

Finally, the Iranian Prime Minister Sa'ed feared a similar event in Tehran:

The [Iranian] Prime Minister apprehends the possibility of further trouble in Tehran next Friday. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, p. 464) (IMG)

All of these facts about the protests in Tabriz, Rasht and potentially Tehran were confirmed by the top ranks of the Persian government and the British Consul General in Tabriz:

The facts about the demonstration cited above are reported to me personally by Prime Minister Saed and by Court Minister Ala and are confirmed by a telegram from the British Acting Consul General at Tabriz to his Ambassador here. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, pp. 464-465) (IMG)

The Prime Minister has just told me and the British Ambassador that he plans to offer his resignation this afternoon. He believes that this will relieve the tension, at least temporarily. The Shah will accept the resignation reluctantly unless he is given encouragement by the British and American Governments to resist Russian interference. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran,

November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, pp. 464-465) (IMG)

Unable to suppress the unrest, Prime Minister Sa'ed resigned shortly after.

C17S2. Introduction to the Tudeh Party

*** IMG-All- {Iran}

Iran was still in the phase of bourgeois-democratic revolution against feudal vestiges and imperialism-fascism. As such, the Tudeh Party of Iran, which was formed by the communists, was officially a bourgeois-democratic party. It was a progressive anti-imperialist popular front party led by the communist agents of the Iranian proletariat. This is why, instead of calling itself the 'communist party', the Party named itself 'Tudeh' because the term meant 'mass'. Analyzing the stances of the Tudeh Party of Iran, the CIA corroborated:

The party machinery, organized along Communist lines of "democratic centralism," has been dominated from the outset by a combination of veteran Soviet-trained agitators and Marxist intellectuals, most of whom have been comrades in arms ever since they were thrown together in the prisons of Iran during the Reza Shah regime.

(THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Furthermore, the CIA stated:

the party has also advocated such objectives as the eight-hour [work] day, recognition of the rights of unions, social insurance, protection of mothers and children, and legal and social equality for women. Although most of its platform relates to the laboring classes, it has asserted that it is not merely a party of the workers but the spokesman for 90 percent of the nation. It has repeatedly stated that it works to uphold the Constitution, is in no way opposed to "constitutional laws," and "has no quarrel with the principles of private ownership."

Apparently nothing has angered the leaders of the Tudeh Party so much as the accusation that the party is Communist and has ties with the USSR. Statements in Tudeh newspapers and books stress the democratic, anti-fascist, and anti-reactionary character of the party. The official line is that the party is a native organization, working for the good of the Iranian nation, which is not and will not become Communist; "if our party publishes pro-Soviet articles, it is because the Soviets fight well against the fascists."

(THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

As a matter of fact, during the Great Patriotic War, the Tudeh Party officially and rightly favored a system similar to the bourgeois-democratic model existing in the United States and Britain, but by the end of the war, denounced the Anglo-American imperialists once the alliance between the Axis and the Anglo-Americans became increasingly clear:

The official attitude of the party toward the US and UK was at first mild; in 1944 it spoke of establishing a government "on the type of the English and American democracies," while the party leaders then appeared to view the US with a certain amount of good will. However, the party line soon thereafter began to harden first against the UK and then against the US. Against the British, the Tudeh leaders developed the theme of the "one-sided policy" arguing that the British had maintained dominance over Iranian foreign affairs and Iranian politicians, particularly of the reactionary elements.. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

Over time, the Tudeh Party stepped up its media campaign against Anglo-American imperial presence in Iran: insisting that Iran receive a much return from the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; alleging that the British-owned Imperial Bank of Iran LS operated entirely for the benefit of the UK; stating that the Shah's visit to the UK in the summer of 1948 was for the purpose of instructions from the British; and repeating the common charge that many of present "reactionary" leaders of Iran are in the pay of the British. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 7) (IMG)

The party is most vehement, as might be expected, about US activities in Iran. vigorously opposed the US arms credit bill which was finally passed by the Majlis in February 1948 and has consistently dismissal of the US military missions to the Iranian Army and to the gendarmerie, alleging that US activities in Iran are part of a plan for creating military bases in various parts of the world and charging that airports are being constructed in Iran under US supervision. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 7) (IMG)

Note that during that time period, the religious population of Iran were unwilling to 'convert' to communism. They instead preferred progressive politics. That is why the Tudeh Party was rightly presenting itself as a secular progressive non-communist party favouring close strategic relations with the Soviet Union, just like the Mapam in Israel. And just like how the communists in the Mapam had adopted the 'Socialist Zionist' culture as the political culture of their popular front party in order to blend more easily amongst the Israeli proletarians, the secular Tudeh Party did adopt some of the

Shia Islamist 'values' as its political culture and "initially ... organized Moharram processions, and designated a special prayer room in its main clubhouse" (See: 'Tortured Confessions', written by Ervand Abrahamian, page 77) as a popular front tactic of including as many the progressive-minded proletarians and intellectuals, who nonetheless held religious views, in the struggle against Anglo-American imperialism in Iran. The Tudeh Party is of course well-known for having advanced women's rights and secular politics, but it did adopt a Shia Islamic image to some extent.

For a while, the left-deviationist current resurged in influence in the Tudeh Party, but was later put down. The left-deviationist tendency in the party sought to weaken communist influence by eliminating the popular front and ending the proletarian alliance with the bourgeoisie. In so doing, the left-deviation would have undermined communist influence in Iran which had taken the form of the communist-led popular front. In response, the:

Tudeh leadership felt compelled ("since the party is neither communistic nor revolutionary") to denounce the "Marxist Trotskyites" within its ranks as representing a "left deviation." (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

Since the anti-Trotskyite purge, however:

the Tudeh Party has devoted energy to denying any ties with the Soviet Union and more energy to attacking the "enemies" of the USSR. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

In itself, popular front activity was the most correct policy line for the situation in Iran. However, the challenge faced by popular fronts is that it can allow infiltration by opportunists. The Tudeh Party made note of this serious problem and self-criticized:

On 1 January 1947 ... the Tudeh leadership confessed that the party, by encouraging quantity rather than quality, had granted membership to corrupt opportunists and adventurers who had ignored the instructions of the Central Committee and injured the feelings of many of their fellow countrymen. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Again, the main source of opportunism during that time period emanated from the left-opportunists who aimed to sabotage the Tudeh Party's popular front tactics. In spite of the challenges it faced, the Tudeh Party of Iran, as confirmed by the CIA in the 1949 document and US Army Captain James Muhl, grew to become the only genuinely popularly-supported party and movement in Iran:

The Tudeh Party is significant not only because of its Soviet connections, which make it the logical nucleus for a quisling government should the USSR accelerate its efforts to interfere in Iran, but also because of the head start it has obtained in rousing certain important elements of the Iranian people from their political apathy. **The other parties which have sprung up in Iran since the fall of the Reza Shah dictatorship are at present chiefly loose associations of notables, leaving the Tudeh Party as the only political group which has achieved any degree of genuine popular support.** Although the Tudeh organization has scarcely begun to organize Iran's vast peasantry, it has made **notable strides in the towns**, which constitute the principal centers of power and control in Iran. Utilizing the **Tudeh- created Central United Council of Trade Unions, the party at one time had more than 70,000 members** — about one-third of Iran's industrial population — and has been particularly active in such key installations as the Iranian State Railway, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and government-owned factories. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

The Tudeh had become the largest political organization in the country after a spurt of rapid growth. By August 1946, it had a core membership of 50,000 and a total roster of 100,000 active members. Together with the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and through its several trade unions, the Tudeh could mobilize about 335,000 political supporters — a formidable force. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900 -1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 61) (iMG)

The CIA further reported:

sixty percent of this membership consists of factory and railroad workers, with the remainder scattered rather evenly through Iran's other social classes. The country's predominant peasant population accounts for only about eight percent of the membership total. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 13) (IMG)

Due to its widespread influence among the urban proletarians:

the Tudeh organization is well fitted to further Soviet policy by undertaking sabotage, work stoppages, and disturbances at critical points within Iran or by setting up a new group of regional autonomist movements. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Iran's regime banned the Tudeh Party of Iran in early 1949. As confirmed by the CIA:

In February 1949, .. the Tudeh organization was outlawed by the Iranian Government, and a number of its leaders were arrested (and later convicted) on charges of treasonable activity. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF

COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

However even as late as July of that same year, the CIA remarked:

Despite these reverses, the Tudeh Party will continue to be an important factor in Iran's future so long as the lagging of social and economic reform creates a reservoir of popular unrest upon which to draw. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

While the party has been temporarily driven underground, it will undoubtedly proceed with its announced intentions of carrying on the struggle.. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

The undemocratic and anti-popular system in Iran, having banned the Tudeh Party in 1949, made revolutionary uprising the only option for the Tudeh party:

It is hardly likely that the Tudeh leadership has any real hope of gaining power through peaceful means, especially in view of the tight control over electoral processes exercised by Iran's present ruling class. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Hence, to this popular communist-led bourgeois-democratic movement in Iran, the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies provided covert military, financial, intelligence, and transportation support. The US intelligence reported:

practical types of Soviet support are provided through appropriate Soviet commercial and cultural organizations in Iran. The assistance provided by such organizations is considerable. the Soviet Hospital at Tehran has supplied the party with newsprint; Iransovtrans has supplied weapons and vehicles, has transported individuals, and has maintained courier services; Iranian-Soviet Fisheries Company has used its boats to smuggle individuals and weapons into Iran; and VOKS and Tass have supplied propaganda material. A number of Soviet organizations have supplied the party with financial assistance, and there is even a report as yet unconfirmed, that the party receives (via the Czechoslovakian Legation) a monthly subsidy of 2,225,000 rials (\$69,000) in cash or easily disposable merchandise. In Tehran, *mohajirs* [emigrants from the Soviet Union] have been supplied with second-hand clothing to hawk in the street and have received free meals at the Hotel Gilan-i-No against ration cards issued by the Soviet Embassy. agents have been supplied for Tudeh organizational work; for example, a Czechoslovakian Communist named Franz Jingar has been active with the party at Isfahan, while a Russian-born agent named Hushangi was at one time the leader of organizational activity at Nowshahr, on the Caspian Sea. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 12) (IMG)

In 1945, the Tudeh Party of Iran participated in the Majlis (Parliament) election, but its key representative Ja'far Pishevari, who was elected from Tabriz, was discriminated against and not allowed into the Parliament:

(Ja'far Pishevari, later head of the free Azerbaijan regime, was elected from Tabriz but the Majlis refused to seat him), while an additional seven deputies are believed to have been covert members of the party. This small Tudeh "fraction" in the alert, more skilled in debate, and more sure of purpose than the other deputies – was very outspoken in the chamber and did much to obstruct the legislative process. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4)(IMG)

In response to the undemocratic character of the regime, the:

Tudeh organization in the field worked to strengthen its hand in preparation for the Soviet-directed attempt to shatter the Tehran government's authority which was made at the end of the war. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

Thus:

At the end of September 1945 a group of Tudeh-backed army officers began a premature revolt in the Khorasan area east of the Caspian Sea. Meanwhile, however, the very active Tabriz section of the party had set itself up as a new and nominally distinct organization, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, and had begun its agitation for autonomy. By the spring of 1946 the Iranian Government was confronted Soviet-backed autonomous regimes in both Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, new Tudeh agitation in Khorasan and along the Caspian coast, Soviet demands for an oil concession, and strong opposition from the right-wing politicians. The term of the XIV Majlis was ending in confusion, its final sessions left quorumless because of the Tudeh demonstrators massed before its meeting place. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

C17S3. The Rise and Struggles of People's Democratic Azerbaijan in Iran / Use of Turkey and Iran as a Route for a Nuclear Holocaust in Baku / The Assassination of Ja'far Pishevari

*** IMG-All-{Iran}

By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Azeri population in Iran no longer identified itself with the latter. As mentioned in C4S2, this trend had started since the end of the First World War. Referring to the Azeri population in his 1979 book, Richard W. Cottam – the infamous American spy who served in the covert operations division of the CIA

between 1953 and 1958 and as a diplomat and Political Officer in the US Embassy in Tehran between 1956 and 1958 – admitted:

nothing that happened prior to 1946 indicates positively that the majority of the population identified themselves with Iran. These were lean years for Azerbaijan. Reza Shah's policy of centralizing commerce in Tehran hit Tabriz particularly hard. The city lost its commercial pre-eminence, and the most active and vital of its citizenry moved to Tehran. Their departure emasculated Azerbaijan as a political center. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 124) (IMG)

Under such circumstances, the Azeris of Iran grew increasingly sympathetic towards a communist-led sovereigntist popular-democratic movement:

the strong dissatisfaction plus whatever separatist sentiment existed helped create the impression that influenced Soviet policy makers in the latter days of World War II. In Tabriz and in every other Azerbaijan city of any size, a communist coterie existed, ready and willing to assume the leadership of a separatist movement. Support could be expected from much of the Christian element; the Iranian army could easily be neutralized by the Soviet occupation forces; land and social reforms should produce acquiescence, if not sympathy, from the huge peasant and illiterate worker population; and because of general dissatisfaction, little opposition could be expected from the small layer of Iranian nationalists. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 125) (IMG)

The leader of the new communist-led Azeri sovereigntist partisan resistance movement was:

Ja'far Pishevari, a life-long communist with official credentials: the first Secretary of the Adalat Committee in Baku, one of three Secretaries of its successor Communist Party of Iran, a participant in the Jangali movement and a member of the nine-man executive committee heading the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan. When Reza Shah imprisoned Pishevari from 1925 to 1941, he made contact with Dr. Erani's communist group. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58) (IMG)

On September 1945, Pishevari founded the 'Firqeh ye Demokrat', or the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, a communist-led partisan sovereigntist movement:

Pishevari announced the formation of the Firqah-i Dimokrat in September 1945. Immediately, he was able to absorb the local Tudeh Party and convene the first party congress that October. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58) (iMG)

The Azerbaijan Democratic Party enjoyed the overwhelming popular support of the peasant and proletarian masses.

Referring to the population of Azerbaijan, Cottam admitted:

the elements of the population that gave support were the very groups that understood politics the least – the peasants and illiterate laborers. Large numbers of these people willingly served in the Democratic army and accepted Russian uniforms and Russian equipment. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, pp. 126-127) (IMG)

On September 16th, the Democratic Party:

launched their revolution in Azerbaijan. ('Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953'. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58)

The Soviets aimed to assist the Azeri proletariat and peasantry in Iran to emancipate themselves and create a People's Democratic state:

The Soviets were willing to work with the Azerbaijani communists, despite differing party orthodoxy and allegiances. The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, or the Firqah-i Dimokrat, was a communal organization appealing exclusively to the people of Azerbaijan. ('Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953'. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58) (IMG)

As always, the strategic interests of the Soviet state of the proletariat converged with those of the proletariat and peasantry in other countries – in this case, the Azerbaijani proletariat and peasantry in Iran. The position of the Soviet Union in its southern Caucasian flank was rather weak. The Soviet Caucasus region had been encircled by a hostile treacherous Turkey and a royalist Persia, both neo-colonies of the Anglo-American imperialists. Via this route, the Anglo-American imperialists could launch their nuclear strike on Baku. Note that after Moscow, Baku was the priority for the Anglo-American imperialists because of its tremendous oil resources, the most strategic commodity for resisting the Anglo-American imperialist aggressors during the potential Third World War. The Soviet state's support for the Azerbaijani uprising in Iran helped strengthen the defenses of the southern Caucasian flank of the USSR against the Anglo-American imperialist bombardment plots. In the words of CIA and State Department consultant Melvyn Leffler:

one suspects that Soviet military planners were eager to capitalize upon the presence of Soviet troops in Iran to safeguard their strategic interests, especially to help protect their petroleum fields and refining industry. They certainly must have known, as did American planners, that in 1940 the British and French contemplated bombing Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus in order to deny petroleum to the Nazis. Soviet planners, having observed the

functioning of the Persian Corridor during World War II, must also have been wary of its future use in wartime if it should be controlled by an adversary. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 211) (IMG)

According to the professional journal of the US Army:

In Moscow, only a week after the formation of the Azerbaijan Republic, the American Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, queried Stalin about the Soviet troops in northern Iran. Stalin replied that they were necessary to prevent Iran from sabotaging Russian oil fields in Baku. (The Azerbaijan Incident, US Major William R. Andrews. In: 'Military Review: The Professional Journal of the US Army', Vol.

54, No. 8, August 1974, p. 79) (IMG)


The vulnerability of the Soviets in Caucasus was real, as the Anglo-Americans seriously planned to use Turkey as a launching pad for a nuclear and conventional strike on the Soviet Caucasus oilfields. It was in September 1945 that the United States military hatched the plots for 204 nuclear bombs to be dropped on 66 Soviet cities (more details in C17S1). The US military designated 15 Soviet cities in particular as the priority cities for a nuclear strike; in that list of 15, the second greatest priority for the United States was Baku due to its industrialization as well as the rich petroleum resources it contained. A CIA document corroborating the significance of the Middle East frontier, pointed to the strategic importance of Baku's oil fields for the USSR:

It is, moreover, an area of Soviet strategic interest, even greater than that of eastern Europe, in view of the general shift of Soviet industry away from the European Frontier, but still within range of air attack from the south, and of the vital importance of Baku oil in the Soviet economy. It is in the Middle East, however, that Soviet interest comes into collision with the established interest of Great Britain and that there is consequently the greatest danger of precipitating a major conflict. Soviet policy in the area must therefore be pursued with due caution and flexibility. (Soviet Foreign and Military Policy, ORE 1, Central Intelligence Group (CIA Predecessor), July 23, 1946, p. 7) (IMG)

The threat of an American nuclear attack on Soviet Caucasus oilfields was very real. Leffler noted:

It was this very vulnerability that United States strategic planners hoped to capitalize on. In fact, United States interest in Turkey accelerated as war planners began to develop a strategic concept for the postwar era and as overall United States-Soviet relations deteriorated sharply in early 1946. In September 1945 strategic planners emphasized "the necessity of keeping a prospective enemy at the maximum possible distance, and conversely of projecting our advance bases into areas well removed from the United States, so as to project our operations with new weapons [i.e. nuclear weapons] or otherwise nearer the enemy." (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 172) (IMG)

the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) launched a series of studies code-named PINCHER late in 1945 to explore the problems of waging a war against the Soviet Union. The first fruit of this exercise appeared on March 2, 1946, when the JWPC forwarded a broad concept of operations to the Joint Staff Planners. With refinement, this became the basic concept of operations around which strategic planning revolved for the next several years. Dealing only with the opening stages of a conflict, PINCHER envisioned war breaking out in the eastern Mediterranean or Near East and spreading rapidly across Europe. (Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Published for the Joint History Office of the Director, Joint Staff, Steven L. Rearden, 2012, p. 71) (IMG)



The 15 priority target cities for a nuclear strike. Source: (Alex Wellerstein's 'Nuclear Secrecy')

Thanks to the presence of People's Democratic Azerbaijan in Iran's north, the Anglo-American imperialists had been forced to rely, in the military planning, for the while, on the Turkish route to Baku and less so the Iranian route. To the Anglo-Americans, Continental Europe was no longer as strategically significant, especially when compared to the Middle East:

Turkey's special role emerged in March 1946 when ... State Department officials pressed military planners to define more clearly the importance of Turkey and when strategic analysts were forced to come to terms with the effects of Western Europe's military weakness and the United States's rapid demobilization. Assuming that Soviet troops would easily overrun all of Western Europe and that United States forces would be evacuated from the continent, the utilization of air power took on more significance than ever before. Turkey was seen as a key to the effective application of air power. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 173. Citing: Byrnes to JCS, March 6, 1946, sec. 5, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), *ibid.*; memo for the Joint Staff Planners, March 8, 1946, *ibid.*; JCS 1641/1, "U.S. Security Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean," March 10, 1946, sec. 6, *ibid.*; JPS 789, "Concept of Operations for Pincher," enclosure sec. 1, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), *ibid.*; JWPC 453, "Disposition Of Occupation Forces in Europe and the Far East in the Event Of Hostilities in Europe, and the Importance of Certain Areas Of Eurasia," March 27, 1946, sec. 5, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), *ibid.*; Operations Division, "Adequate Governmental Machinery to Handle Foreign Affairs," March 13, 1946, P&O 092 TS, Records of the United States Army Staff; meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, March 6, 1946, box 3, safe file, Patterson Papers.) (IMG)

Obviously, the geostrategic conditions dictated that after Turkey, Iran would be the most important geostrategic avenue for an Anglo-American military strike on Soviet Caucasus:

the initial (and tentative) plans of the United States for waging war against the Soviet Union envisioned, among other things, an air assault from the south (from bases at Cairo-Suez). These war plans also denoted a route through the Balkans or through Iran as one of the few likely avenues for a land invasion of the Soviet Union, should it ever become necessary." (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 211. Citing: JPS 789, "Concept of Operations for Pincher," March 1946, RG 218, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), Sec. 1; "Air Plan for Makefast," [Autumn 1946], NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, American-British Conversations (ABC) 381 SSR (March 2, 1946), Sec. 3; "Presentation to the President," January 14, 1947, Forrest P. Sherman Papers (Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.), box 2.) (IMG)

Note also that the Anglo-American imperialists had aimed to base their warplanes in Egypt, as stated above. That was because Egypt was far away from the USSR, and thus harder for the Red Army to hit. The Air Force of the United States was the strength of the US military, and was capable of travelling to the Soviet Caucasus while landing back in Egypt. Ironically, in contradiction to the Anglo-American imperialist intents, Wafdist Egypt was one of the Arab countries closest in strategic relations to the USSR during this period.

The creation of a People's Democratic Azerbaijan would have helped prevent the Anglo-American warplanes from reaching the Soviet Caucasus oilfields. The people's revolution would have emancipated the Azeri peasantry and

proletarians from Anglo-American-backed royalist oppression while also helping the Soviet Azeri people from a nuclear holocaust. The Soviet Red Army aimed to prevent direct involvement in the conflict in Azerbaijan; instead, it maximized efforts to logistically back the Democratic Army partisans:

The Soviets wished to remain as much as possible in the background, probably to avoid antagonizing the local population.. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 126)

(IMG)

On November 15, 1945 the Soviets began to distribute arms to the Firqah-i Dimokrat. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58) (iMG)

Beside logistical support, however, the Soviet Red Army also tried to prevent bloody repression by Iran's royalist forces: Soviet intervention in support of the rebellion limited the amount of bloodshed since their overwhelming forces discouraged any official resistance. Whenever the rebels challenged a military or police station,

Soviet troops would appear and inform the Iranian commander to submit to the rebels. This pattern of Soviet interference was demonstrated when a relief column sent by the central government on November 20 was halted near Qazvin by a Soviet military force and 86 turned back. This Soviet signal to the central government ended any military opposition to the rebellion. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, pp. 58-59) (IMG)

This pattern of Soviet interference against Iranian regime repression happened in a number of cases:

In two instances they were compelled to reveal their hand, but in neither case because of the resistance of Iranian nationalists. Russian troops had to give open support to the Democrats in Ardebil when the Shahsevan tribe joined the local gendarmery in resisting the communist take-over. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 126) (IMG)

As one of the first steps of the revolt, the Democratic Army's partisans took over the agricultural center in Mianeh, as the Soviet armed forces prevented Persian regime repression:

A communist-dominated group seized control of the Azerbaijan agricultural center of Mianeh. Simultaneously, the Iranian army garrison in that city was confined to its barracks by Soviet occupation forces and then disarmed.

This pattern was repeated in the next few weeks throughout Azerbaijan. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 126) (IMG)

Over time, a People's Democratic state was established throughout the whole of the Azerbaijan region in Iran. Once the People's Democratic government in the Azerbaijan region in Iran was established, scientific socialist measures towards improving the conditions of the proletariat and peasantry were undertaken:

The Pishvari government immediately inaugurated social and economic reforms and promised to begin a land distribution program. Even strongly anti-Pishvari residents of Tabriz admitted that more improvements were made in the city of Tabriz in one year of Democratic rule than in the twenty years under Reza Shah. Because of these accomplishments, the regime attracted significant support from the populace. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 126) (IMG)

The General-Secretary of the CPSU, Joseph Stalin, assessed that the Qavam group, while fascist agents of the MI6, could nonetheless be coopted by the Tudeh Party and progressive bourgeois-democratic politicians in Iran's regime, so to drive a wedge between Iran and the Anglo-American imperialists. The Qavam group were preferred over the gang of former Prime Minister Sa'ed. In his letter to Pishvari, Stalin remarked:

We see a conflict between the Qavam government and the pro-British circles in Iran, which represent the most reactionary elements in Iran. Today, Qavam, no matter how reactionary he was in the past, must make some democratic reforms to protect himself and his Administration [from democratic backlash] and to gain the support of Iran's democratic forces. What should be our tactics in such a situation? In my opinion, we should use this conflict to take advantage of Qavam, to [coopt and] support him, to isolate the pro-British forces, and to prepare the ground for further democratization of Iran. All our advice to you is based on this diagnosis. Of course, another tactic was possible: spitting on everything, severing ties, and thus ensuring the victory of the pro-British reactionaries. But this is not really a tactic but is rather stupidity. This is in fact a betrayal of the people of Azerbaijan and Iranian democracy. (...). Here we have used a technique that every revolutionary is familiar with. In any situation that is similar to today's situation in Iran, if someone wants to obtain a certain minimum of demands from the government, then the movement must continue on its way, go beyond the minimum demands and pose a danger to the government until concessions are provided by the government. If you did not advance much in the current conditions of Iran, you would not be able to achieve objectives that the Qavam government is forced to concede today. This is the law of the revolutionary movement. (...).

On the contrary, if you behave wisely and with our spiritual support, demand the legalization of the real and current situation in Azerbaijan, then both Azeris and Iran will respect you as a pioneer of the progressive and democratic movement in the Middle East. (Stalin's Letter to Pishvari, May 8, 1946.

The full text of this document has been released by the Russian history magazine, *Novaya I Noveishaya Istoriya*, Nr. 3, May-June 1994. The text of this letter can be found in the Islamic Republic of Iran's 'Political Studies and Research Institute' (PSRI) as well as USA's 'Wilson Center'. (IMG)

Stalin's policy line concerning the Qavam group in Iran was one of bribe-and-blackmail or carrots-and-stick. Stalin aimed to utilize the Tudeh-led revolt along with the Azeri and Kurdish rebellions as a means of posing so severe a pressure on Iran's regime so as to obtain concessions from Iran's pro-British regime. These concessions would enable the Soviets to force the Qavam group into the hands of the Tudeh forces, to coopt the reactionary Qavam group in the struggle against the Anglo-American imperialists, and to increase the influence of the proletariat over Iran's regime so as to advance the interests of the progressive and democratic forces in Iran and the Middle East. Indeed, as Stalin had implied in his letter to Pishevari, the armed revolt of the Democrats in Azerbaijan-Iran, the Democrats in Kurdistan-Iran, and the Tudeh Party in the rest of Iran inflicted so great a material cost on the CIA-MI6 satellite regime that the Anglo-American intelligence agencies were bogged down towards countering the uprising, leaving the communist and progressive agents in Iran's regime apparatus the operational freedom to penetrate and to turn the tide in the favour of the communist and democratic forces. The material undermining of comprador reaction reduced the material possessions, and hence the leverage, of the comprador agents, thus, in relative though not absolute terms, increasing the material strength and leverage power of the revolutionary agents within the Iranian regime apparatus. This increased communist and progressive intelligence penetration had encircled, compelled, and coopted the Qavam group into accepting the Tudeh Party, taking action against the MI6 spies, and undermining the reactionary forces in Iran while fighting for the democratic forces:

Prime Minister Qavam, enabled to act freely by the adjournment of the Majlis on 16 March, turned first against the so-called reactionary element in the opposition, arresting Sayyid Zia ad-din Tabatabai and General Hasan Arfa and ending the activities of Sayyid Zia's allegedly anti-Soviet National Will Party. Toward the USSR and its supporters, Qavam adopted a conciliatory policy, with an immediate view to obtaining the evacuation of Soviet occupation troops from Iran. In Mazandaran the Tudeh Party proceeded to arm the workers, to take over the government-owned factories, and to police communications. The Tudeh-backed Central United Council of Trade Unions sponsored a rash of unauthorized strikes, Tudeh members seized factories at Isfahan, and party speakers at Abadan heaped abuse on the government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, all without governmental opposition. In June a preliminary agreement was reached between Qavam and the "Azerbaijan Democratic Government," while Abbas Eskandari, brother of the Tudeh Party leader, was named mayor of Tehran; in August, Qavam named three prominent Tudeh leaders to his cabinet, thus enabling them to place loyal followers in important government posts, even in such former right-wing strongholds as Yazd and Kerman. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

In the letter to Stalin, Pishevari had stated:

Secondly, now that Qavam has started the war and spilled the blood of our brothers, let us also put pressure upon him from all sides, so that in this way the freedom-fighters may rise up all over Iran, and a great movement throughout Iran shall emerge to overthrow the reactionary government of Tehran and to establish a democratic government instead.

If this is not good, let us cut ties with Tehran completely and establish our own national government. Whichever policy the Soviet state will choose, we can execute it honorably and succeed.

(Pishevari's Letter to Stalin, December 8, 1946) (IMG)

Note that People's Democratic Azerbaijan had still not officially separated from Iran, and had instead argued that it was fighting for sovereignty and autonomy – not separation. Upon the suggestion of the Soviet officials, the Azeri Democrats had argued so, but the point of non-separation had not been understood. Pishevari's assessment was that, preferably, all of Iran should be conquered by the progressive and democratic forces, with Azerbaijan serving as a major base for this move. Should this Plan A not succeed, Pishevari held, then the Azeri Democrats should pursue Plan B which is the establishment of a Azerbaijan's 'own national government' completely separate from Tehran. Pishevari was not incorrect to say that Plan A should be the revolutionary takeover of the whole of the country and that separation should be pursued only if Plan A fails. Where Pishevari was mistaken, however, was in his assessment of the revolutionary situation in Iran, which clearly did not exist. Such was why Stalin replied:

There is no strong revolutionary situation in Iran. In Iran, the number of workers is small and they are not well organized. Iran's peasants still do not show serious activity. [Unlike Tsarist Russia in 1905 and 1917] Iran is not in a war against a foreign enemy that will weaken the [reactionary regime] circles through a military defeat. As a result, the conditions in Iran are unlike the effective tactics of 1905 and 1917. (Stalin's Letter to Pishevari, May 8, 1946. The full text of this document has been released by the Russian history magazine, *Novaya I Noveishaya Istoriya*, Nr. 3, May-June 1994. The text of this letter can be found in the Islamic Republic of Iran's 'Political Studies and Research Institute' (PSRI) as well as USA's 'Wilson Center'.) (iMg)

The content of Stalin's letter to Pischevari, as mentioned previously, shows that the Soviets wanted Azerbaijan to be a part of Iran, so that this sovereign People's Democratic Azerbaijan would conquer many of the resources in its territory and would operate as a base which shall destabilize the central government of Iran, allowing communist and progressive intelligence penetration to its higher ranks – such was why the Tudeh Party was able to obtain positions in the cabinet – driving a wedge between Iran and its patron, the British Empire. Had Azerbaijan officially separated from Iran, it would have been difficult for it to launch a military assault on the central government at the opportune time because such a military assault would have been denounced as an “Azeri invasion of Iran,” whereas Azerbaijan staying in Iran would have been regarded as an “Azeri people's uprising against the central regime” – huge differences in international law implications and propaganda effects. In time, a militarily sovereign Mahabad plus a militarily sovereign Azerbaijan could help in launching a major rebellion to overthrow the central regime of Iran and then establish a territorially integral Peoples' Democratic Iran in which the democratic freedoms and cultures of all ethnicities are respected, while territorially integrity is pursued along with military and economic recentralization as basis for the rise of a powerful socialist Iran. This Soviet policy was class-wise diametrically opposite, but strategically analogous, to the present-day policy of Israel and the United States concerning Iraqi Kurdistan; contrary to Arab bourgeois-nationalist assumptions, and contrary to what Israel itself pretends, the CIA and Mossad do not support the full separation of Kurdistan from Iraq; the CIA and Mossad both support the full military autonomy of a reactionary Iraqi Kurdistan region strictly without the full separation of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq – that is so, because the continued existence of reactionary militarily autonomous regime in Iraqi Kurdistan yields a powerful American- Israeli base inside Iraq, allowing them to use that base and Kurdish bourgeois-nationalist ‘fifth column’ to launch rebellions against the central government of Iraq, rather than have a separate Kurdistan invade Arab Iraq. The CIA and Mossad support such a militarily autonomous Kurdistan region against the Iran-backed central government of Iraq from inside Iraq, as a step towards destabilizing the central government, and then bringing about in the Arab parts of Iraq the ISIS terrorists that then ‘ethnically recentralize’ Iraq, by savagely terrorizing and suppressing the Kurdish people, and then the CIA and Mossad strengthen this ISIS terror regime as a bulwark against Iran. The same goes for why the Anglo-American and German imperialists in the 1990s and 2000s fought for the military autonomy of Kosovo but not the full separation of Kosovo from Serbia – a NATO-backed so-called “Kosovar people's heroic rebellion against the Russian-backed chauvinist central government of Serbia” would have sounded very differently than a NATO-backed “separate Kosovar state's invasion against poor Serbia” both in terms of the international law implications and in terms of propaganda effects. The Soviet policy concerning the support for People's Democratic Azerbaijan and People's Democratic Mahabad was the socialist pro-democratic anti-fascist anti-imperialist version of the Anglo-American-German and Israeli strategy concerning Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo. Military federalization as a step towards the installation of a new government that then recentralizes the military – such a strategy is sometimes more effective than full partition.

As always, MI6 agent Beria had a radically different vision of the situation. Luckily for Beria, Mir Ja'far Bagirov, the First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party in the Azerbaijan SSR, was on his side. Sergo Beria wrote: My father's relations were excellent with the First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, Jafar Bagirov. The two men had no secrets from each other. (...). This man spoke Turkish and Iranian perfectly, had a lively mind, was able to find his bearings quickly in the most diverse situations, and had shown himself to be a competent administrator, well informed about the oil industry. He ... believed in neither God nor the devil, and still less in communism. His first wife died giving birth to a son. He remarried, to an animated German woman who brought with her three sisters and their mother.

‘It's a real harem,’ said my mother, laughing at all these women, of whom she was nonetheless very fond. In order to house his tribe Bagirov had to have a house built, and this brought down on him a shower of criticisms. Bagirov was reviving the Turkish way of life, he was organising a brothel, and so on ... whereas the persons involved were perfectly civilised German ladies. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 300) (IMG)

Forget not that Bagirov had been responsible for recruiting the Menshevik/Musavat spy for the MI6, Lavrenti Beria, into the Bolshevik Cheka. Long before the Great Patriotic War:

Being a Georgian, Beria could not be given the command of the Cheka in Azerbaijan; therefore, Bagirov, who was a Turk Azerbaijani, headed it. In reality, however, the Baku Cheka was run by Beria. (‘Bagirov, M D/Beria, L P’, CIA, August 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Beria wanted the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic to cease to become a socialist state, to separate from the USSR, and most importantly, to join Royalist Iran. Some time in late 1945 or 1946, in a conversation with his loyal supporter Bagirov, Beria suggested:

You would do better to think of attaching your Azerbaijan to Iran! (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 202) (IMG)

In other words, Beria was aiming to help the Iranian regime, comprador terror regime allied to Anglo-American finance

capital, to steal the Soviet Union's oil resources by taking over the Azerbaijan SSR. The drive to destroy socialism and liquidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Azerbaijan SSR required extensive levels of sabotage at every level. Bagirov's project to corrupt the Azerbaijan SSR would have served precisely that end. The First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, indeed a staunch anti-communist, lived the decadent life of a corrupt official, engaging in nepotism, providing a special privilege for his own clan, and controlling a brothel and a harem made up of German women.

The corruption of the Bagirov gang on the one hand created a network of privileged elites in the Azerbaijan Communist Party, a corrupt bureaucratic class hostile to Soviet power, workers' statehood, and scientific socialism. On the other hand, it would have served to drive a wedge between the state and the masses, foster resentment among some towards the USSR, and thereby pave the way for the collapse of the Azerbaijan SSR and its subsequent separation from the Union.

The Soviets had tried to stay in Azerbaijan. However, the pressure of international law caused the Soviet Union to withdraw. In the letter to Ja'far Pishevari, Stalin had stated that the Soviet Red Army withdrew from Iran because it aimed to take up the issue of international law to expose Anglo-American imperialist hypocrisy concerning the military occupation of the many colonies of the British Empire:

Certainly, if the Soviet forces remained in Iran, you could count on success in the revolutionary demands of the people of Azerbaijan. However, we could no longer keep the Soviet troops in Iran, primarily because their continued presence in Iran would disrupt the foundation of our liberationist policies in Europe and Asia. The British and Americans told us that if the Soviet forces can stay in Iran, then why cannot the British forces stay in Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, Greece, and similarly why cannot the American forces stay in China, Iceland and Denmark? For this reason, we decided to withdraw the troops from Iran and China in order to take this excuse from the hands of the British and Americans, to fuel the liberation movement in the colonies and thus make our liberation policy more legitimate and effective. (Stalin's Letter to Pishevari, May 8, 1946. The full text of this document has been released by the Russian history magazine, *Novaya I Noveishaya Istoriya*, Nr. 3, May-June 1994. The text of this letter can be found in the Islamic Republic of Iran's 'Political Studies and Research Institute' (PSRI) as well as USA's 'Wilson Center'.) (iMG)

The withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army forces, however, allowed the comprador military of Iran's central government to fight against the Democratic forces in Mahabad/Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, paving the way for the restoration of Iranian regime rule. The Iranian regime then launched its fascist war to "liberate" Azerbaijan and to restore feudalism and corruption. The CIA operative Richard Cottam wrote:

After the liberation of Azerbaijan, the Status quo ante returned. Turkish books and the Turkish press were destroyed, and the Persian language was once again taught; the Army and feudal landowners again controlled the Azerbaijan Majlis delegation; and the general policy of sloth, corruption, and neglect returned. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 129) (IMG)

The military defeat of these Democratic forces reduced the lobbying power of the Tudeh Party, allowing Qavam to quickly oust the Tudeh Party agents encircling him in the cabinet:

The mushrooming of Tudeh influence was soon checked, however. Qavam was already becoming annoyed with the Tudeh Party because of its pressure for ratification of the Soviet oil concession agreement and for specific concessions in the forthcoming elections, and when the powerful Qashqai tribes openly rebelled against the ascendancy of Tudeh leaders in the government, he moved effectively. Quickly making an agreement with the Qashqais, he dismissed the Tudeh mayor of Tehran, forced the Tudeh members out of his cabinet, and stressed the rapid expansion of his own newly formed political party, the Democrats of Iran. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

When the royalist regime of Iran fully crushed People's Democratic Azerbaijan, many of the Democratic Army militants sought refuge in the Azerbaijan SSR. Many including Pishevari himself were accepted. However, in the midst of this process, Bagirov made sure to filter out as many Democratic Army refugees as he could:

Although some of the leaders were given refuge, Bagirov relayed that all others should stay put, surrender to the Iranian authorities and play the final act of the tragedy. Many of the democrats were killed in the early months of 1947, while most of the leaders managed to survive the worst phase of repression in December 1946 in the safe haven of Baku, and many others continued fighting in the hills until early summer 1947. (Origins of the Cold War: An International History, Melvyn Leffler, David S. Painter, p. 107) (IMG)

According to Jamil Hasanli – an Azerbaijani government official and a scholar of the CIA-backed Wilson Center – a prominent Soviet intelligence official stated, during the trials of Bagirov, that there was a 'coordinated' attempt 'to kill Pishevari' through a 'car accident':

In the meanwhile, former chief of the Yevlakh regional KGB department Salayev Latif Samed oglu declared as follows: "I believe that the car accident was coordinated to kill Pishevari." Salayev's evidence made it clear that

attempts had been made to seek the instigators of the car accident abroad.

The blame for this crime was laid on Karnik Melikhyan, driver of Pischevari's car. ('Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959'. Jamil Hasanli, 2014, p. 71) (IMG)

The testimony of the Soviet intelligence official was occurring during a time in which Beria's agents throughout the USSR were being purged in 1953, and Bagirov was among them. The Soviet intelligence official added:

after Pischevari's death, chief of the Shamkhor regional KGB department Sarkisov Ruben Mirzayevich told me that before the accident he had been aware of the fact that driver Melikhyan was a son of Dashaks' leader.. ('Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959'. Jamil Hasanli, p. 71) (IMG)

Another close relative of Melikhiyan was described by Salayev as having:

worked in the British Embassy to Iran. ('Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959'. Jamil Hasanli, p. 71) (IMG)

A 2006 work by Teyyub Qurban was a prominent Azerbaijani intellectual. A graduate of journalism studies, he was a researcher defending the legacy of the Beria agent Bagirov, and was linked to the MI6-run Musavat Party, the Party which Beria served in the early days of the October Revolution and the Civil War. Qurban's work serves to corroborate the remarks by the Soviet intelligence official, and provides additional details. Qurban started by saying:

The guests were welcomed by General Qulam Yahya in whose 'Hudson' car they began driving towards Shaki, in the calm of night. Who was the driver of the 'Hudson' car? Karnik Melikhiyan. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Duşmanlarından guclu şaxsiyyat. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

Referring to Melikhiyan, the author confirmed:

His dad was a leader of the Dashnak partisans in Iran. His wife at the time worked in the British Embassy in Iran. The local MGB branch of the Azerbaijan SSR provided him with a personal card after the car accident. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Duşmanlarından guclu şaxsiyyat. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

The Dashnaks in the USSR, as the local assistants of the British intelligence service, had invited the British Empire to invade the Soviet Union. With his wife working in the British Embassy, and his father for the British-backed guerrillas, the perpetrators of the crime should become increasingly clear. Moreover, Melikhiyan apparently possessed an amount of money worth a thousand Manats as well as a gun:

During a search [of his pockets], an amount of money worth 1,000 Manats as well as a 'Walther' gun were found. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Duşmanlarından guclu şaxsiyyat. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

Qurban continued:

The driver insincerely claimed that the accident was not his fault. He claimed that while driving, he fell asleep. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Duşmanlarından guclu şaxsiyyat. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

Melikhiyan's claim is by no means convincing; after all, the rhetorical question to be asked is why Melikhiyan saw virtually no harm during the car accident, whereas Pischevari was horrifically injured:

No one [seems to have] asked the driver as to why, in spite of the fact that the steering wheel in front of you [i.e. the driver] was split in half, you were not hurt at all, whereas sitting beside you, Pischevari had his rib crushed, his leg broken, and his head injured? (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Duşmanlarından guclu şaxsiyyat. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

Even Jamil Hasanli, the official advisor to the Anglo-American puppet despot in Azerbaijan, admitted Melikhiyan's role in the matter. In enforcing the will of those whom Hasanli called the 'the true perpetrators of the crime' of murdering Pischevari, Hasanli agreed that 'Melikhiyan was directly involved':

Beyond any doubts, Melikyan was directly involved in this provocation. ('Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959'. Jamil Hasanli, p. 71) (IMG)

Though injured during the car 'accident', Pischevari did not yet die. However, adequate medical care and aid for him was deliberately withheld by the killer-doctors around him. After briefly 'recovering consciousness' in the hospital on the 11th of that month, Qurban noted, Pischevari:

demanding from the doctors that they bring his brother from Baku; his brother was a doctor and a surgeon. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Duşmanlarından guclu şaxsiyyat. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

However, this demand was completely ignored and:

Instead they brought Dr. Asriyan from the Stepankert City. Pischevari asked to see his twenty-year-old son from Ganja next to him. Who could be closer to the father than his son at the most difficult moment of his life. His son was not informed. Had he been informed, he would have surely discovered the criminal plot and would have

rushed to his father's help. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Duşmanlarından guclu şaxsiyyat. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

That day, on the 11th of June 1947, Pischevari passed away. However, when did the actual team of surgeons come to perform the surgery on Pischevari? They did not arrive until one day after Pischevari died:

Only one day after, on the 12th [of June] the team of doctors and nurses arrived with the plane to Baku. But it was too late. Pischevari did not recover during the surgery. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Duşmanlarından guclu şaxsiyyat. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

The Soviet intelligence official Latif Samad-Oglu, a witness during the trials of Mir Ja'far Bagirov years later, said:

I was in the USSR's domestic intelligence service from 1930 to 1950, and from 1944 to 1949 I was in charge of the Soviet intelligence service's branch in Yolakh. In June 1947, 14 kilometers from Yolakh, Pischevari's car had an accident. As soon as I was informed of this incident, I went there and found the 'Hudson' car there which had been torn apart. The car had hit the fence near the bridge. There had been four people inside the car, but in the site of the incident, only the car driver Karnik Melikhiyan was there alive. He had the documents related to the other people in the car and was standing there. When I searched him, I found 10,000 manat [note: 'manat' is how Azeris referred to the Soviet currency] and a 'Walther' gun. I drew the croquis [i.e. visual sketch] of the incident and returned to Yolakh. I went to the hospital, Pischevari was still conscious. His leg and part of his spine were broken and his head was damaged. Qoliyev was also conscious. General Gholam-Yahya was mildly injured but since his face was wounded, he could not speak. I asked Pischevari to speak of the car accident. He told me that during the night, he was a guest of Nazar Heydarov, the head of the Kirov-Abad Oil Exploration Department.

'We ate dinner there and were resting', Pischevari said, adding 'At 4 AM in the morning Qoliyev suggested that we go to Nukha because Nukha was his birthplace.'

In the end, Pischevari used the word 'treason' several times and said: 'I endured 11 years of solitary confinement in Iran, Reza Shah and his Qavam did not succeed in eliminating me, but now, with such a stab in the back, they reached their goal.'

I asked Pischevari why he thought such and told him that after all, the car and the driver are your own. Pischevari responded: 'The car and the driver are both Gholam-Yahya's'.

Pischevari told me that he would never sit in the front of the car and beside the driver, but this time they had made him sit beside the driver. In the midst of our chat, Pischevari started feeling not good, and asked for help. I immediately contacted Yemiliyanov in Baku and let him know about it. Approximately 5 to 6 hours later, the airplane came. Karimov, the deputy minister, Soleiman, the deputy minister of health, and Dr. Zolfaqar Mohammadev, Major-General Sarijalinski, and the nurses all came with this airplane. Professor Zolfaqar Mohammadev personally took charge of the surgery of Pischevari. Upon my request, specialist doctor Qasimkhan Talishinski from Ganja City and the surgeon Asriyan from Karabakh reached there as well.

The driver Melikhiyan said that during the night he had fell asleep and this caused the accident but in order for him to not die, he used all his might and his two hands to steer the wheel [so to turn such that he would not die] thereby causing the wheel to break. This [self-contradictory story from Melikhiyan] shows that he actually was not sleeping and was conscious prior to the incident [hence why he was able to steer before the collision]. I feel that this incident was not at all a real 'accident', but rather was a deliberate premeditated attempt at murdering Pischevari. I have reached this conclusion based on the following reasons:

1) There was no need to take the craft to Nukha at night. It was not necessary to drive a car at a speed of 90 km.

2) [Pischevari] was not riding in his own car, and the driver was not his own driver. Rather, he went with Gholam-Yahya's car. And these could not be coincidence.

After this incident, Sarkisov Reuben Mirzayevich, the head of the Soviet intelligence in the Shamkhor District told me that the driver Melikhiyan was a son of the leader of Iranian Dashnak forces and his mother Pliyak Gala was working in the British Embassy. For this reason, Sarkisov Reuben Mirzayevich found Melikhiyan to be suspicious. He starts working on his case, and demands information from the Azerbaijan intelligence, and finds out that Melikhiyan had recently been licensed [as an agent] by the Alpha branch of Azerbaijan's intelligence.

Colonel Fursov, who was in charge of the security in the Nakhichevan region, told me after this car 'accident' that long before the 'accident', he had reported via a telegram to Yemiliyanov, the head of the intelligence service in the Azeri SSR, that Melikhiyan is a foreign intelligence operative. However, the Azeri branch of Soviet intelligence did not heed to such warnings, and Melikhiyan continued to be the driver for Gholam-Yahya and trusted him so much that he even took Pischevari for travelling.

But what is [even more] significant is that all of the people linked to the death of Pischevari were later subjected to harassment by Bagirov and Yemiliyanov. Sarkisov Reuben Mirzayevic, the head of the Soviet

intelligence in the Shamkhur zone lost his job in the intelligence, and is now the manager of a public bath. They also purged me from the Soviet intelligence service's ranks and I am now a manager of a school. Farajov was a minister in Nakhichevan, but was demoted to the head of a local branch. By contrast, Nuri Qoiyev was the head of a secretariat but after this event got the position of a deputy minister.

(...). It is also worth mentioning other facts, such as the fact that Pischevari, after being severely wounded, insisted on having his son near him. And his 20 years old son was in Kirov-Abad. It would have taken merely an hour at most, for his son to come and meet him. However, they [the people responsible] did not pay attention. They feared that Pischevari might tell his son about the deliberate nature of the car 'accident'.

(The Case of Mir Ja'afar Bagirov: Transcript, 1993, p. 97. In: 'The Circumstances of the Death of Seyyed Ja'far Pischevari: Naturally Dead or Murdered?', Asre-Nou, Ali Moradi Maragheh-i, March 3, 2016) (IMG)

C17S4. The Mahabad Republic

*** IMG-All-{Iran}

Simultaneous with the Azeri uprising, there came the Kurdish People's Democratic uprising in Mahabad, a more developed district of the Kurdistan province of Iran. The Kurdish revolutionary Qazi Mohammad and the communists and progressives in his team had the support of the people in Mahabad. The British military commander Edgar O'Ballance admitted that Qazi Mohammad was highly popular in Mahabad, the territory of the people's republic. O'Ballance wrote:

While extremely popular in Mahabad, Qazi Mohammad was distrusted by many Kurds because of his seeming friendship with the godless Soviets, and the fact that during the First World War the [Tsarist] Russians had sacked the city. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 29) (IMG)

Mahabad was a more economically developed area of Kurdistan, and was the dream place of many Kurds in Iran. The progressive classes were stronger in that area, a factor explaining in the popularity of Qazi Mohammad among the Mahabadi people as in contrast with his lack of popularity in the rest of Kurdistan. While Azerbaijani Democrats were leading the struggle against imperialism at the time:

In Mahabad in November 1945 Qazi Mohammed announced that the Komola would become the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), and although he held no formal office in this new political party he continued to dominate it. Its aims were autonomy for the Kurds, not complete independence. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

Note that:

The KDPI was distinct and separate from Barzani's KDP. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

The letter 'I' in KDPI makes it clear that the leadership of this organization at least officially regarded the Kurdish people as belonging to Iran, and as confirmed by the British commander O'Ballance, the aim of the KDPI was not separation from Iran, but rather autonomy. The autonomy would be socio-cultural, political, and economic:

A Provisional Council of Kurdistan was to be formed. The party's manifesto was a nationalist one, including the use of the Kurdish language. [Most] officials were ... Kurdish, there would be self-government in local affairs and Kurdish revenues would be spent in Kurdish areas. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

The Soviets – Stalin himself included – did not support the full separation of Kurdistan from Iran, because as mentioned before, Mahabad and Azerbaijan were important bases through which regime change in the rest of Iran could be pursued; in time, a militarily sovereign Mahabad plus a militarily sovereign Azerbaijan could help in launching a major rebellion to overthrow the central regime of Iran and then establish a centralized Peoples' Democratic order in all of Iran in which the democratic freedoms and cultures of all ethnicities are respected. However, in light of the fact that Iran's regime was chauvinistic towards the Kurdish population, and was furthering its collaboration with the Anglo-American imperialists, the fighters for the Kurdish autonomy needed to raise their defenses. The Soviets provided provide military assistance so that the Kurds could defend their newly-gained sovereignty. The war-torn USSR, which did not have nuclear arms yet, was facing a nuclear-armed USA. As such, the Soviets were not able to guarantee the defense of the People's Republic of Mahabad. Nonetheless the Soviets provided as much military assistance as possible in the face of Anglo-American-backed central government:

Qazi Mohammed had two major problems, the first being that the Soviets refused to guarantee the defence of his new republic. The second was that his only means of defence were small groups of armed followers of various sheikhs who had promised allegiance, but these were mercurial, undisciplined and of doubtful reliability. Work was in progress to organise government services and it was also decided to raise a standing army. A Soviet officer was sent to form and train it. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920 -94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 pp. 29-30) (IMG)

The USSR also provided aid to this newly established government in the media sphere. Shortly after the establishment

of the republic:

A Soviet printing press arrived [in Mahabad].. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

Because of the chauvinist attitude of the CIA-MI6-backed regime in Iran, the circumstances were polarized such that pro-independence rhetoric was growing. Thus, in Mahabad:

a Kurdish newspaper, *Kurdistan*, was published, which began openly to advocate independence. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

The central government of Iran no doubt benefited from such pro-independence rhetoric in the newspaper because it would have helped it in depicting Qazi Mohammad and other Kurdish freedom-fighters who sought autonomy – as opposed to fully separation – as 'separatists' or as people who sought to partition Iran, hence weakening the image of the KDPI. Having said that, and regardless, the chauvinism of the central government nonetheless made the call for mere 'autonomy' superficially appear less and less reasonable, and thus the call for independence began to make more sense. In this situation, there came:

a small consignment of Soviet arms, believed to be about 1200 rifles and pistols, as well as bundles of Soviet military uniforms. The euphoria generated by the Kurds in Mahabad was such that on 11 December 1945 the new Kurdish national flag was hoisted in the town.

On to this scene arrived Mullah Mustafa Barzani and his '9000 followers' in November. At first he was treated with suspicious reserve as he was thought to be in the pay of the British. However Qazi Mohammed, whose defence forces were negligible, cautiously welcomed Barzani and agreed that he and his allies could stay in areas just to the north-east of the town, and that a number could actually live in Mahabad. In view of Barzani's military strength and his own weakness, Qazi Mohammed could do no other.

('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

By early 1946, the USSR increased its military aid to the Mahabad forces:

The Mahabad army received two more small consignments of arms in February 1946, believed to consist of about 5000 rifles, a few machine guns, ammunition and some petrol bombs (Eagleton, 1963). At a later date it also received a few Soviet and American military vehicles. These were by no means free gifts as the Soviets took the whole of the republic's tobacco crop in exchange.

At its maximum, in theory at least, the Mahabad army consisted of '70 officers, 40 non-commissioned officers and 1200 soldiers' (Chaliand, 1993). Most of the officers had formerly served in the Iranian or Iraqi armies, or auxiliary services, but many were at once seconded to undertake essential jobs in the administration, so the army was always under-officered.

The Mahabad army remained in or near Mahabad and never achieved any degree of effectiveness, becoming a sort of presidential guard. The real defence of the republic continued to rest in the hands of those tribal sheikhs who were able to muster groups of armed fighting men. Soon the army, as well as members of the government and officials, were clad in Soviet-style uniforms.

On 31 March the Mahabad government appointed four generals, one of whom was Mullah Mustafa Barzani. He proudly retained his rank and used it for the rest of his life. Barzani's personal armed following remained intact and apart, distrusting the Mahabad government. In fact Barzani was secretly lobbying the Soviet authorities to appoint him president in place of Qazi Mohammed, who seemed at times to lose control of events. However the Soviets refused as they did not trust Barzani, and in any case they no longer cared as they were in the process of withdrawing.

On 9 May 1946 the last Soviet troops pulled out from Iran.. The Iranian army, which had mustered about 13000 troops, had been marching towards Mahabad since early April. Probably about 12 000 armed Kurdish tribesmen were available for defence (Eagleton, 1963), all still under the control of their own sheikhs, and a large proportion of them set off to defend their vague frontiers. For example contingents from the Shikaki and the Herki tribes moved to an area just north of Baneh.

('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 pp. 29-30) (IMG)

The Soviets and Qazi Mohammad, as noted previously, rightly distrusted the Titoist renegade Mustafa Barzani, but Barzani, ever the opportunist, had launched some military strikes against the British imperialist forces in Iraq. Despite being led by a renegade, Barzani's troops nonetheless had anti-British sentiments and had been well-trained. As such, Qazi Mohammad and the Soviets had to coopt the Barzani forces, even though behind the scenes, they regarded him as an enemy. As a result, the troops under the command of Mustafa Barzani were armed by the Soviets as well: Mustafa Barzani had managed to obtain a share of the Soviet-provided arms, said to be some 1200 rifles, which would bring his armed element up to the 3000 mark (Eagleton, 1963). Barzani marched south towards Saqqiz to counter a small Iranian force that had left that town on 24 April and was moving

towards Mahabad. The Iranians were ambushed and the prisoners were sent to Mahabad. This boosted the

Barzanis' military reputation to such an extent that the government began to plan for a Kurdish, meaning Barzani, advance southwards to occupy as much Kurdish territory as possible. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 31) (IMG)

Indeed, the Soviet arming of Barzani's troops paid off because his troops really did combat the imperialists. Nonetheless, when the Soviets further retreated from Mahabad due to the previous agreement for Soviet troops to leave northern Iran, the intelligence presence of the USSR and the People's Democratic forces declined in that territory, meaning that Mustafa Barzani was less under pressure to perform well. This gave Barzani the opportunity to reveal a part of his covert face, which was that of a traitor. At this critical time, the diversionary group of Barzani opened the way for the fascist occupation forces of the Iranian regime to cross through, and hence to undermine the Mahabad republic:

The Barzanis had taken up positions in mountains overlooking roads leading from Saqqiz to both Baneh and Sardasht (to the south-west), and so were able to block the Iranian advance. On 3 May, under an impromptu agreement between Mullah Mustafa Barzani and Iranian commanders, the Barzanis withdrew a little way to allow the Iranians road access to their beleaguered garrisons. This did not go down very well in Mahabad, where the government was planning to concentrate its forces at Saqqiz, preparatory to an offensive southwards to Sanandaj. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 31) (IMG)

Increased Iranian military pressure caused differences to arise between Kurds, especially tribal Kurds and urban ones in Mahabad. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 31) (IMG)

Eventually, the Mahabad Republic was overthrown and Qazi Mohammad and his comrades were executed. Barzani was able to escape the scene.

C17S5. MI6 Satellite Turkey's Collaboration with the Nazi Germans during the Great Patriotic War / Turkey as an Avenue for an Anglo-American Assault on the Soviet Union / USSR Defending itself by Demanding Turkish Territory
*** IMG-All-{Turkey}

Well until the summer of 1941, Turkey's regime had collaborated with the Nazi Germans against the Soviets. In the words of a US military intelligence document:

both Turkey and Germany were hostile toward the Soviet Union.. (WARTIME ACTIVITIES OF TEE GERMAN DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SERVICES DURING WORLD WAR II, U.S. Army, European Command. Intelligence Division, published online by CIA, p. 116) (IMG)

Thus, the Abwehr, the German intelligence service, closely cooperated with the Turkish intelligence against the USSR. The US intelligence reported that in the summer of 1941:

with passive and active assistance by Turkish intelligence, information was obtained [by the Abwehr] on Russian troops and their movements. At the same time the Turkish intelligence and the Abwehr employed their operatives interchangeably in assigning additional missions for more Russian information. Although the Turks assisted the Germans in regard to espionage against Soviet Russia, they were strictly neutral in matters concerning the Western Powers. (WARTIME ACTIVITIES OF TEE GERMAN DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SERVICES DURING WORLD WAR II, U.S. Army, European Command. Intelligence Division, published online by CIA, p. 115) (IMG)

Note that the Abwehr, the intelligence agency of Nazi Germany, was heavily dominated by the MI6. Turkish intelligence cooperation with the Abwehr against the Soviet Union also marked the collaboration of Turkey with the MI6. By the time of the onset of Operation BARBAROSSA, however, the Turkish intelligence service, on behalf of the MI6, temporarily ceased cooperation with the Nazi Germans. The victory of the Soviets in the Battle of Stalingrad meant that the Anglo-American imperialists and their henchmen in Israel were to support Nazi Germany and the Axis forces as a bulwark against Soviet power. Hence, the Anglo-American intelligence services re-established their covert alliance with the Nazis some time in between late December 1942 or early January 1943. The alliance was reflected in Turkey and Iran as well. Indeed, the Anglo-German alliance was reflected in Turkey's increasingly friendly policy towards Germany. Firstly, note again that:

Throughout the war, Turkey, ... has remained a non-belligerent ally of Great Britain. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, p. 13) (IMG)

As a British satellite, Turkey permitted the entry of Axis warships through the Straits. In 1943, the Anglo-Americans overtly 'warned' Turkey against allowing Axis vessels through the Straits. Turkey officially accepted the Anglo-American call:

As the result of representations by the British Embassy and ourselves the Turkish Government has decided to hereafter prohibit the transit thru the Straits of so-called barges of which the Germans have thus far transited light.

The representations made by the British and ourselves were based on information to the effect that these so-called barges altho giving the outward appearance of being commercial vessels were built solely for military

purposes and that on their arrival at Greek ports they discharge military supplies and the crews immediately don German naval uniforms.

The Turkish Government anticipates a vigorous protest from the German Embassy as soon as the prohibition is made effective, particularly as a considerable number of these barges have been constructed by the Germans during the past year in Bulgarian and Rumanian ports.

(767.68119/1044: Telegram, The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Ankara, September 8, 1943, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1943. THE NEAR EAST AND AFRICA, Vol. 4, pp. 1086-1087) (IMG)

However, just a few months later, MI6 satellite Turkey once again permitted the entry of Axis naval units through the Straits:

The vessels which were passing through the Straits were of two types. The first were known as K.T. vessels, of about 800 tons, with a normal armament of two 3.7 inch guns and machine guns. The second were E.M.S. craft of about 40 or 50 tons, with a normal armament of one three pounder, machine guns and depth charges. The former could be used for transport of troops and supplies, the latter for various purpose, including submarine chasing. To obtain passage, the Germans dismantled their armaments, which was reinstalled on reaching the Aegean Sea. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, pp. 16) (IMG)

In response:

Moscow press and radio grew more and more hostile to the Turks and began ... criticizing the Turkish Government for having allowed Axis vessels passage through the Straits.. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 33) (IMG)

Again, in order to keep its alliance with the Axis covert, the British Empire overtly joined the Soviet Union in condemning Turkey's policy regarding German warships. As reported by a January 1945 US intelligence document:

Early in June 1944 Great Britain officially protested against the use of the Straits by German warships which had been employed in the Black Sea. When Mr. Eden announced in the House of Commons on June 14, that Great Britain was profoundly disrupted by the fact that the Turkish Government, by allowing German vessel to pass through the Straits from the Black Sea into the Aegean, had helped to increase German naval strength in that region, Numan Menemencioglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, who was responsible for the policy, was forced to resign. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, pp. 15-16) (IMG)

Foreign Minister Eden announced in the House of Commons that the British Government was "profoundly disturbed" by the fact that the Turkish Government, by allowing German vessels to pass through the Straits from the Black Sea into the Aegean, had helped to increase German naval strength in that region. As a result, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu was forced to resign. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 52) (IMG)

Behind the scenes, Britain could only thank its Middle Eastern satellite for allowing Germany to gain strength in the War as a bulwark against the Soviets. In this context, the best way for Turkey and Britain to continue to appear 'anti- Nazi' was for Turkey to declare war on Nazi Germany:

The resignation of Numan Menecioglu accelerated the development of Turkish policy toward a break with Germany, which took place on August 2, 1944. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, p. 16) (IMG)

The Soviets did not trust the Turkish declaration of war, whereas the British were satisfied as it covered up the collaboration of its satellite with the Third Reich:

Although the Soviet Government was distinctly reserved in its attitude toward the Turkish break with Germany, British Prime Minister Churchill announced the break in relations with Germany, with apparent satisfaction in his address to the House of Commons on August 2. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, p. 16) (IMG)

As a result of consistent Turkish regime treachery:

On 19 March 1945, less than one month after Turkey's entry into the war, the USSR denounced the 1925 Soviet-Turkish pact of friendship, stating that it no longer conformed to current conditions and would therefore be allowed to lapse after its expiration on 7 November 1945. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 33) (IMG)

As shown in greater detail in C17S3, the Pentagon high command had developed Operation PINCHER, an American military contingency plan for invasion against the USSR, through a nuclear strike on Baku and the Caucasus oil fields and the march onto the Soviet heartland via the Soviet Caucasus. In March 1946, the US military finalized PINCHER, its studies on the plans for a potential Third World War against the USSR launched from the Middle East. At that same

time, the leaders of treacherous Turkey pretended to be still on friendly terms with the Soviet Union even though the Soviet-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1921 had expired in November 1945:

The Turkish Government officially accepted the Soviet statements at their face value and indicated its willingness to negotiate a new pact. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 33) (IMG)

The Soviets were not very interested in maintaining this relationship with Turkey. The history of betrayals by Turkey's government had sown distrust. Furthermore, the Soviets did not expect Turkey to accept the USSR's new terms and conditions for a new friendship treaty:

In conversation with the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, however, Foreign Commissar Molotov showed how remote the possibility of agreement was, for he is reported to have demanded that any substitute agreement must provide special privileges for the USSR in the Straits and also territorial concessions in northeastern Turkey (in the Kars-Ardahan region). Moreover, later in the same year, the semi-official Moscow press commented favorably upon a claim made by two Georgian professors and published in a Tbilisi (Tiflis) periodical to an area of northeastern Turkey which, it was said, should be annexed by historical right to the Georgian SSR. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 33) (IMG)

Thus, in late:

1946 the USSR demanded a share in the control of the Straits and the right to station Soviet troops there. (SUBJECT: NIE-9: TURKEY'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE, Office of National Estimates, CIA, February 20, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

and:

unofficially claimed the Kars plateau area in northeastern Turkey. (SUBJECT: NIE-9: TURKEY'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE, Office of National Estimates, CIA, February 20, 1951, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

This foreign policy maneuver of the USSR was by no means aggressive. For one, Turkey had stabbed the Soviet Union in the back numerous times. From 1941 onwards, Turkish intelligence closely collaborated with the Nazi Germany's intelligence service in spying on the USSR. Between 1943 and 1944, Turkey, as a British satellite, had actively collaborated with the Third Reich by allowing German vessels through the Straits. For another, the Soviet demands were not forced on Turkey and therefore did not violate international law. Turkish stabs in the back of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Friendship Treaty created a reasonable pretext for getting those Turkish-occupied territories back. Geo-strategically, the Soviet Union, by liberating the oppressed ethnic groups such as the Georgians and Armenians in eastern Turkey, was also creating a buffer zone against an Anglo-American-Turkish aggression against the Soviet Caucasus. In Leffler's words:

In fact, despite the rhetoric about the Soviet expansionist thrust southward, military analysts and civilian officials acknowledged that Soviet demands on Turkey had a substantial defensive component. "Soviet pressure in the Middle East," concluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in March 1946, "has for its primary objective the protection of the vital Ploesti, Kharkov and Baku areas." Three months later, in a comprehensive assessment of Soviet intentions in the Middle East, British intelligence emphasized Soviet efforts to move the center of Soviet industry eastward, to safeguard the Caucasian oil fields, and to protect the development of Soviet resources from prospective attack. In their report to the president, Clifford and Elsey also noted that "the Near East is an area of great strategic interest to the Soviet Union because of the shift of Soviet industry to southeastern Russia, within range of air attack from much of the Near East." And in November 1946, in a still more detailed assessment of the region, United States war planners stressed that the Soviet Union wanted to control the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas in order "to deny them as possible enemy air, sea, and ground offensive bases. By this increase in the depth of her southerly territorial border, the Soviets would greatly increase the security of their vital areas from air attack and from seizure by ground forces." (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 172. Citing: Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1641/1, "U.S. Security Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean," March 10, 1946, sec. 6, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), Records Of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff; JWPC 475/1, "Strategic Study of the Area between the Alps and the Himalayas," Nov. 2, 1946, sec. 3, pt. 1, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), *ibid.*; Joint Intelligence Committee [Of the British Staff Mission], Memorandum for Information No. 223, "Russia's Strategic Interests and Intentions in the Middle East," June 28, 1946, sec. I-C, ABC 336 Russia (22 August 1943), Records of the War Department General and Special Staff; Krock, *Memoirs*, 434.) (iMG)

Turkish leaders of course refused to accept Soviet demands. From the West of the Caucasus, the USSR remained vulnerable to an American nuclear and conventional strike. Throughout all of those years, the United States invested heavily into building up the Turkish air force, which could assist the United States in bombing the oil fields of not only Soviet Caucasus but also Romania:

Accordingly, next to the army, the Turkish air force was the largest recipient of United States assistance. During

1948, for example, the United States transferred over one hundred eighty F-47s, thirty B-26s, and eighty-six C-47s. Smaller numbers of jet fighters began arriving in 1950 and 1951. At the same time, the United States placed a great deal of stress on reconstructing and resurfacing Turkish airfields at places such as Bandirma and Diyarbakir. As a result, Turkey began to develop the capability to attack vital Soviet petroleum resources in Rumania and in the Caucasus; Ploesti and Baku, for example, came within range of the F-47s and the B-26s. Even more important, the rehabilitation of Turkish airfields and the construction of new ones, at Adana for example, meant that if war erupted the United States would be able to bring in its own B-29s to bomb the Soviet Union. Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington and Secretary of Defense Forrestal were contemplating that contingency in early 1948. A more systematic effort to achieve such bombing capability was inaugurated in late 1949; significant progress toward that goal was expected during 1952. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 177. Citing: Ambassador's Report on Aid to Turkey, July 15, 1947, Annex D, Part Three, P&O 091 Turkey, Records of the United States Army Staff; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, memorandum, "Turkish and Iranian Military Effort in War," Feb. 25, 1950, 381 Middle East TS, *ibid.*; "Proposal for Continuing Aid to the Turkish Air Force," appended to Wilds to Robert A. Lovett, Jan. 23, 1948, file 867.20/1—2348, Records of the Department of State; John H. Ohly to Llewellyn E. Thompson.) (IMG)

C17S6. Soviets Strengthen Defenses

*** IMG-All-{Iran}

After the military defeat of the People's Democratic movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in Iran, the Soviets, knowing that the Anglo-Americans plotted an invasion of the USSR via Iran, laid plans to fortify their borders. A CIA document on this matter is as follows:

The following was contained in a speech given in March 1947 by Colonel Hladko, member of the Soviet Army General Staff and of the All-Union Communist Party.

Theory Concerning US/British Plan of Attack

1. Soviet leaders believe that US and British political and operational plans for attack on the USSR include the following military operations:

(a) Action on several fronts, with the main attack through Turkey and Iran, where troop concentrations will cut off Soviet access to oil and Ukrainian food and industrial resources. Every effort will be made to hold the territories guaranteeing free movement along the Mediterranean.

(b) Simultaneous ... launching of a complementary attack from the north. The latter's aim will be to cut the USSR off from the Baltic, take Leningrad and drive to Moscow to meet the southern prong. The Soviet Army consequently will be put in a pocket.

2. The US will strike hard and fast, using all-out tactics to secure a quick break in the Soviet defense.

The Americans and British are counting on a short war because they realize the expenditure of time, men and materiel necessary to cover the vast distances in the USSR. Upon successful accomplishment of this plan – and the US and British General Staffs do not doubt this eventuality – the Communist Party will be liquidated..

3. (...).

4. Another US/British plan is based on exhaustion of the USSR through a long-drawn-out civil war in China, prolonged by extensive US aid to Chiang Kai-shek in the form of equipment and instructors.

Soviet Military Defense Plans

5. Preparing [the] defense of the USSR necessitates securing these two main invasion routes:

(a) The southern route through Baku, Batum and the Don Basin, and

(b) the Scandinavian and Arctic Route threatened by the US. Strong bases for ice-breakers and specially prepared ship and aircraft are being built. Docks and shops are being constructed at Novy Port on the Ob River, Igarka on the Yenesei, and Tiksi on the Lena. To protect this strategic line further, the USSR desires greater access and facilities in Spitsbergen.

6. Fortifications are being built under the guise of industrial enterprises; the local populations are being deported to the Soviet interior.

(‘1. THEORY CONCERNING US/BRITISH PLAN OF ATTACK 2. SOVIET MILITARY DEFENSE PLANS’, CIA, September 12, 1947, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

C17S7. Iran's Titoist Movement, a CIA Creation / The Razmara Administration / Stalin-era Soviet Aid to Mosaddeq Administration / Khrushchev-Malenkov-Beria Betrayals of Iran Cause 1953 CIA Coup / Yugoslav-linked Titoists help 1953 Iran Coup

*** IMG-All-{Iran}

The CIA was interested in establishing a Titoist movement in Iran. The Chief of the Plans Staff of the Near east and Africa Division of the US intelligence reported to the Acting Chief of the Policy, the following:

We are even investigating the feasibility of establishing a local or “Titoist” Communist Party as a possible means of splitting and therefore weakening the Soviet Communist movement in Iran. This is obviously a dangerous undertaking which, if not very skillfully handled, could turn out to be a boomerang. Its potentialities as an anti-Soviet weapon, however, demand that we give it careful consideration.

(“SUBJECT: Comments on your memorandum, ‘The Limitations of Diplomacy,’ dated 13 March 1951” “Memorandum From the Chief of the Plans Staff, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Acting Chief of the Policy, Plans and Review Section, Office of Policy Coordination, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified])”, Washington, April 12, 1951. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954”, Iran 1951-1954, p. 65) (IMG)

The new Titoist party would be formed by Khalil Maleki and Mozaffar Baqai. As admitted by Homa Katouzian – a pro-Maleki researcher who worked as an economic consultant with the CIA front 'Organization of American States', the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) – when Maleki was a member of the Tudeh Party of Iran, he was the contact of the Yugoslav Embassy in Tehran. In an interview with US liberal news agency PBS, Katouzian admitted:

Maleki had been the official Tudeh Party contact with the Yugoslav embassy in Tehran. (“Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'”, PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi- Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

The CIA operative Richard Cottam too confirmed that:

Khalil Maleki [was] the leader of the Titoist Third Force. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, pp. 294-295) (IMG)

Maleki, who had been a contact of the Yugoslav embassy in Tehran, had a favorable view towards the Yugoslav regime because of its anti-Sovietism:

Maleki's regard for Yugoslavia was both because of its break with Stalin and (as part of that) because of its own independent approach.. (Khalil Maleki: The Human Face of Iranian Socialism, Homa Katouzian, 2018) (IMG)

The notorious American spy and CIA coup perpetrator Mozaffar Baqai too regarded:

Maleki as a Titoist communist element and symbol. (“SUBJECT: Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front”, Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, October 27, 1952. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954”, Iran 1951-1954, p. 383) (IMG)

Homa Katouzian continued (note: the square brackets in the following quote were by Katouzian): as early as 1949, Maleki wrote:

I am not concerned with the details of Tito's policies, nor even his major policies which may well be open to criticism and about which I know very little. [I am only concerned with the view] that having regard to one's national self-interest is not in conflict with healthy and proper international relations.

The special reference to the Balkan countries in the above quotation was not accidental, for, surprisingly, Maleki also predicted a rift between Russia and China, despite the apparently solid bond that existed between them at the time, and for many years to come:

The movement that ... Mao Tse-tung now continues, will not in the end remain a satellite of the Soviet Union. Indeed it can be confidently predicted that similar developments to those of Yugoslavia will also take place in China. The forms which these developments will take will doubtless be different from what happened in Yugoslavia. But their substance would be similar resistance against [Soviet] pressures and expansionist behaviour.

(Khalil Maleki: The Human Face of Iranian Socialism, Homa Katouzian, 2018) (IMG)

Among most intelligence circles both in the imperialist camp and in the anti-imperialist camp, it was a well-known fact that Mao's group would eventually follow the path of Tito's group although the forms by which Mao's group presented themselves was going to be different and was going to be in a fake 'anti-revisionist' clothing. The imperialist agent Khalil Maleki was aware of this. Contrary to what is too often stated, Khalil Maleki was actually not a founder of the Tudeh Party. In fact, he:

refused to become a founding member of the Tudeh Party in 1941, when Reza Shah abdicated in the wake of the Allied occupation of the country. (“Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'”, PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

However:

within a year or so, some of the party's leading young intellectuals persuaded him to join the party with the express purpose of helping them to reform its leadership and program. (“Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'”, PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

Maleki's goal was to form a party that would serve as:

a social democratic alternative in the context of the Cold War against ... Soviet totalitarianism. (“Homa

Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force', PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

After the 1948 split, Maleki made overt his opposition to communism:

The time for reflection enabled Maleki to discover the roots of the problem in Soviet Stalinism, on the one hand, and Marxist-Leninist ideology, on the other. He openly denounced the former and grew out of the latter by making it clear that he was no longer a Leninist nor did he subscribe to the Marxist ideology, although he still used Marxian concepts wherever suitable. ("Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'", PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

In fact, as far as his background can be traced, Maleki was never a communist. Well prior to the split, he had opposed Ja'far Pishevari and Soviet power. Among the scholars of Iranian history, it is a well-known fact that Khalil Maleki had broken with the Tudeh and the Soviets over ... the ethnic rebellions in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. (The Coup, Ervand Abrahamian, p. 41)

Well prior to his split, he had problems with the Tudeh Party and wanted to 'reform' it. After failing to 'reform' the Party, he decided to lead a split, thus breaking away from the Party in 1948. Katouzian remarked:

The young reformist intellectuals – led by Jalal Al-e Ahamad – were in contact both with the young and fiery theorist Eprime Eshag [Keynesian] and the "elder" statesman of the party opposition, Khalil Maleki. It was they who persuaded Maleki to lead the famous split of January 1948. ("Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'", PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

Together with Maleki, the CIA spy Baqai formed the 'Hezb e Zahmatkeshan e Iran' (Translated as "Toilers' Party of Iran" and sometimes as "Workers' Party of Iran"). Explaining the origins of the Titoist party, the US intelligence reported:

The break-up of the Iranian Workers' Party is based on issues long buried, but early recognized by Bagai. The beginning was in 1948 when Bagai believed that he could make a strong labor party, based on socialist convictions, if he could unite with him in a middle-of-the-road policy the anti-communist socialists led by Maleki and the largely leaderless religious elements. He found the Maleki-men to be hard and efficient workers but not good socialists and too ambitious to attempt to dominate the party through their own faction. ("SUBJECT: Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front", Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, October 27, 1952. In: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954", Iran 1951-1954, p. 382) (IMG)

Furthermore, Baqai admitted to the CIA that Maleki and his gang were in fact disloyal to Mosaddeq. Referring to Maleki's group in third person plural, the US intelligence reported:

When Dr. Bagai left on his trip to Europe and to the United States (and more lately) when he was ill, he left the power of the party in their hands. On his return to active participation in party affairs he found that although they paid lip service to socialist principles, they were in fact ... not loyal to Dr. Mosadeq. ("SUBJECT: Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front", Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, October 27, 1952. In: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954", Iran 1951-1954, p. 382) (IMG)

Another CIA document reveals that the Titoist agent Khalil Maleki was supported by the CIA for combatting the communists:

Any attempt to build American directed organizations, no matter how indirect the direction, within state institutions and outside, is bound to be discovered and consequently suspected. Roger, for example, can give you the details as to the difficulties we ran into with the Shah through our support of the Workers' Party and then of Maleki's Third Force because they were publicly anti-communist. It became known to the Shah that we were giving the support, even at a time when these organizations were critical of him. This served to encourage his suspicions that the United States was supporting Mosadeq as against him, thus reenforcing his innate irresolution. This is an example of how one of our worthy objectives may help stymie another. There is also a potential future complication in that Baqai and Maleki may never believe, if we are not going along with them, that we are not covertly supporting others. (Letter From the First Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Melbourne) to the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Stutesman), Tehran, November 30, 1953. Source: US National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950 -1954, 788.00/11-3053. Top Secret; Security Information. In: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954", Iran 1951-1954, pp. 858-859) (IMG)

It became increasingly necessary for Maleki and Baqai to pretend to be enemies. Baqai was assigned the task of actively working against Mosaddeq whereas Maleki was going to be a disloyal 'friend' of Mosaddeq seeking to undermine his Tudeh allies. As such, Maleki's group formed the Third Force, which as the CIA admitted, was supported (and directed) by American intelligence. The 'Third Force' as the name of the Party was a slogan in itself. The 'First Force' (i.e. 'First World') was the capitalist-imperialist and pro-fascist camp, to which Maleki, as would later be revealed, had favourable

opinions. The Second Force ('Second World') referred to the anti-imperialist camp led by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The 'Third Force' was named after the Yugoslav-inspired 'non-aligned' approach – promoting 'non-alignment' in the camp of the US-led forces is a pro-Soviet measure, for the slogan 'neutrality' promoted among the pro-American elements shifts the pro-American movement away from the United States and onto the direction of strategic partnership with the Soviet Union. In the context of socialist labour movement politics, however, calls for 'non-alignment' meant shifts away from socialism and onto the camp of American imperialism. This Third Force tendency was actively subsidized by the British spy, CIA agent, and Gestapo agent (see C12S1, C12S2, C12S3, and C12S4) Tito. Recall the following excerpt of a CIA document which stated:

the Yugoslav dictator backs up the so called "Third Force" and the neutral block; his activities are very intense in this field, and especially so among the Asiatic peoples. He holds up the beam (backs up) the labourist [i.e. Labour Party] dissident Bevan ... while his diplomatic mission to Tehran numbers not less than thirty persons. ("SUBJECT: Tito's True Face", Political Information (Analysis of Tito's Relationship with Stalin and the West), CIA, November 28, 1952, p. 13)

The Third Force was a reflection of such reactionary ideologies as 'Third-Worldism' or 'Third World Socialism'. The Third-Worldists ignored the fact that the war-torn USSR had experienced a famine due to the war, not to mention the extermination of at least 27 million of its people by the Nazis, as well as the US plans to carry out a nuclear holocaust against it as early as September 1945. Similar was the case of the peoples of the Peoples' Democracies who had suffered under the savage persecution of fascists and the newly arising Anglo-American imperialist nuclear threats. Portraying the victimized USSR and the Peoples' Democracies as the victimizers mirroring the US-led camp, the Third-Worldists (or the Third Force, or the 'non-aligned socialists') advocated a pseudo-neutral camp when in fact they were objectively on the side of Anglo-American secret services and were actively working to turn the peoples of the colonized world against the peoples of the liberated socialist or popular-democratic camp. This is why, contrary to the popular perception, Gamal Abdel-Nasser regarded the concept of 'non-alignment' as basically junk (C1S3) as well. Tito's sponsorship of the Third-Worldist tendency, by the way, was dictated by the Trotskyite Fourth International, not surprisingly. As the reader may recall from C12S4, the Fourth International instructed Tito the following in 1948:

you would have to become the champion ... of all colonial peoples revolting against their imperialist masters; (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

Through his 'Third Force', the Titoist agent Maleki represented the:

social democratic [read: Kautskyite] alternative in the context of the Cold War against and between Soviet totalitarianism and Western imperial machinations. ("Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'", PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

Reporting to the CIA, Baqai pointed out:

that his split with Maleki will go on indefinitely, with Maleki gradually losing the intellectuals' support he now has; that no worker does, or will, support Maleki. He pictures a withering away of Maleki.. ("SUBJECT: Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front", Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, October 27, 1952. In: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954", Iran 1951-1954, p. 383) (IMG)

Another US intelligence report, describing the Titoist agents of the CIA, the Third Force, admitted:

This political group is headed by Khalil Maleki, once a leader of the Tudeh Party and more recently party organizer and theoretician for Baghai. Maleki claims 10,000 members, certainly an exaggeration as the party publications appeal to intellectual socialists.

(FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OVERTHROW OF MOSSADEQ, "SUBJECT: Transmittal of Branch 4 Estimate Entitled 'Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq'", Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division (Waller) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt), Washington, April 16, 1953. Estimate Prepared in the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, John H. Waller. According to Waller, the Branch 4 Estimate entitled 'Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq' was drafted by Mr. Wilber and represents Branch thinking. Waller referred to the Estimate as a useful as a guide for the CIA's PP planning, and as a reference source of background information. In: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954", Iran 1951-1954, p. 538) (IMG)

Baqai's own 'new' party was by no means popular either:

Earlier a lieutenant of Mossadeq, Baghai has openly opposed him over the allegedly undemocratic and unconstitutional methods of Mossadeq. Should a show down between Mossadeq and the Shah be diverted to a vote on the continuation of Mossadeq's plenary powers, Baghai would probably oppose Mossadeq. Baghai has

not more than three faithful followers among the Majlis deputies. The Party claims 10,000 members but—given the defection of Maleki, probably has less than 2,000 active members.

(FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OVERTHROW OF MOSSADEQ, “SUBJECT: Transmittal of Branch 4 Estimate Entitled ‘Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq’”, Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division (Waller) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt), Washington, April 16,

1953. Estimate Prepared in the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, John H. Waller. According to Waller, the Branch 4 Estimate entitled ‘Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq’ was drafted by Mr. Wilber and represents Branch thinking. Waller referred to the Estimate as a useful as a guide for the CIA’s PP planning, and as a reference source of background information. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954”,

Iran 1951-1954, pp. 538-539) (IMG)

Contrary to how he is often depicted, Razmara was actually Soviet-friendly:

Razmara was called pro-West, but he did far more to accommodate Iranian policy to the USSR than did Dr. Mossadeq. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 210) (IMG)

Officially, Razmara had been among the generals who were ordered to suppress the Democratic force in Azerbaijan, but the fact that others ordered him to participate in these operations does not necessarily mean that he genuinely sympathized with such measures. Razmara was elected as Prime Minister by the same parliament that later elected Mosaddeq as Prime Minister. On the other hand, the Soviets sought to strengthen the Razmara government’s hand:

The Iranian Government is finding it increasingly difficult to adhere firmly to its pro-Western policy. In aligning itself with the West, Iran had hoped to receive aid comparable to that given Greece and Turkey. Having failed to receive such aid, the Iranians are skeptical of Western intentions and question the wisdom of maintaining their pro-Western alignment. They are, instead, inclined to listen to the “friendly” Soviet protestations which characterize the current attitude of the USSR toward Iran. This attitude is manifest in the Soviet release of captured Iranian soldiers and in the wish to negotiate such important matters as trade agreement, frontier disputes, and the return of Iranian gold and dollars held in Moscow. The USSR thus appears eager to make arrangements which would sharply point up Soviet willingness to help Iran, and the Iranians feel that a suitable response to the Soviet approach may lessen the likelihood of direct intervention by the USSR. (SUBJECT: Current Iranian Problems, CIA, September 20, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

This was why the imperialist-fascist secret services decided that Razmara must be ousted. The Shah’s faction eliminated him. Regarding the role of the Shah in the Razmara assassination, a US intelligence document stated:

In 1956, the then minister of court in a conversation with a US Embassy officer “clearly implied” that former prime minister Razmara had been murdered “with the full knowledge of the Shah, if not on his direct order.” The minister of court also stated that he had acted as intermediary between “the court” and the murderers of Mossadeq’s police chief, General Afshartus. In general, however, the Shah continued in a passive position apparently attempting the role of a constitutional monarch, reigning but not ruling. (Centers of Power in Iran, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, May 1972, p. 10) (IMG)

In mid-1951, therefore, Razmara was assassinated. Mansur Rafizadeh, who was the SAVAK director for US affairs and was the SAVAK’s link with the CIA and US State Department, recalled:

During Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s reign, thousands of people were killed and the blame was always laid on “Muslim fanatics.”

In Answer to History, the Shah sings his familiar tune over and over. “On March 7, 1951, Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara was by a member of the Fedayeen Islam, a terrorist group of the extreme right, while attending a religious ceremony in the Great Mosque.” And again, “On January 21, 1965, Moslem fanatics shot and killed another one of my Prime Ministers, Hassan Ali Mansur. Later several guards were killed and in the early seventies [MEK] terrorists murdered three American Colonels in the streets of Tehran.” In reality, these people, including the three American advisers to the Iranian Army, were all killed by the Shah’s directive.

(Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal : An Insider’s Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran, Mansur Rafizadeh, April 1, 1987, p. 134) (IMG)

After the elimination of Razmara however, the Shah’s Persian bourgeois-nationalist faction maintained control over the Iranian government for a brief period:

Happily, the meaning of the Razmara regime and of its alleged American support is clear with respect to Iranian nationalism. Nationalism reigned supreme after Razmara’s assassination, and the overwhelming sentiment among the victorious Nationalists was that Razmara’s removal, even by assassination, was fully justified. In fact, the Mossadeq government was condemned for jailing Razmara’s assassin. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 210) (IMG)

The pro-Shah elements, however, lasted for only less than a month in power. Quickly, in April 1951, Mosaddeq became the Prime Minister of Iran. The progressive character of his politics quickly won him the support of the people of Azerbaijan:

in 1951, when Dr. Mossadeq became prime minister, the entire political complexion of Azerbaijan changed. No other province joined more completely in the Mossadeq movement. There was a bitter election conflict in Tabriz in 1952, but not between Mossadeq Nationalists and royalist conservatives; the contest was between competing elements of the Mossadeqist National Front. Even some of the smaller Azerbaijan cities fell under Nationalist domination, and Ayatollah Kashani was able to swing several rural districts over to the Nationalist side. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 129) (IMG)

Azerbaijan had been the territory from which Shia Islam was spread to the rest of Iran. It was a hotbed of ‘Bolshevism’ during the days of the October Revolution and ‘Stalinism’ by the 1940s. It had also been a zone whose socio-economic conditions at the time generated pro-Mosaddeq, or pro-Soviet tendencies. A commonly held myth is that Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq was pro-American or anti-Soviet. Yes, Iran’s liberals and Shia Islamists really do claim that Mosaddeq was ‘pro-American’ and was overthrown due to his ‘excess trust in the United States’. Such claims against Mosaddeq are not true; though the Iranian government was officially pro-American, and as the official head of the Iranian state, Mosaddeq had to make pro-American gestures, behind the scenes he was pushing for an alliance with the USSR and the Peoples’ Republics. A CIA document corroborated;

Although Mossadeq will probably continue to seek US aid to enable him to meet his budgetary deficit— which would make it easier for him to stand firm on his own terms for an oil settlement and would temporarily strengthen his political position — it is increasingly clear that he opposes the development of closer military and political ties with the West. He has vacillated on giving formal approval to the continuance of the US military missions and the military aid program. He also has strong objections to becoming subject to the US economic advice. Although he was recently prevailed upon to sign a Point IV agreement, he has thus far refused to provide the assurances that would enable Iran to obtain military assistance under the Mutual Security Program. If he fails to receive US aid to relieve his growing budgetary difficulties, he may terminate the contracts of the US military missions and eventually curtail US technical and economic assistance activities in Iran. However, it is also possible that internal pressures may force him to go further in giving commitments to the US than he would personally favor. Meanwhile, he will almost certainly make greater efforts to expand Iran's economic relations with other countries including the Soviet bloc, providing they do not appear to involve foreign interference in Iran's domestic affairs. (PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN IN 1952 IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OIL SETTLEMENT, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-46), CIA, February 4, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The document further acknowledged:

As an alternative to US aid, Mossadeq almost certainly would press forward with negotiations now under way with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for the sale of some two million tons of Iranian oil, and will probably also seek oil deals with other members of the Soviet bloc or with the USSR itself. However, it is unlikely that the Soviet bloc could provide enough tankers to move financially significant quantities of oil from Iran, and thus the sale of oil to the Soviet bloc would probably not provide Mossadeq with a lasting solution of his financial problems. (PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN IN 1952 IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OIL SETTLEMENT, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-46), CIA, February 4, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Lastly, the document predicted:

The USSR might attempt to gain political advantages in Iran by providing Mossadeq with limited advances against future oil deliveries or by satisfying Iran's dollar and gold claims against the USSR. (PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN IN 1952 IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OIL SETTLEMENT, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-46), CIA, February 4, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

When the government of Iran took steps towards nationalizing its oil:

The USSR also expressed its sympathy with Persia’s action against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, May 7, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The Mosaddeq team was a road-paver team planted elevated to the top ranks of the Iranian regime. The Mosaddeq Administration, by pushing against the Anglo-American imperialist agents in Iran, was increasing the operational freedom for the Tudeh Party, thus paving the road to increased Tudeh influence in the Iranian state apparatus.

Some historians state that the US coup against Mosaddeq was due to the oil, as opposed to Soviet influence. Such a distinction between the ‘oil issue’ and the ‘Soviet influence issue’ is, in practice, a false distinction since Iran’s oil nationalization would have antagonized the Anglo-American imperialists and moved it closer to a sympathetic USSR. Mosaddeq’s oil nationalization project denied the Anglo-Americans the access to Iranian oil, while Mosaddeq’s overtures to the USSR brought Iran closer to the socialist anti-imperialist camp. The Mosaddeq faction was a progressive bourgeois-democratic faction. The progressive bourgeois-democratic factions around the world represent the alliance of the anti-

colonial national bourgeoisie with the proletariat and the cooperativists. The expansion of the influence of the progressive bourgeois-democrats of Iran over Iran's oil industry was the expansion of the influence of the Iranian proletariat, the ally of the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat, over Iran's oil industry at the expense of Anglo-American finance capital. The increased influence of Iran's proletariat over the Iranian petroleum resources meant the increased influence of the Soviet proletariat, and hence the Soviet state, over Iran's petroleum resources. The petroleum resources were a key economic resource over which Iran's proletariat, backed by the Soviet proletariat, was fighting against Anglo-American finance capital. Yes, the Anglo-American imperialists went after Iran "because of the oil" in the sense that they sought to reduce the influence of Iran's proletariat, and hence Soviet proletariat, over Iran's oil resources.

After the oil nationalization, Britain sanctioned Iran and withdrew its technicians so that the Iranian economy collapses. The West followed Britain in the anti-Iran sanctions:

No major Western European or US oil company has offered to provide Iran with technicians for her oil industry. (Daily Digest July 21, 1951, CIA, Section 2 (Eastern), p. 1) (IMG)

The USSR, on the other hand, was reported to have offered its economic support for Iran:

The Soviet Oil Administration of Austria, however, has reportedly offered Iran 150 technicians and two Soviet-controlled Austrian distributors are reported to be exploring opportunities for selling Iranian oil. (Daily Digest July 21, 1951, CIA, Section 2 (Eastern), p. 1) (IMG)

It is a fact that indeed the USSR began to send its oil technicians. According to another US intelligence report:

The SMV (Soviet Oil Administration) has sent 15 oil technicians to Iran to instruct the Iranians. The group consists of engineers and drillers, and is known as the Austrian Drilling Delegation. (SMV Technicians in Iran, CIA, November 14, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

In *relative* terms, the USSR was providing enormous economic infrastructure support for the government Mosaddeq. In absolute terms, the USSR could not possibly provide as much economic aid, because the terrain of Iran made it brutally difficult for the USSR to provide much economic support:

Transporting the oil from Iran would present formidable problems to the Soviet Union because the Soviet bloc owns only about 1% of the world's tanker tonnage; more than 10% of the world's tanker capacity is necessary to handle Abadan's production. Without some tanker facilities from non-Communist countries, the USSR would operate the Abadan refinery, for some time at least, at the cost of a large loss in production. The Iranian railroads at present can carry about 250,000 metric tons of oil per year. This amount is a small fraction of the USSR's yearly domestic output, but it would represent most of Abadan's annual capacity for the production of alkylate, the key component in the manufacture of high-octane aviation gasoline. An operating staff unfamiliar with the plant would require at least a year to achieve substantial production of alkylate. Supply of an additional 250,000 tons of alkylate would more than double the USSR's estimated annual production of this commodity, which is vital to the conduct of a long-range strategic air offensive. Overland transport could in time be increased with new tank cars and possibly with air transport.

The Iranian terrain would make construction of a pipeline to the USSR a most difficult and expensive proposition, though it is not an impossible engineering feat. Such a pipeline could conceivably be constructed in two to three years and would presumably be used for refined products. While the USSR might be unwilling to lay so costly a pipeline in view of Iran's vulnerability to Western interdiction efforts in the event of war, there is a strong possibility that such a pipeline would be built if the Soviet Union were to commence integrating Iran into the Soviet bloc in time of peace. There is every likelihood that if the USSR gains control of the oil resources, Iran would be exploited in the familiar pattern.

(Effects of Closing Down the Iranian Oil Industry, Intelligence Memorandum, Assistant Director, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, July 11, 1951, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Khalil Maleki, who did not hold a favourable view of the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and the Tudeh Party, was a prominent Iranian Titoist activist backed by and directed by the CIA, as revealed previously. At the time, Maleki was trying in vain to sabotage the Mosaddeq Administration's efforts to lift and shift Iran out of the Anglo-American imperialist camp. While portraying the Tudeh Party of Iran as enemies of Mosaddeq as opposed to allies, Khalil Maleki supported the CIA's World Bank 'mediations' which called on Mosaddeq to back down in the face of 'international' (i.e. Anglo-American) pressures. This fact was admitted by Homa Katouzian, the economic consultant to the Organization of American States and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and a leading Iranian reformist intellectual known for his extensive research on and support for Khalil Maleki. Katouzian wrote: On solving the issue concerning oil, the logic of Khalil Maleki was on the same track as the view of Mosaddeq in the [National] Movement. The nationalization of oil, before all else, was a strategy for

gaining the independence of the nation and establishing a democratic system. Considering the apathy of the Soviets and the US support for the British, Iran was too weak at the time to be able to carry the struggle forward to the end, especially when there was an enemy in the form of the ruling regime [pro-Shah deep state] and the

Tudeh Party, weakening the country from within. Maleki supported the mediation efforts of the World Bank (Chapter 12), and in the end, was the only major voice in the National Movement to dare to emphasize the necessity of resolving the oil issue for the purpose of the survival of the entire [National] Movement. A decent resolution (lower than the ideal goal), could have reduced international pressures, normalized the economic conditions of the country, increased the financial power of the government, so that it could execute the economic and social development projects. (Mosaddeq and the Struggle for Power in Iran, [Mosaddeq w Nabard Qodrat], Homa Katouzian, 1993, pp. 204) (IMG)

Thus, the CIA and MI6 jointly plotted Operation AJAX. The main figure on the ground responsible for launching this fascist coup d'états was, quite famously, General Fazlollah Zahedi, a member of the Nazi intelligence underground:

During World War II several generals were involved in German-sponsored clandestine political activity; one – Fazlollah Zahedi – later became Prime Minister. (Iran After the Shah: An Intelligence Assessment, CIA, August 1978, p. 10. In: CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION) (IMG)

On March 1953, MI6 agent Beria and his Titoist circle of British intelligence agents at the top ranks of the Soviet successfully eliminated Joseph Stalin and some of his comrades in the Red Army command (see chapter 19). Upon gaining power in Moscow, the ruling Titoist agents of the MI6 did not follow the Stalin-era policy of supporting anti-imperialist and Soviet-friendly governments abroad, and on the contrary embarked upon a program of sabotage against the anti-imperialist and socialist forces. It was during this time period that drastic de-funding of the Peoples' Democracies occurred, and most violently of all, the June 1953 East Berlin riots occurred. It was also at this time that Moscow drastically cut support for the government of Mosaddeq. According to a document published by the American intelligence front, the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Soviet intelligence had knowledge of the Anglo-American coup plans, but the ruling circles in the Kremlin did not provide assistance to Mosaddeq in the face of Anglo-Americana plots:

The KI received data from the MGB and GRU stations in Teheran, much of it quite accurate. The analysts knew that the Americans wanted to topple Mossadeq because he refused to join an anti-Soviet "aggression pact." They learned that US ambassador Loy Henderson, the Shah, and various generals had been conspiring against the Iranian Printr Minister since 1952. General Fazlollah Zahedi was identified as a likely candidate to succeed Mossadeq. Why, then, did the Soviets not leak this to him?

One cannot tell from KI documents.

There is plenty of evidence, however, that the Soviets neither trusted nor supported Mossadeq. (...). But it was not now ready to ally with the "bourgeois nationalist" Mossadeq in Iran.

("Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The "Small" Committee of Information, 1952-1953", Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Vladislav Martinovich Zubok, December 1992, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

Owing to his anti-Stalin bias, the author from the Woodrow Wilson Center falsely claims that Joseph Stalin did not support Mosaddeq, but the earliest Soviet intelligence document which he cites for the context is dated July 7, 1953, three months after the death of Stalin, when the Titoists were in charge of the Kremlin. The ruling Titoist elites, not Stalin, were the ones to have to assist Mosaddeq against the coup. The elimination of Stalin and the subsequent reign of the Titoist agents of the MI6 in the Kremlin paved the way for Operation AJAX. As Mohammad Mosaddeq rightly reflected in his memoirs:

The death of Stalin on March 5 created the suitable conditions for the overthrow of my government (The Memoirs and Pains of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Mohammad Mosaddeq, p. 189) (IMG)

And the other one was [Anthony] Eden, the Foreign Minister of Britain's Conservative Government, who after a while of waiting, as soon as Stalin died and thus the setting for the oppressive behavior of the colonial regimes was created, made a trip to America and convinced the President Eisenhower to trade the freedom of a nation with 40% stock [from Iran's oil].. (The Memoirs and Pains of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Mohammad Mosaddeq, pp. 395-396) (IMG)

The facts mentioned here are also corroborated by the prominent Titoist Third Force officials. Masoud Hejazi, a founder of the Titoist Third Force, recalled that Mohammad-Ali Khonji, another founder of the Titoist 'Third Force', had analyzed that the elimination of Joseph Stalin and the rise of the Titoist circle meant that Mosaddeq could no longer rely on Soviet assistance against the coup. In his memoirs, referring to Mosaddeq's view that Stalin's death led to the coup, Hejazi recalled:

The interesting thing is that Dr. Mohammad-Ali Khonji, as stated before, had reached the same conclusion [as Mosaddeq on the role of Stalin's elimination on the AJAX coup]. In one of the meetings of the Joint Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the Toilers' Party of the Iranian Nation (Third Force), he spent a number of hours to analyze the international political situation concerning Iran, and concluded that due to the death of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet government has moved away from its aggressive [confrontational] approach in the Cold War and is now busy caring about its own domestic affairs, and Dr. Mosaddeq can no longer utilize the existing contradictions between the Eastern Bloc on the one side and the Western Bloc on the other, and as

such, Western colonial policy, through England and America having reached common understanding, will pursue the necessary measures for bringing about the collapse of Dr. Mosaddeq's government. ("Events and Judgements, 1950-1960: The Memoirs of Masoud Hejazi", Masoud Hejazi, p. 316) (IMG)

Dr. Khonji's analysis served as warning of an impending coup. Khalil Maleki strictly prevented such a correct analysis to be handed to Mosaddeq:

Dr. Khonji, based on this theory, was trying to show that the plot to overthrow the government of Dr. Mosaddeq is near, and I, who identified his remarks as completely logical and corresponding to reality, rose to defend him [Khonji], and called for forming extraordinary meetings of the Executive Committee and Central Committee of the Third Force Party's Youth Organization to equip the Third Force Party and the other National forces and for coordination of these [forces].

However, unfortunately, due to the silence and later the resistance of Khalil Maleki, as well as the slanders against Dr. Khonji, including the slander of him being Melancholic, such clear vision of Dr. Khonji did not bring any results..

("Events and Judgements, 1950-1960: The Memoirs of Masoud Hejazi", Masoud Hejazi, p. 317) (IMG)

The Titoist Third Force pursued the Anglo-American intelligence services' policy of divide-and-conquer against the anti-imperialist forces in Iran. One such case has been noted by Mr. Sadiqi, who, in the words of Iran's official modern historical research center, was:

the Minister of Interior of the late Mossadegh government.. (Factors for the Defeat of the National Movement of Iran in the Coup d'Etat of August 19, Political Studies and Research Institute, Pahlaviha.) (IMG)

In an interview Sadiqi corroborated:

In my opinion, the dough for the August 19 [1953] coup was prepared on July 21 [1953], because all the people and all the classes were in favor of Dr. Mossadegh and praised him wholeheartedly. But the late Khalil Maleki and others insisted that elements affiliated with the Tudeh Party participate in a separate demonstration, and millions at another time. As a result, on that day, a half of the day was a leftist demonstration with a special order and great organizational power and the other half of the day was a National [Front] demonstration with organizational weakness demonstrated, and such division of strength signalled to the Western governments assessing Dr. Mosaddeq's strength that the [socio -political] base of the government had weakened.. The Tudeh Party demonstrations that day had apparently been several times the number of the supporters of the [Mosaddeq's] National Movement of Iran. (Factors for the Defeat of the National Movement of Iran in the Coup d'Etat of August 19, Political Studies and Research Institute, Pahlaviha. Source cited: Source: The "Ettela'at" Daily Information 1388/05/28 (August 19, 2009)) (IMG)

The same excerpt of the interview was also presented in the memoirs of Masoud Hejazi, a co-founder of Maleki's Titoist 'Third Force'. Defending Maleki's decision, Hejazi remarked:

What must be added to this text is that when Khalil Maleki and Co. insisted that Tudeh Party affiliates must participate in a separate rally and at a separate time than the National [Front elements], they were, for several reasons, rightful in their plea and insistence. ("Events and Judgements, 1950-1960: The Memoirs of Masoud Hejazi", Masoud Hejazi, p. 362) (IMG)

The evidence makes it absolutely clear that the Third Force pursued the Titoist policy of dividing the anti-imperialist forces, and driving a wedge between Mosaddeq and his Tudeh Party allies, thus, as Mosaddeq's Minister of Interior stated, leading to the 1953 coup in Iran. Upon their release, the Titoist agents of the American secret service and Yugoslav regime continued their collaboration with the regime of the Shah, and extended their ties to the Mossad. The CIA-backed Titoist leader Maleki began to blatantly and unashamedly collaborate with the newly-installed regime of the Nazi spy Zahedi and the Shah:

In addition, there was one significant dissent by a loyal Mossadeqist from the policy of total opposition. After his release from prison, Khalil Maleki, the leader of the Titoist Third Force, argued publicly for a policy of accepting political realities. Maleki said that Mossadeq's overthrow, whatever the immediate causes, would not have been possible had the base of social support for nationalism been larger. Therefore, the Nationalists should drop their intransigent opposition and instead seek to cooperate with the liberal wing of the "ruling class" until social evolution had progressed further. Maleki stressed that this "ruling class" should not be viewed as a monolith—all of one color and traitorous—but rather as a group of men whose views range from the reactionary to the liberal. Were the Nationalists to throw their strength to the liberal wing, an evolutionary trend could be set into motion which might bring the Nationalists back into positions of influence.

Maleki's arguments were published in his magazine Elm o Zendegi and were read widely. But instead of convincing his colleagues, Maleki was charged with having sold out to the Court and the imperialist powers. For a man who had lost most of his worldly possessions after the coup and had spent many months in prison because of his unwavering devotion to the Nationalist cause, the realization that many of his supporters now questioned

his loyalty was surely a heavy blow. Yet in a day when censorship was increasingly strict, Elm o Zendegi had appeared without repercussions; and Maleki had called for collaboration with the men who had overthrown the greatest of Iranian leaders, Dr. Mossadeq. To many Nationalists the case against Maleki was a clear one. The Third Force split into pro- and anti-Maleki factions. The pro-Maleki wing atrophied; Elm o Zendegi ceased regular publication, and Maleki joined Maki and Baqai in obscurity.

(Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, pp. 294-295) (IMG)

Against communist science, CIA's Titoist agent Maleki and his Titoist friend Jalal Aal-e Ahmad had the audacity to openly argue for an Israel under the influence of the Ben-Gurion faction as their model of a 'socialist' society. It is good to support the communist-led 'Socialist Zionist' popular front party Mapam, or to support the agricultural cooperatives and state ownership in Israel, but to hail Kautskyite Israel in general, and the Israel under the influence of Moshe Sharett in particular, as the model for a 'socialist' alternative in 'contrast' to the Soviet Union was characteristic of Titoist renegades. For their service, Moshe Sharett invited them to Israel. Jalal Ahmad subsequently wrote an infamous travelogue hailing Israel's 'socialism'. Referring to Maleki's travel to Europe, Katouzian remarked:

While in Europe, Maleki was invited to visit Israel by Moshe Sharett, an Israeli socialist leader, ex -prime minister and ex-foreign minister.... Maleki, like all European socialists in the 1950s, regarded Israel as a model socialist country and a viable alternative to the Soviet model, and Elm o Zendegi and Nabard-e Zendegi wrote favourable comments on its kibbutz farms while discussing possible programmes for an Iranian land reform. (...). Jalal Al-e Ahmad and his wife Simin Daneshvar also visited Israel as guests shortly afterwards. He wrote a favourable travelogue.. (Khalil Maleki: The Human Face of Iranian Socialism, Homa Katouzian, March 31, 2018) (IMG)

Chapter 18

C18S1. Soviet Military Aid for the Communists in China

*** IMG-All-{China}

The Soviet Red Army sacrificed so much in order to liberate Manchuria from Japanese fascist yoke. Upon liberating Manchuria, the USSR established a base for Chinese communist activity against the KMT, covertly funding the communist rebels against the CIA-backed KMT regime. A "Nationalist informant from Chiamussu area" reported to the CIA:

300 Soviet-trained Chinese pilots have arrived in Chiamusu..

The Soviets are giving the Communists 100 planes which will be delivered to Harbin this month. ('MILITARY INFORMATION: SOVIET AID TO COMMUNISTS, MANCHURIA; KOREAN AND MONGOLIAN TROOPS, MANCHURIA', CIA, October 3, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Another CIA report stated:

A group of 150 Chinese students is attending the Soviet military academy at Inokentevskaya ... near Irkutsk. (...). The academy regularly trains Chinese Communist army officers. (MILITARY INFORMATION: TRAINING AND SUPPLY OF FAR EASTERN MILITARY FORCES BY THE USSR, CIA, May 18, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Another CIA report on the Soviet training of Chinese and Korean units stated the following:

Chinese and Korean Communist Units

8. The only Korean Communist unit in Hunchun is a small liaison detachment called the Hunchun Branch of the China Liaison Group, Korean Volunteer Army. The Chinese Communist units, listed below, are small groups of picked troops.

9. One Chinese Communist infantry battalion is stationed in the city. It was trained in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk by Soviet officers from "sniper" and cavalry units for a period of about one year. Comprising approximately 500 officers and men, the battalion is divided into companies, each

consisting of three rifle and one machine gun platoon. Each (rifle) platoon has four sections, each of which is armed with:

One Jakov grenade launcher, requiring a loader and a gunner

Three Fedorov automatic rifles

One range finder with periscope

Three to five Soviet infantry rifles, M-1930, with telescopic sights

Hand grenades and smoke candles

10. A signal company, also Soviet-trained, is housed in the building formerly used by the Japanese signal unit in Hunchun. It includes about 250 technicians and soldiers, equipped with Soviet M-1930 rifles and sub-machine guns. The company's equipment consists of five radio transmitters and twenty wireless telephones. It maintains contact with Chinese Communist headquarters in Harbin and Chiamussu and is used by the Soviets for contacting Soviet units in North Korea and the USSR.

(MILITARY INFORMATION: SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS IN HUNCHUN, CIA, March 30, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

A report by the CIA's Office of Report and Estimates (ORE) stated:

Partial evacuations from certain areas had taken place earlier, with little or no prior notification to the Chinese National Government. The latter did obtain, on 22 March 1946, a Soviet note giving the target date for complete withdrawal, but that note contained no area-by-area schedule for evacuation. Chinese Communist forces were thus placed in a highly favorable position to replace the departing Soviet occupation forces, thereby gaining physical control over most of Manchuria.

Intelligence reports correctly emphasize the importance of the "capture" of great supplies of Japanese arms and equipment by the Chinese Communist forces after they replaced the Soviet troops in Manchuria. Somewhat less well known is the fact that at least part of such Japanese supplies fell into Chinese Communist hands even during the Soviet occupation. A trained US observer personally saw unarmed Communist troops enter the Japanese arsenal in Mukden while it was completely under Soviet control and Soviet guard, and subsequently saw those troops emerge fully armed. (Other sources, including a Japanese, a Manchurian ex-puppet officer, and a Czech refugee in Dairen, cite similar episodes in Soviet-controlled areas containing Japanese Army materiel.) (IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA, CIA, Office of Reports and Estimates, ORE 45, September 15, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The US intelligence staff under diplomatic cover also confirmed the Soviet training of the Chinese forces:

In June 46 the US Consul General Dairen reported that the morale and efficiency of the Chinese police in

Dairen had visibly increased and that “it is obvious that they are carefully and systematically trained”.

Again in September 1946, he reported that the Soviet military in Dairen were training the Chinese police in the use of the rifle and bayonet. (IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA, CIA, Office of Reports and Estimates, ORE 45, September 15, 1947, p. 11) (IMG)

Furthermore:

Chinese Nationalist sources have indicated that these trainees in groups of several hundreds have been sent to Chefoo and Antung for service under the Chinese Communists. A US oil company official, who left Dairen in July 1948, reports that the transfer of trainees to Chinese Communist forces is “generally known.” (IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA, CIA, Office of Reports and Estimates, ORE 45, September 15, 1947, p. 11) (IMG)

C18S2. Sino-Soviet Economic Relations

*** IMG-All-{China}

Upon defeating the Japanese forces in Manchuria, the Soviets began to remove military-industrial materials from Manchuria as war booty. International law on war booty, established by the Hague Convention, unambiguously states that forces occupying former enemy territories have the right to take as war booty those assets which were used by their enemies for making war. In the words of the document of the Hague Convention:

An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations.

All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.

(“Enemy Material”, MEMO: For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Judge Advocate’s Office, General Headquarters, A. E. F., February 1, 1919. In: “United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: 1917 -1919”, United States Department of the Army, Office of Military History, p. 610) (IMG)

Referring to this rule of the Hague Convention, the US Army Department's Office of Military History stated:

This language is not ambiguous. It means that an art" of occupation is entitled to take possession of the materials of war and supplies belonging to the enemy state if such property is susceptible of use for military operations. either by the occupying Army o[r] the enemy; and property so appropriated may either be used by the occupying Army in its own operations or held to prevent its falling into hands of, and being used by, the enemy. It is equally clear, however, that property, not susceptible of a military use by either belligerent, though belonging to the enemy and at one forming a part of the supplies of his Army, cannot lawfully be appropriated much less destroyed or sold and the proceeds pocketed by the occupying state. In plainer words we are entitled to take only what we can use or what the enemy could use; (“Enemy Material”, MEMO: For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Judge Advocate’s Office, General Headquarters, A. E. F., February 1, 1919. In: “United States Army in the World War, 1917 -1919: 1917-1919”, United States Department of the Army, Office of Military History, p. 610) (IMG)

Regarding the Soviet removal of Japanese assets in Manchuria, American ambassador Edwin Pauley, the personal representative of US President Truman on the subject of reparations, wrote a fairly famous document fiercely condemning Soviet removals of industrial assets in Manchuria. Nonetheless, he admitted that virtually all of the industrial machinery in Manchuria were built by the militarist Japan:

Since all of Manchuria’s major industrial plants are former Japanese assets, as such they are subject to Allied reparations claims. (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley (Ambassador of the United States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, p. 15) (IMG)

This fact shows that the industrial materials removed from Manchuria by the Soviets were militarist Japanese industrial assets, thus liable to removal by the occupying force. As admitted by Pauley in his viciously anti-Soviet report, the Soviets did not remove everything from Manchuria, but rather focused on the industrial assets, which as Pauley had admitted previously, belong to the Japanese military occupation. Pauley wrote:

The term “stripping” as it has been used in the press in connection with removals from Manchuria may be confusing. The Soviets did not take everything. They concentrated on certain categories of supplies, machinery and equipment. In addition to taking stockpiles and certain complete industrial installations, the Soviets took by far the larger part of all function power generating and transforming equipment, electric motors, experimental plants, laboratories, and hospitals. In machine tools, they took only the newest and best.. (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley(Ambassador of the United

States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, p. 9) (IMG)

The Soviet forces also confiscated approximately three million U.S. dollars worth of gold bullion stocks and over a half billion Manchurian yuan from Manchukuo banks. They also circulated nearly ten billion yuan in occupational currency, almost doubling the total Manchurian note issue. In addition to removals, mentioned above, occupational currency was used to purchase factories and properties and some privately-owned merchandise and materials. (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley (Ambassador of the United States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, pp. 10-11) (IMG)

The Soviets soon consolidated their hold on Manchuria and shortly after 1 September 1945 began a systematic and selective removal of industrial machinery. Principal attention was centered on power-generating and transforming equipment, electric motors, experimental installations in the fields of heavy industry, mining, chemicals and cement. As the Soviets made a progressive take-over from the Japanese, production stopped.. (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley (Ambassador of the United States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, p. 15) (IMG)

It is also worth noting, by the way, that the Soviets did not pursue the policy of removals from Korea:

Soviet actions in Manchuria are high-lighted by the entirely different policy followed in Korea where there were practically no capital removals or destruction of industry. In Manchuria the confiscation and removal of food stocks, the destruction attendant upon and following the removals of machinery, the almost complete halting of productive effort.. (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley (Ambassador of the United States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, p. 12) (IMG)

This non-removal from Korea was because the northern region of Korea was run by a communist-led bourgeois republic, friendly to the USSR, whereas Manchuria was susceptible to capture by the US-backed KMT.

For the same kind of reason, once China was liberated by the CCP-led popular front, an agreement was signed with the USSR through which the Soviets would return Manchuria's industrial assets to the liberated China, without China paying any compensation. In a document submitted to the US Congress, Leo A. Orleans, the China Research Specialist in the Research Services of the Library of Congress, remarked:

In 1950, less than 5 years after the Soviet Union drastically reduced Manchuria's industrial capacity by dismantling and carrying off most of the more modern equipment from that region's industrial installations, a series of agreements were signed between the new Communist regime in China and the U.S.S.R. which laid the foundation for Sino-Soviet economic cooperation. An agreement signed in February 1950 committed the Soviet Union to return to China, without any compensation, all the properties and buildings appropriated by the Russians in Manchuria after the defeat of Japan and to help rehabilitate, reconstruct, and build anew 50 enterprises. In some instances, therefore, this involved not only the delivery of whole plants, but also in research and design work, in developing the production of new types industrial goods, and in assembling and adjusting the equipment. The equipment and materials involved in this agreement were later calculated to be worth \$300 million.. (SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Leo A. Orleans. In: "Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers", submitted to: the Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the United States, Vol. 1: Policy and Performance, Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, pp. 126-127. "Leo A. Orleans is a China Research Specialist in Research Services of the Library of Congress" (p. 115 of the same document).) (IMG)

The CIA's Office of Research and Reports (ORR) stated:

Two investment credits have also been extended to Communist China by the USSR. The first of these, covering 141 large industrial installations, was granted on 14 February 1950. It provided a credit of \$300 million for the purchase of equipment and other materials for restored or newly built industrial enterprises. Among the projects for which this aid was scheduled were electric power plants, metal and machine manufacturing plants, coal mining installations, and equipment for transportation. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), August 20, 1956, p. 11) (IMG)

Other Soviet-owned assets in Manchuria were generously given to China according to the 1950 treaty:

Under the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the Soviet government also pledged to restore and handover to China, free of charge, and before the end of 1952, all its rights to the Changchun Railway and all its property; a commitment they honored. The two Governments agreed on Soviet troop withdrawal from Port Arthur and Dairen and on relinquishing to the Chinese all the facilities, including the naval base, at this strategic location. Three Sino-Soviet joint-stock companies were established: Sovsinmetal—to prospect for,

extract and process nonferrous and rare metals in Sinkiang Province; Sovsinoil—to prospect for and extract oil and gas; and the SKOGA company to operate China's air services. Both sides were to share equally in the capital and management of the companies, but in 1954 all three companies were turned over to the Chinese. (SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Leo A. Orleans. In: "Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers", submitted to: the Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the United States, Vol. 1: Policy and Performance, Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, p. 127) (IMG)

Orleans continued:

A trade agreement- signed in Moscow in April 1950 was to provide China with gasoline, paraffin and lubricants, machines and tools, transportation equipment, cotton, raw materials, fuel and other materials that were indispensable for China's economic rehabilitation. By 1952, the Soviet Union accounted for more than 53 percent of China's overall foreign trade turnover. Numerous other agreements signed in 1950-51 ranged from postal, telegraph, and telephone communication to the navigation of rivers bordering the two countries. During these early years, the Soviet Union claims to have supplied with 943,000 tons of ferrous metals (equivalent to about 40 percent of China's total output) and 1.5 million tons of petroleum products, including over 500,000 tons of gasoline and 477,000 tons of kerosene.

Although in 1952 there were nearly 1,000 Soviet specialists in China, the U.S.S.R. never sought to use Its specialists to gain any kind of control over the Chinese economy. While Soviet specialists participated in design work and construction, assembly and commissioning of enterprises, they also were involved in training large numbers of Chinese personnel. Furthermore, large groups of engineers and technicians, as well as tens of thousands of Chinese workers, came to the U.S.S.R. for training during those years.

Even though the Soviets may overstate their claim, it is difficult to quarrel with the importance of their support and experience (and "the aid of the Soviet people") in enabling China to overcome her economic difficulties and in laying the groundwork for a successful transition to planned Socialist construction. (SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Leo A. Orleans. In: "Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers", submitted to: the Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the United States, Vol. 1: Policy and Performance, Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, pp. 127-128) (IMG)

The interest rate was very low:

The repayment was to be made at an annual interest rate of only 1 percent and was to be made in the form of Chinese raw materials to be delivered to the Union in equal parts over a period of 10 years. Parenthetically, however, it should be pointed out that this represents but a fraction of the support Mao asked for. (SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Leo A. Orleans. In: "Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers", submitted to: the Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the United States, Vol. 1: Policy and Performance, Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, pp. 126-127) (IMG)

C18S3. The War against Fascist Japan / The Nuclear Strikes on Japan

*** IMG-All-{Japan}

Imperial Japan was the ally of Nazi Germany. When Nazi Germany would ally with the Anglo-Americans against the Soviets, so too would Japan. Much like Nazi Germany, Japan' imperialist interests actually were in an alliance with the Anglo-American imperialists since 1943. From a Japanese imperialist point of view, the defeat of the Nazi Germans in the Battle of Stalingrad meant a mightier USSR, a Soviet Union with much more productive forces. Such a USSR could then turn eastwards and take out the Japanese Empire. Such a mighty USSR only be defeated through the joint struggle of the Japanese imperialists and the Anglo-American imperialists. Hence began the Japanese alliance with the American imperialists. In their negotiations with the Americans in Europe, which began as early as May 1943 and probably earlier, the Japanese sought to convince the OSS representatives that securing the US interest necessitated a US-Japan alliance against the Soviet Union. According to the declassified files, the Japanese repeatedly asked the OSS representatives:

on [the] status [of] Soviet-American relations with evident desire to impress us that a reasonably strong Japan [can serve] as buffer to protect America from Soviet expansion in [the] Far East. (From Caserta, Italy. Office of Strategic Services, Field Section, X-2, May 1943, p. 1. in: 'OSS – CONTACT WITH JAPANESE OFFICIALS IN EUROPE/JAPANESE PRE-SURRENDER APPROACH TO ALLIED AUTHORITIES THROUGH OSS/MEMORANDUM ON ALLEGED JAPANESE PEACE FEELERS', OSS, 1943-1945) (IMG)

Thus, Japan's leaders aimed to convince the OSS that the United States should help retain a strong Imperial Japan as a base for anti-Soviet action. This explains the Japanese desire to 'surrender' to the United States. Japanese 'surrender'

was a code word for an Imperial Japanese alliance with the United States to counter the Soviet threat. This time, of course, the difference was that the United States had the upper hand in this alliance. Soon enough, the United States would deploy its troops to Japan ostensibly to defeat imperialist Japan but actually to help suppress the rise of the communist forces in Japan and to retain Japan as the imperialist base against the socialist camp. Note that since 1943, the interests of the Japanese imperialists were one and the same with those of the American imperialists. The only major imperialist power whose interests was not the same as those of the Anglo-Americans, the Nazi Germans, and the Japanese, was France. French imperialism was the rival of those powers, and an ally of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies.

In their contact with '673' – the OSS code for one of its agents in Europe – the Japanese stated their condition for surrender: the Emperor must remain in power. 'Otherwise', the Japanese told the 673, 'communism ... will ensue'. Below is an excerpt of the OSS report:

Our 673 is in touch here with Fujimura understood to be one of chief representatives in Europe of Japanese Navy and formerly Assistant Naval Attache Berlin. Fujimura is supposed to be in direct and secret cable contact with Jap minister of Marine and believed to have [the] confidence of Jap Government. He indicated to 673 that he believed Navy circles who now control present Jap Government would be willing to surrender but desire to save some face out of wreckage if possible. In particular they stress necessity [to] save [the] Emperor as otherwise communism and chaos will ensue. (From Bern, Switzerland. Office of Strategic Services, June 2, 1945, p. 1. In: 'OSS – CONTACT WITH JAPANESE OFFICIALS IN EUROPE/JAPANESE PRE-SURRENDER APPROACH TO ALLIED AUTHORITIES THROUGH OSS/MEMORANDUM ON ALLEGED JAPANESE PEACE FEELERS', 1945) (IMG)

In his 1966 memoirs, Allen Dulles confirmed the OSS reports:

On July 20, 1945, under instructions from Washington, I went to the Potsdam Conference and reported there to Secretary Stimson on what I had learned from Tokyo – they desired to surrender if they could retain the Emperor and the constitution as a basis for maintaining discipline and order in Japan after the devastating news of surrender became known to the Japanese people. (The Secret Surrender : The Classic Insider's Account of the Secret Plot to Surrender Northern Italy during WWII, Guilford, Conn. : Lyons Press, Allen Dulles, 2006, p. 219) (IMG)

In his memoirs, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill also confirmed:

We knew of course that the Japanese were ready to give up ... in the war. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 556) (IMG)

All of this explains why the Anglo-Americans were so keen on preventing the USSR from engaging in a combat against the Japanese Empire, with which they were secretly seeking an alliance. Churchill confirmed to his deputy Anthony Eden that:

the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 553) (IMG)

By engaging in a war against Imperial Japan, Churchill admitted in his memoirs, Generalissimo Stalin was fulfilling:

His word .. at Teheran and Yalta that Soviet Russia would attack Japan as soon as the German Army was defeated, and [that] in fulfilment of this a continuous movement of Russian troops to the Far East had been in progress over the Siberian Railway since the beginning of May. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

Nevertheless, and by no means surpassingly, Churchill was disappointed to see that the Generalissimo was staying true to his word, adding that the British did:

not need the Russians. The end of the Japanese war no longer depended upon ... their armies .. We had no need to ask favours of them. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 553) (IMG)

A more intricate question was what to tell Stalin. The President and I no longer felt that we needed his aid to conquer Japan. (...). In our opinion they were not likely to be needed.. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

A means to dissuade the USSR from engaging against fascist Japan was through the use of nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip and a warning. Churchill recalled:

On July 17 [a] world-shaking news ... arrived. In the afternoon Stimson called at my abode and ... said, "that the experiment in the Mexican desert has come off. The atomic bomb is a reality." (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 552) (IMG)

As an indirect means of threatening the Soviets, Truman and Churchill:

both felt that [Stalin] must be informed of the great New Fact which now dominated the scene.. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

However, they also wanted to provide:

not ... any particulars. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

about the bomb. However, Churchill wondered:

How should this news be imparted to [Stalin]? Should it be in writing or by word of mouth? Should it be at a formal and special meeting, or in the course of our daily conferences, or after one of them? The conclusion which the President came to was the last of these alternatives. "I think," he said, "I had best just tell him after one of our meetings that we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite out of the ordinary, which we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese will to continue the war." I agreed to this procedure. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

In fact, as confirmed by many sources, among them British military historian and Colonel Hughes Wilson:

Stalin knew all about the 'Manhattan Project' from the start, thanks to a group of committed Communist spies who kept the Soviet leader well informed. (On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World, John Hughes-Wilson) (IMG)

Warning Stalin about the bomb, therefore, did not serve as an effective means of discouraging the Soviet leaders from fighting Japanese fascism.

The Soviets defeated the Nazi Germans in Europe. The European theatre was finished and the Soviets were preparing for combat against fascist Japan. According to international law, and particularly according to the so-called 'Neutrality' Pact between fascist Japan and the Soviets, the Red Army could not immediately begin its military operations against fascist Japan after the defeat of Nazi Germany, as some months had to pass. It is also not at all the case that the USSR badly needed to directly declare war on Japan. No, the USSR could respond proportionately to the Japanese fascist pseudo-neutrality by sending advisors, intelligence officers, and all kinds of light and heavy arms to the East Asian freedom fighters in the war against Japan. This would have created some slight inefficiency in work since it required a strong degree of emphasis on covert operations. Nonetheless, the USSR could still do that. Therefore, for expanding its influence in East Asia, no, the USSR did not desperately need a declaration of war or a direct war against Japan.

Nonetheless, the time for a direct war against fascist Japan came in the April 1945. According to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the USSR had the legal right to cease the 'neutrality' and 'peace', and to wage war on fascist Japan. The article 2 of the Pact stated:

ARTICLE TWO

Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

ARTICLE THREE

The present Pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

(Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, April 13, 1941 Avalon Project) (IMG)

Naturally, the dialectical laws of history have left no room for a real neutrality in any international conflict; Japan could either promote a pro-Soviet 'neutrality' or a pro-German 'neutrality'. Within the context of international law, a pro-German 'neutrality' would have been legally acceptable enough, had fascist Japan not so vigorously and actively pushed for the interests of the German aggressors. However, Japan was very active in its favorable stance towards Nazi Germany; Japan and Germany were straight up allies. Japan was bogging down the Anglo-American allies of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and later in the Great Patriotic War, Japan pursued an alliance with the Anglo-Americans against the USSR. All of this could hardly be an observance of article 2 of the pact. Furthermore, according to article 3 of the April 1941 deal, the USSR could denounce the 'neutrality' pact with fascist Japan by April 1945. Hence, the USSR indeed denounced the pact in April 1945:

"The neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was concluded on April 13, 1941, that is, before the attack of Germany on the USSR and before the outbreak of war between Japan on the one hand and England and the United States on the other. Since that time the situation has been basically altered. Germany has attacked the USSR, and Japan, ally of Germany, is aiding the latter in its war against the USSR. Furthermore Japan is waging a war with the USA and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union.

"In these circumstances the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR has lost its sense, and the prolongation of that pact has become impossible.

"On the strength of the above and in accordance with Article Three of the above mentioned pact, which envisaged the right of denunciation one year before the lapse of the five year period of operation of the pact, the Soviet Government hereby makes know to the Government of Japan its wish to denounce the pact of April 13, 1941."

(Soviet Denunciation of the Pact with Japan, 1945, The Avalon Project) (IMG)

On August 6, 1945, Hiroshima fell victim to Washington's nuclear bombing. After having murdered tens of thousands of civilians, the US President Truman declared on radio:

Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. (Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum, originally published: August 6, 1945, Courtesy: The American Presidency Project, John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, University of California, Santa Barbara. underline added. For more information on USA's 'crazy' nuclear policy, check the works of Professor Michel Chossudovsky on the matter.) (IMG)

The 'fanatical Japs' would not have surrendered unless nuclear-struck, so say the proponents of the nuclear strikes. Such a narrative was obviously false, since the US intelligence had confirmed that the Japanese wanted to 'surrender' since as early as 1943 – 'surrender' as in ally with the United States. Even after World War II, a Truman Administration report stated:

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (Japan's Struggle to End the War, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, July 1, 1946, p. 50) (IMG)

The nuclear strike on Japan was in part a psychological warfare move against the Soviet Red Army which had just recently entered the conflict against fascist Japan. One thing is for sure: there was no need for the nuclear strike to yield the Japanese surrender, as the surrender had already been negotiated long before 1943, and was to take effect by 1945, without the nuclear strike anyways.

C18S4. The Arrest of Yoshio Kodama

*** IMG-All-{Japan}

Yoshio Kodama was a top mercantile bourgeois leader in fascist Japan, leading a large percentage of the East Asian narco-terrorist network. Describing his background, the CIA reported:

One of the causes to which Kodama has devoted much of his time and money is the right-wing, ultranationalist movement. He joined the movement in his teens, and his name was associated with terrorist incidents and rightist arrests that marked the upsurge of Japanese militarism in the early 1930's.

After the outbreak of war with China, Kodama organized an underground agency based in Shanghai to procure strategic material for the Imperial Navy. The Kodama Agency was also involved in smuggling, narcotics trafficking and paramilitary operations. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0004, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA Central Reference Service, p. 1) (IMG)

In October 1937 Kodama began a series of trips to northern China as a special staff official of the Foreign Ministry's Information Bureau. After his return from the first of these trips, he organized the ... China Problems Settlement National League ... aimed at promoting Japanese activity in China. (With unofficial backing from the Foreign Ministry, Kodama spent the next few years working with ... [Japanese] nationalist groups on China, making frequent trips to Shanghai.) In December 1941 he set up a purchasing agency in Shanghai for the Japanese Naval Air Force. This agency, later named the Kodama Kikan (Kodama Organ), involved considerable black market procurement as well as alleged intelligence responsibilities, and reportedly enabled Kodama to amass a huge personal fortune through wartime trade.. His wartime activities also included ... management of the right-wing newspaper Yamato Shimbun in 1943, and the assumption of the presidency of the ... Japan Southern Mining Company, Ltd. ... as well as several other mines, in 1944. In August 1945 he was appointed a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council in the Higashikuni cabinet.. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0002, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

During World War II, Kodama's:

activities also included ... management of the right-wing newspaper Yamato Shimbun in 1943, and the assumption of the presidency of the ... Japan Southern Mining Company, Ltd. ... as well as several other mines, in 1944. In August 1945 he was appointed a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council in the Higashikuni cabinet.. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0002, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

When Japan established its alliance with the United States in the form of 'surrender', as a manifestation of to the demagoguery of the Allen Dulles network, many of Japan's fascist war criminals were briefly arrested so that the American imperialist occupation forces could maintain a facade of 'concern' for 'justice'. This included Kodama who:

was arrested the following December [1945] and detained in Sugamo Prison as a Class A war criminal suspect. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0002, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

Kodama's arrest was by no means the end of his narco-terrorist career. Rather, history would prove that it was a new beginning. Prior to his arrest, Kodama had utilized the wealth he had amassed from his narco-terrorist activity in order

to finance the creation of the fascist 'Japanese Liberal Party'. The CIA cited a report stating that:

Kodama gave Hatoyama [head of the Liberal Party (LP)] 10 million yen when the LP was formed in late 1945 .. He ... was able to exploit his access to top government officials and his inside information on government policy in various profitable financial transactions. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0001, Yoshio Kodama, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

According to the New York Times:

Yoshio Kodama, a political fixer and later a major C.I.A. contact in Japan ... worked behind the scenes to finance the conservatives. (C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's, The New York Times, Tim Weiner, October 9, 1994) (IMG)

In order to finance the Japanese 'conservatives', really the Japanese fascists, the US intelligence:

smuggled tons of tungsten from Japanese military officers' caches into the United States and sold it to the Pentagon for \$10 million. The smugglers included Mr. Kodama and Kay Sugahara, a Japanese- American recruited by the O.S.S. from a internment camp in California during World War II.

The files of the late Mr. Sugahara – researched by the late Howard Schonberger, a University of Maine professor writing a book nearly completed when he died in 1991 – described the operation in detail.

They say the C.I.A. provided \$2.8 million in financing for the tungsten operation, which reaped more than \$2 million in profits ..

The group pumped the proceeds into the campaigns of conservatives during Japan's ... elections in 1953

(C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's, The New York Times, Tim Weiner, October 9, 1994) (IMG)

Chalmers Johnson, the consultant for the CIA and author of books studied closely by CIA staff, confirmed these reports.

He said:

There is no doubt today that Kodama returned to Japan in 1945 from China as the former head of the Navy's *Kodama Kikan* (Kodama Agency) [as] a fabulously rich war profiteer. He transferred stolen diamonds and platinum before he went to prison to Hatoyama Ichiro and Kono Ichiro, and the funds these materials produced when sold by Kono, about \$175 million, financed the creation of the Liberal Party. The go-between in this famous operation was the *kuromaku* Tsuji Karoku, whom the Diet questioned in 1947 about the alleged use of former military and black market funds to influence politics. (The 1955 System and the American Connection: A Bibliographic Introduction, JPRI Working Paper: No. 11, Chalmers Johnson, July 1995) (IMG)

Already, Kodama's role as the dominant figure of the post-War Japanese politics was flourishing. For their intelligence work against the Realm of the Proletariat, the US authorities needed the expertise of their Imperial Japanese allies. In Japan, the US intelligence service relied on 'scattered' fascist 'groups and individuals'. The CIA stated:

organized Japanese intelligence work as was carried on between 1945 and 1952 was done by scattered groups or individuals, mostly under the direction and control of occupation authorities. (Intelligence in the New Japan, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Studies Archive Indexes, Vol 7, No. 3, APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994, CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, CIA, September 18, 1995) (IMG)

In the meantime, having spent three years in jail, the Japanese narco-terrorist chief Yoshio Kodama was:

Released in December 1948.. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0002, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

Kodama's 'service' to the CIA was a mere manifestation of the alliance of Japan's fascist finance capital with American imperialism. The US intelligence consultant Chalmers Johnson wrote:

There is also little doubt that when Kodama was released from Sugamo on the day after the convicted war criminals were executed, he had been recruited by and was working for U.S. intelligence. On that matter [New York Times journalist] Tad Szulc has written, "Intelligence sources say that Kodama had a working relationship with the CIA from the time he was released from a Japanese prison in 1948"; and another seasoned observer who was also a former SCAP [Supreme Commander for Allied Powers] official, Hans Baerwald, comments, "[Kodama's] release from imprisonment allegedly was tied to his becoming an agent of the American intelligence services in general, and ultimately the Central Intelligence Agency in particular." (Szulc, *New Republic*, April 10, 1976, p. 11; Baerwald, *Asian Survey*, September 1976, pp. 817-18.) (The 1955 System and the American Connection: A Bibliographic Introduction, JPRI Working Paper: No. 11, Chalmers Johnson, July 1995) (IMG)

Another CIA file reported:

Since his release in Dec 48 from Sugamo Prison to which he was sentenced as a Class "A" war criminal, Kodama has been forced to conduct his possibly illegal and dangerous activities covertly. Reports of his influential leadership in the revival of nationalist organizations and in shady black-market transactions are both insistent and widespread. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0024, CIA, April 15, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

With the backing of the United States, Kodama re-established the military of Japan – an underground army of gangsters and guerrillas was established. A Washington Post article that was archived by the CIA reported:

After ... World War II, the Yakuza gangs were in almost total disarray. One development that helped them survive was [the] recruitment of gang members by US intelligence officers. The American authorities used Yakuza members to spy on and disrupt the supposedly leftist labor movement in Japan. Several incidents traced to Yakuza thugs in the pay of the US government were aimed at union members in Japan in the late 1940s and 1950s. (U.S. Blamed in Rise of Japanese Gangs, Washington Post, Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, June 11, 1986, p. 1. Document archived by the CIA) (IMG)

By March 1953, with the death of Stalin, the new Kremlin Titoist rulers reduced pressure on the Japanese fascists. This resulted in the elevation of the Kodama faction in Japan. The CIA reported

By March 1953 Kodama was described as having regained the ground lost after the war and to be once again the undisputed leader of the Japanese right, a position which he still holds, according to various sources. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0001, Yoshio Kodama, CIA, p. 2) (IMG{East Asia})

By the time the Washington Post article was written:

The Yakuza number[ed] about 110,000, and the 2,500 individual gangs are organized into 83 groupings. (Narcotics Review, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, June 1984, p. 2) (IMG)

The Yakuza was the Japanese fascist army of terror performing the function similar to the Gladio networks in Europe and the Schnez Truppe in Germany. As an example of their barbarity, they cut their members' fingers for slight deviation from the line of the Yakuza godfather. Many were pressured to belong to this network of crime syndicates. The United States, honoring its alliance with Imperial Japan, fostered the narco-terrorist networks upon which the Co-Prosperty Sphere had thrived. Finally, in 1952, and once again with the backing of US intelligence, the Japanese war criminals banded together to form the Japanese intelligence service, known as the 'Public Safety Investigation Agency' (PSIA):

The only investigative service, as such, which evolved within the Japanese Government during this period was the Special Investigation Board created under SCAP directive and influence within the Attorney General's Office. The main cadre of this organization came, not from trained military or foreign intelligence ranks, but from among the procurators of the prewar Justice Ministry. In this context of judicial investigation the Special Investigation Board was able to don a mantle of respectability which permitted its survival and indeed growth as a security agency with some intelligence and gray propaganda functions. A few of the mainland operatives of the tokumu kikan [Japanese intelligence service during WWII], mostly from the China theater, joined this service, which emerged in a sovereign Japan in 1952 as the Public Safety (chian) Investigation Agency, taking on as well some senior military intelligence analysts who at last were no longer proscribed from such duty by the purge. (Intelligence in the New Japan, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Studies Archive Indexes, Vol 7, No. 3, APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994, CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, CIA, September 18, 1995) (IMG)

C18S5. The Korean Resistance During the Great Patriotic War / Roosevelt's Plans for Korea / Soviet Industrial Aid to North Korea / The North Korea System / South Korea Invasion of North Korea / US Bombs Soviet Air Bases in the Far East

*** IMG-All-{Korea}

A document by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the US Army stated:

The origins of the KPA are a fusion of Koreans fighting in China for the Chinese Revolution and against Japanese aggression (Yanan faction); the Koreans fighting the Japanese in Manchuria under the control of the Soviets (Kaspan faction); and the Koreans fighting Japanese colonialism on the Korean peninsula as well as each other for control in Korea after the Korean War.

The birth of the KPA can be established probably in 1936 when the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association (KFRA) was established to create a united front organization of anti-Japanese Koreans operating in Manchuria. On June 4, 1937, Kim Il Sung led a small group of partisans subordinate to the KFRA on a raid against a small border village in Korea and defeated a small Japanese police detachment.

This much celebrated victory subsequently became the source of the Kaspan faction's name and the beginning of Kim Il Sung's legendary military career.

In 1939, the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) was formed in Yanan, China, to support Mao Zedong and fought with the Chinese Communist forces in World War II and the Chinese Revolution.⁶⁸ In April 1946, the KVA was absorbed by various area commands which ultimately evolved into the newly forming Korean Peace Preservation Corps moving into northern Korea. Eventually, even this Corps was diluted by further officer transfers and reorganizations and eventually passed out of existence. However, the legacy and history of the KVA continued to be used probably for security and morale reasons.

In 1942, Kim Il Sung commanded a company of the Soviet Far East Command's Reconnaissance Bureau's 88th Special Independent Sniper Brigade and received a significant amount of training and experience in his future development of special purpose forces for the KPA.

(“North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles”, Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Andrew Scobell, John M. Sanford, April 2007, pp. 17-18) (IMG)

The Yanan fraction actually did not contribute much to the revolutionary struggles of the Korean people but nonetheless aimed to steal the credit at the expense of the Kim faction.

The SSI document also stated:

But more important are the distinctly Korean Partisan characteristics that emerged from the guerrilla origins of the armed band led by Kim Il Sung in Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s (see “Origins and Evolution” in the Conventional Forces section). Indeed, psychologically, the KPA is very much an indigenous force that considers itself to be heir to the tradition of Kim Il Sung's Partisans. Officially, the KPA traces its roots back to the band of communist fighters founded by Kim on April 25, 1932. (“North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles”, Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Andrew Scobell, John M. Sanford, April 2007, p. 7) (IMG)

In Korea, Imperial Japan had installed collaborationist structures, as part of its ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’. The advance of proletarian power in East Asia yielded the decline of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, forcing the Japanese Imperial heartland and its helpers into a unique alliance with the United States, in which of course the latter held the upper hand.

During the Great Patriotic War, President Roosevelt wanted a multilateral trusteeship over the Korean Peninsula and to pave the way for democratic development there. A book written with the support of the US Library of Congress's Federal Research Division reported:

The United States took the initiative in big power deliberations on Korea during World War II, suggesting a multilateral trusteeship for postwar Korea to the British in March 1943, and to the Soviet leaders at the end of the same year. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, concerned about the disposition of enemy-held colonial territories and aware of colonial demands for independence, sought a gradualist, tutelary policy of preparing former colonials--such as the Koreans--for self-government and independence. At the Cairo Conference in December 1943, the Allies, under United States urging, declared that after Japan was defeated Korea would become independent "in due course," a phrase consistent with Roosevelt's ideas. At about the same time, planners in the United States Department of State reversed the traditional United States policy of noninvolvement in Korea by defining the security of the peninsula as important to the security of the postwar Pacific, which was, in turn, very important to American security. (‘North Korea: A Country Study’, edited by and written with the help of: the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

However, the pro-Axis Truman Administration completely reversed such a decision. Disbanding the idea of a joint trusteeship:

At a midnight meeting in Washington on August 10 and 11, 1945, War Department officials, including John J. McCloy and Dean Rusk, decided to make the thirty-eighth parallel the dividing line between the Soviet and United States zones in Korea. Neither the Soviet forces nor the Koreans were consulted. As a result, when 25,000 American soldiers occupied southern Korea in early September 1945, they found themselves up against a strong Korean impulse for independence and for thorough reform of colonial legacies. By and large, Koreans wished to solve their problems themselves and resented any inference that they were not ready for self-government. (‘North Korea: A Country Study’, edited by and written with the help of: the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

Nonetheless, respecting the Soviet agreement with Roosevelt era USA, the Soviets tacitly supported the rise of a non - communist anti-fascist leader in North Korea for the first few months:

From August 1945 until January 1946, Soviet forces worked with a coalition of communists and nationalists led by a Christian educator named Cho Man-sik. (...). The Soviets did not set up a central administration, nor did they establish an army. In retrospect their policy was more tentative and reactive than American policy in South Korea, which moved forward with plans for a separate administration and army. In general, Soviet power in the Asia-Pacific region was flexible and resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria in early 1946. (‘North Korea: A Country Study’, edited by and written with the help of: the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

However, the US regime went further in betraying the agreements made by its former, Soviet-friendly President Roosevelt. The US also renounced Roosevelt's line which had supported democratic development. Instead, the Americans went for a fascist military dictatorship in the South. This was clearly reflected in the attitudes of the US and USSR with regards to the Korean people's committees. A US intelligence report stated:

The contradiction between the US and Soviet political ideologies has again been illustrated in Korea where the application of opposing policies to similar situations at the beginning of the occupation had added significance because forty years of Japanese rule had done nothing to prepare the Korean people for self-government. On their arrival in Korea, the US and Soviet forces both found that local politically conscious Koreans ... had formed People's Committees during the interim between the surrender of Japan and the beginning of the occupation. The Soviet forces, which arrived first, at once recognized the People's Committees north of the 38th parallel as the legitimate interim representatives of the Korean people. The US forces on the other hand refused to commit themselves to support in advance the claims of any one group to rule Korea. General Hodge accordingly refused to recognize the so-called People's Republic, which had been elected by the People's Committees on 6 September 1945, except as another political party. (KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), January 2, 1948, p. I-4) (IMG)

Regarding the Korean people in general (and not necessarily just South Koreans), the US intelligence's Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE) admitted:

a socialistic program is favored by the large majority of Koreans (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

A socialistic program – the will of the Korean people – was implemented in North Korea. The US intelligence's Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE) reported:

revolutionary changes have in fact taken place under Soviet rule. Korean and Japanese landowners have been liquidated as a class, and the traditional system of land tenure, which the Japanese exploited, has been abolished. The Soviets boast that one million hectares (12,471,000 acres) of land have been distributed free of charge to the tenants. Banking, communications, and transportation, as well as heavy industry, are all controlled by the people's committees. In other words, all enterprises susceptible of immediate socialization have been taken over by the state. Private enterprise survives only among small producers, such as artisans and farmers. (...). Child labor has been prohibited, and equal rights, both political and economic, have been given to women. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

And:

The economy of North Korea has also been reorganized on the principles of regimentation and indirect control. With approximately one-third of the total population of Korea and 35% of the total food production, the Soviet Zone is agriculturally self-supporting. Korean mining, electric power, and heavy industry are, moreover, concentrated north of the 38th parallel. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

By 1947, the economy of North Korea was reconstructed:

The economy of North Korea has also been reconstructed on the principle of state control. Banking, heavy industry and communications have all been nationalized. The land has been redistributed, and private enterprise survives chiefly in agriculture and handicrafts. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Against the myth that the USSR sought to keep North Korea backwards so to easily 'colonize' it, the US intelligence admitted:

Soviet policy in Korea is directed toward the establishment of a friendly state which will never serve as a base of attack upon the In order to attain this objective at a minimum cost, to its scanty resources in the Far East, the USSR has attempted to make North Korea economically self-sufficient.. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Pauley report, which was the official report of the US government on the Soviet treatment of industrial infrastructure in areas formerly occupied by Japan, backed up the above fact. The US intelligence's Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE) reported:

After inspecting of the industrial areas of the Soviet Zone, Ambassador Pauley concluded that only minor items of equipment had been removed from North Korea. It seems therefore that the USSR intends to preserve the industrial potential and build up the economic self-sufficiency of its zone.(THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Contrast North Korea with South Korea. Commenting on the political attitudes of the South Koreans toward the policies of the Soviet zone, the document further admitted:

There is no doubt of the propaganda value of the Soviet program, especially in the US Zone. Almost all Koreans are leftists by current US standards.. The socialization of basic industries and the redistribution of land figure in the political platform of every party in South Korea. Soviet policies might therefore be expected to have great popular appeal in Korea. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

And:

Communism and Soviet ascendancy are in fact the main issues between the parties of the left and the right in South Korea, where freedom of expression prevails in spite of occasional and temporary restrictions on the press. The leftist parties in South Korea are in general sympathetic, while the rightist parties are opposed to the Soviet regime. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

The Korean people were ideologically socialist or socialist-leaning and the socialist or socialist-leaning parties in Korea were sympathetic to the USSR. The system in North Korea was also highly attractive to the people of South Korea, a 'socialistic program' was favored by the majority of Koreans in general, and the communist party in South Korea drew much support from workers, peasants and students. The US intelligence, while continuing to show disbelief in the popularity of communism in Korea, nonetheless acknowledged the:

lack of evidence ... that the Soviet program [in North Korea] has not won the support of the people. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

Regarding South Korea, as confirmed by a document by the Headquarters of the US Department of the Army:

The Korean Communist Party, resuscitated in October [1945], ... quickly built a substantial following among the workers, farmers, and students. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 23) (IMG)

South Korea's communist party, as the leading anti-fascist resistance force, established popular committees throughout Korea, that led to the establishment of the Central People's Committee and the Korean People's Republic. The people's committees, which were – as admitted by the document by the US Library of Congress's Federal Research Division – rose and grew as a homegrown indigenous movement were regarded as a threat by the American occupiers:

The Korean Communist Party ... had been a major force behind the Central People's Committee.. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 23) (IMG)

Before United States forces had landed in Korea in September 1945, the Koreans had established self-governing bodies, or people's committees. The leaders of these committees had organized the Central People's Committee, which proclaimed the establishment of the "Korean People's Republic" on September 6, 1945. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, edited by Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, 1992, p. 27) (IMG)

The United States military command, along with emissaries dispatched from Washington, tended to interpret resistance to United States desires in the south as radical and pro-Soviet. When Korean resistance leaders set up an interim "people's republic" and people's committees throughout southern Korea in September 1945, the United States saw this fundamentally indigenous movement as part of a Soviet master plan to dominate all of Korea. ('North Korea: A Country Study', edited by and written with the help of: the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

In response to the homegrown formation of the people's committees, the US – betraying the goals and promises of former President Roosevelt – decided to destroy such democratic institutions, institutions which would have no doubt benefited the communists since the Korean people were sympathetic to communism. Instead, the US callously imposed military rule over the southern zone of Korea:

The military government that administered the American-occupied zone proceeded to disband the local people's committees and impose direct rule, assigning military personnel who lacked language skills and knowledge of Korea as governors at various levels. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, edited by Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, 1992, p. 27) (IMG)

Instead:

By early 1946 the military government had come to rely heavily on the advice and counsel of ideologically conservative elements, including landlords and other propertied persons. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 23)

(IMG)

the initially warm welcome to United States troops as liberators cooled. By early 1946, the United States Army military government had come to rely heavily on the advice and counsel of ideologically conservative elements, including landlords and other propertied persons. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, edited by Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, 1992, p. 28) (IMG)

In addition:

the US Military Government furthermore made ... use of the Japanese officials at the beginning of the occupation, [hence] the various Korean factions convinced themselves that they had a legitimate grievance against the US. (KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), January 2, 1948, p. I-5) (IMG)

As such:

Once the United States occupation force chose to bolster the status quo and resist radical reform of colonial legacies, it immediately ran into monumental opposition to its policies from the majority of South Koreans. The United States Army Military Government in Korea (1945-48) spent most of its first year suppressing the many people's committees that had emerged in the provinces. This action provoked a massive rebellion in the fall of 1946; after the rebellion was suppressed, radical activists developed a significant guerrilla movement in 1948 and 1949. Activists also touched off a major rebellion at the port of Ysu in South Korea in October 1948. Much of this disorder resulted from unresolved land problem caused by conservative landed factions who used their bureaucratic power to block redistribution of land to peasant tenants. ('North Korea: A Country Study', edited by and written with the help of: the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

These circumstances had thrown South Korea's economy into complete chaos. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 24) (IMG)

The social unrest created by these developments can be easily surmised. By 1947 only about half the labor force of 10 million was engaged in gainful employment. Labor strikes and work stoppages were a recurrent phenomena, and demonstrations the United States and the policies of its military government drew large crowds. Temporary stoppages of electricity supply from the northern areas in the early part of 1946 and late 1947 plunged the southern region into on each occasion, deepening the gloom among the populace. A vast majority of the disillusioned and disconcerted people paid keen attention to political leaders of various persuasions who offered alternative ways of solving the Korean problem. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

The phony "democratic" institutions set up by the USA's fascist military occupation in South Korea were ignored by the communist-led popular front of progressive parties:

In December 1946 the military government established the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly to formulate draft laws to be used as "the basis for political, economic and social reforms." South Korea's problems, however, required solutions at a much higher plane. The left-wing political groups, consolidated under the rubric of the South Korean Workers' Party, ignored the assembly. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 23) (IMG)

Surely, due to the conditions of war, the economic conditions of South Korea were originally poorer than those of North Korea in some respects. However, the problems in South Korea had solutions, and part of the solution was the abolition of feudalism, recognition of indigenous institutions, the purge of the Japanese fascists and Korean collaborationist officials that were corrupting South Korea, the elimination of the fascist police and its replacement with an anti-fascist police, the establishment of scientific central planning with heavy industry development, etc. None of such institutions were established in South Korea, unlike in the North, a critically important fact which contributed to the widespread unrest in the South, unlike in the North.

Around four months after Japanese surrender, noted William J. Webb of the US Army Center for Military History, Washington initiated the expansion of the South Korean fascist army military capabilities:

Attempts to build a ... defense force in South Korea began shortly after the end of World War II. In January 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General MacArthur to form a Korean police force and, despite problems with equipment and training, the Korean Constabulary grew to 20,000 men by the close of 1947. ('The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950', US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6) (IMG)

Describing the reign of terror by which the South Korean people were suffering and against which the South Korean people supported the communist movement, the US intelligence reported:

The apparent failure of the South Korean Communists to produce a political crisis is hardly surprising and should not be taken as a South Korean "vote of confidence" in US Military Government. On the contrary, the results

thus far achieved appear quite remarkable when it is considered that the Communist organization in the US Zone, since August, 1947, has been subject to all the repressive forces that could be mobilized against the rightist police and fanatically rightist youth groups. That it has been able to achieve even the present dislocation of economic and political life in South Korea on the basis of completely clandestine organization, is not so much due to the skill of the Communist organizers as to the fact that they were sowing fertile soil. The Communists have been able to appeal to the traditional Korean hatred of the rightist police force – a hatred which is unfortunately largely justified. Moreover they have been able to call attention to the inequities in the South Korean economy, namely: the failure to enact a land reform law and the galloping cost of living index. While it is true that both of these latter situations are partially attributable to the lack of certainty concerning South Korea's political future, the fact remains that as long as this situation continues, the South Korean Communists will have the capability of provoking public disorders whenever the need arises. (Intelligence Highlights – Week of 3 February – 9 February 1948, Office of Reports and Estimates, CIA, p. 4) (IMG)

Struck in fear, and determined to wipe out the Korean people's revolutionary threat, the leaders in Washington: asked MacArthur about the advisability of creating a South Korean army. MacArthur proposed instead in February 1948 an increase of the Constabulary to 50,000 men. ('The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950', US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6, underline added) (IMG)

The Americans helped South Korea to expand its repressive police force against to the popular revolutionary aspirations of the Korean people.

The South Korean Regime fostered 'March North for Unification' (Korean: 'Pukchin Tongil' or 'Pukjin Tongil') as its official slogan; it called for a Southern invasion of the North:

[T]he Rhee regime insisted on its northward marching policy of unification (Pukchin Tongil).. (Korean Studies Information Service System, Sun Won Park, 2017) (IMG)

A July 1949 CIA report stated that several high-ranking South Korean officers were fanatically pushing for war against North Korea:

In a recent discussion concerning the defense of the Republic of Korea. CH'AE Pyung-tuk, Chief of Staff, Korean Army, stated that his interest in defensive plans is only secondary; his primary interest is in attacking North Korea as soon as possible. CH'AE and several staff officers spoke at length of the necessity of obtaining additional arms for the defense of South Korea, but admitted frankly that their personal intent is to establish an army sufficiently strong to invade North Korea before reinforcements from Manchuria and China bolster the North Korean People's Army and security forces. (DESIRE OF HIGH-RANKING KOREAN ARMY OFFICERS FOR AN INVASION OF NORTH KOREA, CIA, July 7, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

As another example, Shin Sung-Mo was:

the 2nd Defense Minister of the Syngman Rhee government in 1949. During a July 17, 1949 speech, Shin stated that the ROK Army could occupy Pyongyang or Wonsan in North Korea in one day if were President Rhee to give the order. (Origins of the North Korean Garrison State: The People's Army and the Korean War, Routledge, Youngjun Kim, 2018) (IMG)

As such, the United States deployed the KMAG to South Korea in order provide more training and logistics for the South Korean military:

[T]he Provisional Military Advisory Group established by MacArthur in August 1948 was redesignated in July 1949 the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) and authorized 472 soldiers ('The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950', US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6, underline added) (IMG)

As early as November 1948:

South Korea [had] passed the Armed Forces Organization Act, which created a department of national defense. By March 1949 the South had converted its Constabulary brigades into an Army of 65,000 men assigned to eight tactical divisions – the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital Divisions. In June 1950 the ROK armed forces consisted of the following: Army, 94,808; Coast Guard, 6,145; Air Force, 1,865; and National Police, 48,273. ('The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950', US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6, underline added) (IMG)

Up in the North, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea developed its military as well:

The North Korean People's Army was officially activated in February 1948. ('The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950', US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 7) (IMG)

Immediately, the USSR began supplying extensive military support for the Democratic People's Republic in the North: 150 Soviets [advisors] were assigned to each division; the number dropped to 20 per division in 1949 and to a

lesser number [of Soviet advisors] by 1950 as trusted North Korean officers were developed. By June 1950 the NKPA and the Border Constabulary numbered about 135,000. The primary tactical units consisted of eight full-strength infantry divisions of 11,000 men each, two more infantry divisions at half strength, a separate infantry regiment, a motorcycle-reconnaissance regiment, and an armored brigade. The NKPA benefited from some 20,000 North Koreans who were veterans of the Chinese civil war of the late 1940s, which gave its units a combat-hardened quality and efficiency. The Soviet Union supplied much of the materiel for the NKPA. Of primary importance was the T-34 medium tank, a mainstay of the Soviet armored force in World War II that weighed 32 tons and mounted an 85- mm. gun. The Soviets also supplied artillery support that resembled the weaponry of the older Soviet division of World War II: 76-mm. and 122-mm. howitzers, 45-mm. antitank guns, and 82-mm. and 120-mm. mortars. At the outset of the war North Korea had about 180 Soviet aircraft-60 YAK trainers, 40 YAK fighters, 70 attack bombers, and 10 reconnaissance planes. Like the ROK Navy, the North Korean naval forces had only a few small vessels – sixteen patrol craft and several coastal steamers. ('The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950', US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 7) (IMG)

The Democratic People's Republic's military expansion was for **defensive** purposes only. The Democratic People's Republic had no intent on aggressing the fascist South. On July 27, 1949, the CIA reported:

North Korean military forces are at present deployed in depth in defense against a possible invasion by forces from South Korea. The 38th parallel itself is lightly held, with regimental reserves of the North Korean People's Army held in an area twenty to thirty kilometers north of the border.

The reserves of two divisions of the People's Army charged with the defense of the 38th parallel are stationed from thirty to sixty miles north of the border. National reserves are being retained in the Hamhung (127-32, 39-54) and Nanam (129-41, 41-42) areas.

This defense plan has been prescribed by Soviet military advisers to the North Korean government.

(NORTH KOREAN DEFENSES AGAINST AN INVASION FROM SOUTH KOREA, CIA, July 27, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

By contrast, the South Korean leaders found it increasingly difficult to control their lust for invading the North. For instance:

[T]he old nationalist [Syngman Rhee] also promoted a counterproductive approach during 1949. He openly promoted a plan for unification by invading North Korea. (American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882-1950, Kim Seung-Young, p. 188) (IMG)

The Rhee gang's lust for an invasion against the North should not be regarded as being in contradiction in the slightest to the American finance capital's lust for an invasion. The Americans merely pretended to be more moderate than the South Korean fascists. The South Korean President:

assertively raised this option of invading North Korea when the US Secretary of the Army, Royal, visited Seoul on February 8, 1949. Royal had to restrain him by clarifying that no invasion would be allowed as long as US combat forces remained in Korea. (American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882-1950, Kim Seung-Young, p. 188) (IMG)

Indeed, only when the Americans would *officially* 'leave' the South was the South allowed invade the North. The Soviets and North Koreans made note of this:

I report the results of the investigation I have organized of the information about the preparation for the withdrawal of American troops and the preparations of the South Korean army for an attack on North Korea.. (Telegram from Shtykov on Preparations for an Attack on North Korea, Wilson Center, May 2, 1949) (IMG)

Then:

In September 1949, [General Shin] argued that the ROK Army was ready for war and had been waiting for a war. (Origins of the North Korean Garrison State: The People's Army and the Korean War, Routledge, Youngjun Kim, 2018) (IMG)

Only two months later, the South Korean press published an article – which was reprinted by the CIA – titled 'Hypothetical Invasion of North Korea', describing South Korea's plan for invading the north:

Many attempts have been made to effect the unification of North and South Korea, but all have failed miserably. The only way to erase the division at the 38th Parallel is the use of force. We, therefore, propose to discuss a hypothetical invasion of North Korea as follows:

First Stage – Occupation of Pyongyang in Three Days

Our crack troops can occupy Haeju the first day and then advance on Sariwon. Guarding the border in the Kangwondo area presents no problem because of the characteristic terrain of that territory.

(Hypothetical Invasion of North Korea, original source: Ibuk Tongsin, reprinted in CIA, date of information: December 1949, date of distribution: January 26, 1950, p. 1. Underline original. Bold added.) (IMG)

Wary of this fact, the North ramped up its **defenses** against what a January 1950 CIA report rightly called the ‘**offensively minded South**’:

The continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People’s Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel probably constitutes a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army. (Korea: Troop Build Up, CIA, January 13, 1950, p. 11) (IMG)

Two months later, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea received even more military equipment from the Soviet Union. In a letter to Kim, Stalin said:

I have also received your proposal of 9 March about the delivery to you of arms, ammunition and technical equipment for the people’s army of Korea. The Soviet government has decided also to satisfy fully this request of yours. (Message, Stalin to Kim Il Sung (Via Shtykov), March 18, 1950, Wilson Center) (IMG)

On June 19th, 1950, John Foster Dulles traveled to South Korea and gave a historic speech, excerpts of which are as follows:

Already, the United States has twice intervened with armed might in defense of freedom.. (...). Today, the Korean people are in the front line of freedom, under conditions that are both dangerous and exciting. (...). The American people give you their support, both moral and material.. (Department of State Bulletin, The Korean Experiment in Representative Government Statement, John Foster Dulles Consultant to the Secretary, June 19, 1950, published in Department of State Bulletin, pp. 12-13. Underline added.) (IMG)

The significance of the speech is that it was timed to be approximately when the South Korean Regime, waiting for war, had placed its troops on the North Korean border. According to Webb:

In the early summer [i.e. the latter half of June] of 1950 four ROK divisions held positions along the 38th Parallel: the 1st, 6th, 7th, and 8th. (‘The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950’, US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6) (IMG)

The speech by Dulles was a ‘moral support’ for the South Korean troops that ‘with armed might’ were ‘in the frontline’ of the coming offensive war for the ‘defense of freedom’.

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out.

John Gunther was the biographer of General McArthur, the American Commander who would lead the Anglo-American forces during the Korean War. In his biography of McArthur, Gunther recalled:

Getting into the station and aboard the coaches hitched on to the regular north-bound train was a picturesque experience, because we used the special entrance reserved for the Emperor. A long, tattered, literally red carpet covered the underground passageway, and a covey of little Japanese officials in shabby uniforms bowed and scraped and squirmed as we climbed in. Two important members of the [US military] occupation [of Japan] were with us. Just before lunch at Nikko, and after we had visited a temple which is one of the most ornately spectacular sights in the world, one of these [important members of the US military occupation] was called unexpectedly to the telephone. He came back and whispered, ‘A big story has just broken. The South Koreans have attacked North Korea!’ (The Riddle of McArthur, 1951, John Gunther, p. 150. Bold added) (IMG)

The UN – which the imperialist press depicts as a ‘neutral’ ‘impartial’ body even though at the time, it was largely boycotted by the USSR and its allies, and overwhelmingly represented by countries and neo-colonies of the Western camp – was quick to blame North Korea as the aggressor.

When the ‘news’ of the ‘North Korean invasion of the South’ emerged, even the US Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson doubted the accuracy of the report, believing that a North Korean invasion of the South was not imminent:

Returning to Washington, DC, on June 24, Johnson believed that things were going well in the Pacific [for the South Koreans who were going to invade the North]. At 10:00 p.m., a reporter asked Johnson if he had heard that forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) had attacked the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Johnson received a report about the invasion from a Pentagon duty officer but **was unsure of its accuracy because Far East briefings had not suggested that such an attack was imminent.**

(The Encyclopedia of the Korean War, Spencer Tucker, Paul Pierpaoli, p. 383. Bold added) (IMG)

I shall remind that the South Korean press article titled ‘Hypothetical [South Korean] **Invasion** of North Korea’ called, first, for a takeover of the city of ‘**Haeju** the first day and then advance’ forward. On June 26, 1950, as planned, that is precisely what occurred. The South Korean Regime itself confessed that Haeju had been taken over by the South Korean Army. The US Far East Command agreed with this report. Despite believing that the South Korean and American report on the seizure of Haeju was incorrect, the military scholar Kim Jungsoo of the US Naval Postgraduate School nevertheless points out:

On 26 June 1950, the Defense Ministry of South Korea made a wrong announcement that Haeju was occupied by the South Korean Army and the United States Far East Command believed that the South Korean Army had taken Haeju on 28 June 1950. (THE PROACTIVE GRAND STRATEGY FOR CONSENSUAL AND PEACEFUL KOREAN UNIFICATION, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California Thesis, published in:

DTIC, Kim Jungsoo, March 2007, p. 12) (IMG)

In addition to the great volumes of aid which the Soviets provided for the Korean troops, the USSR also provided military and economic aid to the Chinese forces in the War:

In the Far East, the Soviet Union ... extended economic and military aid to the Chinese "volunteers" in the Korean War, but avoided direct involvement in the conflict. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The Soviets also launched a peace offensive so to expose the Anglo-American unwillingness to pursue peace:

The impetus for the initiation of armistice negotiations came from the Soviet camp. At this time it is not clear whether the USSR really wants to bring about an armistice, or whether it merely wants to gain time to supply Communist China with weapons, ammunitions, military equipment, and economic goods; or to exert pressure toward the achievement of its political aims. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

In the year 1950, the United States military launched a major assault on the Soviet air bases in the Far East, severely devastating the Soviet aerial combat forces in that area. Subsequently, the United States denounced its own military operation by claiming that it was conducted by a rogue officer, rather than on the orders of someone in US high command. Having denounced the military operation, the US government faked a 'trial' of the supposedly-'rogue' officers involved, made sure that the 'rogue' officers would be counted 'not guilty' on the charges against them, promoted them to other prominent military positions, while pretending to have punished them all. Alton Quanbeck described the story of the attack in the 1990 article for the Washington Post. In 1990, the Washington Post published an article by:

Alton Quanbeck, [who] after 22 years in the Air Force, worked for the Brookings Institution, the Senate Intelligence Committee and the CIA. (My Brief War with Russia, Washington Post, Alton H. Quanbeck, March 4, 1990) (IMG)

Quanbeck wrote:

We were skimming the tops of clouds at 37,000 feet when I decided to start our letdown into the target, 10 minutes earlier than planned. We armed our .50-caliber machine guns in preparation for action.

It was Oct. 8, 1950, early in the Korean War, and two of us -- myself and my wingman, Al Diefendorf -- were on a mission over North Korea. Only later did we learn that we had strayed and were, in fact, a few miles inside the Soviet Union.

At 10,000 feet I spotted a small hole through the clouds. We dropped our F-80s in tight circles through the opening and found ourselves above a broad river valley with mountains on each side. Following the river, I proceeded southeast, a heading which I thought would bring us directly to the coastline and well away from the Chinese and Soviet borders.

In the days preceding this mission, signs of the enemy had been scarce, so I was surprised when I saw flashes of anti-aircraft fire from the top of a two-story building in a small town about 500 yards off our right wing. I alerted Diefendorf.

About 20 seconds later I spotted a truck heading west on a dirt road. "Let's go in and get it," Dief said.

An instant later, he shouted, "Look at the airfield, it's loaded!"

It was the kind of target that fighter pilots dream about. Parked in two rows were about 20 aircraft of the P-39 or P-63 type. Thousands of them were built and flown by Americans in World War II, and some were sent to our Soviet ally. Those below us had large red stars surrounded by a narrow white border painted on the side of their dark brown fuselages.

I had only seconds to make a decision. At our speed, the airfield would soon pass beneath us unless I positioned us for an attack. We were also nearing minimum fuel. Our low altitude and the low hanging clouds prevented me from seeing more than a mile or two in any direction. Even if I could have identified distinctive terrain features, it was unlikely I could have related them to the crude maps I carried on the mission.

What made me decide to attack? First, we had had intelligence reports of an expected movement of aircraft down the northeast coast of Korea; second, the planes' markings were nearly identical

to those used by the North Koreans; third, I had used caution in my dead-reckoning navigation so as to hit the coast well south of Soviet borders. More important, they had shot at us first.

Two uncertainties bothered me. First, P-39 type aircraft had never been seen before in North Korea, and secondly, I was not certain where we were. Our target was an airfield at Chongjin on the far northeast coast of the Korean Peninsula, some 430 miles north-northeast of our base at Taegu Air Field in South Korea and only 40 miles south of the Chinese border and 60 miles southwest of the Soviet border. The airfield below didn't match the description of the one at Chongjin, which was reported to have a hard surface.

But I did not hesitate. We went in for the attack.

In our intelligence debriefing later, we claimed one aircraft destroyed and two damaged. We were conservative. Several months later an intelligence officer assigned to Far East Air Force Headquarters told me

"the airfield burned for a week." The aircraft we saw burn must have triggered a series of secondary explosions which reached the other planes. The attack quickly had international repercussions. **The Soviet government protested in the United Nations and the United States admitted responsibility. The story was front-page news but it soon became clear that both governments preferred to forget the matter, each for its own reasons. Nonetheless, some historians believe the mission profoundly affected the behavior of the Soviet leaders toward their Korean allies at a critical time.**

(My Brief War with Russia, Washington Post, Alton H. Quanbeck, March 4, 1990. Bold added.) (IMG)

According to Mikhail Poltoranin, the former head of the KGB Archives during the Yeltsin Administration: F-80 group attacked our Naval bases. (...). They bombed 5 of our bases... (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s – Top Russian Official (Video – Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

They destroyed:

a hundred and three aircraft. (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s – Top Russian Official (Video – Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

Four fighter jets. (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s – Top Russian Official (Video – Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

Quanbeck continued:

By early October 1950, MacArthur had enveloped the North Koreans with his amphibious landings at Inchon and the breakout from the Pusan perimeter to the south and was driving north across the 38th Parallel dividing the two Koreas. The People's Republic of China reacted by mobilizing its Manchurian army and committing it to attack across the Yalu River into North Korea as the U.N. forces approached. **Stalin was concerned not only with the possible defeat** of his North Korean surrogates but also with the prospect that U.N. forces could soon be located near the Soviets' 15-mile-long border with North Korea. Stalin had to decide whether to intervene actively.

As I sat in the briefing tent of the 49th Fighter Group at Taegu, I was little concerned with these questions. I was being briefed for an armed reconnaissance flight over Chongjin. Our group had flown a mission there the previous day but couldn't find the airfield. Another flight had reconnoitered Chongjin in that morning but found no activity. Chongjin received all this attention because our intelligence reported 200 North Korean pilots training in the northeast part of Korea, close to the border.

We were briefed about an hour before takeoff. The briefing officer didn't have much to show us, only a target folder and messages reporting the negative results of the earlier flights. During that stage of the Korean War, photographs or detailed maps of the target areas were not available.

Since we had to fly practically the entire mission without reference to the ground, and since there were no radio navigational aids along the entire flight path, our heading after takeoff and the time of flight would determine our letdown into the target area. A dominant factor was the forecast winds, especially at high altitudes where they were usually strongest. Unfortunately, the Soviets since mid-September had encoded all their weather reports, preventing us from knowing the weather over Siberia, north and west of Korea. The tops of the clouds rose along our path, so we climbed to 35,000 feet and later to 37,000 feet to stay above them. This caused our first deviation from the pre-flight plan.

Then, about 40 minutes after takeoff, flight leader Bud Evans called me on the radio and said his engine had thrown a blade from its exhaust turbine, forcing him to return to base. That was how Dief and I happened to be dropping through the clouds and going after those 20 planes sitting so invitingly on an airstrip somewhere near the Soviet-North Korean border.

I positioned our aircraft for a strafing pass on the northern line of aircraft, then made a sharp, banking turn to the left and fired on the southern line. I could see tracers carving through the aircraft and knew we were getting lots of hits, but there were no explosions. On my last pass, I decided to make sure of one clear kill. I concentrated my fire at one plane and saw it start to burn. Dief followed me closely in each pass. We exhausted our ammunition and were down to minimum fuel -- 400 gallons. Time to go home.

As I pulled off the target, turning right to our homeward course, I saw an island off the coast. "Oh, oh," I thought, "there's no island near Chongjin." After four minutes heading south, I could see a coastal point that matched the coastline at Chongjin. Now I was worried. Dief and I checked our maps and concluded we had struck an unimproved airfield shown at Rashin (now called Najin), 40 miles north of Chongjin and only 20 miles from the Russian border. I felt better.

That evening, after an initial debriefing and dinner, we were summoned to headquarters by Maj. Gen. Earl E. Partridge. I went over the mission completely. Then Partridge laid out a large map, pointed to an area inside the Soviet Union southwest of Vladivostok and asked if we could have attacked there. There were marked

similarities to the terrain features we had described at Rashin. It was possible, but certainly not probable. I thought to myself, "My God, the wind would have to be much stronger than we expected to blow us way up there."

(I later figured the winds must have blown from 240 (from the southwest) at 200 miles per hour, twice as strong as predicted and 90 off the direction predicted by our weather forecasters. At that time, such high speeds of winds aloft were poorly understood. Only two months later I flew an F-80 westward over southern Japan with a ground speed of over 600 mph, which translates as a 200-mph tail wind.)

As we were leaving, Partridge said gently, and with some affection, "You'll get either a Distinguished Service Cross or a court martial out of this mission."

Dief met me when I returned from a mission the next day. His succinct words were: "It's hit the fan." Soon the game was to be played at high levels. Dief and I became pawns as the big boys took over. The headline of the San Francisco Chronicle for Oct. 10, 1950 read: "Moscow Says U.S. Jets Strafed Russian Airfield." From The Washington Post: "U.S. Raid on Soviet Plane Base Charged"

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko delivered the Soviet protest on Oct. 9:

"On October 8 at 16 hours 17 minutes local time two fighter planes of the U.S.A. Air Force of the type Shooting Star F-80 grossly violated the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. and, approaching in a hedge-hopping flight the Soviet aerodrome situated on the seacoast in the Sukhaya Rechka area, 100 kilometers from the Soviet-Korean frontier, fired at the aerodrome with machine guns. As a result of the firing, damage was caused to property of the aerodrome."

To the Soviets, the mission was a surprising and confusing violation of their territory and frustrating evidence of their vulnerability.

Soviet radar probably picked up our F-80's about 100 miles from the Soviet border, then tracked us through the descent and lost us in ground clutter when we dropped into the river valley. A general alarm went out, but the Soviets had no aircraft, guns or missiles to meet the attack. Besides, it was Sunday afternoon; no one was around to do anything. To them, it was like Pearl Harbor, a dastardly sneak attack. The Oct. 8 incident forced Soviet leaders to recognize the vulnerability of their forces, especially in the east, and their inability to defend against the more modern, experienced U.S. Air Force. (...). On Oct. 19, Truman had Warren Austin, the chief American delegate to the U.N., admit the attack. His letter to U.N. Secretary Trygve Lie added: "The commander of the Air Force group has been relieved and appropriate steps have been taken with a view toward disciplinary actions against the two pilots concerned." Austin identified the pilots as 1st Lt. Alton H. Quanbeck and 1st Lt. Allen J. Diefendorf. In the meantime, Dief and I were in limbo. The Air Force's investigating officer, Maj. Harry W. Christian, discovered no physical evidence of a crime, and there were no gun-camera records because our base had run out of film. "There is no real evidence in this case," Christian concluded.

But because of the political pressures from Washington, the Air Force ignored his recommendations and scheduled our general court-martial for Nov. 18 in Nagoya, Japan. We were accused of violating an order to stay clear of the Manchurian (Chinese) border, of strafing Soviet territory (a "country at peace with the United States") and of violating an order to make no attack without positive identification.

Our attorney, Maj. Bernard Katz, argued that the government was trying to locate us "in Manchuria on one count and in Russia on another count" and added: "They did positively identify a target, and they strafed a target that they positively identified. They identified it as a North Korean airfield, on which was contained certain aircraft, bearing the mark of a star. They had been briefed that any aircraft marked with a star found in North Korea was good game"

Both of us were found not guilty of all charges. But the court martial was closed to the public, and the results were never released. Air Force leaders wanted the Russians, and probably President Truman, to believe we had been properly punished.

The Air Force would not permit Dief or me to fly any more combat missions, reasoning that we would be in jeopardy if we were shot down and captured. Instead, Dief was assigned to a fighter squadron in the Philippines, where his new bride could join him. **I was reassigned to a fighter-interceptor squadron in Japan, and then became aide-de-camp to Brig. Gen. Delmar T. Spivey, who had been present at our initial debriefing.** I finished up my tour as a combat crew instructor with F-84's back with the 49th Fighter Group.

(My Brief War with Russia, Washington Post, Alton H. Quanbeck, March 4, 1990. Bold added.) (IMG)

C18S6. Soviet Relations with India

*** IMG-All-{Soviet-India}

The hostility towards the Nehru faction in India is one of the many things that unites Maoists with the Anglo-American imperial enemies of the USSR. One of the myths promoted by the CIA-owned mainstream media, the Maoists,

and the Khrushchev supporters is that the Soviet alliance with India was initiated by Nikita Khrushchev and the Moscow-based Titoists. Actually, positive relations between the USSR and the Indian progressive bourgeois-democracy began during the Stalin era.

In his 1947 speech, Andrei Zhdanov famously listed India as one of the countries sympathetic to the USSR:

The anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. (Speech by Andrei Zhdanov (member of the Soviet Politburo) at the founding of the Cominform (a Communist International Organization) in September 1947, James Madison University) (IMG{Israel})

The following report by the CIA explains a large part of the matter:

Stalin welcomes Nehru's proposals

The Stalin-Nehru exchange of messages underscores the present Soviet tactic of promoting friendly official relations with India in an attempt to encourage Indian "neutrality" and to promote a rift between Indian and Western leaders. Since 14 January when Stalin, contrary to his usual custom, personally received the new Indian Ambassador, Soviet and Satellite diplomats have displayed especial cordiality to Indian officials both in Europe and in New Delhi.

An additional reason for Stalin's ready acceptance of Nehru's proposals is that Nehru advocated seating the Chinese Communists in the UN, a major Soviet objective, while avoiding any mention of the Security Council resolution on Korea. It has been alleged that Moscow requested Nehru to make his offer of mediation and suggested some points to be included. It is not surprising, therefore, that Nehru's appeal was warmly received by Stalin and hailed by Soviet propagandists as "backing the Soviet point of view without reservations."

Another development which may be calculated, at least in part, to conciliate Nehru is the recent change in Indian Communist Party policy. Abandoning its tactics of violence and sabotage, which have been roundly condemned by Nehru in India and on his tour of Southeast Asia, the Indian Communist Party announced on 19 July that it would concentrate on a united front "agrarian reform" movement. (SECRET)

(SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, CIA, July 20, 1950, p. 6) (IMG)

Another CIA report states:

Prime Minister Nehru's conduct of India's affairs is encountering strong opposition from both within and without the government. Deputy Prime Minister Patel, supported by a majority of the Cabinet, has become sharply critical of several major aspects of current Indian policy, reportedly charging that Nehru has: (1) tossed away the potential benefits of closer ties with the US and UK in the unrealistic hope that India might achieve lasting friendship with Communist China and the USSR as well; (2) ... frightened away foreign and domestic investors with the spectre of socialism at a time when India has urgent need of private investments above and beyond the funds the government itself can obtain. Meanwhile, Nehru is being pressed to take a more belligerent attitude toward by extremist anti-Moslem elements, notably in West Bengal and among the Sikh and Punjabi refugees. (WEEKLY SUMMARY #94, CIA, March 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

When Stalin died, Nehru stated the following:

Sir, I crave your indulgence at the commencement of the proceedings to refer to an event of which the House is no doubt aware. In the early hours of this morning Marshal Stalin passed away. Only two days ago, we had heard of this serious illness; only a fortnight or three weeks ago, our Ambassador in Moscow had met him and it so happened that just a few hours before the news of Marshal Stalin's serious illness came to us, I was reading a long report from our Ambassador about his interview with him. When we think of Marshal Stalin, all kinds of thoughts come to our minds, at least to my mind, and the panorama of history for the last 35 years passes before our eyes. All of us here are children of this age and have been affected by it in many ways. We have grown up not only participating in our struggles in this country but participating in another way with the mighty struggles that have taken place in this world, and been affected by them. And so looking back at these 35 years or so, many figures stand out, but perhaps no single figure has moulded and affected and influenced the history of these years more than Marshal Stalin. He became gradually almost a legendary figure, sometimes a man of mystery, at other times a person who had an intimate bond not with a few but with vast numbers of persons. He proved himself great in peace and in war. He showed an indomitable will and courage which few possess, but perhaps when history comes to be written many things will be said about him and I do not know what opinions, what varying opinions, subsequent generations may record, but every one will agree that here was a man of giant stature, a man such as few who had moulded the destinies of his age, a man – although he succeeded greatly in war – who ultimately would be remembered by the way he built up his great country. Again, people may agree or disagree with many things that he did or said, but the fact remains of his building up that great country, which was a

tremendous achievement, and in addition to that the remarkable fact, which can be said about very, very few persons, is that he was not only famous in his generation but as I referred to, he was in a sense 'intimate', if I may say so, with vast numbers of human beings, not only the vast numbers in the Soviet Union with whom he moved in an intimate way, in a friendly way, in an almost family way, if I may say so, but many others too outside who felt that way. I have known people who were associated with Marshal Stalin, who disagreed with him subsequently or who associated themselves with the work that Marshal Stalin did and then who subsequently disagreed with him and came and told me that while they disagreed with him, they felt a personal wrench because of a personal bond that has arisen between him and them, even though they had not come near him or had only seen him from a distance. So here was this man who created in his life-time this bond of affection and admiration among vast numbers of human beings, a man who has gone through this troubled period of history. He may in the opinion of some have made mistakes or succeeded – it is immaterial. But every one must necessarily agree about his giant stature and about his mighty achievements. So it is right that we should pay our tribute to him on this occasion because the occasion is not merely the passing away of a great figure but perhaps in a sense also a greater change, I mean in the sense of the ending of a certain era in history. Of course, history is continuous and it is rather absurd perhaps to divide it up in periods like this as historians and others seek to do; it goes on and on. Nevertheless there are periods which seem to end and take a fresh lease of life and undoubtedly when a very great man passes away who has embodied his age to a great extent, in a certain measure, there is the end of that particular period. I do not know what the future will hold, but undoubtedly even though Marshal Stalin has passed away, because of the great hold he had on peoples' minds and even hearts, his influence and memory will continue to exercise peoples' minds and inspire them. He has been described by many persons, including some who have been his great opponents in the world stage, and those descriptions vary and sometimes are contradictory. Some of them describe him as frank and even gentle person. Others describe him as hard and ruthless, and maybe he had all these feature in him. Anyhow a very great figure has passed away. He was, I believe, technically not the head of the Soviet State – we make reference to the passing of high dignitaries and especially heads of State – but Marshal Stalin was something much more than the head of a State. He was great in his own right way, whether he occupied the office or not. I believe that his influence was exercised generally in favour of peace. When war come he proved himself a very great warrior, but from all the information that we have had his influence had been in favour of peace. Even in these present days of trouble and conflict. I earnestly hope that his passing away will not mean that influence which was exercised in favour of peace is no longer to be availed of. Perhaps, if I may express the hope, this event may loosen all our minds a little from their rigidity in all countries, and that we may view the present problems of the world, not in that rigid way which develops, when people are continually in conflict and argument with each other, but in a somewhat more responsive and understanding way, so that his death may serve to bring us more to think of this troubled world, and to endeavour even more than before to secure peace in this world and to prevent any further disasters and catastrophes from occurring.

In fact, when our Ambassador saw Marshal Stalin three weeks ago or so he expressed himself to him in favour of peace and his desire that peace might not be broken in the world. He expressed then also his goodwill for India and sent his good wishes to our country and to some of us. And it was interesting how he discussed with our Ambassador some of our cultural problems, showing a certain knowledge, which was slightly surprising. He discussed – and it may interest the House – the languages of India, their relationships, their parentage, their extent, and our Ambassador gave him such replies as he could on the subject.

So, I hope, Sir, while expressing our tribute on this occasion, we may also hope that the world will be excited by this event into thinking more in terms of peace. If I may suggest it to you, Sir, perhaps this tribute and our message of condolence might be conveyed by you, Sir, on behalf of the House to the Government of the Soviet Union. May I also suggest, Sir, that the House might adjourn in memory of Marshal Stalin?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am sure the House will fully associate itself with all the sentiments so ably expressed by the hon. Leader of the House, in connection with the passing away of Marshal Stalin. I shall convey, on behalf of the House, to the Government of U.S.S.R. the deep feelings of regret, and the message of condolence that has been passed in this House.

I would request hon. Members to stand in their seats for a couple of minutes.

In token of the memory of Marshal Stalin. I would adjourn this House for the day. The House will meet again on Monday, the 9th of March, 1953, at 2 P.M.

The House then adjourned till Two of the Clock on Monday, the 9th of March, 1953.

(‘Parliamentary Debates, House of the People’, Official Report – Volume 1, No. 18, Friday, 6th March 1953, Parliamentary Secretariat, New Delhi [Cols. 1567-1570]). In: Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India) (IMG)

Chapter 19

C19S1. Class Warfare and the Secret Service Conflict to Hijack the CPSU and the Soviet State Apparatus

*** IMG-All-{Titoist Coup}

The following concept outlined by Walter Schellenberg is very important for people to understand:

Heydrich's own theory, which Himmler and Hitler shared, was that military defeat would so weaken the Soviet system that a subsequent infiltration of political agents would completely shatter it. (Hitler's secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 197) (IMG{Canaris})

Via inflicting severe damage upon the Soviet Red Army, the Soviet state would be bogged down in compensating for such damage and would deploy plenty of resources to this end. This would result in the allocation of fewer resources for counter-intelligence, thus allowing anti-Soviet intelligence agents more room for infiltrating the ranks of the Soviet state apparatus. A more powerful intelligence network would arise systematically undermining the Soviet state. At the time, the severe military defeat inflicted upon the German imperialist aggressors blocked the Hitlerian regime from decisively achieving such objectives. Damages were inflicted upon the Soviet Red Army but even greater damages were inflicted upon the Nazis; the anti-Soviet damages by the Nazis did temporarily elevate pro-Nazi intelligence agents in the Soviet system but anti-Nazi damages by the Soviets were greater, allowing the Soviets to infiltrate the Nazis more than the Nazis infiltrated the Soviets. In other words, due to the fact that tide of the military conflict was in the favour of the Soviet Union, the tide of the secret service conflict ended up being in the favour of the communist faction of the USSR as well, preventing Trotskyite and Titoist infiltration from being so mighty.

Nonetheless, it is true that BARBAROSSA caused great damages to the Soviet Red Army and even more so to the CPSU. Indeed, prior to Great Patriotic War, the Party was dominated by the industrial proletariat. The US ambassador Davies reported:

The party heretofore has been dominated by the industrial working class, constituting about 20% of the entire electorate. (THE RUSSIAN BEAR WADDLES THROUGH, NO. 455, Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALLEGED BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PLAN, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 125-126) (IMG{Democratization})

The conditions of the CPSU were to radically change as a result of the Nazi German invasion. During the Great Patriotic War, the bulk of the CPSU membership participated in leading the Red Army. Countless CPSU members participated in or near the frontlines. In an intelligence report to London, Archibald Clark, the British diplomat to Moscow, cited Red Army Major-General Fomichenko for stating that the CPSU sent two-thirds of its membership to the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War:

With reference to my despatch No. 798 of the 27th November 1944, regarding the relations between the Communist party and the Red army, I have the honour to invite your attention to a remark made by Major-General G. Fomichenko in Red Star on the 23rd March last to the effect that "the party (has) sent two-thirds of its members, including its best forces, into the ranks of the Red Army." (N 4815/1407/38, Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden, No. 250, Moscow, April 11, 1945, Received: May 2, 1945, British Foreign Office (April to June 1945), p. 74. In: British Foreign Office (USSR and Finland, 1945), p. 110) (IMG)

The best of the communists of the CPSU died in the war, paving the way for opportunists and careerists to infiltrate the membership and the ranks of the CPSU. In 1946, Stalin himself stated:

Only in the first six months of the Great Patriotic War, more than 500,000 Communists died on the front lines leading the fight against Nazism, and overall more than 3,000,000 Communists died as the leading cadres in the war. They were the best of all of us – noble, pure, dedicated and selfless fighters for socialism, for the happiness of Soviet people. We miss them. If they were alive now, a lot of our problems would have been eliminated. The task of the Soviet creative people must reflect this, to show the future generations the best traits of a Soviet person. This must be the general line and aspiration for the development of literature, theatre, movies, music and art. (Stalin on Art and Culture, 1946. Revolutionary Democracy, retrieved from: North Star Compass) (IMG)

The Party had numerous communist blue-collar workers, numerous revolutionary intellectuals and bureau workers, and numerous kolkhoz peasants, and yet so many of them died in the Great Patriotic War. This had a severe impact on the CPSU membership. The annihilation of many Red Army generals, Soviet intelligence operatives, and CPSU activists damaged the Soviet Union to a world-historically significant level.

As shown in the table below, the percentage of communist (blue-collar) workers in the CPSU went down from 65.2% in 1932 to 33.8% in 1946. By contrast, the percentage of White Collar workers and intelligentsia in the Party went up from 7.9% in 1932 to 47.6% in 1946 and 49.8% by 1952. Clearly, the white-collar workers – the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats – formed the largest percentage and almost half of the CPSU membership, in contrast to the communist blue-

collar workers who went down from a large majority to a minority. The Great Patriotic War killed numerous communist blue-collar workers and thus led to the white-collar workers – the intellectuals and bureaucrats – outnumbering the blue-collar workers the Party. Numerous communist personnel were exterminated by the Nazis, making the work of the CPSU much harder.

Social Composition (in terms of class or stratum) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Percentages			
Date	Blue Collar Workers	Peasantry	White Collar Workers (Intelligentsia, Officials, etc.)
January 1924*	44.0	28.8	27.2
July 1932*	65.2	26.9	7.9
January 1, 1946**¥	33.8	18.6	47.6
January 1, 1952**¥	32.2	18.0	49.8
January 1, 1956¥	32.0	17.1	50.9

* (Communist Party Membership in the USSR, Princeton University Press, sponsored by: the Russian Institute of Columbia University, published under the auspices of the 'Studies of Russian Institute', author: Thomas Henry Rigby, 1968, p. 325. Citing: Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1st edition), Vol. 11, Col. 534; Partinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 21, November 1932, p. 48; Partinaya Zhizn, No. 1, January 1962, p. 47, No. 10, May 1965, p. 11 and No. 7, April 1967, p. 8; Pravda, March 30, 1966) (IMG))

** (The CPSU Under Brezhnev, CIA, April 15, 1976, p. 15. Citing: 'Partinaya Zhizn', No. 14, July 1973, p. 15) (IMG); note: the CIA data pertained

to 1946 and beyond. The CIA specified that the peasantry spoken of was kolkhoz peasantry in particular.

*** Source: data confirmed by both of the above sources.

¥. Source: 'The CPSU: Stages of History', CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1985, pp.96-97

Since the days of the October Revolution, the overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia, coming from feudal or bourgeois family backgrounds, were hostile to Soviet power. The official history of the CPSU in 1939 denounced the role of much of the intelligentsia as agents of fascist reaction in the Party of the proletariat:

The defeat of the Revolution of 1905 started a process of disintegration and degeneration in the ranks of the fellow-travelers of the revolution. Degenerate and decadent tendencies grew particularly marked among the intelligentsia. The fellow-travelers who came from the bourgeois camp to join the movement during the upsurge of the revolution deserted the Party in the days of reaction. Some of them joined the camp of the open enemies of the revolution, others entrenched themselves in such legally functioning working-class societies as still survived, and endeavoured to divert the proletariat from the path of revolution and to discredit the revolutionary party of the proletariat. Deserting the revolution the fellow-travelers tried to win the good graces of the reactionaries and to live in peace with tsardom.

The tsarist government took advantage of the defeat of the revolution to enlist the more cowardly and self-seeking fellow-travelers of the revolution as agents-provocateurs. These vile Judases were sent by the tsarist Okhrana into the working class and Party organizations, where they spied from within and betrayed revolutionaries.

The offensive of the counter-revolution was waged on the ideological front as well. There appeared a whole horde of fashionable writers who "criticized" Marxism, and "demolished" it, mocked and scoffed at the revolution, extolled treachery, and lauded sexual depravity under the guise of the "cult of individuality."

In the realm of philosophy increasing attempts were made to "criticize" and revise Marxism; there also appeared all sorts of religious trends camouflaged by pseudo-scientific theories.

"Criticizing" Marxism became fashionable.

All these gentlemen, despite their multifarious colouring, pursued one common aim: to divert the masses from the revolution.

Decadence and scepticism also affected a section of the Party intelligentsia, those who considered themselves Marxists but had never held firmly to the Marxist position. Among them were writers like Bogdanov, Bazarov, Lunacharsky (who had sided with the Bolsheviks in 1905), Yushkevich and Valentinov (Mensheviks). They launched their "criticism" simultaneously against the philosophical foundations of Marxist theory, i.e., against dialectical materialism, and against the fundamental Marxist principles of historical science, i.e., against historical materialism. This criticism differed from the usual criticism in that it was not conducted openly and squarely, but in a veiled and hypocritical form under the guise of "defending" the fundamental positions of Marxism. These people claimed that in the main they were Marxists, but that they wanted to "improve" Marxism—by ridding it of certain of its fundamental principles. In reality, they were hostile to Marxism, for they tried to undermine its theoretical foundations, although they hypocritically denied their hostility to Marxism and two-facedly continued to style themselves Marxists. The danger of this hypocritical criticism lay in the fact

that it was calculated to deceive rank-and-file members of the Party and might lead them astray. The more hypocritical grew this criticism, which aimed at undermining the theoretical foundations of Marxism, the more dangerous it was to the Party, for the more it merged with the general campaign of the reactionaries against the Party, against the revolution. Some of the intellectuals who had deserted Marxism went so far as to advocate the founding of a new religion (these were known as "god-seekers" and "god-builders").

(HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS), CPSU Central Committee, 1939, Chapter 4) (IMG)

The MI6 report by the British General Staff of the War Office stated:

there is evidence that a considerable number of intellectuals, previously anti-Bolshevist, have decided to throw in the lot, at least temporarily, with the Bolsheviks. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 101) (IMG{October Revolution & Civil War})

The Lenin faction undertook measures to retain the scientists inside the Soviet Union so to advance the industry of the proletariat's state, while engaging in purge campaigns against the rest of the reactionary intelligentsia:

The overwhelming majority of scientists were hostile to the new regime, more hostile than they had been to the old regime, but neither side to the conflict could do without the other. With ... joy Lenin exiled religious philosophers and sociologists like Sorokin, but he repeatedly warned his comrades that natural scientists could not be treated the same way, however deviant their politics might be. (The Lysenko Affair, David Joravsky, 1970, p. 27) (IMG{Soviet Science})

In the years after the First World War, with the process of socialist construction, there came a small but growing stratum of intellectuals that came not from feudal or bourgeois families but that rather came from working class or kolkhoz peasant families. The proletarian or kolkhoznik family background of these new intellectuals greatly increased their tendency towards a scientific socialist outlook. This changed during the Great Patriotic War, as numerous revolutionary Soviet scientists, professors, researchers, journalists, etc. were murdered by the Nazis. The conditions of the intelligentsia of the USSR reverted back to the years prior to the days of the October Revolution. The counter-revolutionary intelligentsia began to fill up many of the academic and educational positions. Revisionism, anti-socialism disguised as socialism, therefore made up a much greater percentage of the intelligentsia of the USSR in the years after the Great Patriotic War. And such counter-revolutionary intelligentsia in addition to the bureaucrats, the white-collar workers, made up the bulk of the CPSU membership.

For this reason, after the Great Patriotic War, the communist faction in the USSR stepped up its campaign of cracking down on the counter-revolutionary ideas promoted by the CIA and MI6 among the intelligentsia of the Soviet Union. Zhdanovschina, the campaign spearheaded by Zhdanov with the aim of vigorously criticizing various intellectuals for their reactionary views, was launched.

C19S2. Exploiting Contradictions in Parallel Comprador Networks; The Soviet Communist Faction's Handling of the Comprador Pincer Assault

Understand this: Stalin's strategy of combat against the comprador agents in the socialist state apparatus was to allow for two comprador-dominated parallel unofficial intelligence networks, one left-opportunist and the other right-opportunist in rhetoric, and to pit these comprador-dominated intelligence networks against each other, even though, behind the scenes, these two parallel intelligence networks, both rooted in the comprador classes, were covertly allied and would form a bloc, a pincer assault with a left-opportunist flank and a right-opportunist flank, against the Stalin faction. Stalin pursued this strategy with the Trotskyite left-opportunists and the Bukharinite right-opportunists, the left-opportunist Yezhov network and the right-opportunist Yagoda network, the right-opportunist Beria network and the left-opportunist Malenkov network. **In each round of the fight, the Stalin faction would ally with comprador network 1 so to decimate, but not annihilate, the comprador network 2, and thereupon the Stalin faction would encircle with agents and coopt the comprador network 2 so to decimate comprador network 1; upon decimating comprador network 1, the Stalin faction would encircle with agents and thus re-coopt comprador network 1 against comprador network 2; and so forth the cycle would go on.** Such a divide and defeat strategy would gradually help annihilate both the comprador intelligence networks. Again, the two comprador networks are secretly allied, but, as they seek to launch a pincer assault on the communist centrist part of the spectrum, they divide themselves into two flanks, the left-opportunist flank (e.g. Trotsky, Malenkov) and the right-opportunist flank (e.g. Bukharin, Beria). The Stalin-led network would utilize these ostensible 'hostilities' between the covertly-allied left- opportunist and right-opportunist so to compile dossier against each of them, demote their members, erode their strengths, and thereby push for a gradual purge of all such comprador agents. To moderate the 'heat' of revolutionary transformation, the left-opportunist and right-opportunist would be used to respectively heat up and cool down the revolutionary transformation, like two components of a thermostat. This strategy pursued by the Stalin faction was clearly manifested in the collectivization

drive and the Great Purge of the 1930s. However, the Beria network had personal experience with it. Sergo Beria wrote:

What were Stalin's methods of government? His first principle was to multiply the apparatuses. He encouraged the parallel development of the Party apparatus and that of the government, each of which was watched by a third apparatus, that of State Control, while State Security watched them all. The leader of the Party had at his disposal control organisations within the Party itself. Stalin did not create this system based on universal suspicion. Having inherited it from Lenin he had been able to use it to take power. He utilised the apparatuses against his rivals, whom he succeeded in supplanting because he had much more information than they had. Eventually, this arrangement promoted his personal power. The Party had the organs of repression under its orders, but it was the Party's leader who wielded the sword.

Stalin's second principle was to set those around him one against another. He was a master of this art.

He whispered to one man something bad about another, then did the same with the latter. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 145) (IMG)

I have read in the writings of Khrushchev and others that Stalin had begun to fear my father. Actually, he feared no one. He was quite aware of his power and did not know fear, but he was able to judge people's characters. It was not possible to attempt anything against Stalin.. He was so strong, he had succeeded so well in setting those around him against each other, and had so effectively multiplied apparatuses which watched each other, that he had erected insurmountable obstacles. (...). Although my father did not control the security organs he had men in place who kept him informed of whatever was happening. Also, and above all, he had his own intelligence network, which was not dependent on any existing structure. Stalin had allowed him to form it (part of his tactic of using some against others) and had never gone back on that decision. He ... passed on to Stalin only facts compromising the organisations which were intriguing against him. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 246) (IMG)

As was mentioned, the Beria network and the Malenkov network were pitted against each other, even though, secretly, behind the scenes, Beria and Malenkov were closest allies. Sergo Beria recalled:

There were, in fact, provocateurs among them, working for Malenkov, who was already busy getting rid of all his potential rivals. Whenever he saw my father was getting close to someone he began intriguing against that person. He wanted to be the only one close to my father, knowing well that he would never seek the first place [and] would always put Malenkov in front. Worse still, he had believed that he could make Kuznetsov one of his creatures, and now the man had taken up a position against him. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, pp. 215-216) (IMG)

The above quote exposes only a percentage of the depth of the overt-level contradictions behind two covert comprador allies.

Malenkov the left-opportunist was an agent of Beria the right-opportunist. The latter planned to promote Malenkov upon seizing power. Yet, Malenkov, owing to his overt-level ideological contradictions as a left-opportunist in contrast to Beria the right-opportunist, was coopted by the communists so to spearhead purges against the other agents of Beria, despite being an agent of Beria himself.

Beria and Malenkov, two allied comprador agents, were both supporters of the Gestapo agent Tito. Yet, the communist faction led by Stalin, well aware of Malenkov's support for Tito, coopted Malenkov to spearhead anti- Tito action:

After the break between Tito and Stalin in June 1948 my father explained to me that he had never disapproved of Tito: 'Every state has the right to pursue the policy of its choice.' He was conscious of the analogies between Yugoslavia and Georgia. (...). Malenkov, doubtless influenced by my father, who was against that condemnation and often cursed the Cominform, hesitated where the Yugoslav question was concerned. He did not like the anti-Tito campaign but said that he was obliged to take part in it. That was not enough for Stalin, who stuck the label 'Titoist' on him as well as on my father. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 210) (IMG)

The number of parallel comprador networks, though often limited to two, of course needed not to be limited. At times, the Stalin faction sowed dissension and engineered splits among the comprador networks so to give rise to three, four, five, etc. parallel comprador networks, systematically setting maneuvering them against each other.

By 1951, the comprador/Titoist opposition stepped up efforts to circumvent socialist counter-intelligence intrigues and plotted to reduce the overt-level contradictions between the parallel comprador networks. As such, the comprador networks increased cooperation so to compromise the communist faction's attempt to pit them against each other. Nonetheless, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that even after the 1951 agreement, these parallel comprador networks continued their sharp contradiction with each other, despite not being as sharply contradictory as before 1951:

In 1951 the members of the Politburo, Bulganin, Malenkov, Khrushchev and my father began to appreciate that they were all in the same boat and it mattered little whether one of them was thrown overboard a few days before the others. They felt a sense of solidarity once they had faced the fact that none of them would be Stalin's

successor.. **They therefore agreed among themselves not to allow Stalin to set one against another, and that they would immediately inform each other of anything Stalin said about them, so as to frustrate his manipulations. They recalled their former intrigues and buried their old grievances.** Khrushchev told my father that Stalin had asked him for reports on the national question when he was in the Ukraine, though in principle, policy on that matter was still a preserve of the NKVD. This solidarity among the members of the Politburo increased as time went by.

They also confided in Mikoyan, who understood the situation. **But Stalin's intrigues left traces which were not completely wiped out.** It must be said that Stalin constructed his provocations around an element of truth.

After about six months Stalin guessed what was going on and unceremoniously demanded of the members of the Politburo: 'Tell me, are you forming a bloc against me?' He took the steps he thought appropriate and began to meet Ignatiev, the head of the State Security without going through the Politburo.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 239. Bold added.) (IMG)

The overt-level contradictions between the covertly-allied parallel comprador networks continued after Stalin's death and led certain comprador networks, such as those of Khrushchev and Malenkov, to be coopted in the fight against other comprador networks, such as that of Beria.

The use of the parallel comprador networks was manifested in the struggle of the Stalin-Zhdanov faction against the Malenkov-Beria faction. Prior to the Great Patriotic War, while General Zhdanov was being deployed by the Stalin faction to the strategic city of Leningrad, Malenkov, the Trotskyite agent of Beria, experienced a rise in his prestige. The factional influence of Malenkov did not increase as a result of the deployment of Zhdanov to Leningrad, for Zhdanov's role as the commander of the Red Army forces during the German-Finnish Siege of Leningrad undermined the Axis menace, the allies of the Trotskyite agent Malenkov, and thus weakened Malenkov's power base. Nonetheless, Malenkov did see a rise in prestige, an elevation of image among the Soviet state personnel:

Malenkov, a rising young man who had become prominent only in February 1941, was made a member of the Supreme Defense Council, a five-man streamlined Politburo for the conduct of the war. In the Supreme Defense Council Malenkov was Stalin's immediate subordinate for Party affairs, with additional responsibility for aircraft production and for the relocation of Soviet industry from Western USSR to the east. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 1) (IMG{Greece})

By the end of the Great Patriotic War and the imposition of Soviet influence over Nazi-collaborationist Finland, Zhdanov returned to Moscow. Then:

Zhdanov ... began undercutting Malenkov: he successfully unseated him from key positions, and then attacked such associates of his as Varga and Aleksandrov. As for Malenkov, he appeared to be concerned, from late 1946 on, with agricultural problems and suffered a great loss of prominence. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

Zhdanov, a revolutionary communist intellectual, was especially talented in combating the bulk of the intelligentsia, the bulk being corrupt and reactionary. Thus, Zhdanov spearheaded the campaign against intellectuals, the Party membership social base upon which Malenkov and Beria relied for their struggle against the communist faction emanating from the blue-collar workers. Varga, a Malenkov agent and a Hungarian crypto-anti-socialist economic, against the scientific principles of communism, had asserted that Peoples' Democracies were states whose character lied in between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie:

The social structure of these states differs from all those hitherto known to us; it is something totally new in the history of mankind. It is neither a bourgeois dictatorship nor a proletarian dictatorship. The old state apparatus has not been smashed, as in the Soviet Union, but re-organized by means of a continuous inclusion in it of the supporters of the new regime. They are not capitalist states in the ordinary sense of the word. Neither, however, are they Socialist states. The basis for their transition to Socialism is given by the nationalization of the most important means of production and by the essential character of the state. They may, with the maintenance of the present state apparatus, gradually pass over to Socialism, developing to an ever-increasing extent the socialist sector which already exists side by side with the simple commodity sector (peasant and artisan) and the capitalist sector, which has lost its dominant position.. (Democracy of a New Type, Eugene Varga, 1947)

This was of course a claim fundamentally opposed to the scientific theses of communism. The Titoists and their American masters considered Zhdanov to be a communist 'fanatic' and 'dogmatic':

Zhdanov is said to have been a fanatic Communist.. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

Zhdanov was no 'fanatic' communist. Rather, simply, he understood the fact of the incontrovertible correctness of the Soviet cause on all the grand-scale issues and on almost all micro-scale questions, when so many others around him did not. Zhdanov, a communist loyalist, could assist Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich in the Politburo, so to facilitate the

outnumbering of the Beria-Malenkov group during the Politburo voting sessions on policy matters. By the end of the Great Patriotic War, Zhdanov returned to Moscow. Then:

Zhdanov again managed to ... eclipse Malenkov. Zhdanov sold Stalin on the necessity for an ideological cleansing of the Communist Party and for a tightening up of Soviet society generally. Zhdanov himself spearheaded the ideological purge. He then began undercutting Malenkov: he successfully unseated him from key positions, and then attacked such associates of his as Varga and Aleksandrov. As for Malenkov, he appeared to be concerned, from late 1946 on, with agricultural problems and suffered a great loss of prominence. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

There was:

strong evidence of rivalry and enmity between Zhdanov and Malenkov during the immediate post-war period.. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

After the Great Patriotic War, the Stalin-Zhdanov faction coopted Abakumov – a corrupt bureaucrat, thus a comprador class member, and an agent of Beria – for combat against the Beria-Malenkov group. Stalin personally supported Abakumov's appointment to leadership of the MGB and sowed dissension in the Beria network:

Thus, Stalin, pursuing his goal of keeping Beriya under control, appointed Abakumov Minister of the MBG in 1946, and felt that since Abakumov was directly responsible for this dismissal of Merkulov he would not have the opportunity to maintain close relations with Beriya. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

The promotion of Abakumov's rank, bringing for him a higher pay, was a bribe, a 'carrot', aimed at coopting him. The promotion of Abakumov at the expense of the Beriaite agent Merkulov was a way of isolating Abakumov (from the Beria network to which he truly belonged), so to better encircle Abakumov with communist faction agents, as a 'stick' to reinforce the 'carrot' in the cooptation process. At the same time, such a promotion obviously resulted in an artificial 'split' in the Beria network. It is nonetheless worth bearing in mind that, at heart, Abakumov was a Beria agent merely coopted to fight against the Beriaites. Indeed:

After Stalin's death Abakumov told my father what had happened. He claimed that he had only been obeying formal orders from Stalin to complete a dossier against my father. Abakumov protested his devotion to my father and claimed to have done nothing about it. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

Having thus engineered the establishment of three parallel comprador networks, the Stalin faction then coopted Abakumov and his followers for combat against the Beria network and the Malenkov network. Thus, under the influence of Abakumov:

In 1946, on the basis of Smersh documents, many leading generals in the Soviet Army and Air Force, including Marshal A. A. Kovikov, were arrested, decommissioned and sent to concentration camps for detention for various lengths of time, which were specified by a direct order from Stalin. During this period, his agentura disclosed a network of speculative operations in the Ministry of Aviation Industry, which included the Minister himself, Col. Gen. A. I. Shakhurin, who was later dismissed and arrested. This disclosure reflected directly on the position of Malenkov, who was responsible for this ministry during the war as a member of the State Committee of Defense. In addition, this also undermined the authority of one of Beriya's closest friends, Army General V. N. Merkulov, Minister of Defense, who was removed from his position on orders of the Central Committee. In 1946, on the basis of Smersh documents, many leading generals in the Soviet Army and Air Force, including Marshal A. A. Novikov, were arrested, decommissioned, and sent to concentration camps for detention for various lengths of time, which were specified by a direct order from Stalin. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

The return of Zhdanov and the rise of the communist-coopted Abakumov network undermined the Malenkov network and consequently also the Beria network. The blow to Malenkov's Titoist network was so strong that as:

early [as] October 1946, a source of the US Military Attache in Moscow reported that Malenkov had suffered some measure of disgrace.. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 4) (IMG{Greece})

Sergo Beria too recalled

Stalin had begun involving himself in the affairs of the atomic committee in 1946, at the time of Malenkov's disgrace, which also marked a weakening of my father's position. It was then that he started to send for scientists. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 227-228) (IMG)

Abakumov, a bureaucrat, was naturally susceptible to a closer relationship with the MI6 agent Beria, the very man against whom Abakumov was tasked with spearheading purges. Regarding Abakumov's top ally in the Kremlin, a 1955 US intelligence named:

Beriya, with whom Abakumov had very close relations during the last few years before his arrest.. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Note that long prior to his arrest, Abakumov had been a Beria agent, only coopted and set 'against' the latter artificially through his promotion at the expense of Merkulov.

Kuznetsov, the Leningrad Titoist and close ally of MI6 agent Beria, deepened bonds with Abakumov:

Kuznetsov made a show of his friendship with Abakumov. They were constantly seen together. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 216) (IMG)

Petr Deriabin, a former high-ranking intelligence official of the Soviet Union who defected to the USA in 1954 and became one of the top sources for the CIA, added that Abakumov had a very corrupt personality:

Among the misdeeds of Abakumov were ... [i]gnoring "Communist moral principles" by participation in extramarital affairs and misusing government property by entertaining these women in bedrooms of our officers' club and of MGB safehouses, (True, from what I heard in the Guards Directorate.)

Abakumov had a very serious personal weakness that eventually became part of the pretext for arresting him. The weakness was women. Abakumov went to extremes, not in aberrations like the rapist Beria, but in frequency. He compounded the problem by taking his women to apartments that were supposed to be reserved for quite another type of clandestine meeting, between MGB officers and their agents,

Time after time Abakumov compromised these safehouses, which thereupon lost their operational utility, by exposing them to outsiders – actresses, cheating wives, secretaries, foreign visitors, God knows who. Abakumov also took girlfriends to a special room in the MGB club where he stored expensive gifts for them. (Many other State Security generals were similarly guilty.)

One such girlfriend was Olga Chekhova, a German movie star. Abakumov had dispatched a plane to Berlin for her. She was flown to Moscow and taken to the best MGB safehouse for a 72-hour rendezvous.

I have seen her photograph in MGB files. Then in her late 40s, she was singularly attractive. Olga was a distant relative of the Russian writer Anton Chekov. She was the descendent of an uncle of his who moved to Germany in the late 18th or early 19th century. She had circulated among the highest levels of the Nazi leadership, and she had been a Soviet agent since before the war. MGB files contained photographs of her with Hitler, Goering, and Goebbels together; with Martin Bormann; and with the last Gestapo Chief, Mueller – all taken before and during World War II. State Security recruited Olga before World War II but lost contact with her during the war, resuming the contact toward the end of 1945. As of 1952 the MGB had determined Olga resided in West Germany, was considering her for operational use, and for the stated reason of tracking down a rumor that she made a trip to Moscow just after World War II (the one sponsored by Abakumov, presumably) asked the Berlin/Karlsborst residency to find out more about her.

Abakumov, furthermore, had been inattentive to complaints that the chief of his Secretariat, Chernov, was rude toward and uncooperative with elements of the MGB.

('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, pp. 58-60) (IMG)

As MI6 agent Beria's ally:

Abakumov ... had free access to Stalin, because he had audio-surveillance put on the houses of all the members of the Politburo and all marshals of the Soviet Union. (The Execution of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, CIA, January 25, 1955, p. 5) (IMG)

Over time, under Beria's patronage, Abakumov rose as a prominent corrupt official himself, amassing 5 million rubles:

Abakumov's ... personal property, which was looted for the most part in Germany, amounted to between four or five million rubles. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

The top CIA spy Deriabin too confirmed:

Among the misdeeds of Abakumov were ... [misappropriation of government funds. (True, according to the confession of Abakumov's wife, Tonya.) ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, pp. 58-59) (IMG)

He was later purged for this exact reason:

Abakumov was arrested in 1952 chiefly for moral degeneration, mistakes in his work, and for using his position for his personal interests. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

C19S3.1. The Jewish Bourgeois-Nationalists and the Kremlin Doctors

Establishing a Yiddish anti-fascist committee in the USSR was undoubtedly a positive step, but the problem was that what was officially called the 'Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee' was the creature of Beria and Henry Morgenthau: During the war my father initiated the creation of anti-fascist committees, including the Jewish Anti -Fascist Committee, which came into being in April-May 1942. The Jewish intellectual elite helped him to organise this committee, which was intended to form a permanent lobby that would mobilise Jewish capital, financial and political, throughout the world and

influence American policy. The substantial sums that the Soviet Union received during the course of the war came to us thanks to the Jewish financial group.. Morgenthau and Lilienthal are the two names that I remember from this group. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 109-110) (IMG)

Note that Henry Morgenthau had been the US State Department official who founded the Zionist terrorist espionage organization, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC or 'Joint'):

The AJDC was founded in the autumn of 1914 in New York when Henry Morgenthau, US ambassador to Turkey, approached Louis Marshall and Jacob H. Schiff with a request for \$50,000 in support for the Jews in Palestine, who were suffering from famine. (Guide to the Sources on the Holocaust in Occupied Poland, European Holocaust Research Infrastructure (EHRI), Alina Skibinska, Translator: Jessica Taylor-Kucia, 2014, p. 243) (IMG{Israel})

Lavrenti Beria planted Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter, two Bundist leaders of the Kautskyite Second International, in charge of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee:

However, my father made a blunder when he wanted to give the leadership of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to G. Erlich and V Alter. They ... had formerly been critics of Stalin. In general he knew little of the conflicts between the Bund and the Bolsheviks. When Stalin saw their names on the list of future members of the Committee he became violently angry: 'What's this? You've taken people from the Bund, Trotskyists!' And he ordered their arrests. After this gaffe my father delved into the history of the Bund: I saw Merkulov bring him huge files about it. Any Party could derive inspiration from the Bund's remarkable organisation, he remarked. I heard my father express regret at the deaths of Erlich and Alter, talking to the actor Mikhoels, who then became the leader of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 109-110) (IMG)

During 1943, when the US imperialists had shifted strategic orientation in favor of the Nazis against the USSR, Shlomo Mikhoels had a trip to the United States in which he engaged in secret negotiations with the United States, negotiations of a kind that could gain an anti-Soviet character:

Mikhoels ... was sent to the USA with the poet Fefer, between June and December 1943. At the same time, my father sent over there a Georgian film director named Kolotozov, accompanied by a very beautiful Leningrad actress. They were supposed to reactivate my father's old contacts in Hollywood.

My father advised Kolotozov to warn Mikhoels that his every move would be reported to the Soviet authorities by his closest colleague and friend Fefer, and to urge him to control his tongue and conceal even from his nearest companions the real purpose of the visit, keeping secret some of his meetings with Americans. The informer was not reporting to my father but to Abakumov and Merkulov. He was therefore unable to get rid of him and could influence Merkulov only at a very high level (which explains why Stalin dismissed Merkulov). Such a move would have attracted suspicion. Fefer was an enthusiastic skirt-chaser, so he was kept busy with women. In his absence, Mikhoels, accompanied by Kolotozov, was able to meet a certain number of influential financiers. Unfortunately he could not stay discreet. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 109-110) (iMG)

The fact that Beria tried to protect Mikhoels from getting caught by Soviet counter-intelligence for these secret negotiations is an indication of the treasonous nature of the visit. In fact, as confirmed by the Israeli anti-Soviet historian Gilboa, during the meeting with Weizmann, Mikhoels and his henchman Fefer gave the American Zionist intelligence official Weizmann 'a picture of the Jewish community in Russia' after allegedly 25 years of the loss of intelligence contact:

Firm evidence ... is to be found in Weizmann's appraisal of his three-hour meeting with Mikhoels and Fefer in the United States, which he termed as a great privilege and a most moving occasion, after having been severed from Russian Jewry for twenty-five years. Weizmann stated that this talk had given him a picture of the Jewish community in Russia.. He said he believed they were interested in Zionism, or not opposed to it at all events. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 70) (IMG)

Fefer, the agent of Mikhoels, had been present in the conversation. Mikhoels and Fefer provided Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist agent of the American secret service, with intelligence materials concerning the conditions in the USSR. Moreover, **Fefer was to run a network of intelligence agents and killer-doctors in the Soviet Union.** Detailing the intelligence connections between the killer-doctors in the Kremlin, the anti-Soviet Soros agent Brent said:

Fefer had recruited Etinger; Etinger had recruited Vinogradov; Vinogradov had recruited Yegorov; Kuznetsov had sold out to the Americans and had abetted Abakumov, who was preparing for a seizure of supreme power. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 210. Bold added.) (IMG)

Vinogradov was a personal doctor of Stalin. Vinogradov and Yegorov both were involved in the assassination of Zhdanov and were suspected of having masterminded the 1949 murder of Dimitrov, the 1952 murder of Choibalsan, the attempt

to murder PCF General-Secretary Maurice Thorez and several others.

Motivated by Zionism, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee sought to come up with a 'Crimean Proposal', which if implemented would have established an autonomous Jewish settler-colony in Crimea. Shimon Redlich, the agent and former fellow of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center, wrote:

Anastasya Potoskaya, Mikhoels' widow portrayed the atmosphere surrounding the submission of the "Crimean proposal": "I recall those sleepless nights.. Mikhoels' wisdom was permeated with Hassidic romanticism and he believed that he could save his people.." (...). Mikhoels also discussed the matter with some of his close friends. As for opinions within the JAFK, there were some staunch opponents, particularly Ehrenburg ... [who] ... argued that Jewish evacuees should go back to their prewar homes.. ('War, the Holocaust, and Stalinism', Shimon Redlich, 2013, p. 46) (IMG)

James Rosenberg promised Mikhoels full assistance in this plan:

The "Crimean Proposal" affirmed that the plan for a Jewish republic enjoyed massive support among Soviet Jews and would result in extensive assistance from world Jewry. As we know, Jewish organizations in the US, and particularly the JDC, had promised such assistance to Mikhoels and Fefer a few months earlier. ('War, the Holocaust, and Stalinism', Shimon Redlich, 2013, p. 46) (IMG)

The Proposal was sent to the Soviet leadership:

A copy of the "Crimean Proposal" addressed to Stalin, dated February 15, 1944, is on file in the JAFK archive. An identical copy, dated February 21, addressed to Molotov, is on file in the Party archive.' Molotov sent the proposal to Malenkov, Mikoyan, Shcherbakov and Voznesensky on February 24. ('War, the Holocaust, and Stalinism', Shimon Redlich, 2013, p. 47) (IMG)

Raul Wallenberg was one of the Zionist spies of the American secret service and he collaborated with the Nazis under the cover of 'bribing' (read: funding) them in order to 'save the Jews'. Wallenberg was arrested by the SMERSH, the Soviet counter-intelligence. However, the SMERSH chief Abakumov was a Beria agent, and Abakumov was keen to protect the CIA-Mossad network inside the USSR. He therefore had a habit of slowly but surely murdering any Zionist American spy who was willing to testify compromising information against the CIA- Mossad network inside the USSR. For the cases of the deaths of several Zionist spies arrested in the USSR, the fingers point to Abakumov as the perpetrator. For the death of Shlomo Mikhoels, the fingers point to Abakumov as the conspirator. Of course, throughout his career at the high command, Abakumov was backed by Beria.

These murders were part of the case made against him by Riyumin's network and are part of the reason why Stalin promoted Riyumin against Abakumov. The Soviet counter-intelligence indeed arrested Wallenberg in order to extract confessions from him as compromising materials against the Beria-backed Zionist elements in the 'Jewish Anti -Fascist Committee'. Conveniently, since Abakumov was in charge of these efforts, before much compromising material could come out of Wallenberg's mouth against Beria's network, Wallenberg died:

Two or three years later, after his return to Moscow, he told me that Abakumov's Smersh had seized Wallenberg in Budapest in January 1945. Like me, Serov did not know of the connection between Wallenberg and my father. I mentioned the matter to my father as though this had been an exploit of our services. He looked at me and asked: 'where did you hear that name?'

'Serov spoke to me about him.'

My father then telephoned Serov and covered him with invective. 'What got into you to spread such gossip? And before my son, too!' At the time I did not understand this reaction. Later, when the affair of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was used to undermine my father's position, he explained to me that Wallenberg had been kidnapped for the same reason. My father was the target aimed at through Wallenberg. The Wallenberg family had acted as intermediaries with the Finnish government in the armistice negotiations with the USSR. Raul Wallenberg had connections with the British, German and Soviet services and had used these relationships to save Jews.

('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 111) (IMG)

The agenda of the Beria agent Abakumov was to save the Zionist intelligence operatives even if that meant murdering the ones arrested by the Soviet counter-intelligence so to prevent the rest of the Zionist intelligence network from being exposed:

Among the misdeeds of Abakumov were ... [f]ailure to take "active measures" against Zionists and failure to heed the Central Committee about removing Broverman from the minister's Secretariat. (True..) ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, pp. 58-59) (IMG)

Shlomo Mikhoels is widely believed to have been murdered by Lavrenti Beria:

One explanation, apparently deliberately leaked out by Moscow to Jewish Communist and leftist circles abroad ... is significant in the light of subsequent happenings: it claimed that Mikhoels had been silenced by American intelligence agents after the Soviet security services had uncovered an extensive spy ring, operated in

the USSR by the American Joint Distribution Committee and headed by Mikhoels on behalf of U.S. intelligence. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 83) (IMG)

Mikhoels's murder was a planned, deliberate move. To be assured of this, it was not necessary to wait fifteen years until a Soviet Lithuanian paper should report that Mikhoels had been killed by Beria's agents; already towards the end of 1948 it had become increasingly clear that the alleged accident in Minsk had been an official act. "When Zuskin was arrested," Ehrenburg wrote, "everybody started wondering how Mikhoels had lost his life." Binyamin Zuskin, who had ranked sector Mikhoels at the Jewish State Theater in Moscow, had been a pointed director on Mikhoels's death. His arrest at the end of 1948 was a link in the chain of mass arrests and liquidations. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 84) (IMG)

Solomon Mikhoels, founder of the Moscow Yiddish theater, was liquidated on orders of Stalin's security police chief Lavrenti Beria, the Soviet news paper *Lituanija Soviettika* has reported, according to the French press today.

This was the first time that a Soviet organ had officially given the facts of Mikhoels death. Until now Soviet sources had claimed that Mikhoels had died in an automobile accident in 1948. The Lithuanian newspaper said that Mikhoels, a former head of the wartime Soviet Anti-Fascist Committee, died "a victim of Beria's infamy." Beria was executed by the Khrushchev regime following Stalin's death.

(Soviet Newspaper Admits Mikhoels Was Killed by Order of Authorities, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, January 17, 1963) (IMG)

A close associate of Fefer was Dr. Shimeliovich. Among the absurd blood-libelous slanders of the Zionist Dr. Shimeliovich was the outrageous comment that the USSR – the state responsible for saving millions of Ashkenazim from extermination – was not only 'anti-Semitic', but also that its alleged 'anti-Semitism' was worse than even Nazi Germany's. Shimon Redlich, the agent and former fellow of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center, wrote: [S]ubmitted by Dr. Shimeliovich, [it] was considered "too nationalistic." Shimeliovich emphasized the unique tragedy of the Jews under German rule and severely criticized anti-semitism and discrimination against Jews in the non-occupied parts of the country. He openly spoke of the fact that "Anti-semitism in the USSR often causes more anguish than the annihilation of more than four million Jews by the Germans." Finally, a letter addressed to Stalin and signed by Mikhoels, Fefer and Epshteyn, was drafted mid-February, 1944. The "Crimean Proposal" opened with an impressive statement of what would later be referred to as the Holocaust. It spoke of the total annihilation of the Jews in Nazi-occupied territories of the USSR and of the "tragedy which the Jewish people is suffering in the present war." Many Jewish evacuees in, according to the letter, did not consider their places of origin, which had turned into mass cemeteries for their kin, as desirable places for postwar resettlement. Hundreds of thousands of Jews from the territories acquired by the USSR in 1939-1940 would stay within the country and seek places to settle. In addition to demographic arguments, the letter also pointed to the national-cultural needs of Soviet Jews after the war. Jewish cultural and professional cadres were not very welcome by other Soviet nationalities who, with the passage of time, had developed their own national intelligentsia. The few existing Jewish cultural institutions were not able to satisfy the needs of the Soviet Jewish population. The letter also explicitly mentioned "new outbursts of anti-semitism." Since the Jews were experiencing the greatest tragedy in their history, and since their loyalty and patriotism had been proven on the battle front, they became particularly sensitive to wartime anti-semitism, which evoked "sharp reaction in the soul of every Soviet Jews."

The suggested solution to these painful problems would be the establishment of a Soviet Jewish republic, preferably in the Crimea. The Crimea, according to the letter, was "one of the regions where, subject to political considerations, this is possible." Did such an appeal, formulated in February, 1944, mean that the signatories knew about the future fate of the Crimean Tatars? (...). The letter went on to recommend that even before the liberation of the Crimea, a Government commission should be appointed to examine the idea. This, too, may indicate that the planned deportation of the Crimean Tatars might have been known to the signatories. ('War, the Holocaust, and Stalinism', Shimon Redlich, 2013, p. 46) (IMG)

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was working towards the establishment of a Yiddish bourgeois-nationalist regime in Crimea. In so doing, their leaders Mikhoel and Shimeliovich were backed fully by the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC, or 'Joint'), the espionage front and center for the Mossad and the CIA.

Much of what has been written about Shimeliovich is with regards to his activity as an agent of the Mossad and the CIA in the Soviet Union. It is remarkable, also, that Shimeliovich was a prominent doctor in Moscow. In 1952, Moscow accused Shimeliovich and Mikhoels as being middlemen or couriers between the CIA and a group of doctors whom the Kremlin accused of being spies and assassins:

Singled out as the doctors' intermediaries were A. B. Shimelevich, last identified as head doctor at the Botkin Hospital in Moscow in 1947, and Solomon Mikhoels, Chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee during World War II. (The Doctors' Plot, CIA, July 15, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

In a book published by the Yale University Press, the Amnesty International official Joshua Rubenstein

confirmed: Shimeliovich also directly supervised Dr. Miron Vovsi, a first cousin to Mikhoels who had served as a chief physician of the Red Army during the war. (Stalin's Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, Yale University Press, Joshua Rubenstein, Vladimir Pavlovich Naumov, p. 54) (IMG)

Along with Rubenstein, the Israeli anti-Soviet historian Gilboa corroborated:

Professor Miron Vovsi, a former leader in the Soviet army's medical corps with the rank of major-general, was a relative of Mikhoels (whose surname had originally been Vofsi) and had also been one of the personalities connected with the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 299) (No Image)

Furthermore, Vovsi worked closely with another prominent Kremlin doctor named Vladimir Vinogradov, who as will be shown in greater detail shortly later, was directly responsible for the murder of Andrei Zhdanov. According to the Jerusalem Post journalist Louis Rapoport:

Vovsi worked closely with Vinogradov, who was the number-one Kremlin doctor and a giant of Soviet medicine. (Stalin's War against the Jews, Louis Rapoport, p. 148) (No Image)

Quite importantly, Miron Meyer Vovsi was also an:

Israeli Citizen.. ('Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI, Israeli Citizen', To: Foreign Office Visa Section, From: Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), January 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In itself, being an Israeli citizen was not an issue. The problem was the question of dual citizenship. The counter-intelligence divisions of the intelligence services from countries all over the world, both in the socialist camp and in the pro-fascist camp, agree that to be a citizen of two opposing countries and to have a prominent position in one of these two countries should raise suspicion. It does not automatically mean espionage or loyalty to a hostile power, but it does deserve to be investigated.

During late 1952, Vovsi was spending time in Israel, with the British diplomatic channels arguing that he stays there for a while:

As you will note, the British Council suggests that Dr. Vovsi remain in Tel-Aviv until they can confirm his placement at St. Pancras [in London]. ('Re: Dr Vovsi Med. File #23815a', To: Dr. Boris Pliskin (in: Malben, Israel), Alexander Gonik (the Medical Director of the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), December 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

This was happening at the time of the media campaign of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies denouncing the Israeli regime as an American imperialist military base. Furthermore, this was at the time of the arrest of the Titoist killer-doctors by the Soviet intelligence. Under the pretext of granting a 'scholarship' to the Israeli doctor, the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee financed Vovsi:

Dr Meyer Vovsi has been awarded by our organization a six months' scholarship.. ('Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI, Israeli Citizen', To: Foreign Office Visa Section, From: Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), January 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

We take this opportunity to confirm that our organization will bear the costs of transportation of Dr. and Mrs. Vovsi, their maintenance while in England, and tuition. ('Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI, Israeli Citizen',

To: Foreign Office Visa Section, From: Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), January 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In late January, 1953, the CIA-funded/Mossad-funded Zionist Dr. Vovsi was arrested in the USSR and denounced as a medical assassin throughout the Soviet press. I cannot confirm the allegations of medical sabotage and espionage. However, Vovsi's prominent position in the USSR as a dual citizen, his ties to the British diplomatic channels, his close connections with Dr. Vinogradov, and above all the financing of him by the JDC under the cover of supporting his 'education' (read: training) made him very suspicious.

According to one article titled 'Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service', written by a very prominent Soviet intelligence analyst Vladislav Minayev, Vovsi was:

connected with the "Joint," an international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization founded by the American secret service, supposedly for the assistance of Jews in other countries. In reality, this organization, under the direction of the American secret service, conducts wide-scale espionage, terrorist and other subversive activities in a number of countries, including the Soviet Union. One of the arrested men, Vovsi, admitted during the interrogation, that he had received a directive from the "Joint" Zionist organization in the United States "to exterminate leading cadres of the U.S.S.R." (Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service, New Times, Vladislav Minayev, January 21, 1953, pp. 1-2. Re -published in: CIA)

Even as late as February of that year, the American-Israeli intelligence had the audacity to continue to plan for funding Dr. Vovsi:

Scholarship Committee has established at £ 50 ~ a month the amount to which he will be entitled during 6

months stay in England. As we were informed that the scholarships granted by the British Council are in the neighborhood of £ 30-35, we believe that this grant will be very adequate to cover all Dr. Vovsi's expenses. ('Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI Med. File #23815', To: Malben, Tel Aviv, Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), February 16, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In this case, 'our Accounting Department', said Molnar, would:

pay him his allowance. ('Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI Med. File #23815a', To: Malben, Tel Aviv, Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), February 16, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

C19S3.2. The Assassination of Andrei Zhdanov

It is of course completely natural that Anglo-American imperialists would desire to assassinate key communist revolutionaries so to further undermine the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. In the late 1940s, the CIA plots for assassinating communist leaders were revealed as 'Project X'. The 'U.S. News' reported:

strong-arm squads would be formed under American guidance [and] assassination of key communists would be encouraged. (I Choose Peace, Konni Zilliacus, p. 212, citing: U.S. News) (IMG)

Under this plan, strong-arm squads would be formed under American guidance. Assassination of key Communists would be encouraged. American agents, parachuted into Eastern Europe, would be used to coordinate anti-Communist action. (From Trotsky To Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, citing: U.S. News)

One of the major targets of the imperialist-fascist secret service assassination plots was Zhdanov. As confirmed by Timothy Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations, in July of 1948:

Zhdanov suffered a heart attack, the first of several. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 337)

Kees Boterbloem – a history professor at the University of South Florida and a scholar on Zhdanov – put the situation as follows:

On 27 August Zhdanov suffered another heart attack that **was not recognized**, it seems, **by Vinogradov, Egorov**, or Vasilenko, who arrived by plane at the spa **the next day**, accompanied by the radiologist Lydia Timashuk, who prepared an electrocardiogram. **She concluded that Zhdanov's condition called for strict bedrest, but the other five attending doctors disagreed with her and rejected her diagnosis.** On 29 August, on the suggestion of Zhdanov's bodyguard, A.M. Belov, Timashuk warned the head of the Kremlin bodyguards, Vlasik, about a possible misdiagnosis of Zhdanov's illness, but it was too late. In the early hours of 31 August 1948, Zhdanov, on his way to the washroom, suffered a final fatal heart attack. ('Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896-1948', Kees Boterbloem, 2004, p. 333. Bold added.) (IMG)

As Boterbloem stated above, and as confirmed by the Soros agent Brent, the electrocardiogram of Zhdanov's heart was done by:

Timashuk [who] had been a "rank-and-file doctor at the Kremlin Hospital," managing the electrocardiograph unit, with little authority to dispute the findings of the distinguished professors and doctors.. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 14) (IMG)

Note that the team of the Kremlin doctors arrived 'the next day', almost 24 hours late. This has also been confirmed by Jonathan Brent, currently the head of the Zionist think tank YIVO. As the director of the Yale University Press from 1991 to 2009, Jonathan Brent was invited by and received the financial support of the CIA agent George Soros, in founding the 'Annals of Communism' series. The Soros agent Brent conducted extensive research on the history of the USSR, deep into the long-held secret archives of the Soviet intelligence, and employed numerous prestigious scholars – from the US National Security Council or Council on Foreign Relations – in publishing several books regarding Soviet history. As Brent rightly stated, the electrocardiogram of Zhdanov's heart was done just as late:

At seven-thirty in the morning of August 28, Timashuk was summoned to Valdai. Why she was summoned to Valdai on that date has never been explained. Timashuk took an electrocardiogram of Zhdanov's heart ... and she became convinced that Zhdanov had recently suffered a myocardial infarct.. She immediately brought this information to the attention of Maiorov, Vinogradov, Vasilenko, and Yegorov. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

However, Timashuk:

was told [by Yegorov and Co.] to alter her conclusion.. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

This was:

a demand with which she did not comply. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

Resisting the threats by Yegorov and Vinogradov to alter her conclusions, Timashuk began writing a letter to Vlasik: As the head of the Kremlin security guards, Vlasik was responsible for ensuring the physical safety of all leading party and Politburo members. He was the right individual to be informed about this matter, and Timashuk expected him to show her letter to the Politburo, if not directly to Stalin himself. This, she assumed, would bring the responsible parties to justice so that correct medical treatment could be provided. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 15) (IMG)

An excerpt of Timashuk's letter on August 29 is as follows:

I consider that the consultants and physician doctor MAIOROV underestimate the unquestionably grave condition of com. ZHDANOV, permitting him to get up from bed, stroll about in the park, visit the cinema, and so forth, that this provoked the second attack [of August 29] and worsened the indications of the EKG of August 28, and in the future this regimen may lead to a fateful outcome. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 15. Citing: Timashuk to Vlasik, August 29, 1948.) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that:

Timashuk's initial letter had not raised the accusation of murder.. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 14) (IMG)

Timashuk thus sent her secret letter:

Timashuk's secret letter to Vlasik included the transcript of Zhdanov's EKG examination of August 28, on the basis of which he disputed the conclusions and did not receive a strict bed rest regimen that her diagnosis of a myocardial infarct (heart attack) would have indicated for him. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 14) (IMG)

Nonetheless:

all concerned instantly realized the menacing implications of her charge. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 14) (IMG)

However:

She could hardly have expected what happened next. Her letter of denunciation had been expeditiously delivered through covert and secure channel, but she soon suspected that it had nonetheless fallen almost immediately into the hands of Dr. Yegorov himself, chief among those she accused. From the Politburo, from the Ministry of State Security (MGB), from Stalin she heard nothing. Nor would she for several years to come. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 15) (IMG)

Yegorov himself was an affiliate of the MGB:

Yegorov held the military rank of major general, and ... had close administrative ties to important governmental networks, including the MGB (the KGB of the time).. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 16) (IMG)

The roots of Yegorov also went to the Zionist intelligence network controlled by the American intelligence service. Recall from C19S3 that Fefer, the agent of Mikhoels, had been present in the conversation in which Mikhoels and Fefer provided Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist agent of the American secret service, with intelligence materials concerning the conditions in the USSR. Fefer began to run a network of agents and physicians in the Soviet Union:

Firm evidence ... is to be found in Weizmann's appraisal of his three-hour meeting with Mikhoels and Fefer in the United States, which he termed as a great privilege and a most moving occasion, after having been severed from Russian Jewry for twenty-five years. Weizmann stated that this talk had given him a picture of the Jewish community in Russia.. He said he believed they were interested in Zionism, or not opposed to it at all events. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 70) (IMG)

Fefer had recruited Etinger; Etinger had recruited Vinogradov; Vinogradov had recruited Yegorov; Kuznetsov had sold out to the Americans and had abetted Abakumov, who was preparing for a seizure of supreme power. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 210) (IMG)

Vinogradov was a personal doctor of Stalin. Vinogradov and Yegorov both were involved in the assassination of Zhdanov and were suspected of having masterminded the 1949 murder of Dimitrov, the 1952 murder of Choibalsan, the attempt to murder PCF General-Secretary Maurice Thorez, and several others.

As the head of the LSUK, which was the Kremlin medical staff, Yegorov had deliberately concealed the syphilitic condition of Beria from Stalin:

Vinogradov and Yegorov, two of the three Gentiles named by Pravda, were said to be "old agents of British intelligence." Stalin had fired Vinogradov as his personal physician on grounds that he concealed Beria's syphilitic condition. One who did engage in this conspiracy of concealment from Stalin had been the officer heading LSUK, and that was Yegorov. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 105) (IMG)

Vinogradov, furthermore, had close contacts with Beria:

Professor Vinogradov often visited our house. He was not the attending doctor, but we were happy to communicate with this interesting person. (My Father is People's Commissar Beria, Sergo Beria) (IMG)

The head of the MGB was Viktor Abakumov, the financially and sexually corrupt official who had entered a pact with Beria against the USSR. Regarding Timashuk's letter, the CIA agent Petr Deriabin confirmed:

Abakumov ... did not inform Stalin about [Timashuk's] first letter. Perhaps Abakumov suspected that if he were its target, Stalin himself had been the "architect." ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 49) (IMG)

It was most likely Abakumov himself who had informed his friend in the MGB, Yegorov, about this letter:

The letter got into the hands of Dr. P.I. Yegorov, head of the Kremlin hospital and a high-level KGB [MGB] affiliate responsible for the well being of all Politburo members. ('A tangled conspiracy tale,

Soviet style', Los Angeles Times, Nina L. Khrushcheva, February 22, 2004) (IMG)

At the same time:

On ... August 29, the date of her first letter to the authorities, Zhdanov suffered his second severe attack in Valdai again. Timashuk was called from Moscow, where she found Vinogradov, Yegorov, Vasilenko and Maiorov in attendance. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

Last time, Yegorov and Co. attended Zhdanov one day late; this time, Yegorov and Co. did attend Zhdanov, but, much to the suspicion of Timashuk, they made sure to delay the electrocardiogram (EKG) for one day:

Yegorov and Vinogradov instructed her to delay taking another EKG until the following day, August 30.

She could not understand this and interpreted it as another indication of inadequate medical attention.

She found the doctors' refusal to entertain the idea of a heart attack or take appropriate measures both inexplicable and inexcusable, and she expressed her anxiety to the chief of Zhdanov's bodyguards, A M. Belov. She told him that she reason to suspect the doctors of mistreating Zhdanov. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

And:

The EKG taken on August 30 convinced Timashuk even more that Zhdanov had suffered a heart attack.

Once again the doctors categorically instructed her to write nothing about this in her reports. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

the doctors' notes from this period suggest that they did not fully record the progressive alteration in Zhdanov's medical condition or the treatment they provided. From August 7, when Karpai left Valdi, to August 30, the doctors appear to have been consciously manipulating the official medical record so that Zhdanov's death could eventually be presented as "sudden" and "unexpected." ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 64) (IMG)

The next day, Timashuk discovered that Zhdanov had received fatal 'treatment' by the doctors:

Agitated by the situation in which found herself, Timashuk began to interview the nursing staff. What she discovered appalled her still more. The nurses told her that, instead of strict bed rest, Zhdanov had been allowed to go for walks in the park, take massages, go to the movies, and get up from his bed to use the lavatory. Her August 29 letter to Vlasik emphasized the fatal possibilities of such treatment. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

On August 31, 1948, the date of Zhdanov's death:

Timashuk was certain that the "fatal outcome" she had predicted had resulted from negligent treatment.

In her mind the charge had now become murder. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

Timashuk sent a second letter. However:

Timashuk's second letter worsened the problem for Abakumov. He could hardly tell Stalin about it without admitting the existence of the first letter and trying to explain why Stalin had not been informed. No explanation would satisfy Stalin. He would blame Abakumov and the Guards Directorate, anybody and everybody, for failure

to prevent the "murder" of Zhdanov. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 49) (IMG)

As confirmed by a prominent anti-Soviet official in the Soviet intelligence consulted by Deriabin, Abakumov refused to disclose:

the first two Timashuk letters to Stalin. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 49)

Colonel Goryshev confirmed that these worries inhibited our minister [i.e. Abakumov] from disclosing the first two Timashuk letters to Stalin. My boss mentioned Abakumov's concerns later in 1950 when he told me that Timashuk had resumed writing accusatory letters. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 49) (IMG)

The Soros agent Jonathan Brent wrote:

A letter from her to Lieutenant General Vlasik should have gone straight to the Politburo; to the minister of state security, V. S. Abakumov; and if necessary to Stalin. Appropriate action should have been taken. The safety of the state was in question. Her urgent warning should have elicited an instant response. She remained upset, and four days after Zhdanov's death, on September 4, 1948, wrote another covert letter, this time to Suranov.. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 16) (IMG)

The CIA too confirmed:

Because the contents of the report supported facts involving physicians who were attending a number of members of the government, Shtsherbakov [i.e. Shcherbakov] among others, Timashuk's report got into the hands of Vlasik, who was at that time chief of the guard protecting the members of the government. Vlasik wrote on the report the remark "yurunda" (Baloney) and put it on the shelf. This "yurunda" soon made the rounds at the Ministry as a sort of joke. ('Committee of State Security / The Doctors' Plot and Its Reversal', CIA, September 24, 1954, pp. 1-2. Underline added.) (IMG)

Vlasik thus betrayed the USSR through such a great crime.

Shortly thereafter, an autopsy of Zhdanov was to be done:

On Poskrebyshchev's orders, the post-mortem was carried out in an ill-lit, shoddy bathroom in Kuznetsov's presence. (Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, Simon Sebag Montefiore, 2003) (IMG)

The autopsy obviously was done hastily:

The hastily prepared autopsy, performed in Zhdanov's bathtub in Valdai on the evening of August 31, with the staff masseuse, nurse Turkina, taking notes.. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

The official autopsy report of Zhdanov supported the line of the Titoist killer-doctors:

"The death of comrade ZHDANOV, A. A., followed the paralysis of morbidly changing heart that was the consequence of sharp arteriosclerosis of the coronary vessels in combination with general arteriosclerosis. As a result of heart failure there was a sharp attack of emphysema." No heart attack [was mentioned]. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 21) (IMG)

However:

Timashuk could not be quieted or convinced. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

In late 1952, Yegorov, Vinogradov, and several others responsible for the death of Zhdanov were arrested. However, after the death of Stalin, they were released by Beria. After his release from prison, Vinogradov had absolutely no need to fear another arrest:

Finally released ... Vinogradov had no need to fear further retribution or punishment. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 48) (IMG)

Nonetheless, during this time when he was off jail and had no need to fear, he made a very important confession:

it is necessary to acknowledge that the autopsy of A. A. ZHDANOV, who died on 31 August, disclosed that he had suffered a recent myocardial infarct. Therefore the rejection of this by me, professors V. Kh. VASILENKO, and P. I. YEGOROV and doctors G. I. MAIOROV and S. E. KARPAL was a mistake on our part. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 48. Citing: 'Concerning the history of the illness of A. A. ZHDANOV', Vladimir Vinogradov, March 27, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

How could it be a 'mistake' when in fact Yegorov, Vinogradov, Maiorov and Karpai knew and were directly warned of the real results of the autopsy! Regarding the autopsy:

Timashuk sensed collusion.. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

Clearly, this was a cover-up:

The professors were terrified that their misdiagnosis and cover-up would be exposed so they sacked and denounced Timashuk.. (Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, Simon Sebag Montefiore, 2003)

A few days after the death of Zhdanov:

On September 6, 1948, ... an emergency session of experts was convened in the Kremlin Hospital to investigate whether the doctors who treated him in Valdai had misdiagnosed Zhdanov's illness and had provided criminally negligent treatment. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 13) (IMG)

However, Timashuk's line was heavily bashed by the Titoist doctors in that session. The next day, Timashuk: was summarily dismissed on September 7 by Yegorov as manager of the electrocardiographic unit of the Kremlin Hospital and thrown in to the outer darkness of a considerably inferior position in the second polyclinic of the system. Dangerous, stupid, ill-educated, incendiary – in Yegorov's view, Timashuk was an individual to be treated with contempt. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 46) (IMG)

Only an anti-Soviet medical saboteur would ensure delay in the proper treatment of Zhdanov, wrong treatment of Zhdanov, hasty autopsy of Zhdanov after his death, and withholding such critical information about the death of Zhdanov. Clearly, this was an incriminating case of medical sabotage by the killer-doctors of the Kremlin hospital, who arrived almost 24 hours after Zhdanov's heart attack, who made the EKG late for another 24 hours, who knowingly denied the well-evidenced fact that Zhdanov had a heart attack, who at least according to the nurses did not enforce a strict bed regimen for Zhdanov, and who sought to cover up their criminal activity by firing Timashuk. The killer-doctors had collaborators. Again, recall that the intelligence service roots of these Titoist killer-doctors went to Fefer, Mikhoels, and Chaim Weizmann. At home, these killer-doctors were members of the MGB and had direct links with Vlasik, Kuznetsov, Abakumov, three agents of the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria. The fingerprints of the CIA, MI6, and Mossad can be seen in this conspiracy.

Other Kremlin physicians, also belonging to the intelligence network led by Weizmann, played important roles in the Zhdanov assassination. One of them was Dr. Etinger:

The diagnosis is always established in combination with the clinical facts. For your information, we invited the leading specialists of the Soviet nation – academician ZELENNIN, Professor NEZLIN, Professor ETINGER. They evaluated this electrocardiogram differently [than yours and in agreement with us] on the basis of the clinical data. Is it possible that you really believe yourself to be the Alpha and the Omega.? I can no longer permit you to work in the Lechsanupra system, because you create discord and dangerous confusion in the treatment of each individual.. You are not even interested in x-rays. Clinical facts don't interest you.. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 34. Citing: Stenographic records, September 6, 1948, p. 12) (IMG)

Recall that Etinger too had been recruited by the Weizmann network. Etinger argued that:

There are no indications of coronary thrombosis. What is present is a grave form of chronic, coronary failure in combination with attacks of cardiac asthma. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 35) (IMG)

To this, Dr. Zelenin responded:

I concur with Professor Etinger that against the hypertension, the patient had severe coronary arteriosclerosis and above all suffered lack of nourishment to the anterior wall.. Facts pointing to a thrombosis do not exist either clinically or from the electrocardiograph; there is no evidence of a major infarct. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 35) (IMG)

'Etinger's comments at the August 31 session', the authors said, was summed up in the following quote:

The patient had a severe lesion of the coronary vessels owing to hypertension.. Definite indications of a coronary thrombosis are not present. There is a severe form of chronic coronary failure that coincides with cardiac asthma. Manifestations of heart failure have grown up. In connection with a *grave form of chronic coronary failure* the formation of small centers of necrosis is possible (emphasis added)." Zelenin appeared to concur, saying "Undoubtedly this patient is an old hypertensive, with progressive hypertension.. This circumstance – that there were two attacks – is not associated with the clinical picture of an infarct, and I think that there was no massive infarct.. And from the point of view of prognosis each successive attack would be severe and even threatening."

Vinogradov eventually admitted that "ZELENNIN gave a garbled conclusion that subsequently allowed me

to say that the conclusion did not find a myocardial infarct in A. A. ZHDANOV.” This was, in fact, what happened when on August 31, Vinogradov summed up the opinion of the consulting committee:

So, this is the conclusion that was formed at the time ... there is no objection to this diagnosis? (All professors agree.) I would like to turn to you with the question: After the first attack [in July], he was subjected to strict quiet and was kept to his bed. He was not permitted to get up, he used a bedpan. Only after approximately two weeks did he get up a bit. he was permitted to use the toilet’ he was given massages on his hands and legs. they did not though his spine. We permitted him to get up, make a few steps in front of the bed and at the maximum he twice went about 50 meters around the verandah. I want to ask you to turn your competence to this question: Was this incorrect?

“No,” Professor Etinger immediately declared. “It was correct.”

(‘Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953’, Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 61. Citing: Protocol of a face-to-face confrontation between Vinogradov and Karpai, February 18, 1954, pp. 3-9. Interrogation of Vinogradov, November 18, 1952, p. 6. Stenogram, August 31, 1948, p. 10. Parentheses, bold, and Italics in this quote are all original.) (IMG)

After being fired by the killer-doctors, the Hero of the Soviet Union and the brave medical freedom-fighter, Timashuk, wrote letters to Kuznetsov, the self-disguised traitor and enemy of Zhdanov who had worked ‘with’ Zhdanov back when Zhdanov was in Leningrad. Little – if any at all – did Timashuk know of the treasonous character of Kuznetsov and Co. On September 15, 1948, therefore, she sent a letter to Kuznetsov on the death of Zhdanov: Knowing that she would get no justice from Yegorov or his immediate associates, Timashuk next wrote a letter to A. A. Kuznetsov, the Central Committee secretary with security affairs. She restated her opinion about the diagnosis of Zhdanov’s illness.. In her letter to Kuznetsov dated September 15,

1948, a week after the session with Yegorov, she emphasized what earlier she had claimed was never part of her accusation against the doctors: “the treatment and regimen given A. A. Zhdanov *were incorrect*; that is to say, the disease of myocardial infarct demands strict bed rest for the course of several months. In fact, he was allowed to move around (strolls in the park twice per day, going to the cinema, and further physical exertions).” (Emphasis added.) She continued: “Rudely, improperly, without any lawful grounds, Professor Yegorov on 8 September has thrown me out of the Kremlin Hospital to an affiliated polyclinic for the ostensible purpose of improving the work being done there.” Timashuk received no reply. Eventually she would write another letter to Kuznetsov in early 1949. This one, too, went unanswered. (‘Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953’, Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, pp. 48-49) (IMG)

In early 1949 she wrote once more to Kuznetsov. Again she received no reply. The implication was obvious: Kuznetsov took too no interest in saving Zhdanov’s life. (‘Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953’, Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 208) (IMG)

Kuznetsov had every reason to cover up the murder of Zhdanov. Kuznetsov could not betray his friend Abakumov, who also was involved in the cover-up of the murder. Note that:

Kuznetsov made a show of his friendship with Abakumov. They were constantly seen together. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 216) (IMG)

Note also that Kuznetsov was one of the leaders of the Leningrad Titoists, a network of Yugoslav intelligence agents who promoted Russian bourgeois-nationalism as a means of fomenting ethnic tensions in the USSR, so to pave the way to the partition of the USSR.

By the time of Zhdanov’s death, Kuznetsov was already a member of the Central Committee (CC) and a prominent official in the Soviet intelligence allied to Abakumov. The CIA reported:

In 1948, Kuznetsov was transferred ... to the CC as one of its secretaries and Popkov became head of the Leningrad Party organization on the recommendation of Kuznetsov. As Secretary of the CC, Kuznetsov had direct influence on the external political matters of the Communist Party. Everything which was received from foreign rezidentury of Soviet intelligence organizations was sent in one copy to Kuznetsov’s secretariat, as well as to Stalin, Molotov, Beriya, and Malenkov. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The death of Zhdanov destroyed one of the true comrades of Stalin in the Politburo; Stalin was still able to coopt Malenkov against Beria and Beria against Malenkov, but surely, the death of a true communist loyalist was a blow to Stalin’s efforts in ousting the Titoist members of the Politburo. A prominent strategist and fighter against imperialism had fallen. The MI6 killer-doctors’ murder of Zhdanov:

on 31 August 1948 signalled the end of the so-called Zhdanov period. After his Death, Malenkov rapidly achieved a high position in official listings of the Politburo, which was generally taken to indicate that he had returned to grace. Malenkov then allegedly initiated a purge of various persons who owed their positions to Zhdanov’s influence. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 3) (IMG{Greece})

Timashuk again wrote a third letter to Stalin, which was also suppressed by Abakumov in collaboration with his agents Poskrebyshev and Vlasik, who were officially in charge of Stalin's personal self-defense:

In her third, [Timashuk] reiterated the charge about doctors misprescribing for Zhdanov and added a new claim: they used the same method to kill Zhdanov's brother-in-law, Aleksandr Shcherbakov. (...).

"How did Abakumov handle the third letter?" I asked Goryshev. "Gingerly. He took it to the Kremlin, to Poskrebyshev." (...). "It was logical for Abakumov to go to Poskrebyshev with the letter," I said.

"I've heard that they get along well." "Oh, they do, Petr Sergeevich, and I venture to say that Abakumov wanted to trade on Poskrebyshev's friendship with General Vlasik. Needless to say, LSUIK comes under Vlasik as the chief of our directorate, and I'm sure you know too that Vlasik and Poskrebyshev enjoy... er, they get together socially."

"So did Poskrebyshev show the letter to the Big Chief [Stalin]?"

"Far from that," [Colonel] Goryshev said. "They agreed that the only thing to do was to suppress all three letters from her and henceforth ignore Timashuk's accusations. Abakumov returned from the Kremlin with a warning to Sled-Chast'."

"A warning?"

"Our Minister [Abakumov] told Sled-Chast', 'If the investigation of the doctors is reopened again, we'll all lose our heads.'" Stalin would see to that.

(*'Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue'*, Petr Deriabin, p. 51) (IMG)

C19S3.3. The Cases of Shcherbakov, Kalinin, Dimitrov, and Choibalsan / The 'Treatment' of Thorez

An indication of the political hostilities between Beria and Shcherbakov can be observed in the following excerpt of Sergo Beria's biography his father:

Shcherbakov ... took leave of us. After he had gone my father said to my mother 'I never want to see that shit here again.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 244) (IMG)

Clearly, Beria did not like Shcherbakov. Note that the above quote from Sergo Beria was under the heading "*The Doctors' Plot*." Though not a proof, it is nevertheless a hint of Beria being the one to have eliminated 'that shit' – referring to Shcherbakov – who he would 'never ... see ... again' after 1945, when Shcherbakov died. In the official CPSU statement denouncing the killer-doctors, Shcherbakov was mentioned alongside Zhdanov as one of the key figures assassinated by those killer-doctors.

Moreover:

In June 1946, Dr. Vinogradov was a member of a panel of physicians who signed the death certificate for President Mikhail Kalinin. He and his colleagues were also reported to have treated Maurice Thorez, the late Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria, Communist hero of the Reichstag Fire Trial in Nazi Germany, and the late Marshal Choi Balsan of the Mongolian Peoples Republic. ('Dr. Vladimir Vinogradov Dies;

Soviet Therapist Held in 'Plot', New York Times, July 31, 1964) (IMG)

Dr. Petr Ivanovich Yegorov, the killer-doctor and henchman of Vinogradov in the 'treatment' of Zhdanov and Dimitrov: had actually been Chief of the Kremlin's medical directorate, and hence had ... treated at one time or another all of the Politburo members, including Stalin himself, Dimitrov, and Choibalsan. The French Communist press had reported that Vinogradov and another of the accused doctors, Grinstein, had treated Thorez. It is known, for example, that Yegorov treated Kalinin. (*The Doctors' Plot*, CIA, July 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Both Dimitrov and Zhdanov were 'treated' by the same CIA-MI6 killer-doctors aiming for the resignation of Stalin for 'health reasons'. Both Dimitrov and Zhdanov died at around the same time, and both at a relatively young age.

Surely, 67 years is old enough, but for a charismatic Bulgarian leader who should have received high-quality medical care, 67 years old is way too young an age to die a natural death. No need to mention Zhdanov's death at the age of 52, which was certainly a murder, as documented in C19S3.2. Stalin, too, found these deaths suspicious:

Efim Smirnov, a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, said he visited Stalin at his Black Sea vacation home before the middle of January 1953 and found him suspicious about the medical care given a former Leningrad party leader, Andrei A. Zhdanov, and a Bulgarian party chief, Georgy M. Dimitrov.

Smirnov said Stalin remarked to him: "One doctor treated them, and both of them died."

(*Stalin Suspicious of Doctors During Last Months of Life*, AP Archives, John-Thor Dahlburg, February 4, 1988) (IMG)

The leader of People's Democratic Mongolia, Choibalsan, was treated by the same doctors and died a suspicious death in 1952. The life of Maurice Thorez too was in danger though the French communist leader ultimately survived – for the while.

C19S3.4. Etinger Dead

As mentioned previously, Etinger had been recruited by a Zionist intelligence network controlled by the American intelligence service, and had a role in the murder of Andrei Zhdanov. Some time in the late 1940s or early 1950s, the Soviet intelligence service arrested Etinger:

Etinger had been arrested not as a doctor, but as a Jew who ardently supported the state of Israel. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 94) (IMG)

Abakumov was the reactionary Beria agent who wanted the Etinger case closed

At the end of January Abakumov told Ryumin to shelve the investigation and assigned him to another case.

It was here that Ryumin took the initiative that would earn him his unprecedented rise. Instead of dropping the Etinger case, Ryumin secretly made twenty-four trips to Lefortovo, interrogating Etinger thirty-nine times, between January 2 [1951] and the evening of March 2 [1951] ..

('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 111) (IMG)

To the benefit of Abakumov, Etinger died in prison:

On March 2, [1951,] Etinger returned from one such unauthorized interrogation to his cell at 5:15 PM, according to the official summary. He tasted a piece of [poisoned?] bread, made several steps in the direction of the door, and fell unconscious to the floor. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 111) (IMG)

This was far from being the first time that a Zionist agent whose confessions would pose a grave threat to Abakumov was being eliminated and silenced. Mikhoels was another one. Another suspected of being so was Wallenberg. Such a case of the Abakumov network eliminating the doctors who could give important confessions was not without precedent. In yet another case, the Abakumov network deliberately tortured some of the doctors so that they would be eliminated, with one dying of supposed 'pneumonia':

"That's how it stood after [Timashuk's] first letter," I prompted.

"Yes, but then [Timashuk] wrote the second letter. There was hell to pay considering that Comrade Zhdanov had just died. Abakumov told Sled-Chast' to reopen the investigation and put more oomph into it. This time they threw three doctors in the Lubyanka and gave them a tough going over—you know how Sled-Chast' usually interrogates, Petr Sergeevich. It was not the toughest going over that can be dished out, but one of the doctors died in jail, they said from pneumonia. Who'd believe that?"

"I don't know anyone who would. Did the doctors confess?"

"No confessions. Nothing. (...)."

('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 49) (IMG)

C19S3.5. 'Anti-Semitism'? / The Alleged 'Hate America' Campaign

All of those doctors were agents of the MI6 agent Beria's network as well as of the CIA-owned Zionist network led by Chaim Weizmann. Not all of those doctors were 'Jewish'; some were 'gentiles'. In fact, the most strategic conspirators from among the doctors, Yegorov and Vinogradov, were 'gentiles':

Vinogradov and Yegorov, two of the three Gentiles named by Pravda, were said to be "old agents of British intelligence." Stalin had fired Vinogradov as his personal physician on grounds that he concealed Beria's syphilitic condition. One who did engage in this conspiracy of concealment from Stalin had been the officer heading LSUK, and that was Yegorov. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 105) (IMG)

The Doctors' Plot was a conspiracy that involved both 'Jews' and 'gentiles', with the 'gentiles' among them being at the forefront of the medical-terror plots and playing no less strategically significant roles than the 'Jewish' conspirators. The 'gentile' conspirators fostered close ties to Jewish bourgeois-nationalist intelligence networks. The CIA's avenue towards these 'gentiles' was the Chaim Weizmann network, which closely cooperated with the JDC and the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel. Beria's avenue of cooperation with them was via the Abakumov network in the MGB, and the 'Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee' influenced by the Bundist agents linked to the Second International. Beria was tied to the JDC via Morgenthau and to the Weizmann network via the 'Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee'. The Soviet purges against CIA-MI6-backed 'Islamists' were condemned as 'oppression of Muslims', Soviet purges against CIA-MI6-backed Ukrainian fascists were described as 'Great-Russian Chauvinism', etc. This time, given that the terror espionage organization was 'Jewish' in self-description, the purges were called 'anti-Semitic'.

The Soviet state emphasized the bourgeois-nationalist feature of the Jews involved in the Doctors' Plot case, a fact which, as American intelligence admitted, weakens the thesis that the campaign was anti-Semitic. In a telegram to the US Secretary of State in January 1953, US ambassador J. D. Beam admitted that the Soviet government's emphasis on

the 'bourgeois-nationalist' character, rather than the possibly Jewish background, of the doctors, indicated that the purges in the USSR and the Peoples Democracies was not out of hostility to Jews and 'Jews' as a whole:

Perhaps heavy play given Jewish bourgeois nationalist aspect should cause us [to] re-evaluate Jewish element [in] recent Czech trials. However, [the] very identification of these groups as "Jewish Bourgeois nationalist" lessens to [a] certain degree [the] hypothesis which has been advanced that anti-Semitism as such is important and [a] growing element [in] Soviet and satellite policy. (MOSCOW EMBTEL 1036 – DOCTORS PLOT, SW:JKS: HMR/15, CIA, Jacob D. Beam, January 14, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

A CIA document admitted that there were:

no incidents of violence against Jews in the USSR.. ('1. Resistance Potential and Unrest in the USSR 2. Resistance in Poland', CIA, date distributed: June 22, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Although the CIA document was distributed in 1955, the date of information goes back to much longer and encompassed the entire post-war period including – but not limited to – 1946. In fact, another CIA document, this one dated February 1953, stated:

Another indication of cautious approach is the fact that Ilya Ehrenburg was chosen to make the first attack against Israel and the Zionist movement. What better way to offset the shock in Communist ranks and charges of anti-Semitism from the West than to utilize a well-known Soviet anti-Zionist Jew to launch the attack? (THE JEWISH QUESTION IN SOVIET AND SATELLITE PROPAGANDA, CIA, February 10, 1953, p. 6) (IMG{Israel})

There is no indication that the Kremlin proposes to imitate Hitler in the use of racialist anti-Semitism with the ultimate intention of wiping out the Jews. On the contrary, there are some signs, as the award of the Stalin prize to Ehrenburg, of measures to forestall indiscriminate anti-Semitism. (THE JEWISH QUESTION IN SOVIET AND SATELLITE PROPAGANDA, CIA, February 10, 1953, p. 23) (IMG{Israel})

In spite of this, the Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, Ben-Gurion's henchman, instructed his subordinates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to launch a vicious anti-Soviet slander campaign, explicitly stating that Israel "should not rely on the facts" and instead should "incite" "public tension" for "arousing public opinion constantly and repeatedly" against Moscow. Israel and its agents based in Washington launched a campaign to denounce the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies as hostile to the Israelites. While acknowledging that the doctors' plot case in the USSR is a prelude for a purge of "unreliable elements," the Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett remarked:

Here are my instructions in the matter of Moscow's calumnies

(a) This is not a major line of policy but the result of a general trend to strengthen the regime whether for its own sake or in preparation for war, by means of blood-letting, tightening internal espionage, targeting a scapegoat and laying the groundwork for the mass liquidation of unreliable elements.

(b) Even if for Moscow the libel is of secondary importance, for us it is the crux of the matter.

(c) The libel is the outcome of a deliberate decision, and we should expect more such manifestations and prepare for a prolonged campaign.

(d) We have very few weapons in hand and we should not underestimate the [importance of] arousing public opinion constantly and repeatedly, on the assumption that Moscow is not entirely indifferent to the repercussions of its policy in international public opinion and its influence on people and circles sympathetic to it.

(e) We should not rely on the facts themselves to maintain the level of public tension; we must constantly incite it.

Therefore, I favoured from the beginning the initiative for a world Jewish conference to react to the calumnies. This is now the government's stance. The conference should be convened in Paris for greater resonance in Europe. The government of Israel will not participate in either the initiative or the debates but will send an observer. The conference of the organizations for reparations can serve as a precedent for the composition which should be as broad as possible. The aims of the conference: (1) condemnation and refutation of the calumny in a well-considered, dignified and forceful manner; (2) unification of Jewish public opinion and isolation of the enemies of the Jewish people's (3) an appeal to world public opinion; (4) Let My People Go.

The conference will not go beyond the bounds of demanding rectification of the slander of the Jewish people and its organizations, (voicing) its concern for the safety of the Jewish masses, their protection and the demand for their aliya, the denunciation of hatred of the Jewish people and an appeal to the world to rise up against it. It will not condemn communism as a regime and will not overtly join the political war against the Soviet Union.

(CODED TEE ISA 130.09/2309/12, M. Sharett to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Tel Aviv, February 2, 1953. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", p. 873. Bold added) (IMG)

Sharett thereby created the ideological basis and the atmosphere which encouraged the assault on the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet Foreign Ministry blamed him for this precise issue. On February 1953, shortly after a terror bombing against

the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv, the USSR officially broke diplomatic relations with the Zionist regime:

The 20 July announcement that the USSR and Israel have agreed to resume diplomatic relations, broken off 12 February after the bombing of the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv, is the logical culmination of Moscow's reversal of the anti-Zionist campaign which was vigorously pressed during the last months of Stalin's life. (The Beria Purge and Subsequent Soviet Policy, Central Intelligence Agency, July 24, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

The Soviet campaign against the Japanese-backed pan-Islamists was denounced as 'oppression of Muslims', the Soviet campaign against the Ukrainian Nazi-collaborationists was condemned as Soviet 'anti-Ukrainian chauvinism'. American imperialist propaganda went so ludicrously far as to denounce the Soviet hostility to the American imperialists as a "Hate America" campaign, when in fact the Soviets emphasized that the target was American imperialism and not the people of the United States:

Ambassador Kennan sees a "line of retreat" from the Soviet "hate-America" campaign revealed in Soviet efforts to deny its existence. He believes that the Soviet Union realizes that the hate campaign conflicts with the basic "peace" thesis and might conceivably alienate fellow travelers and intellectuals on the fringe of the Communist movement. Consequently, to retrieve the situation, the Soviet Union is assuming an attitude of "shocked innocence" and protesting its "friendship to the American people." Comment: The "hate-America" campaign has not abated in intensity in spite of recent attempts to cross it with the theme of "friendship with the American people."

The USSR has in the past proved capable of exploiting two diametrically opposed propaganda themes at one time. The Soviet Union has shown itself increasingly sensitive to American exposures of its hate propaganda, however, and the present denials are probably designed to maintain the effectiveness of the campaign, which would be seriously impaired by exposure of its motives.

(Kennan comments on Soviet denials of the "hate-America" campaign. In: CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, August 7, 1952, p. 3. No screenshot.)

The Soviets actively raised the vigilance of the Soviet people against imperialist America, but the 'America' condemned in that context connoted American imperialism, and clearly not the whole country and the people of the United States. The CIA admitted that, along with the campaign to expose American imperialist aggression, the Soviet media was promoting the theme of Soviet friendliness to the people of the United States:

The Soviet Union has been increasingly sensitive of American accusations in regard to its "hate America" campaign. Although the Soviet campaign to "expose US aggressiveness" continues unabated, the new theme of Soviet friendliness to the American people has been added. This theme was given extensive attention at the recent meeting of the World Peace Council in Berlin. (Soviet press denies existence of a "hate-America" campaign. In: CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, CIA, August 5, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

And much as how the Soviet campaign against American imperialism was preposterously condemned as a "Hate" campaign against the people of the United States, the Soviet measures not against the good people of Israel but against the conspiracies of the Mossad and its CIA-MI6 handlers, was denounced as "anti-Semitic." Furthermore, rumours that the Soviet Union was hostile to Israel's right of existence as a country are CIA-Mossad slanders. The Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat had much to gain from overthrowing the murderous Zionist regime, to be replaced by a People's Democracy in Israel, but nothing favourable to socialism would have come out of support for the Palestinian chauvinist objective of 'destroying Israel' as a country.

C19S4. The 1949 Leningrad Purge

The CIA reported:

In 1944, Kuznetsov replaced Zhdanov as Party boss in Leningrad. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Zhdanov was by then being promoted to a position in the Kremlin. In vast contrast to the Western press depiction of Kuznetsov as a 'Zhdanov protege', the former in fact belonged to MI6 agent Beria's faction, and was thus hostile to the USSR. Sergo Beria confirmed:

Kuznetsov was very close to my father, contrary to the widely-held idea that he was Zhdanov's man.. My father had already sometimes made use of him during the war. I knew him well.. (...). Kuznetsov sometimes, though very rarely, visited us in Moscow. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (iMG)

In addition:

Despite the post he now occupied, Kuznetsov wanted the Party reorganized. Like my father, he wanted to end the Party's interference in the economy. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Back then, although the proletariat had lost their majority in the membership composition, the Party was still under the influence of a very large percentage of kolkhozniks and proletarians. Party influence over the economy retained a large portion of the influence of the proletariat and kolkhozniks over the economy, whereas the independence of the economic

ministries from subordination by the Party would have allowed the corrupt bureaucrats in the economic ministries to take the reins, not be held accountable, and cruise ahead with their corruption campaign.

The Beria-Kuznetsov alliance went back to as early as the days of the Great Patriotic War. At the time, Kuznetsov:

came to see us at the Military Academy, discussed matters with us and attended Party meetings. He was subsequently accused of seeking support from the youth. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

The phrase 'seeking support from the youth' refers to a very specific group of young people – Russian bourgeois-nationalists who wanted the Russian SFSR to have a privileged position over other republics in the Soviet Union, hence to foment ethnic tensions and hatred of the Russians among non-Russians. Referring to these particular youth, Sergo Beria recalled:

I remember things said by young men returned from the front, who belonged to Communist organisations in Leningrad, when I was still a student and Kuznetsov was a Secretary of the regional Party committee. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Such Russian bourgeois-nationalist youth asked:

Why did Russia not have its own Party organisation: Why was Leningrad, a cultural, political, and economic centre which might count for more than Moscow, reduced to this humiliating status? ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

The attempt to place Russia above other SSRs was a part of the plot to drive a wedge between the other nationalities and the Russians hence to isolate the Russians. Such ethnic tension could help pave the way for the partition of the USSR. As an enemy of the Soviet Union, Kuznetsov was planning to promote such ethnic tensions in the Soviet Union. Supporting Kuznetsov in such efforts was Voznesensky who also held:

ultra-chauvinistic notions.. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

The fact that the Titoists in charge of the Party's Leningrad branch were the agents of Beria is once again testament to the material nonexistence of 'nationalism' in the classless meaning of the term. Beria, a Georgian bourgeois-nationalist who constantly complained about Bolshevik "Russian colonialism" in Georgia, was allied to the Russian chauvinist gang that called for the colonial "superiority" of Russia over the other Socialist Soviet Republics including Georgia. Superficially 'contradictory' chauvinisms, in this case Georgian bourgeois-nationalism and Russian bourgeois-nationalism, are direct allies, for they emanate from the same parasitic classes. The question is not so much whether 'nationalism' in its classless sense can be good or evil; the question rather is whether it can exist beyond imagination; and the answer to the question is that no, 'nationalism' in its classless connotation has almost never bore material existence. Beria the "Georgian nationalist" was so disloyal to the Georgian nation that he allied with the Kuznetsov the Russian chauvinist and Kuznetsov the "believer" in the superiority of Russia allied with a Georgian anti-Russian chauvinist.

By the way, so much for Stalin's alleged "agenda" of promoting Greater Russian chauvinism at the expense of the minorities, the Russian chauvinist foes of the Union of the SSRs were being annihilated by Stalin and his comrades.

In 1949, there was an election in the Leningrad Party organization. Although some party members had voted against Popkov, the result of the election was announced as a 'unanimous' vote for Popkov. Two CIA documents confirmed:

In 1949, as a result of the elections which took place in the Leningrad Party organization, Popkov was re-elected as Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee. After the secret balloting, the election results were read by the Election Commission (Schmetnaya Kommissiya), which stated that without exception all members of the Party conference had voted for Popkov. A few days later, letters began to arrive at the Central Committee, directed specifically to Stalin, from many members of the party conference, who it seemed, had voted against Popkov and were very surprised at the peculiar results of the balloting. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Popkov was up for re-election as First Secretary and Kuznetsov was up for election to the Leningrad Oblast Committee. Several voters cast ballots against the entire slate, but the commission certifying the election felt that it would look more proper if the election was unanimous. They took their problem to Kuznetsov, who told them that it was their affair, thus indirectly countenancing the falsification. (The Execution of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, CIA, January 25, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

It seems like Kuznetsov was trusted by some of those who did not know his true face, perhaps because he was wrongly described by the bourgeois media as a 'protege' of Zhdanov.

At least:

One of those who had voted against the slate then wrote to Stalin informing him that the election had not been unanimous. (The Execution of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, CIA, January 25, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Clearly, the letters of the Party members showed that Kuznetsov, the electoral commission, as well as almost certainly Popkov himself, had committed electoral fraud during the 1949 elections of Leningrad. The communist faction led by

Stalin investigated the case:

A special commission, appointed by the Central Committee, was sent to Leningrad to investigate the situation. The commission found that the results of the election had been shuffled with Popkov's knowledge, and that there were all kinds of discrepancies in the work of the oblast Party Committee. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Referring to Voznesensky and Kuznetsov, Sergo Beria recalled:

My father had no reason to persecute the two Leningraders; he had other things to worry about. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Kuznetsov and Beria were under careful surveillance by the Soviet intelligence service:

A few days before his arrest, in August 1949, Kuznetsov came to our house. He told us that he knew he was being watched. 'I am, too,' my father replied. 'I advise you to be careful what you say to your friends in the Party.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Then:

Stalin used this charge [of electoral fraud] as the basis for the arrests which followed. Kuznetsov had attended the election as Party representative from the center and was held doubly responsible for the falsification. (The Execution of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, CIA, January 25, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Ruthless purges began as a result of which:

Popkov and some of his responsible assistants who had close relations with him vanished without a trace. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Because Voznesensky supported the Yugoslav agents in Leningrad during the purge of Leningrad:

he [i.e. Voznesensky] went down with them [i.e. Yugoslav agents in Leningrad]. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 216) (IMG)

Voznesensky was responsible for damaging the Soviet economic planning. The CIA confirmed:

Voznesenskiy ... made major errors in economic planning.. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

Voznesensky, however, was an economist. It seemed unlikely that an economist so knowledgeable as him would 'err' in economic planning, and seemed more likely that his 'errors' were actually a deliberate act of economic sabotage against the Soviet state. A Soviet engineer who defected to the countries of the US-led camp reported hearing that Voznesensky conducted economic sabotage by deliberately presenting false reports about the state of the Soviet economy:

A Soviet engineer who defected from the USSR in 1949, reported hearing that Voznesensky had been removed because he had attempted to deceive Stalin regarding the degree of the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan. (The Balance of Power August 1948 to October 1950, HR70-14, CIA, August 5, 1953, pp. 10-11) (IMG)

In fact, those were not really 'errors' – they were intentional acts of economic sabotage aimed at undermining the industrial backbone to the Soviet military. Like Beria, Voznesensky wanted to reduce Soviet investments into the military:

Voznesensky also understood that we needed to reduce the hypertrophy of the military-industrial complex, which distorted our system, and my father thought well of him for that. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Voznesensky's opposition to the development of the military-industrial backbone:

brought him into conflict with the Party's organs.. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Even Sergo Beria admits:

Voznesensky did not have the makings of a leader. He would never have been able to head an apparatus or even a ministry. He was, instead, an economist, and his rudeness to his subordinates was not enough to make him a talented administrator. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

The fact that Voznesensky's intention in the first place was to undermine the military-industrial backbone of the USSR and that he did indeed 'mistakenly' undermine the military-industrial backbone of the USSR is evidence that the 'mistakes' were deliberate acts of sabotage. Voznesensky was duly demoted, tried, and executed.

Other individuals that were ruthlessly purged were listed by the CIA document:

G. M. Popov, Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee, and Lt. Gen. I. V. Kovalev, Minister of Communications (sic; Transportation), who like Popov ... used Party funds to build dachy for his mistresses, and finally went so far as ordering a spur-line for his villa on the Black Sea. For the same type of sins, Stalin's personal favorite, Rear Admiral I. D. Papanin, Chairman of the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sear Route, was removed from his post. Papanin soon acquired a taste for the pleasures of social life and built a home, also not with his own money, which, in size, surpassed the estates of great pre-Revolutionary landowners. He had for

his own use about ten automobiles, including an amphibious vehicle he had received from the US under Lend-Lease and which he used for duck hunting. To top it all, he ordered the peasants from the nearby collectives to construct a pond for his white swans, for which his wife had a weakness. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

Note that in the Soviet Union, purges were carried out based on law – not on who was ‘Stalin’s personal favorite’. The survival of a Party member was not dependent on the Soviet leader’s emotions. Of course, Joseph Stalin endorsed the purge of Papanin, upon discovering that the latter was corrupt. **In short, the CIA agrees that the people whom Stalin wanted punished were indeed ‘guilty’ and that the purges affected guilty individuals ‘regardless of their position or rank in the Party’:**

Thus, Stalin ruthlessly punished the guilty, regardless of their position or rank in the Party. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

The communist faction, reliant upon the blue-collar workers in the CPSU and entrenched in many parts of the military and security bodies, was waging the class struggles to entrench its dominance over the state apparatus and to eliminate the corrupt bureaucratic class that constituted the key class base of the Titoists in the Soviet Union.

The corrupt bureaucrats of Leningrad had deep UDB connections as well. In January 1948, Tito’s gang in Yugoslavia sent a delegation headed by Milovan Djilas to the Soviet Union. As Djilas wrote in his memoirs, he was politely welcomed by Zhdanov in Moscow, but clearly, Zhdanov and Djilas did not get along much. Djilas recalled:

Even if we had not been idle we still would have wished to see Leningrad, the city of the Russian Revolution and the city of many beauties. I approached Zhdanov concerning this and he graciously agreed. But I also detected a certain reserve. The meeting [with Zhdanov] lasted barely ten minutes. (Conversations with Stalin, Milovan Djilas, p. 166) (IMG)

On the other hand, Djilas was warmly welcomed and could ‘get along with’ the ‘humane’ and ‘warm’ leaders of Leningrad (Popkov and Kuznetsov), who could ‘understand the language’ of Djilas:

Our encounter with Leningrad’s officials added human warmth to our admiration. They were all, to a man, simple, educated, hard-working people who had taken on their shoulders and still bore in their hearts the tragic greatness of the city. But they lived lonely lives and were glad to meet men from another clime and culture [such as Yugoslav leaders]. We got along with them easily and quickly – as men who had experienced a similar fate. Though it never occurred to us to complain about the Soviet leaders, still we observed that these men approached the life of their city and citizens – that most cultured and most industrialized center in the vast Russian land – in a simpler and more human way than was the case in Moscow.

It seemed to me that I could very quickly arrive at a common political language with these people simply by employing the language of humanity. Indeed, I was not surprised to hear two years later that these people, too, had failed to escape the totalitarian millstone just because they dared also to be men. (Conversations with Stalin, Milovan Djilas, pp. 168-169) (IMG)




The Leningrad leaders were in fact Yugoslav agents – hence Djilas liked them. They leaked intelligence for the Yugoslav delegation:

In January 1948 a Yugoslav delegation led by Milovan Djilas had visited Leningrad and had gotten along well with party leaders there; they had received information from the Leningraders about Soviet internal politics, a leak that had annoyed Stalin. (Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union, Harvard University Press, Geoffrey A. Hosking, p. 254) (IMG)

Again, one ally of the Yugoslav agents in the Kremlin was the Soviet Union’s head of the State Central Planning Commission, Nikolai Voznesensky. ‘Voznesensky’, Sergo Beria recalled:

supported the Leningraders.. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 216) (IMG)

Nor was the death toll of the Leningrad so high. A US intelligence file provided a graph of the membership statistics of the CPSU. As can be seen from the graph (to which I added the red line for the reader to more easily see), there was no dramatic decline in Party membership whatsoever. Also, note that alongside the shaded graph, there is the non-shaded zig-zag curve; that one represents the percentage change in Party membership; and for the period of the Leningrad purge, it shows a membership increase. The graph shows that there had historically been considerable declines in Party membership – such as for the period of the Great Purge and the Great Patriotic War – but the Leningrad Purge was not one of them.



Left: the larger part of graph shown by the CIA document. Middle & Right: zooming in on the period of the Leningrad Purge; the zoom shows almost no change in the Party membership. See: (U.S.S.R., National Intelligence Survey, No. 26, CIA, April 1974, p. 7) (IMG{Mortality})

C19S5. The Demotion of Molotov and the Purge of Polina. Zhemchuzhina.

The arrest of Polina Zhemchuzhina, Molotov's wife, on charges of collaboration with the Mossad appears to have been a conspiracy by the Malenkov network with the objective of forcing the demotion of Molotov. The case against Zhemchuzhina had begun during the Yezhov years, for even during those years she had meetings with Zionist leaders. The cooptation and rise of Beria was utilized as a counter-weight against the undue and baseless suspicion directed against Zhemchuzhina and thus she was saved from a fake 'anti-Zionist' witch-hunt:

In Yezhov's time the Party organs began to compile a dossier on Zhemchuzhina. Malenkov busied himself assembling the items and my father was ordered to investigate Zhemchuzhina's links with the Zionists.

One day Stalin showed him the Central Committee's dossier which proved Zhemchuzhina's anti-Party activity³⁴ and told him to check the accusations, making it plain that they were to be confirmed. 'He did not doubt that I would do as he wished,' my father told me. He examined all the reports, dating back to Yezhov. Zhemchuzhina's only sin was to have helped some Jews. She had indeed met representatives of Zionist organisations, but officially and with the permission of the Politburo, and so of Stalin. They [i.e. the Yezhovites] wanted to make this a crime on her part. 'These charges don't stand up. They only want to organise a provocation against Molotov,' said my father to Stalin, who took his report and did not mention the matter again.

(*'Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin'*, Sergo Beria, p. 169) (IMG)

Malenkov belonged to the Yezhovite group that assembled the dossier against Polina. During the late 1930s, the case against Polina was dropped. However, in 1949, the allegations against her were raised again. The initiative for arresting Zhemchuzhina came from the enemies of Stalin and Molotov, but neither Stalin nor Molotov voted against such an initiative because she had been discredited. Sergo Beria recalled:

In February 1949 the initiative for Zhemchuzhina's arrest came not from Stalin but from people who were competing for his succession. (*'Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin'*, Sergo Beria, p. 169) (IMG)

Furthermore, Zhemchuzhina seemed to not blame Stalin for her imprisonment – or at least her admiration for Stalin implied such:

Molotov loved only Zhemchuzhina, who was herself madly in love, all her life, with Stalin. 'There's a man!' she said to Molotov. (*'Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin'*, Sergo Beria, p. 170) (IMG)

The 'evidence' against Zhemchuzhina rested on her hanging out with Israel's ambassador to the Soviet Union, Golda Meir. Lionized in the West, Golda has been wrongly referred to as Israel's 'Iron Lady'. Yet, anyone with a basic knowledge of Golda Meir would know how weak a woman she was. From Moshe Dayan to Ariel Sharon to David Eleazar, Haim Bar-Lev, and Yitzhak Rabin, no one who knew Golda Meir took her seriously. In fact, the Mapam-

Palmach faction in the Israeli state apparatus installed her at the helm of Israel's regime precisely for how mentally weak and pliable, and hence easily controllable, she was. No doubt Polina Zhemchuzhina's too frequent hanging out with Golda was unwise as it could be used to discredit Polina, but it is difficult to imagine precisely how a brilliant Yiddish revolutionary woman like her could be a 'Zionist agent' recruited by a weak woman and loser like Golda Meir. Furthermore, although like most Yiddish women, Zhemchuzhina loved Stalin, she grew critical of Stalin's anti-Zionist and anti-Bundist policy:

During the war Zhemchuzhina took an active part in the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee despite my father's warnings. Later she sharply criticised Stalin's anti-Jewish policy. How could he not understand that the Jewish people deserved help after all they had done for the revolution? Ought the proletarian state not to show its gratitude? Molotov said nothing. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 170) (IMG)

Do the calculations. The narrative aimed at framing up Zhemchuzhina would go like this: "Zhemchuzhina befriends Golda Meir, the head of the Mossad base in Moscow. Agent Zhemchuzhina then begins to promote hostile agitation against Soviet power by calling for Bundist settlement in Crimea, which, during the Third World War, would be used by the fascists as a Yiddish settler-colonial separatist base subservient to Anglo-American imperialism." True, befriending Golda Meir and then pushing for Bundist settlement in Crimea normally does imply intelligence service work for the imperialist secret services. However, in exceptionally rare cases, individuals render services to imperialist secret services not as agents but as 'useful idiots'. Polina Zhemchuzhina was a smart woman and did not have evil intentions, but on this issue, she acted usefully-idiotic in favour of the Zionist intelligence network, thus making a case against herself and leaving Molotov and Stalin no excuse to save her from a frame-up.

The imprudent actions of Zhemchuzhina did not represent Molotov's views:

Molotov dared not say anything to Zhemchuzhina, because he was afraid of her. Knowing her volcanic temper, he feared that she would go and make a scene before Stalin. However, he complained to Stalin.. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 169) (IMG) my father revealed to us that Molotov had applied Party policy like an automaton and had had people shot, in great numbers, on the basis of mere suspicion. He told us all that in a quite objective way. He warned my mother that Zhemchuzhina was an independent woman with her own ideas. Molotov put up with this, though his attitude was disapproved of by his Politburo colleagues. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 170) (IMG)

Even though Molotov did not agree with his wife's behaviour, the arrest of Zhemchuzhina in turn made her husband Molotov appear as the 'compromised' 'honey-trapped' husband of a 'Zionist agent'. His 'soft' attitude towards his wife was used as an excuse by the Yezhovite agent Malenkov to depict Molotov as a man 'soft' on American imperialism. Malenkov successfully engineered the demotion of Molotov in March 1949, weeks after the imprisonment of Zhemchuzhina. Molotov was replaced by Vyshinsky, a communist loyalist despised by the Titoist faction. Despite the loyalty of Vyshinsky to the socialist state, the position of the communist forces in the Ministry had undoubtedly become weaker with the ouster of Molotov.

C19S6. The Titoist Faction led by Beria Undermines the Soviet Military-Industrial Backbone / CIA Stance on Consumer Goods vs. Producer Goods

Many harbour the delusion that the development of nuclear weapons by the USSR meant that the USSR did not need to invest in its conventional weapons as much, since the USSR was 'not' going to be invaded ever again. This perspective is incorrect. First of all, having nuclear weapons does not automatically prevent a state from being aggressed; the Georgian regime, an Anglo-American satellites state, invaded the nuclear-armed Russian Federation in 2008. Secondly, the USSR needed conventional weapons in order to undermine the terrorist guerrillas that the CIA and MI6 sponsored inside the Soviet Union, the Peoples' Democracies, and other anti-imperialist allies of the USSR. Thirdly, the USSR needed to develop conventional weapons in order to militarily assist the Vietnamese freedom-fighters, the North Koreans in the Korean War, the anti-imperialist Arabs and Mapamite Hebrews in the struggle against the Israeli regime and the reactionary Arab regimes, the anti-Apartheid activists in South Africa, the Latin American guerrillas. All of these wars in which the USSR was to be covertly involved required conventional weapons. Developing nuclear weapons was crucial, no doubt; but the struggle does not end there. The development of nuclear weapons merely turns direct wars into covert or indirect ones.

Stalin supported investments into conventional weapons as well, whereas his Titoist opponents – Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Bulganin – opposed him on this matter. The existence of the intelligentsia as the majority in the CPSU meant that the USSR was going to begin to decline. The was USSR running out of time. In order to counter this tendency to decline, it was necessary that the USSR, for a while, speeds up with the expansion of the anti-imperialist movements worldwide, or else the balance would tilt in favor of the enemies of the USSR and the USSR would implode:

Also, he thought that **time was working in the West's favour**, that the relations of forces was at this moment **as favourable to the USSR as it could be**. So he set himself to prepare, not public opinion but those close to

him, by repeating to them that war was inevitable, and that the Americans would start it.

He claimed to have documents that proved his assertions. There were indeed American plans for a preventative war. (...). My father tried in vain to prove to Stalin that the Americans were not at all ready to go to war.. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 233. Bold added.) (IMG)

The mass-scale development of conventional weapons, the multiplication of bombers, tanks and missiles, all our military preparations pointed to the imminent launching of an offensive. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, pp. 233-234) (IMG)

Rushing is usually what the Trotskyites advocate, but in the context of the USSR, a country that was soon to reach its peak and begin to decline, it was necessary to cause as much damage to the imperialist armies worldwide through the conventional weapons, so that through the weakening of the imperialist militaries, the imperialist intelligence services would also have a weaker backbone, hence being less able to penetrate the USSR. Failing to maximize damage during the golden era of the USSR would have only allowed the imperialists to strike the USSR more easily when it had begun to decline.

Beria on the other hand, advocated the surrender of East Germany to West Germany, the decentralization of the economy, and a cut in military spending:

In 1949-50 the decay of our economy because of the age of our infrastructures and the equipment of our basic industries provided my father with an excuse to go back on the offensive. He initiated economic discussions, using the argument of efficiency, which safeguarded him from accusations of ideological deviation. He urged that Germany be reunited at all costs, that our military expenditure and the size of our armed forces be reduced, and that our production of conventional weapons be cut down in favour of concentration on new types of armament. Only an agreement with Germany would furnish the resources needed to rescue our economy. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 227) (IMG)

For this reason, the Beria group gave false data on the production of the military equipment in 1949-1951 in order to undermine the armed forces of the Soviet Union:

Vannikov thought of a stratagem which he proudly explained to my father. The industries controlled by him published production figures that fell short of reality, so that we could freely dispose of the surpluses that did not appear in the official data. Many people knew of this subterfuge, but nobody brought it to Stalin's attention.

Unfortunately, it was impossible to apply this system to foodstuffs, a domain in which it was harder to fiddle the figures. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, pp. 226 -227) (IMG)

Who was Vannikov? Vannikov was a military general of the Red Army, arrested in 1941 and was supposed to be executed for treason. However, Beria managed to ensure that he survives and that Stalin would be misinformed of Vannikov's death. Later on, when the Nazi Germans invaded, the leverage of the Stalin faction reduced, which allowed Beria to catapult this renegade back to his position in the armaments sector. Thanks to the lobby of Beria, Vannikov was honoured in the USSR, even though he was a traitor:

Vannikov, my father's deputy and the Number Two of the atomic project, was short and thick-set. Intelligent and kindly eyes brightened his big bald head. Three times a Hero of Socialist Labour, he had known many vicissitudes. When he was Commissar for Armaments he was arrested, in June 1941, and condemned to death. My father succeeded in preventing the worst from happening. When war broke out Stalin remembered him. 'What a pity, an intelligent man like him would have been useful today,' he remarked. 'Who knows, perhaps he may have survived somewhere in the camps,' said my father. Stalin was not deceived by this reply and blamed him for it later. A fortnight after this conversation Vannikov was presented to him and he was made Minister. My father thought highly of him. He ... liked me and I kept his confidences to myself. I did not want interference by my father in our relations. Vannikov, who came from Baku, was over 50, and I was 25 years old. He tried to educate me. 'What feelings do you think this regime arouses in me?' he asked. 'I hate it and yet I work for it. And I work honestly. What else can I do?' One day he said to me: 'I soon gave up my career in the Party. I went to Moscow, studied engineering while living from hand to mouth, and got a diploma. But I liked power at that time. Instead of shutting myself up in research I had to go into politics and end up as a Minister. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 181) (IMG)

The Titoist faction led by Beria was aiming to undermine the nuclear power of the USSR so that the Soviets cannot focus on the conventional military after developing their nuclear weapons. The Titoist faction aimed to undermine the conventional arms production of the USSR in order to prevent Soviet arms exports to the anti-imperialist forces. Remember that the anti-imperialist progressive bourgeois-democracy in Syria as well as the Lebanese republic, were all militarily funded by the Stalin-era Soviet Union during the 1940s and 1950s. The People's Democratic Korea especially needed the arms for the war of liberation against Anglo-American imperialism. The undermining of the Soviet conventional arms could utterly decimate the anti-imperialist forces worldwide. It was not just that, however. The reduction of the amount of weaponry available to the socialist forces would have weakened the dictatorship of the

proletariat. Note that the dictatorship of the proletariat is essentially the control of the proletariat over the means of violence. The reduction of the quantity of the means of violence available to the agents of the proletariat would – in relative terms – mean a greater amount of means of violence available to the anti-proletarian comprador forces in the socialist country. A lowering of the quantity of the means of violence available to the dictatorship of the proletariat results in the reduction of the hold of the proletariat over the state and an increase in the influence of the class enemies of the proletariat. Hence, a reduction in the amount of military funds available to the dictatorship of the proletariat results in an increase in the influence of the comprador agents inside the workers' state at the expense of the proletariat.

In the context of the Soviet Union, a reduction in the quantity and quality of the conventional and non-conventional arms of the Red Army would have rolled back the influence of the communist faction of the Red Army while increasing the influence of the Titoist commanders in the Red Army. The weakening of the Soviet military and the weakening of the armed forces of the Soviet allies would have altogether inflicted heavy costs upon the Red Army, thus reducing the funds available for the communist faction of the Red Army. Such a reduction of funds would force the Red Army's communist faction to reallocate funds away from the anti-Titoist secret service struggle onto compensating the military losses. As such, the Titoist faction in the Red Army could gain greater leverage, thus allowing the Beria-led network to systematically demote the communist loyalist commanders in the Red Army, eliminate such commanders, plant Titoist agents in the command of the Red Army, and thereby make the means of violence in the USSR dominated no longer by the agents of the proletariat but by the agents of the comprador bourgeoisie, particularly the corrupt bureaucrats. Through these means, socialism in the USSR could be liquidated and replaced with comprador capitalism.

Beria promised Stalin the hydrogen bomb, not fulfilling the promise until after Stalin died:

We exploded our second bomb in 1951. This was already more than just a copy of the American bomb.¹⁶ To persuade Stalin to be patient my father dangled before him the prospect of something still better – the hydrogen bomb, very much more effective. But he was not in a hurry to explode it. In my opinion, it was ready in 1952 but my father waited till Stalin died before deciding to test it, in July 1953.

He knew very well that Stalin wanted to have the H-bomb before the Americans so as to be able to start a war with them.

Stalin began to harass my father and Kurchatov, demanding that they speed up manufacture to the utmost. (It had begun while we were still working on the two previous bombs.) When they both explained to him that at least three or four years would have to pass before the project was complete, he suspected that Kurchatov was hand in glove with my father. Stalin had begun involving himself in the affairs of the atomic committee in 1946, at the time of Malenkov's disgrace, which also marked a weakening of my father's position. It was then that he started to send for scientists.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 227-228) (IMG)

Beria thus sabotaged the Soviet nuclear program as well. Beria most likely had the bomb ready by 1952. However, he hid it to delay the Soviet nuclear program and to prevent Stalin from purging him, given that the bomb was needed for preventing an Anglo-American imperialist invasion. The early finishing off of the hydrogen bomb would have meant that the defense of the USSR would have been secured insofar as nuclear retaliation capability was concerned, and the USSR could duly focus on the conventional weapons, to wage the Cold War against the Anglo-Americans, as opposed to engaging in a hot war. Developing those nuclear weapons would have given the USSR the deterrence capability that would allow it to stockpile conventional arms for exporting the socialist and progressive bourgeois-democratic revolutions in the areas surrounding the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Stalin was not fooled by Beria's 'Hydrogen Bomb' card. He obviously put pressure on the Beria gang although Stalin did not have enough agents to have the capability to pressure Beria to behave properly with respect to the nuclear weapons. Only in 1946, as stated above, did Stalin have such capabilities.

Such measures by Beria were of course supported by the CIA. The CIA promoted the view that consumer goods must be prioritized over producer goods. In other words, the CIA propagated the thesis that heavy industry – the sector that assisted the growth of the military and the consumer goods – shall be de-emphasized. Concerning the civilians of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, the US intelligence high command, the National Security Council (NSC), set as its plan:

To stimulate their desire for more consumer's goods by bringing them to realize how rich are the fruits of free labor and how much they themselves could gain from a government which primarily sought their well-being and not conquest. (104. National Security Council Report, Washington, June 29, 1956. NSC 5607, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EAST-WEST EXCHANGES) (IMG)

The citizens' 'well-being' is a euphemism for consumer goods whereas 'conquest' is a euphemism for military-industrial backbone strengthened through investments into producer goods or heavy industry. The enemies of the freedom forces promoted the reduction in emphasis over producer goods in the Soviet-led camp so to undermine the latter's productive forces. The emphasis over the consumer goods was a demagogical measure in itself, for it did not account for the fact

that investment into producer goods actually helps multiply consumer goods, that investments into heavy industry boosts light industry, and that establishing {the means of the production of the means of production} multiplies the rate of expansion of the means of production. In 'The Economic Problems', Stalin famously attacked this view that favoured the consumer goods over the producer goods, light industry over heavy industry. Furthermore, the comprador classes which pushed for the reduction in military-industrial investments in the socialist countries did so as a way of reducing the means of violence available to the agents of the proletariat, so to roll back the influence of the proletariat over the means of violence and hence over the state in general. Such a rollback of the agents of the proletariat would have allowed the expanded influence of the comprador classes, such as the corrupt bureaucrats, over the means of violence and thus over the state in general. Upon gaining influence over the state as a whole, the comprador classes would work to directly sabotage not only the producer goods and military but also the very consumer goods for which they preached. Remember Sergo Beria's words regarding the Beriaite drive to sabotage food industry: 'Vannikov thought of a stratagem which he proudly explained to my father. The industries controlled by him published production figures that fell short of reality, so that we could freely dispose of the surpluses that did not appear in the official data. Many people knew of this subterfuge, but nobody brought it to Stalin's attention. Unfortunately, it was impossible to apply this system to foodstuffs, a domain in which it was harder to fiddle the figures.'

C19S7.1. Some Purges Prior to the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952 Amy Knight of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center, remarked:

Abakumov's replacement was none other than [Semyon] Ignat'ev, the former associate of the Zhdanov group whom Beria and Malenkov had managed to remove from the Belorussian Secretariat in 1949. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 158) (IMG)

Her remarks are true, but in a more complicated manner than would appear. As has been mentioned before, Malenkov and Beria were covertly allies while being 'enemies' on the overt level. Covertly, Ignatiyev was an agent of Malenkov and hence also an agent of Beria. However, on a more overt level, Ignatiyev was an ally of Malenkov and an 'enemy' of Beria. Therefore, on the covert level, Malenkov and Beria did indeed oppose Ignatiyev's rise because Ignatiyev could help in the anti-Beria purges, but on a somewhat more overt level, only Beria opposed the rise of Ignatiyev whereas Malenkov supported Ignatiyev's rise.

Ignatiyev, although a Malenkov agent, was nonetheless useful to the Stalin faction precisely because Ignatiyev was weak, had few connections, and was more susceptible to becoming a docile yes-man of the Stalin faction of the Central Committee in carrying out the anti-Titoist purges against the Beria faction:

When he was made head of State Security in July 1951 Ignatiev behaved as a docile tool of the Central Committee. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 217) (IMG)

During this period, Malenkov, coopted by the communist faction, was compelled to pursue anti-Beria purges. Stalin coopted Malenkov to undermine Vlasik and Poskrebyshev who were indeed traitors. Malenkov too tried to use his overt-level 'alliance' with Stalin as a channel for intelligence penetration into Stalin's entourage but Stalin prevented this. Sergo Beria recalled:

Doubtless at Stalin's instigation, Malenkov undertook to discredit Vlasik and Poskrebyshev, though they were fanatically devoted to their master. He wanted to replace them with his own men and ordered Ignatiev to compile a compromising dossier that would show them to be corrupt. It appeared that they used Stalin's name to enrich themselves. Poskrebyshev rushed to my father to seek his help (this man often came to our house and my father put up with him). He proclaimed his innocence, certainly lying. My father replied that he could do nothing, as he was in a much worse situation. 'Have you ever lifted your little finger for me? You can only rely on the wisdom of Iosif Vissarionovich.' Poor Poskrebyshev was ready to climb up to the ceiling. Eventually he was made to retire. Nevertheless Malenkov succeeded only partly in gaining control of Stalin's immediate entourage. He did not manage to infiltrate the Secretariat completely. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 247) (IMG)

For his treason, Vlasik was further demoted to the point of being arrested and sent to the corrective labour camp. Timashuk experienced a rise in prestige as well as greater responsibility, while a Soviet intelligence official named Riyumin was promoted:

Because the contents of the report supported facts involving physicians who were attending a number of members of the government, Shtsherbakov [i.e. Shcherbakov] among others, Timashuk's report got into the hands of Vlasik, who was at that time chief of the guard protecting the members of the government. Vlasik wrote on the report the remark "yurunda" (Baloney) and put it on the shelf. This "yurunda" soon made the rounds at the Ministry as a sort of joke. In 1952 one of the operational bosses going over the old reports happened to pick up the Timashuk report. It just happened a campaign against Jewish elements in the Ministry was on at that time. This colleague again submitted this "overt" report to his superiors and from here it went on up to Stalin. Vlasik

was punished for negligence. From house arrest he was transferred to a concentration camp, since at that time he was already on the way out, and replaced by Col Rakov. By order of Stalin himself a "hot time" came for Timashuk. She wrote voluminous "uncovering" material on the Jewish element among the doctors. Investigation of the case was entrusted to a certain Ryumin, promoted after the arrest of Abakumov, and Ryumin handed it to the Central Committee and the former Deputy Minister Ignatiev. Ignatiev held this post when the anti-Jewish campaign started. Ryumin knew how to exploit the case with the whole technical know how of the MVD. ('Committee of State Security / The Doctors' Plot and Its Reversal', CIA, September 24, 1954, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Some individuals would object by stating that Vlasik was 'framed'. These individuals harbour an erroneous view. Surely, some innocent individuals at the lower ranks of the Soviet government and whom Stalin was not very familiar with could have been framed in Stalin's name and without Stalin's consent. However, Vlasik was very familiar to Stalin. And so, had Vlasik been innocent, Stalin would have gone ahead to support him against the frame-up. Some would object that Stalin might have 'known' that Vlasik was 'innocent', but that he had so little power. This too is incorrect. Stalin had much less power in those years than in the prewar years, but he still had enough power to be able to pursue much of his agenda in the postwar years. Stalin had enough power that even after Stalin's own death, the faction that Stalin had headed managed to purge Malenkov and Beria even though that same Stalin faction also lost to Khrushchev, for historical-material reasons that will be explained later. It follows that while Stalin was relatively weaker, he was not a mere figurehead. Had he been a mere figurehead, he would have been assassinated much earlier, because his enemies could not have tolerated the physical existence of Stalin even as a politically powerless man. Stalin had enough surveillance and intelligence capability to have his faction's intelligence agents to watch out for frame-up of powerful officials around him. And he could save Vlasik. However, Stalin did not save Vlasik from the purge because Vlasik was a vicious traitor to the USSR.

Some would ask the question: why would Stalin not be so vigilant as to prevent his enemies from being in charge of his physical protection in the first place? The question is wrong. Placing one's enemy agents ostensibly 'in charge' of one's own physical protection is often used as a means of demoting those enemy agents from much more sensitive positions such as the heights of the intelligence service and the command of the military down to becoming a semi-figurehead 'in charge' of one's own physical protection. Such a demotion allows for the more sensitive intelligence positions to be filled with one's trusted agents who in turn could more easily surveil the demoted person and semi-figurehead 'in charge' of one's own physical protection. This was the case of Vlasik, who from the top ranks of the Cheka and OGPU was demoted in the 1930s down to the person ostensibly 'heading' the physical protection force guarding Stalin. That such a demotion occurred in the 1930s is clear evidence that Vlasik was an old enemy of Stalin, not an old friend. The real on-the-ground physical protection of Stalin was done by Stalin's trusted and trustworthy guards, the honorable fighters who risked their lives to protect the CPSU General-Secretary; the protection was not done by the crooked Vlasik. Of course, even having such a disloyal element as Vlasik ostensibly 'in charge' of one's personal guards was still risky and was too much, which is why it was high time that Vlasik would be purged. Demoting renegades to being ostensibly 'in command' of those genuinely providing one's physical protection is not unique to Stalin by the way. I know for a fact that it is an intelligence technique used in other countries as well. Of course, one has to ensure that the traitor demoted to being the ostensible commander of the personal protection units really becomes as much of a figurehead as possible, or else there will be room for abuse and assassination. Purges of the associates of Vlasik, Poskrebyshv, and Abakumov occurred by mid-1952. Purges against suspects encircling Stalin occurred:

- Personal chief of staff and aide in directing MGB activities: position vacant since Poskrebyshv's removal in April 1952.
- Minister of State Security: the inexperienced Ignatyev since April 1952.
- Chief of the Guards Directorate: none since April 1952.
- Personal bodyguards: reduced by half in mid-1952.
- Chief of personal bodyguards: replaced in mid-1952 by a colonel lacking command experience in this specialty.
- Personal chauffeurs and bodyguards: also replaced in mid-1952.
- Personal servants at the dacha in Kuntsevo: cut back in mid-1952.

('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, pp. 120-121) (IMG)

The cut in the guards personnel was of course risky because it reduced the troop size for defending Stalin's life; however, even more dangerous was enemy infiltration into Stalin's guards personnel. Hence, the policy of reducing the guards personnel made sense in this context. Many of the guards and officers 'protecting' Stalin were actually unreliable elements and so Stalin decided to reduce the number of his guards:

Up to May 1952 this guard numbered more than 400 persons, actual guards and households attendants. When the commission for re-examining the guard directorate was established in May 1952, Stalin declared that 200

people were enough for his personal guard, and therefore ordered it to be cut in half. However, the actual number who remained from June 1952 until Stalin's death was 250. Of these 250 persons, probably only 60 to 70 were actual physical guards. The rest were chauffeurs, cooks, barbers, gardeners, household servants, and so forth. (CHIEF GUARD DIRECTORATE, CIA, February 25, 1955, p. 7) (IMG)

C19S7.2. The 19th CPSU Congress in 1952 & the Ascendancy of the Titoists to Dominance / The Physical Elimination of Stalin and the Suspicious Deaths of Red Army Commanders

After the Great Patriotic War, Khrushchev formed a closer relationship with MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria:

He thought Khrushchev was crafty and perfidious, extremely dangerous despite his illiteracy. After the war he made a show of passionate friendship for my father, who thought this funny, but eventually let himself be taken by it. Khrushchev never contradicted him openly. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 166) (IMG)

Khrushchev himself had had long-standing friendly relations with British intelligence. He admitted this in his own memoirs:

I will add here only one incident having to do with a left-wing British Labourite. I forget his name. He died three years ago. I was well acquainted with him. He was our good friend, a man of Finnish extraction. He was so devoted to the Soviet Union that the Labourites expelled him from their party. He wanted to come visit us. Stalin who was already ill suddenly took it into his head that this man was an agent, a foreign spy (and during the war he actually had served in the military intelligence). He didn't deny that he had served in British intelligence. And so he was not granted a visa to visit the Soviet Union, although at the time he had been speaking publicly in our favor. Later I met with him, and he said to me: "Comrade Khrushchev, people didn't understand me correctly. I was always your friend. It was wrong to treat me like that. I will be your friend till the day I die." ('Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964', Watson Institute, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 89) (IMG)

The man whom Khrushchev was describing was a very famous Titoist military-political intelligence officer for the MI6, named Konni Zilliacus. Stephen Shenfield, who translated to English the memoirs of Khrushchev, confirmed that Khrushchev was speaking of the anti-Soviet warrior and MI6 operative Zilliacus:

Khrushchev is referring to the left-wing Labour Party politician Konni Zilliacus (1894-1971). Although Zilliacus served as an intelligence officer for the British interventionary force in the Russian Far East in early 1918, he was opposed to the foreign intervention and undermined it by leaking information about the situation in Siberia to the press. In the interwar period he worked for the League of Nations. Elected to parliament in 1945, he was one of six Labour members who in 1949 voted against Britain joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), leading to his expulsion from the Labour Party and the loss of his seat in 1950. He was readmitted to the Labour Party in 1952 and reelected to Parliament in 1955. He continued to pursue a left-wing line in foreign and defense policy, supporting the movement for unilateral nuclear disarmament and later protesting against the American intervention in Vietnam. See Biographies. [SS] (N. S. Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953 -1964, Watson Institute, p. 90) (IMG)

Konni Zilliacus featured prominently during the Slansky trials in Czechoslovakia:

In 1947, Fierlinger copied Slansky on two letters from Zilliacus, which security later found in Slansky's files. Marginal notes made it clear that Slansky had read them. Slansky had also received some letters through diplomatic means. From 1946 to 1948 he met with Zilliacus three times in the presence of others. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 183) (IMG)

During the Slansky trials (see C15S8), it was alleged by the Czechoslovak government that the MI6-Mossad agent Slansky was working for Konni Zilliacus and had contacts of an intelligence character with him. Regardless of whether or not this specific allegation against Slansky was correct, it was very well-known by the officials of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracy that Zilliacus was a prominent MI6 official. He was regarded as unofficially an MI6 spy-master. For some information on what the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies stated regarding Zilliacus, the reader can refer to the transcript of the trials, the English-language translation of which is available online on archive.org at the time of writing.

Thus Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Beria began to gossip among each other against Stalin:

After our arrival in Moscow some members of the Politburo, such as Malenkov [and] Khrushchev ... who wanted to win my father's approval, started to read to him some disagreeable remarks that Stalin had [allegedly] made about him. Khrushchev said that one day when he was boasting to Stalin about his successes in Ukrainian agriculture the latter had barked: 'Stop boring me with your plantations, like Beria with his rubbish about citrus fruits!' Now my father's citrus fruits were like his own children to him. In cultivating them he had sought a means of consoling himself.. My father took the blow.

Khrushchev was quite pleased, I thought. When he had left my mother said: 'Don't take that to heart, Lavrenti. He may have made up that story.'

‘No, Nina,’ my father replied. ‘That was no lie. Khrushchev told the truth.’

(Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 145) (IMG)

As was detailed in C9S3, long before 1951, as early as the 1930s, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Mikoyan were agents of the same faction, together constituted a network of anti-communist activity, and were closely allied. However, outwardly, they pretended to contradict each other, with some members of the group adopting left- deviationist lines and the other members adopting right-deviationist lines as their outwardly appearance. In 1951, these agents decided to reduce the level of their outwardly contradictions and to mobilize into a more direct and joint confrontation against the Stalin faction. In 1951, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Mikoyan consolidated their Titoist bloc to fight against Stalin in the Politburo:

In 1951 the members of the Politburo, Bulganin, Malenkov, Khrushchev and my father began to appreciate that they were all in the same boat and it mattered little whether one of them was thrown overboard a few days before the others. They felt a sense of solidarity once they had faced the fact that none of them would be Stalin’s successor.. They therefore agreed among themselves not to allow Stalin to set one against another, and that they would immediately inform each other of anything Stalin said about them, so as to frustrate his manipulations. They recalled their former intrigues and buried their old grievances. Khrushchev told my father that Stalin had asked him for reports on the national question when he was in the Ukraine, though in principle, policy on that matter was still a preserve of the NKVD. This solidarity among the members of the Politburo increased as time went by. They also confided in Mikoyan, who understood the situation. But Stalin’s intrigues left traces which were not completely wiped out. It must be said that Stalin constructed his provocations around an element of truth.

After about six months Stalin guessed what was going on and unceremoniously demanded of the members of the Politburo: ‘Tell me, are you forming a bloc against me?’ He took the steps he thought appropriate and began to meet Ignatiev, the head of the State Security without going through the Politburo.

(Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 239) (IMG)

Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin were doubtless not so direct with Stalin as my father was, but [Stalin] could have no doubt that my father enjoyed their support. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 247) (IMG)

The consolidation of this bloc, it is worth noting, was also corroborated by Enver Hoxha:

Mikoyan ... plotted with Nikita Khrushchev against Stalin, whom they had decided to murder. He admitted this with his own mouth to Mehmet and me in February 1960. After the putsch they linked up with American imperialism, and set about the destruction to its foundations of the great work of Lenin and Stalin, socialism in the Soviet Union. (The Khrushchevites, Chapter 3, Enver Hoxha)

The alliance between Khrushchev and Beria was completely covert. At the overt level, they were still ‘enemies’ and Stalin utilized such an overt-level ‘hostility’ as a means of undermining them. Even during this time, when Khrushchev was completely a covert ally of Lavrenti Beria, Khrushchev, having been coopted by the Stalin faction, was waging the secret service conflict against one of Beria’s most important henchmen, Abakumov:

Stalin had appointed Politburo Member Nikita Khrushchev as secretary of the Moscow Party Organization in 1949. Two years later Khrushchev chose to come to the MGB Officers' Club and address several hundred of us Party activists from State Security in the windowless auditorium. Such a visit was withoutprecedent.

Not by chance, Khrushchev's subject was our responsibility to the Party. His underlying purpose apparently was to invigorate CPSU discipline—for which read "loyalty to the aftermath of the arrests of the MGB chiefs in August 1951, the month before Khrushchev spoke. He mentioned our former minister only once during his 45 minutes on the podium. He said that Abakumov had failed to detect "the nationalistic-Trotskyite tendencies" of the Leningrad Party Organization. (...). Khrushchev thus implied that, for this reason, Abakumov, his deputies, and many other MGB officers were being sent to prison.

Later the CPSU Central Committee repeated the charge about Abakumov's "lack of vigilance" regarding the Leningrad Party Organization. This and additional accusations appeared in a secret Central Committee letter that was read aloud to us MGB Party activists a month or two after Khrushchev's speech.

(‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, p. 58) (IMG)

The key political battle that resulted in the decline of the Stalin faction was the 19th CPSU Congress, the Congress in which the white collar elements in the Party held the largest percentage though not yet the above-50% majority, whereas the blue-collar elements in the Party held a minority. Surely the kolkhoz peasantry bore characteristics very similar to the proletarians and played a role strongly favourable to socialism but it would obviously be an exaggeration to state that the kolkhoz peasantry in behaviour were as ‘proletarian’ as the proletariat itself. All of these years of emphasis on theoretical work, during the post-war period, all these years of Zhdanovschina, not only was significant for the entire

communist movement, but also served as a tool against the political influence of the liberal intelligentsia, who comprised the bulk of the CPSU. It was aimed at discrediting the intelligentsia. However, ultimately, such efforts to cut the intelligentsia to size did not succeed to the level desired, and the intelligentsia continued to dominate the Party. Regarding the dominant role of the intellectuals in the Party Congress, the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) acknowledged:

Preliminary analysis of the composition of the delegation and comparison with previous congresses shows that the importance of the intelligentsia in Party affairs is greatly increasing. (Developments in the Soviet Party Congress, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, October 9, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Another report, this time by the CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE) corroborated:

The base of the Party has been broadened, thereby depriving the industrial proletariat of its membership monopoly. The duties of the members have been increased, but instead of being professional revolutionists, they are now predominantly informers and propagandists. (The Changes in the 1952 Statutes of the CPSU, Staff Memorandum No. 298, Office of National Estimates, CIA, December 19, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

By the time of the 19th Party Congress, the Stalin faction of the Party was so weak that Stalin was compelled to resign from his position as the General Secretary of the CPSU:

I remember hearing all four of them refer to a statement Stalin had made after the 19th Congress, when he spoke of withdrawing from public life. They recalled that he had already, several years earlier, hinted at retirement, but concluded that, this time, they should call his bluff. ..They toyed with the idea of offering him an honorary position which would allow him to end his days in tranquillity haloed with glory but without real power. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 247) (IMG)

Resignation has always had a twofold character. At times, resignation by a top official can be a means of provoking a revolt against the other officials; in those situations, resignation could help Stalin in specific situations. However, in 1952, the circumstances were different. During the 19th Party Congress, Stalin was encircled by the white collar elements in the Party, which generated the strength of the Titoist faction. For this, and for a number of other reasons, Stalin's resignation was not some kind of a tactic for combatting the Titoists per se, but was an unmistakable evidence of the sharp demotion of Stalin. As such, Stalin lost:

his positions as CPSU general secretary and de facto chief of State Security. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 119) (IMG)

Furthermore:

it is generally agreed that Malenkov dominated the XIX Party Congress. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Malenkov, by then the real General Secretary of the CPSU, gave the report of the Central Committee, a report which had been given by the former General Secretary Stalin in the previous congresses:

The increased importance accorded to the regional Party secretaries, as demonstrated in their election to the leading Party organs, reemphasized Malenkov's key position. Since the basis of their selection appears to have been more their personal qualifications and connections than the significance of the geographical areas which they represented, it is highly probable that they owed their advancement to Malenkov.. The Congress itself was apparently dominated, at least indirectly, by Malenkov since it was he who delivered the keynote address, i.e., the "report" of the Central Committee, which at past congresses had been given by Stalin. (INDECISION AND STRESS 1950-1952, CAESAR – 8, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), August 21, 1953) (IMG)

To put it simply, **Stalin had no real official position in the USSR from October 1952 onwards.** He was simply broadly 'the leader of the Soviet Union' but there was no government position he held. As Sergo Beria stated in the above quote, the Beria-Malenkov-Khrushchev-Bulganin-Mikoyan bloc 'toyed with the idea of offering [Stalin] an honorary position which would allow him to end his days in tranquillity haloed with glory but without real power.' Stalin's leadership of the Soviet Union from late 1952 onwards was merely an informal leadership through an informal network of friends and agents who fought the secret service conflict on his side against the Beria-led bloc. Malenkov, an agent of Beria, was by then the real leader of the USSR. The new Party composition indeed would have generated someone like Malenkov as the new head of the CPSU. The white-collar elements in the Party were the largest minority – hence promoting Titoism – but they were not a majority, let alone an overwhelming majority, meaning that the communists of the Stalin faction still had some influence. And Malenkov – being covertly a Beria agent, but overtly an 'ally' of Stalin – reflected precisely the condition of the Party composition. Overall, through Malenkov, Titoist influence over the high level of the Party leadership increased. Crucially, as a result of the loss of his position as the General Secretary of the CPSU, Stalin no longer had control over the Soviet counter-intelligence apparatus. And a leader without a counter-intelligence service resembles a head without eyes. Nor were the unofficial network that he had through his comrades in the armed forces able to help him much, because this unofficial network had been severely damaged as a result of the Great Patriotic War. Indeed:

Stalin ... would have liked to get rid of the other four [Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin], but he was no longer in control of all the levers of power. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Without such 'Eyes', without a powerful network of intelligence agents, Stalin was soon to lose his life as well, and the communists in the high ranks of the Soviet military were to undergo a period of demotion. Already, as a result of the 19th Party Congress, Leonid Govorov, a well-known ally of Zhdanov, was omitted from the list through a supposed 'oversight':

The first of a series of peculiar events involving military personalities occurred two weeks after the publication of the list of Central Committee members at the close of the Party Congress. On 30 October 1952, a special announcement was made by the Party Secretariat to the effect that Marshal L. A. Govorov had been elected a candidate member but had been omitted from the list through an oversight. Such an error is almost unheard of in the USSR, in view of the importance of these listings, so that the explanation given can scarcely be accepted. It has been suggested that Govorov's belated appointment indicates that he represented a faction which had been side-tracked at the Congress but had begun a strong fight to regain its position immediately afterwards. Govorov, Inspector General of the Soviet Army since January 1947 ... was closely associated with Zhdanov in the defense of Leningrad during World War II and was one of four chief orators at Zhdanov's funeral in September 1948, speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Armed Forces. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

If Govorov, as a remnant of the Zhdanov group was passed over at the Congress, he must have had exceedingly powerful backers to have had his name added to the list. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Pay attention to the following part of the above quote: 'It has been suggested that Govorov's belated appointment indicates that he represented a faction which had been side-tracked at the Congress but had begun a strong fight to regain its position immediately afterwards'. Again, this very much reflects the conditions of the 19th Party Congress, because the white-collar elements held the upper hand as a dominant minority, but there was still hope for the blue-collar elements in the Party. This is also why Stalin was able to go ahead with some of his plans after the Party Congress, but he succeeded only partially:

Stalin ... had important plans for the 19th Party Congress, which was held in October 1952, but he was unable to complete them fully. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 242) (IMG)

One move initiated by the Stalin faction during the 19th Party Congress was the enlargement of the Presidium. Stalin, Sergo Beria recalled:

had to be satisfied with creating an enlarged Presidium of 25 members and 11 deputies, which was to provide him with support for the coming purges. In order to intimidate the Politburo and the Central Committee, he started to talk about 'strengthening the Cheka,' and bringing Chekists into the Central Committee. He praised 'Cheka methods' and so on. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 242) (IMG)

Titoist agents Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Beria together constituted 5 out of the 9 members of the Politburo. More members in the Politburo would have helped Stalin put the Titoist Bloc members in a minority position, thereby helping him to carry out the purges against the Titoist conspirators. Stalin particularly promoted communist and communist-coopted elements. **Stalin's plan was to promote Malenkov against Beria, Khrushchev against Malenkov, and Brezhnev against Khrushchev. That Khrushchev, Malenkov and Beria were covertly allies, and that Brezhnev was an agent of Khrushchev, was a definitive fact. However, on the overt level, they opposed each other, and they could be used against each other.** That is why Stalin brought Brezhnev to the high ranks:

In August 1951, after Ignat'ev's appointment, several new men, all associated with Khrushchev, suddenly appeared in the MGB: A. A. Epishev, a party secretary in Ukraine, and I. T. Savchenko, also from the Ukrainian party apparatus, became deputy ministers of State Security; V. E. Makarev, a former Moscow party official during Khrushchev's tenure there in the 1930s, became chief of the MGB Personnel Department. In addition, a lesser official named N. R. Mironov, who had served in the Ukrainian party apparatus under Khrushchev's protegee Leonid Brezhnev was brought to Moscow to work for the MGB. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 158) (IMG)

The next stage was to unfold a few months later, with ... Khrushchev suffering the same fate. No great problem there. Stalin would have left no witness in place. He would have got rid of the old Politburo and promoted new people, idiots like Brezhnev. After winning the Third World War he was determined to correct all the 'mistaken' interpretations of historical events which had been current in the West. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Many people make the mistake that Brezhnev himself was a 'great communist' and a staunch anti-Titoist. Actually, the facts show that Brezhnev was a Khrushchev agent, but on the overt level, the line that Brezhnev was promoting was very favorable for the Stalin faction against Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Mikoyan. This is why Stalin himself during his lifetime, and the remnants of the Stalin faction after Stalin died (e.g. Vasilevsky and Shtemenko and people

close to them) promoted Brezhnev in the overt-level struggles.

Stalin also resisted against revisionist pressures by encouraging communists outside the USSR to pursue global revolutionary class struggle against imperialist reaction:

It is not impossible that Stalin's speech at the 19th Party Congress, directed to the foreign Communist parties, was designed to supply to non-Soviet Communists what the new CPSU constitution fails to offer: the spirit of world revolution and the assurance that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will remain the source of world revolutionary strength and inspiration. (The Changes in the 1952 Statutes of the CPSU, Staff Memorandum No. 298, Office of National Estimates, CIA, December 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

As in the past, Stalin wanted to expand the Soviet military in order to wage the covert war against the imperialists through the anti-imperialist anti-colonial liberation movement. His enemies – Sergo Beria included – slandered such a campaign of his as to mean that Stalin wanted to launch a Third World War, even though the CIA confirms that he did not. Opposition to the Soviet military and Stalin's line regarding the expansion of the Soviet military in the covert conflict against the Anglo-Americans, was more powerful than ever by 1952. Sergo said:

I must emphasise that opposition was very much stronger in 1952 than it had been in 1945. If Stalin had decided at that time to conquer all Europe my father could not have stopped him, whereas in 1952 the group opposed to war was much more numerous, organized, and more resolute. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 247) (IMG)

Stalin had, in 1952, a plan of action for the years ahead. He had defined his objectives and the means to obtain them. He was perhaps less interested in current affairs precisely because he was concentrating all his efforts on his grand design. He was neither senile nor mad. Until the last months of his life Stalin was in good physical condition and his mind and will were intact. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 242) (IMG)

There indeed existed the obvious correlation between the anti-Stalin opposition, the plot to demote and murder the Soviet Red Army generals, and the plot to undermine the Soviet armed forces. Referring to Stalin's attempt to build up Soviet military, the former head of KGB archives Mikhail Poltoranin said:

This actually has to do with why they killed Stalin. (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s – Top Russian Official (Video – Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018. I watched the video I which Poltoranin made this remark. The video is available online. However, the screenshot of the transcripts from a 'pro-Russia' website has been provided) (IMG)

Whereas Stalin had lost much influence over the Soviet counter-intelligence and did not have a powerful unofficial intelligence network, Beria held the upper hand in this respect:

In 1952, my father felt able to face up to Stalin. (...). Although my father did not control the security organs he had men in place who kept him informed of whatever was happening. All, and above all, he had his own intelligence network which was not dependent on any existing structure. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 246) (IMG)

The coming of the doctors' plot was no coincidence. The same network of doctors that had operated against Zhdanov, was now to target the generals Govorov, Shtemenko, Vasilevsky, Konev, and Stalin. All of these generals and Stalin were allied to each other and were at odds with the Beria faction. Referring to Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, and Konev, a working paper of the CIA staff noted that:

all three had been close associates in the military ministry at Moscow after 1948. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 5) (IMG)

Furthermore, it is well-known that Vasilevsky had been a close comrade of Stalin:

Marshal Vasilevsky, Minister of War prior to the 1953 reorganization ... served in the Stavka under Zhukov during World War II and therefore had been quite close to Stalin. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 5) (IMG)

Konev and Shtemenko are actually well-documented to have been foes of Beria, and comrades of Stalin. This has also been documented by Deriabin who wrote:

Deputy Minister of Defense Konev and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Shtemenko – were enemies of Beria. He had tried to undercut them with Stalin by relaying rumors about their disloyalty. Beria's failed effort irked Stalin in the case of Shtemenko, who was his favorite military officer. When the German Army marched to the outskirts of Moscow in 1941, Stalin and Shtemenko bunkered together two levels below ground in the Kirovskaya subway station; the rest of the General Staff stayed in a command post one level below ground in the Byelorussian metro station. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, pp. 104-105) (IMG)

As such, Shtemenko, Konev, and Vasilevsky formed a network of Soviet generals who sided with Stalin against Beria. To them was added the top Zhdanov protege, Govorov. The 'accidental' omission of Govorov from the Party's electoral list was no coincidence. Regarding Govorov and Konev, the CIA further reported:

Govorov and Konev ... both are believed to have enjoyed the full confidence and trust of Stalin. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, September 20, 1955, p. A-2) (IMG)

The 19th Party Congress, through the reduction of Stalin's influence over the Soviet counter-intelligence afforded the Beria faction the excellent opportunity with which to reduce the security of the communist generals in the Red Army and then pave the way for their deaths. A CIA report stated:

doctor-plot ... made top military leaders its chief target. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 14) (IMG)

Referring to the killer-doctors arrested, Deriabin wrote:

the accused and Beria seemingly cooperated. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 104) (IMG)

The following excerpt of the book by Sergo Beria confirms that the Doctor's Plot case was directed against Beria. In the section headlined, the "The Doctors' Plot," Sergo Beria confirmed this. He wrote:

The Doctors' Plot

My father was at bay. Our second alert came at the end of 1952. 'This time, you know, it's irreparable,' he said to me.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Almost at the same time, the purge of the Beria agents in the Mingrelian clan in Georgia was taking place. Sergo Beria continued:

While in Moscow they were denouncing ... the doctors, in Georgia a parallel campaign was being waged against the Mingrelians. One day my father came in with a stack of newspapers and said to me: 'Here, read. You'll gain from it for your study of Soviet politics. Don't forget one thing: these two affairs are aimed at me and therefore at our family' He was not expressly named as the guilty man, but he knew from his contacts that every accused person was interrogated regarding his relations with my father and about any orders received from him. Stalin was assembling a dossier and waiting for the right moment to bring it into play. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 244) (IMG)

Sergo added:

The doctors concerned were divided into two categories, the British spies and the American spies. All the Jewish doctors, described as British spies, were alleged to be Beria's men. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Sergo Beria was expressing the matter in a somewhat distorted matter. Not all of those doctors were Jewish; many were so-called 'gentiles' if we may use that term. The killer-doctors did work for so-called 'Jewish' intelligence services – the Weizmann network, the JDC, the Mossad – but they also worked for so-called 'gentile' intelligence services such as the CIA, MI6, as well as the Abakumov network in the MGB. Simply put, the 'Jewish' and 'non-Jewish' killer-doctors worked for 'Jewish' and 'non-Jewish' intelligence agents. What feature of the purge of the killer-doctors, then, resulted in the CIA-MI6-Mossad media to highlight the 'Jewish' aspects of those doctors, and to loudly denounce the purge as 'anti-Semitic'? Equivalently, in most of the previous anti-CIA anti-MI6 purges too, the purges against the 'pan-Islamists' were condemned as 'oppression of Muslims', the purges against Tsarist priests were condemned as 'oppression of Christians', the purges against the Ukrainian fascists were condemned as 'Great-Russian Chauvinism', etc. Whereas in the other cases, Islamists, Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalists, Georgian bourgeois-nationalists, etc. were used by the CIA and MI6, in this case, the CIA-MI6 used Zionist and Bundist networks to carry out such hostile anti-Soviet activity. The Soviet media this time mentioned the 'Jewish' anti-Soviet intelligence networks, hence why the purge of the killer-doctors was condemned as 'anti-Semitic'.

As far as are concerned the accurate allegations of the Beria-MI6 connections pointed out by Sergo Beria, Sergo was not wrong – on this issue, the CIA agent Deriabin backed up Sergo Beria's remarks:

The alleged involvement of British intelligence pointed toward sharpening another nail for Beria's coffin. Before he joined the CPSU, and before the Soviets overthrew the Mussavat government ruling Azerbaijan in 1920, Beria was an employee of the Mussavat police. Separately, Pravda claimed that the Mussavat government "operated under the control of British intelligence organs." ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 105) (IMG)

This:

case against the "saboteur-doctors" was Stalin's last stand. If the case mushroomed into a purge that destroyed rivals, Stalin would have been restored to his positions as CPSU general secretary and de facto chief of State Security. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 119) (IMG)

The launching of the Doctors' Plot Case was the means by which the communists in the Red Army sought to launch a resistance against Beria. During the period of the media campaign regarding the Doctors' Plot:

Konev ... wrote a denunciation accusing some doctors of wanting to send him to the other world. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Such a campaign of denunciations was a part of a broader vigilance campaign aimed at keeping the communist personnel of the Soviet state on high alert and ready for mobilization against the Titoist faction. Stalin had a habit of using such vigilance-raising measures.

It was clear that the Doctors' Plot was a prelude to a Great Purge, if such a thing would have been possible again. Sergo recalled:

To [the Doctors' Plot Case] was added the Slansky affair in Czechoslovakia. I was with Vannikov when we heard the news on the radio, on 22 November 1952. He commented 'It's set out like in 1937'. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

In 1952, Stalin began to purge 'Beria's men' so to eventually get to purge Beria. Sergo recalled:

'But why didn't he dismiss you along with ... Mikoyan?' I asked. 'That was a tactical maneuver,' my father replied. 'He fears to confront me openly because he fears that I might resist. (...)' (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

The rise of the Eisenhower Administration in the United States resulted in the further deterioration of the international situation. Like Eisenhower, Truman was a staunch supporter of international fascism as well. However, Truman also had no choice but to be partially accountable to the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party had in it many individuals belonging to the Truman faction, but a significant segment of the Democratic Party was made up of the remnants of the Roosevelt faction, which drew its support directly from the working class 'Democrat' voters. As such, Truman had no choice but to be accountable to these Roosevelt faction agents to some extent. With the successful ouster of Truman and the rise of Eisenhower, the pro-fascist elements in the United States gained greater strength. Like Truman, the Truman-era CIA leaders were also pro-fascist but they too were accountable to the agents of the Roosevelt faction from the Democratic Party. With the ouster of Truman, these CIA leaders were replaced by Allen Dulles, a pro-fascist CIA boss who was less accountable to the Roosevelt faction. In any case, with the rise of the Eisenhower-Dulles group, US imperialism was able to operate more aggressively on a global scale.

In this midst, some may ask: would it not have been better, for the sake of the Soviet Union and all the oppressed masses, to assassinate Beria so that the freedom movements would be saved? Such a question has idealist presuppositions, and emphasizes the role of Beria as an individual and fails to account for the great mountain of agents upon whom Beria relied. Such a question therefore is devoid of a historical materialist analysis. No, Stalin should not have tried to assassinate Lavrenti Beria because (1) Beria would be replaced merely by another Beria agent, (2) assassination plots, under the risk of being discovered, would have brought Stalin and the USSR into disrepute as 'state terrorist', and (3) assassinating Beria was extremely difficult to carry out in the first place, for Beria had numerous agents that would have informed him of the terror plot, thus allowing him to foil it. Even the assassination of not just Beria but also Malenkov, Mikoyan, Khrushchev and Bulganin would have merely replaced them with other Titoist renegades who had countless agents in the Soviet state and had the support of the white collar elements in the Party, the elements with the greatest percentage in Party membership composition. The best avenue and the only possible avenue was to undercut the material base of these renegades in the Party and state apparatus, and then to go after those renegades and purge those renegades legally.

Sergo Beria wrote:

I asked my father if we should wait like sheep going to be slaughtered. 'Things won't go that far,' he replied. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 244) (IMG)

Beria prepared himself and his family for a fight and flight respectively:

My father had learnt to foresee Stalin's actions and reactions, in small matters and great, with infallible precision, because he had studied his behaviour in detail and knew what his aims were. In small matters as in great, Stalin's tactic was the same. My father told me that the operations against himself that had started some time earlier had entered a new phase and a direct attack was becoming possible: 'Now it is not just me anymore,' he added. 'Your mother and you are also targeted. I know that statements against

me have been collected, showing me as an enemy and a wrecker. I will take the necessary measures so far as I am concerned. As for you, I suggest that you make friends with the crews of the test aircraft. In case of necessity, when I give you the signal, take with your mother and your family. Otherwise he will destroy you all.' (...). I was in a state of shock. It stunned me to learn that Stalin was preparing to get rid of my father. 'Doesn't he realise that you are devoted to him?' I stammered. 'Where did you get the idea that I was devoted to him?' he replied. 'The age of vassals and suzerains is past. Many times I have had to act under constraint. Now, though, he has gone too far. One is devoted to someone because one loves him or because one shares his ideas. How can

you think that I am devoted to Stalin? No question of that.' (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 238) (IMG)

In the meantime, Stalin himself was far more careful:

Stalin was now in greater isolation than ever in his Kremlin office. Bodyguards noticed that after Pravda printed the saboteur-doctors story on January 13, Stalin behaved more cautiously than ever before. He ceased entertaining leaders at his dacha in Kuntsevo, he had Guards officers employ more stringent security measures for his trips by limousine between Kuntsevo and the Kremlin, and he received Politburo members only in his Kremlin office, never seeing Beria alone. Stalin, it seemed, feared that revealing his intentions about the purge intensified his opponents' incentives to assassinate him. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 121) (IMG)

The fact that Stalin was really careful not to show up much in public during those last weeks of his life was because he was being extremely cautious to protect his life.

Behind Stalin's back, Lavrenti Beria began a campaign of 'violently criticizing' the line of Stalin. Sergo wrote: I have the very clear impression that in 1952 my father acted so to make Stalin realise that he would not let himself go like a lamb to the slaughter but was ready to declare open war on him should Stalin decide on his liquidation. (...). Previously he had been extremely cautious ... but now he began violently criticizing Stalin's policy.. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 245) (IMG)

Of course, the goal of such 'violent criticizing' was to rally the high-ranking officials of the Soviet state against Stalin. At the same time:

They led us in the MGB to believe that in the Politburo as well as in State Security, Stalin had lost the struggle with Beria. (...). I imagine Beria putting forward two arguments to persuade a majority of Politburo members to join him in a rebellion against Stalin. The first argument would have been this:

Stalin intended the purge to envelop the entire Politburo old guard – Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, and Molotov besides Beria. After that, and following his pattern of the past, it was only a matter of time before Stalin purged some or all of the 16 new members whom he appointed in October 1952. To cancel the purge, the eight old guard members (including Beria) needed five new members for a majority of 13 votes to 12 (including Stalin's). Assuming a democratic process at work in the Politburo, Beria won a majority over to his side, against Stalin."

Second, Politburo members needed no persuasion that Stalin should not repeat the pattern of past purges.

Where Politburo members needed persuasion was on the point that Stalin could not repeat the pattern.

Beria may have argued that Stalin had lost the capability to conduct a purge because he no longer controlled the MGB – Beria did.

('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 119) (IMG)

By February, the tide in the political struggle turned fully in the favour of Lavrenti Beria. Indeed:

From late January through February 1953 the indications of a drastic shift in power accumulated. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 119) (IMG)

Red Army commanders close to Stalin were politically (and most likely, physically) eliminated one after another: Beria's foe and Stalin's favorite general, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Colonel General Sergey Shtemenko, also lost his job in February. The Politburo took this action at the insistence of Beria, after consultation with former Defense Minister Bulganin. Only later did Stalin learn of it. In addition, the Politburo fired Minister of Public Health Dr. Yefim Smirnov, who had been serving simultaneously as Stalin's personal physician.

Lieutenant General Nikolay ("Fat Kolya") Spiridonov and Major General Petr Kosynkin had been commandant and deputy commandant, respectively, of the Kremlin Kommandatura since 1939. Of the two, General Kosynkin was on more intimate terms with Stalin. He spent less time supervising Kommandatura subordinates than standing at Stalin's elbow and fulfilling his requests for personal services.

The obituary for Kosynkin said that he died "unexpectedly" of a heart attack, in the line of duty, on February 17.3 On the next Saturday I happened to see Colonel Nosarev's deputy for Kommandatura

Personnel-Security as we left the main MGB headquarters building. Hailing this lieutenant colonel, I caught up with him, and we walked together for a block or two.

"Too bad about Comrade Kosynkin," I said.

"Yeah, too bad. It hit Colonel Nosarev and me pretty hard."

"Well, it's a severe blow to the Big Chief too, I often saw Comrade Kosynkin opening the car door when the Big Chiefs limousine drove up to the Council of Ministers building.

"Yeah, Comrade Kosynkin was always there," said the lieutenant colonel.

"And almost always the Big Chief would smile at him and say a few words. By the way, was it known that

Comrade Kosynkin had a heart condition?"

(‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, p. 118) (IMG)

Deriabin added:

Kommandatura Deputy Kosynkin, who died in mid-February, had been a Stalin loyalist.. (‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, p. 120) (IMG)

Shtemenko was demoted in 1952:

Of the 5 military officers (Shtemenko, Konev, Vasilevski, Levchenko, and Govorov) who figured in the doctors' plot, ... Shtemenko seems to have suffered a definite decline in position. As he was removed from his post as Chief of Staff of the Army in the autumn of 1952.. He was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee in October 1952. He was reported in East Germany from roughly October 1952 to April 1953, and was last seen at the May Day celebration in Moscow in 1953. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, pp. A-1 to A-2) (IMG)

Konev too was demoted:

Govorov in 1946 had become inspector general of the armed forces, which position was taken over by Marshal Konev from 1950 to 1952. Konev was sent from Moscow in 1952 to the Carpathian Military District, and it is not known whether Govorov regained his former position of inspector general at that time. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, p. A-2) (IMG)

It should be obvious enough that the demotion of a military general is a step for making them be considered as less important and hence reducing a lower allocation of guards for personal defense – hence a step to assassination. Beria managed to promote one of his agents in the Red Army Artemiyev:

In 1952, my father ... had not sat with folded arms but had put his men into key posts. He had appointed one such to head Moscow Military District, Artemiev, who had previously commanded the frontier guards. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 246) (IMG)

Although Stalin was healthy enough to continue leadership, the killer-doctor Vinogradov, an agent of Beria, advised Stalin to desert his post for ‘health’ reasons:

[Stalin’s] personal physician, Professor V. N. Vinogradov had advised that Stalin step down as head of the government for health reasons. (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin’s mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

Beria of course ultimately sought to eliminate Stalin. However, Beria and his bloc could not officially unseat Stalin due to his overwhelming popularity throughout the USSR:

Explaining the removal of "the beloved leader" to the Party and to the public at large presented grave difficulties. The Politburo had to be prudent in letting it be known that Stalin had been unseated—to disclose the mutiny clumsily might stir up violence and cause the shedding of Politburo blood. Telling the truth was not feasible—to declare at this time that the doctors' plot was a fabrication by Stalin might open Pandora's box. Not only would the truth raise questions about the legitimacy of the post-Stalin regime, the truth could spark a counterrevolution against everyone in the Kremlin, including Stalin, or a counterrevolution led by Stalin against his successors. While it sought a solution, the Politburo had no choice but to keep Stalin on as the titular head of the Party and government. (‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, p. 120) (IMG)

Thus, the only realistic way remaining for Beria was to assassinate Stalin under the cover of 'natural' death. As the plot against Stalin was being hatched, it was necessary for Beria to maintain grip on the medical staff. Hence, the influence of Beria in the medical staff of the Kremlin and the armed forces increased:

Tretyakov succeeded Smirnov as minister in February 1953. Under Beria's auspices, Kuperin replaced the imprisoned Yegorov as head of LSUIK prior to March of that year; until then he had been chief of the MGB's own medical office. The names of the "best medical personnel" attending Stalin didn't include those of his personal physician Smirnov nor his predecessor, Vinogradov, who had been jailed with Yegorov. (‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, p. 232. The book by Deriabin was published by his son Petr Deriabin Jr. This quote is from the ‘Notes’ section of the book, written by Deriabin but added to the book by Deriabin Jr. in the final version of Deriabin’s book.) (IMG)

Stalin's personal physician and the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff were both dismissed in February 1953. Also, during that 21-month period the number of Stalin's bodyguards was cut in half, many of his personal staffers were reassigned, and the inexperienced Ignatyev took charge of the Guards Directorate. Gradually the means for protecting Stalin's life had withered.

In the 30 years since Stalin had been named CPSU general secretary, the quality of MGB protection for his life was never worse than toward the end of February 1953. The stripping of Stalin's personal security and his increased vulnerability were apparent.

(‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, pp. 120-121) (IMG)

Deriabin further remarked:

Stalin could not be permitted to live, I believe, due to the risk that he would attempt a countercoup. The Politburo, therefore, overthrew Stalin in February 1953 to avert a purge. Stalin's timely death was the solution – Beria's, Malenkov's and possibly others’ – to the problem of disposing of the deposed Stalin. (‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, p. 131) (IMG)

Corroborating Deriabin, Sergo recalls that his father Lavrenti Beria specifically said the following in reference to Stalin:

It will be better for him to die. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 249) (IMG)

Khrushchev confessed a very important piece of information about Saturday, February 28, 1953. That night, Stalin was a guest at a dinner party; and that dinner party was hosted by the members of the Titoist-Terrorist Bloc: Beria, Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Bulganin. Subsequently Stalin’s good health radically deteriorated.

On the evening and night of Saturday, Feb. 28, to Sunday, March 1, he [Khrushchev], Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin were in Stalin's company. They saw a movie at the Kremlin, then went to the Blizhny dacha and drank until 5 or 6 in the morning. (THE DAYS OF STALIN'S DEATH, New York Times, Harrison E. Salisbury, April 17, 1983) (IMG)

The CIA spy Petr Deriabin remarked:

According to Khrushchev, on Saturday night Stalin was host to Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin at a late dinner party in Stalin’s dacha, and his illness began following the dinner party. (Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Petr Deriabin, pp. 126-127) (IMG)

The British Empire’s naval intelligence officer Ian Grey wrote:

Death came suddenly. On the evening of Saturday, February 28, 1953, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Khrushchev had dined at Kuntsevo. Stalin had been in a good humor, and the evening had been jovial.

When Sunday, March 1, passed without his usual call, summoning them or discussing business by telephone, all were surprised.

(...). Later Sunday night, the duty officer of the guard telephoned Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Khrushchev at their dachas. Stalin had not rung for his dinner. He feared that something had happened, but the guards did not dare to go into his room. All four rushed from their dachas to Kuntsevo. Voroshilov and Kaganovich were summoned. When they gained entrance to his room, they found Stalin lying fully dressed on a rug. He was in a coma.

(Stalin, Ian Grey) (IMG)

Stalin was poisoned with cyanide. That was when his conditions began to deteriorate, leading to his death.

This is confirmed by Mikhail Poltoranin, the former head of the KGB archives during the Yeltsin Era, who had studied the archives on the conditions of Stalin’s death. Below is an excerpt of the transcript of his interview:

INTERVIEWER: Was Stalin poisoned?

POLTORANIN: Yes he was

INTERVIEWER: Are you making an official statement, as the person who used to head the committee on declassifying KGB archives, under Yeltsin?

POLTORANIN: Yes -Joseph Stalin was poisoned?

POLTORANIN: Joseph Stalin died an unnatural death.... (...).

INTERVIEWER: So who was it that killed Stalin?

POLTORANIN: So listen... (...). Then there were the statements of various officials – there was Enver Hoxha, when Mikoyan came to visit a Hoxha congress – [Hoxha] made a statement that the leadership of the USSR are 'cynical conspirators'

So the likes of Mikoyan traveled the world and bragged about the way they killed Stalin. When I went to look into it myself, what actually happened...

INTERVIEWER: The archives themselves?

POLTORANIN: Yes, the materials themselves...

INTERVIEWER: So what's being hidden from us? What's being hidden from us is that Stalin was poisoned. That it was special operation, which was prepared over a long time.

POLTORANIN: Because by then, a new number of people from Stalin's close circle had already been removed; Poskrebyshchev, Vlasik, the Kremlin commandant [Kosynkin] strangely died – who was very close to Stalin. Then (Lavrentiy) Beria appointed a new head of the Kremlin clinic [Kuperin], responsible for all medicines.

In February, 1953 – Stalin began to feel unwell at his holiday home. [Maybe] from a drink of water, or he used to wet his finger when he turned pages – he used to read a lot – maybe that's how it got in... we don't know...

But we do know what the blood and urine samples showed. Well, firstly there was an enlarged liver – this shows toxicity. His leucocytes were four times the norm. This is the white blood cell that fights against toxins.

He experienced vomiting with blood in it, and his skin was a bright pink color with dark patches under the arms, etc...

INTERVIEWER: Was it cyanide? What was the medicine he was given?

POLTORANIN: We looked through his medical log, all his checkups were in it. He was a healthy guy – he had mild first stage hypertension and some rheumatism in his knees.

INTERVIEWER: And nothing else?

POLTORANIN: And nothing else...

And all of the sudden these symptoms are documented. But a conclusion whether he's poisoned – it wasn't written. But there was one person, professor Rusakov, who carried out the anatomical examination of Stalin's body – and he wrote a report to [Kuperin,] the new head of the Kremlin clinic. The new one, that Beria had appointed. He wrote that Stalin was poisoned. Poisoned by cyanide, cyanic acid. All the symptoms pointed to that – and when the body was examined, his airways and mucus membranes were damaged with dots of cyanic acid. Three days after the report – this person died. INTERVIEWER: Professor Ruskov?

POLTORANIN: Yes. But not only did he die – his house was searched and all the documents in it were destroyed. But, through insufficient diligence, although the majority of his documents on Stalin were destroyed, Rusakov had another copy of the report.

INTERVIEWER: So a copy remained intact elsewhere? And you've had that in your own hands?

POLTORANIN: Yes, I read it with my own eyes. So there you go....

(Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s – Top Russian Official (Video – Mikhail Poltoranin), *Russia Insider*, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

Faria published an article based on the findings of Russian author and researcher Edvard Radzinsky. Tukov, Starostin, Lozgachev, and Khrustalev were three of Stalin's bodyguards in his dacha. Radzinsky interviewed or asked questions from Starostin and Lozgachev, who were still alive.

According to Starostin's testimony:

Stalin gave an order [to the guards] he had never given before.. Stalin told his servants and guardsmen in the words of Tukov, "I'm going to bed. I shouldn't be wanting you. You can go to bed too." ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

However, Lozgachev testified in an interview with Radzinsky:

it was not Stalin who gave that unusual order but another guardsman, attachment Khrustalev, who had left the dacha at 10:00 a.m. on March 1. Only then was Khrustalev relieved by the aforementioned guards, Starostin, Tukov, and Lozgachev. ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14, Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

More specifically, according to Lozgachev:

Before leaving [the guards] that morning, Khrustalev told them: "Well, guys, here is an order we've never been given before. The Boss said, 'Go to bed, all of you, I don't need anything. I am going to bed myself. I shouldn't need you today.'" To Radzinsky, there was more here than meets the eye, and he clarifies the situation, "To be precise, [Lozgachev] heard it not from the Boss but from the attachment Khrustalev, who passed down the order, and left the dacha the next morning." ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

Khrustalev was a Beria agent:

Radzinsky posited that after Nikolai Vlasik, Stalin's ... longtime bodyguard, had been arrested and implicated in the contrived Doctors' Plot as well as the developing purge of the MGB, Beria, in an act of personal survival, recruited Khrustalev, a bodyguard strategically placed in Stalin's current personal attachment. ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

The guards noticed a suspicious silence from Stalin, as Lozgachev said:

The next day was Sunday. At ten, as usual, we were gathered in the kitchen, just about to plan things for the day. At ten there was no movement that was the phrase we used when he was sleeping. And then it struck eleven — and still no movement. At twelve — still none. That was already strange: usually he got up between 11 and 12, but sometimes he was awake as early as 10. Soon it was one — still no movement. His telephones may have rung, but when he was asleep they were normally switched through to other rooms. 'Starostin and I were sitting

together and Starostin said: 'There's something wrong. What shall we do?'

And indeed, what were we to do — go in to [help] him? But he had always told us categorically: if there was 'no movement', we were not to go in. Or else we'd be severely punished. So there we were, sitting in our lodge (connected with his rooms by a 25-meter corridor), it was already six in the evening, and we had no clue what to do. Suddenly the guard outside rang us: 'I can see the light in the small dining room.' Well, we thought, thank God, everything was OK. We were all at our posts, on full alert, ready to go, and then, again, nothing. At eight — nothing. We did not know what to do. At nine — no movement. We did not know what to do. At nine — no movement. At ten — none.

([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

Then, the guards decided to enter the room, with Lozgachev leading the way:

I [Lozgachev] said to Starostin: 'Go on, you go, you are the chief guard, it's your responsibility.' He said: 'I am afraid.' I said: 'Fine, you're afraid, but I'm not about to play the hero.'

At that moment some mail was delivered — a package from the Central Committee. And it was usually our duty to hand over the mail. Mine, to be more exact. 'All right, then,' I said. 'Wish me luck, boys'. (...).

Well, I opened the door, walked loudly down the corridor. The room where we put documents was right next to the small dining room.

([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

Then:

I [Lozgachev] went into that room and looked through the open door into the small dining room and saw the Boss lying on the floor, his right hand out-stretched. like this [here Lozgachev stretched out his half-bent arm]. I froze. My arms and legs refused to obey me. He had not yet lost consciousness, but he couldn't speak. He had good hearing, he'd obviously heard my footsteps and seemed to be trying to summon me to help him. I hurried to him and asked: 'Comrade Stalin, what's wrong?' He'd wet himself and he wanted to pull something up with his left hand. I said to him: 'Should I call a doctor?' He made some incoherent noise — like 'Dz.Dz.' ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov. 14, Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

Lozgachev recalled:

On the floor there was a pocket-watch and a copy of *Pravda*. And the watch showed, when I looked at it, half past six. So this had happened to him at half past six. On the table, I remember, there was a bottle of Narzan mineral water. He must have been going to get it when the light went on. While I was talking to him, which must have been for two or three minutes, suddenly he snored quietly. I heard this quiet snoring, as if he was sleeping. ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

The guards phoned 'everybody':

I picked up the receiver of the house phone. I was trembling and sweat beading on my forehead, and phoned Starostin: 'Come to the house, quick.' Starostin came in, and stood dumbstruck. The Boss had lost consciousness. I said: 'Let's lay him on the sofa, he's not comfortable on the floor.' Tukov and Motia Butusova came in behind Starostin. Together, we put him on the sofa. I said to Starostin: 'Go and phone everybody, and I mean everybody.' He went off to phone, but I did not leave the Master. He lay motionless, except for snoring. Starostin phoned Ignatiev at the KGB, but he panicked and told Starostin to try Beria and Malenkov. While he was phoning, we got an idea — to move him to the big sofa in the large dining room. There was more air there. Together, we lifted him and laid him down on the sofa, then covered him with a blanket — he was shivering from the cold. Butusova unrolled his sleeves. ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

Beria, in particular, responded very late.

At that point Starostin got through to Malenkov. About half an hour had gone by when Malenkov phoned us back and said: 'I can't find Beria.' ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

Beria deliberately let Stalin die, for Beria himself had been the engineer of the assassination of the former General Secretary, as will be shown later. While knowing that Stalin was deeply ill, Beria pretended that nothing had happened and that Stalin was 'only' sleeping:

Another half hour passed, Beria phoned: 'Don't tell anybody about Comrade Stalin's illness'. At 3 o'clock in the morning, I heard a car approaching."

At this point, Radzinsky notes that it had now been four hours since the first phone call and many more hours since Stalin had been struck down by the sudden illness, and he had been lying there without

medical assistance all that time. Malenkov and Beria finally arrived without Khrushchev.

(...). Malenkov's shoes creaked. And I remember how he took them off and stuck them under his arm.

He came in: 'What's up with the Boss?' He was lying there, snoring gently. Beria swore at me, and said, 'What are you panicking for? The Boss is sound asleep. Let's go, Malenkov!' I explained everything to him, how he'd been lying on the floor and how he could only make inarticulate noises. Beria said to me: 'Don't panic, and don't bother us. And don't disturb Comrade Stalin.'

And they left.

([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#). **Bold added.**) (IMG)

L. Beria confidently told his son Sergo that Stalin would soon cease to be, according to Sergo himself:

My father had plans which he had formed years earlier. I did not see him during those days. (...). Two or three days later he came to lunch and told me that Stalin would never return to political activity, even if he recovered. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 249) (IMG)

The doctors arrived:

And again, I was left alone. I thought I should call Starostin again and have him alert everybody again.

I said: 'If you don't, he'll die, and our heads will roll. Phone them and tell them to come.' (...). The doctors arrived between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M."

([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

By then, Faria adds:

Thirteen hours had now passed without Stalin receiving any medical assistance. ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

The official conclusion by the Titoist doctors was that Stalin had hemorrhage:

The doctors were all scared stiff. They stared at him and shook. They had to examine him, but their hands were too shaky. To make it worse, the dentist took out his dentures, and dropped them by accident. He was so frightened. Professor Lukomsky said, 'We must get his shirt off and take his pressure.' I tore his shirt off and they started taking his blood pressure. Then everybody examined him and asked us who was there when he collapsed. We thought, that was it, the end. They'll just put us in the car and it's goodbye. But no, thank God, the doctors came to the conclusion that he'd had a hemorrhage. Then there were lots of people, and, actually, from that moment we did not have anything to do with it. I stood in the door. People — the newly arrived — crowded around behind me. I remembered [MGB] Minister Ignatiev was too scared to come in. I said, 'Come on in, there is no need to be shy.' That day, the second of March, they brought Svetlana." ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

Deriabin, who had his own theory on the way that Stalin was murdered, concluded in definitive sentence form:

I conclude that Beria was responsible for the death of Stalin, Malenkov was his accomplice, and Khrushchev and Bulganin were accessories after the fact. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 131) (IMG)

The evidence presented above – how Beria sought to delay the treatment of Stalin, Beria's desire that Stalin dies, the actions of the Beria agent Khrustalev, the changes in the Kremlin clinic, etc. – all leave no doubt as to Beria's role in the murder of Stalin.

Sergo Beria himself explicitly states that he does not rule out the likelihood of L. Beria assassinating Stalin, since L. Beria had nothing to lose:

But my father knew that he no longer had anything to lose. It was possible only to sacrifice oneself in assassinating Stalin. My father being neither a coward nor a sheep walking submissively to the slaughterhouse, I do not rule out the possibility that he may have thought of doing something like that. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 246) (IMG)

As early as 1949, the relations between Stalin and Beria got 'colder' and Stalin expected terrorist attacks from Beria:

I don't think the relations between them [Stalin and Beria] worsened as the result of a particular episode.

It was a slow process which remained for a long time hidden from third parties. Stalin became more and more polite and formal with him, which was a clear sign of increasing alienation. Beginning in 1949, he allowed his hostility to show in a wider circle, while my father began to express himself more frankly about Stalin in conversation with me. He was irritated that he could no longer contain himself. His nerves were frayed.

(...). I think there is only one word that described what my father felt in those days: hatred. Stalin was hateful to him because he expected a death-blow to come from that quarter at any moment.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 237) (IMG)

Molotov recalled that Beria dropped the following hint about killing Stalin:

While on the rostrum of the Mausoleum [where Stalin and Lenin were buried] with him on May 1, 1953, he did drop hints. (...). He said, "I did him in!" – as if this had benefited me. Of course he wanted to ingratiate himself with me: "I saved all of you!" (Molotov Remembers, Feliks Chuev, p. 237) (IMG)

According to Enver Hoxha, shortly prior to his death, Stalin had said straight to their faces that they 'will sell the Soviet Union' once he dies:

Such elements as Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Beria and their apparatchiki hid the truth from Stalin. In one way or another, they misled and deceived Stalin. He did not trust them, therefore he had told them to their faces, "... when I am gone you will sell the Soviet Union." Khrushchev himself admitted this. And it turned out just as Stalin foresaw. (The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 1)

When Stalin died, Beria made sure that all the incriminating documents were eliminated.

Between March 2 and 5, when Stalin died, members of his inner circle were dividing the spoils of power. Beria had already gone through the Kremlin vault and removed incriminating documents. ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

This was hinted at by Poltoranin as well:

Beria appointed a new head of the Kremlin clinic, responsible for all medicines. (...). But there was one person, professor Rusakov, who carried out the anatomical examination of Stalin's body – and he wrote a report to the new head of the Kremlin clinic. The new one, that Beria had appointed. He wrote that Stalin was poisoned. Poisoned by cyanide, cyanic acid. All the symptoms pointed to that – and when the body was examined, his airways and mucus membranes were damaged with dots of cyanic acid. Three days after the report – this person died. Three days after the report – this person [Rusakov] died. (...). But not only did he die, his house was searched and all the documents in it were destroyed. But, through insufficient diligence, although the majority of his documents on Stalin were destroyed, Rusakov had another copy of the report. (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s – Top Russian Official (Video – Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

Beria destroyed almost all documents that incriminated him and his Titoist clique for killing Stalin. Immediately after the murder of Stalin, the guards and officers protecting him and all of those around him who could provide more details on the circumstances of the death of Stalin were dispersed throughout the Soviet Union. The CIA reported: Following the death of Stalin, the Guard [protecting him] was cut down to some extent again and personnel engaged in guarding Stalin were either dismissed or transferred to the provinces. (...). Guard Directorate No. 1 [the Guard Directorate responsible for the physical defense of Stalin] was liquidated after Stalin died. (...). After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued instructions to the effect that all members of Stalin's personal guard were to be given other jobs but that none of them was to remain in the MVD in Moscow. [T]he reason for this order was that the Politburo and especially Malenkov were glad that Stalin died and they wanted his memory to die with him. Therefore, they did not want any rumors or legends about the details of Stalin's personal life circulating in Moscow.

Ordinary workers, such as gardeners, were simply given their work-books and released. All officers and persons who had had access to Stalin were given jobs in the provinces. A very few, however, managed to stay in Moscow but not in the MVD. (CHIEF GUARD DIRECTORATE, CIA, February 25, 1955, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

Beria's agent, Khrustalev, died mysteriously:

'They got rid of everybody. They'd summon you and send you away from Moscow, 'leave the city immediately and take the family with you'. Starostin, Orlov, and Tukov decided to go and see Beria.

To ask him not to send them away. So they went into his office, and he said: 'If you don't want to be out there, you will be down there.' And he pointed down to the ground. So away they went. (...).

Khrustalev fell ill and died soon after. Orlov and Starostin were given jobs in Vladimir, and I stayed at 'the facility' — the facility was empty, with me as superintendent. It was handed over to the Ministry of Health.. That was the end of the nearer dacha." ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161.,

Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

It is likely that Khrustalev died naturally, that Beria aimed to use Khrustalev well after Stalin's death. However, there is a small though significant probability that Khrustalev 'had' to die so that incriminating evidence on Stalin's death would be eliminated.

The doctors' plot case was quickly dropped and the Titoist General Zhukov had a rise in prestige:

In the days before Stalin's death top military leaders were drawn into the conflicting currents of Soviet politics, at least as symbols and probably more substantially, by the 13 January 1953 announcement of a thwarted assassination plot on the part of seven doctors. All the intended victims named in the "disclosure" of the plot were from the ranks of the top marshals, generals and admirals. Whatever the intended consequences of the doctor-plot for the military leadership, they were apparently nullified by Stalin's death. The doctors were exonerated on 4 April 1953, and in the following months some members of the military group whose prestige

had been enhanced by the announcement of the plot seemed to decline in authority. Konev, one of the highest-ranking targets, dropped from public view. Zhukov, previously in disfavor, became a First Deputy Defense Minister; his name began appearing prominently at receptions in early April 1953, although during Stalin's reign the military had been represented chiefly by the inactive Budenny. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

C19S8. The Vigilance Campaign

*** IMG-All-{Democratization}

In the USSR, the importance of security and intelligence studies were frequently emphasized. A US intelligence document provides a useful summary of the vigilance campaign and intelligence studies in the USSR. As correctly stated by the CIA document, the entirety of the Soviet people – especially the inexperienced youth – were consistently encouraged to learn intelligence matters. Pravda reminded the Soviet people that the class struggles in the USSR had not ceased and that they were rather manifested in the form of struggles against saboteurs and enemy agents. According to the CIA document, a Soviet media broadcast implied that the economically corrupt bureaucrats are a comprador bourgeois class serving the enemy, even if they may not be outright agents of the enemy. Other Soviet media documents that I personally read and were not mentioned in the CIA document also emphasized the fact that corrupt bureaucrats belong to the category of comprador bourgeoisie, not national bourgeoisie. While it would be slanderous to refer to all corrupt politicians as automatically and necessarily imperialist spies, there is no doubt that many of them were. Furthermore, all corrupt oligarchic bureaucrats in anti-imperialist countries belong to the category of the comprador bourgeoisie and feed off of espionage networks, even if they themselves would not be spies.

The Soviet media highlighted the absolutely crucial point that embezzlers and corrupt bureaucrats in anti-imperialist countries constitute a variant of the comprador bourgeoisie as opposed to the national bourgeoisie, even if they may appear as national bourgeoisie. Far too often, this critically important point is missed. Far too often, some half-backed 'anti-imperialists' start arguing that corruption concentrates wealth into the hands of a new class of oligarchs and thus a new 'national-bourgeois class' 'emerges' and so the corrupt oligarchs of the anti-imperialist country will supposedly seek to 'expand' this country's industrial production. Far too often, liberals and left-wing reactionaries attribute corruption to the anti-imperialist faction of anti-imperialist states and fail to acknowledge that corrupt politicians all without exception belong to the pro-imperialist fifth column in anti-imperialist states, even if some genuinely anti-imperialist politicians may appear superficially 'allied' to corrupt politicians, and even if some genuinely corrupt bureaucrats repeat the correct anti-imperialist narratives.

Another highlight of the excerpts of the CIA document is that it refers to a book by a prominent Soviet author on intelligence studies, Vladislav Minayev. The CIA presents some of the highlights of Minayev's work. The CIA document does not mention that Minayev's works also mentioned the intelligence activities of Tito's fascist group in favor of the Gestapo and Anglo-American intelligence.

Anyways, here are excerpts of the CIA document:

The vigilance campaign still gets heavy play on the [USSR's] home service, and is exploited indirectly in a variety of contexts ranging from agricultural shortcomings to embezzlement of state funds and immorality in private life. School teachers are enjoined to imbue their young students with a sense of "watchfulness," Komsomols and nonpartisan youths are urged to read available publications on "how to recognize the enemy within" and Party organisations throughout the country are advised to make screening of applicants for membership more thorough than has been the case heretofore. Political vigilance, like charity, begins at home, that is within the ranks of the Communist Party, according to ZARYA VOSTOKA of 3 February. The party is the most coveted organization in the Soviet structure; spies and diversionists "of every stripe" (vsekh mastei) would like to worm their way in for "espionage and sedition" purposes. (...).

In a double page PRAVDA article on revolutionary vigilance broadcast on 6 February, Kozev declares that the "recently unmasked disgusting group of corrupt Jewish bourgeois-nationalists" provides additional proof, if any were needed, that intensified political vigilance must become second nature with every citizen of the Soviet Union. (...). Reminding the Soviet people that there can be no two views on the current international situation, Kozev admits that different opinions on the subject have been voiced by "ill-starred politicians" ... "dogmatists and scholastics".. Some of them "even went so far as to say" ... that the USSR was no longer threatened by imperialism thereby implying that relaxation of vigilance was in order. Such "reasoning" ... is said [by the article] to be anti-Marxian and harmful since it betrays an underestimation of the potential danger residing in the politically-unstable elements of Soviet society and the enemies' capacity of exploiting it:

It would be wrong to believe that with the liquidation of the exploiter classes in the USSR international capital lost the opportunity of recruiting its agents within our country ... fragments of the broken exploiter classes

still exist here and there; so do the disguised followers of the routed anti-Soviet groups – Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, Trotskyites, Bukharinites and bourgeois-nationalists.

(...). Referring to the class struggle ... Kozev again implies that a certain section of Soviet opinion held that since class warfare was over in the Soviet Union it need no longer claim the concentrated attention of Party theoreticians. This contention is countered by the assertion that class struggle is a permanent feature of international and Soviet life and cannot therefore be ignored. For regardless of the forms it assumes – civil war, intervention, blockade or border incidents “engineered by the Anglo-American intelligence” –

the class struggle has been, is and will remain a struggle between Socialism and capitalism on an international scale. (...).

In other words, says Kozev quoting Stalin, if one end of the class struggle is operative within the framework of the USSR the other end extends into the bourgeois states that surround us.

A broadcast from Dnepropetrovsk (4 February) quotes a ZARYA editorial as saying that there is no difference between the common variety of “thieves of socialist property” and political subversives: both are “a godsend to the enemy”....

(...). KRASNOYE ZNAMYA (6 February) warns against the popular pastime of “becoming intoxicated with success” for which there is no justification since the enemies’ intrigues and anti-Soviet machinations tend to intensify in proportion to “our forward movement.” Too many officials are inclined to forget that we are still surrounded by hostile countries: “They forget that capitalist surrounding is not an empty phrase but a real and unpleasant phenomenon”.. An earlier broadcast from Stanislav (3 February) says there is no point in trying to define the difference between political and other offenses against the State since they all come under the same category and their common purpose is to undermine the country’s economic foundation: “the thief who steals public property ... is also [typically] a spy and a traitor”..

Alien Influence on Youth. SOTSIALISTICHESKIY DONBAS (4 February) is concerned about the serious shortcomings and “low ideological level” of studies in the Komsomol education network. With the “most mortal” enemies of the Soviet people trying to infiltrate and undermine every phase of our life, the paper says, it is of particular importance to safeguard the Soviet youths from the wicked influences of reactionary bourgeois ideology. We must use “all forms and means” of propaganda activity and mass-political work to educate in the young Soviet people “. toward the criminal American imperialism” and expose the attempts of its agents, the [imperialist-backed] bourgeois nationalists of all species who are still to be found among us. (...). The Komsomols cannot afford to “forget for a single moment” that the remnants of the exploiting classes and “all sorts of scum” ... in our country are trying to make use of our unstable elements for their nefarious aims. It is therefore the sacred duty of a Komsomol ... always “to be vigilant, to stop all idle gaping, casting and chatter.” Pursuing the vigilance theme on the next day, the same paper urges every citizen of the USSR, Communist and nonpartisan, to read all available literature dealing with foreign intelligence and espionage so that he may learn to “recognize the enemy and his subversive methods.” Highly recommended in this connection is a recently-published book by V. Minayev, “The Secret Weapon of the Doomed” ... which “exposed” American hostile activities against the USSR in the past several decades. “It is necessary to read it. It is absolutely essential for each one of us to do so!”

The items quoted below are typical of the rest of the available material on the current vigilance campaign transmitted centrally and locally:

Smolensk, 4 February – the US Government has allocated 100 million dollars for subversive, terrorist and espionage work against our country.. The revelation of Party and State secrets is a crime against the Party and is incompatible with its membership (RABOCHIY PUT editorial);

Moscow, 6 February – Anybody who indulges in such vices in private life as drunkenness, grabbing and flippant passions cannot be a reliable fighter ... all this is used by the enemies to demoralize the Komsomol and thus deprave them politically.. It is time to put an end to the harmful, fallacious view that daily life is a private affair (KOM SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial);

Kurgan, 8 February – It is imperative to educate the Soviet people in the spirit of loyalty ... and to teach them to oppose any insidious tricks of foreign intelligence and to heighten the preparedness of the Soviet people to defend the interests and honor of our Socialist fatherland (KRASNY KURGAN editorial);

Minsk, 5 February – Another fault of propaganda work is that lectures do not assume a militant character and do not expose bourgeois ideology, and in particular that of United States imperialism (ZVYAZDA editorial).

No Thy Enemy: In a lengthy review of Minayev’s book “The Secret Weapon of the Doomed” published in IZVESTIA on 8 February and quoted by the Moscow radio on the same day, Petrov makes the point that to know one’s enemy one must study his underhand methods of operation. Minayev’s book is therefore invaluable from that point of view: it “reveals the cruel methods” ... employed by the imperialist intelligence services. American subversive activities against the USSR, according to the book, pre-date the Second World War by a

number of years when Trotskyites, Bukharinites and Zinovyevites had been employed to undermine the foundation of the young Soviet Republic. Such activities are said to have become intensified during the last war with the object of “establishing secret contact with the German-fascist intelligence and the Gestapo behind the back of the Soviet Union”.. Implicit also in Minayev’s book, as quoted in Petrov’s review, is the attempt to associate American wartime help to the USSR (presumably lend-lease) with subversive activities. The US, it is stated, had shipped to the Soviet Union 235,000 packages of carrot, salad, pea and other vegetable seeds – all of them labelled “to the brave people of the USSR,” but

in addition to the vegetable seeds they all contained also seeds of poisonous weeds which are harmful to human beings and animals.

(...). The expansion of the American intelligence in the post-war years has been particularly rapid, Minayev tells his readers, and it now comprises “over 100 thousand employees and agents”.. Spies and diversionists are said to be trained “in most of the American universities” ... including numerous specialized schools. Similar cadres are being trained, under American sponsorship, in Western Germany and Austria, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Indeed there is hardly any sphere of human activity, including the foreign embassies in Moscow, according to Minayev, that has not been affected by the insidious machinations of US intelligence. Even such organizations as UNESCO and the International Children’s Emergency Fund are “utilized for the purposes” ... of American espionage. Referring to the sources of aid at the disposal of the American intelligence service, Minayev declares that

the most active aid to American intelligence is offered by the Vatican and the bourgeois-nationalist Zionist organizations.

(INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES, CIA, Information from: Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts, Date of Information: February 3, 1953 to February 9, 1953. Date Distributed: March 16, 1953, pp. 2-6) (IMG)

The vigilance campaign, the campaign to further educate the Soviet population, was also a part of the campaign of the communist faction against revisionist intellectualism, to educate the populace against liberal anti-purge influences and to promote the mentality of a socialist counter-intelligence officer among Party members. Most importantly for the context of 1952-1953, the vigilance campaign was a tactic by the Stalin faction to mobilize much more of the Soviet state personnel against the Beria gang. Not every communist loyalist in the USSR was on high alert about the threat posed by the Beria group and the killer-doctors’ terror plots. Raising vigilance could reinforce the tendency by the communist loyalists to take active measures against corruption throughout the Soviet Union, hence undermining the corrupt bureaucrats that formed the class base of the Titoist faction headed by Beria.

C19S9. The Rise of the Beriaite Titoists

*** IMG-All-{Titoist Coup}-{The Reign of Beria}

With the death of Stalin and some of the communist Red Army generals, the influence of the communist agents of the proletariat over the means of violence somewhat decreased while the Titoist agents of finance capital and the corrupt bureaucrats in the Soviet state apparatus could advance their agenda of further undermining the influence of the proletariat in the military and intelligence bodies, so to transition the Soviet Union away from a socialist dictatorship of the proletariat onto an anti-Soviet dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie. Lavrenti Beria was the leader of the vast network of the corrupt bureaucrats allied to Anglo-American finance capital. Stalin’s death was a cause for him to rejoice:

Once Stalin was buried, the Politburo members started to swagger around. 'Now we'll put the country on its feet again.' My father was pleased because he could now implement reforms that previously had been inconceivable. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 251) (IMG)

In his memoirs, Enver Hoxha recalled how only a day after Stalin’s death, the Titoists had determined their official positions for themselves in the government:

One day after Stalin’s death on March 6, 1953, the Central Committee of the party, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were summoned to an urgent joint meeting. On occasions of great losses, such as the death of Stalin, urgent meetings are necessary and indispensable. However, the many important changes which were announced in the press one day later, showed that this urgent meeting had been held for no other reason but ... the sharing out of posts! Stalin had only just died, his body had not yet been placed in the hall where the final homage was to be paid, the program for the organization of paying homage and the funeral ceremony was still not worked out, the Soviet communists and the Soviet people were weeping over their great loss, while the top Soviet leadership found the time to share out the portfolios! Malenkov became premier, [and] Beria became first deputy premier and minister of internal affairs.. (The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 1)

Long before the death of Stalin, the Titoists had planned which position each of them will get after their joint assassination

of Stalin. Either way, according to Amy Knight:

Although Khrushchev claims they did not meet to make decisions until after Stalin died, in fact the bureau of the CC Presidium – consisting of Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Khrushchev – met during the night of 4-5 March. They decided at this meeting to do away with the enlarged CC Presidium [which Stalin fought for] reverting to the earlier practice of having only a Presidium. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, pp. 180-181)

Beria was restored to his position as the head of the Soviet intelligence service. Although Beria was not officially at the highest position in the Soviet government, through his agents Malenkov and Khrushchev, Beria was able to exercise enough influence so as to be the de facto leader of the Soviet state. One has to remember that the Politburo was to make the more immediate decisions. With the death of Stalin, the Politburo was firmly dominated by authoritarian-minded Titoist assassins, who felt no need to consult the Central Committee of the Party, let alone the rest of the Party. Hence the Central Committee and other members of the Party were not going to have as much influence over the policy-making procedures for quite some time. This fact gave Beria and other autocratic Titoist assassins ample time and room to unilaterally make significant changes to the situation in the Democratic Bloc for the first few months after the death of Stalin. The Party certainly had the power to check the policies of the Kremlin Titoists, but the Party membership already was dominated by the intelligentsia and bureaucrats and hence there was little motivation – but not zero motivation – on the side of the Party membership majority to combat the Titoist assassins' policies anyways. This fact too gave Beria and other Kremlin Titoists audacity to make steps in dismantling the socialist bloc.

In its quest to undermine socialism, the Titoist Beria faction in the USSR pursued the following three main concurrent courses of action:

- (1) **To Weaken the Soviet Military.** The Soviet military was not so directly involved in combat worldwide, but was covertly involved in the conventional/guerilla wars in East Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Undermining the Soviet military's covert/proxy wars in the region would have rolled back the dominant tendency, the communist tendency, in the Red Army staff, while increasing the leverage of the Titoist generals in the Red Army in their factional conflict. That is, the communist faction in the Red Army would be bogged down in the conflicts, thus having less funds for waging the secret service conflict against the Titoist generals in the Red Army, hence allowing for increased influence by the Titoist elements in the Red Army. More Titoist influence in the Red Army would mean more Titoist influence in the Soviet intelligence bodies that relied on the Red Army for their operations in the first place. More Titoist influence in the Soviet intelligence service would assist the Beria gang in its campaign to elevate the positions of the Trotskyites and Titoists.
- (2) **To Elevate the Position of the Corrupt Bureaucrats in the Soviet State.** As the private sector was illegal and suppressed in the USSR, the main base for the agents of fascist reaction in the USSR was the corrupt bureaucrats. The decentralization of the Soviet state apparatus would have minimized economic coordination thus allowing the corrupt bureaucrats to profit and to rise in strength. The increased influence of the corrupt bureaucrats in the Soviet state would be a counter-weight to the influence of the proletariat in the workers' state. This would assist the Titoists in their efforts towards yielding a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie.
- (3) **To Link up with Anglo-American Finance Capital.** The corrupt bureaucrats in the USSR were the class allies of the Anglo-American finance capital, the pro-fascist type of finance capital. Linking up with the Anglo-American finance capital via the CIA and MI6 would assist the Titoists in their efforts to hit the Red Army and the communist foes of the Titoists while elevating the corrupt bureaucrats upon whom the Titoists relied. The Titoists in the USSR did not have a military force of their own. As such, they required alien armed forces, such as the Ukrainian fascists backed by the CIA and MI6, to hit the interests of the proletariat in the Soviet military. To the Anglo-American imperialist intelligence agencies, the Titoists would provide the intelligence materials on what to hit, whereas the terror armies fighting the proxy war for the Anglo-American intelligence agencies would do the hitting. In this process, the way would be paved on the one hand for the Anglo-American finance capital to more easily colonize the countries allied to the USSR (and to eventually go after colonizing the territory of the former USSR itself), and on the other hand, the corrupt bureaucrats in the USSR would be able to more easily profit out of undermining the communist agents of the proletariat in the armed forces.

To weaken the Soviet military:

My father who was still in charge of the military-industrial complex, put a brake on the arms programme, reducing the mass-production of tanks, guns, and aircraft. ... Here too he met with strong resistance, especially from Bulganin [who at the time was encircled and coopted by the agents of the Stalin faction]. The war party [i.e. referring to Stalin faction] in the Ministry of Defence, especially the commanders of the land army, howled that this was treason, and began to hate my father. This group continued to rage after his death, and Khrushchev had to use Zhukov to combat them. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 261) (IMG)

As assistance to the CIA-MI6-backed terrorists such as the UPA, AK, Nazis, etc. Beria also sought to withdraw the Soviet Red Army forces from Eastern Europe altogether:

My father told us that he was now going to succeed in applying the policy which he had wanted to apply after the war and which Stalin had prevented: to go back to governments of coalition with the socialists [social democrats] and to withdraw our troops from Central Europe. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 264) (IMG)

Together with the plan to partition the Soviet Union, Lavrenti Beria went ahead and promoted the establishment of a Titoist-dominated 'autonomous' army for each of the Soviet Socialist Republics, so that these Titoist-dominated local armies would serve as a counter-weight to the Red Army and could duly pave the road for the partition of that country. Zhukov sympathized with Beria every single step of the way, but because Zhukov was surrounded more by the communists in the Red Army, Zhukov felt no choice but to oppose Lavrenti Beria on some questions. In any case, Beria tried to aggressively pursue his agenda:

Zhukov and my father had a dispute about territorial formations and national armies. My father thought them necessary. Zhukov replied, saying that admitting this principle would lead to the destruction of the Soviet Union. There must be only one army [in Zhukov's opinion]. At most one might tolerate a regiment that carried a Ukrainian flag, comparable to the Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even that, though, he thought went too far. My father saw nothing inexpedient in authorising the creation of national guards. They would look grand at receptions for foreign heads of state. He could very well picture a Ukrainian national guard dressed in Cossack costume and carrying sabres. The police, too, he thought, should be autochthonous. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 261) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria sought to pave the way for the partition of the USSR:

He merely wanted to move the centre of gravity from Moscow to the republics ... because he thought that the economic prosperity of the USSR would be the quickest way to independence for the republics. The Soviet federation had to be decentralized. Only defence, transport and foreign policy should remain the responsibility of the central administrations, while everything else would fall within the competence of the local authorities. The various territorial units which had been delimited arbitrarily by the Soviet power should be redrawn in conformity with ethnic criteria, but without harming economic connections. He discussed these questions fairly frankly with Khrushchev and Malenkov. Those two rascals were not so foolish as to contradict him. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 295) (IMG)

While Beria did argue that the military should remain centralized, he argued such only to make his program of decentralization appear more reasonable, because as stated above, Beria supported the decentralization of the military as well. The Ukrainian fascist separatists were the weapons of Beria in the fight against the Soviet state, the dictatorship of the proletariat. Leonid Kravchuk was the first President of Ukraine since the 1991 collapse. A staunch Ukrainian fascist separatist, he rose to power in the early 1990s 'thanks to' Gorbachev. Kravchuk was also the man whom Beria sought to put in charge of Ukraine. In fact, Beria sought to free the Ukrainian nationalist-separatists from prison, put them in charge of Ukraine, and help them 'pursue the well-being of [their] people' by separating from Titoist Russia.

The former president of the Ukraine, Kravchuk, was one of a group of young men from western Ukraine whom my father had wanted to bring forward. The machinery of repression had destroyed them, Kravchuk escaping by a miracle. In Poland, I met Ukrainian nationalists who had spent fifteen or twenty years in the camps. Our ambassador was much afraid that my meeting with these men might turn sour on me. He warned me: 'I know what you're like. Try to control yourself this time.' These Ukrainians were older than I was. Imagine elephants advancing towards one another! But these men fell into my arms. 'These people know nothing,' they told me. 'In 1953 your father summoned us to Moscow with other leaders of the nationalist movements and told us "I consider that your criticisms of the Soviet regime are fundamentally correct. Every people has the right to defend its interests within the Soviet state. I propose that you enter the government and put together a policy for the well-being of your people." And when that happened to him which you know about, we were tortured for three months to get us to tell what he had said. But we held out, and collected fifteen extra years.' My father had spoken also of bringing back the emigres, without obliging them to become Communists. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 261) (IMG)

As can be seen, the Beria faction, whose primary base was the corrupt bureaucrats, was aiming to infiltrate the Ukrainian fascist agents of the kulaks into the socialist state.

During the Stalin era, the influence of the proletariat over the state increased, while the influence of the corrupt bureaucrats decreased. This was seen in the demotion of the corrupt bureaucrats to lower ranks of the industrial apparatus. Beria was seeking to reverse that trend:

My father thought that the middle echelon of the industrial apparatus supported him, and this was true. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 270) (IMG)

Decentralization itself not only inherently promoted bureaucracy, but also gave greater power to the middle-echelon bureaucrats – who had previously been demoted to such a lower position thanks to the constant pressures of the dictatorship of the proletariat – so that they may have their own local independent kingdoms within the industries, kingdoms engaged in mafia competition among each other rather than coordinating for the betterment of the industrial production.

Beria also wanted to privatize the USSR's light industry and construction sectors:

This time, my father was supported by [Titoist agents in the] Gosplan, by the energy-producing complex and by the arms industry. Together with Saburov he advocated releasing light industry and building work from state control. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 227) (IMG)

Concurrent with the push for the weakening of the Soviet military, the demotion of the communist generals from the Stalin faction after Stalin's death, and the elevation of corrupt bureaucrats, Beria and his Titoist henchmen actively pursued the project for a coup d'états against the Soviet state. Beria was in a rush because he knew that just less than 50% of the CPSU was made up of the blue-collar workers and the kolkhozniks, which served as an obstacle to the Titoists reliant on the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats in the CPSU. The proletarians and kolkhoz peasants served as a class base in the Party, upon whom the communists in the Red Army and intelligence bodies could rely. The anti-Soviet actions of Beria were raising the vigilance of the communists in the Soviet state, which could lead to more active measures that would slow down the pace of inevitable Titoization, a slow-down which could come with Beria's execution as well. Hence:

My father ... was in a hurry because he realized that the time he had in which to act freely was limited. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

The CIA stated:

The preparations for Beriya's usurpation of authority began immediately after the death of Stalin. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Beria wanted to stage a military coup. He thus began his large-scale sabotage of the Soviet intelligence service, dramatically cutting down its personnel, planting his Titoist agents at the helm of the intelligence service especially regarding domestic affairs, and withdrawing Soviet intelligence agents abroad to undermine Soviet extraterritorial intelligence and special operations:

When L. P. Beriya became Minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union after the merger of the MVD and MGB in 1953, he began, in accordance with resolution of the new administration to reorganize the State machinery, to cut down sharply (about 50 percent) the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (both the central administration and the provincial organs), supposedly dismissing principally old and experienced workers. Simultaneously, Beriya ordered the recall of most of the residents [resident agents] and more experienced workers from the MVD offices abroad, with the exception of the Tokyo office because of its special position. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Sergio Beria, the son of Lavrenti Beria, confirmed:

My father counted on shaking off the MVD before the congress met, or at any rate he voiced that hope to my mother. He wanted to pass the following measures without delay: to attach intelligence and the frontier guards to the Ministry of Defence, at the head of which he would have put Zhukov, and to abolish the MVD's own armed forces. He dreamt of being able to devote himself to administering the economy, thanks to his good relations with Zhukov. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Those whom Beria placed in power were corrupt bourgeois-nationalists and traitors to the dictatorship of the proletariat:

Many of these replacements had been arrested previously or had been removed from responsible positions because of excessive drinking, as had been the case with Pavel Yakovlevich Meshik in Ukraine. Another example was Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanovoz, who had been released by Molotov for immoral behavior and subsequently had held a minor position in Moscow as Chief of Supplies in either VOKS [USSR's commission for inter-cultural understanding and cultural relations with foreign countries] or the World Peace Council.

(...). However, Beria's replacements were either his former supporters or persons who ... could be counted upon to follow his orders.. Fadeykin ... was unsuited to his job and incapable of handling a large staff. Further dissatisfaction among the MVD workers stemmed from the fact that when the [Caucasian bourgeois-nationalist] Colonel General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov became First Deputy Minister, he showed preference towards the Georgians, Armenians, and other national minorities. For instance, he appointed Lieutenant General L. B. Vlodzimirskiy, who had spent some time in prison, and another named Shlyuger ... who had been imprisoned for dereliction of duty. Lieutenant General Belkin was a further example of an appointee whose nationality was other than Russian. All of them were appointed to high positions and their appointments created misunderstandings and unnecessary rumours.

(The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Beria's understanding was that because:

these replacements had been offended by their treatment under the Stalin regime [i.e. when they were purged under Stalin], they would be faithful to Beriya upon their reinstatement in positions of authority.

(The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

In order to transform the Soviet intelligence service, the Titoists needed to criminalize the socialist agents responsible for the purges and to rehabilitate and decriminalize the 'victims' of the Stalin-era purges. Indeed, Beria initiated the project for which Khrushchev and Gorbachev later took credit. Beria, not Khrushchev, was the supreme rehabilitator of Trotskyism. Regarding the Stalin-era purges, including the anti-Trotskyite purges of the 1930s:

Some time [after Stalin's death] my father drew up the instructions for the committee charged with rehabilitations. He recommended that all the trials be reviewed, including the pre-war ones, and **that Trotskyism be treated as a political tendency and not as spying.** Malenkov, Saburov and Pervukhin sided with him, but ... Kaganovich opposed, presenting a resolution to the effect that this would be premature. This was a problem that called for a special study. Rehabilitation commissions had to be set up, the people had to be prepared, saved from shock, and we must avoid harming the international Communist movement. On that last point my father, irritated at being blamed for 'hastiness,' replied drily that the Party and everything to gain in taking the initiative in exposing past crimes, if it wanted to be respected world-wide. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 259. Bold added) (IMG {Factional Conflict & Great Purge})

For the plot to overthrow the Soviet state in collaboration with Lavrenti Beria:

Zhukov thought that only a military coup d'état could get things going. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 267) (iMG)

Another commander associated to Beria was the notorious Pavel Artemiyev:

Besides Beriya, the following persons took part in the plot: the Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General Pavel Artemevich Artemyev (at one time he was employed by the MVD).. Goglidze, Kobulov, Dekanozov, and Merkulov were arrested later. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Clearly, Beria was trying to practically destroy the MVD, and install his agents at the helm, and one of his many agents was the fake 'hero' of Stalingrad, General Zhukov, the treasonous general who did nothing good for the USSR and who stole the credit for the Stalingrad victory from Vasilevsky. Ukrainian Nazis continue foolishly regard Zhukov as their enemy when in fact Zhukov was on their side.

Lavrenti Beria, as Sergo Beria recalled, wanted also 'to abolish the MVD's own armed forces.' Beria simply wanted to weaken the MVD as much as possible. Beria targeted MVD counter-intelligence, which was one of the most sensitive sectors of the security apparatus as it was the body responsible for the purges.

The CIA document also reported:

To the general surprise of the officers of the Second Chief Directorate, the former chief of Beriya's secretariat when Beriya was People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lieutenant General Stefan Solomonovich Mamulov, was appointed to the post of Chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD. General Mamulov belongs to the category of administrative workers; he does not have much practical experience in counterespionage or, especially, in espionage work. Mamulov's lack of practical experience reflected in a certain measure of the work of resident offices of the MVD abroad. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

While the agency of Kobulov, Kruglov, Merkulov, Dekanozov, etc. for Beria is voluminously well-documented, I have no information that Mamulov was a Beria agent per se. Perhaps that is the point. Beria faced a formidable resistance from the MVD counter-intelligence and found it difficult to plant his own agents there, and so he likely went for the second best option he had, namely the planting of less experienced enemy agents such as Mamulov so that of MVD counter-intelligence would have a weaker command.

On the other hand, Beria targeted the Malenkov agents in the Soviet intelligence. The thing that characterized Malenkov and his agents was that although they belonged to Beria's Titoist network, they were encircled by the agents of the Stalin faction; and so for the sake of their political survival, they had to cooperate with Stalin faction agents. At the same time, they had enough lobbying power not to be fully purged by Stalin faction, since the existence of Beria's agents and the fact that they pretended to oppose Beria's faction caused the Stalin faction to genuinely need them for sowing division in Beria's camp. Such a characteristic of Malenkov and his agents was the result of the campaign launched by the SMERSH and Zhdanov against Malenkov and his agents, causing the latter category to be hit so hard that they were compelled and coopted to cooperate with Stalin faction.

Beria and Malenkov were close friends. However, since Malenkov was more encircled by communist or pro - communist intelligence agents than Beria was, Malenkov had to take the side of the communists on many issues. Hence, there came rumours of ideological differences between Beria and Malenkov, rumours that were technically incorrect but partially based on facts nonetheless. The CIA document again reported on this:

The preparations for Beriya's usurpation of authority began immediately after the death of Stalin. At that time there were rumors in Moscow among persons close to governmental circles, and especially among the administrative personnel of the MVD, about differences of opinion on questions of state politics which had arisen between Beriya and Malenkov. These rumors seem somewhat paradoxical because of the long and close friendly relations of these two men. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Ignatyev, an agent of Malenkov, had cooperated with the Stalin faction's agents too much for Beria to accept. Although belonging to the Titoist network, Ignatyev was too encircled and too compromised by Stalin faction agents around him and so Beria could not rely on him. As replacement, Goglidze and Kobulov, two well-known agents of Beria who were purged by Stalin faction, were reinstated in top positions:

Beriya reinstated in the positions of the central administration of the Ministry persons close to him, such as the Colonel General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov (who had been removed from the post of Deputy Minister of the MGB USSR in 1946), and others with whom he had worked in the past, including those persons who had been working with him lately in the organization of the Council of Ministers [the Committee of Information]. The chief of the MGB administration for Khabarovsk Krai, Colonel General Sergey Arsenyevich Goglidze, was ordered to Moscow and was appointed one of Beriya's deputies shortly before the removal of Semen Denisovich Ignatyev. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

the methods of work of these auditing commissions were often biased. After the arrest of Abakumov, Goglidze's authority was strengthened again. Shortly afterwards he was appointed Deputy Minister of State Security and stayed in this post after the merger of the MVD and MGB. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 6) (IMG)

Abakumov, a corrupt official and an agent of Beria, was also encircled by Stalin faction agents and thus had been compromised enough to be compelled to cooperate with Stalin faction. Again, Sergio Beria recalled:

After Stalin's death Abakumov told my father what had happened. He claimed that he had only been obeying formal orders from Stalin to complete a dossier against my father. Abakumov protested his devotion to my father and claimed to have done nothing about it. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergio Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

Beria removed many of these communist faction agents encircling Abakumov so that Abakumov would have a freer hand in pursuing a pro-Beria campaign. Beria also removed many of the agents encircling Ignatyev. The US intelligence document stated:

There were many changes among the personnel who remained after the dismissals in the central apparatus of the MVD. Most of the workers who occupied administrative posts under Colonel General Viktor Semenovich Abakumov and Ignatyev were dismissed. Some who were close to Abakumov and Ignatyev, especially those in the Investigation Section and in the then Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence) of the former Ministry of State Security, were arrested. Conditions at that time in the ministry of internal affairs were reminiscent of the years of the "big purge". Responsible workers had to go through the terrible times twice – the purge carried out by Beriya, and more severe purge organized by Malenkov after Beriya's arrest. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Indeed, some of the anti-Beria intelligence agents within the Soviet counter-intelligence were arrested. Beria's reign over the Soviet intelligence in 1953 boosted the torturers in the Soviet intelligence:

It frequently happened that Beriya questions personally some prisoner who was not giving the desired testimony, and in such cases he applied refined tortures, in comparison with which the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition are understood to be child's play. In confirmation of these facts, the bill of indictment stated that the investigating organs had material evidence in the form of the instruments of torture used by Beriya and found during the search of his personal belongings. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Beria also tried to purge Molotov:

Seeing how stupidly obstinate Molotov was, my father proposed that he be replaced by Maisky at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 'If you don't agree, you can resign. Times have changed and the spirit of the Council of Ministers must also evolve,' he told Molotov. Maisky would clear up our position in relation to the Western powers. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergio Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Maisky had met Mossad representatives in London and had expressed sympathies with the Zionist cause in the past. Stalin is known to have maximized efforts to demote Maisky. There is nothing surprising about Maisky being a Beria agent and pro-Anglo-American.

Knowing that there were anti-Titoist plans by the communist faction, Beria tried to do in 1953 what Khrushchev succeeded in doing in 1956: to give a Titoization speech. Beria therefore decided to call for a Party congress in Georgia in order to make 'revelations' against the Stalin-era Soviet state, to purge his enemies, and to pursue his Titoization 'reforms':

My father ... was in a hurry because he realized that the time he had in which to act freely was limited. I think that he certainly had hidden motives when he proposed the calling of a congress. He wanted to get rid of his colleagues because he knew that something was being hatched against him. He foresaw that the test of strength would take place at that congress, and he prepared actively for that. He could count on the support from the leading personnel in the economy, from the scientists, from some diplomats, from the military and from the heads of the republics. (...). He intended to set forth before the delegates in the name of the country's leadership a coherent program of reforms in domestic and foreign policy. He thought that, when they had learnt the truth about past events, the congress majority would rally to him and give him their support. I remain convinced that he was not mistaken. Once his colleagues had retired he would be able to proceed legitimately with reforms. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Beria, who had saved the Zionist agents of the American secret service, was planning to give a speech on Stalin-era 'anti-Semitism'. In that congress:

My father ... did perhaps intend to make certain revelations. I have only indirect signs of this: some of his collaborators mentioned to me dossiers that he had entrusted to them. Before he died, my father's secretary Lyudvigov, a man of Polish origin, was able to tell me that my father had ordered him to compose a report on anti-Semitism in Russia and the world. Clearly, my father was preparing to write an article or deliver a speech on the harmfulness of anti-Semitism. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Somewhat related to the above remark by Sergo Beria is the following quote from a CIA document:

when Beria came to power he wanted to show the people that Stalin's bloody regime had come to an end and, since he himself was half-Jewish, the policy regarding the Jews was changed. ('Committee of State Security / The Doctors' Plot and Its Reversal', CIA, September 24, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

The Stalin-era USSR had liberated countless Yiddish people from extermination prior to, during, and after the Great Patriotic War, was waging a war against the Home Army terrorists responsible for the anti-Semitic pogroms in Poland, and was a true friend of the people of Israel. Allegations of 'anti-Semitism' are baseless slanders spread by the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist agents of the Anglo-American secret services, such as the CIA-backed or MI6-backed Zionist or Bundist currents. It was obvious that the 'anti-Semitism' label was being used by the MI6 agent Beria and his gang against the USSR, due to the communist stance against the anti-communist Zionist subversion campaign sponsored by the CIA-MI6 network.

However:

the members of the Presidium forestalled him. They knew that my father was more intelligent and stronger than they were. If he managed to carry through the reorganisation he had begun, they would become redundant. My father's mistake was to have revealed some things too soon. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Indeed, as Sergo implied above, the pace of Titoization by Beria was so quick that Beria's true face was exposed to the MVD. This had a vigilance-raising effect in the MVD. Prior to his purge of the MVD personnel, among the MVD workers:

Beriya had enjoyed a high reputation prior to his taking over the MVD. (The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

In fact:

When Beriya was re-appointed Minister of Internal Affairs [MVD], after Stalin's death, all MVD workers thought that the system within the MVD would be much improved. (The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

However:

when Beriya began to remove leading officials who had served under previous ministers and to replace them with his old cronies, the opinion among MVD employees was that the best men were being released and replaced by irresponsible persons whom Beriya was drawing from the archives. (The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

The rapid pace of the Titoization efforts by Beria had a vigilance-raising effect in the MVD, resulting in the MVD to spearhead the purges against the Beria group, with Khrushchev opportunistically joining in. Deriabin wrote:

In regard to the attempted coup, the two volumes of Khrushchev's memoirs contain nothing about Kruglov, the MVD, and their forewarning of Beria's intentions; nothing about Beria positioning MGB troops preparatory to the seizure of power; nothing about the Politburo counter-positioning Army units; nothing about the arrests of Beria's six henchmen; nothing about the intensive investigations of possible complicity by the Moscow Military District. Khrushchev would have his readers think that he was first to divine Beria's motives and that he based his suspicions on recommendations Beria made to Politburo members. The memoirs do describe Beria's arrest, but that is the most to be said for the Khrushchev version of the showdown. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an

eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 159) (IMG)

The Beria group pursued its counter-revolutionary program with knowledge of the **historical materialist fact that the benefits (for the Titoist faction) of causing material damages to the Soviet state would outweigh the costs of the ruin of the Beria group's reputation**, for reputation is a lesser-material factor whereas damage to the Red Army, a colour revolution in Germany, a CIA-MI6 coup in Iran, etc. are all material factors. It is true that lesser-material factors such as popularity can help agitate one's followers towards inflicting material damages against the enemy. However, so is it also true that popularity is best gained through material dominance (i.e. dominance over the economy, military, intelligence, etc.) and the translation of the material dominance to the ideational sector (i.e. the media, the 'popularity contest', etc.). The material strength can not only help assure dominance in the material sector, in the economy and the military, but also help to reduce the costs of financing a media and public relations (PR) campaign to rehabilitate much of one's negative public image and to make one either more popular or not so hated as to cause a popular uprising against oneself. In the context of the Titoist-communist conflict, causing material damages upon the Soviet state would reduce the backlash capabilities of the anti-Beria elements; the policies of the reactionary classes against the proletariat could never be popular among those proletarians affected by such policies but surely gaining control over the military and intelligence and then translating such control over the military and intelligence bodies towards gaining control over the media, could help mislead enough of the Soviet public to erode the strength of an anti-Beria backlash. In that respect, in pursuing the counter-revolutionary action against the Soviet state with utmost speed, Beria was pursuing a correct strategy from a Titoist viewpoint, for he was materially devastating the Soviet state at the low cost of having a negative reputation among the Soviet state personnel. That aspect of Beria's strategy was not flawed.

What, then, went strategically/tactically wrong? Why was the Beria group purged? The most important factor is that the communist faction, despite facing material damages inflicted upon them by the Beria group, still had enough material factors, such as enough of the means of violence, under its influence in order to wage a backlash against the Beria group. Beria and his team knew of plots against them by the communist faction but were kept in the dark concerning the tactical details planned by the communist faction against them. Even then, the communist tide against Beria could be countered by the Beria group not through the Beria group keeping their own reputation 'clean', but by inflicting even more material damage on the communist faction. Given that the communist faction in the Soviet Union had enough material strength to be able to purge large segments of the Beria group, what was needed was the unity and general mobilization of the communist forces in the Soviet state apparatus towards an anti-Titoist and anti-Beriaite purge. This general mobilization was brought about because the quick counter-revolutionary measures of Beria raised the alarm and vigilance among the communists. The increased vigilance allowed the communists to quickly take action, amass more anti-Beriaite agents, and to use the material capabilities under their influence to hunt down Beria and his team. Note that had the communist faction in the Soviet state not had much of the material factors under its influence, the high vigilance and the will to hunt-down Beria would not have been enough to yield an anti-Beriaite purge; from this, once again one can reaffirm that the Beriaite policy of quickly inflicting maximum damage on the Soviet state was a correct policy (from a Titoist viewpoint) even though it raised the vigilance of the Beria gang's foes. The Beria group did not really make any strategic mistakes in confrontation with the communist faction. Beria even pursued the correct strategy of preparing for an escape from the Soviet Union. The classic tactic for escaping is to set up ratlines for escape and to spread false rumours of one's death. Indeed, take for example the purge against the Slansky ring during which Jan Bojko, a prominent agent of the Slansky faction, aimed to escape to Yugoslavia by exploiting the false rumours of his 'death':

Bojko was a close collaborator of Gen. Bredich Reicin, executed during the purge of the Slansky group.

Bojko, a Slovak, generally believed dead, had actually been concealed by Slansky's followers and was detected trying to reach Austria on the way to Yugoslavia with important documents.

His capture revealed a conspiracy involving the highest circles of Communist leadership and increased Soviet suspicion with regard to Czechoslovak unwillingness to purge unreliable elements. Soviet authorities have placed the responsibility on Dr. Stefan Reiss, a former Minister of Justice, a Hungarian Jew by birth, but considered a Slovak. He is a protege of President Zapotocky.

(Investigation of Czechoslovak leaders, CIA, February 15, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

During the July attempt at hunting down Beria, the Titoist faction in the Soviet Union spread the lies about Beria's 'death' back then:

At the same time a rumour of [Lavrenti Beria's] death was put about, without official confirmation. Many people believed it. Khrushchev and his clique ... spread this rumour deliberately. ... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 271) (IMG)

Hence, there was every indication that the Titoists led by Beria had readied themselves not just for a coup against the Soviet state but also for avenues of escape in case they were to be arrested. If you cannot beat them, join them and rise to lead them so that you may mislead them. Two of Beria's own agents, Khrushchev and Malenkov, were deployed to lead – and hence mislead – the communist efforts towards a purge against the Beria faction, and to ensure the continuity

of Titoist influence in case the anti-Beriaite purge succeeds. After all, Beria knew well that a plot was hatched against him:

My father ... was in a hurry because he realized that the time he had in which to act freely was limited. (...) He wanted to get rid of his colleagues because he knew that something was being hatched against him. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

It was just the case though that, naturally, Beria and his team did not know about all the tactical details of the communist plot to purge them, and thus failed to counter such a move. Beria was lured into a meeting of the Central Committee and thereupon he was arrested.

At the same time, the deployment of Khrushchev and Malenkov into the leadership of the communist camp did not just mean Beriaite influence over the communist network but also meant communist cooptation of Malenkov and Khrushchev, since infiltration into the communist camp could only come through adopting most of the aspects of the policy line pursued by the communist faction in the Soviet Union. Hence, Malenkov, with utmost reluctance, participated in the anti-Beria coup.

Anyways, the CIA document stated:

One of the variations of Malenkov's plan called for Beria's arrest at a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was scheduled for the end of June 1953 (approximately the 26th or 27th). Malenkov, however, was not quite sure that Beria would be present at the meeting of the members of the Central Committee because he had previously several times failed to appear at such meetings and had begun to disregard Malenkov in general. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

To this end:

All the preparations for the arrest of Beria and his accomplices were carried out [by a communist team ostensibly headed] by Malenkov in complete secrecy. Among the persons who took part in these preparations were members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whom Malenkov trusted completely; they were issued arms. The officers from the Chief Guard Directorate of the MVD who were on duty in the buildings of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Kremlin were totally isolated and had no way of even guessing of the plans for the arrest of Beria, let alone the members of the central apparatus of the MVD in general. For their part, Konev and Zhukov selected the generals and senior officers whom they trusted most and who could be relied upon in case of need. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

However, the tide had turned far too strongly against Beria for Zhukov to collaborate with Beria. Hence, Zhukov actually opportunistically joined Konev in the fight against Beria:

Marshal Konev, Zhukov and Bulganin, two guards divisions were ordered to Moscow on an urgent basis from their quarters in the Urals. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

It was expected that Malenkov would put up an armed resistance because the army leaders were on Malenkov's side. Therefore, General Aremyev ordered two divisions from the Moscow Military District to Moscow in time for the coup d'état. One of the divisions was armored. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Some people would argue that after having eliminated Stalin, Malenkov and Khrushchev had genuinely turned against Beria, out of greed for personal power. According to this narrative, Beria, Malenkov, and Khrushchev had all allied with each other to get rid of Stalin, but turned against each other after having eliminated Stalin. This narrative, untenable empirically, is nonsense dialectically. It is contradicted empirically by the fact that in the past too, long before the death of Stalin, Khrushchev was acting against Beria even when Khrushchev was establishing closer covert bonds with Beria. Recall from C19S2 and C19S7.2 that Khrushchev had entrenched his alliance with Beria in 1951, and yet, even then, Khrushchev, having been coopted by the Stalin faction, was pursuing the purge of the Abakumov group, the henchmen of Beria in the Soviet intelligence service. Clearly, just as how well before Stalin's death, Khrushchev was an agent of Beria while pretending to be 'against' Beria, Khrushchev behaved the same way after Stalin's death. The exact same goes for the Malenkov group, which, well before Stalin's death, had been coopted by the Stalin faction against the Beria group – the Malenkov network was coopted to spearhead the Mingrelian Purge and the Leningrad Purge, both anti-Beriaite purges – even when the Malenkov group was deepening its bonds with the Beria network; and the same was done by the Malenkov group after Stalin's death. Notice, by the way, that even well after the death of Stalin, Zhukov was allied to Lavrenti Beria as Sergo Beria rightly recalled; and yet, Zhukov too opportunistically joined the anti-Beriaite tide in order to save himself from communist-led anti-Beriaite purges. The case of Malenkov's and Khrushchev's 'hostility' to their covert ally Lavrenti Beria was no different. Hence, the narrative that 'suddenly', Malenkov and Khrushchev turned 'against' Beria, out of an opportunistic greed for power, or because Stalin had died, is empirically contradicted.

Yet, it is also nonsense, dialectically. The ally of my ally is my ally. Khrushchev was allied to the Anglo-American

imperialists. Beria was allied to the Anglo-American imperialists. No need to mention their long history of mutual collaboration. They represented the same class forces and were backed by the same class forces. To believe that Beria and Khrushchev would be genuinely opposed to each other is to believe in anti-dialectical superstition. Malenkov had misgivings about Beria attending the meeting of the Central Committee; such a misgiving was natural as Malenkov – coopted, closely surveiled, and compelled into anti-Beriaism by the communists – was making a move against Beria reluctantly. Thus, reported the CIA:

In spite of Malenkov's misgivings, Beria came to this meeting of the Central Committee. By the time Malenkov was ready to speak, all the entrances and exits of the building where the meeting was held were blocked by armed members of the Central Committee, and the MVD guards were removed from their posts. (...). During the meeting Beria felt that something was not right and tried to leave the meeting hall, but was not permitted to do so. After Malenkov had charged Beria with criminal anti-State activities, Zhukov and Konev personally arrested him. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

There came:

Beria's angry protests at Malenkov's infamous injustice, then his tearful pleas for freedom, and so on. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

As the reader may recall from Molotov's memoirs, when Beria got arrested, Beria got into his begging mode. The CIA document partially corroborates this by noting the:

picture of the transformation of this man, who only a few minutes ago was a haughty and self-assured statesman, into a flabby distraught creature begging for mercy was tragic and left a very unpleasant feeling with all those who were present. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

The person leading the trial of Beria was Konev, the old comrade of Stalin:

It is characteristic that the special legal board for the trial of Beria and his accomplices consisted basically of responsible workers of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the representatives of the armed forces. The trial was held under conditions of great secrecy, and very few persons, even from among the leaders of the MVD of the USSR, actually knew about what happened at this trial. Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev was appointed chairman of the trial of Beria and his accomplices. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Thence:

After Beria's arrest a thorough purge was made of the personnel of the central apparatus of the MVD, its oblast and kray administrations, and also the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the union republics, especially in Georgia and Armenia. Many of the leading workers were arrested. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

The purge of Beria indeed partially entailed the backlash of the MVD intelligence agents who belonged to the Stalin faction, against Beria and the agents whom he had planted in charge of the MVD. Indeed, after the arrest of Beria, there came about the purge of many Beria agents throughout the MVD:

The same evening the employees of the central apparatus of the MVD were ordered to destroy all pictures of Beria. Shortly afterwards began the arrest of the leading personnel of the MVD. Malenkov appointed the special commission of the Central Committee under the chairmanship of Nikolai Nikolayevich Shatalin with the task of carrying out the general purge among the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (central administration as well as provincial branches). In other words, there began the hunting for and the destruction of Beria's partisans – large and small. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

Many of the corrupt officials in the Soviet counter-intelligence apparatus were purged, thus allowing for a spirit of democracy within the Soviet intelligence:

as a result of the measures taken and the liquidation of the remains of "Beriaism", [the] system of the State Security organs became incomparably more democratic, and that the struggle against bureaucratism, bad organization, and arrogance of individual chiefs was carried on decisively, especially in the Second Chief Directorate. For example, Colonel A. M. Korotkov, who was noted for his rudeness and his contemptuous attitude toward his subordinates, became [so kind in his outwardly behaviour that he began to appear as] almost a saint as a result of these measures. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

Of course, the spirit of democracy in the Soviet counter-intelligence is not to imply the establishment of some absurd application of the 'worker self-management' model in the counter-intelligence. Rather, it is to mean less bureaucratic terror inside the counter-intelligence sector. Through the purge of Beria, General Konev, as the head of the remnants of the Stalin faction, also gained some increased strength in the USSR:

Marshal Konev's status has definitely risen; he has advanced from a military district commander to a deputy defense minister as revealed in April 1955 to the commander of the Soviet-Satellite combined staff in May 1955. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, p. A-1) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

After the purge of Beria, the Malenkov group was further weakened since the Malenkov group had extensively collaborated with Beria's group. On the overt level, Khrushchev opposed Malenkov. The best thing about Nikita Khrushchev was that he was the stupidest one among the original clique of Titoist assassins in the Soviet leadership. A dumb renegade is always easier to contain than a smart renegade. The Stalin faction headed by Konev supported Nikita Khrushchev's overt-level 'opposition' against Malenkov and thereby assisted in the demotion of Malenkov in 1954. Led by Konev, the communists in the Soviet security and purging apparatus found it easier to manage Khrushchev and thus supported his rise. Later on in 1957, Malenkov pretended to be a 'Stalinist' and started to oppose Nikita Khrushchev on the overt level; that was when the sympathies of the communists went towards an overt-level alliance with Malenkov's group against the Khrushchev group.

The Beria agents had already been betraying the USSR long before their defection to the territories of the US-led bloc. However,

The defection of the Beria agents

Beria was accused of being an MI6 agent, a rapist, a torturer, and a terrorist:

The crimes of Beriya and his accomplices against the State forms the main part of the bill of indictment.

This part described at length the espionage Beriya did for foreign intelligence organisations and his anti - Soviet subversive activity in the sphere of Socialist construction. The statement was simply a paper with greater detail than the official announcement of the Soviet Government about the arrest of Beriya and his accomplices. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

Further, Beriya was accused of complete moral and personal corruption. In confirmation, the bill of indictment cited the fact that during the time which Beriya had lived in Moscow (since 1938) he had seduced a great number of Moscow girls (the statement indicated "over two hundred"). Many pages of the indictment were devoted to Beriya's romantic adventures; (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

After the sentence of Beriya and his group had been carried out, the main headquarters of the MVD had read at closed Party meetings the bill of indictment of Beriya's group. From the time spent in reading this bill of indictment (about five hours), one can judge the quantity of sins which these persons were accused. In particular, Beriya was accused of inhuman cruelties and animal sadism with regard to individual persons arrested by State Security organs. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

The above excerpts do not mention that Beria was accused of being an MI6 agent but the reader can research for themselves on this; it is well-known that Beria was officially accused of being an MI6 agent, a supporter of separatist terror groups, and a supporter of MI6 satellite states.

One of the other henchmen of Lavrenti Beria purged was Viktor Abakumov. However, as a part of the communist faction's compromise with the Khrushchev-Malenkov group, one of the official 'reasons' given for the execution of Abakumov was that he caused the Leningrad purge. That is, the officially stated argument and 'reason' for the purge of Abakumov was partially wrong, but the real behind-the-scene reason, which was Abakumov's service to Beria, was correct. The same goes for some of the accusations against Beria for the latter supposedly being the willing enforcer of every 'murderous' policy line of Stalin. The real reason for the purge was concerning his treasonous intelligence activities for Anglo-American intelligence services, but he was blamed by the Khrushchev group for some of the correct policies of the Stalin era anyways.

C19S10. Deepening Links with the CIA-MI6

*** IMG-All- {The Reign of Beria}

Knowing that the MI6 agent Beria and his Titoist henchmen had conquered the pinnacles of power, Churchill took initiative in expanding relations with the USSR, as a channel for extended intelligence penetration, which could assist the Beria faction further in its Titoization efforts. The Americans too were acutely aware of the Titoization in the USSR and the changes coming about, although not as aware as the British. Christian Ostermann, a leading intelligence official from the CIA front think tank Wilson Center, wrote:

Delicately balancing hardline skepticism with a more conciliatory approach toward the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow, Eisenhower's "Chance for Peace" speech of April 16, 1953 cautiously made any detente in U.S.-Soviet relations contingent upon Kremlin concessions such as free elections in Eastern Europe or the signing of an Austrian peace treaty.

It was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who, though initially rather dubious about a Soviet change of heart, was more willing to explore potential opportunities which seemed possible with the change of leadership, thus breaking with the skeptical and reserved reception which Moscow's peace offensive had met in the West. On April 20, Churchill not only backed the U.S. "initiative" but also indicated that he favored high-level talks with the new Soviet leadership. Following the Pravda article of April 25, which had signaled Russian willingness for talks on Germany, the British Prime Minister, in a speech in Parliament on May 16, boldly called

for a “conference on the highest level [...] between the leading powers without delay,” holding out the possibility of “a generation of peace.”

In going well beyond Eisenhower’s “deeds, not words” approach, Churchill was primarily motivated by his belief that a negotiated settlement was necessary to prevent nuclear war and that the new Soviet leadership was amenable to personal diplomacy. Moreover, the prime minister felt that the West could now negotiate from a position of strength and that Eisenhower was thus also ready for negotiations.

(‘The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback’, Wilson Center, Christian F. Ostermann (Director), December 1994, p. 12) (IMG)

After the arrest and purge of Beria, Beria’s agents fled to the countries dominated by the imperialist camp and they provided plenty of intelligence to the Anglo-Americans. A US intelligence official admitted:

Much CIA information, direct from Moscow, comes from Russians who served under the liquidated Beria and defected to our side, pouring out secrets [to us] ... (THE MYSTERIOUS DOINGS OF THE CIA: America’s Secret Agents: Part Two, The Saturday Evening Post, Richard Harkness, Gladys Harkness, November 6, 1954, p. 66. In: CIA archives) (IMG{GDR})

C19S11. Deepening Ties with the UDB

*** IMG-All-{The Reign of Beria}

Beria aimed to force the USSR to bow to Titoist Yugoslavia:

My father's second project in the sphere of foreign policy was to bring about reconciliation with Tito's Yugoslavia. He pointed out to his colleagues that Tito had not joined the Atlantic alliance in spite of the extremely difficult situation his country was in. He had held out. The USSR ought, therefore, as soon as possible, to admit the wrong it and the Cominform had done, and reveal the whole truth on that affair. (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 263) (IMG)

He sent a letter to Rankovic, offering him the chance for a secret meeting:

Beria's second effort focused on Yugoslavia. He was about to send a secret emissary to Belgrade to offer Yugoslav Prime Minister Alexander Rankovic a secret meeting, and, ultimately, the restoration of friendly relations. Again, this step, if taken, would have meant a major revision of the Stalin-Molotov line in foreign policy. Earlier in the spring, the Presidium (on Beria's initiative?) had quietly decided to stop the "hate-Tito" campaign.. (The Cold War: Cold War Espionage and Spying, Vol. 4, Lori Lyn Bogle, p. 22) (IMG)

In the letter to Rankovic, Beria requested:

a secret meeting with Rankovich and Tito to normalize relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. (Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 206) (IMG)

The person who was to carry that letter to Rankovic and Tito on Beria’s behalf was Colonel Fedoseyev who was later arrested for the same reason:

Several days after Beriya’s arrest, Party meetings were held in each administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on orders from the Central Committee. These meetings bore the usual character expressions of indignation towards the “enemy of the people” and self-flagellation for the lack of the required political and “Chekist” alertness. Usually at such meetings some scapegoats are found for sins which until then have been known to no one, and secret enemies of the Soviet regime are “denounced”. This is what also happened at the meeting of the workers of the Second Chief Directorate. One of the speakers declared as the chief of a department, a specialist in intelligence, Colonel Fedoseyev, was a partisan of Beriya and that he should be handed over to the investigating organs. According to the speaker, Beriya personally was training Colonel Fedoseyev for a trip to Yugoslavia, where he was to conduct some kind of very important negotiations on state affairs with Marshall Tito. In proof of his words, the speaker added that a personal letter addressed to Tito was found in Beriya’s private safe, and that it was this letter that Colonel Fedoseyev was to deliver to Tito. Fedoseyev most categorically denied the accusations; however, he was later arrested. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

However:

This initiative was never undertaken. Beria was arrested on 26 June and the question of his undercover approach to Tito was one of the many charges brought against him. At the 2-7 July Plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Molotov made clear that ... Beria had gone too far by referring to 'Comrade Tito and Comrade Rankovic; dropping talk of Yugoslavia as a fascist state and restoring 'bourgeois' relations was all that was being sought. Faithful to the rhetoric of the past, Molotov referred to 'Tito and his band', and he even hinted that Beria had been interested in following Tito's path by creating some sort of popular front organisation within the Soviet Union which would have operated alongside the Communist Party. (Tito: A Biography, Geoffrey Swain, p. 110) (IMG)

Beria’s letter was:

held as proof that Beria was, in Molotov's words, an "agent of the class enemy." (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 206) (IMG)

Although the improvement of relations with Tito's Regime was not a good idea, Molotov, as a remnant of the communist faction, at least sought to block the Titoization of the Soviet Union.

The CIA spy Deriabin wrote:

Beria offered assurances to Czechoslovakia that the USSR would not continue to interfere in Czech internal affairs, and he wrote a personal letter to Marshal Tito apologizing for the manner in which Stalin had treated him. The MGB officer who would carry the letter to Tito showed it to me. The final sentence said, "Let us cast the past aside and look ahead to the resumption of diplomatic relations between our two nations." ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin) (IMG)

C19S12. Zionists Rehabilitated – 1953

The Anglo-American Zionist agents and killer-doctors involved in the deaths of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov were rehabilitated by Beria:

In a memorandum to the Presidium dated 1 April 1953, Beria detailed to his colleagues the falsifications and tortures in the 'Doctors' Plot' arguing that it was necessary to 'fully rehabilitate and immediately release all detained doctors and members of their families'. Thus on 4 April 1953, Pravda published a decree from the Ministry of Interior announcing that the defendants were 'fully rehabilitated as to the accusations of sabotage, terrorism and espionage brought against them, and ... released from detention'.

With these words, 'rehabilitation' made its appearance in the Soviet public parlance. (De-Stalinizing Eastern Europe, Kevin McDermott, Matthew Stibbe, Marc Elie, p. 28) (IMG)

At that time a statement was published to the effect that the Jews had been acquitted. Of course Ryumin and Timashuk were blamed for everything. ('Committee of State Security / The Doctors' Plot and Its Reversal', CIA, September 24, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

The Stalin-era USSR pursued the correct policy of seeking friendship with the people of Israel, but the Ben-Gurion regime, a terror state in service to Anglo-American imperialism, agitated anti-Soviet propaganda deliberately for the purpose of terror incitement against the Soviets. This terror incitement culminated in the bombing of the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv by Shabak-backed 'Kingdom of Israel' terrorists, consequently the breaking of Soviet diplomatic relations with the regime of Israel, despite the Soviet state's continued rightful recognition of Israel as a state. As a stab in the back of the Soviet diplomatic corps, the Beria group re-established diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel:

The 20 July announcement that the USSR and Israel have agreed to resume diplomatic relations, broken off 12 February after the bombing of the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv, is the logical culmination of Moscow's reversal of the anti-Zionist campaign which was vigorously pressed during the last months of Stalin's life. (The Beria Purge and Subsequent Soviet Policy, Central Intelligence Agency, July 24, p. 8) (IMG{Israel})

Chapter 20

C20S1. The Colour Revolution in East Germany – June 1953

*** IMG-All- {GDR}

As previously demonstrated in C15S9, the German Democratic Republic, faced with the problems of agriculture, embarked upon a program of gradually collectivizing its agriculture, emphasizing the voluntary process of joining kolkhoz, and actually demonstrated success in this regard. Nonetheless, the East Germans were not so fortunate by the end of 1952, since unfavorable weather conditions yet again hit East Germany, alongside Poland and Czechoslovakia. The following is an excerpt of a document by the CIA's Office of Research and Reports regarding this matter:

A. Northern Area (Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia)

In the northern area of the European Satellites the fall of 1952 was characterized by above-normal precipitation, with the result that fall plowing and sowing of grains for harvest in 1953 were considerably hampered. Despite the fact that spring plowing and sowing were aided by favorable weather over most of the area, it is believed that the over-all acreage of bread grain will be less than prewar, because of failure to fulfill the fall sowing plans for winter wheat and rye.

Available weather information and reports from the American Embassy in Moscow indicate that cold and lack of rain characterized the spring much of Poland, although more abundant rainfall appears to have occurred in June. Favorable conditions for spring work were reported in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Rainfall appears to have been gradually adequate to abundant in the late spring and summer months, and in July heavy rains were reported to have caused harvesting difficulties for grain and cultivation difficulties for root and vegetable crops.

(‘CROP CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET BLOC, 1953 (RR IM-379)’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 23, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

Another CIA document, while spreading the usual propaganda against the communists, nonetheless acknowledged that there was a poor crop year in Germany at the time:

The "new course" in East Germany, first outlined on 9 June 1953, followed a 12-month period of intense effort to communize the country rapidly. On top of an overly ambitious 5 -year plan (goals of which had been advanced one to two years in many cases) and a high level of reparations, was imposed a rapid remilitarization program and **a poor crop year**. The impossibility of fulfilling these combined tasks was obvious.. Through the end of May, Party leaders, in vituperative and uncompromising speeches, emphasized rapid socialization of the GDR, describing this as the means by which German unity would be accomplished. (Economic Characteristics of the New Course in the USSR and East Europe, CIA, September 29, 1953, p. 7) (IMG)

The unfavorable weather caused food shortages in East Germany, which was something that gave the Moscow Titoists an opportunity to pursue their pro-Nazi agenda against the German Democratic Republic. As confirmed by Lavrenti's son Sergo Beria, Lavrenti Beria had a pro-imperialist agenda on Germany:

My father [Beria] would have liked to form two blocs, uniting the neutral countries of Central and Eastern Europe – one around Poland, the other around Dimitrov's Bulgaria and Tito's Yugoslavia. In his mind this arrangement should be completed by a unified and non-socialist Germany. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Hence in late December of 1952, when the agriculture of East Germany was already being damaged by the unfavorable weather, Beria met with some of Nazi Germany's officials, including Erwin Respondek and Joseph Wirth. This fact was reported to the CIA by Wirth:

Dr. Joseph Wirth, a former German chancellor, claims that he saw Lavrenti Beria in Berlin-Karlshorst in December 1952. The arrangements for the meeting were made by Dr. Erwin Respondek, formerly of the German Foreign Service, who was also present at the interview.

Wirth alleges that he has been asked to take over an important post in a new East German government which, he was told, will be established soon. He was told by Beria that the Russians are planning a new policy toward Germany, and was asked to collaborate in it.

(Meeting between Wirth and Beria, CIA, July 7, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Erwin Respondek had been a high-ranking Nazi German official who had spied for the Americans, as shown in C10S4. With Respondek was Wirth. As a leading member of the German ‘Centre Party’, Joseph Wirth had

officially supported the Enabling Act, the act which was to give the Nazi leaders the tyrannical powers they obtained after the Reichstag Fire. Wirth and others voted along the Nazis in its favor:

What little resistance there remained among Center Party parliamentarians to the Enabling Act dissipated, leading even Bruning and like-minded Catholic politicians such as Joseph Wirth to fall into line and vote with the Hitler government. (Soldier of Christ: The Life of Pope Pius XII, Robert A. Ventresca, p. 79) (IMG)

As can be seen, a new policy by Beria had begun with regards to East Germany. The conquest of power and the assassination of Stalin by Beria and the Titoist faction created new opportunities for Beria in the plot to overthrow the government of East Germany. Upon seizing power in March 1953, the Titoist faction in the Soviet Union drafted new documents dictating for the reversal of socialization. Against the pressure of the Titoist faction in Moscow, the SED refused to pursue the reversal of the socialization, but inevitably unable to confront the Moscow-based Titoists with utmost vigour, the SED drafted a document that called for a slowdown of socialization and some reforms. The Moscow-based Titoists were furious and Beria began to insult Ulbricht for drafting a document of mere slowdown reforms in response, as opposed to the complete reversal of the socialization course undertaken. Christian Ostermann, a leading official and scholar of the CIA's front think tank Wilson Center, wrote:

According to the memoirs of SED Politburo member Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of the party organ Neues Deutschland, the SED leaders had to take quite a beating as all of the Soviet comrades rejected the superficial draft. Beria displayed particular aggressiveness, allegedly throwing the documents at Ulbricht across the table with the words: "This is a bad remake of our document!"

The Soviet leaders acknowledged that "we all have made mistakes" and that the recommendations were not meant as "accusations," but insisted that "everything has to be based on a change in the conditions in the G.D.R." Demanding that the SED leaders should "not worry about [their] prestige," Malenkov warned that "if we don't correct [the political line] now, a catastrophe will happen." The Soviet leaders appealed to the Germans to "correct fast and vigorously."

(“This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse”: The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives’, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Had the communist faction maintained dominance over the Politburo, the USSR would have rendered generous assistance to the East Germans against the poor agricultural conditions, much as how the USSR did this to Czechoslovakia in 1949-1951 (see C15S8). However, the Titoist bullies were in power, and hence aid to communists was not coming. The East Germans were, in the words of a book published by the Harvard University Press:

Unable to obtain aid from the Soviet Union. (From Nazism to Communism: German Schoolteachers Under Two Dictatorships, Harvard University Press, Charles B. Lansing, 2010, p. 207) (IMG)

On the one hand, the communist workers' faction of the SED, headed by Ulbricht, was isolated by the Kremlin Titoists, and the East German People's Democracy was defunded. On the other hand, the Kremlin Titoists continued to assist the Titoist and Kautskyite elements of the SED. Indeed, one of Beria's top agents in East Germany was Zaisser, who supported the handing over of East Germany to West Germany:

In so far as Beria is concerned, there is evidence that Stalin's erstwhile henchman strongly advocated a moderate economic policy for all of Eastern Europe in order to stabilize Central Europe and head off West German rearmament. He supported a group within the East German leadership led by Minister for State Security Zaisser. Zaisser ... called for a remodeling of the Socialist Unity Party into an all-German labor party and for negotiations on reunification, on the assumption that it was impossible to build Socialism in a divided country. ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

The call for the reversal of socialization and the westward strategic reorientation of Germany by the Moscow Titoists also helped the Kautskyite SPD grouping in the SED, which during the Stalin era had been reduced to a minority dominated by the communist workers' faction. In the newly arising conditions, the Kautskyites gained the upper hand and the power of Grotewohl – the representative of the German SPD contingent of the SED – and the SPD contingent in general was boosted against the communist workers' faction within the SED led by

Ulbricht:

In East Germany, US officials were quick to notice in the days following Stalin's death that Walter Ulbricht was taking special pains to straighten out his record. His 8 March policy statement, published in the East German press prior to Malenkov's funeral oration, attributed to Stalin's guidance policies that Ulbricht had long espoused. At the same time at a late March meeting of the Soviet Control Commission [headed by Semenev] Grotewohl had criticized the SED Central Committee and, indirectly, Ulbricht for failure to meet successfully the problems of reparations, refugees and consumer goods shortages. The relative mildness of East German reaction to West German Bundestag ratification of the EDC and the contractual agreements was taken at the time as a possible indication that Ulbricht's strong policies were less acceptable than they had been previously. (GERMANY, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), July 16, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Beria's goal with regards to all of the Peoples' Democracies was to promote the Kautskyite ('socialist') elements in some of the popular fronts at the expense of the communists:

My father told us that he was now going to succeed in applying the policy which he had wanted to apply after the war and which Stalin had prevented: to go back to governments of coalition with the socialists and to withdraw our troops from Central Europe. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 264) (IMG)

When the Grotewohl faction's influence increased:

The East Germans recently invited the West German Socialist Party to send a commission to East Germany to cooperate with the Socialist Unity Party. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), March 20, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

Thus, West German imperialist agents who called themselves "social democrats" were invited into East Germany. Against this set-up, later on:

On 5 May Ulbricht continued his hard line when he bitterly denounced the West German Socialists as traitors to the working class despite their opposition to the Bonn and Paris treaties. Ulbricht's propaganda tactic of basing the unity campaign on the ... thesis that an increasingly communized East Germany would become more attractive to West Germans demonstrated an inflexibility inconsistent with the emphasis being given to the German unity campaign in statements emanating from Moscow. (GERMANY, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), July 16, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

In the meantime, in the absence of Soviet aid, and the constant lobbying of the Kremlin Titoists, the best response for East Germany was to strengthen itself against imperialists on the one hand and Titoist stabs in the back on the other hand. East Germany needed its economy improved so to alleviate the economic problems resultant from a lack of Soviet aid on the one hand and the poor harvest and natural weather problems, and to strengthen the influence of communists over the state in the face of imperialist and Titoist pressures. Thus, it was necessary to end the artificially low work norms which had reduced productivity. As such, the norms were increased by 10%. A book published by the Harvard University Press stated:

Aware that previous attempts at raising the traditionally low work norms by means of collective work agreements had failed, East German officials unleashed a massive campaign to introduce what they called "technically determined work norms," culminating in May 1953 with the state decreeing a 10 percent increase in the workers' quotas. Since many workers relied on the bonuses that came with the regular overfulfillment of artificially low work norms, the announced increase represented a potential 25 to 30 percent cut in real wages. (From Nazism to Communism: German Schoolteachers Under Two Dictatorships, Harvard University Press, Charles B. Lansing, 2010, p. 207) (IMG)

As confirmed by Helene Seppain of the CIA's Wilson Center, Semenev was a Beria agent:

A Malenkov-Beria man, Semyonov saw his task as keeping a reunified Germany disarmed. ('Contrasting US and German Attitudes to Soviet Trade, 1917-91: Politics by Economic Means', Helene Seppain (former Wilson Center scholar), 1992, p. 108) (IMG)

As a top representative of the Moscow Titoists, Semenev was a key agent bringing the Titoist 'New Course' and conspiring to undermine Ulbricht and his communist workers' faction in the SED:

We now know that Semenev returned to East Berlin with a "new course." Moscow was prepared to sacrifice Ulbricht, or at least downgrade him.... ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952 - 1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 5) (IMG)

The stab in the back of the East German communists by the Kremlin Titoists helped the renegades in the SED

to step up their comprador bourgeois 'criticism' of the socialization and collectivization policies of East Germany, while blaming these matters on Ulbricht's supposed 'dictatorial style':

Grotewohl's notes of the June 2-4 Kremlin meetings do not reflect any personal criticism of Ulbricht, who had stood for the accelerated socialization program. Following their return to Berlin on June 5, however, discussion within the SED Politburo of how and when to publicize the New Course document quickly turned into criticism of Ulbricht's dictatorial leadership style. During SED Politburo meetings on June 6 and 9, fellow Politburo members vented their dissatisfaction with Ulbricht's personality cult and management of the Secretariat. ("This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Now to be sure, the right to criticize and express opinions is something that all communists should support, and so, the fact that these renegades had the legal right to criticize in the democratic centralism manner is a good thing, but their 'criticism' itself was baseless and anti-scientific.

In this counter-revolutionary ritual of advancing Kremlin Titoist interests through 'criticism':

Semenov, who had returned with the SED delegation from Moscow and participated in the sessions, seemed increasingly inclined to support Ulbricht's critics. ("This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Finally:

The Politburo finally decided to draw up a comprehensive statement on "the self-criticism of the work of the Politburo and the Secretariat" which would be presented to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. It also resolved to set up a commission, composed of Ulbricht, State Security chief Wilhelm Zaisser, OelBner, Herrstadt, and Berlin SED boss Hans Jendretzky, to "prepare an organizational reform of the working methods of the Politburo and Secretariat." ("This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

So much for the supposedly 'democratic' mindset of the Titoist assassins at the helm of the CPSU, the East German leaders were ordered to reverse course, and to swiftly impose this New Course on the rest of the Party from above. The communists in SED leadership opposed such a dictatorial behavior but there was so little they could do in the face of the much-mightier Moscow-based Titoist bullies who held many more strings than they did:

Most Politburo members agreed that the announcement of the New Course program warranted careful preparation of the party and the population at large, but Semenov urged speedy implementation of Moscow's instructions. When, on the evening of June 10, Herrstadt pleaded with Semenov to give the SED two week's time to prepare the policy change, the High Commissioner insisted that "the communique has to be in the paper tomorrow, warning the Neues Deutschland editor that "you may not have a state for much longer."

Heeding Semenov's order, the Politburo announced the "New Course" liberalization program in Neues Deutschland on June 11. As expected by Herrstadt and others, the communique with its frank admission of past mistakes came as a surprise to many in and out of the party. Reports from local party organizations, carefully monitored by the SED headquarters in Berlin indicated with great candor the widespread disappointment, disbelief, confusion and shock within party ranks as well as the populace.

To many, the communique signaled the SED's final bankruptcy and the beginning of its demise. Party members felt betrayed and "panicky"

("This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 67) (IMG)

The Kremlin Titoists were forcing this Titoist New Course, as a means of capitulating to the US-led bloc of Atlantic powers:

The decisions of the Political Bureau of the SED and the government order of 11 June 1953, in which the change of course was made definite, unquestionably followed as a result of Semenov's directions. Semenev wanted to get rid of the obstacles to an understanding with the West, which obstacles were, in his opinion, obvious enough. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

Crucially, the New Course imposed by Kremlin Titoists was to sabotage East German industrial reconstruction and rearmament efforts through the shift of emphasis away from heavy industry onto light industry, and hence through the de-emphasis of the development of the industrial backbone to the society and military. This new policy line would have of course also prevented the expansion of the working class base in East Germany, hence weakening communist influence there. According to Ostermann, an intelligence report to the Kruglov (a Beria agent) stated that almost everyone in the SED Politburo, foremost among them Ulbricht himself, opposed the shift away from heavy industry to the consumer goods sector:

A recently declassified report to the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs [and Beria agent] S. Kruglov by the KGB deputy resident in Berlin, Ivan Fadeikin, throws new light on the events within the SED Politburo. In a June 30 conversation with Soviet officials, the GDR Minister of Trade and Supply Curt Wach reported on the opposition which the New Course instructions from Moscow, particularly the shift of resources from the heavy to consumer goods industries, had encountered within the SED Politburo on June 9. Just about everybody seemed to oppose a plan tabled by the Minister of Machine Construction, Hermann Rau according to which 1.3 billion marks would be reallocated to light industries. Key members of the SED leadership — Rau himself, Wilhelm Leuschner, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Fritz Selbmann, Minister for the Ore-Mining Industry, Fred Oelbner, Anton Ackermann — opposed the plan to cut back on heavy industry. According to Wach, Ulbricht most vehemently spoke out against the plan, arguing that “[w]e cannot free up such resources. Rau's plan disorganizes the national economy, and our economy is already disorganized as it is.” (‘“This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse”: The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives’, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Nonetheless, with the pressure of Semenev and other Kremlin Titoists, this policy was enforced for the time being:

If the 9 June SED course of action is implemented, as indicated by Grotewohl on 21 June, the East German quest for economic self-sufficiency, premised on build-up heavy industry at expense consumer goods production, in effect has been scrapped. This bound to shift weight of importance from industrial proletariat to farmers and consumer goods producers entailing serious weakening SED influence in its role as vanguard industrial proletariat. This in turn tends weaken Soviet hold over east zone populace. (CIA BERLIN ANALYSIS OF UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), No. 4511, July 8, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

With the blessing of the Moscow Titoists, the Kautskyite renegade from the Second International, Grotewohl, took steps to promote the Evangelical Church, the infamously CIA-backed church that promoted an anti-Semitic neoconservative Christian Zionist messianist vision of the world:

On 10 June 1953 there was a statement by the representatives of the Soviet Zone, with Prime Minister Grotewohl at their head, during the course of a conversation with Bishop Dibelius and five bishops from the Soviet Zone of the Evangelical Church, that all measures hostile to the church in the Soviet Zone Republic would be adjusted, they declared themselves ready to guarantee the independence of church affaire according to the provisions of the constitution. (...). The agreement with the Evangelical bishops of the Soviet Zone, looking to the abandonment of the attack on the churches which had taken place the day before, was expressly confirmed. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Then:

The “new course” which Semenov had commenced was put into effect by a series of further measures by the Soviet administration. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

In order to undermine East Germany's military defenses, one of the first measures undertaken by the Moscow Titoist agents in East Germany was to impose the end of the paramilitary training in the 'Society for Sport and

Technique', as part of the program to capitulate to the West:

The paramilitary GST-training (GST = Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik) was stopped at once. On 17 June 1953 it was arranged that, when resumed, this training was to proceed only in accord with certain special measures. The decision not to continue the GST-training, in the form hitherto used, was announced in instructions for agitators on 8 and 11 June 1953. It was further stated that the relaxation of tension now appearing in the realm of higher politics must not be disturbed by any false steps of a militant-political nature. This decision was emphasized in the report of a dissolution at the district headquarters of the GST on 12 June 1953. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

And:

All work in the construction project at Rügen harbor was stopped on 11 June 1953, on orders of the Ministerial Council of the Soviet Zone. The continuation of security work at the projects under construction was to be closed down until 31 August 1953. Only a temporary halt in the work seemed to be involved, however. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

The KVP, which was a military force recruiting predominantly out of the Nazi German POWs in the USSR, was an unreliable institution but could nonetheless be useful in the transfer of military knowledge and expertise to the communists in East Germany. Under the New Course, however, the transfer of military knowledge to East German communists from these former Nazi German POWs ceased:

The change in course by the Soviet Zone administration in the first half of June 1953 ... also affected the Volkspolizei in various ways:

a) Limitation of the buildings of the KVP.

b) Breaking off of the military training of 18 to 30 year old members of the SED and FDJ, already being carried out by the KVP.

(CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 21) (IMG)

While the defense, security apparatus, and economy of East Germany was being systematically undermined by the Beria agent Semenev and other Moscow Titoist agents assisting him, the SED also lost prestige as a result of the New Course. Thus, some SED members:

called for Ulbricht's resignation. Many thought the SED retreat from crash socialization resulted from pressure by the West German government under Konrad Adenauer and the Western powers, evidenced by such reports as the one from the small town of Seehausen where "the entire village is in the bar, drinking to the health of Adenauer." To make matters worse, the only segment of the population which seemed to have been excluded from the New Course liberalization were — paradoxically — the workers: the raised work norms arbitrarily imposed on May 28 remained in force. Labor dissatisfaction was further fueled when the SED regime, groping to maintain its authority, confirmed the controversial norm increases on June 13. ("This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 67) (IMG)

In terms of the psychological warfare, therefore, on the one hand the SED had retreated in the face of the comprador bourgeois ideology, and on the other hand, the workers were to work for higher norms, norms which surely were justified economically, but which were used as excuse for launching a colour revolution.

The American intelligence service definitely had a hand in promoting this colour revolution. Colour revolutions are launched obviously not through paying every single protester to come into the streets, but rather through constant propaganda work and psychological warfare, which serves as the arousal factor driving some of the ordinary individuals into the streets to clash with the People's Democracy.

The economic situation in the neighbouring Peoples' Democracies was not so dissimilar to that of East Germany. Poland and Czechoslovakia faced trouble in their agriculture due to the unfavorable weather conditions, as noted by the CIA. Yet, in spite of this fact, the colour revolution occurred in East Germany, but not in other People's Democracies at the time. Indeed, the CIA admitted that the belief that large-scale protests were simultaneously occurring in other Peoples' Democracies is groundless:

Western reports of large-scale demonstrations in Poland as an aftermath of the East German riots

are denied by US embassy officials in Warsaw. They report that the situation is calm in Warsaw, and they noted no evidence of demonstrations or increased security precautions during the trips through, central, northern and southwestern Poland in late June.

Similarly, reports of strikes and demonstrations throughout the other Satellites are unconfirmed and probably untrue.

(NSC Briefing: EAST GERMANY, CIA/NSC, July 8, 1953, p. 10) (IMG)

While there were rumours that in Poland there was unrest as well:

US embassy in Warsaw denied unrest and martial law in Poland. (CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT EVENTS IN THE SOVIET ORBIT, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), July 14, 1953, p. 4)

(IMG) Why did the protests happen in East Germany at the time and not in other places?

It is indeed the case that in East Germany, a large percentage of the German workers had a high level of respect for communism. Indeed, on the esteem for communism among the German workers, the US intelligence had reported: The esteem for Communism among the German workers rose considerably during the Spanish Civil War – a crucial period in Europe; it declined sharply during the German-Russian non-aggression pact, and climbed steeply with the decline of Germany's military fortunes on her Eastern Front. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 19) (IMG{Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

The 'Hitlerite majority' in Germany was primarily concentrated in and emanating from the agrarian petit-bourgeois areas, located mainly in southern Germany, unlike in north German, which was industrialized, proletarianized, and historically a zone of anti-Hitlerite uprisings such as the Stennes rebellion (see C10S7). Hitler's lieutenant, Hermann Rauschning, recalled:

Hitler's nature was incomprehensible to the North German. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 165) (IMG{Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

East Germany, located to the northeast of Germany, was proletarian-populated territory alien to Hitlerism. Furthermore, the German proletarians were immensely satisfied with the conditions in which they lived, as late as November 12, 1952 in East Germany:

There is much satisfaction with improvement in living standards, the greater range of goods offered, and the somewhat easier work tempo. A great number of special privileges are given to the working intellectuals, to labor heroes and master peasants, and the prizes or orders these person get are accompanied by material, cultural, and educational privileges. The great number of vacation homes for these elite and their children were mentioned most approvingly, and the division of the population into the followers of the regime, enjoying these privileges, and the others, the loafers and idlers has been very well adapted to German mentality. A point of pride is the new housing projects in East Berlin, especially the Stalinale. All new apartments will be reserved for the elite, and this is an attractive form of social pressure. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

All of this then begs the question: why the colour revolution in East Germany at the time? Had the colour revolution encompassed the entirety, majority, or even just slightly less than 50% of the East German working class, the colour revolution would have been far more widespread, far mightier, and far more difficult to put an end to. The colour revolution clearly was not such, and, considering the pro-communist attitudes of a significantly large percentage of the German proletarians, it is clear that the colour revolutionary uprising did not recruit as large a mass of the German proletarians as the Anglo-American media has claimed. Nonetheless, inevitably, a certain percentage of the German workers, immensely influenced by the propaganda of the Hitlerian years, continued to retain their militantly anti-Soviet views and were very easy to agitate into colour revolutionary action against the People's Democratic state of East Germany. Any kind of a shock, be it economic or political, had the potential for sparking protests by them, although naturally, the economic shocks were more effective for agitation among the workers. The sudden decline of the East German economy in the year 1953 as a result of the poor weather conditions coupled with the backstabbing of the Moscow Titoists severely deteriorated the German economy enough to spark some protests.

The protests would not have expanded into major riots, unless with the propaganda and agitation of the CIA-MI6 media outlets. Several documents prove that the colour revolution was instigated by the propaganda and

intelligence apparatus of the Anglo-American imperialists. A major CIA document confirmed that the colour revolutionary workers were 'summoned by the West' into the streets, The US intelligence document stated:

The main factor was the body of workers of the Soviet Zone, free from bourgeois struggles for security but driven to the limit. Summoned by the West and emerging for the first time from their eight-year submission to a system of organized isolation, they became aware of their revolutionary strength, though occasionally overestimating the real possibilities in changed mood. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

The psychological and media warfare operation for spreading the riots to outside of Berlin so to bog down Red Army troops outside Berlin, was done by the 'Radio in the American Sector' (Rundfunk im Americanischen Sektor – RIAS). Describing the establishment of the RIAS, the US State Department stated:

RIAS, the official radio station of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, was established to provide a mass medium of expression for the democratic West in Berlin and the Soviet Zone.

In the fall of 1945, when it became apparent at the outset of quadripartite relations that the Soviets would not relinquish unilateral control of Radio Berlin, the Americans decided to establish their own radio service. This service went into operation on February 7, 1946..

(RIAS [Radio in American Sector] Berlin, US State Department, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

US intelligence agent and prominent Wilson Center scholar Christian Osterman admitted that the RIAS was instrumental on spreading the riots:

RIAS' broadcasts were instrumental in quickly spreading the riots from Berlin to more remote areas of the GDR.... ("Keeping the Pot Simmering": The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953', Christian F. Ostermann (National Security Archive, Washington), German Studies Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (February 1996), Published By: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 66) (IMG)

RIAS was located in West Germany and West Berlin. The Anglo-American intelligence presence in Berlin no doubt assisted the propaganda process. In an abbreviated report, the CIA/NSC reported that West Berlin served as a secure base of Anglo-American and West German intelligence services, provided a safe haven for anti-GDR elements, and kept up the 'resistance' spirit of the populations:

Spontaneity [of the] uprising [is] not detracting from essential role played by West Berlin, symbol free society, offering sanctuary to persecuted, secure base [of] allied and German information and cold war agencies. Uprisings vindicate US and British policy hold on to Berlin even at risk [of] World War III and tribute to foresightedness [of] those who persisted [in] keeping alive resistance spirit [of the] east zone populace by all methods short of direct intervention. (CIA BERLIN ANALYSIS OF UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), No. 4511, July 8, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

All of these points made in the above CIA/NSC quote would seem too trivial to need to be mentioned, since Anglo- American intelligence and propaganda presence and activity against East Germany was a constant factor anyways. However, there is more to the story behind the above quote, than may at first appear. The other US intelligence document provided more precise details as to how West Berlin kept up the 'resistance spirit' and provided a hub for counter-revolutionaries. The intelligence document not only reaffirmed the crucial role played by RIAS in fomenting the colour revolution, but also stated that 'strike commandos' moved to Berlin to gain access to the riot's leadership center:

Spread of the Revolt in the Zone:

[N]ews of the beginning of the disturbances in East Berlin had already reached all cities in the Soviet Zone on 16 June 1953. On one side they were quickly spread everywhere by RIAS and other Western Zone radio stations, on the other side by railroad men, chauffeurs, and travelers. In many cities, the news from East Berlin led to immediate preparations for strikes and demonstrations, on 17 June 1953.

In the Leuna-Werke, strike commandos decided to go to Berlin and share the demonstrations there. They supposed – as did many other demonstrating groups – that there was a central direction in Berlin guiding the revolt in the whole zone. The Leuna workers wanted to get in touch with this center. On 17 June 1953, however, they were prevented from going farther on their way through the Soviet troops. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 12) (IMG)

There was indeed leadership shown by CIA operatives in carrying out further labour unrest and sabotaging East

German industry. One of the most important American mainstream news media outlets was 'The Saturday Evening Post', journalists of which interviewed anonymous top CIA officials and congressional intelligence committee staff. A US intelligence official interviewed made a very important remark in 1954 regarding the intelligence activity of the CIA:

Q[uestion]: Does CIA co-operate with anti-communist resistance and freedom movements in the satellite countries and in nations threatened by Red subversion?

A[nswer]: Besides its spy network and the open CIA function of research, the agency operates a superclandestine third force – the top-secret activity of aiding and abetting freedom forces where the patriotism of captive peoples may be fanned from a spark into action.

In one satellite, where factory workers were grouching about Red pay cuts and stepped-up norms, an agent trained in the technique of labor organizations promoted work slowdowns.

(THE MYSTERIOUS DOINGS OF THE CIA: America's Secret Agents: Part Two, The Saturday Evening Post, Richard Harkness, Gladys Harkness, November 6, 1954, p. 67. In: CIA archives) (IMG{GDR})

Until November 1954, at least, there was clearly only one so-called 'satellite' that had an uprising by 'factory workers' against 'Red pay cuts and stepped-up norms', and that was the German Democratic Republic. Without naming East Germany, the CIA official above is admitting that the CIA 'promoted work slowdowns' in East Germany, which shows that the high level of organization in the June 1953 colour revolution was no coincidence, but was the work of the US intelligence.

The uprising furthermore was admitted by the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) to have seemingly had good leadership by experienced tacticians:

local uprising in some instances said to have shown remarkable degree organization, suggesting ad hoc leadership by experienced tacticians and good mass discipline. (CIA BERLIN ANALYSIS OF UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), No. 4511, July 8, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

The above pieces of evidence fully confirm the role played by RIAS in fomenting the colour revolution, and the Atlantic camp in 'summoning' the colour revolutionaries into the streets. The documents almost confirm – but not fully confirm – that there were operatives on the ground, in the field, in East Germany leading the sabotage and worker unrest.

While the reader may be tempted to assume that the colour revolution was launched directly for the purpose of the immediate collapse of the East German government, this assumption is not correct. This colour revolution in fact was launched for the purpose not of immediately yielding the full and thorough collapse of the incumbent government, but for the purpose of gathering the mass force which rolls back the dominant faction, the progressive faction, of the Red Army and the East German government while elevating the Titoist agents fascism inside the German government so that these Titoist agents would be able to more smoothly pursue their Titoization agenda. The American intelligence and propaganda apparatus, through fomenting such a colour revolutionary uprising was creating the required 'pressure from below' with which to give the Titoists in the USSR and East Germany greater leverage in forcing upon the communist faction the advancement of even more Titoist reforms. This is why the Kremlin Titoists, recognizing the importance of the CIA colour revolution objectives, supported the colour revolutionary protests. The class interests of the Titoists representing the bureaucrats, the kulaks, and the comprador mercantile capital were fully aligned with the class interests of Anglo-American finance capital, for they all were waging a class war against the proletariat and the kolkhoz peasantry.

No doubt the right to criticize is a democratic right to be cherished by communists, but Semenev's 'Soviet High Commission' was trying to utilize the criticism in the form of demonstrations as a pressure from below with which to undermine the previous 'course of the government and the SED', hence to promote the revisionist New Course. Referring to the attitude of Semenev's 'Soviet High Commission' towards the demonstrations, the CIA confirmed:

the Soviet High Commission ... was inclined to a demonstrative criticism of the previous course of the government and the SED, which was to be reoriented on the "people's opinion." (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 11) (IMG)

Semenev was of course an agent of Beria and Beria was an agent of Britain and Israel, hence it being natural for them to support a CIA colour revolution that could impose from below the Titoist 'New Course' on SED.

To provoke violent riots, it was also strategically necessary for the Titoists to give the colour revolution the martyrs it needed for the latter to gain the excuse for violence of epic proportions. The savagery and liberality shown by the KVP, a military and security institution controlled by the Beria agent Zaisser was in line with this objective. The KVP, which was formed by the Nazi German POWs in Soviet camps and was under the direct legal and political control of Zaisser's Interior Ministry, was naturally a highly unreliable institute filled with diversionaries. David Childs – the fellow at the Royal Society of Art and the history scholar who won awards from the German foreign ministry for his research on East Germany – wrote:

the KVP was under the command of ... Wilhelm Zaisser and Heinz Hoffmann. Both had served in the International Brigades in Spain.. ('The GDR (RLE: German Politics): Moscow's German Ally', David Childs, 2015, p. 271) (IMG)

The diversionary and pro-imperialist saboteurial character of Zaisser's KVP is exposed in the fact that on the one hand, Zaisser's KVP terrorized protesters 'recklessly', thereby provoking more riots, and on the other hand, showed huge leniency towards the riots through outright desertions once the riots were provoked into existence. The CIA reported:

Information regarding [the KVP] runs all the way from desertion to reckless firing. The reports that have come in strongly suggest that the KVP could not be relied upon in case of internal trouble, at least not to the degree of the Soviet authorities. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

The pincer assault of the KVP's rogues against the socialist forces was a reflection of the Beria-Zaisser network's strategy of combat against People's Democratic Germany. The policy of simultaneously (1) sowing terror for provoking colour revolutions and (2) liberality towards colour revolutions in East Germany was the strategy masterminded in this case by Beria. On the one hand, Beria, through Semenev, was imposing upon the East Germans liberality towards reaction. He used Zaisser to this end:

In so far as Beria is concerned, there is evidence that Stalin's erstwhile henchman strongly advocated a moderate economic policy for all of Eastern Europe in order to stabilize Central Europe and head off West German rearmament. He supported a group within the East German leadership led by Minister for State Security Zaisser. Zaisser ... called for a remodeling of the Socialist Unity Party into an all-German labor party and for negotiations on reunification, on the assumption that it was impossible to build Socialism in a divided country. ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

On the other hand, that same 'liberal' Beria was promoting an extremely vicious 'crackdown' on the protesters, so to provoke more riots. Molotov recalled in his memoirs:

Let the Germans rise up against us?! Everything would have turned shaky, the imperialists would have taken action. There would have been a total collapse.

As soon as reports of the events in the GDR started to come in, Beria was among the first to say, "We must act! Unhesitatingly! Ruthlessly! Most urgently!"

(Molotov Remembers, Interviewer: Feliks Chuev, Interviewee: V. Molotov, p. 380) (IMG)

In these conditions, the violent riots quickly spread, with terror attacks targeting and shaking the foundation of East Germany's security. The following are only some of the many examples provided by US intelligence regarding violent riots in different East German cities:

f) Goerlitz: Prison seized by demonstrators. Prisoners freed. Burgomaster thrown out of his office.

g) Jena: The building of the SSD was demolished by rioters and attacked by the crowd. Political prisoners were freed, documents burned.

h) Quedlinburg: Demonstrations began as early as 6 a.m. on 17 June 1953. SSD building in Breitscheidstrasse seized, documents destroyed. District police station occupied. Police commandos disarmed and locked in the cellars. House of the DFB (Demokratischer Frauenbund) and the House of Freedom taken. One Soviet officer and two Soviet soldiers disarmed by the crowd and thrown out of the windows. All three probably killed. Soviet measures of retaliation and numerous arrests.

i) Rathenow: Starting point of demonstrations on 17 June 1953 was the Optical Works. The SED offices were occupied by rioters, documents burned. SSD official Hagedorn killed by the mob.

j) Rosslau: Assault on the prison by demonstrators. One hundred eighty prisoners freed. k) Rostock-Warnemunde: Revolt of the workmen in Rostock in the Dieselmotor Works (VEB) in Rostock on 17 June 1953. Numerous machines rendered useless, fire in several workshops. Damage to equipment

about 500,000 DM, according to estimate. Resumption of production will not be possible for three to four weeks. VoPo assault units stoned.

(CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 16) (IMG)

In some cities there were encounters quite as serious as those in East Berlin. The demonstrators did not confine themselves to processions and fights with the SED and the VoPo, but stormed administration buildings, SED-Centrals, police stations, prisons, and jails. In many places houses and documents were burned. In several cases VoPos and SED members, especially officials of the SSD, were killed. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 13) (IMG)

Through the launching of these terrorist attacks on the East German military, security, intelligence, police, etc. units, the rioters furthered the agenda of the Kremlin Titoists, namely to weaken the East German defenses and security to render it easier to be devoured by West Germany. The colour revolutionary stab from the front against East Germany was to accompany the Moscow Titoist stab from the back.

The vast series of the counter-revolutionary policies pursued by the Beria group had a vigilance-raising effect on the Soviet counter-intelligence and military personnel. Beria, who had a positive reputation among many Soviet state personnel, was by then despised by many of the same personnel, as mentioned before. Hence, the vigilance-raising effect led to the quick counter-measures by the communist faction in the Soviet intelligence and military bodies. In response to the disaster in East Germany:

the Soviet leaders allied themselves against Beria in Moscow. Beria's "radical notions" evidently were made known to the Communist bloc elite soon after his fall. ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

Had Beria's ally Khrushchev sided with Beria at this point, Khrushchev would have fallen with Beria soon. Knowing this, Khrushchev decided to overtly take a stance against his covert friend. Thus:

Khrushchev and Ulbricht have since accused Beria and Malenkov of advocating in early 1953 a policy which they charge would have led to abandonment of East Germany. ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

In this new situation, in East Germany, some of the Beriaites were cracked down upon:

After Beria's downfall the remaining Soviet leaders moved to restore Ulbricht's primacy in East Germany. Ulbricht pounced on Beria's proteges in his party, accusing them of treachery to the party and its program. At the 15th SED central committee plenum in July 1953, he publicly linked Beria with Zaisser and his clique; The Soviet leadership renewed its endorsement of Ulbricht during an August 1953 visit to Moscow. ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

Facing the new Titoist tide in the bloc, and the defunding done by the Kremlin Titoists, Walter Ulbricht decided to lobby for the reduction in East German reparations payments. Already, when the June 1953 debates were going on, Ulbricht advocated the reduction in reparations, but was not able to go very far with reducing the reparations payment: With the GDR lacking sufficient resources, Ulbricht instead favored a different approach. Shifting the burden to the Soviets, who after all, had decreed the policy shift, he argued that "we should turn to the Soviet government with the request that they lower the reparations payments." A fellow Politburo member succinctly pointed to the thought that must have been on everybody's mind: the only way "to get out of this catastrophic situation and improve our position" was for the Soviet Union to "[render] us the same help that the USA is giving Western Germany through the Marshall Plan." As Wach recounted,

"[n]o one reacted to this statement." ("This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, pp. 66-67) (IMG)

However, with the downfall of Beria and his group, the East German communists were able to lobby for aid. Walter Ulbricht knew how to counter-bully the Titoist assassins in the Kremlin into a less incorrect line, and into partially supporting East Germany. As confirmed by the CIA, Ulbricht in particular knew:

much about lobbying in Moscow to frustrate undesirable developments. (THE IMPLICATIONS OF ULBRICHT'S RETIREMENT FOR EAST GERMANY: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, No. 1687/71, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, May 4, 1971, p. 3) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha described Ulbricht as a ‘haughty stiff-necked German’ who knew how to counter-bully the Moscow Titoist bullies into assisting East Germany against the Anglo-American imperialists:

Ulbricht ... was a haughty, stiff-necked German, not only with small parties like ours, but also with the others. He had this opinion about relations with the Soviets: ‘You have occupied us, you have stripped us of industry, but now you must supply us with big credits and food, so that Democratic Germany will build up and reach the level of the German Federal Republic.’ He demanded such credits arrogantly and he got them. He forced Khrushchev to say in a joint meeting: “We must assist Germany so that it becomes our show-case to the West.” And Ulbricht did not hesitate to tell the Soviets in our presence:

“You must speed up your aid because there is bureaucracy.”

“Where is the bureaucracy,” asked Mikoyan “in your country?”

“No, not at all in our country but in yours,” replied Ulbricht.

(The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha)

C20S2. Austria

*** IMG-All-{GDR} {Hungary}

It was necessary that the US-aligned Nazi-friendly Austrian regime would be deprived as much as possible from the useful industrial equipment. As such, the Soviets duly deprived Austria from the equipment. According to the Hague Convention and according to the Yalta agreement, the USSR had a right to seize Nazi Germany’s military-industrial assets as part of reparations and war booty. The Soviets had two main strategies for the assets seized: (1) develop those industrial assets and use them to generate goods and services to be imported into the USSR as part of reparations, and then, upon receiving the reparations, hand over those assets back to the respective countries in which those assets had existed; (2) strip the industrial assets and take them into the USSR. The Stalin-era USSR pursued strategy 1 for the countries in which popular-democratic order had greater potential for establishment or in which People’s Democratic system had already been established, since by eventually turning over those assets to the Peoples’ Democracies, the USSR could help in the industrial development of those states; the Stalin-era USSR pursued strategy 2 for the countries in which, owing to high Anglo-American intelligence and military presence, there was little chance for People’s Democratic development at the time, and so much the better if those countries get deprived of their industrial assets. Referring to Stalin-era Soviet policy in Austria, the CIA referred to the case:

of Soviet plants in Austria where USIA plants had been almost completely stripped of all useful equipment following World War II. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

By depriving Austria from those industrial plants, the Soviet Union was not conducting economic terrorism against the Austrian proletarians, and was not ruining their lives. The plants which the Austrian reactionaries had under their control were used for producing armaments to sponsor terrorists who cross-border infiltrated and had the blood of many proletarians on their hands. Better deprive the Austrian regime from such plants; better to deprive the state sponsor of terror from the industrial means of exporting terror.

With the rise of the Titoist faction onto power, Soviet policy changed, and there came about an effort to promote the military-industrial development of countries under Anglo-American intelligence and military influence. The USIA (abbreviation for ‘Directorate of Soviet Assets in Austria’) as such never regained its pre-war capacity, and only after the treasonous Titoist gang of Khrushchev seized power in the Kremlin in March 1953 did some physical capital arrive, as part of the Moscow Titoists’ efforts to fund to the CIA-backed pro-Nazi Austrian terror regime:

This dismantled equipment had been shipped by the USSR and USIA plants never regained their pre-war capacity even though the USSR did install some modern equipment and started a belated drive to rebuild these plants in 1954. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955-June 21, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

East Germany and the other Peoples’ democracies had their heavy industries de-funded by the Kremlin Titoists, whereas Austrian industry was to grow.

C20S3. Hungary – 1953

*** IMG-All-{GDR} {Hungary}

Christian F. Ostermann, a prominent official in the US intelligence front think tank Wilson Center, wrote:

The June 2-4 talks with the East German leaders have to be viewed against the background of a larger effort by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership to halt and mitigate some of the worst excesses of Stalinist rule in East Central Europe. Similar talks, which, in each case, resulted in the announcement of a “New Course” program were held with the Hungarian leadership (13-16 June 1953) and the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha later that month. The transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian talks on June 13-16, are instructive for several reasons: Much fuller than the fragmentary Grotewohl notes, the transcript of the Soviet- Hungarian meeting is striking for its similarities: as in the German case, the discussion focused on the “audacious” industrialization and socialization drive and the abuses of power (especially by the security police), though cadre questions received considerable attention, too. As before with the East Germans, the Soviet leaders “urgently” demanded changes and warned that “a catastrophe will occur if we do not improve the situation.” Once again, Malenkov and Beria were harshest and most “passionate” in their criticism, though Molotov and Bulganin did not lag behind. Unlike the earlier talks with the German leaders, however, Soviet criticism was vented primarily at premier and party chief Matyas Rakosi, the leading proponent of Stalinist rule in Hungary. Criticism of Rakosi’s rule, his personal involvement in most political issues, and his “personality cult” quickly produced changes within the leadership: within days of their return from Moscow, Rakosi resigned from the premiership which was given to the agrarian specialist Imre Nagy (though Rakosi stayed on as party leader). (“This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse”: The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives’, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Sergo Beria confirmed that Lavrenti Beria despised Matyas Rakosi:

Another he could not endure was [PCF leader] Jacques Duclos, who reminded him of Rakosi: ‘reptiles,’ he called them. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Liquidationist in line, Beria called for the dissolution of the Party within the Popular Front and the resignation of Rakosi:

my father told Rakosi that the Party must no longer interfere in the economy and that domination of the Council of Ministers by the Party ought long ago to have been ended in the Soviet Union and, a fortiori, in the People's Democracies. 'Busy yourselves with ideology and the education of the masses if you want to stay in politics in spite of your health problems. But you would do better to resign,' he said. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 264) (IMG)

The Titoist faction in the Soviet Union led by the gang of Lavrenti Beria elevated the Nagy faction:

‘You were wrong, there are no irreplaceable people,’ my father had shot back. Rakosi therefore had to submit to the decision of the Presidium by which he was to devote himself to ideology, leaving the government to Imre Nagy. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 264) (IMG)

Imre Nagy, the MI6 agent and official leader of the Hungarian colour revolution of 1956, was also a Beria agent:

I well remember the Hungarians Nagy, Kadar and Rajk. They were Communists but they understood that Communism could not sit on bayonets in their country. Some agreed with the idea of a coalition with the Social Democrats, which would have allowed them to get close to Austria. My father was very friendly with Imre Nagy. He had been evacuated to Georgia during the war and had enjoyed his stay! It is said that he had behaved badly when he was in the Comintern. I never heard my father say anything about that. He simply told me that Nagy was one of the people on whom he could rely in carrying out his plans. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 197) (IMG)

Beria indeed installed Nagy as the leader of Hungary in 1953. He was able to do so because in Hungary, the communists had not been able to consolidate influence and there had not been enough purges of counter - revolutionaries. The blue-collar elements did not have as much state control, and Hungary’s economy remained largely agrarian, meaning that there did not exist a large class of proletariat. In countries with a large peasant population and a small blue-collar worker population, it was usually easier to oust the ‘Stalinist’ leaders.

In 1953, Hungary began the ‘New Course’ which involved economic liberalization and the release of CIA-backed fascists including Janos Kadar, about whom more details will be provided later:

The proclamation of the New Course with Imre Nagy as premier in the summer of 1953 brought new personalities to the fore and instituted liberalized policies in agriculture and industry at the expense of doctrinaire Communists who had profited from earlier economic policies. Violent opposition from these elements was silenced by Rakosi; apparently on Moscow's orders, and the new policies enforced.

During the summer of 1954, Nagy emerged as a genuine leader backed by the majority of the central committee.

But Nagy's resort to extra-party mechanisms to gain popular and his encouragement of unrestrained criticism of regime policies drove Rakosi to seek the support of the Kremlin against Nagy. Meanwhile, the liberation of Janos Kadar and other imprisoned Communists strengthened party moderate forces against the former leadership. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. II) (IMG)

By helping Titoist agent Imre Nagy to rise to power, Beria got Hungary on the road to the fascist terror that was to come about in 1956.

C20S4. Beriaite Conspiracies in Poland

*** IMG-All-{Poland}

The effects of the Beria gang's Titoist New Course were to be seen in People's Democratic Poland too. The brutal Beria gang placed heavy pressure on People's Democratic Poland to prevent the purge of Spychalski, the former Gestapo spy, who had become an American-Israeli agent by 1946 and a British agent by 1947, and who had sought to launch an MI6-backed Titoist military coup in Poland to install Gomulka onto power. The CIA reported:

Bierut was in Moscow prior to Beria's arrest and Beria instructed the Poles to keep the case of Bishop Kaczmarek in suspension and not to conduct a public trial. Beria wanted Kaczmarek released from jail pending further developments. Beria was also of the opinion that the Spychalski trial should also be delayed but that Spychalski was to be kept in prison. Bierut was called to Moscow approximately three to four days before the publication of the information that Beria was under arrest. (...). Bierut returned to Moscow after the arrest of Beria and at this time Malenkov and other Soviet officials told Bierut that Beria's plans concerning Polish trials were not realistic. Bierut received Instructions that the trial of Bishop Kaczmarek should be conducted as soon as possible and that preparations should be made for the trial of Spychalski. (EFFECTS OF BERIA'S ARREST IN POLAND, CIA, February 5, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

C20S5. Khrushchev and Moscow Titoists Rehabilitate Nazi German Troops – 1954-1956

IMG-All-{Gulag}

Why does the Western media hail Nikita Khrushchev as a 'liberator'? It is because he and his Titoist henchmen 'liberated' Axis troops and fascist gangs from the corrective labour camps, allowing them to commit their savage crimes within Soviet territory.

From 1953 onwards, the guards were allowed to fraternize with the pro-American fascist criminals, which, not surprisingly, emboldened these criminals:

The guards escorting the prisoners often would strike up a conversation and chat with the prisoners, and tried to maintain an almost friendly relationship. From that time on the prisoners often went as far as to be rude to the guards.. The criminals would shout: "Wait until the Americans come – we'll hang you all!" ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 3) (IMG)

Worse yet, numerous pro-American fascist criminals were released by the MI6 agent Khrushchev's Titoist gang, allowing them to commit more crimes in the USSR. The US intelligence reported:

The 1953 amnesty was for ordinary criminals. Approximately one-half per cent of the prisoners in Ozerlag were released. Up to 70% of the prisoners in Angarlag were released. They were released in one grand sweep, in approximately one week. Within the next three months the majority of them were rearrested for crimes which they had newly committed and returned to Angarlag. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

The Titoist faction led by the Beria-Malenkov-Khrushchev group brought about the freedom of criminals, who were by then able to re-commit criminals out in the open. This, however, was by no means the worst of it. In fact, British agent Khrushchev and his Titoist gang released from jail 1.5 million Nazi/Axis troops.

Within the context of international agreements and Soviet laws, many Axis / Nazi German POWs were repatriated by the USSR back to their respective countries. This implementation of this policy well preceded the assassination of Stalin, and well preceded the 19th CPSU congress. The repatriation policy of the USSR, however, did not mean that the Axis troops that had committed crimes were not to be tried. Indeed, they were tried to terms of corrective labour for between 5 to 10 years. The Titoist ruling clique in the Kremlin presented a fundamentally revisionist and pro-fascist misinterpretation of the repatriation policy, taking it to mean that Nazi German troops in general have to be released from jail *as swiftly as possible*. The CIA reported:

Following World War II, a large but unknown number of foreign nationals became prisoners of war in the USSR. These prisoners came from virtually every country of Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and estimates of their total have ranged from a few hundred thousand to several million: It has also been estimated that "anything up to 10 percent" of all prisoners in about 1950 were foreign nationals. **As noted previously, beginning about 1950, large numbers of these prisoners of war (particularly Germans) were tried under Soviet criminal laws and sentenced to terms of corrective labor, usually of 5 to 10 years, for various crimes against the state.** Although substantial numbers of prisoners of war had been released before the death of Stalin, the USSR has been pursuing since 1953 a **systematic** policy of freeing foreign nationals from the prison camps. Numerous returned prisoners report evidence of this policy.. According to these returnees, a concerted effort was made beginning in 1953-54 to collect prisoners of a given nationality in special camps preparatory to repatriation, a process which took many months in most cases and even several years in some instances. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, pp. 22 - 23. Bold added) (IMG)

The CIA also noted that Kudriatsev, a major official at the time, admitted that massive swathes of those jailed were released since March 1953:

The Soviet Deputy Procurator General, P.I. Kudriatsev, intimated that about 3 million persons had been under detention in the USSR in March 1953, almost half of whom were political prisoners, but that at that time (May 1957) only about 800,000 or 900,000 persons were imprisoned, of whom about 18,000 were political prisoners. Kudriatsev also stated that the number of prisoners had been reduced by 70 percent since the death of Stalin, that 52 percent of those detained at that time were released as a result of the amnesty of 27 March 1953, that more than half of those then (presumably In May 1957) serving sentences had been sentenced after March 1953, and that the number of prisoners then was less than in the 1920's and less than one-third of the number In prerevolutionary Russia. These are the first figures ever released by Soviet officials concerning the prison population and, in light of current agitation among Soviet jurists for the release of crime statistics, suggest that the USSR may be preparing to issue official statistics concerning crime rates and the criminal population. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 22) (IMG)

The CIA specifically pointed out that the Nazi collaborators were forgiven, with their sentences halved and many of them outright freed from jail:

A decree of 17 September 1955 permitted the immediate release of persons sentenced up to 10 years for collaborating with the Germans during World War II, and sentences of 10 years or more for such crimes were halved. The decree also released, regardless of length of sentence, those persons who were imprisoned for serving in the German army and police or in "special German units." (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 8) (IMG)

The total number released is unknown. In 1953, all Japanese war criminals and, allegedly, 9,000 Germans were released. In late 1955 and early 1956, 9,652 German prisoners were repatriated as a result of an agreement reached between West Germany and the USSR in October 1955. The Soviet Red Cross denied that any German prisoners of war remained in the USSR in 1957. All remaining Japanese prisoners allegedly have been freed as a result of the special amnesty for such persons issued in December 1956. (...). During 1953-56 the USSR released numerous Hungarians, Rumanians, ... Iranians, and other foreign prisoners of many nationalities. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953 - 57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 23) (IMG)

The Titoist Regime freed tens of thousands of Nazis, Nazi Collaborators, and Japanese Fascists:

Tens of thousands of others were also set free on the basis of a September 1955 amnesty for "wartime collaborators." (Gulag Survivor, Nancy Adler, p. 22)

Stalin's successor Khrushchev took a more conciliatory course and found the German POWs — the Soviet Union called them war criminals, which many of them were — to be a useful bargaining chip.

At the Berlin four-power conference preceding the Paris Treaties, for example, Khrushchev hinted about their release to improve his negotiating position. In January 1955 it was rumored that Khrushchev was negotiating the release with the leftist opposition parties in Bonn in an attempt to weaken Adenauer's government. The West German government was falling victim to its own overinflated POW propaganda, which made the issue appear much more important than it was: in April 1953 Adenauer gave the official number as 300,000 POWs; in August West Germany told a United Nations commission on POWs that there were 102,958; by early 1955 Adenauer only spoke of 40—50,000 men, and finally, right before the Moscow trip, the Bonn Foreign Office admitted that there were actually only "about 9,000" men still being held. (Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933-2001, Harold Marcuse, p. 125) (IMG)

Certain prisoners of war indeed do have a right to be freed and repatriated according to the Geneva Convention. However, there are conditions and exceptions to this especially regarding the war criminals. The sentences were reduced and many war criminals were released. This was the problem of Khrushchev's Titoist group.

And as an agent of the Anglo-American Imperialists, this move by him produced:

a favorable reaction in the West at no cost to the USSR. (Probability of Soviet Release of Some World War II Prisoners, May 5, 1953, CIA, p. 1)

The media of the US-led bloc praises Nikita Khrushchev and the Titoists for ending the corrective labour system and freeing those jailed in it; this is not surprising since the Western intelligence services were not only in cahoots with the Axis forces, they were mostly established by the Axis forces. Khrushchev's release of those jailed, an act which was hailed by the West, was the release of the fascist bandits, the Nazi-collaborationists, and the criminals who re-committed their crimes on Soviet soil. There is no reason to doubt nor is there reason to regard as imperialist propaganda, the CIA's claim that Nikita Khrushchev's group was responsible for the release of countless Axis troops, since it is already documented that those arrested during the Stalin-era were Axis troops, fascist thugs, and common criminals, and it is also well-known that Khrushchev released the prisoners thereby ending the Gulag system. Plus, the CIA propagandists were on Khrushchev's side anyways.

C20S6. The Promotion of Idealistic Military Theories as Pretext for Military Sabotage

IMG-All-{Titoist Coup} {Khrushchev – Political}

Why did the British secret service, the Anglo-American media, and Nikita Khrushchev keep emphasizing that Stalin was not aware that the Great Patriotic War was coming, that Stalin did not expect Hitler to invade after the Molotov- Ribbentrop negotiations? There are many reasons for this, but all of these reasons originate from at least two key reasons.

The first key reason is that they sought to make Stalin appear as though he regarded Nazi Germany as his ally, and so did not expect a war with them in the first place. This is a part of the conspiracy to rehabilitate the British media, the Nazi secret service, and the Trotskyites for stating that the USSR had betrayed the anti-Nazi struggle.

The second key reason for this however was that by promoting such a narrative, they were seeking to exaggerate the importance of surprise attacks while playing down the importance of the historical-material factors of war.

The historical materialist and dialectical approach to warfare takes into account the importance of surprise attacks and emphasizes utmost vigilance against any potential enemy strikes, but it does not exaggerate the importance of strategic surprise to the point that the historical-material factors of warfare are ignored. This is actually basic common sense. Assuming all else constant, if an army of swordsmen launched a surprise invasion against an army of advanced tanks, artillery, etc., the surprise of the attack can only get the army of swordsmen so far – and not very far. On the other hand, imagine if two armies are of completely equal military strength in every sense except that one of the armies has the advantage of launching a surprise assault on the other army. Obviously, if all else constant, the army launching the surprise attack will have relative victory if not absolute victory. The case of the Great Patriotic War was somewhere in between these two extremes of spectrum. The Soviet and Nazi militaries had a comparable strength but obviously not equal strength. This meant that while the surprise attack was one of the important factors, it was not necessarily the only decisive factor. This is why on the one hand:

Stalin did not deny that strategic surprise could determine the outcome of war and even seemed to admit the possibility that Germany's surprise attack might have been decisive. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

And on the other hand:

Stalin ... asserted .. that ... "the momentum of unexpectedness and suddenness which constituted the reserve strength of the German fascist troops has been fully spent." Stalin ... did not depreciate the factor of surprise.. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

More specifically:

Stalin ... in his Order of the Day on Army Day, 23 February 1942, during the Soviet winter offensive which followed the German failure to capture Moscow in the first months of the war [said]:

Now ... the issue of the war will not be decided by such a fortuitous ... factor as suddenness, but by such constantly operating factors as the strength of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of the divisions, the armament of the army, and the organizational abilities of the army commanders.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

The 'constantly operating factors' to which Stalin refers are what I like to refer to as the historical-material factors of warfare, since the concept of the 'constantly operating factors' is actually a translation of historical materialism into the realm of the military affairs. The 'strength of the rear' and the 'the quantity and quality of the divisions, the armament of the army' are all different parts and aspects of the military-industrial backbone and hence of the productive forces. Closely related to the concept of the productive forces in warfare is the material factor of geography, especially insofar as the control over and exploitation of the strategic natural resources (e.g. the oil in the Soviet Caucasus) are concerned. The 'morale of the army' relates the less-material factors such as culture and individual psyche. I will mention the applicability of other historical materialist concepts into the military field later in this section. However, by now, it should be clear to the reader as to why the fortuitous factor of surprise can hardly be as significant a factor as the more material factors such as geography and productive forces with regards to military affairs.

To summarize with regards to the relationship of surprise to factors that are more material: (1) surprise is not as material a factor as the 'the strength of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of the divisions, the armament of the army', and any other more material factors; (2) surprise can be the decisive factor if two armies are equally strong in all the material factors except for the element of surprise itself; (3) Surprise could be a major factor if two armies are comparable – but not equal – in strength in terms of the other material factors of war, but in that situation, surprise cannot necessarily be the only decisive factor.

It takes no genius to understand this point with regards to the relative importance of the fortuitous factor of surprise. However, unfortunately, the revisionists seriously had the audacity to challenge even such a basic fact, causing debates in the USSR and significant policy implications, and knowing that many people would not pay enough attention, would not be vigilance, and would not challenge them.

Playing up the importance of surprise attacks to the point that the advancement of the historical-material factors of warfare are ignored is a blatantly infantile idealistic approach to military affairs. All this media hype about Stalin allegedly – and it is a false allegation as documented in C10S4 – being surprised by the Nazi invasion was a means of exaggerating the significance of the surprise attack and its impact on the war, hence to gain the excuse to downplay the importance of heavy industry and the development of the military-industrial backbone. The latter in turn was a means of stagnating and sabotaging the development of the Soviet military-industrial backbone.

The Moscow Titoists and their agents promoted the idealist view on the military. It should come as no surprise that:

Soviet discussions of the relative significance of surprise and the constant factors in war have almost invariably invoked the authority of Stalin. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information

Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 11) (IMG)

After the Great Patriotic War and persisting until mid-1953, the recognition of the critical importance of historical- material factors of war – also known as the constantly operating factors of war – was integrated into Soviet defense 'doctrines' as Soviet military science common-sense:

After the war ... it evolved into a tenet of Soviet "military science" which by constant repetition tended to imply a general strategic depreciation of the surprise factor. Thus the LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA (1954) contended that "surprise and other accidental features of the situation can only yield temporary successes." Marshal Malinovsky, writing in RED STAR on Army Day 1952, even came close to interpreting Stalin's remark as meaning that strategic surprise could not be decisive and that Soviet military strategy should be based only on the constant factors. After quoting Stalin, he asserted:

The Stalinist formulation of permanently operating factors provides the key to the understanding of the decisive conditions of victory in a modern war. The profound scientific analysis (sic) of these factors made by Stalin is of enormous theoretical and practical significance. In military and organizational work, the consideration of correct utilization of these factors make it possible to concentrate the chief attention on the solution of basic problems determining the fate of the war.

A similar passage appears in the 1950 edition of Stalin's official biography and thus certainly had Stalin's personal approval.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

And:

In the weeks before [Stalin's] death, Chuikov [not to be confused with Zhukov] said that Stalin's strategy at Stalingrad comprise "the use of active defense to exhaust the enemy, grind down his manpower and material, and then launch a counteroffensive" (2 February 1953) and Sokolovsky discussed active defense strategy in World War II (PRAVDA, 23 February 1953); (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 14) (IMG)

After the death of Stalin, the communist loyalists in the Red Army, a prominent figure among whom was Vasilevsky, continued to promote the scientific historical materialist view regarding war, and promoted the narrative on constantly operating or historical-material factors of war:

References to the thesis on constantly operative as against fortuitous factors continued after Stalin's death, when its place in post-war Soviet military doctrine was no longer dependent on his personal influence. It was affirmed by Vasilevsky after Stalin's death (9 March 1953) and by Lieutenant General Kozlov (16 February 1954). Although indications of increased respect for strategic surprise were evident in early 1954, the strongest depreciation of the surprise factor, and apparently the only explicit elite denial that strategic surprise could be decisive, came more than a year after Stalin's death, in an article by the second ranking professional soldier of the USSR, Vasilevsky, on 9 May 1954, ten months before Marshal Rotmistrov was to attack underestimation of the surprise factor and declare that it could be decisive in war. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

With regards to the specific material conditions of the USSR in the face of the Nazi assault during the Great Patriotic War, and the Anglo-American assault on the Caucasus for World War III, the USSR had promoted the concept of active defense, which entailed that the historical-material factors in the USSR would be used to deprive the relatively less material factor of a surprise attack from its momentum and its effectiveness; then, the historical-material factors of war would be used to push back against the imperialist-fascist aggressors. Therefore, it is important to note that the notion of active defense was the strategic application of the historical materialist notion of the constantly operative factors of warfare into the military historical-material conditions of the USSR. Here is an excerpt of the CIA document on this:

2. Active Defense

While strategic surprise and the constant factors are correlative and usually discussed together, the concept of "active defense" is infrequently related to them explicitly. The connection is firmly

established, however, by Sokolovsky's PRAVDA article on Army Day 1953, which contends that an active defense strategy relies on the constant factors in war:

The key to the understanding of this regularity [in war] is the thesis worked out by Stalin on the permanently operating surprise factors which determine the outcome of war. This thesis makes possible a genuine scientific approach to the preparation of the country and the army for active defense and the eve solution of most important strategic problems in the course of the war itself on the basis of a thorough assessment of the economic, moral and military potential of the fighting countries.

(...). The general concept of active defense has served as a political doctrine and propaganda slogan as well as a military doctrine. Sokolovsky's 1953 Army Day article declared that:

preparing the country for active defense goes far beyond the framework of purely military problems. These preparations comprise an economic, political, ideological, scientific, technical and actual military approach affecting the whole sphere of life and work of both State and people. a. Active Defense as a Military Doctrine: Active defense has been used to characterize the strategy of assuming a defensive posture in order to exhaust the enemy before launching the counteroffensive. It was applied by Stalin to the early stages of World War II:

It is a well-known fact that following the temporary withdrawal caused by the German imperialists' perfidious attack, the Red Army turned the tide of war and went over from active defense to a successful offensive against enemy troops.

(...). Bulganin [stated in 1949:]

Stalin's outstanding service as a military theoretician is his solution of the questions of active defense and the counteroffensive. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the Stalin theory on these questions and the Stalin art of its application for the victory of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Fatherland War. To realize that importance, suffice it to recall the part in the war played by the Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk battles which were classic examples of active defense and counteroffensive.

It is possible that Bulganin in this statement was not expressing his own views and was merely seeking to please Stalin.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA,

The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, pp. 12-14) (IMG)

The idealist emphasis on the surprise factor was denounced as adventurist:

The concept of active defense based on the prime importance of constantly operative factors, was after the war repeatedly set against the "adventurist" strategy of reliance on such a fortuitous factor as strategic surprise with the goal of achieving a "blitzkrieg" victory. Pronouncements on Soviet political-military strategy stressed "preparations for active defense" and ability to mobilize rapidly if required. According to Bulganin at the XIX Party Congress, the Soviet people made "no secret of the fact that our economy can in the shortest possible time be switched to a war footing." Vasilevsky made the same point as late as V-E Day 1954, when he claimed that "the socialist structure made it possible to transform the whole economy of the country onto a war basis in the shortest time...."(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 15) (IMG)

Beside geography and productive forces, another important historical-material factor is the class orientation of the army staff. By that, what is meant here is not whether the army commanders are from working class backgrounds or not, nor is it about the anarchist concept of worker unions directly democratically electing the military commanders. These are imperialist-sponsored, petit-bourgeois, left-deviationist, idealist 'workerist' ideas with a superficially 'proletarian' coloring. Rather, by the term 'class orientation', what is meant is simply is: loyalty. It answers the question: to what side of history are the staff in the military and industry loyal? To the imperialist-fascist finance capital and their secret services, or to the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist side of history combatting the enemy secret services and confronting finance capital? The agents of the enemy in the military use diversionary/saboteurial tactics such as: (1) attack the enemy where it is strong and refuse to attack the enemy where it is weak; (2) launch military provocations to hand the enemy the excuse for invasion and then once the enemy invades, move the defense troops away so that the front would be opened for the enemy; etc.

These elements existed in the military of the USSR and they were duly purged. The purge of the agents of the imperialist-fascist secret services and those loyal to finance capital was a purge that was necessary for preparations for active defense during the Great Patriotic War and anti-imperialist struggles before, during, and after the War. The reorientation of the military and industrial staff away from the class forces loyal to finance capital towards the class forces hostile to finance capital marked the work of the USSR with regards to the historical-material factor, the class orientation of the military.

During the period of the doctors' plot case and during the 19th CPSU congress, the importance of class orientation as a historical-material factor to account for was emphasized by communists such as Stalin, Molotov, Govorov as well as by Malenkov, the crypto-Titoist who pretended to side with the communist faction:

Active Defense as a Political Doctrine: In its more general meaning, as a way of describing those elements in national policy which are directed toward maintaining the security of the Soviet State, active defense received special prominence at the XIX Party Congress in October 1952, when it was introduced into the Party Statutes: One of "the chief tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union now [is] to strengthen in every respect the active defense of the Soviet country against aggressive actions of its enemies." This provision was cited, along with other calls for strengthening active defense, by professional military leaders and by Bulganin at the Party Congress and in the following months, most notably on Army Day 1953.

The Congress' emphasis on the task of active defense was particularly noted by Marshal of the Soviet Union Govorov, who mentioned the doctor-plot in his 23 February RED STAR article and was himself allegedly one of its intended victims. The Report to the Congress by Malenkov, in surveying the decade of "preparation for active defense" before the war, cited the purge of the thirties as one of these preparations. It seems possible that the political activation of the doctrine in the Warsaw fall of 1952 and winter of 1953 was related to the doctor-plot which made top military leaders its chief target.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 14) (IMG)

Additionally, according to the CIA:

One of the targets, Marshal Govorov, writing in RED STAR on 23 February 1953, referred to the plot, recalled the purges of the thirties in discussing Soviet defense capabilities, and called for one-man leadership in the Army -- a rare injunction from a top marshal. Govorov's involvement in Soviet politics was explicitly acknowledged at his funeral (22 March 1955) by the Moscow Party Secretary Kapitanov: "Govorov...devoted much attention to political work and took an active part in the Moscow Party organization of the capital." Sokolovsky, who was not among the alleged targets of the doctor-plot, did not mention it in a PRAVDA article appearing at the same time as Govorov's. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

Naturally, since the purges were denounced after the assassination of Stalin, the concept of the class orientation of the military staff was simply ignored. Referring to the purges of the military as the 'political meaning' of the 'the concept of active defense', the CIA stated:

Shortly after Stalin's death the concept of active defense lost its political meaning, just as it tended to lose its military meaning as a description of the first stage in World War II. It was used retrospectively to characterize the economic preparations for the war and in general calls for strengthening the country. Even with this diffused meaning, the concept was apparently no longer acceptable after February 1955, since no allusions to it have been noted since that date. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 15) (IMG)

After the death of Stalin, Vasilevsky was at the forefront of the theoretical struggle to preserve Stalin's historical materialist line on warfare:

Vasilevsky is the only top marshal who persisted after Stalin's death in propagating the most distinctive of the Stalinist views on Soviet military doctrine and World War II. In his 1954 Army Day article he spoke of the "period of active defense" at the beginning of the war and described the operations of the Soviet Army in this period as "the implementation" of active defense. In the same article he depreciated the factor of surprise by contrasting the views of Soviet and bourgeois military science on its

importance: "Soviet military science, unlike bourgeois military [pseudo-]science, does not exaggerate the significance of such for gratuitous elements as the element of surprise." (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 22) (IMG)

The historical materialist elevation of the historical-material factors of war and relative depreciation of the fortuitous factor of surprise by Vasilevsky did not mean that he depreciated the importance of vigilance:

In his RED STAR article on [August 1953] Vasilevsky, while stressing the constant factors in war and denying the decisiveness of strategic surprise, amplified the call for vigilance. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, pp. 15) (IMG)

In spite of the struggles of the communist faction, however, the Moscow Titoists – already possessing a strong socio-economic base in the CPSU membership thanks to the white-collar worker element – were able to easily bulldoze their way through and pursue their agenda of weakening the historical materialist conceptions of warfare, despite the resistance of Vasilevsky:

Since Stalin's death, professional military leaders have rarely characterized the early surge of World War II as one of active defense. (...). Vasilevsky, in a commemorative article immediately afterwards, put ... stress on Stalin's application of active defense.. But the only subsequent known instance is another article by Vasilevsky almost a year later, on Armed Forces Day 1954 (RED STAR):

Already in the first period of the Great Fatherland War – the period of active defense – the Soviet Army showed in the great battle of Moscow that it was capable of beating the vaunted Hitlerite troops. Implementing the active defense, n the Soviet Armed Forces frustrated Hitler's plan of blitzkrieg war.

Here again, as in his depreciation of the surprise factor on 9 May 1954, Vasilevsky persisted in affirming Stalinist military doctrine until midway in the interval between Stalin's death and the current revision of doctrine, well after other top leaders had discarded it.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 14) (IMG)

The composition of the CPSU had the white-collar elements as half of the membership, which was enough to pursue a revisionist counter-revolutionary line, but not large enough to pursue a swift dismantlement of everything that the communists had built in the USSR. Khrushchev embodied the membership composition of the Party and the tendency of the Party to pursue counter-revolutionary changes in a gradual – as opposed to swift, Beria-style – manner. Thus, unlike the speedy Titoist Beria and the somewhat speedy Titoist Malenkov, the position of the relatively slow-motion Titoist Khrushchev at the helm of the CPSU was well-entrenched. This meant that the Titoists in the Red Army could cautiously pursue their counter-revolutionary Titoist line. This is the reason that:

Chuikov, the first marshal of the Soviet Union to accept publicly the enhanced significance of surprise, did so immediately following the January session of the Central Committee which confirmed Khrushchev's victory over Malenkov. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 25) (IMG)

Hence:

Soviet military doctrine in the past half year has been radically altered by a reappraisal of the decisiveness of surprise attack in modern war, particularly in view of developments in nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Indications of this change occur in recent pronouncements of the top soviet marshals, but the only extended discussions of it to date are by a professional military man, Marshal Rotmistrov (in the 24 March RED STAR) and by a Party-military official, Lieutenant General Shatilov (in the 28 May LITERARY GAZETTE). (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 11) (IMG)

According to the CIA, other Red Army commanders followed, in challenging Stalin's and Vasilevsky's common – sense historical materialist views on military science:

The correlation among the three concepts is also evident in the fact that Rotmistrov's and Shatilov's recent articles revising upward the significance of the surprise element also depreciated the concept of

active defense. (...). Shatilov, in his 28 May 1955 article revising Soviet military doctrine, strongly criticized active defense[:]

(...). It must be pointed out that our literature on the Great Fatherland War often portrays and idealizes the initial stages of the war as a classic form of defense – so-called "active defense" – and that in addition authors are trying, in contradiction to reality, to portray the events themselves as if "active defense" had been planned ahead of time and was included in the consideration of our command; in fact the initial stages of the war, constituting a sudden enemy invasion with numerical superiority in tanks and planes, were unfavorable for our country and its Army which ... experienced the bitterness of withdrawal. A primitive interpretation of the initial period of the war, perverting living reality in any sector, be it in fiction, or scientific works cannot be tolerated. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 13) (IMG)

Those Kremlin Titoists who promoted this idealist notion regarding the surprise attack were the same Kremlin Titoists who, in a flagrantly hypocritical self-contradiction, denied that there was any potential for enemy attack in general, again to gain the excuse for stagnating the military-industrial backbone. The same Khrushchev who denounced Stalin for not preparing for war also claimed that there is no need to prepare for war. Surely the imperialists were not going to launch a total war on nuclear-armed USSR but they did launch numerous proxy wars against the pro-Soviet forces, such as the Arabs during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the Koreans during the Korean War, and the wars against the Ukrainian fascists inside the USSR itself. In the case of the Korean War, the USA also 'mistakenly' and temporarily invaded the USSR in 1950 during the Korean War, by bombing Soviet air bases, but then apologized for it. To fail to build up the Soviet Union's conventional weapons sector constituted a godsend to the sworn enemies of socialism.

C20S7. Titoists Expand Influence over Red Army, De-Fund Soviet Military, Capitulate to American Imperialism / CIA Coup against Mosaddeq 'Thanks' to Stalin Death

Importantly, to weaken the leverage of the communist elements with influence in the Red Army, to prevent the funding of anti-colonial movements, and to pave the way for the partition of the territory of the former Soviet Union, the Khrushchev group drastically de-funded the Red Army. In the words of the prominent CIA and RAND Corporation official Myron Rush:

Khrushchev cut back on the growth of military spending and sharply reduced the size of the armed forces, at a time when the United States had a large and widening margin of military superiority.. (The Soviet Military Build-up and the Coming Succession: A Review Essay. Reviewed Work: 'Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union' by Seweryn Bialer. Review by: Myron Rush. Source: International Security, Spring, 1981, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring, 1981), p. 183. Published by: The MIT Press) (IMG{Khrushchev – Political})

The decline of the communist forces in the USSR allowed for the CIA to more aggressively pursue its agenda around the world. Allen Dulles, the real head of the Eisenhower Administration, overthrew the communist-friendly governments of Iran and Guatemala. The United States could by then shift away from focusing on the defense of the US heartland and could instead aggressively pursue the overthrow of the pro-communist forces.

An anonymous CIA official interviewed, stated:

Evidence points to a shifting of emphasis from a "dollar-defense" line based solely on developing and stockpiling more and more military weapons [for World War III against the Soviet Union] to a strategy of countering the communists underground.. This was the strategy in Guatemala, where we alerted "freedom forces" who were then able to drive the Reds to the surface and hand them a sound defeat. (THE MYSTERIOUS DOINGS OF THE CIA: America's Secret Agents: Part One, The Saturday Evening Post, Richard Harkness, Gladys Harkness, October 30, 1954, p. 22. In: CIA archives) (IMG{GDR})

The so-called 'freedom forces' is yet another term that the CIA has hijacked for its reactionary agenda, and which deserves to be reclaimed by the actual freedom forces.

Anyways, Guatemala's situation was repeated in Iran as well, in which the Mosaddeq Administration, which was backed by the Soviets and the Tudeh Party, was overthrown and a monarcho-fascist regime was installed. Mosaddeq wrote in his memoirs:

The death of Stalin on March 5 created the suitable conditions for the overthrow of my government.

(Memoirs and Pains of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Mohammad Mosaddeq, p. 189) (IMG{Iran})

And the other one was [Anthony] Eden, the Foreign Minister of Britain's Conservative Government, who after a while of waiting, as soon as Stalin died and thus the setting for the oppressive behavior of the colonial regimes was created, made a trip to America and convinced the President Eisenhower to trade the freedom of a nation with a 40% share of stock [from Iran's oil].. (Memoirs and Pains of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Mohammad Mosaddeq, pp. 395-396, underline added) (IMG{Iran})

Indeed, the death of Stalin, 'created the suitable conditions for the overthrow' of the Mosaddeqist bourgeois-democratic government. The bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial state is a state controlled by the anti-colonial national-bourgeoisie. As the national-bourgeoisie of the colonial countries is weak in its confrontation towards the colonial imperial bourgeoisie, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie aims to increase its influence over the state and the economy through an alliance with the proletariat. As such, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie elevates the proletariat into the bourgeois state apparatus, giving the bourgeois state some of the characteristics of the dictatorship of the proletariat; this adoption of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie yields bourgeois-democracy. Not in every government does this proletarian alliance with the national-bourgeoisie take the form of communist party support for the progressive bourgeois state but in the case of Iran, it did. The communist-led popular front party, the Tudeh Party, supported Mosaddeq. So did the USSR itself. The coup against Stalin and some of the other Red Army generals led to the withdrawal of communist influence in Iran, thus causing the 1953 coup.

The facts mentioned here are also corroborated by the prominent Titoist Third Force officials. Masoud Hejazi, a founder of the Titoist Third Force, recalled that Mohammad-Ali Khonji, another Titoist 'Third Force' founder, had analyzed that the elimination of Joseph Stalin and the rise of the Titoist circle meant that Mosaddeq could no longer rely on Soviet assistance against the coup. In his memoirs, referring to Mosaddeq's view that Stalin's death led to the coup, Hejazi recalled:

The interesting thing is that Dr. Mohammad-Ali Khonji, as stated before, had reached the same conclusion [as Mosaddeq on the role of Stalin's elimination on the AJAX coup]. In one of the meetings of the Joint Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the Toilers' Party of the Iranian Nation (Third Force), he spent a number of hours to analyze the international political situation concerning Iran, and concluded that due to the death of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet government has moved away from its aggressive [confrontational] approach in the Cold War and is now busy caring about its own domestic affairs, and Dr. Mosaddeq can no longer utilize the existing contradictions between the Eastern Bloc on the one side and the Western Bloc on the other, and as such, Western colonial policy, through England and America having reached common understanding, will pursue the necessary measures for bringing about the collapse of Dr. Mosaddeq's government. ("Events and Judgements, 1950-1960: The Memoirs of Masoud Hejazi", Masoud Hejazi, p. 316) (IMG{Iran})

As a result of the de-funding and de-budgeting of the Soviet Red Army, the Titoists were able to expand influence over the means of violence, thus taking another major step in transition the USSR from a dictatorship of the proletariat to the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie. The middle of 1955 was a critical moment in Soviet history, for it was then that the Titoist faction gained enough power to be able to more aggressively pursue its counter-revolutionary agenda. The increased strength of the Titoist faction arose out of the fact that Govorov, one of the most important communist agents at the high command of the Red Army, died under mysterious circumstances. Eventually, and conveniently for the Kremlin Titoists who had opposed the 'Zhdanovite' commander, Govorov died at the age of 58, and:

The detailed medical bulletin issued 20 March 1955 on the illness and death of Marshal Govorov may have been intended to silence any suspicions that his death might have been due to unnatural causes. In the ceremony surrounding his funeral, coming as it did so shortly after the removal of Malenkov, great efforts were made to show the unity of party and government with the military leaders. Virtually all leading party and government officials stood for a short time at his bier, and all subsequently attended his funeral on Red Square. This tribute was in marked contrast to that accorded to Marshal Tolbukhi, who died in 1949, when only Bulganin and Shvernik stood by the bier and only six Politburo. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA,

Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, pp. A-1 to A-2) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

Konev whose position had become weaker did not rise against Khrushchev while Zhukov, the traitor in the Battle of Stalingrad, spoke out in favor of the Gestapo agent Tito:

Konev was cautious and restrained in discussing the Yugoslav question, but Zhukov (on 1 May) gave an accolade to the Yugoslavs and to Tito for their wartime roles and appealed personally for a rapprochement. This statement was apparently designed either to support Khrushchev's Belgrade visit or to establish a claim for credit for the rapprochement. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 9) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

By expanding influence over the Soviet military, the Titoist faction could then more easily pursue its Titoization agenda well before the 20th CPSU Congress. The Red Army and the intelligence bodies closely cooperating with it served as the guards of the CPSU against the increased membership of the corrupt bureaucrats in the CPSU. By reducing communist influence in the Red Army, the Titoists led by Khrushchev could then increase the membership percentage of the bureaucrats in the CPSU. A SAVAK spy with extensive contacts to the international communist movement and the Warsaw Pact countries stated that the leadership of the CPSU had become a band of corrupt bureaucrats:

All of this has a material origin and is a sign that the particular stratum that governs the government as well as the leadership of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union has grown too bureaucratic and prosperous, and this is the basis for the growth of capitalism in the Soviet Union and can lead to the ... transition to capitalism. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG{Khrushchev – Political})

Indeed, by the time of the 20th CPSU Congress and for a long time beyond it, the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats – the white-collar elements – gained the majority in the percentage membership composition thus being able to vote for the Titoization program initiated by the Khrushchev group. The Titoization Speech, the so-called 'Secret' Speech, was the vigilance-reducing speech through which Khrushchev was to gain the support of the white-collar majority in the Party in the struggle against communism in the Soviet Union. It was to assist the Titoists led by Khrushchev in the struggle to criminalize the Soviet intelligence service and to decriminalize the 'victims' of the Soviet intelligence service, hence allowing the Titoists to take over the Soviet security bodies, ensuring the transition of the USSR from a dictatorship of the proletariat to the dictatorship of the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie, particularly the dictatorship of the corrupt bureaucratic oligarchic bourgeoisie.

The real meaning of the phrase 'the Stalin era' is the era during which the industrial blue-collar workers held numerical dominance over a democratic centralist Party that dominated the government apparatus of the Soviet Union, and during which the communist agents backed by the CPSU held a dominant position over the USSR's means of violence, the armed forces and the intelligence bodies. The practical meaning of the phrase 'the Khrushchev era' in turn is the era during which the white-collar elements – i.e. the intelligentsia, the bureaucrats, and so-called 'technocrats' – held numerical dominance over the Party and factional dominance over the Red Army command. Even the personality of Stalin naturally rose to leadership due to the hold of the industrial blue-collar workers over the Party whereas the personality of Khrushchev naturally rose to the top due to the numerical dominance of the white-collar workers over the Party. Contrary to the idealist belief, the tip of the iceberg does not stand on air and then generate the rest of the iceberg and mountain underneath it; rather, in accordance with the historical materialist science, the tip of the iceberg is the culmination of the rise of the massive mountain that elevated the tip of the iceberg to such a high position. Personally, I disagree with the use of such phrases as 'the Soviet Union under Stalin' or the 'USSR under Khrushchev' because such phrases cultivate the idealist notion that the 'tip of the iceberg' – Stalin or Khrushchev – generated the rest of the system which they led. It is incontrovertibly true that Stalin and Khrushchev were leaders that greatly influenced the course of events in the system 'under' their leadership and many of the Soviet policies were "Stalin's policies", but the class composition of the system 'under' their leadership had a greater impact on whom – Stalin or Khrushchev? – would be the leader, than the one leader on the class composition of the system. In this specific context, when the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats thinly dominated, how do we distinguish between a dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie? How do we know which one was running the state? We know this not only on the basis that the white-collar elements slightly dominated the Party but also on the basis that the general policy direction of the state became one of further and further economic decentralization in order to strengthen the bureaucrats and the general foreign policy direction of the state was one of undermining the peoples' democracies and the anti-imperialist states from Hungary to Albania to North Korea to Egypt. The

general policy direction in the favour of the reactionary forces demonstrated that the domination of the CPSU by the white-collar elements and the domination of the means of violence by the Titoist agents reliant upon the white-collar elements did have the effect of resulting in reactionary policies being pursued.

The corrupt bureaucrats that upheld Khrushchev were, as a comprador class, allied to the Anglo-American finance capital. This was directly reflected in the fact that Khrushchev, the man representing them, was an agent of the MI6. Before 1953, Khrushchev's track record was one of close relations with the MI6 spymaster Konni Zilliacus (see C19S7.2), knowing that Zilliacus was an MI6 spy, and with the MI6 agent Beria, knowing that Beria was definitely a traitor. After 1953, everywhere in Khrushchev's track record, one can see activities for the MI6, the foremost among them being his full-on collaboration with the UDB regime in Yugoslavia in all spheres, and the UDB was a CIA- MI6- BND front. Khrushchev's extensive collaboration with the Tito-Rankovic gang is incontrovertible proof of his collaboration with the British intelligence service. Khrushchev's open ties to Zilliacus, an MI6 official Khrushchev knew to be an MI6 official, served to reinforce the contacts with the MI6.

From hereon, the comprador bourgeois government of the territory of the former Soviet Union after the 1955-1956 overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat will be referred to in this book as 'Eurasia', so to distinguish it from the socialist Soviet Union. Socialism was temporarily restored in that country in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (more on this later) and for that time period, the term used in this book to refer to the government of that territory is again the 'Soviet Union' or 'USSR'.

C20S8. A Reply to the '1991 Capitalist Restoration' Argument

Some of those who argue that the socialism was overthrown in December 1991, harbour the anti-dialectical stance that until a state is 'suddenly' torn apart, the way it was 'suddenly' torn apart in 1917 or in 1991, a state cannot undergo a change its class character. A gradual change of the class character of a state is impossible, they argue. This view is anti-dialectical, for it ignores the law of the 'leap from quantity to quality'. The law of the 'leap from quantity to quality', explained in depth by Engels in *Anti-Duhring*, is one of the fundamental concepts of dialectics largely ignored by the proponents of the 'suddenness' theory. Actually, the key to determining the class character of a state is not whether such a state was established or overthrown suddenly or gradually. Rather, the key to determining the class character of a state is the issue of classes' control over the means of violence. Control over the means of violence is the sole characteristic that determines the class character of a state, and taking control over the means of violence can be done gradually or suddenly.

The question of the control over the means of violence is the alpha and the omega of the communist stance against Kautskyism. Kautskyism is a treacherous tendency for it promotes the thesis that merely electing the 'good politicians' into office will be enough for the establishment of a progressive state; the communists on the other hand argue that the 'good politicians' must be supported through increasing their faction's control over the means of violence. The Kautskyites argue that some legislations for reforms are enough; the communists on the other hand argue that real reforms can only be enforced through control over the means of violence. The Kautskyites refuse to support military operations aimed at inflicting material costs upon the dominant anti-proletarian faction of the anti -proletarian armies; the communists call for 'revolutionary defeatism' against such reactionary armies in order to inflict enough material costs to reduce the leverage of the dominant faction of the reactionary army, so that the minority faction in the army, representing the intelligence agents of the proletariat, can take over the rest of the army and thus control the means of violence and yield real effective change. There are a number of other problems with Kautskyism, but the essence of the matter boils down to this question of the means of violence.

The transition to socialism requires the proletariat to conquer the command of the means of violence. Such a conquest of the command of the means of violence can be gradual, sudden, or a combination of gradual and sudden, but it must, of necessity, be an armed conquest. That is the key feature that sets apart a socialist from the Kautskyite illusory. It is no Kautskyite deviation to argue that the class character of a state can be changed gradually, so long as the argument notes that the gradual change has come through an armed conquest of the means of violence by a certain faction representing certain class interests. Recall that most of the Peoples' Democracies, Czechoslovakia being the main exception, were at first officially established and declared as communist-led bourgeois states and they were to transition towards socialist statehood and dictatorship of the proletariat, not through a sudden ripping apart the state as a whole and launching a revolt from below to demolish the troops, but through a leap from quantity to quality, a revolutionary change involving the proletarian masses from below and the armed vanguard of the working class from the top. Similarly, there is no reason to believe

that a socialist state cannot transition to a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie without a 1991-style demolition of the state; on the contrary, the overthrow of socialism can occur through the leap from quantity to quality, which certainly was greatly helped by the fact that the Axis invasion exterminated so many blue-collar elements in the CPSU.

C20S9. The Secret Speech

*** IMG-All- {Khrushchev – Political}

The Titoization speech was a Trotskyite-fascist propaganda work not written by Khrushchev alone, but by a web of Titoist elements inside and outside the CPSU. There was a commission behind the selection of the lies to be stated:

his “Secret Speech” [was] a document in fact composed by a commission headed by veteran party ideologue Piotr Pospelov.. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers’ Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 13) (IMG{Romania})

Informing his SAVAK chiefs, a SAVAK spy with extensive contacts to the international communist movement and the Warsaw Pact countries remarked:

Khrushchev had neither the spiritual ability nor the necessary communist understanding.... (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, Khordad 22, 1344 / June 12, 1965. Source: ‘Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents’ [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

The SAVAK spy further stated:

Regarding the knowledge of Marxism, I have not seen anyone among the Soviet leaders who has been able to deal with major world issues based on Marxism-Leninism and materialism, and dialectics and historical materialism.

Suslov, who is apparently the current theorist of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, not only does not seem to be a communist, but he has such characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie that his theories are more similar to those of the petty bourgeois ideology.

From the point of view of having Marxist political knowledge, I do not see much value in the current Soviet leaders.

(The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, Khordad 22, 1344 / June 12, 1965. Source: ‘Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents’ [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

Expressing their extreme satisfaction, a memorandum of the US Government noted:

The denigration of Stalin and Moscow’s acceptance of Titoism have created difficulties in Soviet relations with the satellites; (...). This fluid situation in the satellites has increased the previously limited U.S. capabilities to influence a basic change in ... the satellites. (...). There is a possibility that an internal relaxation might result in the long run in the development of forces and pressures leading to fundamental changes of the satellite system in the direction of national independence [read: colonial dependence on Washington] .. (NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES IN EASTERN EUROPE, NSC-5608, 73. National Security Council Report, Washington, July 3, 1956. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1957, EASTERN EUROPE, VOLUME XXV) (IMG)

I need not mention that the regime in Washington cared little for the ‘national independence’, ‘individual freedom and security’ or ‘popular will’ of Eastern European countries; these were merely euphemisms serving as cover for American plans to install their social-fascist neo-colonies in Eastern Europe. The thesis of the existence of a third camp in between the anti-imperialist camp and the pro-imperialist camp is a thesis in favor of deception for the purpose of intelligence penetration; The ‘third’ force between the pro-imperialist forces and the anti-imperialist forces would either be a pro-imperialist force disguised as ‘neutral’ (e.g. Tito and his fascist gang) or an anti-imperialist force disguised as ‘neutral’ (e.g. Nehru-era India, Mosaddeq-era Iran, Quwwatli-era Syria). Khrushchev made it clear that he sided with the former category – the pro-imperialist ‘neutrality’ headed by Tito’s group.

The Titoization speech was a huge service to the MI6. Referring to the clandestine propaganda activity of the MI6 in Eastern Europe, the anti-Soviet British military intelligence officer Michael Smith remarked:

Copies of the speech were run off in their thousands and were distributed clandestinely throughout eastern Europe, fuelling demands for reform, particularly in Poland and Hungary. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

Pro-MI6 reforms were on the way:

As details of the secret speech became more widely known, the clamour for reforms began to grow. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

The notes prepared by US intelligence for the meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) are especially instructive. Not only do they state that the attack on the Stalin-era USSR was an excellent opportunity for the US- led camp, they also somewhat implied that Stalin's books must be removed and burnt, which is actually something that the Khrushchevians indeed implemented since that time. Another remarkable thing stated was that the degradation of Stalin could help Mao seize Stalin's spot. The following are excerpts of the notes:

1. Attempt to destroy Stalin tradition presents grave problems for Soviet Union and real opportunity for Western World attack – overt and covert.

2. If Stalin degraded then Mao [i.e. Chinese Chairman Mao] takes his place along side of Lenin.

3. For 25 years Stalin not only Soviet dictator but also leading theoretician and great war hero.

They, therefore, have three-fold task of destruction.

a) Tens of millions of copies of his works are scattered throughout the Soviet Union, Stalin on Leninism,

Short History of Communist Party, etc., etc. Can they remove and burn these?

b) Every history book filled with Stalin eulogies. Also Encyclopedia Britannicas..

c) If Stalin a gangster, what is position of other members of the gang? Molotov worked with him for 40 years; Khrushchev held key job under him for 18 [years], Bulganin, 21 [years], Mikoyan 30 [years], Kaganovich 28 [years] and Malenkov 27 years. (...).

('NSC BRIEFING – 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

The NSC document also stated:

5. Stalin was artisan of Soviet foreign policy for 25 years. These should now be repudiated.

Example:

Korea, Berlin, Rejection of Marshall Plan, etc. And do Tehran, Yalta ad Potsdam agreements still stand?

('NSC BRIEFING – 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

8. Name of Stalingrad should be changed; Stalinallee in Berlin and all places bearing his name; his body removed from mausoleum next to Lenin, statues and other momentoes destroyed. ('NSC BRIEFING – 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 3) (IMG)

Word by word, Khrushchev was implementing these.

C20S10. Criminalizing the Soviet Intelligence Service

*** IMG-All- {Khrushchev – Political}

One of the major objectives of the 1956 Titoization Speech was to criminalize the Soviet intelligence service while decriminalizing the reactionary agents 'victimized' by the Soviet intelligence service. The document by the National Security Council (NSC) of the United States stated:

7. (...). If Stalin is as bad as they say, should not Army move in and liquidate his long time henchmen who still run government? Should not all of Stalin's appointments through Soviet Union be reviewed and replaced? ('NSC BRIEFING – 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

The 'henchmen' referred to the counter-intelligence officers in the USSR who had combated imperialist-fascist secret service infiltrators and comprador agents in the USSR, in an affair that reached its climax during the Great Purge. It is important to note that the rehabilitation of the imperialist-fascist agents purged during the Stalin era was not just an attack on Stalin and socialism, but was also an assault upon the communist and progressive elements in the Soviet counter-intelligence sector, who had combatted the fifth column. The decriminalization of the Trotskyite/Bukharinite fifth columnists would have criminalized the communists and progressives who purged the fifth column; the denunciation of the accusations against the fifth column as 'frame-up' would have served to actually frame up the communist and progressive elements in the counter-intelligence. In other words,

the Moscow Titoists' 'rehabilitation' efforts was not just a war for a revisionist re-writing of history, but was also a war on the counter-intelligence service, so to allow the infiltration of Titoists in the counter-intelligence. And upon conquering the counter-intelligence sector, there would be little room for filtering out agents who would take over the extraterritorial intelligence, the military, the economy, and the cultural affairs. In a letter to the 'Japanese Communist Party' published in TASS and archived by the CIA, Nikita Khrushchev stated:

Espionage is needed by those who prepare for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the cause of peace. It does not intend to attack anybody. Therefore, the Soviet Union has no intention of engaging in espionage against other states.. (KHRUSHCHEV: TEST-BAN PACT POSSIBLE NOW, Khrushchev Letter to Nozaka, Text of Khrushchev's reply to a letter from Japanese Communist Party Chairman Sanzo Nozaka,, Moscow Tass in English to Europe 2013 GMT, June 28, 1962. In; Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Issues No. 126, CIA, BB-2 to BB-3) (IMG)

Ladislav Bittman, a former Czechoslovak intelligence officer who defected to the Atlantic intelligence services, quoted Nikita Khrushchev on this as well:

As late as 1962, Nikita Khrushchev claimed that "espionage is needed by those who prepare for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the cause of peace. It does not intend to attack anybody. Therefore, the Soviet Union has no intention of engaging in espionage." (The KGB and Soviet Disinformation, International Defense Publishers, Ladislav Bittman, 1983, p. 19) (IMG)

Denying the existence of the extraterritorial intelligence by Party chief would have not only given imperialist-fascist secret services the excuse to denounce communists as blatant liars, but also would have served a revisionist rhetoric that would have set the ideological basis for Khrushchev to go ahead with his words and to destroy the extraterritorial intelligence service. The denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev was a part of Khrushchev's plot towards opening up the USSR for foreign intelligence services. A SAVAK spy with extensive contacts to the international communist movement and with the Warsaw Pact countries, stated:

When Khrushchev became head of the Soviet Party and government, he sought to wash away all the mistakes that had been made in the Soviet Party and government by accusing Stalin, in order to establish better relations with the Western world, and to present himself to the world as a philanthropist and a capable communist. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

Under very suspicious circumstances, the Soviet intelligence agents that had penetrated the pro-fascist camp suddenly were easy prey to hunt down. In Israel for example, as was mentioned in much greater detail in C16S6, there was a powerful intelligence service taking the form of a communist-led 'Socialist Zionist' popular-front party, Mapam. Via the Mapam, many luminaries infiltrated the ranks of the Israeli military and intelligence apparatus. Ze'ev Avni, through the Mapam, rose to become a leading official in the Mossad and the Israeli Foreign Ministry. However:

Avni was caught early in 1956 and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 194) (IMG{Mapam})

The precise date of Avni's arrest was in April, only one month after the 20th CPSU Congress. The 20th CPSU Congress was the onset of a course of 'de-Stalinizing' the Soviet intelligence service. 'De-Stalinizing' the Soviet intelligence service really meant destroying the Soviet intelligence service, elevating MI6 operatives at its high ranks, and most importantly for Avni's case, eliminating the agents of the Stalin faction in the Soviet intelligence. One of those Stalin faction loyalists reportedly was Avni:

Avni ... told his interrogator that Stalin had been a 'genius' and initially refused to believe that Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' of 1956 denouncing Stalin was genuine. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 193) (IMG{Mapam})

The 'De-Stalinization' of the Israel branch of the Soviet intelligence service probably came about in the form of the betrayal of Avni to the Shin-Bet chief, Isser Harel. 1956 was also the year in which the 'Cambridge Five', who were described as the Stalin-era Soviet spies in the high ranks of the MI6, were publicly exposed.

Levi Levi, an alleged Soviet spy in Israel, was captured in 1957:

Zeev Avni, who worked in the Foreign Ministry and carried out special missions for the Mossad, was caught, convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term in 1956. Levi (Lucian) Levi worked for the

Operations Unit (today the Operations Branch), of the Shin Bet, which as part of its mission, according to foreign reports from Poland, broke into the embassies of the communist countries, in order to photograph documents and install listening devices. He was arrested and sentenced to prison in 1957. (In Depth: The KGB's long history of running agents in Israel, The Jerusalem Post, Yossi Melman, October 27, 2016) (IMG {Mapam})

Another case in point of how Khrushchev further undermined the extraterritorial intelligence is with regards to Orthodox Christianity. It must be remembered that during the Stalin era, the Orthodox Church was utilized by Soviet intelligence as a tool of extraterritorial influence (see C15S7), with which to reduce the influence of the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia. Knowing this, the British agent Khrushchev scored points in favor of the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia by attacking its rival, Orthodox Christianity. The MI6 operative Richard West wrote:

Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalin, his friendship with Tito and his boisterous clowning manner led the West to believe that he was a 'liberal', new-style Communist of the Yugoslav kind. However, in some respects, Khrushchev was even more despotic and cruel than Stalin [who was neither despotic nor cruel], particularly in his persecution of Christian believers. In a major offensive against the Russian orthodox Church, Khrushchev imprisoned scores of bishops, priests and nuns. He reduced the number of churches to 7,000, representing a loss of two-thirds. The seminaries were reduced from eight to three, and the number of functioning monasteries from sixty-seven to twenty-one. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 268) (IMG)

Again, none of this is to defend the reactionary content of Orthodox Christianity. The point rather is that it was a useful weapon of extraterritorial soft power and intelligence, which Khrushchev seriously undermined.

Note also Richard West's contrasting of Khrushchev with Stalin. Too often in Anglo-American media, Stalin is slandered as having been more cruel towards those who believed in religion, whereas Khrushchev is praised as kinder towards the religious. This myth, however, is debunked by the MI6 operative Richard West who admitted that the opposite was true. While communists should indeed campaign against religion, such a campaign must not be via terroristic means. Lenin and Stalin opposed forceful campaigns against religion (see the relevant previous chapters and sections), and instead advocated persuasion and anti-religious propaganda. Forcing irreligiosity was not only anti-democratic, but also would have stirred up religious uprisings against communism, while driving a wedge between the Party and the predominantly religious proletarian/peasant masses – and that is what the Trotskyite-Titoist agent of the MI6 and UDB, Khrushchev, intended.

C20S11. The Further Decline of the Economy Since 1956

*** IMG-All- {Khrushchev – Political}

The CIA's Office of Research and Reports (ORR) provided a detailed report on the decline of the Soviet- People's Democratic camp economy from the highest rate of growth to an economy on the decline:

The confidence in the economic strength and solidarity of the Sino- Soviet Bloc which was expressed so firmly at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in early 1956 weakened by the end of 1956. Strength is still there, but the solidarity has been proved not so strong as had been thought, and the internal economic problems of the various countries loom larger than expected. To the critics of the Communist system, events have been encouraging, to the Communists, sobering. Bloc countries are now in a period of transition and of unstable relationships -- a period of reorganization, of re-planning, of renegotiation, and of regrouping.

By early 1956 the Sino-Soviet Bloc had become an impressive aggregation of economic power. Its population was 900 million. Its total gross national product (GNP) was 38 percent that of the NATO countries, almost 70 percent that of the US. Its rate of economic growth was significantly more rapid than the present growth of the NATO powers or of the US.

Despite the confidence expressed in early 1956, deep economic problems lurk under the surface today. (Survey of the Economies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), September 13, 1957, p. 1) (IMG)

A big reason for the economic decline and disintegration of the Eastern Bloc was the Khrushchev faction's attempt to make each country invest less in its industrialization and more in its consumer goods.

Today it is no longer necessary for each socialist country to develop all branches of heavy industry, as had to be done by the Soviet Union, which for a long time was the only socialist country, and existed in a capitalist encirclement. Now, when there is a powerful community of socialist countries whose

defence potential and security is based on the industrial might of the entire socialist camp, each European people's democracy can specialise in developing those industries and producing those goods for which it has the most favourable natural and economic conditions. This at the same time creates the necessary prerequisites for releasing considerable resources to develop agriculture and the light industries, and on this basis to satisfy more and more fully the material and cultural requirements of the peoples. (Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), Twentieth CPSU Congress, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 10)

Prioritizing heavy industry was needed for establishing the means of production that would produce the means of production, hence growing the economy, The Khrushchev group was aiming to prevent this from happening.

C20S12. Regarding Criticism of Stalin and Stalin-era USSR

The USSR was a massive country with vast amounts of resources not only natural but also human. The USSR possessed a powerful intelligence apparatus, both for extraterritorial intelligence and for domestic intelligence. It also had a massive body of experts and advisors in all fields. The communists in the USSR were, furthermore, able to at least identify who the top wreckers and counter-revolutionaries were and were able to stay vigilant against their deceptions.

The General-Secretary of the CPSU, in leading the Party of the proletariat, had access to all this body of expertise, intelligence, resources, advisory, etc. As such, the General-Secretary of the CPSU had access to massive loads of information upon which to make decisions. Failure to account for the General-Secretary's access to such extensive and deep amount of information would be a failure to take into account the historical-material realities of the USSR and hence would be a failure to make a historical materialist scientific analysis. Stalin was armed with a strong understanding of dialectics and the historical materialist science. This meant that he could analyze the information that reached him scientifically. Thus, in terms of policy making and strategic assessments, he could make informed, scientific, and strategically correct decisions regarding any aspect of Soviet life towards which he was responsible. It would be rare for someone so well-armed with dialectical and historical materialist vision on the one hand, and such a large access to information and data on the other hand, to make errors in policy making and strategic decisions. Where Stalin as the head of the Soviet Union did make mistakes on policy-making and strategic issues was when there was a failure of or insufficient level of intelligence and information provided, such as with regards to the exact timing of the Nazi invasion, or perhaps when he was compelled to resign from the position of General Secretary of the CPSU in 1952 thus having less access to intelligence materials. However, it would not be fair to blame Stalin for that since he was not personally responsible for going out there and gathering military intelligence. It was not his fault that people failed to provide a good quantity or quality of information to him. So that 'error' of not being able to prophesy what would happen or what is happening is obviously not a real error in the field of policy-making and strategic decision-making. An analyst who says that Stalin made errors in the realm of policy-making and strategic decisions will have to take into account the massive load of information and expertise to which any General Secretary of the CPSU would have had and with which the General Secretary could make well-informed decisions. And by taking into account the fact that the General Secretary could make well-informed decisions, an analyst who states that Stalin made mistakes in the macro-level and mid-level issues could minimize misjudgement of Stalin, and perhaps even arrive at the conclusion that Stalin did not err at the macro-level and mid-level which the analyst initially believed Stalin made.

A similar kind of statement can be made about Gorbachev; as the chief of the Titoist 'CPSU', Gorbachev made well-informed decisions based on the historical materialist science and dialectics – the difference though was that Gorbachev was on the opposing side of history, the side of comprador reaction. Insofar as is concerned the pursuit of his comprador and pro-imperialist objectives, I am not aware of any strategic error committed by Gorbachev at the macro- and medium levels. Similarly, Khrushchev, while relatively unintelligent, had excellent advisors knowledgeable about methods of counter-revolutionary activity, and thus he pursued his comprador objectives systematically with low amounts of strategic error. Tito, the evil genius leader of Yugoslavia's fascist resistance against Soviet power, made few grand-strategic and medium-scale errors insofar as serving the fascist cause is concerned. The strategic correctness of Tito's policy line (from a reactionary fascist viewpoint) was reinforced by the flooding of Tito with the intelligence materials provided to him. However, Tito himself had a good understanding of dialectics, hence his ability to perform well from a fascist standpoint. Whenever I hear the yellow journalist media state that so-and-so major leader with so much access to information made a strategic mistake at the grand level or at the medium level, I go on alert and doubt such claims. Major leaders with plenty

of access to information have indeed made some mistakes on the medium-level policy matters but almost never in the grand strategic level. Hitler did not make a strategic mistake to invade the Soviet Union, although he made mistakes in some of the medium-level planning details in addition to some of the tactical details. Dyck Cheney did not make a strategic mistake to invade Iraq, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq did not benefit Iran. Such narratives that grand strategic moves are dependent upon the mistakes, or lack thereof, of individual leaders are yellow journalistic idealistic narratives. Such massive military and intelligence bodies do not so easily allow such grand-strategic mistakes to be made. The same goes for Stalin. Insofar as the grand strategies are concerned, CPSU General-Secretary Stalin and the Stalin-era USSR never did anything wrong from the viewpoint of someone who seeks the advancement of the cause of the proletariat. From collectivization to the Great Purge, from the Nazi-Soviet commercial relations to the friendship with the people of Israel, policies after policies of the USSR were each shining in more glory than the other despite appearing 'evil'. The medium-level policy matters were largely a matter of experience and knowledge of dialectics and historical materialism. The less the experience, the more the mistakes; the more the experience, the less the mistakes. Take for example the following remark by Stalin:

Marx and Engels believed that we needed a militia-based army. In our first years, we also thought that only a militia-based army was needed. Life has taught us that that was incorrect. Today, in order to defend the country, we need a modern army with various specialists. A militia-based army is good only in the situation where war is decided with the rifle. Today we should discard this old militia-based army. Today the army is not the manufacture army, but the machine army. Therefore, we need people in the army who know machines. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 3. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

As time went by, experience piled up. In the beginning phase of the October Revolution and the Civil War, many Soviet officials, despite having positive intentions, had low experience and therefore made mistakes in the medium-level policy matters, Stalin's error on the militia-based army being a case in point. Later on, over time, they learned from such errors, did not repeat them, and tried to fix them. Stalin, due to being well-versed in historical materialism and dialectics, was a careful, cautious observer, quickly learning from experience. He managed to learn from his errors quicker than most of his colleagues, which was a factor that gave rise to his leadership of the CPSU in the first place.

I sometimes get accused of fostering this cult of personality and refusing to accept that Stalin made mistakes, treating him as a demigod. Such accusations are baseless. My counter-argument against such accusations is that these accusers do not judge political leaders from a historical materialist perspective. Such accusers do not look at the fact that the political leaders being judged had access to plenty of information, were battle-hardened, and intuitively dialectical and historical materialist even if fighting for the reactionary side of history. From the viewpoint of American imperialism, Allen Dulles, Moshe Dayan, and Robert McFarlane made no mistakes in the grand-strategic and very few mistakes in the medium-level policy matters. They almost never erred against the interests of the finance capital which they served. In the same way, at that macro- and medium levels of decision-making, Stalin almost never erred against the interests of the proletariat which he served.

At the scale of the small details of life and in the tactics of political struggle, everyone makes many small mistakes and Stalin could not have been an exception.

C20S13. The Nazi Rebellion in Hungary / Yugoslavia supports Nazi rebels / The Role of the Intelligentsia in the Rebellion / Yuri Andropov was a Trotskyist-Titoist agent of the MI6, UDB, and Horthyite Rebels

*** IMG-All- {Hungary}

The Titoization Speech of 1956 greatly emboldened the Hungarian intelligentsia and agitated them with the anti-communist speech needed for a colour revolutionary action against the Hungarian state:

After the 20th Party Congress in the USSR, a completely different mood came into being. Among the writers and other intellectuals, so-called isolated groups came into existence; these groups organized debating evenings, with their main motive being that Hungary must again become master of its own house and that the interests of the Hungarian people should again be put first. A writers' newspaper was again published, originally once per month, later weekly. In this paper the government was strongly criticized and mistakes were traced. (...). The writers' newspapers came to be read more and more by industrial workers in Budapest and Csepel, and the newspaper boys who for the sake of security always

hid these newspapers under the official newspapers, made three or four times the price for the writers' newspapers. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, pp. C-6 to C-7) (IMG)

As the MI6 officer Michael Smith recalled, once the American intelligence obtained a copy of Khrushchev's full speech:

Copies of the speech were run off in their thousands and were distributed clandestinely throughout eastern Europe, fuelling demands for reform, particularly in Poland and Hungary. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith, 1996. p. 123) (IMG)

The result of spreading such 'information' was greater colour revolutionary unrest by the liberal intelligentsia:

As details of the secret speech became more widely known, the clamour for reforms began to grow. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

Titoist Yugoslavia utilized the Khrushchev group's Titoization drive to agitate the Hungarian intelligentsia into a Titoist colour revolutionary movement:

In April 1956 a Hungarian, rather Communistic transmitter came on the air; this transmitter was on Yugoslavian soil. The chief doctrine of this radio station was that Hungary should build up its own [Titoist] [pseudo-]socialist state. The official Yugoslavian transmitters were hindered from 1948 until the beginning of 1956 by jammers. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. G-4) (IMG)

At the same time, the Moscow Titoists, in collusion with the Belgrade Titoists, worked to install the Hungarian Titoists onto power:

conferences were being carried on between the Russian leaders and Tito. Tito had demanded that the reparation payments, among others those from Hungary, which had been stopped by Stalin in 1948, should be resumed, and that the relationships with Hungary should be improved. His great enemy in Hungary, RAKOSI, immediately fell along with his supporters as a victim of the de-Stalinization and was succeeded by GERO. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-7) (IMG)

Khrushchev and Mikoyan personally were involved in ousting Rakosi and promoting the Titoist foes of Rakosi. As the CIA stated:

The extreme de-Stalinization pronouncements of Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party dealt a drastic blow to the Rakosi regime and encouraged his opponents into renewed efforts to oust him and institute liberalized policies. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. III) (IMG)

The party was shattered as the result of a series of Soviet policy moves culminating in the de-Stalinization pronouncements of Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party. These measures split the party into hostile factions and precipitated dissension in the organization from top to bottom. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. I) (IMG)

Mikoyan reportedly arrived on 14 July, rejected Rakosi's proposal for the arrest of some 400 persons, including some forty writers and ... Imre Nagy, and apparently was sustained in his verdict by Khrushchev. It strongly appears that Rakosi was forced to resign as party chief when his plans for coping with the opposition were rejected. Rakosi's subsequent references to his guilt of "cult of personality" suggests that Mikoyan may have lectured him on the subject during his visit to Budapest. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 72) (IMG)

Gero was Hungary's Malenkov equivalent; in other words, he was a Titoist but of the kind that was somewhat more coopted by the communists, unlike Nagy who was not really coopted by the communists much. Nonetheless, during the Gero era, the:

the rehabilitation of [Yugoslav-backed Nazi anti-Semite] RAJK with complete restoration of honor took place.. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-6) (IMG)

The rise of the Titoist faction in Hungary led to the elevation of the fascist agents into the Hungarian military and intelligence apparatus, an elevation that was reinforced morally by the criminalization of the Hungarian

counter-intelligence service which had hunted the Nazi agent Rajk down. As the CIA document had stated, RAKOSI, immediately fell along with his supporters as a victim of the de-Stalinization'. At the same time, this gave the pro-Nazi elements the operational freedom they needed for counter-revolutionary action against the people of Hungary. Then:

In October 1956 GERO and some of his close fellow workers made the trip to Belgrade [just when a rebellion had started in Hungary]. Meanwhile revolt had started in Hungary also.. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-7) (IMG)

With the planned absence of Gero, Hungary's Malenkov equivalent, the non-coopted Titoists gained much greater operational freedom and engaged in a colour revolution. With the support of Hungary's Titoist leadership, the Hungarian intelligentsia first staged rallies, which – very importantly – were supported by the counter-revolutionary elements of the AVH. This is important because it shows that the Titoist elements had indeed risen in the ranks of the Hungarian security apparatus. The colour revolutionary intelligentsia moved towards Hungary's radio station in order to be able to further agitate the intelligentsia. However, the doors were locked. The reactionary elements in the Hungarian security, AVH, intervened, shot the guards, and allowed the colour revolutionary students to continue their measures. The CIA reported:

a movement of sympathy with the Poles arose; **this was supported by the [the Titoist] Hungarian leaders for reasons of opportunism.** A mass meeting was to be held by Hungarian youth at the Joseph Behm Square, where the statue of this Polish freedom hero stands. A great many people got time off to attend the this meeting and rather small Behm Square could not contain this mass of people. Meanwhile GERO, who was just returning from Belgrade, had ordered that the meeting could not be held, but shortly thereafter permission was given. The meeting took place on 23 October in the afternoon. Before that, the Petofi club had called upon the Disz (Communist Youth Organization) to close ranks with it on a number of points containing the demands of the Hungarian youth for more democracy. The crowd met in the square by the Parliament building. **The Budapest students** had decided on this, and the leadership of the Disz had joined them. Here it was demanded that the program of the Hungarian youth should be made known over the radio, for which purpose the mass moved to the radio station in Budapest. When this building appeared to be completely locked, people tried by force to get access to the station. **Some young officers tried to intervene but were shot down by AVH troops who had arrived in the meantime.** ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-7 to C-8. Bold added) (IMG)

The colour revolutionary uprising of the intelligentsia, timed with the arrival of Gero to Belgrade and the opportune time for Nagy to launch the rebellion, was far from spontaneous, especially considering how supported it was by the Titoist elements in the AVH and the Hungarian military. And furthermore, as reported by The Independent, the MI6 officer Michael Smith said:

The [British intelligence] officers I spoke to said there was an intention to cause an uprising in Hungary. (MI6 trained Rebels to fight Soviets in Hungarian Revolt, The Independent, Christopher Bellamy, October 22, 1996) (IMG)


Hence came the colour revolution. The colour revolution created the pressure from below with which the Nagy gang were able to conquer power and purge the communist faction:

Confronted with this crisis, the party central committee and politburo were called into hasty session on the night of 23-24 October. (...). During the stormy all-night session several Stalinists were thrown out of the political committee ... and replaced by two moderates (Szanto and Kobol) and one Nagyist, Losonczi. In the early morning hours, Nagy was chosen premier. The following day – 25 October – with the fighting mounting in violence, Erno Gero was deposed as party first secretary and Janos Kadar elected in his place. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 79) (IMG)

Contrary to what is often claimed, there is no evidence of a major involvement of the Hungarian proletarians in the colour revolution. Certain segments of the Hungarian workers surely did involve in the colour revolution, of course. The 1953 Titoist New Course de-emphasized heavy industry and producer goods, and promoted economic decentralization. The effects of this were clearly reflected in the situation in Hungary. The Titoization agenda and the New Course, caused an economic disaster in Hungary. Hungary was seeing steady and high level

of economic growth until 1953, but the growth began to slow down after the 1953 introduction of the Titoist 'New Course'. With the purge of the Beriaites and the rise of the Gero group, which was coopted by the Rakosi faction in 1954, growth partially resumed, but by 1955, when the Khrushchev faction reasserted influence, growth in Hungary ceased and in fact the economy began to sharply decline.

HUNGARY
GROSS VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS AND PRODUCER GOODS
1938, 1948-57, and 1960 plan



(‘LIGHT INDUSTRY IN HUNGARY 1947-57’, Economic Intelligence Report, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, July 31, 1957, p. 8)

Unrest, therefore, began to grow. However, even then, the discontent did not grow into the active participation of the workers, unlike what the Trotskyites often claim. Recall from C10S7, that even those proletarians who had become enthusiastic members of the Nazi Party ended up serving as a major communist fifth column, a pool of spies for the KPD and the USSR, as well as Strasserite rebels waging a shadow war against the Hitler gang. If even those ‘Nazified’ proletarians ended up serving as a de facto anti-Nazi fifth column inside the Nazi Party, what reason is there to believe that the Hungarian proletariat would become a horde of diehard Titoist fascist counter-revolutionaries? There is no reason to believe such, nor is there any evidence that such a thing occurred. Despite the slight involvement of Hungarian workers, the core of the so called ‘proletarian revolution’ was not at all by the proletariat but by the Hungarian intelligentsia. Some workers’ councils were reportedly established but even then, the workers in such councils did not engage as much in the colour revolution. The core of the ‘revolution’ was by the intelligentsia and was mainly based not in the factories but in the universities:

the leaders of the revolution at the universities were the following, among others: Ladislaus POSZNAR,

Alex PERGEL, Johann VINCE, Johann VARGA, Edith MOLNAR, Eduard NEMETHY, Alex SAL, and Zoltan MEREY, all of whom were taken prisoner by the KADAR regime. Bela JANKO, and Ladislaus GRUBER were in this central leadership. these people were representatives of the various faculties of the Budapest University and the Technical High School. There was also a group of intellectuals occupied with the complete reconstruction of Hungary. Leading figures among them were Georg ADAM, a writer; Ladislaus KARDOS and Georg MARKOS, professors. The revolutionary council of the Medical University consisted of representatives of the professors, lecturers, and assistants and students. The first one was represented by Dr. Stephan PATAKY and Dr. Zoltan ZSEBLK.. (‘PRE-

REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-9) (IMG)

Then events followed very fast. People quit work everywhere, and in the shortest possible time, in all offices, places of work, plants, and so forth workers' councils **were chosen by free and secret written ballot.** In the meantime the fighting groups had gotten a great number of weapons from the Kilian barracks, where a young Captain had taken over the leadership and opened up the stores of weapons. Also supplies of weapons came freely from the factory militias of the large plants in and around Budapest. **Then government had lost its power and shortly before his resignation GERO, on the basis of the Warsaw Pact, called in the help of the Russian troops.** In the meantime the leaders of the revolution at the universities kept themselves busy trying to create a nucleus out of the writers to form a coordinating organ between the various revolutionary councils, which at first worked completely independently. **This was, of course, a result of the great spontaneity of the revolution. Couriers instituted communications between the various councils and after some days, there really was coordination.** Also, close contact was maintained with the NAGY government. At the urging of the coordinating organ NAGY reported that as quickly as possible discussions would be opened with the Russians concerning the withdrawal of the Russian troops. (**PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, pp. C-8 to C-9. Bold added.**) (IMG)

The above CIA report itself contained a number of anti-Soviet and anti-communist biases, of course, presenting the fascist war in Hungary as a 'pro-democracy' uprising. However, even in that biased CIA report, no evidence was provided of an active 'proletarian' involvement in the 'revolutionary' efforts of the Hungarian intelligentsia. The maximum amount of 'evidence' was that 'People quite work' – which could easily be due to the feeling of unsafety as a result of the 'revolution' – and that "workers' councils" were formed in the factories. The formation of workers' councils and the self-management of factories would reduce economic discipline but could hardly be the active 'proletarian revolution' which the Trotskyites describe. The 'revolution' in Hungary was mainly done by the intelligentsia, and the involvement of the pro-'revolution' elements among the proletarians was at best conservative and limited to mere formation of 'councils' in factories. Again, when even the Nazi-minded among the German proletarians served as a crypto-anti-fascist fifth column in the Nazi movement, what reason is there to believe that Hungary's proletarians would suddenly become active pro-Horthyite warriors? Historical experience has shown many a time that those proletarian masses indoctrinated with reactionary pro-fascist anti-communist propaganda end up not fighting as much the progressive and communist forces and direct their hawkish rhetoric towards the imperialists, accusing the latter of allegedly not being anti-communist and chauvinist 'enough'. In the United States, this fake 'anti-communism' of the proletarians is concentrated in the Trump's electoral base, which preaches American supremacy while actually accusing the American corporations and American intelligence of being run by 'Marxists'. In Israel, the post-2005 pro-Putinist 'far-right' movements, which receive the support of the Hebrew proletarians, are anti-Arab and anti-communist in rhetoric but have struck the IDF, CIA, Mossad, and private banks tens of times more than they have struck the Arab civilians and the communist cause. In short, some individual proletarians, many from parasitic class backgrounds such as kulaks, would be serious anti-communists, but the bulk of those proletarians influenced by anti-communist or pro-fascist ideas tend to direct their energy towards combat against the actual fascists and anti-communists, all the while being soft on the real communists and real anti-fascists. It follows that the fascist 'revolution' in Hungary could not possibly be anything close to an 'uprising of the proletarians' and that the formation of councils was the maximum level of 'proletarian defiance against the regime'. Another noteworthy member of the Nagy regime was Georgi Lukacs, the Titoist 'philosopher' and 'sociologist' whose elevation was clearly indicative of the elevation of the liberal intelligentsia in the Hungarian regime apparatus and the inherent links of the intelligentsia with the MI6-backed Nazis:

Lukacs returned to Hungary in 1945 and though his record with non-Party intellectuals during the Cold War is not emblemished, he did in 1956 become a minister of the brief communist revolutionary government of Imre Nagy, which opposed the Soviet Union. (Moscow, the Fourth Rome, Katerina Clark. p. 347. No Image)

Nagy undertook the radical Titoization of the Hungarian system:

Nagy from the outset took a more extreme position than the moderates. On 28 October [four days since

the start of the rebellion] he declared that the bloody fighting between revolutionaries and Soviet and AVH forces was due to "mistakes and crimes" of the past ten years, and denied that counterrevolutionary elements were behind the insurrection. (...). He assented to the suspension of collectivization (28 October) and abolition of the crop collection system (30 October). (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 81) (IMG)

With the high level of influence over the military and intelligence bodies by the Titoists elevated by Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Tito, the resources of the Hungarian military were being diverted by rogue Hungarian military officials directly to the colour revolutionaries as stated previously. The Titoist colour revolutionary intelligentsia were armed by the CIA and MI6 via Austria. The vehemently anti-Soviet MI6 official Michael Smith wrote:

On 23 October 1956 a student demonstration calling for free elections, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the return of Nagy brought a quarter of a million people on to the streets of Budapest. Large numbers of weapons began to appear in the crowd. Some came from the American arms caches in Austria and other almost certainly were British. Fighting broke out with security forces. In an attempt to placate the demonstrators, Nagy was reappointed Prime Minister. There was sporadic fighting for several days, followed by a series of reforms introduced by Nagy, including the disbandment of AVH secret police.. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith, pp. 123-124) (IMG)

Long before the colour revolution, the CIA and MI6 had been preparing for such a day:

American intelligence had stepped up its covert operations in Eastern Europe in the twelve-month period leading to the Hungarian uprising, training the 'Red Sox' teams of Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Romanian emigres for covert action inside their home countries. Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA, told the National Security Council that 'developments in the satellites present the greatest opportunity for the last ten years both covertly and overtly to exploit the situation'. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 122) (IMG)

Prior to the uprising:

MI6 had been active behind the scenes for some time providing covert assistance to potential Hungarian rebels and was aware that they were planning an uprising. (New Cloak, Old Dagger. Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

The British had been in close contact with dissident elements inside Hungary for some time, spiriting them across the border into the British zone of Austria for resistance training preparation for a future uprising. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

In fact:

Certainly MI6 planned to support resistance fighters in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The SIS representatives in Prague and Budapest went out into the woods burying stay-behind packs like those that were being hidden in the Austrian Alps by Preston and Giles. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

Describing the details of the MI6 involvement, Smith stated:

But dissidents appear to have made their own way across the border rendezvousing with their contact in true Cold War fashion, often quite literally under a certain lamp-post in a backstreet of a border town. A military officer working for MI6 would then take them up into the mountains for a four-day crash course in a variety of military skills before they were infiltrated back into Hungary. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

British intelligence had stumbled on a startlingly easy way of getting people of out Hungary and into Austria. An illegal frontier crosser admitted that her nephew, a driver on one of the trains taking Soviet staff officers from Hungary to their HQ in Austria, had smuggled her across the border in the cab. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

As The Independent reported:

the weapons used were American, and others almost certainly British. (MI6 trained Rebels to fight Soviets in Hungarian Revolt, The Independent, Christopher Bellamy, October 22, 1996) (IMG)

Smith further stated that the:

MI6 and the CIA had buried arms caches in the woods around Prague and Budapest for use by "stay-behind" parties or fifth columnists in case of war. (MI6 trained Rebels to fight Soviets in Hungarian Revolt, The Independent, Christopher Bellamy, October 22, 1996) (IMG)

A British intelligence officer interviewed by Smith recalled:

We were taking them up into the mountains and giving them a sort of ... crash course. I would be told to pick somebody up from a street corner at a certain time of night in the pouring rain. Graz was our staging point. Then, after we'd trained them – explosives, weapons training – I used to take them back ... We were training the agents for the uprising. (MI6 trained Rebels to fight Soviets in Hungarian Revolt, The Independent, Christopher Bellamy, October 22, 1996) (IMG)

Meanwhile, the Anglo-American imperialist press propagated the myth that the Hungarian 'revolution' was completely spontaneous, that the 'revolutionaries' got virtually no assistance from the Anglo-American intelligence organizations supposedly because the Anglo-Americans could only focus on the Suez Crisis at the time and not on Hungary, and that the 'revolution' was by the proletarians. The Anglo-Americans kept on denying involvement in the events in Hungary in order to present it as spontaneous, so that more Hungarians participate in it without fear of foreign schemes – and this too was a part of the media work. The colour revolution that Nikita Khrushchev and other Kremlin Titoists had helped ignite also gave them the excuse to 'be busy' with Hungary so to not come to the aid of the Masriyin in the face of the Anglo-Israeli invasion of Egypt. Yet, it was not just the CIA and MI6 which had a role in the colour revolution. Recall that Yugoslavia had set up a radio to agitate the intelligentsia towards a colour revolution. Yugoslav involvement did not end there.

The Nazi German Panzerwaffe troops harbored by Titoist Yugoslavia were then deployed to Budapest to launch the massive anti-communist terror operations and anti-Semitic pogroms:

two trucks with panzer troops had been on the way from Yugoslavia to Budapest. This would have been after 4 November, and it is said that the trucks with the panzer troops, which had surrounded Budapest, were taken prisoner. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. G-3) (IMG)

The role of the Yugoslav regime in instigating the colour revolution had also been confirmed by the Warsaw Pact media at the time, by the Red Army officials, as well as by the memoirs of Enver Hoxha. The gang of the Gestapo agent Tito went farther than mere incitement and even served as the harbourer of the Nazi Wehrmacht's Panzerwaffe troops deployed to Hungary for fighting supposedly on behalf of the Hungarian people.

Numerous Nazi-aligned Horthyites participated in the colour revolution along with the UDB-backed Panzerwaffe troops. The CIA reported:

Of course, some individuals who took an active part in the revolution have a background in the days of the [pro-Nazi] Horthy regime: for instance, army officers who joined the freedom fighters or provided them with weapons, have been officers in Horthy's army.. (Some Lessons of the Hungarian Revolution, CIA, p. 5) (IMG)

Fierce nationalism, as the CIA pointed out, played a prominent role in the rebellion:

These events [in Hungary] encouraged the fierce nationalism which had characterized all of Hungary's history. (...). Nationalist symbols (the flag, the anthem, the coat of arms) played a significant role throughout the recent events. (Some Lessons of the Hungarian Revolution, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

Specifically providing the defining characteristics of the kind of fierce nationalism spoken of, the CIA stated: Hungarian nationalism is **anti-Slav, anti-Rumanian, anti-Czechoslovakian, anti-Semitic,** and anti -Communist. On the positive side it is Christian, **pro-German ...** and pro-Western, consisting of a deeply ingrained sense of the historic role of Hungary as a Christian nation and an outpost of Western civilization and culture. The establishment of Roman Catholicism as Hungary's national religion in 1000 A.D. oriented not only religious feeling but also the nation's culture and political development toward the West.. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August, 1957, p. 4. Bold added) (IMG)

The kind of 'fierce nationalism' manifest in those protests was an anti-Semitic one:

rejection of Hungarian [territorial] revisionist ambitions, [and] the disproportionate number of Jews in high official positions, ... are forceful illustrations that Communism is the very antithesis of Hungarian nationalism. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

The CIA confirmed that the vast majority of Hungary's Yiddish population had an extremely low counter - revolutionary potential and that the Yiddish-Hungarians supported the Red Army intervention and the communist- coopted Kadar group. The US intelligence also confirmed that the Hungarian 'revolutionaries' launched many pogroms. As always, a large minority of the Yiddish, some of the Yiddish intelligentsia and most Yiddish bureaucrats, were collaborating with the Nazis against the proletarian majority of Hungary's Yiddish

population. Jewish pro-Nazi organizations subservient to American imperialism credibly claimed that a large minority of the Yiddish population in Hungary actively supported the 'revolutionaries' (Yugoslav-harboured Panzerwaffe troops). The following is an excerpt of the CIA document:

One U.S. Jewish spokesman, apparently well-informed, has claimed that some 25,000 Jews in Hungary joined in the revolt against Communism. Another source, also well-informed, claims that 16,000 Jews were among the great tide of Hungarian refugees which crossed the frontier and found haven in Austria. Granted these allegations are true, the question remains as to what part was taken in the rebellion by the remaining 100,000 or more Jews in Hungary. No conclusive answer is possible, but the available information suggests that while many of these Jews took no action either for or against the government, a large percentage actively supported the Kadar regime and the Soviet intervention. In this connection it may be noted that the ... Hungarian secret police (AVH), which [mostly] remained loyal to the Communist Party throughout the rebellion and was the principal target of revolutionary fury, is believed to have been staffed in considerable measure by Jewish [proletarian] personnel.

Under present conditions existing in Hungary, both the resistance potential of the Hungarian Jews and their possible utility to Special Forces appear to be exceptionally poor. A large proportion, possibly the majority, of the Jewish population is apparently loyal to the Kadar regime either through conviction or desire to live in peace. Of the Jews who sympathized with or aided the recent revolt, it seems likely that many have been badly shaken by the **anti-Semitic outbursts of the revolutionaries** and now ask themselves whether the position of the Jews in a liberated Hungary would be any better than under a Communist government.

(Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August, 1957, pp. 97-98. Bold added.)

(IMG)

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) too confirmed that pogroms throughout Hungary were taking place during the 'revolution', although, ever the propaganda weapon of the Anglo-American imperialist agencies, the JTA claimed that the attacks were 'sporadic' rather than pervasive and systematic:

The revolution saw sporadic attacks on Jews in small towns across the country, with some targeted as representatives of the regime and others **simply for being Jews. In Budapest, a few soap-box orators raged against "the Jews," and some elderly Jews say they feared the revolution would turn against them.** All told, some 200,000 Hungarians, or some 2 percent of the population, fled the country, including an estimated 20,000 Jews, or one-fifth of the Jewish population. (1956 crises decimated two Jewish communities, in Hungary and Egypt, Michael Jordan, October 25, 2006. Bold added.) (IMG)

For the Gestapo agent Tito and his Nazi terror band, the Holocaust was not enough. Tito and his gang felt thirst for the blood of a seventh million. For them, the quota of the seventh million was a measure of career success. Nowhere and never did they miss the chance to directly and materially support the pogromists, be they the Gestapo torturers in Yugoslavia, the Nazi Wehrmacht's Panzerwaffe troops in Hungary, the infamous Nazi spy General Marian Spychalski in Poland, the Gestapo agent Anwar Sadat in Egypt, the PLO terrorists in Lebanon, and the Saddamite Iraqi regime. So correctly the Stalin-era Soviet Foreign Ministry describe Tito, that proud Nazi in the closet, as Hitler's successor:

The Tito fascist clique is an abominable product of the darkest forces of international reaction. The imperialists rightly regard Tito as Hitler's successor. It is no accident that when the fascists captured power in Germany the Tito-Rankovic clique was in the service of the Hitlerite Gestapo which later turned over the Yugoslav traitors to the secret services of other imperialist powers. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol'stvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

The Yugoslav regime staffed its UDB fascist secret service with Gestapo cadres. The Titoist-Nazi Yugoslav regime agitated for such an anti-Semitic pogromist 'revolution' and harboured the Panzerwaffe troops that carried out the anti-Semitic terror as part of the systematic annihilation campaign against Hungary's pro-Communist loyalist Yiddish population. All this time, the CIA-funded media propagated the myth that Titoist Yugoslavia, the dictatorship that picked up the mantle of Himmler and Eichmann, was Eastern Europe's 'most philo-Semitic' 'socialist' state under the 'benevolent' reign of which the Semitic communities culturally 'flourished'.

A prominent Nazi anti-Semitic commander of the CIA-backed MI6-backed Hungarian fascist rebels was

Bela Kiraly. Nagy released Bela Kiraly and made him the leader of the Hungarian rebel armed forces and planted other counter-revolutionary fascist agents to become prominent leaders of the Hungarian government:

He permitted the revolutionary reorganization of the Defense Ministry and the appointment of revolutionaries (Maleter and Kovacs) and ex-prisoners (e.g., Bela Kiraly) to top military posts. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 81) (IMG)

Bela Kiraly was a former Nazi commander in Hungary. According to 'The Independent':

Kiraly stayed with the army when Hungary's leader, Miklos Horthy, was removed from power by the pro-Nazi Arrow Cross movement in October 1944 after he had ordered Hungarian forces to cease fighting. On Hitler's orders the Arrow Cross were determined to continue the war to the end. Days before that end came for Hungary, in March 1945, Kiraly was put in charge of defending the town of Koeszeg on the Austrian border. (Bela Kiraly: Soldier who led Hungarian resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1956 uprising, The Independent, [Gabriel Patros](#), Saturday 11 July 2009, underline added) (IMG)

For his Nazi activities, he was:

a victim of the old Stalinist regime.. (Bela Kiraly: Soldier who led Hungarian resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1956 uprising, The Independent, [Gabriel Patros](#), Saturday 11 July 2009) (IMG)

Kiraly attended:

Kiraly was released weeks before the 1956 Revolution, and was in hospital recovering from an operation when fighting erupted in Budapest on 23 October. Five days later he was smuggled out of hospital, against doctors' orders, to attend a national gathering of armed revolutionary groups. Such was his reputation both in military terms and as a victim of the old Stalinist regime, that he was almost immediately elected Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed National Guard which brought together the various revolutionary groups with sympathetic units from the established security forces. (Bela Kiraly: Soldier who led Hungarian resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1956 uprising, The Independent, [Gabriel Patros](#), Saturday 11 July 2009) (IMG)

True, the USSR had collapsed in early 1956 and Eurasia was a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, but the membership composition of the Titoist 'CPSU' was such that the Titoist white-collar elements only had a slight margin over the non-white-collar elements, the proletarians and kolkhozniks. They were in the weaker position, but had power enough so as to raise vigilance against the fatal dangers of Titoization and to coopt some of the Titoist agents in the 'CPSU' against Titoization, if Khrushchev showed an unacceptably poor a performance. The communist loyalists that operated within the Eurasian state apparatus and the 'CPSU' could persuade enough ordinary elements in the Party, even them who would have normally sided with Khrushchev, and to coopt enough the Titoists under the pressure of the proletarians to temporarily 'cross the floor' and side with the communist faction, and thereby form the majority with which to compel Khrushchev to take proper action. Indeed, a memorandum from the US National Security Council (NSC) stated:

Following this development there had been a flood of intelligence material alleging new and serious rifts over the Yugoslav problem among the Soviet leaders. It was the burden of many of these reports that Khrushchev was now completely isolated in support of the new and more liberal approach to Yugoslavia. Certain Yugoslav sources were insisting that Khrushchev's opponents are arguing that Tito's policies are dangerously weakening the control of the USSR over its satellites. Whatever the precise truth of all these rumors, General Cabell said that the CIA believed that recently Soviet policy toward the satellites had given rise to concern and that the Soviet leaders believed they will now have to shift their course and again tighten their controls. On the other hand, General Cabell pointed out that Bulganin and Mikoyan had been at least as closely associated with the new policy of liberalism toward the satellites as Khrushchev himself. (Memorandum of Discussion at the 298th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 27, 1956. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955 - 1957', Vol. 26, Central and Southeastern Europe, US Department of State, p. 747) (IMG)

As such, Khrushchev was eventually, and with much reluctance and delay, compelled to engage against the Hungarian colour revolutionaries by sending the Red Army. In late October 1956, there was:

full-scale fighting between AVH troops and the rioters (24 October), Soviet troops intervened. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. IV) (IMG)

On November 1, 1956, Nagy officially announced the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and appealed to the US-led camp for support:

On 1 November, presumably under the influence of extreme revolutionaries and faced with the build-up of Soviet armies, Nagy took the extreme step of proclaiming Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw pact and asking for the neutralization of Hungary under the protection of the United Nations. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 81) (IMG)

Red Army troops entered Hungary and obliterated many of the fascist forces led by Nagy. Fearing execution by the superior Red Army troops:

Nagy and most of his ministers sought refuge at the Yugoslav embassy. With no one left to take orders from, Kiraly led several thousand members of the National Guard out of his headquarters in the centre of Budapest, first to the outskirts of the city and then to the Bakony mountains in western Hungary.

(Bela Kiraly: Soldier who led Hungarian resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1956 uprising, The Independent, [Gabriel Patros](#), Saturday 11 July 2009, underline added) (IMG)

Tito's gang gave refuge to Nagy. The communist forces in Eurasia later compelled Tito's gang to release Nagy from the Yugoslav embassy, upon promise of not hurting Nagy. Nagy was subsequently executed.

The Yugoslav regime continued to insist that the Red Army must leave Hungary. According to the research wing of the CIA's RFE/RL:

The Yugoslav delegate UN, Jozhe BRILEY, sprung a last night by joining the growing demand from the non-Communist world that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Hungary and the Hungarians be permitted to manage their own affairs.

BRILEY told an emergency session of the General Assembly that his government was opposed to intervention of foreign forces in any country. "The less interference, from whatever source, the better for the Hungarian people."

(YUGOSLAV REACTION TO HUNGARY, Evaluation and Research Section, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, November 9, 1956, p. 1. In: Open Society Archives, Budapest, Hungary) (IMG)

Although the Red Army rightly intervened in Hungary, once again the slight margin which the Titoists had over the communists in the struggle for control over the Red Army was manifest, this time in the choice of who was to lead the new Hungary. Janos Kadar, a former deputy and ally of Laszlo Rajk with ties to the Horthyite intelligence service during the Great Patriotic War, was the deputy to Imre Nagy during the 'Hungarian Revolution'. While Nagy's chances of political survival had ceased, the Marshal of the Renegades Tito decided to go ahead with supporting the next 'best' Titoist candidate in Hungary at the time, Janos Kadar. Importantly, **Yuri Andropov, a pro-Nazi MI6 agent and the Eurasian ambassador to Hungary at the time, supported the Nazi Hungarian rebels led by Imre Nagy, an assisted Tito in the efforts to install Kadar.** Such facts are well-documented.

To document Andropov's treasonous activities, let us start with an excerpt of the Sergio Beria biography of Lavrenti Beria. Sergio Beria recalled that many years later, when Andropov had emerged as the chief of the KGB, Andropov had told Sergio Beria:

'I have closely studied your father's proposals on economic and foreign policy fields. Many of them are absolutely correct.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergio Beria, p. 277) (IMG)

Note that Lavrenti Beria had been the top supporter of the Imre Nagy faction. That Yuri Andropov would hail 'Many' of the economic and foreign policy lines of Lavrenti Beria was strongly indicative of what was to come. Vyacheslav Matuzov, among the most prominent KGB officials in the 1970s and the 1980s, confirmed that Yuri Andropov's intelligence roots can be traced to Leon Trotsky, and that Andropov was one of the leaders of Gorbachev's 'Perestroika':

The mechanism of "perestroika" was carried out by Primakov's supporters outside the KGB, partially attracting from there the personnel that Andropov personally created. After all, Andropov also came to the KGB and the Central Committee not from scratch. And here it is interesting to consider the roots of Andropov himself. (...) Andropov was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of the Karelo-Finnish SSR. Otto Kuusinen stood behind him. Who was Kuusinen associated with? With Lieutenant General of State Security Yevgeny Pitovranov. This is the "father" of all the Andropovs,

Primakovs and other leaders of "perestroika". (...). The thread runs from the Comintern and Leon Trotsky. The "red thread" in this story is the struggle of Joseph Stalin against Trotskyism in the ranks of the law enforcement agencies. In my opinion, all this was created on the basis of the special services. ('Vyacheslav Matuzov: Mikhail Gorbachev was a pawn in the plan for the collapse of the USSR', EurAsia Daily, interviewer: Sarkis Tsaturyan, March 11, 2019) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha recalled in his memoirs that Yuri Andropov supported the Nagy faction and the Nazi terrorist insurgents in 1956:

The Soviet ambassador in Hungary was a certain Andropov, a KGB man, who was elevated to power later and played a dirty role against us. This agent, with the label of ambassador, found himself surrounded by the counter-revolution which broke out. Even when the counter-revolutionary events were taking place openly, when Nagy came to the head of the government, the Soviets still continued to support him, apparently hoping that they could keep him under control. During those days, after the first half-hearted intervention of the Soviet army, Andropov told our ambassador in Budapest:

"We cannot call the insurgents counter-revolutionaries because there are honest people among them. The new government is good and it is necessary to support it in order to stabilize the situation."

"What do you think of Nagy's speeches?" our ambassador asked him.

"They are not bad," replied Andropov, and when our comrade pointed out that what was being said about the Soviet Union did not seem to be correct, he replied:

"There is anti-Sovietism, but Nagy's recent speech was not bad, it was not anti-Soviet. He wants to maintain links with the masses. The Political Bureau is good and has credit.

The counter-revolutionaries acted with such arrogance that they forced Andropov, together with all his staff, out into the street and left them there for hours on end. We instructed our ambassador in Budapest to take measures for the defence of the embassy and its staff, and to place a machine-gun at the top of the stairs. If the counter-revolutionaries dared to attack the embassy he was to open fire without hesitation. **But when our ambassador asked Andropov for weapons to ensure the defence of our embassy, he refused:**

"We have diplomatic immunity, therefore no one will touch you."

"What diplomatic immunity?!" said our ambassador. "They threw you out into the street."

"No, no," said Andropov, "if we give you arms, some incident might be created."

"Very well," said our representative. "I am making you an official request on behalf of the Albanian government."

"I shall ask Moscow," said Andropov, and when the request was refused our ambassador declared:

"All right, only I am letting you know that we shall defend ourselves with the pistol and shotguns we have."

The Soviet ambassador had shut himself up in the embassy and did not dare to stick his head out. A responsible functionary of the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, who was being chased by the bandits, sought refuge in our embassy and we admitted him. He told our comrades that he had gone to the Soviet embassy but they had turned him away.

(The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 9. Bold added.) (IMG)

The New York Times – having interviewed several Hungarians and 'Westerners' in Budapest, Geneva, and elsewhere, who knew Yuri Andropov during his years in Hungary – reported that Yuri Andropov sought to prevent the intervention of the Red Army against the Nagy faction:

On Nov. 1, 1956, with the streets of Budapest blackened from battle, with Soviet forces pouring into the country despite their agreed withdrawal from the capital, Imre Nagy, the leader of the Government, who sought to bring about change, found himself under pressure from all sides. He called Mr. Andropov to his office and denounced the troop movements.

The Soviet Ambassador said he knew nothing of this but promised to find out. Some time later, after what Hungarians close to the situation have described as a heated telephone conversation, he gave his word that the influx of Soviet troops would be halted. (...). The next day, the new commander of the national guard, Gen. Bela Kiraly, was sent to the Soviet Embassy to look into the Ambassador's complaints that Hungarians were sacking it. Mr. Kiraly, who now teaches at Brooklyn College, remembers that Mr. Andropov assured him, "Believe me, general, the Soviet people are Hungary's best friends." He offered immediate negotiations to discuss a new withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

(SOME INSIGHTS INTO ANDROPOV GLEANED FROM BUDAPEST ROLE, The New York Times, R. W. Apple Jr., December 28, 1982. "The writer of the following article [R. W. Apple Jr.] interviewed Hungarians and Westerners in Budapest, Geneva and elsewhere who knew Yuri V. Andropov during his years in Hungary on their expectations for the new Soviet leader.") (IMG)

Upon finding out that Red Army intervention into Hungary had grow inevitable, Yuri Andropov found that the next 'best' candidate, from a Titoist perspective, was the deputy leader of the Hungarian Nazi rebel regime, Janos Kadar. Andropov persuaded Kadar, a Nagy faction loyalist, to pretend to oppose the Nagy faction and to deploy himself onto the camp of the Red Army:

According to several Hungarian sources, Mr. Andropov had already begun to make his plans for the country's future. On Nov. 1, Mr. Kadar, First Secretary of the party, and Ferenc Munnich, the Minister of the Interior in the Nagy Government, stopped at the Soviet Embassy and talked for some time, apparently to the Ambassador. Miklos Vasarhelyi, Mr. Nagy's press aide, who later spent four years in prison, said, "It was Andropov who talked to him first, and it was Andropov who persuaded Kadar to go over to the Soviet viewpoint." (SOME INSIGHTS INTO ANDROPOV GLEANED FROM BUDAPEST ROLE, The New York Times, R. W. Apple Jr., December 28, 1982. "The writer of the following article [R. W. Apple Jr.] interviewed Hungarians and Westerners in Budapest, Geneva and elsewhere who knew Yuri V. Andropov during his years in Hungary on their expectations for the new Soviet leader.") (IMG)

Through the MI6-backed Horthyite rebel and Titoist leader Janos Kadar, Andropov aimed to ensure the continuity of the Nagy faction's project in Hungary after the overthrow of Imre Nagy's immediate entourage. In other words, Kadar was to be a stay-behind agent of the Nagy faction, a Nagy loyalist who infiltrated the camp of the anti-Nagy forces so that the anti-Nagy opposition may be led, and misled, by an agent of the Nagy faction. Yuri Andropov decided to promote Janos Kadar at the behest of Tito himself:

It is widely believed in Budapest that Mr. Andropov was one of the key figures in persuading Nikita S. Khrushchev to install Mr. Kadar as Mr. Nagy's replacement. Khrushchev himself preferred Mr. Munnich, who had fought in the Russian Revolution and in the Red Army in World War II.

On the night of Nov. 2-3, however, Khrushchev was meeting President Tito of Yugoslavia at the latter's island retreat of Brijuni in the Adriatic Sea. According to the diary of a Yugoslav diplomat who was present, Tito argued strongly that Mr. Kadar would be more likely to attract a genuine popular following in Hungary, not least because he had served time in jail under the Stalinist Government of Matyas Rakosi.

"Andropov knew the opinion of Hungarian party leaders better than anyone else, and he knew the mood of the people," a close associate of Mr. Kadar said. "When Tito opted for Kadar, Andropov was in position to support him."

(SOME INSIGHTS INTO ANDROPOV GLEANED FROM BUDAPEST ROLE, The New York Times, R. W. Apple Jr., December 28, 1982. "The writer of the following article [R. W. Apple Jr.] interviewed Hungarians and Westerners in Budapest, Geneva and elsewhere who knew Yuri V. Andropov during his years in Hungary on their expectations for the new Soviet leader.") (IMG)

The CIA too confirmed that Janos Kadar, an agent of Nagy faction not really committed to cracking down on the Titoization efforts of the Nagy regime, was undertaking the pro-communist measures because he had been encircled by the communist intelligence agents who were planted around him under the guise of 'Soviet advisors':

the NAGY government had matters completely in hand on 3 November 1956 and without the support of the Russian troops, which in the meantime had been completely rotated, KADAR would not have gotten his foot in the door. Even during the first period of the KADAR regime, everything which had been changed and democratized by the revolutionary councils remained. People at the universities acted as though nothing had happened, tried to get things back on the rails as fast as possible and quietly to maintain the rights they had gained. KADAR, however, was completely surrounded by Russian advisors and is now a puppet of the Russian regime, a prisoner in his own Parliament building. Even after 4 November 1956 some people went ahead with the publishing of pamphlets, including a stenciled student newspaper which was read by the Hungarian population. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-10) (IMG)

In other words, the anti-communist Kadar behaved like a 'communist', for he was coopted by the communist faction of the Soviet intelligence service. Nevertheless, the influence of the communists in the Soviet Red Army on Hungary was never sufficient so as to yield the replacement of the communist-coopted Titoist agent Janos Kadar with a communist loyalist anti-Titoist statesman. Kadar therefore served as the compromise candidate, the 'lesser Titoist'. Indeed, the 'lesser Titoist' 'lesser Nazi' Kadar group continued many of the Titoist policies lines albeit at a slower pace and to a lesser extent. The infamous American spymaster Noel Field, who had been released from Hungarian jail by Imre Nagy still roamed and operated freely in Hungary till the end of his life. Referring to the Noel Field family, Karel Kaplan, a West German intelligence agent, wrote in 1990:

All three Fields were released in October 1954. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 25) (IMG)

The New York Times reported:

And after Soviet forces in 1956 toppled the Hungarian Government of Imre Nagy, which had released him, Noel Field upheld the new Hungarian regime of Premier Janos Kadar as having saved Hungary from "white terror." (Noel Field, Self-Exiled US Aide, is Dead, New York Times, September 14, 1970) (IMG)

Noel Field's condemnation of the 'White Terror' was obviously demagogical and was for fostering his cover as a fake 'communist'.

Noel Field died in Budapest, the Hungarian capital, in 1970 when Kadar was in power:

Noel Field, the former United States State Department official ... obtained asylum in Hungary with his wife, Herta, in 1954, died yesterday in a Budapest hospital. He was 66 years old and had long been suffering from cancer. (Noel Field, Self-Exiled US Aide, is Dead, New York Times, September 14, 1970) (IMG)

Regarding the influence of the Mossad in Hungary, the conditions also reflected the balance of forces. On the one hand, the Anglo-Yugoslav secret services had installed their agent Kadar at the helm and thus the UDB and MI6 had influence in Hungary. On the other hand, there was the Eurasian Red Army influence which countered the MI6-UDB influence in Hungary. This is reflected in the compromise situation with regards to the Zionist migration, involving the denial of passports to young people but permission for older people to leave:

Summary

Touval, on his own initiative, met with Hungarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Szarka in order to express his gratitude on the successful beginning of emigration from Hungary and to ask that the Hungarians make sure that their instructions for issue of passports for anyone intending to leave for Israel be followed regardless of that person's age. Szarka said that to the best of his knowledge 80 passports for Israel are issued daily and that altogether 2,000 have been approved since December. He pledged to take action to remedy the denial of passports to young people as well as to enable the emigration of people previously imprisoned for Zionist activity.

(Coded Tel. 554, Outg.: 93.01/2295/13, 'M. Touval (Budapest) to the East European Division', January 24, 1957. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol. 12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 – March 1957, Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, p. 310) (IMG{PD – Post-1953 Migration to Israel})

Note that the elderly Yiddish citizens of Hungary were not considered 'biologically valuable' for the Zionist state-building project. The Mossad was often reluctant to bring the elderly to Israel (see C16S2). Therefore, the Hungarian government's limitation of the Zionist migration to the elderly showed that the communist forces, backed by the Red Army presence, exercised an overall greater influence over Hungary than the forces of Titoist reaction.

A month prior, Israel had been promised by Hungary's deputy foreign minister that efforts would be maximized to assist in the channeling of the Yiddish citizens in Hungary through Yugoslavia so to eventually reach Israel:

Touval reports on his talk with Deputy Foreign Minister Sebes on the options for emigration from Hungary.

Sebes affirmed his government's readiness to allow emigration and said that he believes that in January approximately a thousand Jews would be able to leave for Israel. The age restrictions imposed on emigrants would not hold for those going to Israel. He requested that an effort be made to carry out the emigration quietly.

Touval pledged Israel's readiness to channel the emigrants through Yugoslavia or send them by air and said that the mere fact that substantial emigration has commenced would calm the Jews and they would await their turn. He expressed his readiness to recommend that in the agreement between Israel and Hungary, precedence would be given, as far as possible, to merchandise that they require.

The talk was held in a very friendly atmosphere. With the utmost caution, Touval is starting to envisage mass immigration from Hungary to Israel.

(Coded Tel. 529, Inc.: 130.09/2295/13, 'M. Touval (Budapest) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the East European Division, December 25, 1956. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol. 12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 – March 1957, Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, p. 207) (IMG)

The fact that the Kadar gang was in charge of Hungary on behalf of the Nagy faction even after the Red Army intervention serves as excellent proof of the depth of the influence which the Titoist faction in Moscow exercised over the Red Army. It shows that while the communist faction did have a large stake over the Eurasian state apparatus, the Titoist faction still thinly dominated in the Party, in the intelligence service, and in the military, not to mention also in the economic bodies.

C20S14. Economic Revisionism in Hungary

The well-known Anglo-Israeli intelligence operative Robert Maxwell – who was the father of Ghislaine Maxwell, the partner in crime of Jeffrey Epstein – was a 'good' friend of the Kadar group in Hungary. So welcomed was Maxwell by the Hungarians that got to write the introduction of a book of selected speeches and interviews by Kadar, a book that was published by the Hungarian government-controlled academic media. In the introduction to the book, Maxwell heaped praise on Kadar, but in the midst of such praise, he also pointed out that New Economic Mechanism, the revisionist policy advocated by Kadar and his group, brought greater autonomy for enterprises, and that Hungary was a member of the IMF:

The New Economic Mechanism has brought about major changes in industry which even allow workers to use State factories out of normal hours to produce goods for their own profit at privately negotiated prices. Factory managers are given greater autonomy, and personal accountability for performance has been increased throughout the economy. This flexibility of approach has brought benefits. Hungary is a member of the IMF and has improved its balance of payments, but her foreign debts are still relatively high. This has meant that the continuous improvement in the standard of living of the Hungarian people has halted over the last couple of years, although a modest resumption of economic growth is expected in 1985.

Kadar's number one priority is the welfare and future of Hungary and her people, to which he has dedicated his whole life. Every problem, every situation, is tackled from the standpoint of Hungary and her place in the world. In this he is a fearless and formidable protagonist.

(Introduction, By: Robert Maxwell (General Editor of the 'Leaders of the World' Series), January 1985. In: 'Janos Kadar: Selected Speeches and Interviews', Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, pp. IX-X) (IMG)

In his speech to the Central Committee, Kadar emphasized that economic decentralization of management was "essential" "Marxist" "socialist reform":

The elements of the reform concerning the decentralization of distribution and management are also essential. Summing up, I believe I can say that the reform is a Marxist reform, a socialist reform.

(Address to the Session of the Central Committee, Janos Kadar, November 24, 1967. In: 'Janos Kadar: Selected Speeches and Interviews', Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, p. 296) (IMG)

The CIA confirmed that the economic decentralization systematically decimated the Hungarian economy, for decentralization by nature drastically reduced coordination between the various economic bodies and empowered the local enterprises to engage in corrupt activities without any accountability to central bodies. Note that under a centralized economy, there would be no major problem regarding coordination. The centralization of the economic decision-making bodies away from many bureaus onto a few central bureaus would allow easier monitoring of the economy by the counter-intelligence agencies, for surveillance of a few central bureaus is easier than the surveillance of many scattered bureaus. Yet, decentralization did the precise opposite and empowered local enterprises to suck the budget while damaging production. Detailing the results of the New

Economic Mechanism in Hungary, the CIA reported:

11. Under the NEM, the Hungarians hoped to cope with the investment problems by modernizing the construction and building materials industries and by decentralizing investment decision making. Beginning in 1969, substantial funds were earmarked for expanding output of cement, bricks, and other materials, and the construction industry was given a larger share of investment. Little payoff has been achieved so far or, in fact, was expected by the leadership in the short run.

12. **A more immediate impact came from decentralization but in the direction opposite to that expected. Enterprises and state banks were given significant investment authority at the expense of the often politically motivated ministries.** In theory, only firms that were profitable would be able to invest. The profits of an enterprise were to be divided into a profit sharing fund, a reserve fund, and a development fund. Development funds – the source of an enterprise's own investment – could be either invested or placed on deposit with the banks to earn interest, although interest rates are too low to offer an attractive alternative to investment. Enterprise funds also could be supplemented by state credits or grants or by bank credit. Bank and state credit would be parceled out according to three criteria: the size of the development fund of the enterprise applying for credit; the expected profitability of the project; and, for large projects, the contribution of the intended investment to national economic objectives. **Under the new system, nearly all investment would be initiated by enterprises.**

13. **The reformers' expectations were not realized. The now relatively unfettered enterprises refused to play by the new rules.** Even while the NEM was being devised, enterprises deliberately underreported their profit position in the hope of retaining more profits or obtaining higher subsidies.

As a result, enterprise profits in the early stages of the reform were 50% larger than the government had expected. Development funds and self-initiated investment swelled excessively. Above-plan investment by enterprises amounted to 3.2 billion forints in 1969, and rose to 10 billion forints in 1971.

The inflationary rise in investment put considerable pressure on prices of building materials, which, although heavily controlled, still increased by 4% in 1971. (...).

15. **As might be expected, enterprises frequently initiated projects without the required financial backing.** For example, the Tisza chemical combine began a \$25 million development program in 1971 with financial backing for about one-half of its program. The coal mining enterprises in Borsod placed orders for various installations even though their application for credit had not been finally approved. According to Deputy Premier Matyas Timar, the "motto" of enterprises was, "What is important is to get the work going; the state will give the missing money from its budget." A government audit in 1970 discovered that 32 enterprises did not have development funds to cover 3 billion forints in committed investment; the state financed about 70% of the difference, creating a substantial budget deficit. Meanwhile, the banks, which had been expected to play a major role in rationing investment, were simply sidestepped by enterprises.

16. **Even the major projects that remained in state hands were too numerous and not effectively controlled. The responsibility for various stages of these projects – from blueprint to construction – was scattered among enterprises and ministries, leading to breakdowns in coordination and cost overruns.** The Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Office, which had been expected to coordinate and control major investments, had neither adequate information about nor effective veto over the projects being promoted by other ministries.

(HUNGARY: THE FIRST TEST OF THE NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM: Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, May 1972, pp. 5-6. Bold and underline added.)
(IMG)

Note that to this day, the CIA-funded media presents Hungary as the economic success model in the CMEA countries, calling Hungary "the happiest barracks" in the 'Second World' countries. The Kadar gang and their CIA backers hailed the decentralization measures in Hungary as 'Goulash Communism', the kind of a 'socialism' that allegedly brings plenty of food.

By the 1980s, the majority of the Party was white collar intelligentsia:

Three-quarters of the party members were originally industrial and agricultural workers; now, only one-third of them are. (Introductory Biography by L. Gyurko. In: 'Janos Kadar: Selected Speeches and Interviews', Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, p. 146) (IMG)

Twenty-nine per cent of the party's members are industrial workers, 6 per cent are in agriculture, 41 per cent are intellectuals and white-collar workers, 16 per cent are pensioners, and 8 per cent work in other jobs. (Introductory Biography by L. Gyurko. In: 'Janos Kadar: Selected Speeches and Interviews', Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, p. 145) (IMG)

The Party was, furthermore, a "mass Party" as opposed to a vanguard democratic centralism Party:

The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party is at once a mass party, and the leader of society, as the Constitution specifies. (Introductory Biography by L. Gyurko. In: 'Janos Kadar: Selected Speeches and Interviews', Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, p. 145) (IMG)

Hungarian Titoist leader Janos Kadar was of course a well-known Khrushchev supporter. Gyurko, a journalist and the official introducer of the book of the selected speeches, wrote:

It is well known that he liked Khrushchev; their relationship was built on the common struggle. I remember well what a shock it was to many Hungarians when Khrushchev was dismissed. The Stalinist period was still too close and the fear was very real that the change could mean a return to the old policy, to the old methods.

Kadar was in Poland that day. When he got back, the whole country waited to hear what he would say.

I was there when he got off the special train at the railway station. He did not wait until he got his office, did not wait to consult and to be informed. He spoke to the country as soon as he got back. Calmly and frankly.

"A great variety of events have occurred in the past week. There was some news that we were very happy to hear, and some that was a source of surprise. I want to tell you this frankly and honestly. As you know, there have been personal changes in the top leadership of the Soviet Union. Comrade Khrushchev, who asked to be relieved of his post on grounds of his age and poor health, has been relieved of his post, and Comrades Brezhnev and Kosygin have been elected to take his place. In every country and in every party a matter of this nature is up to the party and the country to decide on. For my own part, I think that Comrade Khrushchev deserves a great deal of credit for his fight against the Stalinist personality cult, and for the fact that there is still peace. He worked for peace. (...)"

(Introductory Biography by L. Gyurko. In: 'Janos Kadar: Selected Speeches and Interviews', Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, pp. 139-140) (IMG)

C20S15. Economic Titoization in Poland / Bierut's Suspicious Death / On Gierek's Views / The Gestapo agents Sychalski and Kaczorowska Rise to Power in Gomulka Era

*** IMG-All-{Poland}

The following table shows the CIA estimates of Poland's level of growth in all economic sectors industry, agriculture, transport and communication, trade and services from 1950 to 1953 and from 1953 to 1955. Until 1953, according to the CIA estimates, industry, construction, transportation, and communication saw immense growth, but the agricultural sector suffered.

Gross National Product: Poland

A. <u>Billion 1955 Dollars</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>
Gross National Product	16.7	19.2	20.7	22.1
B. <u>Indexes (1950 = 100)</u>				
Gross National Product	100	115	124	132
Industry	100	132	146	161
Agriculture	100	97	99	101
Construction	100	149	151	151
Transport and Communication	100	140	149	166
Trade and Services	100	114	128	138

(‘EASTERN EUROPEAN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1950-1955’, CIA, September 27, 1956, p. 5) (IMG)

The suffering of the agricultural sector was natural because forget not that Poland, just like East Germany and Czechoslovakia, had been affected by bad weather/climate conditions during those years:

A. Northern Area (Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia)

In the northern area of the European Satellites the fall of 1952 was characterized by above-normal precipitation, with the result that fall plowing and sowing of grains for harvest in 1953 were considerably hampered. Despite the fact that spring plowing and sowing were aided by favorable weather over most of the area, it is believed that the over-all acreage of bread grain will be less than prewar, because of failure to fulfill the fall sowing plans for winter wheat and rye.

Available weather information and reports from the American Embassy in Moscow indicate that cold and lack of rain characterized the spring much of Poland, although more abundant rainfall appears to have occurred in June. Favorable conditions for spring work were reported in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Rainfall appears to have been gradually adequate to abundant in the late spring and summer months, and in July heavy rains were reported to have caused harvesting difficulties for grain and cultivation difficulties for root and vegetable crops.

(‘CROP CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET BLOC, 1953 (RR IM-379)’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 23, 1953, p. 4. Underline original) (IMG)

Had the policies of centralized industrialization and agricultural collectivization not been pursued, Polish agriculture would have been devastated far more as a result of the poor weather conditions, but thanks to the People’s Democratic economic policies, agriculture did not suffer too badly. As in all of the Peoples’ Democracies, Poland too probably suffered economically due to the treasonous activities of the Beria gang, but the restoration of communist influence during the Beria purge again improved the economy, and hence Poland saw an economic growth in all sectors until 1954 and a significant growth also until 1955. While negatively portraying the economic growth of Poland, the CIA did nonetheless make a number of confessions regarding the growth of industry. By the time the 1956 colour revolution and installation of the imperialist agent Gomulka occurred, the CIA reported:

Poland, although the largest European Satellite in area and population, ranks third in gross national product per capita. Largely an agricultural and mining economy at the end of World War II, Poland has subordinated agriculture and light industry in order to speed development of mining and heavy manufacturing. In tripling the output of the machine-building and defense industries during the Six Year Plan (1950-55), Poland outstripped even the expansion of its coal industry, which is its chief raw material asset, and became dependent on imports for other industrial raw materials and food. Although food availability per capita has returned to prewar levels, food distribution has not kept pace with rapid urbanization. The quality of the diet and of consumer goods has not improved commensurately with the

growth of the economy or the effort extracted from the workers ... (GOMULKA AND THE POLISH ECONOMY, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), November 7, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

Shortly after Nikita Khrushchev's Titoization Speech, during the 20th CPSU Congress, on March 12, 1956, Boleslaw Bierut aged 64 died of 'natural' causes; hardly anyone in Poland ever believed the narrative that Bierut died of 'natural' causes. There have been many works speculating, not without basis, that martyr Bierut was murdered by the Khrushchev group because Bierut stood in the way of Titoization in Poland. Even an intelligence body as high as the US National Security Council (NSC) put quotation marks around the word "died" in describing the 'death' of Bierut:

What will leadership in those satellites now do? Bierut leader [of] Polish Communist Party "died" in Moscow. Rakosi must be trembling in Hungary and same [with] other satellite leaders to whom degradation [of] Stalin [was] incomprehensible. ('NSC BRIEFING – 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

In 'The Khrushchevites', Enver Hoxha too hinted that Bierut's death was suspicious. After his tragic 'natural' death, Bierut was succeeded by Ochab. Ochab was to Poland what Malenkov was to the USSR and what Gero was to Hungary. Ochab was undoubtedly a Titoist but since he was encircled by communists around him, he was coopted into adopting a mostly-communist line on the overt level. With the endorsement of the Titoists dominating Moscow, a wave of Titoization began in Poland, resulting in economically neoliberal policies. This led to the spontaneous revolt of the Polish workers. It was known as the 'Poznan Riots':

Since the Polish press, has termed the rioting workers' complaints as "just demands," the government is likely to raise wages and improve working conditions in Poznan, thus probably inspiring demands for similar benefits elsewhere in Poland.

The embassy suggests that the apparently inept handling of the Poznan workers' demands prior to the demonstration may result in the removal of a number of officials.

(US EMBASSY VIEW ON CONSEQUENCES OF POZNAN RIOTS. In: Central Intelligence Bulletin,

CIA, July 6, 1956, p. 5) (IMG)

The regime has implied in a party newspaper editorial of 29 June that the liberalization campaign will continue. However, the riots may result in a slowing of the process and a weakening of the position of liberal elements who were reportedly gaining strength in opposition to stricter [pro-communist] policies of party first secretary Ochab. (THE POZNAN RIOTS. In: Central Intelligence Bulletin, CIA, June 30,

1956, p. 3) (IMG)

The 'Poznan Riots' are often wrongly cited as a revolt 'for' liberalism when in fact the workers were protesting against the Titoization and economic liberalization pursued since the 1956 20th CPSU Congress. The CIA-funded mainstream media wrongly portrays the Polish communists as having condemned the worker protesters, when in fact the CIA archives prove that the Polish Party press termed the workers' complaints as just demands and that their voices were heard. To be sure, worker protests that are not led by a party or organization, particularly a progressive party or organization, are risky. While workers protesting peacefully against liberalization is good, proper organization of such protests helps to minimize the risks of such protests being exploited by the enemies of the proletariat.

To further strengthen the cause of the liberal intelligentsia,

Copies of the speech were run off in their thousands and were distributed clandestinely [by the MI6] throughout eastern Europe, fuelling demands for reform, particularly in Poland and Hungary. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

At the same time, the Allen Dulles network had stepped up its operations against the Polish nation:

American intelligence had stepped up its covert operations in Eastern Europe in the twelve-month period leading to the Hungarian uprising, training the 'Red Sox' teams of Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Romanian emigres for covert action inside their home countries. Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA, told the National Security Council that 'developments in the satellites present the greatest opportunity for the last ten years both covertly and overtly to exploit the situation'. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 122) (IMG)

The course of Titoization pursued by the Moscow Titoists and the Polish Titoists gave Poland's reactionary intelligentsia the operational freedom for their colour revolutionary action against communism. As always, the

intelligentsia chanted slogans for liberalism, Westernization, existentialism, etc. October 1956 was the infamous date in which the colour revolutionary intelligentsia mobilized, using such slogans, to install the Gestapo-Mossad spy Spychalski and his collaborator Gomulka. The US intelligence confirmed the important role of the intelligentsia in the October 1956 colour revolution:

The eruptions that took place in Poland and Hungary in 1956 saw the virtually complete disintegration of the regime controls over intellectual life. Writers, journalists, and artists led the way in taking over or disrupting government and party apparatuses of control. With the rise of Gomulka to power in Poland and the quelling of the Hungarian revolution, the new governments began to cast about for methods of re-establishing these controls. The Gomulka regime has relied in its efforts largely on persuasion, while the Kadar regime has vacillated between force and inducement. In both cases the resistance of the intellectuals has kept the regimes from achieving more than limited success. (...). When Gomulka returned to power in October 1956, the Polish Party's control over intellectual life was almost nonexistent. Writers were free from censorship; publishing houses were independent of effective State control. The main Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, did not necessarily present anything more than the views of its editors. (POSITION OF INTELLECTUALS IN EASTERN EUROPE, IR No. 8005, Intelligence Report in OSS-INR Reports, Washington April 27, 1959. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US State Department, p. 72) (IMG)

As a result of the colour revolution of the intelligentsia, the MI6's Home Army pogromists as well as the Nazis rose to the highest ranks of the Polish intelligence service. It was not just Spychalski and Gomulka who rose, but also many other Nazi agents, Home Army terrorists, etc. supported by the Gomulka-Spychalski group. Before delving any further into this matter, it is important to introduce a political figure who was not so important at the time but later emerged as a key player. His name: Edward Gierek. He would later rise to become the General-Secretary of the Polish Party, succeeding Gomulka in the 1970s. Since his interview-memoirs will be cited extensively, it is worth providing some details about him.

Gierek was definitely a Titoist, not a communist. This became clear with regards to his positions on the Stalin-era USSR and on the 20th CPSU Congress. For start, he slandered the Stalin-era USSR as a tyrannical regime that brutally terrorized any and all critics of Stalin:

[Rolicki:] It is a pity that you did not put these thoughts into practice in the seventies.

[Gierek:] Sir, we will still have the opportunity to talk about the significant changes made to the party under my secretary. I can only say that I regret very much that in 1948 Gomulka's allies did not have enough strength to support his concept of delaying reunification. Unification, I would add with all responsibility, was imposed in Moscow. Stalin then acted like a man who has less and less time and has to unify all socialist countries, transform them into one fashion at a predetermined time. From the point of view of Stalinism, the unification of the party was a great success, while from the point of view of socialism, as it can be seen years later, it was a great failure. Its effects will be felt by a whole generation now. Unfortunately, I am making these considerations too late, but today I am fully aware that it was a great mistake.

[Rolicki:] I think Stalin would have crushed anyone who resisted his concept, and the PPS was undoubtedly doomed in one form or another to annihilation on the day the Yalta conference ended.

[Gierek:] I agree, but regret.... [latter ellipsis is by Gierek himself]

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 51-52) (IMG)

'Stalinism', Gierek said, was an 'original sin'. Indeed, Gierek stated:

Throughout the entire time of People's Poland, the party was also burdened with the original sin of Stalinism, which the communist movement did not want to get rid of at first and then could not very much. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 49) (IMG)

Gierek also spoke in defense of the treasonous 'Polish Communist Party' (KPP), which had supported the MI6-backed pro-Nazi coup of Pilsudski, and had thus been thoroughly purged by the Soviets during the Great Purge. In slandering Stalin as 'murderous', Gierek said:

A year later, the Party was dissolved and its Central [Committee] activist was murdered on Stalin's orders. I believe that the KPP was one of the most severely experienced communist parties in history.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

The Titoization speech and policy line of the 20th CPSU congress brought Gierek the hope, because new Titoization changes were going to come:

I was, like everyone else, shocked by the 20th Congress. But I never counted myself as an orphan after the genius of Stalin. After September 17, which made a tremendously negative impression on me years ago, I never really shook off. The sediment of distrust remained forever. It didn't have any political significance, of course, but it did matter to me. Therefore, I will confess that I read Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress not only with being grilled but also with hope. For I thought that this was not the end of the changes, but only the tip of the iceberg, and after the revelations, deeper changes must come. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 44-45) (IMG)

The 1956 colour revolution brought elevated him in the Polish Party as well:

[Rolicki:] Your further promotions are connected with the spring of 1956.

[Gierek:] Yes, I became the secretary of the Central Committee at the 6th Plenum, after the 20th Congress and the death of Bierut.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 44) (IMG)

Unsurprisingly, Edward Gierek's social base lied in the white collar elements:

Edward Gierek ... draws his strength from his ... administration of Poland's major industrial center, the province of Katowice. Gierek has grouped around him discontented "technocrats," young party bureaucrats, and ideologically unassailable elements seeking economic and social reform. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

At the same time, his position in one of Poland's major industrial centers inevitably put upon him the pressure of the Polish proletarians living in that industrialized zone. In other words, this representative of the white collar elements was also significantly under the pressure of, and coopted by, the agents of the proletariat emanating from the Katowice zone. This led Gierek to adopt the line of a 'compromise candidate', the midpoint politician serving as the agent of the bureaucrats but also to a large extent coopted to serve the proletariat.

With the outbreak of the Titoist colour revolution in Poland, the Gestapo agent Gomulka rose to power and brought with him numerous fascist Home Army infiltrators such as Mieczyslaw Moczar, who gradually rose to become the head of Gomulka's intelligence service. Edward Gierek, who would later rise to become the General-Secretary of the Party, admitted the intelligence collaboration between Moczar and the MI6 front 'Home Army'. Gierek remarked:

on the wave of repairing the wrongs of the Home Army milieu, Moczar recruited several figures who were important in this circle.. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

It is worth reminding that there is a difference between recruiting enemy agents so that they stab the imperialist enemy in the back vs. recruiting enemy agents so that they can enter and hence infiltrate the Polish intelligence service more easily. Since we know that Moczar was one of the Titoist elements who rose to power through the 1956 colour revolution, it should be obvious that the collaboration with the Home Army was for pro-Home Army objectives. Gierek also stated:

Moczar ... tried to reach an agreement with representatives of the Home Army movement. In this way, he created a broad platform for the cooperation of the war generation. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 65) (IMG)

As can be seen, Moczar was a collaborationist with the British secret service via the Home Army, the terrorist army that attack kolkhoz peasants, the terrorist army that closely allied with the Ukrainian fascist butchers of the Poles as early as 1946, the terrorist army that collaborated so extensively with the Gestapo and Japanese fascist secret services, the terrorist army that carried out pogroms against the Yiddish people so to expel them to Palestine so that they shall become the pawns of the Zionist settler-colonial project, the army that, without coordinating with the Soviets, launched the Warsaw Uprising ostensibly to 'fight' 'against' the Nazis but actually to help the Nazis break the spirit of the Polish nation, to wipe out the heroes of Warsaw, and to gain the political capital for extended MI6-AK-Gestapo presence in post-war Poland.

The CIA too confirmed:

The most vociferous of the two major groups of rightist challengers is the hard-line nationalistic, and anti-Semitic group led by former interior minister Mieczyslaw Moczar. Paradoxically, Moczar's faction has strong links to Gomulka. It derives from the "native" Communists or "partisans" who, under Gomulka's leadership, formed the core of the party in Poland during World War II. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA,

Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

As late as 1968, the CIA reported:

Like the early Gomulka, Moczar prefers a nationalistic party and was an early opponent of the party's "Muscovite" wing. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

Furthermore, as shown previously in C13S4.6_ (same quote repeated here), Moczar had risen to power during the 1940s with the assistance of Gomulka:

Gomulka ... had also built up a personal staff among the ... party leadership, who reflected his outlook completely. That group by this included **Zenon Kliszko**, **Marian Spychalski**, Wladyslaw Bienkowski, Alexander Kowalski, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, **Micyslaw Moczar**, Marian Baryla, Ignacy Korczynski, and others. Several of them had charge of important spheres of activity in the party – Spychalski, for example, in the armed forces, Kliszko in party cadres, Kowalski in youth organizations, Moczar in the police and Bienkowski in the cultural sphere. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY – Gomulka and Polish Communist, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 23. Bold added.) (IMG{Poland})

As confirmed by Gierek, Moczar courted around himself the intelligentsia and mythologized himself as a 'great' wartime partisan leader:

Within a few years, [Moczar] created a legend around himself of a great partisan leader, and then the creator of the veterans' movement. (...). With the pen – as it was commonly believed – Zukrowski wrote "The Colors of the Fight", later filmed by Passendorfer. The book became reading and had a dozen or so editions, the film, although mediocre, did not leave the screens. Then, ... using quite cheap nationalist phrases, [Moczar] gained influence in artistic circles. Like a great patron of culture (and after March '68, while retaining his function in the ZBoWiD, he became the secretary of the Central Committee overseeing the army and the Ministry of the Interior), shining prizes and praise, flirting with smiles, gathered around him actors, significant writers, including Zukrowski, Bartelski and others. The spread of guerrilla "ideology" will someday hopefully be an interesting topic for historians.. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

The CIA too confirmed that Moczar was on the side of the intelligentsia and the white-collar elements:

Moreover, [Moczar] has courted and won some of the same elements that would be more naturally allied with Gierek if they were in Katowice, i.e., the "technocrats," managers, and even the youth and intellectuals. But his call for change is unaccompanied by a discernible program, and it appeals mainly to those who cannot see beyond their own frustrated ambitions. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

Moczar has led the way in appealing to Polish pride in wartime resistance, exploiting to the full his role in it. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report,

CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 5) (IMG)

Historical phenomena do not suddenly pop out of nowhere. Considering the fact that Moczar was betraying the revolutionary forces after World War II, it is not at all improbable that he was betraying the revolutionary forces during World War II as well.

The Titoist colour revolution made the MI6 agent and AK-collaborationist Moczar the deputy chief of the Interior Ministry:

After his return to power, Gomulka forgave [Moczar] for this betrayal. Moczar appeared in the central arena a few years after October as the deputy minister of the Interior Ministry responsible for security.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

Numerous Gestapo spies, Home Army terrorists, American-Israeli intelligence agents, and MI6 operatives were catapulted into the high ranks of the Polish state, as a result of the MI6-backed 1956 Titoist colour revolution. They gained prominent positions in the intelligence service, the security apparatus, and vital economic sectors.

The British spy Konni Zilliacus freely travelled to Poland and was allowed by Gomulka to gather intelligence. His intelligence-gathering mission, his studies on the conditions in the Eastern European countries, allowed him to write a book titled 'A New Birth of Freedom?: World Communism after Stalin'. I did not spend the time to read the whole book, but I read parts of it. The book actually did not detail his entire intelligence assessments, but did, as the title suggests, happily conclude that Titoization was emerging victorious in much of

Eastern Europe. The mere fact that Konni Zilliacus was welcomed by the Gomulka group in Poland is itself a strong evidence of the MI6 connections of the Gomulka group.

There was also for example a woman named Blanka Kaczorowska. As confessed by Witold Pronobis, the founder of a special research department of the CIA media Radio Free Europe, she was a Gestapo spy during World War II. Pronobis stated:

In Kalkstein's spying network, Blanka Kaczorowska, his fiancée and later wife (they got married in November 1942, i.e. at the time when they deliberately began their cooperation with the Gestapo), played a significant and particularly criminal role. Until the beginning of March 1944, she was active in the Second Department (information and intelligence) of the Home Army Headquarters and, unrecognized as a Gestapo agent, denounced more people. About twenty officers and soldiers in total.

She withdrew from work in the underground on her own, justifying her decision with an increasingly visible pregnancy. It is known that she maintained close, friendly contacts with some of the Home Army officers handed over to the Gestapo! On her account, Lt. Col. Władysław Szczekowski "Leszczyca" and "Stanisław" from the 2nd Division of the Home Army Headquarters. A day later, his secretary Wanda Woycicka "Dorotka" was captured on a Warsaw street, soon shot in the Pawiak prison.

Also in December 1943, due to the denunciation by Kaczorowska, a dozen or so employees of the Study Bureau of the Second Headquarters of the Home Army, including Irena and Janusz Wituski, Halina Skierska, Maria Dziubakowa, Maria Ike-Dunikowska, Natalia Rykowska, Eryk and Jadwiga Scharfenberg, were captured. It was Kaczorowska who denounced Karol Trojanowski "Radwan", the head of the Western Department of the offensive intelligence ("Stall"), who was her lead officer. This betrayal had further tragic consequences, as "Radwan" could not stand the brutal interrogations and revealed to the interrogators of the Gestapo other people involved in the work of the Polish underground.

The last victim of Kaczorowska was Dr. Jadwiga Krasicka from the Industrial and Economic Intelligence of the Home Army. Almost all of the people denounced by Kaczorowska died in torture rooms in Pawiak or in Szucha. After a cruel investigation, many took further victims ...

(Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (IMG)

The charismatic head of the Home Army, General Stefan Grot-Rowecki, was handed over to Germany by the Poles: Eugeniusz Świerczewski, Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein. "The first was also liquidated by the Home Army, I talked to Kalkstein when he was lying on his deathbed, and fate took cruel revenge on Kaczorowska" – writes Witold Pronobis especially for "Focus Historia". Historian and former journalist of Radio Free Europe, and at the same time a relative of the general, he tracked his traitors for several dozen years. Here is his investigation report. (Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (IMG)

Many genuinely anti-Nazi elements within the Polish Home Army were systematically exterminated so that the Polish Home Army would be sufficiently infiltrated and thus fully hijacked by the pro-Nazi terrorists loyal to the MI6, an intelligence service that was by then the ally of the Nazi secret service. During the Bierut era, the Gestapo spy Blanka Kaczorowska had been arrested for her crimes against Poland and was serving a prison sentence:

In 1945, Blanka Kaczorowska ... found her father in Lodz, Jan Kaczorowski, who was employed in the Lodz military judiciary. Through her father, she met a judge, then the owner of a private law firm, Roman Rawicz-Vogel. Although he was much older than her, after a few weeks she stayed with him and introduced her friends as her husband. In 1948, they moved to Warsaw and lived in a house purchased by her father at 15 Bachmacka Street. While still in Lodz, she began university studies at the Faculty of Humanities, which she graduated from in Warsaw. She joined the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) and was active in the "Życie" Academic Union of Young Struggle. After graduating, she found a job at the State Research Institute of Folk Art.

She was arrested when the management of the institute decided to send her to study doctoral studies in Prague. She was detained in December 1952 on charges of collaboration and agent collaboration with the Gestapo. Soon her trial was held, which ended with a life imprisonment.

(Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (IMG)

The 1956 Titoist colour revolution brought the Gestapo spy Blanka Kaczorowska out of prison and allowed her

to infiltrate into and earn income from the Polish intelligence service. Through the Polish secret service agencies, she was also able to install herself in charge of such critically sensitive economic sectors as the 'Import-Export Center for Chemicals', which even till today continues to be one of the top Polish conglomerates:

However, [Blanka Kaczorowska] only stayed for 5 years and left the walls of the prison in Fordon near Bydgoszcz in 1958.

She agreed to a close and loyal cooperation with the Security Service, proving her in her cell by eagerly reporting on her fellow prisoners.

At the end of June 1959, she became a secret paid associate of Department II (responsible for counterintelligence) as agent "Katarzyna". Since her file was destroyed in 1982, I have not been able to recreate the exact nature of her collaboration, the people she denounced and the tasks she performed, also later in France. From 1949 to 1968 (with a break due to the arrest and imprisonment in 1953-1958),

Kaczorowska and her son lived in Warsaw in the aforementioned house at ul. Bachmacka, together with the family of his brother Włodzimierz (he died in 1975). Later her daughter-in-law also moved in.

Sister Irena, 8 years younger than Blanka, moved to Switzerland at the end of the 1960s and lived with her husband in Geneva.

Cooperation with the services also allowed Kaczorowska to find attractive jobs almost immediately after her release from prison. First, it was CIECh, i.e. Import-Export Center for Chemicals at the Pow^zzkowska [zone] in Warsaw.

After a year she moved to the National Institute of Industrial Design (ul. Swi^ztokrzyska 20), and a few months later to "Orbis". It was there, while working at the Foreign Tourist Service Department (ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 40), that she became involved with the communist counterintelligence. Apparently, the type of tasks assigned to her changed over time, which in 1965 caused her to move to work as the main secretary at the "Foto-Kino-Film" Import and Export Headquarters (18 Foksal Street). (Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (IMG)

The rest of Moczar's team also was elevated in its positions. Referring to "Moczar and his allies," the CIA reported that in 1959:

Gomulka, believing he could control them [Moczarists] on the basis of old loyalties, brought them into his regime to help with serious economic and administrative problems. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

With the installation of MI6 and Gestapo agents at the helm of the Polish intelligence, military, and economy, the way was opened for the front companies of American intelligence and US finance capital to 'invest' in Poland. Indeed, the US State Department emphasized the MI6 Titoist colour revolution in Poland created a new 'atmosphere in official United States-Polish relations' especially in 'informational ... fields' (i.e. intelligence sharing) and 'exchange of persons' (i.e. sending more American 'diplomatic' corps to Poland) so to 'keep open our channels of contact':

The events in Poland in October 1956 and the advent to power of the Gomulka regime afforded the United States opportunities to pursue policies designed to help sustain the Polish people in their struggle against the domination of the Soviet Union and world communism. In the past four years the United States has concluded with Poland a series of PL 480 sales agreements totaling \$365.3 million. In addition, a total of \$61 million in credits has been extended through the Export-Import Bank. The Polish people are aware of and appreciate this aid which has been of direct benefit to them. Of equal importance is the fact that our aid helps to create an atmosphere in official United States-Polish relations, such as those in the informational and exchange of persons fields, and thus to keep open our channels of contact with the Polish people. By and large our policy towards Poland and specially our aid to the Polish people enjoys the support of public and Congressional opinion, including the support of the Polish-American community in the United States. (SUBJECT: Restoration of Trade Agreement Benefits to Imports from Poland: Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower, Washington, September 6, 1960. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960', Vol. 10, Part 2, US Department of State, p. 293) (IMG)

The 1956 Titoist colour revolution in Poland, having installed Mossad agents such as Spychalski, also directly benefited the Mossad in the Zionist migration to Israel. An intelligence document from the Mossad station in

Warsaw, dated February 19, 1957, confirms that the 'abolition of Stalinism' in Poland allowed for the Zionist mass migration to Israel:

Katz states that the facts about mass immigration from Poland can no longer be kept quiet, but the wording of the publicity should be carefully controlled. It should be stressed that after the abolition of Stalinism, the reunion of families, which was arbitrarily stopped seven years ago, once again became feasible. However people leaving Poland, where private property was abolished, leave penniless. Immigration must not be used as proof that Poland is antisemitic. Jews leave because they want to go to the Jewish State and live as Jews. They also fear that reactionary and antisemitic elements may again succeed in putting a stop to reunion of families. (Coded Tel. 165, Inc.: 130.09/2306/12, 'K. Katz (Warsaw) to the East European Division', February 19, 1957. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol. 12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 – March 1957, Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, p. 410) (IMG{PD – Post-1953 Migration to Israel})

C20S16. Economic Revisionist Policies in Poland

*** IMG-All- {Poland}

The MI6-installed Titoist government of Gomulka embarked upon a policy of de-emphasized the heavy industry:

The new government of Wladyslaw Gomulka promised modification of the system and changes in the development strategy. Consumer goods received a larger share of the national product, and some quantities of grain and food were imported from the West. State control was mitigated by giving limited policy input to enterprises, and the rate of investment was reduced. (Country Studies: Poland, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Sponsored by US Department of the Army, Glenn E. Curtis, October 1992) (IMG)

Agriculture, furthermore, was decollectivized:

Among the reform measures of 1956, the ... significant lasting change was the decollectivization of agriculture. (Country Studies: Poland, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Sponsored by US Department of the Army, Glenn E. Curtis, October 1992) (IMG)

And:

a lively debate occurred on so-called "market socialism" (Country Studies: Poland, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Sponsored by US Department of the Army, Glenn E. Curtis, October 1992) (IMG)

Regarding the decentralization of the economy in Poland, the CIA reported:

The most extensive reorganization of the central governmental structure in the Satellites has occurred in the Polish government. Since the uprising of October 1956 a number of central staff offices have been dissolved, the State Planning Commission has been abolished, and a new and smaller commission with considerably reduced functions has been formed to take its place. The Council of Ministers was reorganized, special committees were established to handle special problems, and an Economic Council was set up. (REORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES 1956, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), October 14, 1957, p. 8) (IMG)

Further details of the decentralization are provided by US intelligence as follows:

In reorganizing the Polish Council of Ministers, bureaus as well as branch specialists of industry attached to the deputy premiers were eliminated. At the same time, 3 temporary organizations were created and attached to the Council, 1 for industrial production, 1 for building and transportation, and 1 for agricultural production and rural problems. In addition, special committees were established for investment plans, government housing, water economy, and plan technology.

Effective on 1 January 1957 an Economic Council was formed under the Polish Council of Ministers.

The Economic Council is composed of 35 members (prominent economists and scientists) and will function as a temporary advisory body. The main task of the Economic Council is the preparation of a "Polish model of a socialist economy." It will deal with both current and long-range economic problems. According to one of the deputy chairmen, these problems will include such questions as the "autonomy and decentralization" of enterprises; a reform of the present system of prices, wages, and incentives; the comparative and appropriate rates of growth in the various branches of the national economy; and the possibilities of and limits to a rise in the standard of living. The first plenary meeting of the Economic

Council took place on 9 February 1957.

The Polish government recently abolished the Ministry of State Control and established in its place a Supreme Control Chamber subordinated to the Sejm, or to its inner group when the Sejm is not in session, rather than to the Council of Ministers. The objective of this change is to broaden state control to include checking by the legislative branch (the Sejm) on administrative decisions and decrees as well as on the executive branch of government (the Council of Ministers).

The Polish Council of Ministers in the latter half of 1956 transferred some of its prerogatives to the individual ministries. Ministers may not exceed planned production costs and losses and make certain changes in the investment plan, within limits ... Banks also were given additional responsibilities by the Council for controlling wage funds in order to prevent excessive expenditures attributed to "loosened wage discipline" on the part of some lower level supervisors.

(REORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES 1956, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), October 14, 1957, p. 9) (IMG)

A number of ministries in Poland, such as the Ministries of Forestry, the Food Industry, Internal Trade, and State Agricultural Farms, have undergone reorganization since mid-1956. In foreign trade, import-export companies such as Polimex (machinery) and Varimex (miscellaneous equipment and consumer goods) are being replaced by individual firms which will be "state controlled" but will have more operational freedom than their predecessors. In addition, the Ministry of Internal Trade has established local boards of trade in each of six cities to supervise local trade enterprises. In larger towns, municipal boards of trade will be established to handle local trade matters. Finally, a new draft law has been drawn up which provides for the merger of 10 economic ministries into 5 ministries.

The extensive reorganization of the Polish government illustrates the intention of present Polish leaders to focus the reorganization on their own specific needs rather than to follow automatically the Soviet pattern of development. In this manner, central bureaus attached to deputy premiers were abolished, the State Planning Commission was reduced in influence, and an Economic Council was set up to develop a Polish "model" of socialism.

(REORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES 1956, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), October 14, 1957, pp. 9-10) (IMG)

C20S17. The 1956 Titoization Speech; The Effects on East Germany

*** IMG-All-{GDR}

The East German communists – including their leaders – opposed Khrushchev's Titoization agenda:

The instinctive response of the East German leaders therefore was to resist de-Stalinization. They experienced some initial confusion because some formal agreement with the Soviet denunciations of Stalin was required of them but quickly recovered and took the general line that the policies of the GDR were basically correct and that any tendency toward the "cult of personality" had been eliminated by 1953. This ... did not entirely satisfy the Party rank and file or the public, but, with only nominal steps to rehabilitate purged Communist leaders and political prisoners, the regime managed to keep unrest within manageable limits. ('TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT', CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

The Titoization speech provided the psychological warfare and media warfare weapons required to launch the colour revolutions in Poland and Hungary. While East Germany did not experience a colour revolution, elements of colour revolutionary unrest could nonetheless be seen in it:

unrest continued to be manifested by the ideological ferment among intellectuals and students... ('TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT', CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 27) (IMG)

The colour revolutionary elements in East Germany created the pressure from below with which to impose the return of some purged Titoists back to power. It also brought to power some intellectuals who had ties to the Kautskyite Second International intelligence agents of West Germany, and who also had ties to the MI6 colour revolutions in Poland and Hungary:

The admission to the central committee of the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (SED) of three former opponents of First Secretary Walter Ulbricht's policies may be designed to appease the restive intellectual element by giving it greater representation in high party circles. The

most prominent of the three is Franz Dahlem, former politburo member who was once regarded as Ulbricht's principal opponent in the party. The other two are Hans Jendretzky, former Berlin party boss, and Alexander Abusch, leading East German intellectual. All three men were publicly criticized by the party in 1952 -53.

These appointments do not necessarily presage any fundamental concessions to dissident elements demanding more freedom, as Dahlem, at least, appears to have been intimidated into supporting Ulbricht's policies. Ulbricht, in his speech to the central committee meeting last week, sharply rejected the concept of national Communism, once espoused by Dahlem, and declared that East Germany would not follow the Yugoslav pattern.

The ferment among intellectuals and students and their demands for more freedom are causing the regime serious concern. One group, led by a university professor who was arrested in late November 1956, reportedly had contacts with intellectuals in Hungary and Poland and with Social Democrats in German with a view toward encouraging changes in East Germany.

(FORMER OPPONENTS OF ULBRICHT ADMITTED TO EAST GERMAN PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE. In: Central Intelligence Bulletin, CIA, February 5, 1957, p. 6) (IMG)

All such Titoization changes were resisted by Ulbricht and his faction, as confirmed by the above documents. The fact that East Germany had a large industrial working class base made it easier for the communists to resist revisionism and Titoization. In the field of economics, there was a shift towards economic revisionism, decentralization in particular, but this too was met with a powerful resistance, thanks to the large industrial working class base that existed in East Germany. Decentralization occurred in this context through the setting up of the State Planning Commission as a separate bureaucratic body of its own, instead of a body subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Thus, a dual bureaucracy was established, and, as is well-known, bureaucratic proliferation is a means of sowing economic chaos, sabotage, and corruption. The CIA reported:

East Germany received first consideration. In May 1956 the State Planning Commission, which previously had functioned as an organ of the Council of Ministers, was set up as a separate legal entity. ('TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT', CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 25) (IMG)

State planning mechanisms were torn apart into smaller organizations and hence proliferating more bureaucracy:

Additional organizational measures specifically taken to long-term planning included the following: (a) the establishment of a Central Supply Commission for Mineral Resources (under a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers) to check and coordinate assessments of the raw material potential of the GDR in order to provide a better basis for long-range economic planning and (b) the convening of an ad hoc commission of specialists by the Chairman of the State Planning Commission to oversee the utilization of economic reserves – that is, materials and production capacity. ('TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT', CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 25) (IMG)

However, as confirmed by the CIA, the GDR managed to slow down decentralization:

The East German regime postponed the delegation of additional responsibilities to enterprise management and justified the delay on the ground that thorough study of the operational problems of industry should precede further reform. In May 1956 an ad hoc commission was set up under Fritz Selbmann, Commissioner for Industry and Transport and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to study supply and inventory problems in industry, particularly excessive stocks of raw materials and semi-finished and finished goods.

The findings submitted to the Party Central Committee by this Commission were reportedly highly critical of the discrepancy between plan targets and market demand for products, the lack of sufficient advance notice of orders for special products, the failure of the GDR to acquire a continuous supply of critically needed materials from imports, excessive drains on the capital of enterprises by the government, and similar problems of a fundamental character. Moreover, the Commission allegedly concluded that these conditions could not be improved without altering some of the basic concepts of central planning and permitting greater flexibility in the operations of individual industries. The Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, however, did not immediately act upon the recommendations of the ad hoc Commission, and the practical effect was to defer reform at the enterprise level indefinitely. Likewise, no was made to enhance the economic role of the local organs

of the state administration as recommended by the 25th Plenum, although routine functions were in a few instances transferred to them on a piecemeal basis. In view of the de-Stalinization in the USSR, the Peoples Chamber of the GDR began with great fanfare to consider new legislation for "continuing the democratization" of government by increasing the powers of local organs. On 21 August 1956, two bills dealing, respectively, with the relationship between the Peoples Chamber and the local legislative assemblies and with the regulation of working methods of the administrative organs were given a first reading in the Peoples Chamber. Contrary to the usual custom of the Chamber, the bills were sent to committee in order to provide an opportunity for widespread publicity, and no serious attempt was made to enact them until after the uprisings in Poland and Hungary. Thus the leaders of the GDR were clearly more interested in propagandizing the public about their "democratic" intentions than in really enhancing the economic role of the local organs.

(‘TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, pp. 26-27) (IMG)

In East Germany:

After some initial panic [about the Hungarian colour revolution] they [i.e. East German communists] joined with the USSR in rejecting national Communism and in reaffirming Soviet Bloc solidarity. They also conducted an active campaign against the doctrines and experience of Poland and Yugoslavia and took vigorous measures to repress dissidents and "revisionists" in the GDR. (‘TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 27) (IMG)

At the same time though, the MI6-backed colour revolution led by the anti-German chauvinist and Gestapo agent Gomulka meant that the Polish exports of coal and coke were reduced, and thus the East German economy was hit. Gomulka had helped his Gestapo and West German Nazi friends by stabbing East Germany in the back.

Regarding the impact of the Polish colour revolution, the CIA reported:

Loss of vital imports from within the Soviet Bloc caused dislocations in the East German economy. The reduction in Polish shipments of hard coal and coke, for example, contributed to underfulfillment of production targets for steel, which in turn disrupted production schedules in other economic sectors. The October uprisings obviously were not the sole cause of the economic difficulties experienced by the GDR. (‘TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 27) (IMG)

The disruption of coal supplies and the weakening of the East German economy weakened the East German communist faction and thus strengthened the Titoist and Kautskyite enemies of the East German communists. This allowed for greater lobbying power in favor of economic decentralization. On the other hand, since there already was a strong enough industrial blue-collar working class base in East Germany, the East German communists were able to partially mitigate these revisionist lobbies. Thus, East German leaders pretended to be interested in decentralizing the economy (and proliferating bureaucracy), but did not actually go forward with it as much as desired by the Kautskyites and Titoists:

The regime therefore took an ambivalent position on management reform after the October 1956 uprisings. Although adhering to the "hard line" ideologically, the leaders pretended to have some interest in workers' councils and other liberal innovations, without any intention of making serious use of these reforms. They also resumed implementation of the reform proposals of the 25th Plenum and attempted to convince the public that their efforts would adequately "decentralize" and "democratize" the economic structure. (‘TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 27) (IMG)

C20S18. On the Construction of the Berlin Wall Stalin once advised Pieck and Ulbricht:

The demarcation line between East and West Germany should be considered a border--and not just any border, but a dangerous one. We need to strengthen the defense of this border. The Germans will guard the first line of defense, and we will put Russian troops on the second line. Agents of Western countries are moving around the German Democratic Republic all too freely. They can decide to use some extreme

measures and kill you or Comrade [Vasilii] Chuikov. This has to be taken into account. Therefore, we need strong border defenses. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 2. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

During the era of Khrushchev, there was an effort at reducing the number of Red Army troops in East Germany, and to leave East German People's Democracy defenseless against foreign aggression by cross-border infiltration of terrorists. In this midst, East Germany needed to come up with relatively cheap means of preventing foreign aggression by cross-border infiltration of terrorists. The German Democratic Republic had every legal and moral right to surround itself with defense barriers, be it with barbed wire or with walls, against foreign aggression by cross-border infiltration of terrorists. While the building of defense barriers is a morally and legally legitimate physical defense policy, the question is: whether the building of the wall, as opposed to barbed wire, helped the enemy more in terms of psychological warfare? Undoubtedly, the wall was of great use to the media of the US-led bloc for the purpose of anti-communist propaganda. However, establishing barbed wire instead of the wall would have been no better in terms of the psychological warfare since it would have been picked up by Western propaganda outlets as "evidence" that East Berlin was a giant "concentration camp" "surrounded by barbed wire" "in a manner reminiscent of the Nazi era." While barbed wire was used in some areas of East Germany, barbed wire was, in terms of psychological warfare, not much less detrimental than the wall, and in terms of physical defense, was obviously less effective than the wall.

C20S19. Titoization in Bulgaria

In the agrarian countries, the countries with a low blue-collar worker population, it was much easier to oust the communists. The peasants had favorable attitudes towards communism in many of these countries but owing to their petit-bourgeois attitudes, they were usually passive in the face of Titoization. Hence, by 1954, the Chervenkov faction began to weaken:

The personal position of Vulko Chervenkov has become rather delicate. In order to replace those who had disappeared from the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party [during the purge of Kostov's group] he had to appoint men who had been in the interior resistance, by far the most numerous and the youngest. The President of the Council has thus an important clique against him. The entire secretariat is here: Todor Zhivkov; Kruchev; Ganey, eliminated from the Politburo in May 1949 and again in March 1954; and Boris Taskov, who, because of continuous disputes with General Ivan Mikhaylov, was dismissed from the Presidency of the "Food and State Reserves" Administration in May 1952. In the Politburo, the clique includes Yugov and Zhivko Dzinkov, mentioned above; Rayko Damyanov, washed out after the Delyana affair; Georgi Chankov, a member of the Clandestine Politburo in March 1944, an ally of Yugov's; and Staykov and Prakhov, recent arrivals on the scene. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

By the time of the twentieth CPSU Congress, the Yugoslav intelligence agent Yugov rose to power:

For the Yugoslavs, the coming to power of Yugov is a success.. (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 8) (IMG)

The collaboration of Yugov with the Yugoslav fascists is well-known. Around the same time, the Yugoslav agent Kostov was rehabilitated; Yugov and Kostov had never been real enemies. Todor Zhivkov was the kind of a counter-revolutionary who was able to so easily flip-flop and alter his rhetoric in favor of anyone he was talking to. In his speeches, it was hard to find an actual real point made, and there was so little criticism and self-criticism. Zhivkov was excellent at talking for hours upon hours without actually making any real point. In the cases in which he did make a point, it was stereotypically either aimed at attacking anti-Titoists for opposing the Yugoslav regime, or was aimed at slandering Dimitrov as a 'Titoist' and denouncing his 'naivete' for supposedly allowing Bulgaria to be devoured by Yugoslavia.

C20S20. Why the Cold War Continued

Why would Anglo-American imperialism ever continue the conflict against a country dominated by a comprador bourgeois state? Why continue the Cold War, when the socialist state in the territory of the former

Soviet Union was overthrown?

Short answer: class struggles never end; when communism becomes the order, one shall continue to struggle against bourgeois restoration; when imperialism dominates, finance capital continues the class struggle for retaining such dominance; when political fighters are losing, they try to lose as little as possible, and when they are winning, they try to win as much as possible; there is never enough with class struggles.

Long answer: there are several reasons inherent to class struggles in general. Firstly, note that the dictatorship of a class is the quantitative dominance of a certain faction over a certain state; a dictatorship of the proletariat cannot possibly be the rule of the proletariat over all the aspects of a state but constitutes the decisive and strict dominance of the proletariat over the overwhelming majority of a state; in a dictatorship of the proletariat, the anti-proletarian classes inevitably catapult their intelligence agents into the ranks of the workers' state thus preventing the absolute 100% control over the state by the proletariat. Similarly, in a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, the comprador bourgeoisie do not have absolute 100% control over the comprador bourgeois state, but rather the proletarian class and the kolkhoz peasants catapult their communist agents to the ranks of the comprador state apparatus, thus creating a powerful opposition intelligence network against the comprador bourgeois forces within the comprador state. Hence, while the Titoist faction had gained the margin over the communist faction, it was not at all the case that the communist faction had ceased to exist. There still existed a chance that the communist faction would be able to resurge back to decisive dominance. The communist faction was responsible for diverting the funds of the Titoist state in Eurasia towards funding the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces worldwide instead of allowing those funds to be used by the Titoist state in Eurasia for the funding Titoist projects. As such, the communist faction continued to pose a menace. Eurasia had vast amounts of productive forces some of which were still under the influence of the communists. Those productive forces too had to, from the imperialist viewpoint, be dismantled so that Anglo-American finance capital's exploitation of the resources and the dismantlement of the productive forces could easily proceed.

To the contingent planners of the US-led bloc of imperialist powers, the overthrow of socialism and the establishment of the comprador bourgeoisie was not really the end, but was rather a beginning. The Anglo-American imperialists were well-trained in the science of contingent planning, meaning that they made plans against not only what already was happening, but also what may have potentially occurred. There was the potential that the proletariat would swiftly conquer power in Eurasia hence to reinstate the dictatorship of the proletariat; there was the potential that a national-bourgeois force would launch a putsch to overthrow the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie and replace it with a dictatorship of the national bourgeoisie hostile to the interests of the US-led camp. In fact, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the dictatorship of the proletariat was briefly restored, but it was quickly overthrown again. As contingent planners therefore, the imperialists needed not just the overthrow of socialism but also the large-scale sabotage of the productive forces that had developed during the years of socialist development; they also needed the Eurasian heartland – the territory of the former Soviet Union, the largest country in the world with resource self-sufficiency – to be torn asunder, partitioned further and further so that it is easier to dominate; they also needed the culture of the peoples of the former Soviet Union to become further and further corrupt, reactionary, anti-communist, and pro-imperialist. Hence, the Eurasian Titoists, as agents of the CIA-led alliance of imperialist-fascist secret services, not only overthrew socialism and the Soviet Union, but also embarked on the project of sabotaging the productive forces of the Eurasian Heartland, pave the way for Eurasia's shrinkage and partition, and to sow corruption wheresoever they could find room for corruption.

The fact that the Titoist faction had a proverbial 51% stake, rather than an 80% stake let alone a 99% stake, over the state meant that while the state was dominated by the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie, there still existed a communist faction that had a proverbial 49% stake, thus being immensely capable of lobbying for pro-communist policies. This immense lobbying power which the communist faction had against the Titoist policies of the dominant comprador bourgeoisie obviously led to major discrepancies and self-contradictions in the Eurasian foreign policies and internal policies. For example, after the communist political forces compelled Nikita Khrushchev to place their nuclear warhead in Cuba, the MI6's 'good' boy Nikita took his revenge on the communists by striking a deal with American intelligence behind Guevara's and Castro's back, removing the nuclear warheads and allowing 'UN inspectors' (read: American spies) into Cuba to inspect the military intelligence even though Khrushchev knew that these 'inspections' were imperialist espionage. The Red Army militarily funded the Abdel-Nasser faction but so too is it true that the Kremlin conspired to overthrow the United Arab Republic as shall be explained in further detail in C21S2.1. Ultimately, since Eurasia was a dictatorship of the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie, the Titoist faction eventually won in its fight against the communist faction,

and hence Eurasia's economic infrastructure was sabotaged, and Eurasia was partitioned by 1991. Since the Titoist faction in 1956 was only slightly more powerful than the communist faction though, the process of bringing about the collapse of Eurasia took as long as $1991 - 1956 = 35$ years, as opposed to just a few years.

The discrepancies in Eurasia's foreign policy line allowed Maoist propaganda to deliberately conflate the communist faction with the Titoist faction, hence to portray the communist faction as the same as the Titoist faction, hence to portray the communist fighters against the US-led bloc as collaborators with the US-led bloc! The laws of the crises of overproduction dictate that the communist faction would have collaborated with the American imperialists only if there was another power, such as a powerful Nazi Germany revived, that was more a threat to the communist and American imperialist projects, hence to draw the communists in Eurasia and US imperialists into an alliance against this greater threat. However, such a threat was practically non-existent, meaning that according to the laws of the crises of overproduction, Eurasia and the US-led camp would be the two main global rival forces. The rivalry, according to dialectical laws of history, could not possibly be limited to specific geographic areas or specific fields, but stretched onto all the different fields: in every corner of the planet, in the space, in the fields of culture, propaganda, military, intelligence, etc. Worse yet, the Maoist propagandists referred to the communist faction as 'Soviet social imperialist'. In other words, according to Mao and the Maoists, the 'Soviet social imperialists' and the US imperialists – which were the two main rivals – were cooperating with each other in many fields, as opposed to thoroughly confronting one another in all fields. Does that thesis sound familiar? That is the Kautskyite notion of 'ultra-imperialism', the notion that imperialist rivals will not compete with each other, will not launch devastating wars, and instead can come together, cooperate with each other, and form a peaceful harmony of imperialist powers; the implication of this fundamentally anti-'Leninist' thesis is that imperialist wars can be prevented. The global propaganda apparatus of the CIA-backed international Maoist reaction promoted Kautsky's anti-dialectical, anti-historical, anti-materialist, anti-scientific, and anti-communist argument.

C20S21. Why it is Impossible to Lose Hope

Even if one single imperialist power – for example, the United States – conquers the other imperialist powers, defeats all of its major rivals and goes on the path of victory and total dominance of the world, such an imperialist power would be quickly fractured into two imperialist powers, because each of the imperial elites dominating this imperialist power, out of utmost greed, would seek to get power for oneself and not the other imperial elites. Hence, a segment of the imperial elites dominating this imperialist power would defect to the camp of the enemies of this single world-dominating imperialist power and would thereby rally massive parts of this empire with oneself so to pave the way for the partition of this empire. It follows that there cannot ever be a single colonial empire dominating the world.

In the same ways, inter-imperialist alliances quickly break up. The term 'NATO' is ironic because it implies that imperialist France is strategically aligned with Anglo-American-German imperialism, whereas in reality, in spite of appearances to the contrary, French imperialism was unofficially allied to the USSR/Eurasia/Russia and the anti-imperialist forces throughout the Cold War so that French imperialism could defeat its Anglo-American-German imperialist rivals. Even if such an Anglo-American-German imperialist alliance were to take over almost all of the world, before such a global conquest, this Anglo-American-German imperialist alliance would split and these former allies would be rivals. Perhaps -perhaps! – for this reason did Stalin, a few months before the hybrid coup against him, mention this in *The Economic Problems*. He knew that even if the communists begin to lose, and even if the imperialists begin to win, the imperialists then begin to lose and the communists then begin to win. Inter-imperialist rivalry is the primary contradiction that weakens global imperial dominance and allows for the breathing room, the operational freedom, for the cause of the proletariat and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie to rise, exploit inter-imperialist contradictions, and achieve its objectives. The inter-imperialist contradiction, the primary contradiction, allows for the proletarian-bourgeois conflict, the secondary contradiction, to result in the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie – such did Stalin correctly imply in *The Economic Problems*. Therefore no matter how much defeat the proletariat face, they will win thanks to the imperialist bourgeoisie ensuring their own defeat.

C20S22. Revisionism in Mongolia

*** IMG-All- {Mongolia}

Tsedenbal, the Trotskyite adventurer who had pretended to be staunchly pro-Soviet during the Choibalsan years, replaced the latter in 1952, and joined Nikita Khrushchev and other Kremlin Titoists in denouncing

communism under the cover of denouncing 'Stalinism' in 1956. The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress: Under the guidance of early party leaders Horloyn Choybalsan and Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, the principle of democratic centralism was weighted heavily toward its centralizing features, just as it was being applied in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. Purges, reprisals, and political violence in Mongolia mirrored the arbitrary behavior of Stalin. Choybalsan directed his attacks against political foes, rivals, and religious institutions. After Choybalsan's death in 1952 and Tsedenbal's emergence as the top party and government leader, Mongolian politics again followed the Soviet example. Starting in 1956, Tsedenbal initiated an extensive anti-Stalinist, anti-Choybalsan campaign, accusing the party leader of having conducted a "cult of personality" like Stalin. (Country Study: Mongolia, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, sponsored by the US Department of the Army, edited by: Robert L. Worden & and Andrea Matles Savada, June 1989) (IMG)

The Mongolian Party composition also changed during the approximately four decades of Titoist reign in Mongolia. As early as 1970, and probably much earlier, half of Mongolia's Party membership was made up of the intelligentsia and bureaucrats, whereas less than a third of the Party was made up of blue-collar workers. As early as 1968, half of the state legislature was dominated by intelligentsia. The US military colonel Dupuy reported:

There were 48,570 members of the MPRP in 1966, 3,000 of these being candidate-members. This was a significant increase over the figures for 1963, when reportedly the party had 41,015 members and 2,077 candidate-members. Nearly half of the party membership (49 percent) represents government officials. About 30 percent are classified by the party as workers, and the remaining 21 percent as livestock cooperative members. The Party's youth organization, the once dominant Revsomols, still has a larger membership than the parent is today very much a subsidiary organization to the MPRP.

The 48,000-plus members of the MPRP represent a very favored elite, slightly more than 4 percent of the population of 1.1 million. They owe their status to their preferred positions as functionaries of the Soviet-supported Mongolian Communist regime. There is no reason to believe that the overwhelming preponderance of this elite is not most satisfied with the regime. its accomplishments, and its prospects. Because of the nature of the state and the society, the individual careers of the members of this elite are unusually closely tied to the political leadership of the Party and its ties in turn with the USSR. There is no evidence to suggest the likelihood of an early change in the attitude of this elite, whatever the change in its membership.

(Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, 1970, p.

233) (IMG)

In the election of June 1966 to the Great People's Khural, it is claimed that only 27 ballots in opposition were cast. In that Khural, still in office in 1968, reported results indicate that of the 287 members, about half were "workers and peasants" and the rest from the "intelligentsia" (largely government and Party officials and bureaucrats). Nearly 22 percent were women, (see ch. 10, The Governmental System).

(Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 235)

(IMG)

The Mongolian Party adopted the line of the Kremlin Titoists headed by Khrushchev and Gorbachev, and was thus the Party of the revisionist intelligentsia and bureaucrats, and hence the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. By 1990, the revisionist Party and state apparatus had enough corruption and decentralization for the bourgeois state to transition from a state that was socialist in appearance but bourgeois in content, to a state that is bourgeois in appearance and content.