

The History of the USSR & the Peoples' Democracies

Part 5, Chapters 21-24

by
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Sovinform | July 2023

Title: “The History of the USSR & the Peoples’ Democracies”

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Media: Sovinform (sovinform.net)

Originally published: May 2023 2nd Edition (published in July 2023)

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Chapter 21

C21S1. The New Titoization Drive in France's Communist Movement

*** IMG-All-{PCF post-1953}

As a result of the 1956 Titoization speech, quick changes began in the line of the French Communist Party (PCF). The PCF, which had opposed the colonization of Algeria, began to officially support it to a significant extent, just a number of days after the Titoization speech, once the PCF leaders went to Moscow and returned from there:

COMMUNISTS MAY BACK MOLLET GOVERNMENT ON ALGERIA

The French Communist Party (PCF) is seriously considering supporting [the Kautskyite 'Socialist'] Premier Mollet in the National Assembly vote on special powers for Algeria, according to a member of President Coty's staff. The acting secretary general of the Socialist Party believes that the Communists may at least abstain. He comments that the current PCF line stressing "ties between France and Algeria" is an amazing change probably linked with the recent return of Communist leaders from Moscow.

The US embassy believes Mollet's chances are very favorable for winning the vote, which is expected by 13 March. Communist support of Mollet for a strong policy in Algeria would indicate the party's determination to use every device to achieve a popular front. In an effort to get widespread support on this issue, Mollet has been consulting with party leaders from the Communists to the Poujadists. None of the major nongovernment parties has committed itself. However, it is believed that the right-center would be unwilling to bring down the government now, particularly since the government's Algerian policy is much more to its liking than seemed possible when Mollet assumed office. In the event of Communist support, the right-center can also be expected to back the government in an effort to avoid the appearance of a popular front.

(COMMUNISTS MAY BACK MOLLET GOVERNMENT ON ALGERIA. In: CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, 15740205, March 8, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

As part of the Kremlin Titoist project to contain the expansion of the influence of the Abdel-Nasser faction, the Eurasian Titoist ambassador Vinogradov supported the 'French' colonial presence in Algeria so to strengthen American imperialist presence:

MOLLET WINS CONFIDENCE VOTES WITH COMMUNIST SUPPORT

The National Assembly's overwhelming support of Premier Mollet's request for extraordinary powers will give the French government a temporary respite to begin implementation of its Algerian policy.

The government can now be expected to increase its military effort. At the same time it will attempt to win Moslem support by seeking to put into effect its announced program of economic, administrative, and social reform in Algeria.

The Communists, probably believing that the government's policy will end in failure, were willing to reverse their stand on Algerian independence and support the government rather than jeopardize their popular front objective. Soviet ambassador Vinogradov told a high French Foreign Ministry official on 7 March that the USSR supports continued French presence in North Africa. Vinogradov made no reply when the Frenchman asked: "Isn't it because you Russians would prefer to have a weak France in that strategic area rather than let it fall under the influence of the US?"

(MOLLET WINS CONFIDENCE VOTES WITH COMMUNIST SUPPORT. In: CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, 15740205, March 13, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Vinogradov would not have known how to answer that question because the whole point of supporting the 'French' colonization of Algeria was to precisely ensure the continued presence of the Anglo-American and German imperialist domination of Algeria in the name of France.

Enver Hoxha too wrote:

The French Communist Party took an active part in the meeting of the Information Bureau which examined the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It condemned and sternly denounced the betrayal by Tito and his group.

However, after the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's advent to power, vacillations and deviations appeared again in the line of the French Communist Party and the stands of its leaders. These vacillations were apparent as early as 1954, in its attitude towards the liberation war of the Algerian people.

What did the French Communist Party do to assist this war? It waged only a propaganda campaign and nothing more.

(Eurocommunism is Anti-Communism, Hoxha, MIA)

There also came about the revisionist distortion of the concept of popular frontism, and there came the incorrect view that popular frontism and non-sectarian approach to proletarian class struggles was through subordination to the Kautskyite agents of imperialist-fascist secret services, who in France were represented by Mollet and his 'French

Socialists'.

Hence, in line with the Kremlin Titoist emphasis on collaboration with the Kautskyite agents of imperialist-fascist secret services:

Unity of action with the [Kautskyite fake] Socialists was given special emphasis at the congress, and the chief of the visiting Soviet delegation stated in his "directive" the great importance attached to such collaboration.. (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, July 26, 1956, p. 10 of 16) (IMG)

As with virtually every communist party, there came renewed pressure for having intellectuals into the Party:

Thorez ... baited an appeal to intellectuals to join the party by reiterating the "different roads to Socialism" thesis.. (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, July 26, 1956, p. 10 of 16) (IMG)

All of these facts about the partial Titoization of the PCF should not by any means imply that the French Communist Party was at its core, Titoist or revisionist. It is no exaggeration to say that PCF had a glorious history, with the Popular Front of the prewar years, the training of numerous communists and progressives, the leadership of the French Resistance during World War II, the planting of their leaders at – and hence infiltration into – the top ranks of the French imperialist state. The Party also waged a resistance against the Yugoslav regime and the Kremlin Titoists. In fact, the Titoization that occurred in the PCF was clearly under the pressure of the Kremlin Titoists and did not represent the true core of the PCF.

As part of the PCF resistance against the Moscow Titoists:

Thorez ... claimed that nearly 50, 000 new members have joined since January, but added that some recruitment weaknesses exist, particularly among metal and mine workers. He also emphasized the weakness of the Communist youth organization.. (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, July 26, 1956, p. 10 of 16) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha wrote:

As to the leaders of the French Communist Party, such as Thorez, Duclos and others, however, it is a fact that at first they were dismayed at Khrushchev's "secret" report against Stalin and did not accept it.

After this report was published in the Western press, the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party made a statement in which it condemned this report and expressed its reservations about the attacks on Stalin. Thorez personally, told me in regard to this problem: "We sought explanations from the Soviet comrades, they gave them to us, but we are not convinced." I pointed out to Thorez, 'You are not convinced, while we do not agree in the least.' Thus Thorez and the French Communist Party had long been aware of our opinion of the 20th Congress and of the Khrushchevites' slanders against Stalin.

The French and the Italians were like cat and mouse. I had talked with Thorez and Duclos about the stands of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party against the Marxist-Leninist line, in defence of the Titoite revisionists and against our Party. At first, they and the French as a whole seemed to behave well towards us. We stuck to our views and they to theirs. We continued our ceaseless attacks against the Titoites and they seemed to have no trust in Tito. We were on the same course in our stand towards the Italian leaders, too.

(The Khrushchevites, Hoxha)

Not for nothing did Lavrenti Beria despise PCF leader Jacques Duclos:

Another he could not endure was Jacques Duclos, who reminded him of Rakosi: 'reptiles,' he called them. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Hoxha continued:

Prior to the events which brought the split, Comrades Marcel Cachin and Gaston Monmousseau, two glorious veterans of communism, came to our country. Our whole Party and people welcomed them with joy and affection. I had very open and cordial talks with them. They visited our country, spoke to me about it with great sympathy, and wrote in glowing terms about our Party and people in "L'Humanite". Monmousseau also published a very pleasant book about our country. Sitting with me in front of the fire, he told me about the visit he made to Kor?a and his participation with the cooperativists of Kor?a in the grape harvest. In the course of our talk, I asked the author of "Jean Becot", who is from Champagne, the place of famous wines:

"Comrade Monmousseau, what do you think of our wine?"

He replied pince-sans-rire³ "Like vinegar."

I laughed heartily and said:

'You are right, but tell me, what should we do about it?'

Monmousseau went on to speak for a whole hour about wine and this helped me greatly. I listened with admiration to the old man whose cheeks were glowing and eyes sparkling with enthusiasm, who had the colour of the wine of his birthplace, Champagne.

Before we went to the 81 parties' Meeting in Moscow, Maurice Thorez asked to come to our country for a holiday. We welcomed him with great pleasure. We thought (and we were not wrong) that he was sent by the

Soviets to “soften us up”.

When he was on holiday in Durres, I told Thorez about all the vile things the Soviets had done to us.

Maurice listened attentively. He was astounded because he did not know these things. They had hidden everything from him. I spoke about the Bucharest Meeting and our stand at that meeting. He said that they had been informed about the stand of the Party of Labour of Albania at the Bucharest Meeting by the delegation from their party, and since this stand had impressed them, he had set out for Albania with the intention of talking about this question with us. Thorez said that the Bucharest Meeting was useful and did not pronounce himself at all on whether or not it was in order. He did not criticize our stand in Bucharest and when he had heard me out, all he said was:

“Comrade Enver, you must clear up these things they have done to you with the Soviet leadership.”

As to the struggle against Titoism, Maurice Thorez approved everything. We saw him off by ship for Odessa.

In Moscow, before I spoke at the 81 parties’ Meeting, Maurice Thorez invited us to dinner. This time it was obvious that he had come from Khrushchev to persuade us not to speak against the revisionist betrayal at the meeting, but he failed in his mission. We did not accept the mistaken “advice” he gave us.

Maurice Thorez criticized us in the meeting, but in moderate terms. However, after I had spoken, Jeannette Vermeersch, Thorez’s wife, met me and said:

“Comrade Enver, where are you heading on this course you have begun? We do not understand you.”

‘You do not understand us today, but perhaps you will understand us tomorrow,’ I replied.

Everyone knows how things turned out for the French Communist Party. It, too, set out with determination on the revisionist road. It betrayed Marxism-Leninism and, with some nuances, followed the line of Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

(The Khrushchevites, Hoxha)

The full Titoization of the PCF, therefore, was resisted with some success by the Party. In the words of the CIA:

The congress was geared to give incontrovertible evidence of party solidarity despite the effects of Moscow’s de-Stalinization campaign. Maurice Thorez’s re-election as secretary general and the Soviet delegate’s reference to him as a “dear friend” emphasize his continuing leadership. Thorez paid lip service to the value of criticism of the cult of personality, but he stressed that such criticism could not be “transferred mechanically” to the French Communist party. The de-Stalinization drive within the French party thus seems to be successfully checked.. (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, July 26, 1956, p. 10 of 16) (IMG)

However, obviously, there were serious problems that arose. The communists of the PCF, Thorez and Duclos included, had always opposed the colonization of Algeria. This is well-documented and the CIA document cited previously briefly mentions it. Nonetheless, as with every other communist party, the Titoization speech inflicted severe pressure on the PCF to collaborate with the Kautskyites in various fields and not just in the occupation of Algeria. As mentioned before though, the Moscow Titoists wanted the PCF to fully and completely endorse the colonization of Algeria. The fact that, as Hoxha stated, the Party only partially opposed the colonization of Algeria during the mid-1950s is evidence of the factional dispute between the communist and Titoist factions of the PCF. Overall though, the PCF descended into a degree of Titoization. It did recover during the 1960s and the 1970s, and then went down again long later. Either way, what matters is that Moscow Titoist pressures on the PCF pushed it towards an anti-Algerian direction.

C21S2.1. Abdel-Nasser Faction wages Cold War against Moscow Titoists

*** IMG-AII-{UAR}

Imperialist media presents Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Nikita Khrushchev as great ‘friends’ and ‘allies’. Such a portrayal is false. Abdel-Nasser was indeed allied to the anti-imperialist elements that surrounded Nikita Khrushchev and other Kremlin Titoists, but that does not mean that Abdel-Nasser was friends with Nikita Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists per se. On the contrary, Abdel-Nasser was engaged in a bloody cold war against Nikita Khrushchev and the Moscow Titoists; such a bloody cold war against Khrushchev and Co. was unfavorable to Anglo-American interests because Khrushchev and Co. were agents of Anglo-American intelligence; such a bloody cold war was favorable to the weak though significant anti-imperialist elements that surrounded Nikita Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists; such a bloody cold war was indirectly helpful to the weak though significant communist elements in the CPSU, elements which were a minority but which waged intra-Party struggles against the dominant white collar (intelligentsia and bureaucrat) elements that supported Titoism.

In a secret letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Gamal Abdel-Nasser complained that the Eurasians came to Egypt’s aid far too late with regards to 1956 war. When the 1956 war began, Shukri El-Quwwatli – who had been a military ally of Stalin-era USSR and socialist Czechoslovakia – had gone to Moscow to ask for Eurasian assistance to Egypt against the aggressors. There, Quwwatli was mistreated by the Kremlin Titoists and Eurasian aid to Egypt was flatly rejected. Egypt had to face the Anglo-‘Franco’-Israeli aggression on its own, and the Eurasian ultimatum against the aggressors came very late. Here are excerpts of Abdel-Nasser’s letter:

The aggression came at the same time that we were preparing for negotiations in Geneva, on October 29, 1956.

You referred to a speech I gave in Damascus in which I said "We were standing in the face of the tripartite aggression on the battlefield alone, not waiting for anyone's help," but this phrase – as I felt from your speech and your statements – made you upset!

It did not occur to me to underestimate the value of the ultimatum given by Bulganin, the Soviet prime minister at the time, but the fact remains that we were on the battlefield alone. Our soldiers in Sinai were fighting alone, and our army and people were fighting in the streets of Port Sa'id alone.

The visit of Shukri al-Quwatli to Moscow was on October 30, 1956, and he had the opportunity to talk with Bulganin in the presence of a number of Soviet leaders and senior military marshals. I received a letter sent by al-Quwatli specifying your position on the aggression: the Soviet Union is not ready to enter a world war, and on this basis it cannot intervene militarily, even by sending volunteers, and that the most it can do to help us [Egyptians] is to send some equipment to us, along with some technicians!

What I did was; I removed this letter from the file which contained it, and put it in my pocket; Because I did not want anyone whose morale might be affected by reading it to see it, and it returned to its place as one of the state documents after the battle was over.

This document is an honor for us; it is the best proof that we fought, and were not only in the battlefield alone, but we knew that we would remain alone!

The Soviet ultimatum – the effect of which no one can deny – came from Moscow as a surprise to us, after 9 days had passed in which we were on the battlefield alone, and everything – even the Soviet ultimatum – depended on the steadfastness of this people, and their willingness to sacrifice.

It was the matter that necessitated statements – which did not fall from you on the site of contentment – about the truth in the matter of the tripartite aggression; Radio stations that speak in your name, and newspapers published in your countries, began – amid discussions between us and the Syrian Communist Party – thanks to this warning! It was my duty to put the role of the Egyptian people in its rightful place.

We appreciate your position and understand its motives, and it never occurred to us to ask you to enter a world war for us!

You [went on and] accused us of interfering in the internal affairs of others, but also in the affairs of the Soviet Union!

(Cairo-Moscow, Dar ul-Shoruq, Sami Ammareh) (IMG)

Syrian President Shukri El-Quwwatli had been overthrown in a CIA coup in 1949 by Colonel Za'im. A fascist terror state was established. However, later on, democracy was restored, and Quwwatli returned to the scene. Syria by then had been heavily infiltrated by the CIA. This meant that there was a strong chance that another coup against the Syrian democracy was coming. In this midst, Quwwatli advocated Syria's merger with Egypt. Abdel-Nasser knew quite well that economically, such a project was definitely not feasible; the reason why he accepted such an offer though was to assist Quwwatli in the purge of CIA agents in Syria. Thus, the merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (UAR) was not for the purpose of a real integration of those countries because such a project was not feasible – rather it was to undermine CIA-MI6-Mossad interests in Syria. Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists disliked the purge of the CIA-MI6-Mossad elements and so began a hostile policy against the unification of Syria and Egypt. In his letter to Khrushchev, Abdel-Nasser wrote:

As for the Unity [of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic (UAR)], the evidence indicated that the new direction for it did not suit your tendencies and desires. The position of the Communist Party was on Unity; it did not accept the comprehensive consensus of the Syrian people for its establishment, and the communist MP Khaled Bakdash was the only one who preferred to flee, and then we found him resorting to some countries of the socialist bloc. Finally, he stood beside you in the celebration of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party, and began to attack the government of his country [Syria], which caused us anxiety and annoyance: its purpose [i.e. the purpose of the Unity of Egypt and Syria] is to violate the principles of peaceful coexistence in this public way!

It was also an indication of your direction; the Soviet Union, after the Declaration of Unity on February 1, 1958 from Cairo, remained for more than two weeks keen to refrain from expressing its opinion on it.

(Cairo-Moscow, Dar ul-Shoruq, Sami Ammareh) (IMG)

In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev admitted:

On the other hand, we did support Bagdash, and Bagdash was waging a struggle, exerting all the influence the Syrian Communist Party had – a struggle against unification with Egypt. ('Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964', Watson Institute, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 820) (IMG)

Khrushchev continued:

By that time the formation of the UAR had been accomplished. Syria fell under Nasser's leadership, and democratic conditions in that country were abolished. The Syrian Communist Party found itself in a difficult situation. Syria began to be trimmed down, having its hair cut to conform to the Egyptian social and political model. We, of course, did not support this and spoke out against it. Our position offended Nasser; he became unfavorably disposed toward us. That's fully understandable. He understood correctly that we were supporting the Communists of Syria, who were fighting against Egypt and against Nasser. ('Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964', Watson Institute, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 820) (IMG)

A campaign of fascistic slanders began by the Kremlin Titoist propaganda sheet, 'Pravda'. According to Abdel-Nasser, Pravda went so far as to claim that the notorious Khrushchev-backed Syrian politician Riad Al-Turk (who as I am writing, is still alive and is now 91 years old) was murdered in 1958 in a UAR prison! Abdel-Nasser responded in UAR media:

Informed circles in Cairo commented on what the Soviet newspaper Pravda published today against the United Arab Republic. (...). Pravda did not learn from the consequences of its abuse of the UAR, and today it is slipping into new abuses. In a way, if it indicates anything, it is due to the ignorance of its editor of the nature of the Arab people, who do not accept abuse, and who are determined to preserve their independence and dignity. Yesterday, the Soviet newspaper Pravda accused the UAR of killing Riyad al-Turk in the Mezzeh prison in Damascus, and carried out a campaign based on slanders and defamation. (Political comment by the President [Gamal Abdel-Nasser] in response to what was published by the Soviet newspaper Pravda attacking the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel-Nasser) (IMG)

Why would there be any surprise that Abdel-Nasser and Khrushchev would be enemies, in light of the fact that Khrushchev personally promoted Zionism? Also, socialist Czechoslovakia was a country that provided military assistance to the UAR. Khrushchev and other Kremlin Titoists imposed tough sanctions on and fomented colour revolutionary uprisings in Czechoslovakia, and supported Titoist-Zionist agents centered around Dubcek against communist blue-collar workers' elements in the Party headed by Novotny. Not only were sanctions imposed on the country that militarily funded Egypt/UAR, the Kremlin Titoists delayed as much as possible Eurasian arms sales to the UAR and then when the arms transfers were to come, they stopped the arms flow. In doing so, Khrushchev wished to push the UAR into Tito's hands and Khrushchev did partially succeed, since the UAR was forced to look to the Yugoslav regime for arms. Hoda Abdel-Nasser, the daughter of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, has very extensively studied the personal and secret intelligence papers of Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Hoda wrote:

A reciprocal media campaign took place between Gamal Abdel Nasser and Khrushchev several months after the Egyptian-Syrian union, despite its opposition to the interests of both countries. As for the Soviet Union, it entered the Middle East by selling arms to Egypt, after the West had been procrastinating with it for more than three years, during which Israel took advantage of the opportunity to carry out repeated attacks on its borders with Egypt. (...). Relations between the UAR and the Soviet Union had become volatile, but the general trend was for the worse. This was reflected to a large extent, especially with regard to the supply of weapons; as the delivery was stopped and the price was raised, the situation with regard to spare parts in particular became bad, and the UAR began looking for other sources of weapons, such as Yugoslavia or local industry. (Secret Letters between Nasser and Khrushchev, Hoda Gamal Abdel-Nasser, November 14, 2013) (IMG)

Yugoslavia and the UAR had contradicting stances on the Middle East issues. In order to contain the expansion of UAR influence into Lebanon, the US deployed its troops there. The response of Yugoslavia, the alleged 'ally' of the UAR, is interesting to note. The Yugoslav regime's Charge d'Affaires Franc Primozic spoke to the US Secretary of State. Here are excerpts of the Memorandum of the Conversation between the two leaders:

The Secretary asked Mr. Primozic whether the Yugoslav Government considers that it is wrong to send troops to aid a friendly nation which has requested assistance in preserving its independence. Mr. Primozic replied that the UN is the proper body to take such action. ('SUBJECT: Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires' discussion with the Secretary concerning Middle East crisis: Memorandum of Conversation', US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires ad interim Mr. Franc Primozic, July 19, 1958. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960', Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2, p. 344) (IMG)

Sometimes, arguing that the US should invade a country via the UN is used by diplomats of anti-imperialist states as a cover and an excuse with which to block a US invasion. However:

The Secretary then noted that the Soviet Union had vetoed a proposal in the Security Council which would have transferred to UN forces the responsibilities which US troops have assumed in Lebanon. He asked Mr. Primozic whether in the Yugoslav view this Soviet veto was a constructive step. Mr. Primozic conceded that it was not. The Secretary then continued that there are US military elements in some 30 countries throughout the world where they have been sent without involving the UN. Should they now be withdrawn, he asked. Mr. Primozic replied in the negative.. ('SUBJECT: Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires' discussion with the Secretary concerning Middle East crisis: Memorandum of Conversation', US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Yugoslav Charge

d'Affaires ad interim Mr. Franc Primozic, July 19, 1958. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960', Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2, p. 344) (IMG)

According to the Yugoslav view, therefore, the 'US military elements in [approximately] 30 countries throughout the world' including in Lebanon should not have been withdrawn, and the Eurasian move to obstruct a US intervention into Lebanon via the UN was counter-productive.

The climax of the story, however, was manifested in Iraq. Iraq was where the covert intelligence war between the UAR and its allied freedom forces against the joint alliance of Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists, Tito's fascist gang, the SAVAK, the Mossad, the Kurdish bourgeois-nationalists, the Hashemites, and the Anglo-American secret services became bloodier and more violent than ever. There are many critical pieces to the story, but presenting all of them would require me to write too much; so I will only present the most important parts.

In Iraq existed was a circle of Nasserist Free Officers headed by Iraqi generals Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim and Abdel-Salam Aref. The former was a fake 'Nasserist' 'Free Officer' whereas the latter a real one. In July 1958, the battalions under the command of the Iraqi General Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim and the Iraqi Nasserist Free Officer Abdel-Salam Al-Aref were sent by the Hashemite Iraqi regime to support the Hashemite Jordanian regime. The Nasserist Free Officer Abdel-Salam Aref used this opportunity to launch a military coup against the Hashemite monarchy, to seize Baghdad's critical stations and thus to install a new state in Iraq. This was the critical time in which Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim, who at the time posed as a Nasserist Free Officer and as a 'friend' of Aref, to join Aref in the coup. However, Al-Qasim did not participate and thus betrayed the person to whom he presented himself as 'friend'. Instead of marching to Baghdad to help Aref, Al-Qasim stayed in Jordan thus to fulfill his mission of supporting the Jordanian monarchy. Fortunately, Aref succeeded in his coup despite Al-Qasim's stab in the back. Upon being informed of Aref's success, Al-Qasim rushed to Baghdad ostensibly to 'help' Aref but actually to launch a counter-coup against Aref and his comrades. As such, Al-Qasim made himself the first in command of the newly established Iraqi republic and made Aref the second. Shortly thereafter, Qasim made up slanders and excuses, and ousted Aref out of even the second-in-command position. To this day, the CIA-MI6-Mossad puppet media falsely presents the enemy of the Arab nation, Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim, as the true coup plotter and operator. The Moscow Titoists and the social-fascist 'Iraqi Communist Party' parroted the CIA-MI6-Mossad narrative. In his letter to Khrushchev, Abdel-Nasser remarked:

The [1958] Iraqi revolution was the beginning of the great crisis in our relations, although much of what was mentioned in your speech opened our eyes to the fact that the causes of misunderstanding between us extended to much before this revolution!

It is surprising that we hear from different circles an attack on Arab nationalism as a basis! [Our] solidarity with the Iraqi revolution began a long time ago; a number of the leaders of the Iraqi revolution – including Qasim, the Iraqi prime minister – had contacted us before the revolution, and asked that we help them in planning it. Our advice to them was; That they keep their affairs a secret even from us, and that they seek help only from their own people, and that only those who will bear the burden of implementing the revolution undertake the development of the revolution's plan.

After the Iraqi revolution succeeded, the Iraqi Communist Party wanted to seize the opportunity to control it; it took advantage of a personal dispute that broke out between Qassem and his deputy, Arif; in order to create an atmosphere of confusion to help him achieve his goals!

(Cairo-Moscow, Dar ul-Shoruq, Sami Ammareh) (IMG)

In the above quote regarding the 1958 Iraqi coup and counter-coup, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, who waged a bloody struggle against Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim, was being highly diplomatic, and thus used kind words in describing that traitor Qasim. Unlike what Abdel-Nasser diplomatically stated, the conflict between Aref and Al-Qasim was not as much a personal conflict, as it was a conflict between anti-imperialist and progressive forces headed by Aref and the imperialist-fascist reaction led by the MI6 agent Qasim. Upon seizing power, Qasim presented himself as a third force lying in between the reactionary Arab monarchies and the UAR. He started saying that Palestine was occupied by Egypt and by reactionary Jordan. In reality, the MI6 agent Qasim continued his old mission of serving the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. Volumes of documents prove the irrefutable fact that the Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim regime was covertly allied to the British intelligence service. However, perhaps a top document on this matter is the following, in which it is admitted that Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim supported financial aid to the Anglo-American imperialists' comprador regime in Jordan:

Jordan Seeking Financial Aid From Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim is favorably disposed toward a Jordanian request for financial assistance, according to information from the Lebanese ambassador in Baghdad who until recently handled Jordanian affairs there. The amount and terms of the aid sought were not disclosed. Qasim reportedly has not made a final decision on the matter.

Iraqi aid to Jordan probably would arouse considerable opposition among many Iraqis who are displeased over the rapprochement with Jordan, which they view as aligning Iraq against the UAR.

Qasim, however, may consider that benevolence toward Jordan would enhance his prestige as an impartial Arab leader amid apparently rising pan-Arab sentiment in Iraq. A pro-government Baghdad newspaper has referred to possible efforts by the "Iraqi Government to eliminate differences between the UAR" and Jordan [by ousting the UAR and installed an Anglo-American puppet state in Egypt to make it like Jordan].

The Jordanian Government is preoccupied with the UAR's threat to its security and with its perennial financial problems. The Jordanians apparently hope Qasim will be helpful in both of these situations.

King Husayn's regime swallowed its outrage over the murder of Husayn's Hashemite relatives in the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and recognized Qasim's regime in October 1960. Since then gradual progress has been made in re-establishing relations between the two countries.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, January 9, 1961, p. 3) (IMG)

In fact, according to Roby Barrett, a US State Department's Foreign Service Officer and fellow at CIA front think tanks:

The British actually feared a Nasserist regime in Iraq and the potential consequences for the petroleum interests there and throughout the Gulf more than the potential threat of a Communist takeover. London pressed for continued arms shipments to Iraq, arguing that strengthening Qasim and the Iraqi military provided the most potent firewall against the [real] Communists and Nasserists. ('Intervention in Iraq, 1958-1959', The Middle East Institute, Roby Barrett, April 1, 2008) (IMG)

In a confidential conversation with Iran's Shah in the Buckingham Palace, Selwyn Lloyd, the Antony Eden-era Conservative British Secretary of State, admitted to the Shah that the MI6 was militarily funding the Khrushchevian-backed Al-Qasim regime:

After dinner at Buckingham Palace on the 5th of May I had a short conversation with the Shah. (...) I then spoke of our relations with the new Iraqi Government and our dilemma about arms. The Shah said that he thought we were right to agree to continue the supply of arms to Iraq and added that the situation seemed strange to Iranians. The Iraqis had [under Nasserist pressure] left the Baghdad Pact and were flirting with [Khrushchevian pseudo-]Communism and they got arms both from the Russians and now from us [the MI6]. (EQ 10334/15, RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SHAHANSHAH OF IRAN ON THE 5th OF MAY, 1959, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. J. W. Russell (Tehran), No. 69 Confidential, Foreign Office, May 8, 1959) (IMG)

Playing his usual hypocrisy games vis-a-vis the British, and to lobby the British into further military armaments of Pahlavi Iran, the Shah ostensibly expressed 'regrets' about the MI6 militarily funding of the Qasim regime; yet, it remains a fact, presenting the evidence of which is beyond the scope of this work, that the SAVAK ceased the campaign against Iraq's government as soon as the Qasim faction consolidated power against the Nasserist faction. The MI6 agent Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim received the full support of the MI6 agent Nikita Khrushchev, who admitted in his memoirs:

We supported Kassem by all possible means.. ('Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964', Watson Institute, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 820) (IMG)

Al-Qasim and his fascist gang also received the support of Tito's group. Regarding Abdel-Nasser's line on the Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim regime, Tito explicitly said:

Nasser took an overly radical route and is needlessly and profusely inflaming the relations [with Iraq] He can lose a lot of his own prestige Nasser is a man who allows himself to be 'fired up' ... He should look at these things with more reservation and realism but I fear that this is not the case. ("Companions in misfortune": from passive neutralism to active un-commitment – the critical role of Yugoslavia', Svetozar Rajak. Citing: 'Tito's report on his trip to Asia and Africa before the Federal Executive Council, Belgrade, 17 March 1959, AJ, 837, I-2/11.' Chapter in: 'Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War', Routledge, edited by: Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, & Marco Wyss, 2016) (IMG)

"Janko Smole, a high-ranking Yugoslav Party official, commented to a British diplomat" the following:

Nasser had made very serious blunders in the Middle East but the main negative factor in the situation was the degree of control achieved by the Iraqi communist party acting solely in the interest of the [Soviet] 'camp' ... Nasser, who had lost his head and behaved in a hysterical fashion, had made it easier for them to establish their grip. ("Companions in misfortune": from passive neutralism to active un -commitment – the critical role of Yugoslavia', Svetozar Rajak. Citing: 'T.W. Garvey, British Embassy in Belgrade to J.M. Addis, FCO, 15 April 1959, TNA, FO 371/145114.' Chapter in: 'Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War', Routledge, edited by: Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, & Marco Wyss, 2016, p. 76) (IMG)

Horrible crimes against humanity were committed by the Al-Qasim regime. However, there was hope. Undoubtedly, the Iraqi Baath movement was infiltrated by fascist assassins such as Saddam, Ali Salih Al- Sa'di, and (later on) Nadhim Kzar, but at the time, the progressive revolutionary elements headed by Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr held the upper hand. Upon the request of Michel Aflaq, the UAR began financing the Iraqi Baathists headed by General Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr to help them in their counter-coup against Al-Qasim's gang. Knowing that a coup was being planned against the

Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim faction, the Tito regime informed Abdel-Karim Qasim of the coup plot, thus allowing the Al-Qasim regime to hunt down the prominent Iraqi Ba'athist freedom-fighter Salih Mahdi Al-Ammash. Sa'id Aburish, a prominent journalist and spy for the CIA's Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, was a supporter of Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim, and lashed out at Abdel-Nasser and the Ba'athists for involvement in the coup against Qasim. Yet, Aburish also confirmed:

Kassem was not without friends and the **Yugoslavs**, among others, told him of the plot to overthrow him. Colonel Saleh Mahdi Ammash, a Ba'athist officer in the Iraqi Army who was among the conspirators, was arrested in January 1963.. (Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge, Sa'id Aburish, 2001, p. 56. Bold added.) (IMG)
Salih Mahdi Al-Ammash later rose to become a prominent Iraqi Ba'athist supporter of Hafez Al-Assad and a major foe of Saddam Hussein. Ammash was assassinated by Saddam Hussein's Mukhaberat in the 1980s.

Yet in spite of the counter-measures by the Al-Qasim regime, the regime was still vulnerable, and in 1963, Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr successfully launched a coup against Al-Qasim known as the Ramadan 1963 coup. However, much as how in July 1958 there occurred two military coups stacked closely on top of each other but presented as one coup, the Ramadan 1963 coup by Al-Bakr was followed by at least three other military coups so spatio-temporally proximate to Al-Bakr's coup that it appeared as though one coup happened in the Ramadan of 1963.

The net results of these four (or more) coups/counter-coups was that Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr was able to re-install Abdel-Salam Aref as head of state but also that the Trotskyite mass-murderer Ali Salih Al-Sa'di was able to launch a reign of fascist terror: terrorizing Arabs, Kurds, Persians, fellow Baathists and Nasserists, communists, etc. He did this in order to provoke an uprising against the faction of Al-Bakr and Aref. He did indeed give the Anglo-Americans and Khrushchev and their agents the excuse to wrongly blame Aref for the mass-murder, kind of like how Stalin was blamed for Yezhovschina. By blaming Aref and Al-Bakr, Khn.ishc.hev and the Anglo-Americans were undermining the enemies of Ali Salih al-Sa'di hence to indirectly promote Al-Sa'di's gang to which Saddam is said to have belonged. The Moscow-based Titoists viciously slandered Iraq's UAR-backed government of committing a genocide in Iraq's Kurdistan region, as the following excerpts of a UN document reveal:

1. Mr. ARKADIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had addressed a letter (E/J809) to the President requesting the inclusion in the agenda of the current session a new item entitled "Policy of genocide which is being pursued by the Government of the Republic of Iraq against the Kurdish people". In submitting its request, the USSR delegation had been guided by the provisions of Article 62 of the Charter, and of General Assembly resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946 on the crime of genocide. To its letter of request the USSR delegation had attached a memorandum setting forth facts which confirmed that a policy of genocide was being pursued by the Iraqi Government against the Kurdish people. At the same time, the Soviet Government had addressed communications to the Governments of Iraq, Iran and Syria on the same question, giving the relevant facts of the case and proving that the matter had acquired serious international significance and should be drawn to the attention of United Nations organs.

2. In view of its international significance, the problem should be examined in the Economic and Social Council, for it was directly linked with the problems which came within the Council's competence, and with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which the Council had prepared. Moreover, the Council already had a number of items relating to human rights on its agenda.

3. The Soviet Union had been compelled to urge that the item should be included in the Council's agenda because at that time brutal reprisals were being conducted by the Iraqi authorities against the Kurdish people, who comprised nearly a quarter of the population of Iraq. Largescale military action was being taken against peaceful Kurdish towns and villages; troops supported by aircraft, tanks and artillery were gradually exterminating the civilian population, including children, women and old people; vast areas were being laid waste and large numbers of civilians were being driven from their homes.

4. Some might say that those data were available only to the Soviet Government, but that was not the case: the events had been publicized so widely that factual information could be obtained not only from official statements of the Soviet Government and from the Soviet press, but from such international newspapers as Le Monde, which bore out the Soviet statements in a leading article in its issue of 11 July, and the New York Herald Tribune, 10 July, which reported that three divisions, or 60 per cent of the Iraqi army, were conducting a merciless campaign against the Kurds, wiping Kurdish villages from the face of the earth with tanks, bulldozers and napalm bombs.

5. That was why the Soviet delegation had hastened to all the attention of the Economic and Social Council to the question, in order that the Council should use all its authority and influence to ensure that those merciless and brutal actions should be terminated forthwith.

(UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 1278th meeting, Thursday, July 11, 1963, official records, Palais des Nations, Geneva, p. 1) (IMG)

Suddenly, the partners-in-crime of the butcher of Kosovo, the traitors who assisted the Marshal of the Traitors in the crimes against humanity, started 'worrying' about the 'genocide' in Iraqi Kurdistan. While murder of Kurds did occur, it could not be genocide per se, not as much because Al-Sa'di was murdering people semi-indiscriminately. To kill one border guard of a hostile state gives the foe the pretext for invasion; to kill a thousand border guards deters a foe from an invasion. Killing one border guard is a provocation of an enemy invasion, whereas killing a thousand border guards is a suppression of an enemy invasion. The same goes for genocide. A Kurdish bourgeois-nationalist rebellion, not a genocide, was desired by Al-Sa'di and his mafia. Annihilating the Kurds would have prevented a rebellion by the Kurdish bourgeois-nationalists, whereas massacring a relatively smaller number of Kurds would have provided the pretext for a bourgeois-nationalist rebellion. Al-Sa'di, an Arab, was also exterminating countless Arabs. He murdered people not to 'cleanse' entire ethnic groups, not to break the spirit of those ethnic groups, but to rather provoke the tribes of those ethnic groups into revolting against the Iraqi government. Elsewhere in that UN document cited above, it is confirmed that India – a country that was allied to Stalin-era USSR and the UAR and which had assisted the UAR in hijacking Tito's 'Non-Aligned Movement' – refused to accept the Moscow Titoist line. Of course, India rejected the Eurasian Titoist line in the usual diplomatic language:

Mr. NEHRU (India) said he had listened to the statement of the Soviet Union representative with great attention and respect. (...). However, in dealing with such matters affecting a friendly country, there had to be some objective in view. The Indian objective was to help in promoting a peaceful atmosphere conducive to a peaceful settlement. The passing of resolutions condemning one side or the other would be of no help in creating such an atmosphere. It was India's desire and hope that the Government and people of Iraq would be able to overcome their difficulties. He was aware that they wished to avoid conflict, to solve their problems peacefully and to devote themselves to the great task of internal construction and development which was the principal task of all the Afro-Asian countries, including India. (...). Irrespective of legal and other considerations, and because of India's desire to help in promoting an atmosphere which would lead to reconciliation and peace rather than to bitterness and recrimination, his delegation was unable to support the Soviet proposal. [Nehru] appealed to the Soviet delegation to reconsider its initiative. The objective should be the promotion of peace rather than the aggravation of difficulties. (UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 1278th meeting, Thursday, 11 July 1963, official records, Palais des Nations, Geneva, p. 2) (IMG)

To this day, many CIA spies on CIA payroll denounce Abdel-Nasser and his comrades as 'sellouts' to 'American imperialism' for the operations against the Qasim regime. Furthermore, Aref and Al-Bakr were trying to arrest Al-Sa'di for his numerous crimes and to execute him. By blaming Aref and Al-Bakr and Co. for the crimes of Al-Sa'di, the Khrushchev group were actually indirectly assisting Al-Sa'di, the very perpetrators of these mass-murders. Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs:

Bad relations had developed between Aref and us. We did not consider him a progressive-leaning person, and as an individual he was unpleasant. It was hard to have a conversation with him. Nasser gave a ceremonial dinner for his guests. Just prior to that, news arrived that Aref had carried out reprisals against the progressive forces in Iraq. I remarked to Nasser: "This is very distasteful. According to our information, Aref has arrested or killed a lot of people. It's distasteful even to sit next to such a person."

The seating arrangement at President Nasser's table was such that I was supposed to sit right next to Aref. Nasser took exception to my remarks: "I think your information is incorrect. I don't think Aref has done this, especially while he's in Egypt as my guest and would be meeting with you. He has very much wanted to meet you and wants closer ties with the USSR."

I said to him: "I doubt it. Nothing like that has been evident in his speeches or his political line."

"I will find out right now," said Nasser, and hurried away.

After a little while [Nasser came back and] said: "Aref swears to God that he hasn't done any such thing, that these are fabrications of the capitalist press. Nothing of the sort has happened. They are lying. I [that is, Nasser] believe him because he's a devout religious person. He spends all his time on his knees, bowing toward Mecca and praying to Allah, asking Allah to answer his prayers about every possible problem. Aref is such a religious man that he's incapable of lying, I assure you."

The dinner proceeded with full ceremony, and afterward I had a talk with Aref, who brought up the subject on his own initiative. "The information you have received is inaccurate. It is apparently being circulated by persons who don't want improved relations between Iraq and the USSR. I have done no such thing, and I never would."

(Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 3, p. 832) (IMG)

A few years later, Abdel-Salam Aref was murdered by a plane crash 'incident', allowing for a CIA-backed fascist coup. Khrushchev was probably cheerful.

Although Khrushchev was officially ousted before 1965, the Titoist faction continued to wield a significant level of

influence until early 1968. The Eurasian Titoists supported the military coup by the CIA agent Salah Jadid and his gang of Trotskyite-fascist butchers and torturers. In an interview after the Jadid coup, Michel Aflaq, who had been directly leading the Syrian branch of the Ba'ath Party prior to the Jadid coup, complained of the hostile attitude of the Eurasians towards the Ba'athists in Syria:

The Soviet Union is the largest socialist country and the largest progressive international weight in the world. Our party has faced hostility without serious justifications. However, we did not react and reciprocate the hostility. Rather, we were patient and ignored. We remained on the position dictated by revolutionary logic and the interest of the Arab nation in befriending the socialist state. Finally, the Soviet Union pushed hostility to the end when it supported the rebels against the party and considered the sons of the wealthy families who were brought to power by tanks and who disguised themselves in the words of leftism and socialism as the true representatives of the party, while attacking the party and its leaders and founders who lived their lives in deprivation and fought for thirty years for socialism. And regarding the issues of the toiling Arab masses, [Moscow] accused them of being right-wing and reactionary.

It is not permissible for us to react and act in any way from which colonialism and reaction could benefit. However, in addition to this legitimate concern, this caution, and this wisdom, we must be faithful to the truth and to warn against getting carried away in the politics of force, imposition, arbitrariness and tyranny whatever the disparity between our strength and the strength of the Soviet Union. The truth is the measure; it is stronger than the largest force in the world and it [i.e. the truth] is on our side. Our answer to the Soviet Union will not be to go backwards in approaching the positions of the right and reactionary but rather in being faithful to our revolutionary approach and goals, and in clarifying our position to our people and to the progressive parties and movements in our country and in the world.

(The June 5 War and the time for Historic Action, Michel Aflaq, October 1967. In: 'Fi Sabil El-Ba'ath' [In the Path of Resurrection], Vol. 2, Michel Aflaq, pp. 269-270) (IMG)

The reign of Salah Jadid and his fascist gang, not to be confused with the Hafez Al-Assad era, was marked by barbaric terror, the handing over of the Golan Heights to Israel, the extension of Kuwaiti intelligence and Muslim Brotherhood terrorist networks in Syria, the rise of the Fatah, a conspiracy to transform the Arab National Movement (ANM) into a Maoist network, a hostile attitude towards the UAR and post-1969 Libya, and many other treasonous activities. Even after he was overthrown, Jadid continued his subversive activities against Syria through his correspondences from jail. He set up a subversive network within the Syrian Arab Army in order to launch a coup against the Al- Assad faction in 1976. By the late 1970s, his network also allied with fascist Iraq and Saddam's Mukhaberat.

It must also be recalled again that it was 'thanks' to the Kremlin Titoists that the 1953 coup in Iran happened. Mosaddeq made a reference to this matter (see C20S7 and C17S7). Furthermore, it was Khrushchev himself who stabbed the struggles against the Shah in the back, promoting peaceful coexistence with the regime. Khrushchev had the audacity to go as far as to make the ridiculous left-deviationist argument that since people in Iran are getting hungrier and hungrier under the Shah, they will automatically overthrow the Shah regime and that hence there is no point in revolutionary class struggles against Iran's regime because over time, the Shah's regime will be naturally overthrown! According to Special Report by the SAVAK:

Khrushchev made this clear to the American informant Walter Lippmann, saying that the poverty, misery and dissatisfaction of the Iranian people contributes to the advancement of communist goals in Iran.. (...). Khrushchev has stated that we do not need to take action with regards to Iran because the time in this country works in our favor, and it seems that Khrushchev does not want to spend anything in this country more than time. (The Special Report of the Foreign Intelligence and the Activities of Iranians Living Abroad [Gozaresh e Vizheh e Ettela'at e Khareji va Fa'aliat e Iranian e Moqim e Keshvar haye Kharej], SAVAK, p. 3. In: 'The Tudeh Party in Exile According to SAVAK Documents' [Hezb e Tudeh dar Kharej az Keshvar be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK], Vol. 2, p. 549. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

The Iranian regime was also financially supported by the Moscow Titoists in late December 1954. During the Stalin era, the Shah faction demanded that the USSR 'repays' its 'debt' to Iran for 'invading' Iran during the Great Patriotic War. The USSR had no real obligation to pay Iran because Iran was rightly intervened in militarily by the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, an intervention that was morally just and in line with international law. On the contrary, the hostile regime in Iran was morally obliged to pay debt to the USSR for the former's criminal pro -Nazi activities during and prior to the Great Patriotic War. Nonetheless, during the Razmara era and the Mosaddeq era, the USSR began to change its stance and use the issue of 'debt' 'payment' as an excuse to fund the Razmara and the Mosaddeq administrations. Since Mosaddeq's position was still not very strong, however, Iran was still not ready just yet for being thoroughly funded by the Stalin-era USSR. Thus, the USSR took steps towards funding Iran under the cover of 'paying' its 'debt' for the 'invasion', but ultimately did not fund Iran because the USSR needed to ensure that any financial support it would provide to Iran would not fall into the hands of the enemies of the Mosaddeq faction and yet the Mosaddeq faction had still not

gained enough influence over the Iranian regime. Stalin's death, as Mosaddeq had stated, paved the way for the 1953 coup (see C17S7). Furthermore, the Kremlin Titoists not only refused to support the Mosaddeq faction, but also, after the 1953 CIA-MI6 coup, provided financial support to the Shah regime in the form of the 'repayment' of the 'debt' in 1954:

The High Contracting Parties have agreed to a final settlement of all mutual financial claims relating to the period of the Second World War.. Within two weeks after the entry into force of the present Agreement, the State Bank of the USSR shall transfer to the National Bank of Iran in two consignments, at the frontier railway station of DzhulfaIranskaya, 11,196,070.3 (eleven million one hundred and ninety-six thousand and seventy point three) grammes of gold in payment of the claims of the Iranian Side.. (IRAN and UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS – Agreement concerning the settlement of frontier and financial questions (with Protocols and annexes). Signed at Tehran, on 2 December 1954. Official texts: Persian and Russian. Registered by Iran on 24 January 1963. In: UN Treaty Series, UN, for: 1963, p. 260.) (IMG)

As such, the Kremlin Titoists paid for a 'debt' that the USSR should not have paid to Iran's regime. It is fair to say that this measure was basically funding the Shah's regime. The Titoists in Moscow also provided the Iranian regime with military funding. Bizhan Jazani, the founder and the primary theorist of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG) and a former Tudeh Party activist, remains an icon of Iran's communist movement. He is even greatly praised by the Tudeh Party leaders. Jazani wrote the following concerning the Eurasian military aid to Iran's regime:

We have seen in this analysis that all opposition forces in Iran, even the Tudeh Central Committee (which considers it its duty to defend all aspects of Soviet diplomacy in Iran without exception), agree that the reactionary, anti-national, anti-democratic, anti-popular, and comprador nature of the Shah's regime has not changed, and that it is not in the path of the weakening of these features, but rather as explained previously, the recent maneuvers are especially for the entrenchment and of the positions of the Iranian regime, which contradict the interests of our nation, and the anti-colonial interests of the peoples of the Middle East and the [rest of the] world, and is in line with the strategies and tactics of neocolonialism.

Therefore, there are no objective factors that could justify the change in the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries towards the Shah's regime, neither from the publication of national positions nor from the regime's foreign policy, and that is why we say and believe that unfortunately the Soviet Union violates socialist policy and proletarian internationalism. Today, a regime is flattered, a monarch is hailed as a "great reformer," a government is given weapons and economic aid with which to stabilize its government, which has had no fundamental change away from its much-despised past, the days in which the corruption in the palaces of the Shah were being revealed. Military aid to it is a betrayal of the peoples of Iran and the liberation movement[s] of the Middle East..

In a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Sino-Pakistani relations on February 14, 1964, Mr. Suslov said: "The leadership apparatus of China, in addition to deteriorating its relations with India to an extraordinary level, has reached a point which, as you are aware, while not being a member of any official military pact, is practically an ally of Pakistan, a member state SEATO and CENTO, military pacts that pose a danger to the peace and security of the nations of Asia.

The fact is that the leaders of China, by throwing away "all the revolutionary statements" of their own, have gone down a road which cannot be reconciled with the principled approach of the united front of the socialist countries in the struggle against the imperialist blocs. What can be said? The methods of the Chinese leaders about choosing their friend and ally is very strange. A question must be asked:

How can they dishonor and tarnish the socialist countries and the communist parties, and at the same time to flatter the reactionary regime of Pakistan right in front of the whole world? It is really incomprehensible. Would there be anyone who would believe that close relations with Pakistan is rooted in the interests of the progress and the development of the revolutionary struggles of the nations of Asia against imperialism, about which the Chinese leaders have stirred up controversy?"

(Suslov's Report, Persian translation, p. 27)

Indeed, what can be said! We ask, in particular, Mr. Suslov and the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, which justifies Soviet policy: does anyone believe that approaching the Shah's regime and providing military and economic assistance to the Iranian government and political and propaganda support for the monarchy results in the advancement of the interests and the development of the struggle of the Asian nations against imperialism?!

How is it that no blind eye is turned towards the deviation of China towards the government of Pakistan, but a blind eye is turned to the deviation of the Soviet Union towards the government of Iran and even towards Pakistan itself? Why is the flattery of the reactionary regime of Pakistan condemned but the flattery of the Shah's regime is not reprehensible and even the Central Committee has tried to justify it as correct policy? Yes, "It is really incomprehensible" as to what the Shah's regime lacks in terms of its reactionary position from the Pakistani regime? The same reasons that led Suslov to ask "Would there be



Brezhnev, Shah, Empress Farah discuss arms sales to Iran.

anyone who would believe that close relations with Pakistan is rooted in the interests of the progress and the development of the revolutionary struggles of the nations of Asia against imperialism?", compel the Communists of Iran and all the anti-colonial forces of the Iranian people, to ask, and especially to ask Mr. Suslov and the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party: Would there be anyone who would believe that close relations with Iran is rooted in the interests of the progress and the development of the revolutionary struggles of the nations of Asia against imperialism, and is based on proletarian internationalism?

In our view, the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Iran is contrary to the interests of the progress and development of the revolutionary struggle of the nations of Asia against imperialism, is contrary to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and constitutes anti-socialist diplomacy.

That is because helping the Iranian government and further entrenches the reactionary and anti-national regime and the cause of imperialism in the Middle East..

(The Problems Facing the Iranian People's Anti-Colonial and Liberation Movement & the Most Critical Tasks of Iran's Communists in the Current Conditions, Bizhan Jazani, Autumn 1967. Reprinted by the: The Organization for the Unity of the Iranian People's Fedayeen, Winter 2003, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

The Eurasian armament of Iran's regime in 1967 (Brezhnev era) and during the Khrushchev period could not have been for the purpose of 'coopting' the regime of Iran. Sometimes, certain regimes under the significant influence of the reactionary forces can be overthrown through a progressive state's tied aid unto them. For example, in such a case, armaments would be provided on the condition that 'Soviet advisors' and 'Soviet technicians' (i.e. Soviet spies) would be placed in charge of installing those weapons. Such was why Stalin offered weapons sales to the Shah, provided that Soviet advisors/technicians would be running such equipment; the Shah, initially unaware that Stalin wanted 'advisors' and 'technicians' to come along with those Soviet weapons to be installed, welcomed this weapons sales, but upon finding out about the real depth of the matter – that this was a plot for Soviet intelligence penetration – rejected the Soviet offer. Hence, sometimes, weapons sales can be a means of intelligence penetration. However, such weapons sales have to occur provided that there are mechanisms in place to prevent the reactionary forces from hijacking those weapons and expelling the spy-'technicians' or spy-'advisors'. Note that Stalin made that offer back in the mid-1940s, when Iran had been democratized, and the progressive forces had a significant influence; back then, there was a low chance of the Shah's faction from being able to hijack those weapons and expel the Soviet advisors. The scenario was radically different in 1967 when the fascist faction had more influence over the Iranian regime than before, due to the defeat inflicted upon the UAR in the 1967 War. The 1967 defeat of the UAR was directly correlated with the sharp demotion of the Nasserist

agents in the high ranks of the SAVAK, a demotion which had rendered the Shah's faction all the more powerful. Clearly, arms sales to the Iranian regime back then would not have allowed intelligence penetration, for the SAVAK would have been able to easily receive those weapons and then, through excuses and blackmail, expel the spy-advisors and spy-technicians. Without a doubt, Iran's regime was being armed, not coopted, by the government of Eurasia, which proves that Moscow was dominated still by the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie.

Nikita Khrushchev also supported Israel's war against Egypt. Later, in his memoirs, he morally endorsed Moshe Dayan, argued that the Jews are culturally superior, that the UAR was the aggressor in the 1967 War, and that Israel was just defending itself through a pre-emptive strike against Egypt:

The main reason for Israel's victory was that it had a higher cultural level and better discipline in its army, and its officers had combat experience and excellent training. After all, very good specialists from many different countries had come together in Israel. For example, I have a very high regard for their top general, [Moshe] Dayan, as a military man. He's a fine fellow! I said as a joke that if I was premier and he was in the Soviet Union, I would immediately appoint him our minister of defense.

He is worthy of that. The Jews are a people who have been dispersed all over the world. That's why it turned out that their officers were better trained, and so were their soldiers, their tank crews, and airplane pilots. What about the factor of fanaticism? Well, that's not primary. There are all sorts of fanatics. But if you pull down a fanatic's pants and whip him a few times, that fanatic will run off without looking back, so as not to get another whipping. The thing is that the Israelis were simply better organized, had a better mastery of their weapons, and made more intelligent use of them.

It was hard for the Egyptians to contend with them, and they paid dearly, **poor fellows**. To put it crudely, **they could ride camels** and knew how to handle rifles, but they had now been seated in tanks. (...).

I simply can't understand how such a thing happened. How could we have permitted it? I repeat, **the Soviet Union bears a major share of the responsibility** for what happened. With the possibilities we had of exerting influence **we could have restrained Nasser from going to war**. We had the possibility of giving President Nasser good advice, not to make a display of ardent militancy in demanding that UN peacekeeping troops be withdrawn. Also, it was not necessary to close the gulf that Israel used for commercial shipping.

In short, he shouldn't have heated up the atmosphere. But as things happened, an atmosphere of imminent war was created. That's how I understood the situation at the time. It's true that Israel started the war. It launched a surprise attack, **but it launched that attack preemptively**, to forestall its opponent, because both sides had already mobilized and were on a war footing. Israel struck first and easily achieved a thorough routing of Egypt's troops.

(Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 3, pp. 862-863. Bold added.) (IMG)

Yes, Khrushchev was being serious. He would have been a good comedian or clown, however, just by continuing to talk like a Khrushchev.

Again, it is essential to emphasize that these crimes against the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa were not committed by the 'national-bourgeois' elements in Eurasia, but were rather done by the comprador bourgeois elements. Khrushchev, the Kremlin Titoist assassins, and the white-collar workers in the CPSU that supported them were affiliated with the comprador classes, not the national bourgeoisie. They operated not for Eurasian interests but for the home-grown reactionary classes allied to Anglo-American finance capital.

Abdel-Nasser and other freedom fighters rightly decided to partially ally with Eurasia insofar as the communist and anti-imperialist elements in Eurasia maintained some influence. The conditions of class struggle in the USSR – particularly, the facts that Khrushchev and other Titoists dominating the state were supporters of the Dayanites in the Israeli regime but the government which Khrushchev headed provided some arms to Egypt – is demonstrative of the deep divisions in the Eurasian state.

At the same time, contrary to how some would seek to depict the matter, the communists or the proletariat did not continue to maintain the upper hand during the Khrushchev era. No, Eurasia was a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, which held the upper hand even in the Eurasian military. This is proven by the fact that Eurasia during the Khrushchev era provided not just financial support but also military support for the SAVAK regime in Iran, a regime posing a far greater menace to Egypt than Israel's regime.

Abdel-Nasser was also critical of the role of Tito's group for the latter's support for the Dubcek faction. Referring to Tito's group, in a 1968 conversation with Gromyko, Abdel-Nasser stated:

In fact, they [i.e. Tito's group] were reckless in their position on the issue of Czechoslovakia.. (Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Cairo, El-Qubba Palace, December 23, 1968, p. 17) (IMG)

Also worthy of consideration are Hoxha's remarks on Abdel-Nasser's relations with Tito. In part because a relatively small country like Albania did not have as much of an intelligence presence in the Middle East as it did in Yugoslavia,

Enver Hoxha's assessments of the situation in Yugoslavia were often very correct but his assessments of the situation in the Middle East often contained serious flaws. Therefore, as Hoxha had information on Tito but not so much on Abdel-Nasser, the value of Hoxha's assessments of the Tito-Nasser relationship is mixed. Nonetheless, to the extent that it is worth, Hoxha said:

Apparently, Tito has lost all credit in Nasser's eyes.. Nasser has understood what Tito really is. (THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE OF THE ARAB PEOPLES IS JUST, Enver Hoxha, May 25, 1967.

In: The Reflections on the Middle East)

Nasser ... understood that Tito was a perfidious liar who hatched up plans to the detriment of the UAR and other peoples. In the UAR Tito's diabolical game was unmasked. (TITO, AN AGENT OF THE AMERICANS, FALSE FRIEND OF THE ARAB PEOPLES, HAS FOLDED HIS ARMS, Enver Hoxha, June 8, 1967. In: The Reflections on the Middle East)

Considering that Tito's gang supported the Israeli regime, the Al-Qasim regime in Iraq, the US military intervention in Lebanon, etc., it seems unlikely that Abdel-Nasser would support Tito's gang.

In 1968, thanks to the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia, the UDB was greatly shaken and thus the Tito gang began to lose some of its influence in the UDB. The communist forces gained a slightly greater level of influence in fascist Yugoslavia, thus forcing Tito's gang to capitulate to the anti-Titoist forces in Eurasia. In this midst, Abdel-Nasser was to serve as an intermediary, getting Tito's gang to 'improve relations' with the Eurasians: but the truth is that Tito sent me a letter and I said it to the ambassador, in which he says: He wants to strengthen his relations with the Soviet Union, and he was talking about meeting two delegations from the two countries to speak. Of course, if having any chance like this, the West, and America is going to

Yugoslavia! In fact, we see the need to settle relations with Yugoslavia very strategically. (Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Cairo, El-Qubba Palace, December 23, 1968, p. 17) (IMG)

Worthy of highlight is that such an improvement in Eurasian-Yugoslav relations in the 1970s occurred during the Brezhnev era, when the remnants of the Stalin faction, Shtemenko and Vasilevsky along with others, had seen a rise in their influence over the Eurasian state. In this case, whereas the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia during the 1950s and the 1960s was a case of capitulation to the Titoist forces, in the 1970s the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia, when Rankovic was forcibly demoted by the communist forces whose influence in the UDB had increased, was a case not of Eurasian capitulation to the Titoist regime in Yugoslavia but of the communist anti-Titoist agents in the Yugoslav regime forcing the latter to capitulate to the anti-Titoists. One must make the distinction between the 1970s vs. 1950s-1960s when it comes to 'improvement of relations' with Yugoslavia. In the 1970s, Tito remained a fascist agent of the Anglo-Americans but he was back then encircled and pressured by the 'Cominformists' so to capitulate to the Eurasians.

Yugoslavia, partially de-Titoized, began to serve as a transit point for aid sent from Moscow to Egypt:

Abdel Nasser: The second issue is the issue of Tito. The issue of Yugoslavia is very important to us, as it is the railway that brings [materials] from Moscow to Cairo from a [geo-]strategic point of view. As for the last time they made an air bridge, it was Yugoslavia. (Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Cairo, El-Qubba Palace, December 23, 1968, p. 17) (IMG)

Since, under the influence of Palestinian anti-Semitic propaganda, Arab public opinion had been misled against direct negotiations with Israel, the UAR negotiated with Israel via Yugoslavia and Romania:

Brezhnev: You do not have contact with Israel?

Abdel Nasser: Two indirect contacts..

The first contact is through Tito who met with Goldman, and Goldman said that Israel wants peace, and that they [i.e. Israeli leaders] are divided, and the Cabinet has a hard-line part, and a part that wants peace, and the majority wants peace, [and] Goldman wants peace. (...). The second call came from Romania. The Deputy Foreign Minister came to Egypt and said: He wants to come to a special issue of peace with Israel. He came and repeated the same words that Tito had said. I said: This talk contradicts what the government of Israel is doing.

(Minutes of the talks between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Soviet leaders in Moscow, The morning of July 5, 1968, p. 16) (IMG)

C21S2.2. Khrushchev Faction on Sukarno and Indonesia

*** IMG-All-{Indonesia}

According to the CIA, which in turn cites the conversation with Indonesia's foreign minister, Nikita Khrushchev insulted Sukarno:

Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio has told the American ambassador that Khrushchev's visit was the

“toughest affair he has ever had to handle” and that there was almost constant bickering between President Sukarno and the Soviet leader. He quoted Sukarno as saying “I didn’t invite this man here to be insulted by him.” Subandrio gave the impression that Khrushchev had boasted of Soviet achievements, alluded to Indonesian bungling, and given blunt lectures on the virtues of Communism.

In discussing Indonesia's five-year plan, wanted detailed figures on the country’s economy. When Sukarno said he was not interested in these details, Khrushchev told him, "You aren’t socialist. Socialism consists of figures, figures, figures." ‘You are a robot,’ Sukarno retorted. When Khrushchev challenged Indonesia's purchase of Lockheed Electras as “imperialist aircraft,” Sukarno replied that he was buying what he considered best suited for Indonesia.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, March 5, 1960, p. 2) (IMG)

C21S2.3. The Khrushchev Faction Promotes Zionist Migration

*** IMG-All- {Zionist Migration post-1955}

As detailed in depth in C16S2, during the Stalin era, efforts were maximized to block Zionist migration. However, from 1955 onwards, by the time of the historic triumph of the Titoist faction led by Khrushchev, there came a radical shift in policy in favour of sending the USSR’s Yiddish and Juhuri citizens as cannon-fodder for Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon. Mohammad Hasanein Heikal, a presidential envoy and diplomatic representative of Gamal Abdel- Nasser and a top media official of the United Arab Republic, wrote:

Throughout the periods extending from the mid-fifties to the end of the eighties – the rate of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union did not exceed an annual average of four thousand immigrants. (On the Issue of Migration of Soviet Jews, Mohammad Hasanein Heikal, February 27, 1990, p. 2. From: nasser.bibalex.org) (IMG)

In other words, approximately 140,000 Yiddish and Juhuri citizens left Eurasia between 1955 to 1990. Some went directly to Israel. Others, who did not wish to go to a territory ‘encircled’ by the Arab states, were first lured into the West, in which they were bombarded enough with propaganda to end up in Israel.

For what it is worth, the PFLP Information Bulletin stated in 1975 that when many Zionist Jews were leaving Israel, there was also ‘a large number of Soviet Jews ... immigrating to Israel, thus strengthening the Zionist state’: Immigration in 1974 dropped drastically and an increasing number of Israeli Jews left the country or expressed a desire to leave. Although a large number of Soviet Jews are immigrating to Israel, thus strengthening the Zionist state, there is on the other hand an increasing emigration of those Jews from Israel. (PFLP Information Bulletin, No. 16, March 1975 to April 1975, Foreign Relations Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), p. 11) (IMG)

The PFLP media until 1979 was not very reliable on these matters, for the PFLP until then was dominated by the terrorist agents of Saddam Hussein’s Mukhaberat. However, the above information is corroborated in spirit by Heikal’s remarks and the PFLP’s own later comments. By the late 1970s, an anti-Saddamite and pro-Syria faction led by the team of Abu Ali Mustafa was elevated to the leadership in the PFLP and temporarily began to exercise a much greater influence over the PFLP military and media, rendering the PFLP media more reliable as anti-imperialist media. In 1981, the reliable PFLP Information Bulletin confirmed that 1,100 Yiddish and Juhuri citizens from the Soviet Union migrated and became the potential cannon-fodder of Ariel Sharon:

The number of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union was 6,670 during the first half of 1981; only 1,100 of these immigrated to occupied Palestine; 84% changed their minds. (PFLP Information Bulletin, No. 59, February 1982, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), p. 16) (IMG)

According to Clive Jones of Britain’s Royal Historical Society, Yuri Andropov and Kosygin were key figures behind the project for Zionist mass migration:

the world outcry ... coupled with the need to court Washington, allowed the reformers within the Kremlin – Kosygin and KGB Chief Yuri Andropov among them – to implement measures leading to large-scale emigration. (‘Soviet Jewish Aliyah, 1989-1992: Impact and Implications for Israel and the Middle East’, Clive Jones, 2013, p. 22) (IMG)

Yuri Andropov was a Titoist on the side of Beria. Sergio Beria recalled how the Anglo-Yugoslav agent (see C20S13) and KGB chief Yuri Andropov told Sergio Beria:

‘I have closely studied your father’s proposals on economic and foreign policy fields. Many of them are absolutely correct.’ (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergio Beria, p. 277) (IMG)

The fact that there still occurred a large amount of Zionist migration during the Brezhnev era is a strong indication that the revolutionary forces in Eurasia were overall still not so strong as to halt to such a project. The inability to contain Zionist migration in the long-run is not on its own a proof of the comprador bourgeois character of the state, but serves as a reflection of the weakness of the proletarian class forces in Eurasia.

C21S3. Slight Proletarian Dominance or Slight Comprador Dominance?

Some argue that the communists and non-communist progressives’ simultaneous maintenance of positive relations

with Eurasia and negative relations with the Khrushchevians was not because the Titoists comprador forces maintained a majority stake and the proletariat a minority stake over the state, but that the reverse was the case; the proletariat, they allege, maintained a slim majority share while the comprador forces maintained a very large minority. This view is incorrect, for it again fails to account for why the strategic orientation of the Eurasian state was tilted in favour of the Yugoslav regime against the Peoples' Democracies, in favour of the SAVAK regime against the UAR. Strategic orientation is determined by the question of which faction dominates the military and intelligence bodies of a state, the means of violence, the determinants of the class character of a state. Strategic orientation is not weakly or moderately correlated with the class character of a state. Rather, it is most strongly correlated. It completely reflects on whose side of history – the side of the proletariat, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the cooperativists? Or the side of finance capital, mercantile capital, the bureaucrats, the kulaks, and the feudal landlords? – the state is. And the strategic affiliation of the Khrushchev-era Eurasian state with the latter side of history was direct proof that the slight majority held by the white-collar elements in a CPSU which dominated the Red Army, had been a slight majority that transformed the strategic orientation of the state and, in correlation, converted the Eurasian state into a comprador bourgeois state, not a dictatorship of the proletariat.

C21S4. The 'Anti-Party' Group / On Voroshilov

*** IMG-All-{Voroshilov}

In 1957, the Molotov faction in the CPSU spearheaded an attempt to oust Nikita Khrushchev from the leadership of Eurasia and to install Malenkov in replacement. Malenkov had previously taken Titoist stances and had held views at times more reactionary than those of Khrushchev. However, Malenkov, later re-coopted by the communists, began to assist Molotov in the struggle against Khrushchev's group. The efforts against Khrushchev proved unsuccessful. The latter, supported by an overwhelming majority in the Party, struck back, leading to the demotion of Molotov. To weaken communist influence, the communist-coopted Titoist agent Malenkov and Bulganin too were sharply demoted by the Khrushchev group.

One who belonged to the Molotov faction was Voroshilov. Many do not know that Voroshilov had always been a weak personality somewhat annoying Stalin. Voroshilov was no 'reactionary' man – a comrade of Stalin since the days of the Civil War, he had credentials as a fighter for socialism. However, many among his comrades criticized him for his underperformance. The Titoists had an easy time coopting him, due to his relatively weak personality. In 'The Khrushchevites', Enver Hoxha recalled how Voroshilov joined Nikita Khrushchev in slandering Stalin even in unofficial meetings. In 'Molotov Remembers', Molotov too criticized Voroshilov by mentioning that Voroshilov began to associate himself with the intelligentsia, showed poor performance in his tasks, and started disgracefully siding with Khrushchev. It may have been the case that Khrushchev had managed to intimidate Voroshilov into accepting his line, for Khrushchev used intimidation tactics often. Regardless, by 1957, Voroshilov showed some sympathies with the so-called 'anti-Party' group headed by Molotov and Malenkov against Khrushchev faction: Khrushchev renewed the attack on the anti-party group in the USSR, which has long since been ousted from power, and for the first time publicly named Marshal Voroshilov – former titular chief of the Soviet state – as the seventh member of the group which had sought to unseat him in 1957. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, October 18, 1961, p. 3) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha recalled:

At a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party in the Kremlin, in the summer of 1957, after many criticisms, Khrushchev was left in the minority, and, as Polyansky told us from his own mouth, Khrushchev was dismissed from the task of the first secretary and was appointed minister of agriculture, since he was an "expert on *kukuruz-a*". However, this situation did not last more than a few hours. Khrushchev and his supporters secretly gave the alarm, the marshals surrounded the Kremlin with tanks and soldiers and gave orders that not even a fly was to leave the Kremlin. On the other hand, aircraft were sent to the four corners of the Soviet Union to gather up the members of the Plenum of the CC of the CPSU. "Then," said Polyansky, this product of Khrushchev, "we entered the Kremlin and demanded admission to the meeting. Voroshilov came out and asked what we wanted.

When we told him that we wanted to enter the meeting, he cut us short. When we threatened to use force he said: 'What does all this mean?' But we warned him: 'Mind your words, otherwise we shall arrest you.' We entered the meeting and changed the situation." Khrushchev was restored to power.

(The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 6)

During the purge of the 'anti-Party' group, Voroshilov apparently continued to capitulate to Khrushchev, perhaps in part due to a calculated desire to stay in the system and revolt against the Khrushchev faction at a more opportune time, but certainly also in part because he was easy to cajole and blackmail.

C21S5. Khrushchev (Again) Sabotages the Economy on a Large-Scale through Decentralization / Kosygin Reforms ***

IMG-All-{Economic Titoization in Eurasia}

As confirmed by the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center:

organizational disarray [was] created by Khrushchev's regional economic council (Sovnarkhoz) system. ... (ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY: THE CEASELESS SEARCH FOR PANACEAS, CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, December 1977, p. 13) (IMG)

Details of the corrupt chaotic bureaucracy generated by the Sovnarkhozy of the Khrushchev-led Moscow Titoists is provided by Kenneth Whiting, a prominent scholar from the United States Department of the Air Force, and the Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Maxwell Airbase in Alabama. Whiting basically confirmed that the decentralization policy, which promoted bureaucracy, created a massive disarray in the Soviet economy, sowed chaos, and allowed the creation of loyalist cliques of corrupt nepotist families that neglected the needs of the whole economy and local needs. The following is an excerpt of the document by Whiting:

The Khrushchev Period.—Khrushchev, in his decade of power from 1955 to 1964, ... [was] an advocate of high priority for consumer goods and meaningful investment in agriculture. In his efforts to push his programs Khrushchev was very likely to thrash about nosily, suddenly decide upon a scheme for reorganizing some sector of the economy, or even the whole economy, and then rush about the Soviet Union excoriating officials right down to the local level if he thought them insufficiently responsive to his latest gambit. Needless to say, the Soviet economy was in a state of turmoil during Nikita's hey-day from 1957 to 1964. and even a brief outline of his many reorganizations is bound to seem like a complex story.

On May 7, 1957, Khrushchev addressed the Supreme Soviet on the subject of an overall reorganization of the Soviet economic management and announced some drastic changes. (...). In announcing the new program, Khrushchev stated:

The tasks of further advancing the national economy at the present stage of its development, as has already been said. make it necessary to shift the center of gravity of operational guidance of industry and construction closer to enterprises and construction projects. However. this can be done only by a transition from the management of the national economy through the industrial ministries and agencies to management based on territorial principles. The party Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers hold that the economic councils, which are to be set up in economic administrative regions should become the organizational form of such management.

(...). Under the new system a large number of economic ministries were abolished and 105 Councils of the National Economy (sovnarkhoz) established in their place. Each of the 15 republics had at least one sovnarkhoz, and large republics such as the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. had many. Each of the sovnarkhozy was thus charged with the guidance of a wide variety of enterprises within its geographical area.

In connection with the reorganization, the composition of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers underwent considerable change. Only six All-Union ministries (Construction of Electric Power Stations, Foreign Trade, Medium Machine Building, Railways, Sea Fleet, and Transport Construction) and ten union- republic ministries were retained. This was a drastic reduction from large numbers of ministries prior to the reorganization. But the new Council included 15 chairmen of the Republic Councils of Ministers as well as 11 high officials of Gosplan, raised to ministerial rank. In addition, the heads of over 20 state committees and commissars were also members. Thus the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers had over 60 members.

Under the new system the importance of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission, or Gosplan, was augmented considerably. Khrushchev summed up the role of Gosplan in his speech of May 7, 1957.

The U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission (Gosplan U.S.S.R.) must become the scientific economic planning agency of the country. It is called to submit the requirements of the national economy to profound and comprehensive study. to take into consideration the achievements of science and technology and, on this basis, to draw up proposals for the development of all branches of the national economy, taking the potentialities for the integrated development of the economy most carefully into account, and to rationally utilize resources in the general interests of the state. Under the new conditions, the national economic plans will be drafted on the basis of the union republics and the economic administrative regions. The U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission must insure the correct and proportionate development of the branches of the country's economy and check from these positions the plans of the different union republics and regions.

(...). The plans were formerly routed from Gosplan to ministry to glavk to enterprise, but under the new system they went from Gosplan to Republic Councils of Ministers to their Gosplans to sovnarkhozy to enterprise. This was mandatory if the local desires of the sovnarkhozy and Republic Councils of Ministers were not to take precedence over the goals of the national plan. (...).

The Councils of Ministers in the multi-sovnarkhoz republics found themselves overburdened with detail in trying to settle disputes among their sovnarkhozy. For example, the R.S.F.S.R. had 67 sovnarkhozy to cope with. In July 1960 all-Republic sovnarkhozy were set up in the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to deal with

sovnarkhoz problems within their jurisdiction.

In May 1961 the Soviet leadership came up with a plan to establish 17 large economic regions (10 in the R.S.F.S.R., 3 in the Ukraine, one in Kazakhstan, one for the 3 Baltic Republics, one for the Transcaucasian Republics, and one for the 4 Central Asian Republics). These large economic regions were an attempt to coordinate the production of the various sovnarkhozy more in the way of what the central planners wanted. Nothing, however, seemed to lick the problem of "localism". New protective "family circles" composed of the top officials of the sovnarkhoz, the enterprises, and sometimes the Republic Gosplan were constantly emerging, and drastic penalties did not seem to stop the tendency. These officials put their local welfare first and the national plan second whenever they thought they could get away with it. Sometimes the sovnarkhoz tried to make itself self-sufficient so as not to be dependent on the vagaries of outside sources of supply, even though the local inputs cost more. In other words, they were guilty of the same sin that the former ministries had been accused of. but this time it was on a local level.

(Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase Alabama, United States Department of the Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, 1970, Kenneth R. Whiting, pp. 58-60) (IMG)

Years later, the CIA reported on how some of Khrushchev gang's saboteurial 'reforms' were repealed and stated:

The restoration of the economic ministries and the centralization of responsibility for some key functions in newly created state committees had a positive impact, eliminating the near-chaotic situation created by Khrushchev's organizational innovations. The implementation of other aspects of the reforms ... has been characterized by considerable recentralization of decision-making authority, removal of elements of spontaneity, and increasing complexity in decision-making rules and related incentives. (ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY: THE CEASELESS SEARCH FOR PANACEAS, CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, December 1977, p. 17) (IMG)

The year 1965 also saw another major sabotage policy partially enforced through a decentralization "reform." In fact, during this period, the spectre of Titoism-Beriyaism continued to haunt the Soviet economy. As Sergo Beria put it:

In 1965 Kosygin took up some of my father's ideas on the economy but applied them only partially. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 277) (IMG)

The prominent scholar Albert Szymanski, perhaps out of naivete rather than opportunist intent, defended the policies implemented by the Belgrade and Moscow Titoists, and wrote books in their defense. Szymanski, who stated that central planning was as dominant in Eurasia as it had ever been, nonetheless admitted:

The 1965 Kosygin Reforms reduced the number of planned targets assigned to enterprises from between 20 and 30 to eight. These were: (1) the total quantity of goods to be produced and sold, (2) the main assortment of these goods, (3) the size of the wage fund, (4) the amount and rate of profit, (5) the payment to and allocation from the state budget, (6) the volume of investment and exploitation of fixed assets, (7) the main assignment for improving technology, and (8) the allocation of material and technical supplies. In addition it should be remembered that all wage rates and prices, as well as interest rates and the main distribution of credit, remained centrally determined. The number one indicator of success by which managers were judged (and so their bonuses decided and their future careers determined) was 'realized output' i.e. the actual material quantity of goods sold. (Is the Red Flag Flying: The Political Economy of the Soviet Union Today, Albert Szymanski, June 1979, p. 40) (IMG)

The greater the number of indicators, the more the pressure on the enterprises to improve the different aspects of the production process, with regards to quantity, and more importantly, with regards to quality. That is, the large number of indicators would specify the qualitative details of the production. The dramatic reduction of the number of indicators was – contrary to Szymanski's beliefs – a severe decentralization program that dramatically reduced the quality of products. Hence, the decentralization amounted to yet another major economic sabotage by the Moscow Titoists. The media of the CPSU in 1971 reported that the 1965 reforms brought even greater autonomy for enterprises:

The [23rd] Congress adopted the Directives for the Five-Year Plan for 1966-70. It drew attention to the need to strengthen economic methods and stimuli in management of the economy, to improve planning and increase the economic initiative and independence of industrial enterprises and collective and state farms. (THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU: What the Congress Discussed and Decided, March 30, 1971 to April 9, 1971, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, p. 78) (IMG{Communist Resurgence})

Nonetheless, by the late 1960s, the communist anti-Titoist faction saw a rise in influence, and was able to partially undo some of the sabotage carried out by the Moscow Titoists:

Another reform occurred in 1973 which coincided with the re-centralization of authority over enterprises and which was probably its corollary. Facing the continuing problem of the geometrically growing complexity of central planning and the problems of decentralizing authority, individual enterprises are being consolidated into

multi-enterprise associations. Each association either links enterprises which perform similar functions or links those that are closely integrated economically with each other (typically they are in close physical proximity). Thus considerable decision making power is now vested in this middle level between the enterprise and the ministry. Centrally planned targets are now given only to the association which in turn allocates its responsibilities to its various constituent units, thereby considerably simplifying the job of the centre without losing any fundamental control. The average number of enterprises per association is three to five with usually around 4,000 employees per association. (Is the Red Flag Flying: The Political Economy of the Soviet Union Today, Albert Szymanski, June 1979, p. 40) (IMG)

The correct policy would have of course been to restore the powers of the ministries, instead of creating these Associations of Production, the combined of enterprises mentioned above. However, the formation of such combines was nonetheless a partial though vastly insufficient undoing of the decentralization project.

C21S6. Bulgaria's Revisionist Economic Reform

*** IMG-All- {Bulgaria}

With the blessing of the Kremlin Titoists, Bulgaria's Titoists headed by Zhivkov decentralized the state industries in a sneaky manner. In all economies, there are ministries and state enterprises. Scientific socialism advocates the gradual but steady centralization of the economy such that the rate of centralization correlates with the process of the development of the productive forces. Therefore, if scientific socialist policies were to be carried out in Bulgaria, the economy would have been concentrated in the economic ministries over time. The Titoists in Sofia on the other hand, skillfully decentralized the economy through the establishment of the 'state industrial associations', a series of economic organizational and planning bodies that lied in between the state enterprises and the economic ministries. The powers of the economic ministries were decentralized onto the state industrial associations, and the level of authority that economic ministries had over the state enterprises was handed over to these mid-level state industrial associations. As such, it appeared as though the economy was centralized away from state enterprises and onto the state industrial organizations, whereas in reality, the economy was decentralized from the economic ministries at the top onto the mid-level, the state industrial organizations. By the way, the same kind of a strategy had been pursued by the Slansky faction in Czechoslovakia in order to sabotage the economy, as shown in C15S8. A 1974 book published by the media of the 'Bulgarian Communist Party' Central Committee explained in depth the history of 'socialist' Bulgaria's political economy. The book admitted:

The state industrial associations, which in 1954 were renamed industrial departments and general directorates, generally until 1959, when the management of the national economy was organized on a territorial basis, represented superior organizations over enterprises with relatively broad autonomy in their operational management. They had the rights of legal entities, had certain features of separate business units, as they had the right to dispose of machinery, equipment, vehicles and valuables made available to the enterprises involved in them. However, their balance sheet and profit were formed as the sum of the balance sheets and profits of enterprises. The associations were not materially responsible for the results of the economic activity of their subordinate enterprises. However, with the planning system, with the right to shift fixed and working capital and direct bank credit, they were a unit in the management of enterprises, which even then showed its advantages and helped the development of industry, especially in some industries with more enterprises. Associations such as Vinprom, Tobacco Monopoly, Canning Industry and others managed to cover, direct and centralize the activity of purchasing, processing and marketing the products. With this, specific independent economic functions developed in them. In principle, however, their main task was to manage, plan and control the activities of enterprises. In all cases, the main responsibility and the main economic functions were concentrated in the enterprises. (THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, Partizdat (Publishing House, Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party), Sofia, 1974, pp. 196-197) (IMG)

Then, in 1959, the economy was further decentralized to a level below the state industrial organizations and still above the state enterprises. The growth of inefficient, corrupt, bureaucracies was encouraged through the decentralization:

In 1959 the form of economic management of enterprises was reorganized on an administrative- territorial basis. The associations were closed and the enterprises were subordinated to the "Industry" department of the district people's councils.

For about three years, the companies were territorially subordinated, but did not change their economic and legal nature. Until 1964, when the experimentation of a new system of management of the national economy began, they worked under the economic and legal conditions set by the Law on State-Owned Enterprises. According to these conditions, they had a certain property independence, had fixed and working capital and as a final result made a profit or had a loss. They had a separate account with the Bulgarian National Bank and were accountable to the state for the results of their business activities.

The fixed assets and their working capital were expanded on the basis of a plan, using own and borrowed

funds or funds from the state budget. The budget received taxes from enterprises, the most important of which was the turnover tax. The state could seize surpluses from the working capital of enterprises, cover their losses, provide subsidies and finance their capital investments free of charge. Due to the great need to centralize the accumulations for solving the main tasks of socialist construction, a significant part of the realized profit was accumulated in the state budget.

A characteristic feature of the functioning of business organizations during this period was the immediate planning of their activities on all indicators. The plan of the enterprises was built on their proposals, but after its compilation by the state authorities it took on a directive character. The system of material interest and stimulation of the collectives and the managements of the enterprises was built mainly on the basis of the implementation of the plans by volume and by some of the qualitative and value indicators. The savings from the salary fund, the reduction of the prime cost, the realization of the profit were sources or conditions for the formation of incentive funds, which served for the bonus of the leading engineering and technical personnel.

The economic relations between the enterprises were direct and each of them bore economic responsibility for the performance of the contracts. The companies were also a party in the negotiations with the bank for obtaining working capital loans. The capital investments they received were mostly gratuitous, depending on the planned needs. Their development depended mainly on the considerations provided for in the national economic plan.

(THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, Partizdat (Publishing House, Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party), Sofia, 1974, pp. 197-198) (IMG)

Naturally, the decentralization of economic decision-making to local districts turned each district into its own independent economic 'kingdom', and these local kingdoms naturally had a tendency not to coordinate. The result was a highly uncoordinated, chaotic, inefficient bureaucratic economy. Furthermore, it is always more difficult for anti-corruption 'watchdog' or supervisory bodies to track corrupt activities among numerous local bureaus than it is for them to track in a few concentrated bureaus. The bureaucratic chaos and the weakened anti-corruption drive, boosted the corrupt bureaucratic class, upon which the Bulgarian Titoists relied, in that country. The US Department of the Army and the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress have always advocated economic decentralization. Yet so pervasive was the bureaucratic corruption resultant from decentralization that even the US Department of the Army and the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress could not hide the fact that in this system:

major enterprise directors used newly decentralized financial resources to line their own pockets. (Bulgaria: A Country Study, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, sponsored by the US Department of the Army, June 1992) (IMG)

C21S7. 'Peaceful Coexistence'

Lenin and Stalin denounced the Trotskyite thesis of worldwide military adventurism, in favor of the thesis of 'peaceful coexistence' between socialist and non-socialist states. At the same time, Lenin and Stalin argued for the intensification of class struggles within each country. They regarded participation in parliaments as a tool with which to pursue the agenda of an armed revolution. The MI6 agent Khrushchev, on the other hand, deliberately misinterpreted the line on 'peaceful coexistence' as meaning that class struggles should cease altogether, that any kind of revolutionary confrontation against imperialists and fascists must end, that armed struggle should completely cease, and that almost-exclusively parliamentary means for reaching 'socialism' should be adopted. The CIA's daily bulletin reported:

Khrushchev, prior to his visit to the United States, told Indian Communist party secretary Ajoy Ghosh that Communist parties in India and other non-bloc countries should avoid uprisings and other "warlike situations" since their overall effect would be harmful to the growth of Communism.. While Ghosh presumably presented the Soviet leader's remarks in a manner designed to give the greatest possible support to his own moderate position within the Indian party, Khrushchev's instructions are consistent with Moscow's current emphasis on relaxation of international tensions.

Khrushchev was reported by Ghosh as having justified his views on the grounds that if war can be avoided for three or four years, the military strength of the bloc will surpass that of the West, especially the United States. He also explained that while the USSR would try to give aid in the event of uprisings by "progressive forces" in non-bloc countries, violent actions would lead reactionary elements to unite in suppressing them.

The Soviet leader's counsel to Ghosh follows closely the advice given Indian Communists by letter from the Soviet party in late July just before the fall of the Kerala Communist regime. Moscow then suggested continuing to rely on "parliamentary means" to come to power. The Chinese Communists, while agreeing with this general policy line, suggested to Ghosh during his visit to Peiping in early September that the Indian party should adopt a "tougher" line in opposing Nehru and Congress party policies or it would risk losing the Indian Communist party's right wing to "reactionary forces." Ghosh, who returned to Peiping for national day celebrations on 1 October because of fears the Chinese might throw their support to the left wing of his party and thus jeopardize

his position as party secretary, planned to leave Peiping for another visit to Moscow on 10 October.

(‘Khrushchev Advises on Communist Tactics’, CIA, October 10, 1959. In: ‘CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN[15787706]’, CIA, October 10, 1959, p. 1) (IMG)

Nikita Khrushchev’s Titoist revisionist distortion of the Lenin-Stalin principle of ‘peaceful coexistence’ was manifested in every country.

C21S8. Dictatorial Khrushchev Fosters Cult of Personality Around Himself

Contrary to the Anglo-American imperialist propaganda which depicts Khrushchev as democratic and committed to collective leadership, the opposite is true. Khrushchev was dictatorial, and forced Party members to adopt his policy line. Myron Rush, an employee of the CIA and the RAND Corporation, reported:

Perhaps the most striking evidence of Khrushchev's capacity to change the composition of the leading bodies is the nature of the Central Committee elected at the 22nd Party Congress (1961). The majority of voting members (around 60 percent) were newly promoted; moreover, about half the candidate members from the previous Central Committee failed to win re-election. Khrushchev dominated the proceedings at Central Committee plenums, frequently bullying the speakers — even Politburo members. He was a great innovator, and while some of his schemes were successfully resisted, it is remarkable how many of his innovations actually were enacted (including some highly disruptive ones) and how much his successors found necessary to repeal. (Brezhnev and the Succession Issue, Myron Rush. In: Problems of Communism, Vol. 20, July – August 1970, p. 11) (IMG)

A SAVAK spy with extensive contacts to the international communist movement and the Warsaw Pact countries reported that in fact, Nikita Khrushchev:

created a new form of cult of personality in the Soviet Union. In fact, his aim was to take over Stalin’s spot through demagogical measures and through compromise with the Western world. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: ‘Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents’ [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

The SAVAK spy continued:

He [i.e. Khrushchev] made serious errors in his relations with other socialist countries, ... in a vulgar way. He basically forgot the relations of equality between the socialist countries and created the role of the father of the world of socialism for himself. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: ‘Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents’ [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

Khrushchev also:

moved away from communism and pursued a policy line of megalomania and careerism. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: ‘Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents’ [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

C21S9. Confessing the End of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat / The Terror Attack in Novocherkassk

*** IMG- All-{Khrushchev – Political}

Almost 5 years after the 1956 capitalist restoration and overthrow of the socialist Soviet state, Titoist leaders officially admitted that the country they ruled was no longer socialist. In 1961, the Party, partly owing to the fact that white-collar and bourgeois intellectual elements formed its majority, and partly under the dictatorial coercion of Khrushchev, officially denounced what it had already unofficially denounced years ago: dictatorship of the proletariat. Indeed, the new rules of the Party stated that the ‘Communist Party’ which used to be the Party of the proletariat, had become the ‘party of the Soviet people as a whole’ and that socialism had ‘triumphed completely’:

Socialism has triumphed completely and finally. The Communist Party, the party of the working class, has today become the party of the Soviet people as a whole. (Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, October 31, 1961, p. 5)

Not until the communist stage is reached can it be said that ‘socialism has triumphed completely and finally’. And in this specific context, to argue that the party was the party of the ‘Soviet people as a whole’ would mean to also include the corrupt bureaucratic class hostile to the proletariat as a part of the ‘Soviet people’. Anyways, thanks for almost admitting that the territory of the former Soviet Union was no longer ruled by the proletariat.

Another course of action which the Khrushchev group undertook was to launch a suppressive terrorist attack on the workers in order to prevent the resurgence of the communist faction in the CPSU. By the early 1960s, popular pressure against the Khrushchev-Mikoyan group had begun to mount. Large-scale anti-Titoist manifestations of the working class in Novocherkassk occurred. In the streets, the proletarians demonstrated support for the legacies of the USSR, Lenin and

Stalin, and against the corrupt Titoist elites. They also protested against the falling wages, and higher prices. The response of the ruling Titoist elites, the Khrushchev-Mikoyan group, was to shoot those workers. The case of the Novocherkassk massacre has been widely documented in the Anglo-American imperialist media. However, it has also been corroborated. In a 2018 statement, the Russian Communist Workers' Party, which is a new Party that emerged after 1991, confirmed:

Abandoning dictatorship of proletariat and the goal of socialism changed the class essence of the state.

The state became incapable of acting in the interests of workers class, these interests being the interests of society during proletarian dictatorship. It's indicative to point out that the revisionist program of the nationwide party was adopted by the XXII Congress of CPSU in the autumn of 1961, whereas in June 1962 in the city Novocherkassk of Rostov Region there were applied troops against workers that expressed their protest against rising prices, falling wages and boorishness of the officials. The protesters were shot at. Thus we can say that dozens of victims among workers served as the first evidence of the so called nationwide state and the party led by N.S. Khrushchev in the making. (REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST WORKERS' PARTY (RCWP-CPSU), 100 years since the Great October Socialist Revolution and the lessons for contemporary communists, April 18, 2018) (IMG)

Chapter 22

C22S1. The Partial Resurgence of the Communists via Brezhnev Group

*** IMG-All-{Communist Resurgence}

In post-1956 Eurasia, the only realistic way to restore socialism was for communists and their progressive allies to expand their influence over the Eurasian intelligence and military, so that proletariat would expand their influence over the means of violence, while minimizing the anti-communist Titoist faction's influence over the means of violence. Then, after controlling the means of violence, the communists could use legal mechanisms to purge off many of the corrupt bureaucrats and counter-revolutionary intellectuals that existed in the CPSU, and to lobby for greater percentage representation of blue-collar elements in the CPSU. Through the purges of the white-collar elements and the increased quantity of blue-collar elements, the leap from quantity to quality could occur, and socialism would be restored. The control of the communist agents of the proletariat over the means of violence could bring about purges that would change the character of the state; and the use of the means of violence would give these changes a revolutionary character, even though the change would be gradual and hence would superficially appear as 'reformistic'. This is why the communist comrades of Stalin in the Red Army – Shtemenko, Vasilevsky, and Konev – did not give up their positions in the military – the means of violence – after 1956, and continued to work within the Eurasian state apparatus.

The left-opportunist reactionary tools of imperialist-fascist secret services – e.g. Mao's gang and their Maoist followers – condemned those communists who did not give up their positions as 'collaborators', 'reformists', and 'revisionists'. Later on, they also added 'social-fascist' and 'social-imperialist' to the list of their swear words against these communists. Why did the Maoists do this? There were many reasons, but a key reason was to increase pressure on the communist forces who resisted the Titoist Khrushchev faction to give up their resistance, and thereby leave the stage to be dominated by the Titoist Khrushchev faction and their Anglo-American imperialist backers. The Maoist left-deviation sought to strengthen the Khrushchev right-deviation through such left-opportunist rhetoric, such revisionist rhetoric disguised as 'anti-revisionist'. Under the cover of 'fighting reformism', the Maoists wanted the communists to give up their influence over the means of violence, so that the only kind of resistance against the Khrushchevians would be the unarmed reformist 'resistance'. Under the cover of 'refusing' to collaborate with the Khrushchevians, the Maoists advocated what amounted to greater strength for the Khrushchevians. The hostile attitude towards communist influence over the Red Army is why Mao's gang launched the social-chauvinist invasion against Eurasia in the late 1960s, murdering Red Army units – during the late 1960s, communist comrades of Stalin, such as general Shtemenko, were elevated and gained more prominent positions in the military.

In Eurasia, the comprador bourgeois elements dominated the state, and hence Eurasia was a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie. However, the dominance of the comprador elements was not as pervasive as it was, for example, in Yugoslavia. Hence, whereas in Eurasia, the communists could operate both covertly and overtly against the reactionary forces, in Yugoslavia, the way forward was for communists to operate covertly against the regime, try to infiltrate its ranks, and destabilize the state from within. In Eurasia, a 'communist' armed rebellion against the state would have bogged down the Red Army – the stronghold of the communist faction – for suppressing the rebellion, hence weakening the communist forces. In Yugoslavia on the other hand, the Yugoslav army was a stronghold of Titoist fascist butchers, and hence an armed communist rebellion against it would have weakened the Titoist faction and was thereby to be hailed as progressive. In judging whether an armed rebellion against a comprador bourgeois state is to be launched, one must ask: whom will the armed rebellion target – revolutionaries or reactionaries? If revolutionary infiltrators in the counter-revolutionary state would be the target of the armed rebellion from below, then the communists should not launch such a rebellion. If, however, the counter-revolutionaries in the counter-revolutionary state would be the inevitable target of the armed revolt from below, the armed rebellion from below should by all means be launched, in a manner that accounts for the strategic and tactical conditions.

Nikita Khrushchev was indeed able to undermine the socialist forces. However, the conditions of the world were not very favorable to the Khrushchev faction by the 1960s. Firstly, by 1962, the Kennedy Administration successfully curbed CIA influence worldwide, thereby giving the Khrushchev group less lobbying power in the struggle against the communist faction. The team of Kennedy had a direct role in staging counter-coups against imperialist-backed fascist regimes (one of which, by the way, was the Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim regime, supported by Khrushchev and the Anglo-American imperialists). The curbing of CIA influence allowed for the collapse of many imperialist-backed regimes in 1962-1964 all around the world. Inevitably, this global decline of the CIA influence during the Kennedy years favoured the communist faction in Moscow, resulting in the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev and his replacement by Leonid Brezhnev.

It is no secret that Brezhnev was a Titoist, and a pupil and agent of Nikita Khrushchev. This was mentioned in C19S7.2. Through the leadership of Brezhnev, the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie continued to exercise influence in Eurasian affairs. Nonetheless, the fact that the Khrushchev group planted its agent Brezhnev in charge of key aspects of the military also made Brezhnev more accessible to the communist anti-Titoist elements to be found in the military. In time, with the weakening of the Khrushchev faction in the early 1960s, the surrounding of Brezhnev by the communist

anti-Titoist elements was tantamount to communist anti-Titoist encircling and hence coopting of Brezhnev. Coopted by the communists, Brezhnev organized the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964. During the period 1964-1968, the policy line of the Titoists headed by Khrushchev largely continued, but clearly began to decline. Note that during those years, the Titoists in Eurasia still had enough power to ensure the military funding of the regime of the Shah and in supporting the Salah Jadid group's Trotskyite coup against the Ba'athists in Syria in 1965 (see C21S2.1). At the same time, the communists were increasing their influence over the Red Army, and the Red Army was deploying its forces in the border with China in order to confront China's terror regime (see C23S5.4). By 1968, the communist faction in Eurasia had greater influence, the results of which were the elevation of Stalin's comrades, Red Army commanders Shtemenko and Vasilevsky in the hierarchy of the Warsaw Pact and Red Army forces. With the rise of Brezhnev therefore, anti-Titoist elements gained greater influence over the government. The Central Intelligence Agency rightly made note of:

The persistently expanding political role of the Soviet military leaders. (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

It was not the case that the expansion of the influence of the military leaders was resulting in a military dictatorship instead of the rule of the Party. Rather the 'STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER' CIA document's reference to the increase in the role of the military leaders was a reference to a specific faction, the communist faction, of the Red Army. As an indication of the trends in the ideological development, the CIA document added:

the military [were] prominent in [the] rehabilitation of Stalin as a wartime leader.. (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

Karen Dawisha of the CIA's Brookings Institute wrote:

The question of Stalin's place in Soviet history had been fiercely argued since his death, with his contribution clearly receiving more favorable appraisal after Khrushchev was ousted. In June 1968 a book was published entitled *The General Staff During the War*, by General Sergei Shtemenko, who praised Stalin's wartime leadership. In a review of the book, *Krasnaya zvezda* commented that the General Staff had not been so unprepared for the Nazi invasion as some historians believed. The attack had not thrown the General Staff into disarray, thanks primarily to Stalin, who had remained in the Kremlin throughout, refusing to evacuate the Staff headquarters to underground shelters in Kirovskaya Metro. Shtemenko, who had been demoted by Khrushchev for his loyalty to Stalin, was soon to regain some of his former prominence. He was to become the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact only three weeks before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. (The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, Karen Dawisha, 1984, p. 205) (IMG{Czechoslovakia})

Correlated with the rise of the communist faction in the Red Army was the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the weakening of the Tito faction in Yugoslavia in 1968 and of the Gomulka faction in Poland in 1969-1970. In the Middle East, increased Eurasian military and intelligence presence was useful in strengthening Egyptian commandos in the War of Attrition against the Israeli occupation of the Sinai in 1969, a factor which elevated the Mapam faction led by the communist intelligence agent Yigal Allon in Israel. Correlated with these was the destabilization of the reactionary foes of Egypt – such as the royalist Libyan regime, the Jadidist Syrian regime, and the Abdel-Rahman Aref regime (not to be confused with Abdel-Salam Aref) – which led to the 1969 Free Officer coup in Libya, the Hafez Al-Assad faction's ascendancy to dominance in 1969-1970, and the 1968 Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr faction's Ba'athist coup in Iraq. In Somalia, Siad Barre's terror gang was forced to capitulate to the communist faction of the Red Army; in South Yemen, the Abdel-Fattah Al-Isma'il faction was pushing ahead against the Maoist elements; in Saudi Arabia, the Faysal faction, the progressive bourgeois-democratic faction with a long history of strategic partnership with the Stalin-era USSR, saw a major boost in its influence. Even in Egypt, after the Sadatist takeover in 1970-1971, the Sadat gang was, for the while, so weak that the Nasserist forces in Egypt forced the Sadat gang to cooperate with Syria and Libya. There was a boost in Eurasian aid to Cuba. In France, after a brief setback in 1968-1969, the Gaullists, the agents of the French imperialist rivals of Anglo-American-German imperialism, saw a further boost in their influence at home. Many positive developments were occurring worldwide, thanks to the partial resurgence of the communist faction in the Red Army and the CPSU. So shaken were the dark forces of fascist reaction, thanks to only a partial – only a partial! – communist resurgence in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

In the sphere of the economy, many of the liberalization reforms which were sabotaging the economy were slowed down. As a result of the increased influence of the anti-Titoist elements, there was a:

Slow-down in economic reform (major elements of the program are not being implemented. (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

The Maoist and Hoxhaist currents mislead progressive-minded individuals by claiming that the Brezhnev era was as bad as the Khrushchev era. It is worth reminding these left-deviationists that the policy of promoting Brezhnev against Khrushchev was the policy of Stalin. As mentioned in C19S7.2, Stalin's plan was to first coopt the Malenkov – Bulganin group and support this coopted group against the Beriaites and the Beriaites against the Malenkov-Bulganin group. The next step was to coopt the Khrushchev team and support it against the Beriaites and the Malenkov- Bulganin group. The third step was to coopt Brezhnev and then promote him against Khrushchev. The latter steps were basically 'Salami Tactics', Soviet-style. That Khrushchev, Malenkov and Beria were covertly allies, and that Brezhnev was an agent of Khrushchev, was a definitive fact. However, on the overt level, they pretended to have opposed each other, and they could be coopted and used against each other. That is why Stalin brought Brezhnev to the high ranks:

In August 1951, after Ignat'ev's appointment, several new men, all associated with Khrushchev, suddenly appeared in the MGB: A. A. Epishev, a party secretary in Ukraine, and I. T. Savchenko, also from the Ukrainian party apparatus, became deputy ministers of State Security; V. E. Makarev, a former Moscow party official during Khrushchev's tenure there in the 1930s, became chief of the MGB Personnel Department. In addition, a lesser official named N. R. Mironov, who had served in the Ukrainian party apparatus under Khrushchev's protege Leonid Brezhnev was brought to Moscow to work for the MGB. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 158) (IMG)

The next stage was to unfold a few months later, with ... Khrushchev suffering the same fate. No great problem there. Stalin would have left no witness in place. He would have got rid of the old Politburo and promoted new people, idiots like Brezhnev. After winning the Third World War he was determined to correct all the 'mistaken' interpretations of historical events which had been current in the West. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergio Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

After Stalin's death, in the 1950s, General Konev had a role in coopting Malenkov and using him against Beria, then coopting and partnering with Khrushchev and using Khrushchev against Malenkov. General Shtemenko and General Vasilevsky were responsible for coopting and supporting Brezhnev against Khrushchev in the 1960s. Stalin, Konev, Shtemenko, and Vasilevsky were all communist friends, hostile to the Titoist faction, and were all named as the targets of the Doctors' Plot. Therefore, the narrative promoted by Maoist and Hoxhaist currents is quite misleading; it is true that Brezhnev himself was a Titoist reactionary 'at heart' but he was coopted by the communist forces and pursued many correct policies on different fronts.

During the Brezhnev era, the communists in the Red Army also increased confrontation against the Titoist Regimes, in particular:

the Rumanian and Yugoslav practice[s].. (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

A tougher line on the Yugoslav regime was shown. One notable statement was

written by General Konstantin S. Bochkarev, a military theoretician, in the 14 February issue of the Ministry of Defense Daily Red Star (Krasnaya Zvezda). (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

Remarkably:

the article Bochkarev was directing criticism, and possibly even implied threats, to the Rumanians and Yugoslavs. (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

The Brezhnevian phenomenon was very well-reflected in the membership composition of the Party. Whereas the Khrushchevian era marked the rule of the white-collar elements as the dominant majority in the Party, the Brezhnevian era marked the rule of the white-collar elements as the dominant minority in the Party. This meant that like the Khrushchev era, Titoist policies were to continue, but also that unlike the Khrushchev era, the anti-Titoist elements and the remnants of the communist faction could much greater exercise greater influence over the Party. The dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie in Eurasia was not overthrown, but it was weakened, no doubt.

The US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported that the white collar / intelligentsia / bureaucrat stratum dominated the revisionist CPSU, but they dominated it no longer as a majority but as the largest minority; they now composed a significant amount less than 50% of the Party membership composition:

Over the years, the CPSU has become largely a white-collar organization of careerists although it attempts to retain contact with the "masses" through recruitment from the workers and, to a lesser degree, the peasants. Still, the tendency of the better educated and professionals to seek membership for opportunistic reasons reinforces trends that tend to turn the party into a conventional ruling caste. At the beginning of 1968, 94,000 doctors and candidates of arts and sciences were party members; this is more than half of the total number of scholars with advanced degrees in the USSR. Similarly, about 33% of the country's engineers, of the agronomists and livestock experts, 25% of the teachers, and of the medical doctors were party members in early 1968. Males predominate

at a 4:1 ratio, although the percentage of women has risen from to in the last 40 years. The CPSU is overwhelmingly urban in composition; workers comprised 38% of total membership in 1967, white-collar employees and others comprised almost 46%; and only 16% came from collective farms. This last percentage sank to 11.4% in November 1969. (World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Issue 22, US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, CIA, 1970, p. 72) (IMG)

Approximately 2-3 years later, there was an increase in the percentage of the blue-collar workers and again a decline in the percentage of the white-collar elements:

The period under review has seen further growth of the Party ranks and qualitative improvement in the composition of its membership. At present the CPSU membership is 14,455,321, or nine per cent of the country's adult population. The membership composition is as follows: workers, 40.1 per cent; farmers, 15.1 per cent; and office employees, 44.8 per cent. It should be noted that over two-thirds of these office employees are engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors, scientists, and workers in the field of literature and art.

Three million people have joined the CPSU since the 23rd Congress. Of these, almost 1.6 million are workers. The speaker noted that the requirements for CPSU membership have been raised. The Party has begun to rid itself more resolutely of those who violate Party and state discipline, or abuse their official powers, or whose behaviour casts a slur on the name of Communist.

All these years the CPSU and its Central Committee have undeviatingly followed the line of further developing inner-Party democracy, observing the Leninist norms of Party life, and stepping up the activity of Communists. The Party has consistently implemented the principle of electivity and accountability of its leading bodies. The spirit of collective effort and collective leadership has taken firm root. Questions relating to Party work are discussed and decided on a thoroughly democratic basis.

(THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU: What the Congress Discussed and Decided, March 30, 1971 to April 9, 1971, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, p. 20. MIA) (IMG)

Then, in 1976, there was again an increase in the percent composition of the blue-collar elements in the Party (41.6%), and a slight decline in the white-collar elements, the intelligentsia and other white-collar employees together forming 44%:

Since the 24th Congress, nearly 2.6 million men and women have been admitted into the CPSU. At present the Party has 15,694,000 members. Of them 41.6 per cent are workers, 13.9 per cent collective farmers, nearly 20 per cent intellectuals in the technical fields, and over 24 per cent workers in science, literature, the arts, education, public health, management and the military spheres. (Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, Leonid Brezhnev, February 24, 1976. In: Documents and Resolutions: The XXV Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, pp. 75-76. MIA) (IMG)

By 1981, the white-collar elements held only a slight margin over the blue-collar elements, according to the Party's report, but they continued to rule as the largest minority:

In the period under review the membership of the CPSU grew by 1,800,000. Today it has 17,480,000 members. Of these, 43.4 per cent are factory workers, 12.8 per cent are collective farmers and 43.8 per cent are members of the technical, scientific and creative intelligentsia, workers in education, medicine and culture, people working in administrative apparatus, and members of the armed forces. (Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, Leonid Brezhnev, February 23, 1981. In: Peace, Plans, and Progress: The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A New World Review Collection, edited by Marilyn Bechtel, David Laibman, & Daniel Rosenberg, 1981, p. 83. MIA) (IMG)

Social Composition (in terms of class or stratum) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Percentages			
Year	Workers	Cooperativist Peasants	White-Collar (Intelligentsia, 'Technocrats', Bureaucrats)
1946	33.8	18.6	47.6
1952	32.2	18.0	49.8
1956	32.0	17.1	50.9
1961	33.9	17.6	48.5
1966	37.8	16.2	46.0
1971	40.1	15.1	44.8
1976	41.6	13.9	44.5
1981	43.4	12.8	43.8
1983	44.1	12.4	43.5

(Source: 'The CPSU: Stages of History', CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1985, pp. 96-97. Depending on the specific year, the data above is either corroborated or validated by facts and statistics provided by the CIA.)

In this situation, since the white-collar elements only held a small margin over the blue-collar workers, the blue-collar workers and the cooperative peasants in the Party could together form a majority with which to dominate the minority white-collar elements. Surely, the cooperative peasantry were not as proletarian in class character as the actual proletariat, but surely also, their class interests converged enough with the working class to lead them to side with the blue-collar elements in the Party on most issues. The collectivized peasants, in a socialistic and collective manner, owned big agricultural businesses, thereby giving them the ability to afford taking risks against the reactionary class forces, unlike the petit-bourgeoisie who feel that they cannot afford to risk losing their businesses by standing up against finance capital. Due to this character of the collectivized peasantry, they are more susceptible to cooperation with the proletariat. **In this midst, the leap from quantity and quality had occurred enough to render Eurasia back into a dictatorship of the proletariat, albeit a fragile and weak dictatorship of the proletariat. For that period in time in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 'Eurasia' became the Soviet Union again, a socialist state.** By 1983, according to the CPSU data, the proletarians once again formed the largest percentage. The composition of the CPSU in the early 1980s bore some resemblance to the composition of the Party in the early 1920s. The difference however was that in the 1920s, the balance of power was not so decisively in favor of the Anglo-American imperialists, whereas in the 1980s, the global balance of power was in the favor of the Anglo-American imperialists. The Red Army was bogged down in the war in Afghanistan, meaning that communist and anti-Titoist elements in it had to reallocate more resources away from the fight against the Titoist bureaucrats onto fighting Al-Qaeda. This gave the white-collar elements more space to breathe in the political sense, and thus meant that the struggle for weakening the white-collar elements in the Party peaked by the early 1980s. With the bogging down of the Red Army in Afghanistan and the military setbacks it faced, the socialist faction that dominated the Soviet state apparatus was rolled back again and lost leverage, thereby giving increased strength to the Titoist faction. Hence, by the mid-1980s, the white-collar elements regained control over the state apparatus. The rise of the Gorbachevian tendency was a symptom of this white-collar control over the state, party, military, and intelligence bodies.

C22S2. East Germany Transitions to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

*** IMG-All-{GDR}

SED Party membership had the blue collar workers as the largest percentage. The blue-collar workers together with the kolkhoz peasants constituted the majority in the SED membership. It is worth mentioning that whereas the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie, who have too small of businesses to risk competition with imperialist finance capital, the kolkhoz farmers have big businesses, big businesses that are controlled democratically by the farmers working in them and which are large enough as businesses to be able to risk standing up against imperialism. Hence, the collective farmers gain a pro-socialist anti-imperialist class characteristic, making them allies of the proletariat.

In a document co-authored by Colonel Donald W. Bernier – the former Director of Foreign Intelligence Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the US Department of the Army – and William Giloane – a researcher working for the US State Department – it was written:

Statistics coming out of the Seventh Party Congress reported a total of 1,769,912 SED members, with blue-collar workers listed as the largest single component—over 45 percent of the party membership. Salaried workers, consisting largely of members of the bureaucracy in state and party offices, made up the next largest group, with some 16 percent of the total membership. In order to portray the SED as a worker's party, the leadership asserts that the salaried employees and the intelligentsia (see Glossary) are also workers. Compared to the party composition as reported in 1961, there was an 11-percent increase in the number of blue-collar workers by the time of the Seventh Party Congress and a decline in salaried employees from 32 to 16.1 percent. Because the for categorizing the membership are not known, however, the differences may be in the manner of classification rather than in actual in membership (see table 10). (AREA HANDBOOK FOR EAST GERMANY, Eugene K. Keefe, Donald W. Bernier, Lyle E. Brennehan, Wayne A. Culp, William Giloane, James M. Moore, Jr., 1972, p. 144) (IMG)

The table below, using information from the document by the Colonel, sheds light on the class struggles within the SED. By the 1970s, East Germany was ending the private sector:

Since December 1971 the government has been engaged in a major effort to nationalize the remaining private and semi-private enterprises, which employ one out of every seven industrial employees.

The industrial sector is 79% nationalized, while handicrafts and small artisan operations have a higher proportion of private and semi-nationalized ownership. Transportation and communications are 93% state-owned,

while construction is 52% nationalized. Cooperatives make up about 80% of agricultural management, and state farms account for 16%. No other country in Eastern Europe has achieved collectivization to this extent.

(Basic Data on the Economy of East Germany, US Department of Commerce, Office of East-West Trade Development, Bureau of East-West Trade, James Ellis, 1973, p. 5) (IMG)

Ending the private sector was important because the existence of the bourgeoisie even in the economy inevitably gets reflected in the upwards catapulting of the agents of the bourgeoisie into the state, even a workers' state. It is not the case that the continued Keefe, Donald W. Bernier, Lyle E. Brenneman, Wayne A. Culp, existence of the bourgeoisie in the economy William Giloane, James M. Moore, Jr., 1972, p. 146) (IMG) has no effect on the level of the influence of the proletariat over the proletariat's state. No, crippling the material base of the bourgeoisie in the economy leaves the enemies of the proletariat devoid of the material base through which to retain lobbying power in the workers' state. Hence, the great weakening of the private sector was of great importance for the rise of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is worth mentioning a few caveats, however. Firstly, although the blue-collar workers together with the kolkhoz peasants formed the majority in the SED, so was it also true that a significantly large minority of the SED was made up of the remnants of the Kautskyite SPD faction headed by Grotewohl and other such traitors. Secondly, the bourgeois parties in East Germany were not dissolved and continued to exercise some influence over the East German state. Hence, the hold of the proletariat over the state was not as strong, despite the general dominance of the proletariat over the state. Unfortunately, by the late 1970s, the weakening of the socialist forces throughout Eastern Europe was paving the way towards the rollback of the proletariat's faction in the East German state and the increase in the strength of the corrupt bureaucrats in the East German state. This was manifested in the drastic economic decentralization and the elevation of the corrupt bureaucrats. The result was the liquidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the 1980s, a while prior to the official 1989 collapse of the 'German Democratic Republic' as a state.

Membership by Social Composition, of the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany, 1967

Social Classification	Percent of Total
Industrial workers (blue collar)	45.6
Salaried employees (white collar)	16.1
Intelligentsia	12.3
Pensioners	12.1
Cooperative farmers	6.4
Housewives	4.4
Students and school pupils	1.6
Producer cooperatives	0.8
Others (including businessmen and tradesmen in semi-state-owned semi-private enterprises)	0.7

AREA HANDBOOK FOR EAST GERMANY, Eugene K. Keefe, Donald W. Bernier, Lyle E. Brenneman, Wayne A. Culp, William Giloane, James M. Moore, Jr., 1972, p. 146) (IMG)

C22S3. Libyan Jamahiriyah against Yugoslavia / Yugoslav Trouble-Making against Syria

*** IMG-All-{Titoists against Libya and Syria}

It is often claimed that Muammar Al-Qadhafi was a real friend of the Mossad agent Tito. Such a narrative is false. Erik Goldstein, the Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the US Naval War College, noted the opposition of Qadhafi and Castro against Yugoslavia's fascist leader. As early as 1973, and by:

the time of the Algiers conference, a split in the movement had become apparent. (...). Quaddafi and Castro ... soon found common cause against the United States, and united in opposition to Tito who preferred to remain less pro-Soviet. But Tito continued to remain in the minority as NAM members refused to equate Soviet imperialism with Western imperialism. ("Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy", Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein, Richard Langhorne, 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

By 1975, the Anwar Sadat faction in Egypt had gained decisive control over the Egyptian state, and immensely boosted Egyptian Sadatist subversion against Syria and Libya. The Sadatist Egyptians could count on the support of Yugoslavia, which lobbied against the attempts to expel Egypt from the Non-Aligned Movement. A US State Department document leaked by the Wikileaks confirmed:

ON THE CREDIT SIDE, YUGOSLAV SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS WAS OCCASIONALLY HELPFUL. YUGOSLAV BACKING WAS IMPORTANT FOR SADAT WHEN HE CAME UNDER FIRE FROM RADICAL ARABS DURING THE SINAI DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS (ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY YUGOSLAV SUPPORT FOR SADAT'S

RECENT ANTI-SOVIET ACTIONS). THE GOY [Government of Yugoslavia] SHOWED CONSIDERABLE COURAGE IN HEADING OFF THE MOVE AT THE LIMA NON-ALIGNED MEETING TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ISRAEL'S EXPULSION FROM THE UN, A KEY FACTOR IN PREVENTING THE ISSUE FROM COMING TO THE FLOOR OF THE UNGA. YUGOSLAVIA REACTED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY'S ECONOMIC PROPOSAL AT THE GA AND HAS CONTINUED AMONG THE MOST REALISTIC IN ON-GOING WORK ON THE DC-LDC ECONOMIC RELATIONS. FINALLY, BY ABSTAINING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON A PUERTO RICO RESOLUTION, YUGOSLAVIA DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY THAT IT WILL ON OCCASION TAKE OUR INTERESTS INTO CONSIDERATION IF WE FIGHT HARD ENOUGH (AND EARLY ENOUGH) FOR THEM. TWO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WERE USEFUL TO US. THE ARRESTS OF AND PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN YUGOSLAVIA AGAINST PRO-S[OV]IET COMINFORMISTS REMINDED THE WORLD OF CONTINUED SOVIET MEDDLING. DESPITE THE SOOTHING NOISES OF THE "PRAVDA" ARTICLE AND MINIC-GROMYKO COMMUNIQUE, THE YUGOSLAVS CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THE NEED TO KEEP DEFENSES UP. IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE, AND AS EVIDENCED BY DOLANC AT THE CPSU JAMBOREE, THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE LED A GROWING RESISTANCE TO SOVIET CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT. (BUT THIS IS A TWO-EDGED SWORD FROM THE U.S. VIEWPOINT, HELPING TO LEGITIMIZE AND STRENGTHEN WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES EVEN AS IT ENCOURAGES THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW.) (1976BELGRA01725_b, YUGOSLAVIA-ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT, US Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, March 17, 1976, pp. 2-3. Bold added.) (IMG)

Against the Arab states and Cuba, the Yugoslav regime lobbied for the inclusion of Sadatist Egypt in the NAM. As a result of the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, a number of intelligence documents on Titoist-Sadatist collaboration were leaked. One US intelligence document uncovered due to the 1979 student seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran, revealed:

3. EVEN BEFORE THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, THE PLO, IRAQ AND SYRIA HAD TURNED THEIR ATTENTION TO SUSPENDING EGYPT FROM THE NAM,

SPECIFICALLY TO INSCRIBING AN ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE NACB MINISTERIAL IN COLOMBO. HOWEVER, THEIR INITIAL EFFORTS HAVE THE NACB CONSIDER EGYPT'S SUSPENSION FROM THE NAM DID NOT WORK. AT MEETINGS OF THE NACB. IN APRIL,

FOR EXAMPLE, EGYPT—SUPPORTED BY SRI LANKA, INDIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA—PREVENTED CIRCULATION OF T[he] LETTER QC ALL NAM MEMBERS ASKING FOR EGYPT'S SUSPENSION.

4. THIS PROCEDURAL SETBACK HAS PROMPTED SOME ARAB AMBASSADORS TO QUESTION THE FEASIBILITY OF SUSPENDING EGYPT FROM THE NAM AND OAU.

5. THE YUGOSLAVS AND INDIANS ARE SENDING MINISTERIAL LEVEL DELEGATIONS TO LOBBY AGAINST EGYPT'S SUSPENSION AMONG ASIAN AND ARAB MEMBERS OF THE NAM. TITO PLANS TO VISIT LIBYA ON MAY 31 TO URGE RESTRAINT ON QADHAFI.

6. IN ADDITION TO ITS OBJECTION ON PRINCIPLE TO EGYPT'S SUSPENSION, YUGOSLAVIA IS CONCERNED THAT THE INTENSITY OF ANTI-EGYPTIAN SENTIMENT AMONG THE OTHER ARAB STATES MAY FORCE BELGRADE TO TAKE SIDES. (...).

8. AS AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE NAM AND THE HOST OF THE NEXT SUMMIT, CUBA'S POSITION IS ESPECIALLY [IM]PORTANT. ORDINARILY CUBA WOULD SUPPORT THE SUSPENSION MOVE OUT OF SYMPATHY WITH THE ARAB HARDLINERS AND A DESIRE TO RETALIATE FOR EGYPT'S PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO "EXPEL" CUBA.. (SUBJECT: INTSUM 820, To: London for Glaspie, Paris for Nicholas Murphy, Beijing for Ambassador Strauss. Also to: Department of Defense /Intelligence Support Activity. May 29, 1979. Bold added.) (IMG)

No wonder that a declassified CIA document corroborated:

In recent years Yugoslavia has been under assault from Cuba and other nonaligned radicals – as well as Moscow – for its allegedly lax record in supporting anti-Western causes. (Yugoslavia: PLO Ties and Terrorism, CIA, March 3, 1986) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime's trouble-making against Libya and Syria was far from being limited to the diplomatic sphere. The Yugoslav regime also funded the PLO terrorists that were fighting against the Syrian Arab Army and the Libyan expeditionary forces in Lebanon in the 1970s and the 1980s. Further demonstrating the Yugoslav regime's malice is also the fact that Yugoslavia supported especially the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), an army of terror that was supported by the fascist Iraqi Mukhaberat, the Rif at-Khaddam-Khouli faction in Syria, the gang of Mousa Kousa and Abdel-Salam

Jalloud in Libya, and the gang of Sadat in Egypt. The enemies of the Al-Assad faction and of the Al-Qadhafi faction were being materially sponsored by the Yugoslav regime. The CIA agreed that the Belgrade fascists provided arms to Abu Nidal's gang:

Our best evidence of Belgrade's involvement with international terrorism comes from Yugoslavia's long-standing cooperation with Abu Nidal's Black June Organization. (The Abu Nidal group, formerly known as Black June, was responsible for terrorist operations worldwide against conservative Arab governments, Israeli interests, and moderate Palestinian leaders). Yugoslavia reportedly agreed to allow Abu Nidal's group to use Yugoslavia for safe haven and transit as long as Black June kept it secret and informed Belgrade in advance. Belgrade refused a request for explosives but offered to provide assault rifles and training to Black June members. In exchange Black June reportedly transferred \$2 million to a Yugoslav bank and promised to induce other Arabs to invest in troubled Yugoslav firms. (Yugoslav Support for International Terrorist Groups, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, September 17, 1984, p. 2) (IMG)

The 'Black June' was the name which the ANO adopted as the name of the Lebanon branch of the ANO. The term 'Black June' was named after June 1976, when the Syrian Arab Army intervened in Lebanon to save that country from being further settler-colonized by the Palestinian terror network that was funded by Sadatist Egypt and Saddamite Iraq.

The ANO was able to move freely in European countries. Most permissive of the European regimes, however, was Yugoslavia. A US intelligence document leaked by the Wikileaks stated:

THE GROUP'S ABILITY TO MOVE AT WILL IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES [makes] THEIR ACTIVITIES HARDER TO TRACE. TO FACILITATE TRAVEL, THE ORGANIZATION HAS A RECORD OF USING MOROCCAN AND OTHER NORTH AFRICAN TRAVEL DOCUMENTS INCLUDING THOSE PRODUCED BY ITS OWN FORGING OPERATION. SOME COUNTRIES SUCH AS YUGOSLAVIA HAVE BEEN MORE PERMISSIVE THAN OTHERS IN ALLOWING ABU NIDAL MEMBERS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, APPARENTLY HOPING THAT THIS WILL BUY THEM A MODICUM OF IMMUNITY FROM TERRORIST ACTS. THERE IS GROWING RECOGNITION THAT THIS IS A DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION. (85STATE371963_a, ABU NIDAL TERRORISTS ORGANIZATION, US Secretary of State, December 6, 1985) (IMG)

The Libyans were well aware of Abu Nidal's connections to the Titoist-fascist Yugoslav secret service. According to a US State Department:

The [Yugoslav] government has denied, as has the United States, the assertion of Libyan ruler Qadhafi, carried in a US newspaper, that notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal was living in Yugoslavia. (Patterns of Global Terrorism, US Department of State, 1988, p. 35) (IMG)

The MI6 operative Patrick Seale, one of the foremost authors on Abu Nidal, confirmed that Yugoslavia was the primary center of Abu Nidal Organization:

Abu Nidal's oldest relationship in Eastern Europe was with Yugoslavia, where Palestinians had been going to study in large numbers since the 1960s. When Abu Nidal broke from Fatah in 1974, he managed to poach some of Fatah's students in Yugoslavia and used them to start recruiting in earnest, causing violent clashes between his supporters and Fatah's. In April 1980, his men in Belgrade threw a bomb at a car in which Abu Iyad was thought to be travelling. Not wanting further headaches of this sort, Yugoslav intelligence decided to open a line to Abu Nidal.

The Yugoslavs considered Abu Nidal a terrorist. But they ignored his activities.. He of course exploited such tolerance for all it was worth. From 1980 onward, he kept a secret representative in Belgrade: first Ali al-Farra (Dr. Kamal), then Iyad Muhammad (the husband of one of his nieces), then Ali Afifi, followed by others. As a result, from 1980 to 1985, Yugoslavia became the organizational center for Abu Nidal's European operations. Weapons were stored there; his teams of assassins coming in from Libya or Lebanon used Yugoslavia as a staging post on their way to other destinations; and weapons were moved from there into the rest of Europe. Inside the organization, Yugoslavia was considered "semisecure" in the sense that if its members got into trouble, the organization could usually strike an under-the-table deal with the Yugoslavs to get them out of it.

(Abu Nidal: A Gun For Hire, Patrick Seale, 1993, pp. 276-277) (IMG)

Back in 1958, Yugoslavia had supported the US intervention in Lebanon, which was aimed at containing the influence of anti-Zionist Egypt. Mossad agent Tito's successors continued his legacy. In 1982, the UDB-funded ANO helped Israel invade Lebanon. The Abu Nidal Organization, launched the assassination attempt against Shlomo Argov. While serving as the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov was an agent of the Mapam Underground, the communist intelligence network in Israel that sought the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat in Israel, and a democratic peace between the Hebrew nation and the Arab nation in an Arab-Israeli strategic partnership to drive out the Anglo-American imperialists from the Middle East. The Zionist mainstream disliked Argov and would have loved to see him dead. The goal of the ANO was to on the one hand physically eliminate this Mapam Underground agent, while also

giving the Ariel Sharon group in Israel the 'needed' pretext for invading Lebanon. The Israeli intelligence Colonel Efraim Karsh admitted:

Even worse, the attempt on the life of the Israeli Ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov, which was carried out by the Baghdad-based Abu Nidal terrorist group and which sparked the 1982 Lebanon War, the PLO's gravest military defeat since the 1970 Black September, was conceived by Saddam Hussein.

It is inconceivable that Abu Nidal (who was later expelled from Baghdad) could have carried out such an operation without his host's approval. It was also common knowledge at the time that any Palestinian attack on Israeli targets was bound to lead to a general conflagration. Israel had publicly announced its determination to remove the Palestinian military threat to its civilian settlements in the Galilee, and was impatiently looking for an excuse to make good on its promise.

What could Hussein gain by providing the bellicose Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, with a long-sought pretext to unleash Israeli troops on the Palestinian and Syrian forces in Lebanon? The diversion of Iran's attention from the war against Iraq, to the "treacherous attack by Zionism and imperialism" on brotherly Muslim states, who incidentally also turned out to be Tehran's main Arab allies. But even if Tehran failed to live up to his expectations, an Israeli-Syrian-Palestinian confrontation in 1982 would still debilitate Iran's two most prominent Arab allies, thereby ensuring Iraq's western border against a perennial rival.

(Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, Efraim Karsh, Inari Rautsi, 1991) (IMG)

As such, the Yugoslav intelligence, which was partially in service to the Mossad, yet again supported the Ariel Sharon faction in Israel, in devastating Lebanon, so as to contain the influence of Syria and of the revolutionary faction of Islamist Iran. Furthermore, in contrast to what is usually stated, the mainstream factions of Syria and Libya were not supporters of the Abu Nidal group. The ANO did receive support from the Khaddam-Khouli group in Syria, the enemies of the Al-Assad faction, and the Mousa Kousa group in Libya, the enemies of the Al-Qadhafi faction. The CIA's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) admitted that Syria had many problems with Abu Nidal's gang:

INR stated that it agrees that serious tensions have arisen between the Syrian Government and the ANO and that President Assad is unhappy with ANO's involvement in the Palestinian Camp Wars. Syria, moreover, is attempting to lower its profile in regard to the use of terrorism and to decouple itself from ANO terrorism generally. (SUBJECT: Counterterrorism Warning and Forecast Report, National Intelligence Council, CIA, FROM: Charles E. Allen (National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism), MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, June 1, 1987, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Qadhafi is believed to have once verbally supported Abu Nidal and Arafat simultaneously, but he never really sympathized with Abu Nidal nor with Yasser Arafat, despite the appearance of 'friendship' with Arafat. Libya 'welcomed' Abu Nidal into Libya, by jailing him. American journalist on Arab affairs and British Petroleum Vice President Youssef Ibrahim reported in the New York Times (a copy of his article was published by The Washington Post):

Abu Nidal, the Palestinian widely considered one of the world's most dangerous terrorists, has been placed under house arrest by Libya, officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization here and Arab diplomats in Paris say.

The move against Abu Nidal, who lives in a compound near Tripoli, the Libyan capital, is believed to be a result of Arab and Palestinian pressure on Libya to put an end to his terrorist activities, which were becoming an obstacle to Arab diplomacy.

P.L.O. officials here and senior Egyptian diplomats said that ... President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in October asked the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, to either extradite Abu Nidal to Egypt or prevent him from mounting any terrorist operations from Libya as an essential condition for restored relations between the two nations.

There is no indication that Colonel Qaddafi intends to turn Abu Nidal over to Egypt, the officials said. Deadly Feud With P.L.O. Officials of the P.L.O., which has been Abu Nidal's principal enemy in the Arab world since he broke with it in 1973, said the developments could signal the end of the Abu Nidal organization, or at least the beginning of a long paralysis. The faction is believed responsible for terrorist attacks that have killed or wounded 900 people in at least 20 countries since 1974, when it was formed.

(...). Abu Nidal, who has lived in Libya since he was expelled from Syria in 1987, is wanted in Egypt for, among other things, the 1985 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner that ended with the deaths of 56 passengers in Malta during an attempted rescue.

His organization is held responsible for several of the most heinous acts of terrorism, including the killing of 21 people in the bombing of a synagogue in Istanbul in 1986. It has also claimed responsibility for the slaying of a leading Palestinian moderate, Issam Sartawi, in 1983.

Several Arab affairs experts said the Libyan action against Abu Nidal strongly suggests that his organization, the Fatah Revolutionary Council, is nearing collapse. Under pressure from several Arab governments, a growing

number of its leaders and trained cadres have defected to the P.L.O.

Dissident senior leaders of the faction, Arab diplomats and P.L.O. officials had reported in early November that more than 150 members of the group, including more than 20 of its leaders, were slain this year and last year in an internecine struggle as Abu Nidal sought to assert absolute control over the group's 1,000 to 1,200 members and its considerable financial resources.

Officials said Colonel Qaddafi had ordered a search for the bodies of senior leaders of the group who were said to have been killed and buried inside the Abu Nidal compound near Tripoli.

(...). "The man's time is over," said a senior Arab diplomat and former intelligence official who is familiar with Abu Nidal's relations with Syria, Iraq, Libya and the P.L.O. '

(Abu Nidal Is Reportedly Placed Under House Arrest by Libyans, New York Times, Youssef Ibrahim, November 28, 1989) (IMG)

The Abu Nidal group was however responsible for kidnapping Musa Al-Sadr on behalf of Saddam Hussein's Mukhaberat and then making it appear as though the kidnapping was done by Qadhafi.

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), the Israeli think tank subordinate to IDF military intelligence (AMAN) and later renamed as the famous 'Institute for National Security Studies' (INSS), admitted in 1990 that since 1987 – the year in which the UDB agent Abu Nidal moved his troops to Libya – there was a significant reduction in the activity of the Abu Nidal's gang. Note that the Abu Nidal gang was officially called the Fatah Revolutionary Committee (FRC). The JCSS stated:

Additional factors that presumably produced a reduction in FRC international activity were intra-organizational. In 1987 Abu Nidal promised to halt terrorist activity in the international arena for a period of ten months, as part of a new strategy aimed at positioning himself closer to the mainstream of the Palestinian national movement and leadership. When this period ended in mid-'88, elements of the organization made a spectacular comeback to the international arena (for details, see Infer 1988.) By then, the entire framework of the Palestinian struggle had changed due to the outbreak of the uprising in the Territories, and the assaults were perpetrated to manifest dedication to the armed struggle. But the campaign generated friction within the group's ranks, focusing on the issue of the future course of the fight; this culminated by late 1989 in a series of intra-organizational assassinations in Lebanon and Libya, causing several prominent members to leave the FRC. All this took place against a backdrop of rumors concerning Abu Nidal's terminal illness, his worsening relationship with Qadhafi, and his house arrest by the Libyan ruler. (Inter: International Terrorism in 1989, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Anat Kurz, Spring 1990) (iMG)

Yugoslavia's regime was never a real friend of Assad-era Syria. By 1969, when the faction headed by Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad had emerged as de facto triumphant in Syria, unofficially sidelining the Salah Jadid faction, Syrian strategic cooperation with Nasserist Egypt were maximized. In a conversation with Gamal Abdel-Nasser about the tactical details of what would later become the October 1973 War, Hafez Al-Assad said that the Yugoslav military 'aid' offered to Syria was malfunctional:

Al-Assad: (...). We harbour no doubt as to the importance of having field artillery, counter-artillery.

Yet, we are searching for it everywhere, in the West, even with smugglers and [their] companies, And in this, there is great difficulty.

Abdel Nasser: The Yugoslavs might be able to send it.

Al-Assad: They offered us a hexagonal cannon for about 19,000 Syrian pounds, which is used and has many faults, as I myself and Lieutenant-General Fawzi went out and tried it. After the battle, after the war, they sent me 3 cannons. We tried every cannon and they all had a malfunction!

(Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Syrian President Nouredine Al-Atassi, From the Egyptian Side: President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Members of the Supreme Executive Committee: Anwar Sadat, Ali Sabri, Mohammad Fawzi, and others. From the Syrian side: Nureddin Al-Attasi, General Hafez Al-Assad, Sami Al-Droubi. El-Qubba Palace, Cairo, May 2, 1969, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

C22S4. Yugoslav, Romanian, and Chinese Support for Saddamite Iraq against the Republic of Iran

*** IMG-All- {Titoist-Saddamite Connection}

During the Iran-Iraq War, the Yugoslav regime supplied Iraq with weapons against Iran, while it did not sell weapons to Iran. Ali Khamenei, who was the President of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, recalled:

former Yugoslavia ... was one of Iraq's main centers of support.. (The Trip of Ayatollah Khamenei to Yugoslavia, Ali Khamenei, October 21, 2006. In: farsi.khamenei.ir) (IMG)

He also remembered:

After the war was over – I think it was the end of 1967 – I, then-President, and a number of other officials had a trip to the former Yugoslavia.. After a long and detail negotiation, they refused to even sell a tank to us!

Meanwhile, whenever the Iraqis had low supply in the war front, all kinds of eastern and western tanks immediately came to them. (The Trip of Ayatollah Khamenei to Yugoslavia, Ali Khamenei, October 21, 2006. In: farsi.khamenei.ir) (IMG)

Regarding the superficial ‘greeting’ and ‘respect’ that the Yugoslav regime authorities had for Iran:

Back when I was President, I traveled to Yugoslavia. There, they pretended to respect us and welcome us. But no matter how much we insisted, they refused to give us any conventional weapons. (The Trip of the Supreme Leader to Yugoslavia, Ali Khamenei, September 16, 2010. In: farsi.khamenei.ir) (IMG)

The Islamic Revolution Documents Center, which is an official archives center of the Islamic Republic of Iran, listed **Romania, China, and Yugoslavia** as three of the sponsors of fascist Iraq during Saddam groups’ fascist war on Iran:

In addition to the above list, countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Yugoslavia, China, Romania, Italy, Singapore, etc. should also be added to the list of Saddam's supporters. (The 80 Countries that Armed Saddam in the War against Iran, Islamic Revolution Documents Center (IRDC), September 22, 2015) (IMG)

Anglo-American intelligence confirms that the Yugoslav regime supported Saddam’s fascist war on the people of Iran. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), which is a front for CIA agent George Soros’s Open Society Foundation, the Titoist regime of Yugoslavia also exported ‘several thousand Orkan rockets to Iraq in the late 1980s’:

Given the presence of Iraqi specialists at Potoci, the partnership on developing the Orkan system, the Yugoslav success at manufacturing chemical-capable Orkan rockets, and the export of several thousand Orkan rockets to Iraq in the late 1980s, it is possible that technical cooperation extended to converting Iraqi Orkan rockets for chemical warheads. (ARMING SADDAM: THE YUGOSLAV CONNECTION, International Crisis Group (ICG), December 3, 2002, p. 6) (IMG)

The arming of the Iraqi fascist regime was yet another step in the long history of the Titoist collaboration with Saddam’s group, a collaboration that began – back when Tito was alive – primarily through such terrorist organizations as the Abu Nidal group, which was one of the many contact points between the UDB, Mossad, SAVAK, Kuwaiti intelligence, Saudi intelligence, and Saddam’s Mukhaberat. It is also worth noting that Abu Nidal carried out terrorist attacks in Syria in the 1970s and was the main culprit behind the kidnapping and murder of Musa Al-Sadr, which was wrongly blamed on Qadhafi.

C22S5. The Titoist Yugoslav regime on the British Occupation of Ireland and Apartheid South Africa

*** IMG-All- {Richard West – Titoist Reign}

The Yugoslav regime opposed the freedom forces on every corner of the planet. The Yugoslav fascist propaganda sheets based in Belgrade hailed the British army of terror, the army of the colonial occupation of Ireland:

Significantly, the Belgrade newspapers were almost alone in Europe in taking the side of the British army in Northern Ireland. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 303) (IMG)

Concerning Tito’s stance on South Africa, the MI6 operative Richard West reported:

Nor did [Tito] lend support to terrorist organisations such as the African National Congress, which was subsidised by the Soviet Union. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 284) (IMG)

C22S6.1. Revolutionary Cuba against Titoist Yugoslavia

*** IMG-All- {Cuba}

In 1968, Fidel Castro revealed the depth of the crimes of the Yugoslav regime against the people of Cuba. In a speech he gave in denouncing the Yugoslav regime, Fidel Castro read a part of a document that was captured by the post- Batista Cuban revolutionary government. Parts of the document which Castro presented are as follows:

“From the military attache to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, Mexico, D.F., 13 December 1958; Gen. Francisco Tabernilla Dolz, (?MP), Military City, Marianoa.

“My dear friend, I enclose various photographs which have been given me by the Yugoslav ambassador in this country – a great friend of mine. On a certain occasion I talked to him when I had been told that private negotiations were taking place about the possibility of acquiring armaments. He tells me that in fact he can supply us with various types of armaments that we might need, such as 30.06 rifles and so forth, and he talked about a type of boat like those in the photographs that could be of great use to us.

“He explains that he has an ample quantity of these torpedo boats, which would be very economical, since they produce with very cheap labor and have the best naval shipyards today, after the English.

“These boats have a speed of over 40 kilometers an hour. They have two anti-aircraft machineguns, an anti-aircraft gun, and torpedo launchers. There is also a great abundance of these torpedoes, which are very cheap.

“Although I explained to him that at this time the negotiations for any kind of armaments were suspended because we had acquired enough in other places, he told me that at any rate he would give me a list with exact specifications, cost, date of delivery, and freight charge to our ports.

“As soon as he gives me these data, I shall send them to you immediately. (...).

“Col. Chief A. P. Chaumon, military attache.”

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: ‘The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis’ [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, pp. 11-12. Also see ‘Comments on Czechoslovakia’, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Castro’s speech was published not only by the Cuban government press but also by the Punto Final (‘Full Stop’), the media organ of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (el Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria), a Guevarist-inspired guerrilla organization that later formed the armed detachments supporting the Allende government in the 1970s and attempted to foment subversion against the Pinochet-influenced Chilean military. The speech was translated to English by the US government agency Federal Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and subsequently copied and published by the Marxists Internet Archive (MIA), a Trotskyite-dominated online media outlet that publishes speeches and articles from all communists and – in the broadest sense – ‘leftists’. To ensure that the English translation is correct and not distorted by American imperialist propaganda, I checked the Spanish version and slightly altered the English translation provided by the FBIS/MIA so to increase the accuracy of the translation. The reader can check the screenshots of both the FBIS/MIA version and the original Spanish-language document in the Screenshots appendix section of this book.

Since the United States government, under the pressure of the remnants of the pro-Soviet Roosevelt faction in the Democratic Party had officially sanctioned the Batista regime, the American imperialist secret service decided to covertly sponsor Batista – much like how Reagan had denounced the Nicaraguan contras but also covertly funded it nonetheless. Explaining the nature of the document discovered, Fidel Castro explained:

Imagine our surprise some months later when, one day, poking around in the archives, in the archives of the Batista government, we found the text of this document. (...) Those who have read the history of Moncada know that this Chaumon was precisely the officer who perpetrated tens of assassinations in the Moncada garrison after the attack. He was the most criminal of all the officers, who assassinated tens of prisoners, and he was later sent to Mexico and was a “great friend” of the Yugoslav ambassador, to whom, 18 days before the triumph of the revolution in December 1958, when thousands of Cubans had been here – we had been fighting for 2 years – this ambassador, in the name of Yugoslavia, and after consulting, was offering all kinds of arms – cheap, economical, launches, everything.

How great, I say, was our indignation and surprise when we found this document in the archives, signed by the person who signed it, especially when we needed arms to defend ourselves from the imperialists, and they had put all kinds of obstacles in our way and did not sell us a single weapon, and they were offering arms to Batista just as the war was ending.

As we are not going to hold the worst opinion, we are not going to have the worst concept of the role that this party played, when even the imperialists would not sell arms to Batista, when not even the Yankees would sell them arms, these gentlemen were offering good and cheap arms.

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: ‘The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis’ [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, p. 12. Also see ‘Comments on Czechoslovakia’, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Indeed, the fact that the Yugoslav regime supplied weapons to the Batista junta is also confirmed by the British intelligence agent Richard Gott, who served in the MI6 front ‘Royal Institute of International Relations’, which was the predecessor of the Chatham House. Gott wrote:

the Yugoslavs ... continued to supply Batista with weapons until the last moment. (Cuba: A New History, Yale University Press, Richard Gott, p. 164) (IMG)

In spite of the fact that the Yugoslav regime and the Anglo-American intelligence services continued to covertly sponsor the Batista junta, the Cuban revolutionaries succeeded in ousting the Batista junta in 1959.

In the sphere of domestic policy, a number of revolutionary economic reforms occurred in Cuba. A lesser-known one is that Cuba pursued the correct economic policy – fully endorsed by Che personally – of emphasizing producer goods over the consumer goods. In October 1964, Che wrote:

The transformations so far made in the Cuban economy have produced great changes in the structure of our foreign trade. As regards exports the changes have been limited chiefly to the opening up of new markets, with

sugar continuing to be the main export article. On the other hand, the composition of our imports has changed completely during these five years. Imports of consumer goods, particularly durables, have decreased substantially in favor of capital equipment, while a small decrease can be noted in the imports of intermediate goods. The policy of substitution of imports is showing slow but tangible results. (The Cuban Economy: Its Past and Its Present Importance, Ernesto Che Guevara, October 1964. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, pp. 144-145) (IMG)

At the same time, the Yugoslav intelligence missed no chance to conspire against the new revolutionary government of Cuba. The same Yugoslav embassy that had served as a base through which Yugoslavia would negotiate the arms sales to Batista, emerged as a base through which Tito's gang stabbed Cuba in the back. After the revolution, initially the Cubans were not well aware of the criminal character of the Yugoslav regime. Hence, the Cuban revolutionaries decided to purchase arms from the Yugoslav regime – and the arms were never coming. Fidel Castro remarked:

I was saying that some will ask why have we been so tenacious in our attitude toward the Yugoslav League of Communists. We want to point out a fact, a very important fact from the beginning of the revolution regarding our relations with Yugoslavia. It was in the year 1959, when our country had already made the first laws, when not only had we begun in our country the agrarian reform that brought us into confrontation with imperialism, but also, in the United States, the first plot against us was already being hatched.

At that time we did not have relations as yet with the USSR or with other countries of the socialist camp.

And we had to buy our arms in some capitalist countries. We made our first purchases of arms in Belgium and Italy. Because of pressure by the imperialists, and first not by pressure but by CIA conspiracy, there was an explosion on one of the ships coming from Belgium with arms, which resulted in around 80 victims. Later, the Belgian Government, under pressure from the U.S. Government, stopped selling arms.

Meanwhile, the United States was preparing its mercenaries against us and on the other hand was carrying out its policy of blockading our purchase of arms. The Italian Government at that time was under such pressures. We recall that we were trying to buy 16 mortars – 16 mortars from Italy, and they had already sold us four and [some parts] of the other 12. However, under the pressure of the Yankee imperialists, they stopped the sale of the 12 pieces. That left us practically with four pieces and [parts] of the others, but without the cannon.

In this situation, we turned to the government of Yugoslavia to try to buy some arms, including the 12 cannon and some 120 mortars and some other pieces. And here we have a report by the comrade in charge of that mission, Maj. Jose M. Fernandez Alvarez.

And here is it in synthesis; I am going to read this information. It says:

"In 1959, as the Batista tyranny was defeated, after the defeat of the tyranny, military equipment had to be acquired. This equipment was needed urgently and immediately to defend the revolution, whose laws and measures in process of being promulgated would surely cause hate among its logical enemies, who would try to destroy it.

"On a tip that was given us, we got in touch with the ambassador of the Yugoslav republic at the end of 1959 and at the beginning of 1960, in a very superficial manner. Later, we went to visit him in the Yugoslav Embassy on 42nd Street and (Tercera) Miramar, accompanied by Maj Raul Castro.

"On this visit, the minister of the armed forces informed the ambassador of Cuba's interest in buying arms and equipment, especially light infantry arms, rifles, machineguns, rocket launchers, mortars, and ammunition.

"The ambassador was generally evasive, and when the minister said something about payments, he said that the matter of arms was a different matter in regard to payments and that many details [were involved]. The minister indicated to the ambassador that I should stay in contact with him to learn about prices and the arms available, and to carry forward negotiations in this regard.

"It was extraordinarily difficult to carry out this task since the lists were delayed. Evasive answers were constantly given us. It was said that there were no arms available and that they had to be manufactured, that the prices had not arrived; and when the prices were finally in our possession, they dealt especially with small caliber arms at extraordinarily high prices, even on the international market.

"Prior to this and afterward, when we tried to get arms in Yugoslavia, some comrades went to Yugoslavia and also tried to arrange for the purchase of arms with the same results, with the presentation of other obstacles.

"We can say that in no operation could we make progress, despite our negotiations and great interest, since the Yugoslav representation here in Cuba did not make it feasible.

"As a conclusion to the foregoing, we can say that Yugoslavia's attitude was markedly opportunistic, since it wanted to be paid in dollars and at black market prices for the few lines that it offered.

"They said that the total amount of the operation did not justify the difficulties that they would have with the United States over selling us arms. And they were reluctant to give us the lists and prices. They proposed

that discussions be carried out through a private Yugoslav commercial company as a screen, in order that the operation should not appear under that country's name, and in general little cooperation was shown. But it appeared that Yugoslavia did not want to make the sale to us, and on the other hand it appeared opportunist or at least intended to dissuade us from the conditions stipulated. ”

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: 'The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis' [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, pp. 10-11. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Therefore, in the face of conspiracies of American intelligence against the revolutionary government of Cuba, the latter was also stabbed in the back by the Yugoslavs who did everything they could to waste the time of the Cuban people. The distrust that the Cuban revolutionaries had towards the Yugoslav regime was also reflected in the remarks of Che Guevara. While Che Guevara – whether out of unawareness/naivete or out of diplomatic pragmatism – rejected the narrative that Tito's gang were agents of imperialism, he nonetheless did show that, at least intuitively, he found Yugoslavia's government problematic:

GUEVARA: (...). We must find ways and means by which to face the new issues brought about by removing the old situation and by building a socialist society.

REPORTER: What is your opinion of the Yugoslavian experiment in this respect?

GUEVARA: We definitely oppose the Yugoslavs, and we do not wish to use big flashy words on this subject; we are not talking about backsliding – but we also do not wish to talk about being stationary.

We do not at all accuse the Yugoslavs of being agents of imperialism, and so forth – but we oppose them in a basic manner.

REPORTER: How?

GUEVARA: We believe that there are two ways in which we differ from the Yugoslav experiment: that is, in our reaction to Stalinism and in opposition to the Soviet Union to dictate to us its economic and leadership ideals.

(Interview with Al-Tali'ah, Al-Tali'ah, No. 4, April 1965. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, p. 411) (IMG)

One of the many problems that Cuba had with the Eurasian Titoists headed by the Khrushchev gang and the Gomulka regime in Poland among others was precisely with regards to the issue of Yugoslavia. Fidel Castro later recalled: The occurrences in Czechoslovakia only serve to confirm to us the correctness of the positions and the theses that our revolution and our party have been maintaining – our position at the Tricontinental Conference, our positions in the Latin American Solidarity Organization, and our positions regarding all the international problems – there is a series of facts that confirm this point of view. It is known, for example, that one of the factors that we have explained – which explains – which has been a constant element of irritation in our relations with many countries of the socialist camp and with many communist parties is the problem of Yugoslavia. (Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: 'The Cuban Approach

in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis' [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, pp.

10-11. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Castro continued:

However, recently in many countries, the communist parties, including the communist parties of the Warsaw Pact, have begun quite to forget the role and nature of the Yugoslav League of Communists.

They began to call Yugoslavia a communist country, they began to call it a communist party, to invite the Yugoslav League of Communists to meetings of the socialist countries, to meetings of base organizations of the communist parties; and this evoked our constant opposition, our constant disagreement, our constant taking or exception, expressed on various occasions. (...). The communist movement for a long time – with much justification – kept that party ostracized. An infinity of articles written by all the parties appeared in publication against that movement, denouncing it, pointing a finger at it.

Afterward, naturally, some parties forgot this, and the friends, followers, the unconditionals, began also to forget this in the face of all the political preaching about the ideological resurgence of the revolutionary movement, which has led to these most dolorous situations.

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: 'The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis'

[El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, p. 10. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

At the same time, Cuba continued to maintain bonds with the enemies of the Yugoslav regime. When the Eurasian Titoists headed by the gang of Nikita Khrushchev imposed the fiercest pressures on different countries in order to make them break their relations with People's Democratic, Cuba was one of the few countries that refused to bow to such intensive pressure. Fidel Castro said in 1967:

Our country never broke relations with Albania, when a large number of countries from the socialist camp broke relations with this country. (FIDEL CASTRO SPEECH AT LASO CLOSING SESSION, Speech by Prime Minister Fidel Castro at closing ceremony of First LASO Conference, held in Havana's Chaplin Theater — Live, Havana Domestic Radio and Television Services in Spanish, Havana Domestic Radio, August 11, 1967. In: Castro Speech Database, Latin American Network Information Center (LANIC), University of Texas) (IMG)

In the meantime, the Yugoslav embassy continued its hostility to revolutionary Cuba. The MI6 operative Richard West recalled:

In Communist Cuba I happened to meet a diplomat from the Yugoslav Embassy. Apparently Fidel Castro's bodyguards had recently shot up the embassy car and wounded one of their personnel, so he was not feeling well disposed to Cuba, but even this could not explain the flow of invective to which he subjected the country, making no effort to keep his voice down. He said that Fidel was just a tin-pot Latin American fascist, similar to Juan Peron, the Argentine dictator. He said that the Cubans lived in terror and hoped only to reach the United States. He added that when the revolutionary leader Che Guevara disappeared to try and start a revolt in Bolivia, Fidel Castro had an affair with Guevara's wife.

All this was told to me by the diplomat of a country supposed to be on the best of terms with Communist Cuba. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 271) (IMG)

The freedom forces in Cuba greeted the Warsaw Pact intervention into Czechoslovakia in order to undermine the Yugoslav regime's intelligence presence in that country. Regarding Warsaw Pact intervention into Czechoslovakia, the Maoists obviously blatantly sided with Tito's fascist gang. Unfortunately, the Party of Labour of Albania – at the time under Maoist influence – overtly sided with the butcher of Kosovo on this matter, even though by then, covertly, Albania's trade relations was being strategically realigned with Brezhnev-era Eurasia. Castro on the other hand, fully endorsed the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, which was obviously aimed at minimizing Yugoslav regime's influence presence there:

Some people must have asked themselves the reason for that attitude – why Cuba is always emphasizing the role that the Yugoslav League of Communists Party plays in the world. What is the role of an instrument of imperialism that that party plays in the world?

Now, in relation to the occurrences in Czechoslovakia, the main promoter of all that bourgeois liberal policy – the main defender, the main promoter – was the organization of the so-called Yugoslav communists. They applauded with both hands all those liberal reforms, that whole concept of the party ceasing to be the instrument of revolutionary power, of power ceasing to be a function of the party – because this is very closely linked to the entire outlook of the Yugoslav League of Communists. All those criteria of political nature that completely deviate from Marxism, those criteria of an economic nature, are intimately linked with the Yugoslav League of Communists' ideology. (...) And here we have the facts. It was this organization that was one of the principal promoters of the deformations of the political process in Czechoslovakia as the agent – that is what this organization is – of the imperialists.

Some will say that [I err, but] I am going to show at least some facts. Tito was received as a hero in Prague a few weeks ago. This was the result of what? Of the ideological weakening, of the political weakness.. And were we not saying, how this can be? And to what extremes we are going, when this element – known to be revisionist, condemned historically by the revolutionary movement, which has taken the role of an agent of imperialism – was received by [the intelligentsia of] a nation practically as a hero? Now, of course, Tito is one of those most scandalized by this event of the participation of Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia.

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: 'The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis' [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, pp. 10-11. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

In the 1970s, when the Guatemalan terror regime, the CIA-installed fascist terror state hostile to Cuba, was being defunded by the Carter Administration, the Administration whose aim was to stab US imperialism in the back, the Guatemalan regime could nonetheless comfortably rely on the regimes of Israel, South Africa, and Yugoslavia to provide the arms it needed:

In the early 1980s, a whole worldwide right-wing network could be seen in action in Guatemala, offering aid in whatever form was needed. General Rodolfo Lobos Zamora mentioned the United States, Israel, and Argentina as countries that offered Guatemala military aid “spontaneously” (*Enfoprensa*, 1984).

Since 1975, Guatemala has received arms from the United States, Israel, France, Switzerland, Taiwan, Italy, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. (The Israeli Connection: Whom Israel Arms and Why, Benyamin Beit- Hallakhmi, 1987, p. 82) (IMG)

Indeed, the hostile relations between Cuba and Yugoslavia continued well into the 1970s and the 1980s. During the 1970s, the Cuban communists were aiming to hijack the CIA-backed Titoist ‘Non-Aligned Movement’. In cooperation with Libya, Cuba spearheaded the attempt to isolate the reactionary gang of Tito. Erik Goldstein, the Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the US Naval War College, noted the opposition of Qadhafi and Castro against Yugoslavia’s fascist leader. As early as 1973, and by:

the time of the Algiers conference, a split in the movement had become apparent. (...). Quaddafi and Castro ... soon found common cause against the United States, and united in opposition to Tito who preferred to remain less pro-Soviet. But Tito continued to remain in the minority as NAM members refused to equate Soviet imperialism with Western imperialism. (“Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy”, Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein, Richard Langhorne, 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

As late as 1979, Castro continued to be opposed to Tito:

The debate between Castro and Tito continued at Havana, albeit in an anticlimatic fashion. Castro attacked the United States and China as the cause of the world’s ills and reportedly sought to have the conference adopt a more openly pro-Soviet view of events. Tito responded by urging the Non-aligned Movement to remain independent from the superpowers. Efforts to bring the movement back to discussing economic difficulties and the debt crisis met with little success. (“Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy”, Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein, Richard Langhorne, 2002, p. 26) (IMG)

Documents leaked due to the US Embassy seizure in Tehran in 1979, confirm that the US State Department regarded the interests of the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie in Yugoslavia against People’s Democratic Cuba as in line with the interests of the United States:

UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM NOTED THAT THE US WAS TALKING FIRST TO YUGOSLAVIA ABOUT THE CUBAN DRAFT BECAUSE WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE HAVE PARALLEL INTERESTS. (NNNNVV ESB028BRA554, PP RJQMHR, DE RUEHC #7420/02 2011651, ZNY CCCCC ZZH, P 200030Z, From: Secretary of State, Washington DC, To: RUDKRB/American Embassy Belgrade, Priority 2892, INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY, July 1979) (IMG)

After all, the Yugoslavs were struggling to defend American imperialist interests in the NAM:

THE YUGOSLAVS WILL FIGHT HARD TO AVOID POSITIONS THAT WILL OFFEND THE US, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IN THE END THERE WOULD BE SOME COMPROMISES THAT COULD CAUSE THE US SOME PROBLEMS. (NNNNVV ESB028BRA554, PP RJQMHR, DE RUEHC #7420/02 2011651, ZNY CCCCC ZZH, P 200030Z, From: Secretary of State, Washington DC, To: RUDKRB/American Embassy Belgrade, Priority 2892, INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY, July 1979) (IMG)

In order for the Tito regime to pursue such pro-American objectives:

BELOVSKY HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT WE [Americans] WOULD UNDERTAKE THESE EFFORTS IN A WAY THAT DID NOT SUGGEST INTERFERENCE IN NAM’S AFFAIRS AS THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN THAT THE YUGOSLAVS AND OTHER MODERATES WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH. (NNNNVV ESB028BRA554, PP RJQMHR, DE RUEHC #7420/02 2011651, ZNY CCCCC ZZH, P 200030Z, From: Secretary of State, Washington DC, To: RUDKRB/American Embassy Belgrade, Priority 2892, INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY, July 1979) (IMG)

The United States pretended to be separate from the NAM, when in fact, the United States was supporting Yugoslav attempts to control the NAM.

C22S6.2. Revolutionary Cuba against the Moscow Titoists / People’s Democratic Development in Cuba with Brezhnev-era Eurasian Assistance / The Struggle for Establishing a Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Cuba / Some Theoretical Errors of Cuban Leadership

*** IMG-All-{Cuba}

Revolutionary Cuba on the one hand faced the front-stabs of the imperialist powers headed by the United States, and

the stabs in the back by the Moscow Titoists. Added to this was the fact that Cuba had poor economic infrastructure and a low availability of communist literature. All of these were obstacles in front of the Cuban proletariat, making it harder for them to achieve their objectives. There were at the same time factors that worked to Cuba's advantage. By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the international colonial system had been severely damaged. This itself was a factor that assisted the Cuban people in their liberation from American yoke in the first place. At the same time, there were many other freedom movements that succeeded in the countries formerly colonized, thus paving the way for allies worldwide with which a revolutionary Cuba could trade, and thus break Americana encirclement. Furthermore, in spite of the dominance of the Titoist tendency in Eurasia, and despite the fact that Eurasia had become a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, there were nonetheless communists as well as progressives within the state apparatus of Eurasia, and they sympathized with Cuba's struggles against Anglo-American intelligence. These communist and progressive elements that continued to exist in Eurasia made the effort to assist Cuba in the face of the aggression-by-infiltration projects of the American secret service.

The powerful existence of both the factors that favored and the factors that disfavored Cuba's proletarian class is reflected in the foreign and domestic policies that the Cuban government pursued, and is also correlated with the strength of the worker membership within the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). The purpose of this section is to expose both the lesser-known positive aspects and the lesser-known negative aspects of the situation in Cuba, with regards to political economy, international relations, and intelligence wars, to demonstrate the intensive class struggles and at times, stalemates, that occurred in that country.

A major problem between the Cuban revolutionary leadership and the Khrushchev group was the latter's support for American military espionage against Cuba. Nikita Khrushchev agreed that the so-called 'international inspectors' on nuclear programs are nothing but spies seeking to collect military intelligence:

If inspection is established without confidence, this will not be inspection. With spoiled relations between countries, such inspection becomes a form of military intelligence aimed at choosing the most favorable moment for either of the parties to commit aggression. We entertain no thoughts of any aggressive attack and will certainly not accent such inspection. But if conditions of mutual confidence are created between countries, then the establishment of inspection will present no difficulties. (Interview with William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Nikita Khrushchev, November 22, 1957, Pravda, November 28, 1957. In: 'Soviet World Outlook: A Handbook of Communist Statements', Bureau of Intelligence Research of the US State Department, July 1959, p. 201) (IMG)

The belief that 'UN inspectors' have historically been 'neutral' observers is a childish delusion. It is no secret that the 'UN inspectors' or 'nuclear inspectors' from the IAEA have historically been CIA-MI6 spies. The CIA spy Saddam Hussein defected to the anti-imperialist camp in 1989 and began to clash with the CIA; this is why after 1989, Saddam fiercely struggled against the arrival of 'UN inspectors' or 'nuclear inspectors' to Iraq. The 'inspectors' got into Iran's nuclear sites and subsequently Iran saw numerous explosions in its nuclear sector. The same Khrushchev who agreed that 'international inspectors' on nuclear matters are spies and the same Khrushchev who knew very well that the UN – the body that invaded Korea in 1950 – was an Anglo-American military and intelligence front, promoted such military intelligence gathering by the 'UN inspectors' in Cuba, something that got Khrushchev into a fierce clash with Fidel Castro:

On October 24 Khrushchev announced that he was determined to avoid "reckless decisions," and certain Soviet vessels en route to Cuba were ordered to change course. On October 28 Khrushchev advised the [US] President that he had given orders to "dismantle the arms which you describe as offensive and to crate them and return them to the Soviet Union." Khrushchev's agreement to permit U.N. observers to verify the dismantling of the missile sites was obstructed by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, who refused to allow observers to come to Cuba. The United States therefore continued air and naval surveillance of Cuba and withheld any formal promise not to invade the country in the future. (USSR, Capsule Facts for the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Information Service, Department of Defense, October 1967, p. 8) (IMG)

Had Khrushchev committed such a treasonous policy 'in consultation' with Cuba's leaders, Khrushchev was still going to be a traitor and an enemy spy anyways. Referring to Khrushchev's behaviour regarding Cuba, a terrorist who had agreed to spy for the SAVAK told his bosses:

Regarding the question of Cuba and the Caribbean Sea crisis and regarding the treatment of Albania, [Khrushchev] made serious errors. Ostensibly to maintain world peace, [Khrushchev] agreed to capitulate to the Americans against Cuba's independence.. And if it were not for the steadfastness of the Cuban people, the Americans would have swallowed [Cuba]. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, Khordad 22, 1344 / June 12, 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

Revolutionary Cuba's alliance with Eurasia was not because of the Khrushchev group but was rather in spite of the

Khrushchev group. Some people hold the incorrect view that the deployment of weapons by Eurasia was a dangerous provocation and a profound error; these people are incorrect. The policy of ruthless confrontation with the United States and 'grabbing America by the throat' off the coast of Florida was a policy of anti-imperialist confrontation emanating from the remnants of the communist faction in Eurasia. Imperialist America's tough response to such confrontation by the Eurasians gave Khrushchev the leverage he needed to commit treason and to denounce such anti-CIA confrontation as 'reckless'. He therefore was able to allow the 'UN inspectors' (CIA-MI6 spies) to gather military intelligence on Cuba, and ensured the withdrawal of some of the Eurasian military units from Cuba.

By the mid-1960s, there came about an erosion of the power of the Nikita Khrushchev faction, and the communist anti-Titoist elements that had encircled the Khrushchev agent Leonid Brezhnev, coopted Brezhnev to make moves to oust Nikita Khrushchev. By October 1964, Khrushchev was officially ousted and Titoist influence in Moscow saw some – but by no means total – decline. The Cubans greeted the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev and the rise of the Brezhnev faction, although they were wary of the profound Titoist deviations that the Brezhnevians had as well, since after all Brezhnev too was covertly as Titoist as Khrushchev and overtly a mere lesser-Titoist. In that same month of Khrushchev's ouster, Che Guevara wrote the following in an article:

One of the main bases for the development of our sugar industry, as well as for the development of the country as a whole, is the agreement recently signed between the U.S.S.R. and Cuba. This guarantees to us future sales of enormous quantities of sugar at prices much above the average of those paid in the North American and world markets during the last twenty years. Apart from this and other favorable economic implications, the agreement signed with the U.S.S.R. is of political importance inasmuch as it provides an example of the relationship that can exist between an underdeveloped and a developed country when both belong to the socialist camp, in contrast to the commercial relations between the underdeveloped countries exporting raw materials and the industrialized capitalist countries—in which the permanent tendency is to make the balance of trade unfavorable to the poor nations. (The Cuban Economy: Its Past and Its Present Importance, Ernesto Che Guevara, October 1964. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, pp. 145-146) (IMG)

The same Che Guevara that had fiercely denounced the Moscow Titoists headed by Khrushchev, wrote the above, which clearly reflects the Cuban recognition of some shifts occurring in Eurasia. Note that during the Khrushchev era, Che Guevara once openly declared that he will resist Cuba becoming dominated by the Moscow Titoists to the end:

BERGQUIST: You once said that Cuba would resist becoming a Soviet satellite to the "last drop of blood." But how "sovereign" were you when Khrushchev arranged with Kennedy for the missile withdrawal without consulting you?

GUEVARA: As you know from Fidel's speech, we had differences with the Soviet Union.

(Interview with Bergquist, No. 2, *Look Magazine*, April 1963. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, p. 398) (IMG)

Much like most of the freedom forces around the world, the Cubans were hostile to the Kremlin Titoists headed by the Khrushchev gang but looked favorably towards an alliance with the remnants of the communist network and anti-Titoist elements that from the Soviet legacy. As such, Cuba opposed the Eurasian Titoists but sought to form an alliance with the anti-Titoist elements that existed in Eurasia. Che, who resisted the domination of Cuba by the Moscow Titoists, favoured strategic partnership with the Eurasians when signs of improvement came in the mid- 1960s.

Castro knew that the Brezhnevians in the Warsaw Pact, while definitely preferable over the Khrushchevians in the overt level, were nonetheless Titoists on the covert level, and were not going to make the moves necessary to counter the Yugoslav regime influence, nor were they going to turn against the fascist enemies of Cuba in Latin America as much as they should have:

And we wonder whether, perhaps, this bitter experience with Czechoslovakia will not lead to a rectification of these errors, and whether the party of the League of Yugoslav Communists will cease to be accepted as a communist party, as a revolutionary party, and will cease to be invited to mass meetings and the political organizations of the socialist camp.

We are seeing many interesting things as a result of these events. It is explained that the countries of the Warsaw Pact sent armies to put down on imperialist plot and the development of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia. However, it has caused us to disagree and be discontented and to protest over the fact that these same countries have been fomenting relations and a rapprochement of an economic, cultural, and political nature with the oligarchical governments of Latin America, which are not simply reactionary governments, exploiters of their peoples, but are shameful accomplices in the imperialist aggressions against Cuba and shameful accomplices in the economic blockage against Cuba. And these countries have seen themselves stimulated and encouraged by the fact that our friends, our natural allies, have forgotten this cavalier role, this traitorous role, that these governments carry out against a socialist country, the blockage policy which those countries carry out

against a socialist country.

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: 'The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis' [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, p. 12. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Until early 1968, the Titoist faction in Moscow was still able to wield a high influence in many of the policy matters. This is reflected in the profound economic mismanagement that occurred in Cuba during this period, which could have been prevented through Eurasian aid. In 1966, the program for a harvest of 10 million tons by 1970, was launched. The Central Committee of the PCC noted that during this period there was:

an inefficient management of resources, which aggravated the financial problem and the shortage of workforce. (The Report to the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba: Historical Analysis of the Revolution, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, pp. 16-17. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodísticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

The report by the Central Committee further added:

Organizational deficiencies and inadequate methods of direction and economic management were also present. The realities turned out to be more powerful than our purposes. (The Report to the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba: Historical Analysis of the Revolution, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, pp. 16-17. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodísticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

During those years, severe mismanagement took place, including the left-deviationist policy of wage equalization:

However, in the social order between 1967 and 1969, negative trends such as the decoupling of wages from the production norm and the elimination of interest on credits and taxes charged to the peasantry took hold. All this, together with the fact that the issue of remuneration according to work was not taken into account, caused an excess of circulating money parallel to a shortage of supply of goods and services; promoting the conditions for the increase of absenteeism and labor indiscipline. (Política Socioeconómica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodísticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Surely, the economic mismanagement was something that happened inside of Cuba, but the Eurasians could provide technical expertise in preventing such a high level of mismanagement. Had the communist anti-Titoist elements in Eurasia had such a massive hold over politics, they surely would have been able to assist Cuba much earlier in preventing this catastrophe, but they obviously did not have as much power until 1968-1969. The revisionist policy of wage equalization and many other such bad policies were either abandoned or diminished in influence by 1969, but the effect was enough to cause the damage to the economy.

It would be wrong to entirely blame the Eurasian Titoists and the inadequate aid or 'aid' to Cuba as the factor for such economic problems. Cuba's economic management is known to have been directly influenced ideologically by the views of Che Guevara. Che Guevara held correct stances on a number of political-economic issues, one of which was the need to emphasize producer goods over consumer goods. However, he also held some erroneous theses that need to be mentioned, in order to shed light on the wage equalization policy that was promoted by many managers in Cuba at the time.

Despite Che's positive intentions, some of the views that he promoted gave greater ideological leverage to the anti-Cuba economic saboteurs in the Cuban economic management positions. It also misled many of the well-meaning albeit naive individuals in the economic management positions. In particular, Che Guevara held incorrect views with regards to the question of material vs. moral incentives, and against the historical materialist science. What follows are a number of excerpts from the works of Che Guevara. The underline and bold of Che's writings is done by me to highlight those parts that are especially idealist. The square brackets are added by me and contain my critiques of the views in the quotes. Here is the quote from Che:

It is necessary to make one thing clear: We do not negate the objective need for material incentives, but we are reluctant to use them as a **fundamental** element. [The word 'element' is too broad. Insofar as incentives are concerned, promoting 'purely' moral incentives is a fundamental goal of communism, but communist historical materialist analysis holds that material incentives are the fundamental means of reaching this fundamental goal.]

We believe that in economics such a lever becomes an end in itself and then begins to impose its own force on the relationships among men. We should not forget that material incentives come from capitalism and are

destined to die under **socialism**. [No, they are not destined to die under socialism, but are rather destined to die under communism, when production is so extremely high that material incentives in production become irrelevant.]

How are we going to make them die?

Little by little, through gradual increase in consumer goods for the people, which will make this type of incentive unnecessary—**we are told**. [We are told so by Marx and Engels in The Critique or the Gotha Programme. One should not be dogmatic about the ideas of Marx and Engels, but certainly on this issue, as with the vast majority of their other ideas, Marx and Engels are very correct.] We see in this answer a very rigid **mechanism**. [With all due respect to Che, Che's view on this matter is idealist. Since Che has an idealist stance on this matter, Che is incorrectly viewing scientific analysis as 'mechanistic' or mechanical materialist.]

Consumer goods, that is the watchword and the great molder, in the end, of consciousness, according to the defenders of the other system. We believe that direct material incentives and consciousness are **contradictory** terms. [No, they are not so contradictory. Material incentives lay the material foundation to the transition towards communism, and by laying the material foundation, they create the comfort and free up the needed time and space for individuals to develop their consciousness.]

This is one of the points at which our disagreement reaches concrete dimensions. It is no longer a matter of variations. To the defenders of financial self-management direct material incentives – projected into the future and accompanying the society in the diverse stages of building communism—do not contradict the "development" of consciousness. For us, they do. That is why **we fight against their predominance**; they mean a delay in the development of socialist **morality**.

(On the Budgetary System of Finance, Nuestra Industrial Revista Economica (Havana), Ernesto Che Guevara, February 1964, pp. 3-23. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, p. 121) (IMG)

Che again promoted the left-deviationist notion that providing bonus payment for over-fulfilment is incorrect:

we do not accept that the principle of from each according to his capacity, to each according to his work be interpreted as the complete payment, bonus pay, for the overfulfillment of a given quota.. (On the Budgetary System of Finance, Nuestra Industrial Revista Economica (Havana), Ernesto Che Guevara, February 1964, pp. 3-23. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, p. 124) (IMG)

The following quote also contains some obvious flaws but the latter part of the:

What, then, is the correct handling of material incentives? We believe that their existence cannot be forgotten, whether as a collective expression of the masses' strivings or as an individual presence; they are a reflection of the workers' mental habits from the old society.

We do not have a clearly defined idea as to how to use material incentives collectively due to insufficiencies in the planning apparatus which prevent us from having absolute faith in the system and from having organized a structure until now that would permit us to steer clear of difficulties. We see the greatest danger in the antagonism created between the state administration and production organizations. This antagonism has been analyzed by the Soviet economist Lieberman, who concludes that the methods of collective incentives should be changed, abandoning the old formula of rewards based on the fulfillment of quotas and moving to more advanced ones

Even if we disagree with Lieberman on the matter of how much emphasis should be given to material incentives (as a lever), we believe that his concern with the aberrations that the concept "fulfillment of the quota" has suffered is quite correct. The relations between enterprises and central organizations acquire contradictory forms and the methods used by the enterprises to obtain benefits sometimes have taken on characteristics that have nothing to do with socialist morality.

We believe that in a certain way the possibilities of development offered by the new production relationship for promoting the evolution of man in the direction of "the kingdom of freedom" are being wasted. We gave a detailed account of precisely this in our definition of the essential agreements of the system of interrelationships that exist between education and the development of production. One can embark on creating the new consciousness because there are new production relationships and, although in a general historical sense consciousness is a product of production relationships, the characteristics of the present period must be considered because there is a fundamental contradiction (on a worldwide level) between imperialism and socialism. Socialist ideas have influenced the consciousness of the whole world; that is why consciousness can develop and advance further than the particular stage of productive forces in a given country.

(On the Budgetary System of Finance, Nuestra Industrial Revista Economica (Havana), Ernesto Che Guevara, February 1964, pp. 3-23. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and

with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, pp. 121-122) (IMG)

It surely is possible that with the spread of communist ideas worldwide, consciousness develops to the stage in which it becomes a more a significant historical force than the other historical-material forces and factors, at the specific period of time. However, this would require an in-depth and extensive education of virtually all of the population of the world in the science of socialism. Only then can consciousness become a force potentially capable of overpowering all the other historical-material forces. This was clearly not the case in Che Guevara's time, however. Che Guevara was correct in stating that 'consciousness can develop and advance further than the particular stage of productive forces', but the implication he seemed to be drawing from that statement is incorrect, for it would certainly be an exaggeration to believe that consciousness can develop and advance so further and farther than the productive forces that consciousness would be able to yield a socialist society.

The issue of whether Fidel Castro was a communist or not is controversial. Some argue that he was never really a communist, whereas others argue that he was one as soon as he declared himself one. It is true that Fidel Castro and some of his followers in the Party harbored some erroneous views alien to scientific socialism. It is also true that Fidel Castro in the first years, even when he declared himself a 'communist', was not so well-versed in the science of communism to be a communist. In the 1960s and early 1970s, while having a good anti-imperialist intuition, Castro did not have a strong understanding of scientific socialism. However, by the mid-1970s, Castro gained practical knowledge of how to class-struggle, and used that knowledge in order to advance the influence of the proletariat over the state and that state's influence over the economy, thus advancing communist objectives. In the end, knowledge of the core tactics and strategies of waging proletarian class struggles constitutes the core knowledge of scientific socialism. And Fidel Castro, despite some of the theoretical errors he had, understood the core of scientific socialism by the mid-1970s. Some question whether the Castro faction (since the 1970s) was a communist faction in the PCC; such a view is erroneous. The Castro faction since the 1970s was striving for proletarian control over the state and a proletarian-controlled state's control over the economy and culture. As such, it was struggling for socialism.

The gradual rise of the Brezhnev faction in Eurasia meant that material changes occurred in the partial resurgence of the communist faction. Fidel Castro confirmed that improving Cuba's economic situation:

would not have been possible without the understanding of the Soviets, who accepted reduced amounts of sugar between 1972 and 1974 [i.e. Brezhnev era], without thereby reducing the increasing shipment of raw materials, food, fuel and equipment to Cuba and by increasing, on the other hand, the prices of our export products, thereby improving the terms of trade. (The Report to the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba: Historical Analysis of the Revolution, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, pp. 16-17. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

The CIA-sponsored Maoist left-opportunists will promote the narrative that Cuba was a 'colony' of the 'Soviet social-imperialists' and so the 'social-fascist' 'puppet' Castro was merely promoting 'lies' to help his 'colonial masters'. However, an intelligence memorandum by the CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE), which is responsible for handling economic data, confirmed:

Cuba also benefits from guaranteed Soviet purchases of sugar at prices usually above the world market level. (CHANGING INFLUENCES ON CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY, CIA, Office of National Estimates (ONE), December 29, 1972, p. 7) (IMG)

Long after the dismantlement of the CMEA and 30 years after the 1991 partition of Eurasia, when the Cubans were not under the 'duress' of the 'Soviet social-imperialists', the official website of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) acknowledged that the CMEA – to which the Maoist left-opportunists refer as a 'Soviet social-imperialist' economic 'exploitation' body – gave preferential prices, a secure market, and necessary production inputs to Cuba:

In 1972, Cuba joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which meant access to the necessary inputs for production processes and at the same time having a secure market for national productions, even with preferential prices. (Politica Socioeconomica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Even though Cuba faced a drought in the early 1970s, Cuba nonetheless experienced a significant amount of economic growth, at least according to Cuban government source that emerged 30 years after the 1991 partition of Eurasia:

In general, between 1971 and 1975 the Cuban economy experienced an annual growth of 10%. (Politica Socioeconomica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

During the period 1970-1975, thanks to the assistance of the communist faction in Eurasia, as well as the fortunate increase in the world sugar prices, Cuba was able to import much of heavy industry from the Western countries. Cuba

could not import much heavy industry from Eurasia since Eurasia was just recovering from years of Titoist economic sabotage inflicted upon heavy industry by the Khrushchev group. Anyways, the CIA reported:

Although Havana remains heavily dependent on Soviet trade and economic assistance, rising world sugar prices between 1970 and 1975 enabled Cuba to sharply step up purchases from the West. Despite a doubling of Cuban-Soviet trade in this same period, the share of imports from the West rose from 31 percent in 1970 to 48 percent in 1975. Havana considers many Western capital goods to be of higher quality than Soviet counterparts and has sought for some time to diversify its import sources. (The Cuban Economy and Trade with the West. In: WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, March 18, 1977, p. 14) (IMG)

Then in 1976, drought hit Cuba again, damaging its sugar production:

CUBA: Drought Hampers Sugar Production

Cuba's persistent drought probably will hamper sugar production this year despite improved efficiency by sugar processors. Sugar production this year will total about 6 million tons, roughly equal to last year's level. This stagnation reflects below-normal rainfall for the third consecutive year in the important cane-growing regions in eastern Cuba. Milling yields could improve, however, because of reduced caneburning and a planned increase in mechanical harvesting of the crop from 33 percent of total volume harvested in 1976 to 42 percent next year.

Stagnation of sugar output in 1977, together with prospective low world market sugar prices at least through mid-year, may force Cuba to curtail imports further from non-communist countries, already down by a third this year. Cuban hard-currency earnings in 1977 are unlikely to exceed this year's estimated \$800 million, an amount equal to only about two thirds of 1976 imports from non-communist countries. Cuba is reluctant to expand its hard-currency debt substantially beyond the current estimated \$1.3 billion because debt service obligations, estimated at \$400 million in 1977, are already burdensome. Imports from the USSR and other communist countries will probably be increased slightly again next year. Cuba will not feel a new financial constraint on imports from the communist countries because they will continue to pay 19 to 30 cents a pound for Cuban sugar compared with the likely free market price of 7 to 9 cents.

(‘CUBA: Drought Hampers Sugar Production’. In: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, December 27, 1976, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

By the way, the CIA document above once again confirmed that the Eurasians were purchasing Cuban sugar at a price two times to four times the world market price. If ‘Soviet social-imperialism’ bore material reality, then certainly the ‘Soviet social-imperialists’ did a poor job of ‘colonially exploiting’ ‘their appendage’ Cuba, contrary to how the global Maoist fascist reaction portrays the matter. The effects of the 1976 drought were perhaps somewhat more severe than the drought in the early 1970s, because they were coupled with drops in the world price of sugar, noted both the PCC and the CIA. The PCC media reported:

In that period, the economic evolution of the country as of 1976 was not without difficulties that led to the reconsideration of the goals agreed upon in the First Congress.

Among the adverse factors were the fall in the price of sugar, the severe droughts that affected the country for three years, the dependence of the national economy on the world capitalist market, and the deterioration of international economic relations, which was felt in the growing interest on foreign debt and on the increase in freight rates in international transport. (...). However, Fidel synthesized in the Central report rendered at the II Congress: “ *The current period 76-80, which is about to end, has been one of extraordinary advances in the organization of our economy, in the struggle to create the conditions for a greater efficiency in the use of our productive resources, and also of significant achievements in our economic development and in the purposes of increasingly satisfying the needs of our people, although it has been a period fraught with numerous difficulties of an objective nature, both internal and as external, which have prevented us from reaching everything that we have proposed.* ” (Politica Socioeconomica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas,

Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

The CIA too reported:

Stagnating Cuban sugar production, declining world sugar prices, and rapidly rising hard-currency debt led to a sharp cutback in Cuban imports from the West last year. Hard-currency earnings fell by approximately half, as the world free market price for sugar plummeted from 14 cents per pound at the beginning of the year to 7 or 8 cents per pound at the end of the year.

At the same time, Havana was forced to restrict additional borrowing because of its mounting hard-currency debt, estimated at \$1.3 billion, and the bleak prospects for a significant rebound in world free market sugar prices. An estimated 30 percent of deliveries from the noncommunist world were held up at Cuba's request.

Continued low world sugar prices will limit Havana's hard-currency earnings in 1977 to about \$800 million—close to the 1976 level.

(The Cuban Economy and Trade with the West. In: WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, March 18, 1977, p. 14) (IMG)

The economic damages inflicted upon Cuba reduced the amounts of funds available to the communist faction in Cuba, making it harder for the communist faction to wage the secret service conflict against the Titoist faction. This gave the Titoist faction greater lobbying power, leading to the pursuit of Titoist economic policies, especially the decentralization and further bureaucratization of the economy through the demagogical policy of 'worker self-management'. In 1976, the policy laid down in Cuba was the System of Direction and Planning of the Economy (SDPE). The SDPE system reaffirmed the policy of decentralizing planning to the local enterprises such that the planning process would become subordinate to the local districts' 'needs':

Planning is a unique system in which the three objective economic levels must be integrated: global of the entire national economy, branch and companies, coordinated with their territorial planning. The determining and decisive interest is that of the national economy as a whole. Therefore, the plans of the companies will be subordinate to the objectives of the development of the given territory, in aspects such as finances, standard of living, labor resources, local natural resources and others. (First Congress of the PCC: Thesis and Resolutions: On the System of Direction and Planning of the Economy, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, p. 5. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Part D of the new SDPE document approved of and advanced by the congress of the PCC called for the worker self-management principle – a populist means of decentralizing the economy and proliferating bureaucracy – to be incorporated into the planning process:

d) Combine the necessary centralization of the main decisions with the maximum possible participation of the workers, the administration of the companies and the intermediate levels of management in economic planning and management. In relation to this, it is necessary to grant the corresponding autonomy to companies in economic-operational decisions. (First Congress of the PCC: Thesis and Resolutions: On the System of Direction and Planning of the Economy, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, p. 2. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Again, remember that worker self-management makes the production slower by so-called 'democratizing' the individual enterprises. Along with such a demagogical anarchistic measure, came the decentralization of the economic decision-making to such enterprises. The decentralization sowed further chaos in the economy, making it harder for enterprises to coordinate. Out of such chaos grew the bureaucratic mess, that strengthened the corrupt bureaucrats at the expense of the proletariat in the secret service battle for control over the state. Furthermore, the centralization of the economy allows the communist counter-intelligence service to have to surveil only a few economic bodies, whereas the decentralization of the economy forces the counter-intelligence authorities to have to surveil many economic bodies, thus making it harder to hunt down the corrupt bureaucrats. Pay attention to the following data provided in 1976 congress of the PCC, which shows the percent membership composition in the Party:

Workers in Industrial Production, Agriculture, Construction, and Services: 35.9%

Professional and Technical Workers: 9.2%

Workers in the Tasks of Political and Administrative Direction: 42.1%

Administrative Workers: 4.1%

Small Farmers: 1.8%

Others: 6.9%

(First Congress of the PCC: Theses and Resolutions on the Internal Life of the Party, PCC, 1976, p. 4. p. 50. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

As can be seen, the 'Workers in Industrial Production, Agriculture, Construction, and Services' and the 'Small Farmers' together comprised $35.9\% + 1.8\% = 37.7\%$ of the membership composition of the Party. On the other hand, adding the percent composition of the white-collar elements in the Party, represented by the 'Professional and Technical Workers', the 'Workers in the Tasks of Political and Administrative Direction', and the 'Administrative Workers', we get $9.2\% + 42.1\% + 4.1\% = 55.4\%$. As can be seen, the white-collar elements in the Party formed a majority at the time of the 1976 congress, which is what generated the Party line in favor of the revisionist pro -bureaucrat policy of economic

decentralization.

After the 1976-1977 hit taken by the communist faction, however, there came some improvements in the conditions faced by Cuba, which once again strengthened the agents of the proletariat while undermining the agents of the bureaucrats. Fortunately, the revisionist economic policy of 'worker self-management' was implemented only partially:

The participation of the workers in the elaboration of the plans of the companies has not been possible to carry out at the desired level. At times, there has been a lack of programming the necessary time for their effective inclusion in this process. On other occasions, the meetings to discuss the Control Figures of the Plan have not been properly organized. In addition, there are cases of lack of attention from company administrations and central and local State agencies, in terms of fulfilling the task of fully informing the groups of workers.

In this way, it has been manifested, in many companies, the fact of not explaining to the workers, later, when the Directive Figures have been issued, the reasons that have led to not accepting their proposals for reasons that vary but that have, generally, fundamentals referring to supply difficulties or of a technical nature.

The participation of the workers in the elaboration of the plans is a basic element of the policy of the Communist Party and of the socialist State that favors the initiative of the masses and of the cadres and that constitutes a fundamental aspect of socialist democracy to which shall be given utmost attention.

(Second Congress of the PCC: Resolutions: On the System of the Direction and Planning of the Economy, Cuban Communist Party, 1980, pp. 2-3. In: *Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodísticas*, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

This was correlated with the fact that the communist faction in Cuba's Party was able to actually carry through with its agenda of increasing the working class representation in the percent membership composition of the Party. Hence, by the year 1980, the 'Production Workers' and the 'Service Workers' together reportedly formed 47.3% of the percent membership composition of the PCC (source: *Vanguard Party Politics in Cuba*, Marifeli Perez-Stable. In: 'Conflict and Change in Cuba', edited by Enrique A. Baloyra & James A. Morris, p. 75. Citing: Cuban government data.) (IMG). At the same time, the white collar elements formed $15.0 + 23.6 + 4.3 + 4.3 = 47.2\%$ of the Party membership ((source: *Vanguard Party Politics in Cuba*) (IMG). One could call this a neck-and-neck race between the white collar and blue collar elements. The election of Reagan in 1980, and the gradual replacement of the agents of the Carter faction with the agents of the G. H. W. Bush faction, further strengthened the CIA and the US military, allowing for a more aggressive projection of American imperialist influence in Latin America. Although by 1980, the pace of Titoization had been slowed down and the blue-collar elements had seen an increase in their membership percentage in the Party, the December 1980 congress saw a partial resurgence of Titoism. The second congress of the PCC in 1980 reaffirmed:

The participation of the workers in the elaboration of the plans is a basic element of the policy of the Communist Party and of the socialist state that favors the initiative of the masses and the cadres and that constitutes a fundamental aspect of socialist democracy to which there will be to be given the utmost attention. (Second Congress of the PCC: Resolutions: On the System of the Direction and Planning of the Economy, Cuban Communist Party, 1980, pp. 2-3. In: *Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodísticas*, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

The conditions became even worse in the mid-1980s, for there came an even greater increase in Titoist influence projected from Eurasia. During the era of the Anglo-American spy Gorbachev (see C24S4), the pressures on Cuba to decentralize was much stronger, because this was part of the strategy to sabotage Cuba's economy through greater bureaucratization. Thus, the PCC programs of the 1980s too decentralized the economy further and further:

In this sense, the Party and Government Measures Programs stand out as instruments of direction to ensure the economic and social objectives of the years 1983 and 1984, approved in the XI and VIII Plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the PCC in the years 1982 and 1983, respectively.

These Programs decentralized economic, social and political tasks as a way of ensuring the integral development of the country in the corresponding year and constituted a more efficient working instrument to centrally control those activities that were decisive to achieve prioritized objectives.

(*Politica Socioeconomica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodísticas*, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Since the 1980s until the late 2010s at least, Cuba's economy had been decentralizing further and further, thus generating more and more economic inefficiencies and bureaucracy. The decentralization increased further afterwards, especially in the 1990s. Back in the Gorbachev years, CIA-sponsored media was actively spreading the news of the Castro faction's deep conflicts with the Gorbachev faction in Eurasia, so to give the Gorbachev faction the excuse to condemn the Cubans as 'disrespectful' to 'fraternal USSR' hence 'deserving' to be de-funded by the Eurasians. Once aid to Cuba would reduce,

the Fidel Castro faction would be weakened and Gorbachev's agents in Cuba would gain greater leverage in the factional conflict, thus being able to rollback the proletarian influence over the Cuban state apparatus and open up that country to Anglo-American colonization. To foil such a conspiracy, Fidel Castro publicly endorsed Gorbachev and denied the correct accusations that he opposed Gorbachev. This was a correct move, and can be compared to the fact that a few days before Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet media deliberately denied that a war with Germany was soon to come.

With the Titoist faction in the CPSU – itself generated from the majority white collar membership – fully in charge by 1985, the pressures in favor of the bureaucrats and white collar elements in the PCC increased as well; hence, in 1985, the 'Production Workers' and the 'Service Workers' together comprised 43.2% of the percent membership composition of the PCC, whereas the white collar elements increased to 47.4% of the Party membership (source: Vanguard Party Politics in Cuba, Marifeli Perez-Stable. In: 'Conflict and Change in Cuba', edited by Enrique A. Baloyra & James A. Morris, p. 75. Citing: Cuban government data.) (IMG). The proletariat comprised a large minority in the PCC, but were not able to dominate the PCC. On the other hand, the white collar elements maintained a slight majority during that period. While Cuba's revolutionaries did make mistakes, for the most part, the problems concerning the role of the working class in the PCC as well as the decentralization measures are the result of the Anglo-American intelligence stabs in the front and the Titoist stabs in the back. At least for the period studied, it would not be fair to say that Cuba reached the phase of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', and instead remained a progressive bourgeois-democracy that was led by the proletariat. In that respect, therefore, Cuba fulfilled the first stage of the development of People's Democracy but not the second stage. Left-deviationist currents misinterpret this phenomenon as to imply that one should launch another 'revolution from below', an armed rebellion to destroy the Cuban government in order to establish a socialist state – this view is incorrect. In Cuba, the proletariat already control a large segment of the state apparatus and it would be counterproductive and pro-imperialist to launch an armed rebellion to demolish the whole Cuban government. Rather, the correct step is for the Cuban proletariat to merely expand their influence over the state apparatus by gaining greater influence over the means of violence – the armed forces and the security and intelligence bodies – and then purging the corrupt bureaucrats in the Party and increasing the quantity of the communist blue-collar elements in the Party, as the key steps for the transition to the second stage of People's Democracy, namely the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the years examined, the Cuban proletariat, in the face of intense Titoist backstabbing and Anglo-American front-stabbing, could not establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. However, because of the assistance they received from the freedom forces worldwide, and obviously due to their own efforts as well, they were able to hold out and to entrench themselves as a large minority in the Cuban state, thus making Cuba a progressive bourgeois-democracy led by but not dictated by the proletarian class, much like many of the Peoples' Democracies in their first stage. With the decline of imperialism, Titoism will decline as well and the proletarian elements in the state can increase their quantity to cause a qualitative leap, thereby making Cuba a well-entrenched dictatorship of the proletariat.

There is and has been plenty of mismanagement and bureaucracy in Cuba going back to the 1960s. The reason why the Cuban system deserves admiration is that it advanced more than all the other Latin American countries in combatting such bureaucracy by elevating the class enemies of the bureaucrats – the proletariat – over the state. In many of the other Latin American countries, under the banner of liberalization, the black-marketeers and bureaucratic oligarchic thieves were legalized and placed in charge of government; and since they were legalized and given state legitimacy, they were no longer defined as bureaucrats, mis-managers, and black-marketeers. Cuba has advanced more than most others because it has cracked down on so many parasitic class forces and has elevated the proletariat as replacement; that is what the progressives should have presented as the admirable feature about Cuba. More correct than the narrative that the US sanctions have made Cuba poor, is the narrative that the sanctions imposed by US finance capital have given increased factional leverage to the corrupt bureaucrats in Cuba thus causing internal economic mismanagement and sabotage. Unfortunately, many progressives have been somewhat dishonest about Cuba, by sweeping the fact of the bureaucratic class there under the rug. The problem with such a dishonest narrative is that it presents Cuban society as almost monolithically proletarian and socialist, does not recognize that class struggles between the bureaucrats and the proletariat exist, and thus presents anything that goes wrong in Cuba as purely 'externally'-made. It does not mention the alliance of US finance capital (an 'external factor') with the corrupt bureaucrats (the 'internal factor') in Cuba, and does not mention the Cuban proletariat's struggle against the Cuban bureaucrats who generate the fifth column serving US intelligence and cause deformities in the Cuban system. Hence, the reason why Cuba deserves admiration is not that therein thrives a rosy economy, which actually exists only in the exaggerative descriptions of the romantics, but rather the admirable thing about Cuba is that it has remained as a state far more under the influence of the proletarian class than most of the other states since the 1989-1991 collapses. And such a continued high influence of the proletariat over the Cuban state has allowed that country to retain the vital economic standards and has prevented that country from descending into the reign of economic terror by which most of Latin America was struck.

C22S7. People's Democratic Development in Albania / Titoization and Anti-Titoist Resistance in Albania

*** IMG- All-{Albania}

Even as late as 1955:

Yugoslav clandestine activities against Albania have continued, at any rate until recently. Cedo Mijovic, Kapllan, ... and Vlado Popovic, who is a major in the UDB, are among the chief recruiters of Albanian agents who are sent into Albania. General Dushan Mugosha (member of the Communist Party of Serbia, Deputy in the Federal Parliament, and a director of all immigrants) does not appear as one of the recruiters, although he directs these activities. He certainly wants to overthrow the present Tirana regime and substitute one under Yugoslav influence. But Mugosha has said that they must wait for the opportune moment. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Hence:

The Yugoslav Government geeks, in a quiet way, a closer relationship with the National Committee for a Free Albania – NCFA, and with the Albanian emigrants in the West, in an effort to gain greater influence in this refugee community. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Yet, Albania was bullied by the Kremlin Titoists to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav regime and to allow a Yugoslav fascist spy ('Yugoslav ambassador') into Albania. Nonetheless, the Albanians refused to give much fanfare to the Yugoslav regime:

No fanfare accompanied the renewal of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, and the arrival of the Yugoslav ambassador in Tirana was barely mentioned in the press. ('1. ALBANIAN REACTION TO GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION 2. NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 3. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

A document by the CIA Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) stated:

Preoccupied with the maintenance of domestic order, both public and party, plagued with the most primitive economy in all of Europe, and ... suspicious of Yugoslavia, the Albanian leaders have been unhappy with the trend of soviet policies since the death of Stalin. Inter alia, only lip service – and not much of that – was paid to the post-1954 Soviet bloc campaign to improve relations with Yugoslavia. (ALBANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 30, 1961, p. 1) (IMG)

The Kremlin Titoists assassins who rose to power after murdering Stalin, stabbed People's Democratic Albania in the back by discouraging Albanian investment into heavy industry, so to keep it an agrarian country with a weak military-industrial backbone, so that it could be easily colonized by the Yugoslav regime. This fact has been confirmed by Enver Hoxha and the Albanian media several times (see for example 'The Khrushchevites'). However, it has also been confirmed by CIA-Mossad agents. For example, the Soros agent Miranda Vickers wrote:

During the war, Italian mineral exploration had revealed the extent of Albania's raw material base, yet both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union wanted the Albanians to concentrate on developing agriculture rather than their considerable mineral resources. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

The emphasis was to no longer be on heavy industry but rather on agriculture:

In 1954, Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party Central Committee, announced that the USSR had granted Albania considerable credit and other economic privileges for the further development of the country's economy. It was implied that the economic aid was of an agricultural nature. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG{Bulgaria})

Thus:

The government's new economic policy to increase production of consumer goods, introduced in the summer of 1953, has been disappointing. ('1. ALBANIAN REACTION TO GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION 2. NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 3. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The defunding of Albanian heavy industry 'thanks' to the pressures of Moscow Titoists no doubt resulted in only partial success in the Five Year Plan:

During the 1950s Albania embarked on an ambitious programme of electrification and industrialization. Despite protests from Moscow, greater attention was paid to the exploitation of Albania's rich mineral wealth, which included chrome, oil, nickel, coal and copper. The first five-year plan, 1950-5, which was aimed primarily at relieving acute shortages and strengthening the overall economy, proved to be far too ambitious.... It did, however, manage to produce the Vlore cement works, a sugar-cane factory, the tobacco fermentation plant at Shkoder, and the Tirana textile combine, plus a few tractors and threshing machines. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

Meanwhile, the Yugoslav regime continued its hostile and subversive activities against People's Democratic Albania,

even after the exchange of embassies:

All Albanian political emigrants in Yugoslavia believed they were going to be sent back to Albania after the exchange of embassies. Mugesha issued a declaration that they would never do this, regardless of relations with Albania, and drew attention to Tito's declarations on the subject of normalization. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

As always, there was a correlation between the wave of Titoization that struck the Party of Labour of Albania between 1953 to 1956 and the increase in the Party recruitment of the white-collar elements. In the 3rd Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha remarked:

As Marxism-Leninism and the experience of our Party teach us, the strength of the Party and the steel unity of its ranks rests, first of all, on the social composition of the Party, on the quality and purity of its ranks. It is for this reason that the strengthening of the composition of our Party has been and remains one of the primary problems.

During the period since the 2nd Congress, the party organizations have carried out more careful work to bring into the ranks of the Party the best people, those most loyal and determined, in the first place, from the working class, from the ranks of the working peasantry, and the people's intelligentsia. As a result of this work, some successes have been achieved in the improvement of the composition of the Party. At the 2nd Congress only 11.5 per cent of the members were of worker status, whereas today workers comprise 17.7 per cent of the membership of the Party, that is, there is an increase of 6.2 per cent. In the admissions to the Party during this period workers make up 23.55 per cent, members of the agricultural cooperatives 6.18 per cent, members of the artisan cooperatives 2.61 per cent, poor and middle peasants 37.5 per cent, while office workers, students, and so on, make up 30.15 per cent.

From the above figures it results that, despite some advance in comparison with the past, in the work for the improvement of the composition of the Party, especially as regards the more rapid increase of its ranks with workers, we have not done very well. In the admissions to the Party, not only do workers not occupy the first place but, in comparison with those admitted from the other strata, in particular from among the office workers, the percentage of workers is still quite unsatisfactory.

All the conditions have been created in our country for the constant strengthening of the composition of the Party, because our industry has been set up and is growing. Increasing the ranks of the Party with elements from the working class is a vital question for the Party. However, it is noticed that some party committees and organizations do not properly tackle the problem of training elements from the working class for admission to the Party, but frequently submit to the requests of office workers, carried away by the phrases, in the ready presentation of which such people are well skilled. The party organizations should thoroughly understand that the time has come when they must achieve a more marked increase in the percentage of workers in the total membership of the Party, and educate these elements from the working class through active work. Naturally, this does not mean that from now on we should fling the doors of the Party wide open to all the workers who may wish to join the Party.

(REPORT AT THE 3rd CONGRESS OF THE PLA, Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha, May 25, 1956. In: Enver Hoxha Selected Works, Vol. 2, The "8 Nentori" Publishing House, Tirana, 1975, p. 555-557. MIA)

Hoxha credibly claimed that some within the Party were liberally recruiting white collar elements while not sufficiently elevating the blue-collar elements in political education so to join Party membership. Since the previous Congress of the Party was in 1952, it is likely that Moscow Titoist pressures and influence in the Party resulted in such a shift. This factor definitely also must have reinforced the pro-Titoization tendency in the 3rd Congress.

At the time, since the reactionary character of the Khrushchev group had not yet become well-known amongst communists, an open revolt against the Khrushchev group would not have been feasible, and such an open revolt would have been exploited by the Titoists to crush the then-isolated communist resistance against Titoization. With the advent of the 20th CPSU Congress and Khrushchev's infamous Titoization speech, Enver Hoxha, like pretty much every other communist leader in the bloc, paid lip service to Khrushchev's Titoist theses in order to survive politically against Khrushchev's Titoization agenda, buy time, so that later on, when the true face of the Moscow Titoists had been revealed enough, the fomenting of a strong action against Khrushchev's group could be undertaken. The excerpt of Hoxha's speech is provided by the Communist League of UK, which was the well-known Hoxhaist organization founded by the famous 'Hoxhaist before Hoxha' William Bland, one of the most well known authors in support of the Party of Labour of Albania. Here is the excerpt of Hoxha's speech cited by the Communist League (UK):

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has made a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the decisive role played in the building of socialism and communism by the masses of the people,

and the great damage caused by the cult of personality, alien to Marxism-Leninism.

These incorrect and non-Marxist conceptions on the individual were developed and cultivated over a long period in regard to Comrade Stalin.

The great error of J. V. Stalin lies in the fact that not only did he accept the praises and flatteries addressed to him, but he himself supported and encouraged these anti-Marxist viewpoints.

The cult of personality and the leadership practice of J. V. Stalin were marked by the open violation of Leninist principles of the collective leadership of the Party, were marked by violations of the Leninist norms of the Party. The contempt of J. V. Stalin for the norms of Party life and for the principle of collective leadership of the Party, the solution of problems in an individual manner on his part, the contempt for Party opinion, taking even severe measures against those who expressed a contrary opinion to his own could not fail to cause, and did cause, great harm, producing grave deviations from Leninist rules of the life of the Party and the violation of revolutionary legality.

He did not show the necessary vigilance on the eve of the Patriotic War against Nazi Germany; he did not devote the necessary attention to the further development of socialist agriculture and to the material well-being of the collective farms; he supported and incited an erroneous line in the Yugoslav affairs.

(Enver Hoxha: 'Rapport d'activite du comite central du Parti du Travail d'Albanie au Ille Congres du Parti' (Report on the Activity of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania to the 3rd Congress of the Party) (May 1956); Tirana; 1956; p. 180, 181, 182-83. In: 'DIMITROV: REPLY TO READER', Communist League (UK)) (IMG)

This fact – Hoxha's lip service to Khrushchev's Titoist theses – was later covered up and omitted by Hoxha probably so that he could present his resistance against Khrushchev as completely firm and devoid of the slightest 'vacillation'. Hoxha's temporary lip service in favor of the Titoist theses of the 20th CPSU congress was a strategically necessary means of pretending to fit in the Eastern Bloc, because back then, an open revolt against Khrushchev would have served the Titoists by helping them isolate the Albanian communists. Khrushchev was to be overtly confronted at a later more opportune time, when Khrushchev and the degenerate nature of the Titoist theses of the 20th Congress were sufficiently exposed among the communists of the Eastern Bloc. This correct strategy which the Party of Labour of Albania pursued was also the correct strategy pursued by the Romanian communists headed by Gheorghiu-Dej and the French communists headed by Maurice Thorez. Both of the latter leaders tried to do what Hoxha did.

Even as late as the 1980s, Hoxha – while acknowledging that Dej and Thorez were opposed to the Yugoslav regime and hostile to Nikita Khrushchev's lines – also made the error of denouncing Dej and Thorez for their temporary lip service to Khrushchev's counter-revolutionary theses; in other words, Hoxha criticized Dej and Thorez for doing precisely what Hoxha himself had done. All the while, having largely omitted the fact of Hoxha's own temporary lip service to Khrushchev's Titoist theses, Hoxha presented himself as inflexibly opposed to the Kremlin Titoists. While the fact of omitting Hoxha's own lip service to the Titoist theses is understandable and was perhaps needed for keeping the 'moral high ground' against the left-opportunists, the fact that Hoxha criticized Dej and Thorez for pursuing the same strategy that Hoxha himself pursued was a historiographic error from Hoxha. The opportunity for confronting the Kremlin Titoists did emerge for Albania by the 1960s. The CIA Office of Current Intelligence stated:

An opportunity for registering Albania's strong discontent arose in the spring of 1960, when Peiping brought its growing dispute with Moscow into the open. Here for the first time was a potential center of support for a militant dissent from Soviet strategy. At both the Soviet-convened Communist conferences at Bucharest, in June and at Moscow in November, the Albanian leaders, Hoxha and Shehu, unequivocally, and seemingly irrevocably, cast their lot with Peiping. (ALBANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 30, 1961, p. 1) (IMG)

Albania's alliance with the People's Republic of China must not be understood as genuine friendship with that regime. Enver Hoxha basically regarded Chinese government's 'opposition' to Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists as semi-fake. Here is an excerpt of a document written by him in 1962:

THE CHINESE ARE GIVING KHRUSHCHEV A HAND (APRIL 6, 1962)

The Chinese ambassador came to transmit to me a message from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania which, in substance, says: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is of the opinion that a meeting should be held with the Soviets on the basis of the proposals of the parties of Indonesia, Vietnam and New Zealand, in order to iron out differences and strengthen the unity of the socialist camp. We must take the initiative, say the Chinese comrades, and uphold the banner of unity. They add that the conditions we have laid down for this meeting are understandable to the Chinese, but will not be accepted by the other parties, therefore, for its part, **the Communist Party of China lays down no preconditions**. It proposes that we exchange party delegations to discuss the issue.

We shall reply to them. We accept the exchange of delegations with the Communist Party of China, but we

will not alter our stand in the least in regard to the proposed meeting with the Soviet revisionists.

This is a wrong course the Chinese comrades are trying to lead us on to, it is an opportunist road of vacillations and concessions to the Khrushchev traitor group which finds itself in grave difficulties, and is intriguing in order to escape defeat. The Chinese comrades are giving it a hand to pull it out of the mire, giving it the possibility to strengthen its positions and go on the attack again.

(Reflections on China, Enver Hoxha. Bold added)

Negotiations with enemies are useful, but require preconditions. According to Hoxha, the Chinese government was willing to iron out differences without preconditions. While Hoxha regarded China as an ally, he did not see them as being truly on his side. Nonetheless, for the while, the Chinese regime leaders held a line useful to the Party of Labour of Albania, hence the overt-level alliance of the two parties. However, none of that is to mean that at any point in time did the Albanians regarded the Chinese regime leaders as true comrades. Enver Hoxha further stated:

Many a time later I have turned back to this period of the history of the Communist Party of China, trying to figure out how and why the profoundly revisionist line of 1956 [adopted by the Chinese] subsequently seemed to change direction, and for a time, became “pure”, “anti-revisionist” and “Marxist-Leninist”. It is a fact, for example, that in 1960 the Communist Party of China seemed to be strongly opposing the revisionist theses of Nikita Khrushchev and confirmed that “it was defending Marxism-Leninism” from the distortions which were being made to it, etc. It was precisely because China came out against modern revisionism in 1960 and seemed to be adhering to Marxist-Leninist positions that brought about that our Party stood shoulder to shoulder with it in the struggle which we had begun against the Khrushchevites.

However, time confirmed, and this is reflected extensively in the documents of our Party, that in no instance, either in 1956 or in the '60s did the Communist Party of China proceed or act from the positions of Marxism-Leninism.

In 1956 it rushed to take up the banner of revisionism, in order to elbow Khrushchev out and gain the role of the leader in the communist and workers' movement for itself. But when Mao Zedong and his associates saw that they would not easily emerge triumphant over the patriarch of modern revisionism, Khrushchev, through the revisionist contest, they changed their tactic, pretended to reject their former flag, presented themselves as “pure Marxist-Leninists”, striving in this way, to win those positions which they had been unable to win with their former tactic. When this second tactic turned out no good, either, they “discarded” their second, allegedly Marxist-Leninist, flag and came out in the arena as they had always been, opportunists, loyal champions of a line of conciliation and capitulation towards capital and reaction. We were to see all these things confirmed in practice, through a long, difficult and glorious struggle which our Party waged in defence of Marxism-Leninism.

(The Khrushchevites, Hoxha)

People's Democratic Albania 'allied' with the left-deviationist government of China as means of countering the right-deviation of the Kremlin Titoists headed by Khrushchev, much as how the Stalin faction in the CPSU 'allied' with the remnants of the Trotskyite left-deviationists in order to keep the Bukharinite right-deviation in check. And much as how the Bukharinites and Trotskyites were overtly hostile to each other but covertly allied to launch a pincer attack on the USSR on behalf of imperialists, the Maoist left-deviationist regime of China and the Khrushchevian right-deviationist administration in Eurasia were overtly hostile but covertly allied. Both the Chinese Maoists and the Khrushchevian Eurasians were allied to the Yugoslav regime and supported international Titoism (more on this later). People's Democratic Albania could never possibly be a true friend of the Chinese regime because China's regime was a Yugoslav satellite of the left-deviationist type, even though for a while, China 'criticized' Tito and his regime, but also semi-officially praised it several times. Nonetheless, Albania rightly 'allied' with left-deviationist Titoist China to keep the right-deviationist Titoist administration in Eurasia in check, much as how the communist faction led by Stalin 'allied' with remnants of Trotskyites so to weaken Bukharin's right-wing faction and so to move away from NEP. It was not impossible to utilize the fake 'contradictions' between the Chinese Maoists and the Khrushchevians in order to obtain concessions. The Syrian Arab Republic during the Al-Assad years was able to, through a special process, compel the Iranian regime led by the Shah to provide loans to Syria, while Syria was working to further undermine the regime of the Shah under the guise of fighting against the 'enemies' of Iran's regime. Anyways, the new situation allowed Albania to get the Chinese to sponsor Albania, thus allowing Albania to industrialize and allowing the Albanian communists to stand up against the Moscow Titoists:

The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, have in many ways indicated their support of the “heretical” Albanian stand. They, for example, replaced Moscow as Albania's principal supplier of grain, providing about 180,000 tons since last September for credit (as against 70,000 tons from the USSR, at least a part of which required cash) – this despite famine conditions in China. And in late April, they announced a new, long-term Sino-Albanian aid agreement granting 125,000,000 in credits for Albania's Five Year Plan (1961-1965). These actions substantially reduce the ability of Moscow to apply economic pressure against Tirana. (ALBANIAN

RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 30, 1961, p. 3) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Kremlin Titoists – in an operation headed by the Anglo-Yugoslav agent Yuri Andropov (see C20S13) – launched a Putsch against the Party of Labour of Albania and above all targeted Hoxha himself:

Their latest move against Moscow, however, came this month with the holding of a public trial of ten “traitors and spies” who were charged with seeking – as agents of Greece, Yugoslavia, and the United States – to overthrow the Albanian regime. Testimony during the trial, was in fact, directed against Soviet policies particularly those toward Yugoslavia. The coup itself, far from being hatched in the Free World, represented – according to all of our evidence – an attempt by the USSR last summer to purge the party of anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements.

Since that abortive coup, Moscow has attacked Tirana through economic pressures, innuendo in public speeches, and direct criticism of the Albanian party by ... Italian Communist Party chief Togliatti.

(ALBANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 30, 1961, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

It is important to note that the putsch launched against the Hoxha faction was not a case of Eurasia seeking to establish its own 'imperial' domination over Albania. Rather, the goal was to turn Albania into a Titoist state to be devoured by the Balkan Empire, so that the Anglo-Americans would control that territory. In other words, the coup was a plot aimed at pushing Albania out of the Eastern Bloc instead of having it be 'controlled' by Eurasia.

Since the 1960s, plans were established for developing a network of bunkers to defend Albania against foreign aggression by the Greeks in the south, the Yugoslavs in the north, and the Italians in the west. Tito's fascist group established a settler-colonial fascist apartheid regime in Kosovo. In their desire to extend the boundaries of their Titoist settler-colonial empire, Belgrade's ruling fascist junta hatched plots for the swallow-up of Albania. In such circumstances, setting up special defensive networks of bunkers throughout Albania was a necessary means of resisting a potential Yugoslav regime aggression.

As with the rest of the Peoples' Democracies, Albania faced heavy economic pressures, which weakened the communist faction in that country and allowed the counter-revolutionary faction to grow. This led to the implementation of the revisionist 'worker self-management' line which was later famously criticized by Hoxha himself. Michael Kaser, who provided economic advice on Eastern Europe to several of the Western governments and NATO bodies, wrote:

However, by 1965 it had become clear that the Albanian leadership was not satisfied with the outcomes generated by the economic system.

The Third Five-Year Plan target for global industrial production was 97 percent fulfilled. Taking into account the economic difficulties caused by the Soviet Union's economic blockade, it would seem that the industrial sector of the Albanian economy had performed well over the period 1961-65. However, it should be recalled that following the split with the Soviet Union in 1961 there was a drastic downward revision of plan targets and, as the discussion in Section III shows other sectors fared less well than industry. Thus, under admittedly difficult environmental circumstances, the classical Soviet model of economic administration was not producing economic growth rates to satisfy leadership. More seriously, it has been suggested that economic failures were “a major factor in triggering off the unrest that began to spread through Albania during 1965 and 1966”. In other words, Enver Hoxha's position as leader of the PLA was in jeopardy and this, probably more than any other factor indicated the [tendency toward] change.

(...). In October 1965 the PLA took a further step, apparently attempting to [respond to] the level of popular unrest, when its Central Committee, in conjunction with the Council of Ministers issued a call to the masses to participate in drawing up the Fourth Five-Year Plan. In the document, it was explained that Albania was surrounded by imperialist and revisionist enemies, and was being subjected to an economic blockade and that, therefore, would have to build socialism relying on its own resources. (...).

It was argued that investments and construction projects should be more profitable, timely and essential”. Workers were exhorted to approve plans which minimized expense and waste and party members were reminded that their duty was to further the “ideo-political” education of the workers. The only specific change in planning introduced in the Appeal was that henceforth workers in enterprises would discuss broad plan targets, which the enterprises would use in drafting a detailed project plan rather than be sent a detailed plan from the state hierarchy.

(ALBANIA – A UNIQUELY SOCIALIST ECONOMY, Michael Kaser and Adi Schnytzer, East European Economies Post-Helsinki: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, pp. 586-588) (IMG)

William Ash, at the time a Maoist sympathizer with People's Democratic Albania, was one of the people who travelled to that country to study it and provide information for other sympathizers with Albania. William Ash too wrote:

Industrial enterprises in Albania are the property of the people and are run by the class enjoying state power, the workers themselves who, indeed, through their representatives in the Government manage the country's entire economy. But is this merely an ideal or do the workers actually exercise control in the places where they are employed?

The managers of enterprises are appointed by the appropriate ministry and are responsible to it for the organisation of production. In this task they are assisted by the Party branch, the trade union and the various workers' collectives in that particular concern. Manager, Party and trade union run the enterprise in compliance with the directives of the current plan on the basis of democratic centralism, combining centralised leadership with the maximum creative participation of workers engaged directly in production.

(Pickaxe and Rifle: *The Story of the Albanian People*, William Ash, 1974, pp. 165-166) (IMG)

Another serious problem with the economic policy of People's Democratic Albania was the petit-bourgeois left-deviationist wage equalization program. In this regard, William Ash wrote:

Correct relations between workers on the factory floor and those in leadership positions are maintained by a system of payments in which there is no pronounced disparity. The ratio between low, average and high pay is among the lowest if not the lowest in the world, brought about by consistently lowering the salaries of all high ranking officials including state and Party leaders while improving the rates of pay of those in the medium or lower brackets. Since 1966 when Enver Hoxha at the Fifth Party Congress called for special efforts in implementing socialist principles, higher salaries have been cut twice and there has been a steady rise in lower rates of pay and pensions. (Pickaxe and Rifle: *The Story of the Albanian People*, William Ash, 1974, pp. 167-168) (IMG)

Providing further details on the wage equalization which Ash himself supported, Ash wrote:

In the huge Mao Tsetung textile combine at Berat the manager receives 1100 leks a month and the lowest paid workers start at 550. Skilled technicians receive about 750. At the caustic soda factory in Vlora the chief engineer gets 900 leks, the director 1000, those doing light work from 500 to 550 and average workers between 700 and 750. The manager of the copper wire factory in Shkodra gets only 880 leks per month because it is fully-automated and comparatively easy to run, while the workers, 60% of whom are women and young girls, make about 600 leks. All women, who have been drawn into industry in ever increasing numbers, have always received equal pay for equal work. At the tractor spare parts factory in Tirana workers get on the average 600 leks a month, the chief engineer 900 and model workers may make as much as 1000. Workers, invariably men, engaged in particularly hard or hazardous work like mining, heavy loading and unloading, dyeing where lead paints are used, diving or glass smelting, receive more pay, often exceeding the salaries of directors; but there is a continuous movement by the use of new techniques and equipment toward eliminating the heavier and more hazardous jobs.

To compare these payments in industry with those to writers and intellectuals: teachers, depending on qualifications, start at about 550 leks per month, rising at the end of five years to 700 and after 20 years to 750. They receive an additional 20 leks per month if they take posts in rural areas. Full time writers in the Writers Union are paid about 800 leks.

(Pickaxe and Rifle: *The Story of the Albanian People*, William Ash, 1974, p. 169) (IMG)

To be clear, by 'wage equalization', the idea is not that the wages were equal for everyone. Rather, their differentials were reduced to an unreasonable level shown above. Enver Hoxha himself personally supported wage differentials as a means of supposedly changing the consciousness of the people and supposedly shifting it away from 'bourgeois' attitudes. Hoxha said:

The differentials must be reduced, the high salaries should be cut down further so that the raised standards of living for a certain category of people will not encourage the desire for a bourgeois way of life, the desire for material gain and stimulus. (CADRES MUST BE TRAINED IN THE SCHOOL OF THE WORKING CLASS, Enver Hoxha, March 31, 1975. In: *Enver Hoxha Selected Works*, Vol. 4, Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania)

If someone earned a high amount of wealth through unjust methods, then it would be fair for the socialist state to reduce his income or wealth. However, if someone tried very hard and earned a correspondingly and proportionately high amount of income, then it would be unjust for their income to be cut. The Party of Labour of Albania was pursuing the left-wing revisionist policy of reducing wage differentials to such an unreasonable level demonstrated by William Ash (himself a sympathizer with this system) above. Worse yet, Enver Hoxha himself called for even greater wage equalization in order to 'weaken' bourgeois attitudes. This was a blatant Maoist left-deviation from Hoxha. As for bourgeois attitudes, they can be weakened through cultural work to inspire – but not force – people to spend their money for the good of the society instead of themselves; the state had no right to seize the wealth of people who earned it through their efforts, nor would state theft of people's money reduce greed.

The Party of Labour of Albania, due to its alliance with China, was able to obtain a significant number of concessions from that left-opportunist Mao regime. In certain periods in time, however, the Party of Labour of Albania, especially until the mid-1960s, was under the influence of the Chinese state. The Chinese state itself was under the heavy influence of the Chinese peasantry. The influence upon Albania of a Chinese government upon which the petit-bourgeoisie have a high influence meant a significantly high influence of the petit-bourgeois forces over Albania. Enver Hoxha himself had some of such petit-bourgeois deviations in the form of Maoist left-deviations.

The most significant Maoist left-deviationist line parroted by People's Democratic Albania was the narrative that firstly, the revisionist "Soviet Union" had become a social-imperialist power competing with American imperialism, and that secondly, this "Soviet social-imperialist" rival of the US imperialism cooperated with American imperialism globally! This kind of a rhetoric, which is a repeat of the Kautskyite notion of 'ultra-imperialism', is to be found all over Hoxha's writing and is seen throughout Zeri i Popullit, the organ of the Albanian Party. The reason for how and why this 'Soviet social-imperialist' collaboration with American imperialism is a revisionist and Kautskyite notion has been explained in C20S20 and C1S2. Many Hoxhaists have been sincere communists, have sincerely struggled against American imperialists, and have objectively contributed very positively to the movement of the proletariat; however, such left-opportunist discourse regarding the 'Soviet social-imperialists' and their allies was undoubtedly a godsend to the countless Maoist spies of the American secret service who started presenting themselves as 'Hoxhaists', and helped convert many – though not all – 'Hoxhaist' parties into the weapons of the Anglo-American secret services.

Nonetheless, what matters more than calling Eurasia "social-imperialist" is that the Party of Labour of Albania correctly recognized that the US-led camp is the greatest and greater enemy of the world, and thus refused to accept the Chinese revisionist notion of 'Three Worlds Theory'. Albania also realigned itself economically and strategically with the allies of Brezhnev-era Eurasia, and thus covertly realigned itself with Brezhnev-era Eurasia, even though it overtly continued to denounce them as 'social-imperialist'.

Well before the mid-1960s, Enver Hoxha had already criticized the Chinese several times. Some of the documents for this have been revealed and many more of such documents exist from Hoxha. However, from the mid-1960s onwards, the criticism of China went up to another level albeit initially in 'secret'. Secretly in Party meetings, Enver Hoxha began to criticize China's left-deviationist and revisionist policies as early as 1966, as shown previously. Then, in 1967, the relations declined even further:

Albanian-Chinese relations outwardly appear solid, but there are indications that Tirana's friendship for Peking peaked in early 1967, and has since cooled off. (EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), April 18, 1968, p. 1) (IMG)

The Brezhnev group, coopted by the communist faction, saw an increase in its influence at the expense of the Khrushchev group. The rise of the Brezhnevians was a partial resurgence of the communist faction, using their cooptee Brezhnev as the vehicle of influence. Since Eurasia, increasingly under the influence of the communist resurgents, was practically no longer a real threat to People's Democratic Albania, Albania found it easier to increase its trade with the other Eastern European countries in the latter half of the 1960s. Although outwardly, Albania continued to denounce Eurasia, in practice, there was an increase in covert commercial relations with Eurasia – 'covert' not in the sense that it was some kind of a secretive smuggling operation, but rather covert in the sense that Eurasia boosted its economic trade relations with the Eastern European states. In a document co-authored by William Giloane, a researcher employed by the US State Department, it is stated:

In 1964 Communist China's share of the trade was equal to that of the Soviet Union in 1960, and the actual volume represented by that share was 23 percent larger. During the 1962-68 period trade with Communist China amounted to about half the total trade volume, but the share of Communist China declined below that level toward the end of this period. This decline was the result of a successful effort by the leadership to expand the country's trade with ... Communist Eastern Europe..

Trade with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, other than Yugoslavia, continued after the break with the Soviet Union and increased by 66 percent from 226 million leks in 1960 to about 375 million leks in 1968. The share of this group in total trade rose during this period from 35 to 40 percent, almost entirely after 1964. Albania's most important trade partner in this group has been Czechoslovakia, second only to Communist China with a volume of 118 million leks in 1968, equivalent to about 12 percent of Albania's total trade volume in that year. Following Czechoslovakia in order of importance were Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria, with trade volumes ranging from 69 million to 53 million leks. Trade with Hungary and Romania amounted to about 40 million leks and 32 million leks, respectively. With the exception of Poland and Romania, Albania's trade balance with the countries of Eastern Europe

(Area Handbook for Albania, Vol. 550, Issue 98, Eugene K. Keefe, William Giloane, Sarah Jane Elpern, James M. Moore, Jr., Stephen Peters, Eston T. White, 1971, p. 172) (IMG)

Since Albania boosted its trade relations with the Eastern European allies of Eurasia, it follows that Albania,

dialectically speaking, de facto covertly boosted economic relations with Eurasia, with Eurasia's Eastern European allies as the intermediary for covertness. Whereas the Khrushchev group had sanctioned Eastern European countries and was seeking to push them into the Western trade orbit, the Brezhnevians in Eurasia were trying to move the Eastern European countries farther away from the US-led camp and closer to Eurasia instead. Albania did not restore relations with the Eurasians directly, but boosted ties with the Eastern European states that were closer to Eurasia. This gave Albania greater leverage for more freely criticizing the Chinese revisionists. This fact about Albania's increased economic relations with Eurasia's camp is significant because it shows that (1) the Brezhnevian tendency in Eurasia reduced pressures on Albania on the covert level; (2) Albania, while independent and self-reliant, was not 'xenophobically' 'autarkic'; (3) by the laws of dialectics, assuming the absence of miscoordination and misunderstanding, there can be no third force in politics; and 'third force' is almost always a delusion; hence, by the laws of dialectics, Albania's move away from a pro-Western China would have meant an inevitable unavoidable move towards an anti-Western Eurasia; and although Albanian media presented socialist Albania as a 'third force' miraculously lying in between 'Soviet social-imperialists' (Eurasia) and the Sino-Western alliance, in practice Albania covertly shifted further towards the Eurasian camp. To be sure, trumpeting the quasi-myth ('quasi' as in 'almost') of a third force in one's media can be useful for the pursuit of covert operations and deceiving one's enemies, but in the end, none of that means that the 'third force' is no longer a quasi-myth.

The Party of Labour of Albania, despite adopting the Maoist left-deviationist line, went up an anti-Maoist route in practice and – indirectly and de facto – boosted strategic partnership with the resurged communist faction in Eurasia. Even if Hoxha himself genuinely believed such foolish theories as 'Soviet social imperialism', he still could not avoid the material forces much more powerful, the inevitable tendency of the People's Democratic Albanian state to partner with the communist agents of the proletariat resurging in Eurasia. The Party of Labour of Albania covered itself with such a Maoist left-opportunist veneer while being communist anti-Maoist in practice and at core. This pseudo-Maoism of the Party of Labour of Albania is rooted in the proletarianized and kolkhoznik composition of the Party. Concerning the composition of the Party, the CIA reported:

Total party membership in January 1970 was officially announced as 75,673. This figure represents about 3.5% of the country's total population and an increase in membership of 9,346 since November 1966 when total party membership was 66,327. Workers accounted for about 35% of the total party membership, peasants almost 29%, and white-collar workers about 36%. Since 1966, the percentage of party members classed as workers has slowly increased. Of the new party members selected during the period 1966-69, 35% were workers, 45% collective farmers, and only 16% white-collar employees. Efforts are continually made to increase the number of women party members, who in 1966 amounted to 12.5% of the total membership. The regime is also concerned about the unequal geographic distribution of the party membership. Although the rural population is twice as large as the urban population, 68% of party members live in urban areas. Despite the great number of peasants joining the party in 1966-69, the percentage of peasants in the total party membership in 1970 was only 0.02% higher than in 1966, indicating, in part, changes in job status. (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 20: ALBANIA: GENERAL SURVEY, CIA, August 1971, p. 47) (IMG)

In 1982, Richard Staar – a major CIA official, US State Department intelligence research specialist, and Hoover Institute fellow – wrote:

More recent statistics indicate that the proportion of industrial workers in the party had increased to 38.0 percent and the proportion of peasants on collective farms to 29.4 percent. The remaining 32.6 percent in late 1981 were probably for the most part government officials, intelligentsia, and members of the armed forces. (Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe: Fourth Edition, The Hoover Institute, Richard F. Staar, 1982, p. 5) (IMG)

The Party definitely made a constant effort at increasing the blue-collar elements and reducing the percentage of the white-collar elements. Enver Hoxha said:

Now 122,600 communists, of whom nearly 38 per cent are workers, 29.4 per cent cooperativists and 32.6 per cent office workers, are militating in the ranks of the Party. (...); 24,363 candidates for membership, 42.40 per cent of them workers, 40.43 per cent cooperativists and 17.17 per cent office workers, have been admitted to the Party in the years following the 7th Congress. (REPORT TO THE 8th CONGRESS OF THE PLA, Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha, November 1, 1981. In: Enver Hoxha Selected Works, Vol. 6, The "8 Nentori" Publishing House, Tirana, 1987, p. 352. MIA)

The proletarians, despite not forming an above-50% majority in the Party, did constitute the largest percentage of the Party. Reinforcing the hold of the proletariat over the Party were the kolkhozniks that emerged in the late 1960s with the success of the collectivization drive. At the same time, the Party of Labour of Albania was initially composed in its membership primarily of the petit-bourgeois peasantry rather than the kolkhoznik peasantry. This strength of the petit-bourgeoisie in the Party of Labour of Albania in the initial years gave some strength to the Titoism-Maoism current in it, leading to the adoption of reactionary Maoist left-opportunist stances – alongside the correct anti-Titoist anti-Khrushchevian stances it held – and the material implementation of some of such Maoist lines. However, the rendering

of the petit-bourgeois contingent in the Party into a kolkhoznik contingent led this Maoist-deviationist Party to become more communistic at its core, while retaining its previously-adopted Maoist left-opportunist line no longer as the core of the policy line of the Party but merely as the appearance, the veneer, of the Party. In other words, the core of the Party's character was communist proletarian and kolkhoznik, while the veneer of the Party, the outwardly shell, continued to retain the legacy of Maoist petit-bourgeois left-deviationism. (Note that the proletarianization of the membership/electorate of a party/movement does not automatically change the veneer into a communist one, but does change the core class orientation of that party/movement into a communistic or pro -communist one. Such was why the proletarianization of the staff of the Storm-Troopers rendered that staff into a pool of KPD-Soviet agents disguised as Strasserite 'Nazis' (see C10S7), such was why the Democratic Party of Roosevelt and Kennedy ended up becoming the party of the pro-Soviet traitors to American imperialism disguised as 'liberals', etc.). The characteristics of the Party of Labour of Albania were reflected in the personality of Enver Hoxha himself as well. Hoxha was a communist with some Maoist left-deviations.

C22S8. The Demotion of Rankovic

The gradual resurgence of the communist faction in the Red Army in the mid-1960s weakened the UDB, bogging it down in several theatres, thus giving greater room for action for the freedom fighters in Kosovo in 1960s. As a result, Tito's ally Rankovic lost his position as the UDB chief and was demoted in July 1966. Enver Hoxha recalled:

To save their own skins, to save the system of terror, oppression and exploitation which is being shaken to its foundations, J.B. Tito and his clique have «sacrificed» their closest collaborator Rankovic on whom they loaded all the blame and made the scapegoat for all the failures, [so-called] mistakes, crimes and defeats of the Titoite regime to date. (WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?, Enver Hoxha)

Tito was obviously being a hypocrite in blaming Rankovic for the crimes that he himself had committed in cooperation with Rankovic. However, the demotion of Rankovic was not without a material cause; it was a setback for the Tito regime itself. Under the pressure of the growing tide of the 'Cominformists' in Yugoslavia, Tito's gang was forced to give some concessions to the Eurasians and to improve relations with Eurasia in a manner that weakened the Titoist faction in Yugoslavia.

C22S9. Counter-Revolutionary Stabs in the Back of Socialist Czechoslovakia

*** IMG-All-{Czechoslovakia}

The Czechoslovak Communist Party represented the reality of Czechoslovakia as well. The fact that the Czechoslovak Communist Party had the industrial blue-collar workers with staunchly pro-Soviet anti-West-German views as majority led to committed communists to rise to the top ranks of the Party. It is worth noting that the communist leader Novotny had the support of the Czechoslovak industrial (blue-collar) working class. Even as late as February 29, 1968, when Novotny was alleged to be in his least popular, the CIA stated:

Novotny's strength ... lies among ideological conservatives, industrial workers, and the government and party bureaucrats at regional district levels. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, February 29, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha too expressed favorable views towards the top Czechoslovak leaders, though he was critical of Novotny:

In my opinion, the Czechoslovaks were different from the others. They were more serious than all of them. I have spoken about Gottwald, but it must be said that we Albanians also got along well with those who came after him. We were sincere with them, as with all the others, but the Czech leadership behaved well towards us, too. They had respect for our people and our Party. They were not very lively, but I can say they were restrained, correct and kindly.

Novotny and Shiroky, Dolansky and Kopecky, whom I have met and talked with many times, when I went to their country on business or for holidays with the family, behaved openly and in a modest way with me and all our comrades. That conceit and arrogance, which was apparent in the others, was not to be seen in them.

(...). In Czechoslovakia the difference was even greater. Whether in Prague, Bratislava, Karlovy Vary,

Brno and many other places to which I have travelled, either officially or privately, I have been free to go wherever I wanted, whenever I wanted, with one obvious guard and everywhere I have been welcomed in a very cordial and friendly way. In the course of a trip, they themselves spontaneously took me to strategic places. Wherever I have gone in Czechoslovakia, either in official talks or in free conversations with the families of Novotny and Shiroky in Prague and Karlovy Vary, or with Bacilek in Slovakia and with a number of party secretaries in various towns and factories, the conversations have been sincere, joyous, happy and not formal. There was not that heavy atmosphere which I felt in the Soviet Union, despite the great love we had for that country and that people.

(...). But as I said above, after the death of Gottwald, the Khrushchevites were getting their grip on Czechoslovakia. It seemed that Novotny, as the first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, adhered

to correct positions, but time showed that he was a wavering opportunist element, and thus, in one way or another, he did the work for Khrushchev and Co. He played a major role in carrying through the plans which made Czechoslovakia a dominion occupied by Russian tanks.

(The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 5)

Regarding the Red Army's intervention in Czechoslovakia, Novotny had the correct position, and Hoxha was incorrect. However, as the above quote rightly suggests, Novotny, Siroky, and Dolansky followed the path of Gottwald and Stalin on key issues. These communist leaders in Czechoslovakia were the tip of the iceberg in their Party, the iceberg being the majority industrial blue-collar workers in the Party.

Czechoslovakia was an industrial socialist country with a large blue-collar working class base, and the workers there were vehemently anti-Nazi and pro-communist. The memory of Munich 1938 was not forgotten. Many such workers were well-educated in the science of socialism. This not only politically strengthened the socialist state, it also allowed for Czechoslovakia to face less economic problems even in the face of the stabs in the back by the Kremlin Titoists. The CIA reported:

Economic conditions had improved in Czechoslovakia in 1955. According to official claims, the growth of gross industrial production equalled the previous peak year's (1953) figure and the real wages index rose from 59 to 72, while the cost of living dropped from 139 to 130. The highest level of pre-war agricultural production was claimed to have been exceeded in 1955, for the first time. Complaints of food and other shortages were comparatively rare in Czechoslovakia, by far the most prosperous of the Satellites. In political and intellectual spheres, there were no signs of ferment, in striking contrast to Poland and Hungary. Not that everybody was satisfied in Czechoslovakia, far from it, but there was less economic cause for dissatisfaction. There had been no split of any consequence in the Party, in which the Stalinists, headed by Antonin Novotny, the General Secretary, and Viliam Siroky, the Prime Minister, held complete control, with President Zapotocky presumably smoothing out eventual disagreements. (COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

While problems came about as a result of Kremlin Titoists in the back swiftly after the assassination of Stalin, Czechoslovakia was able to partially recover:

The economic plans of the regime, announced in February 1956, mirrored a conviction that the troubles which had set in after Stalin's death in 1953 had been successfully overcome. (COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

Industrial Czechoslovakia had inherent weaknesses too, however. The industrial capitalism in Czechoslovakia had not developed into a very highly concentrated monopoly capitalism, meaning that there were many capitalists in Czechoslovakia. This is important because capitalist property-owners married and would form families, resulting in there being numerous families forming a large bourgeois stratum. This in turn gave rise to a large stratum of intellectuals from bourgeois family roots. Thus, much as how the industrialization of Czechoslovakia was a blessing, the fact that capitalism was not heavily concentrated into a few monopolies gave rise to numerous capitalist families and hence a large stratum of liberal intellectuals in Czechoslovakia. The counter-revolutionary intelligentsia were a lobbying force for Titoist influence in Czechia.

Unlike Czechia, Slovakia was not very industrialized. The population there was to a large extent agrarian petit-bourgeois. Unlike the proletarians, who have nothing to lose except their 'chains' in the struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie have small businesses which they may lose. At the same time, unlike the national bourgeoisie and the cooperative peasants who have big businesses with which they can take the risk of engaging in a struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie do not have such big businesses and therefore cannot afford to take major risks in the struggle against finance capital. The inability of the petit-bourgeoisie to wage a struggle against imperialism results in the areas populated by the petit-bourgeoisie to become easy prey to material domination by finance capital. Such was the reason that Slovakia was a channel through which the Nazi Germans were able to more easily conquer Czechoslovakia. Such was the reason that Slovakia became a major hub for fascism. Such was the reason that after the Czechoslovak Revolution of 1948, Slovakia continued to be the major base of the Trotskyite and Titoist agents of the CIA, MI6, UDB, Mossad, BND, etc.

Socialist Czechoslovakia faced serious challenges, because firstly, it was front-stabbed by the imperialist camp and their agents in Czechoslovakia, and backstabbed by the Moscow Titoists who supported the imperialist secret service plans against it. Titoist reaction could count on the Trotskyite agents retaining influence in Slovakia, the intelligentsia in Czechia, all in a united front led by finance capital against the Czechoslovak proletarians. The Titoization speech by Khrushchev in 1956 did cause damage to socialist Czechoslovakia, despite the strong resistance by the proletarian state. The Czechoslovaks first defended Stalin against Khrushchev's accusation, and stood against Khrushchev's other Titoist

theses. Later on, when facing greater pressure, they presented the Titoist counter-revolutionary Slansky and his group as the 'Stalinists' of Czechoslovakia and stated that Czechoslovakia had already 'de-Stalinized' well before the USSR. This was a means by which the Czechoslovak communists were able to continue their 'Stalinism' under the guise of the 'anti-Stalinism' approved of by the Moscow Titoists. The CIA's senior research staff wrote:

5. The top leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, being one of those which was quite satisfied with conditions as they were ... apparently decided that, so long as the 20th Congress had reaffirmed the admissibility of different roads to socialism, it might as well differ from the USSR in the matter of de-Stalinization. When, therefore, the regional Party meetings held on March 5 to discuss the lessons of the 20th Congress revealed considerable lower level interest in this particular subject, the official press service, CTK, issued the following day a lengthy report in which the chief points were applied in general terms to Czechoslovakia, but Stalin was defended rather than accused. While the report admitted the necessity of overcoming "all the remnants and the recurrences of the cult of the individual and agreed that in the later period of his activities, Stalin committed many mistakes, shortcomings appeared in his work, such as in the principle of collective leadership, it also declared that it was necessary to see "the positive role which Stalin played." His was the "historical merit" of having "resolutely frustrated the attempts of enemies who tried to destroy the Party and Soviet State." In other words, Stalin had, according to the report, saved Russia and Communism. How much did his mistakes and shortcomings weigh in the balance?

6. As more and more details of Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin leaked out and news of developments in Poland kept coming in, feeling in Czechoslovakia rose considerably. The Party leadership found it expedient to howl with the wolves for a while. In a report issued on April 10, the Central Committee of the Party gave an extensive criticism of Stalin's mistakes and admitted that the cult of personality had seriously corrupted the Czechoslovak Party. Two days later, the Party mouthpiece, Rude Pravo, carried the further admission that the security organs had frequently violated socialist legality and that a special commission appointed by the Political Bureau had been investigating trials for the last 18 months. It had been found, the paper stated, that it was Rudolf Slansky, the Party leader executed in November 1952, and two of his associates, who had introduced the practice of violating socialist legality, and that these violations had continued even after his exposure. Persons found to have been innocent had been released.

7. The providential discovery that Slansky had been responsible for the death of many innocent people presumably made it impossible for the Czechoslovak Communists to follow the example of their Hungarian and Bulgarian comrades in parallel cases and to rehabilitate him. It was true, as Premier Siroky admitted to a New York Times correspondent on April 13, that Slansky had been falsely accused of Titoism and that "certain manifestations of anti-Semitism" – eleven of the fourteen defendants in the Slansky trial had been Jews – "had been mistakingly introduced," but Slansky had on the other hand been subsequently found guilty of another serious crime. His culpability was, on balance, no less. Besides, Slansky's and his associates' conviction as "Trotskyite, Zionist, bourgeois, nationalist traitors and enemies of the Czechoslovak people and of Socialism" stood. Siroky was apparently not in the least troubled by the fact that all the foreign fellow conspirators besides Tito named by Slansky in his confession — Gomulka, Kostov, and Rajk had been officially declared innocent, or by the fact that Rude Pravo had the day before denounced the sentencing of people "on the mere basis of their own confession obtained by illegal methods, without there being any material proof." That apparently only applied to sentences of which Slansky was the author, not the victim. Neither did Siroky explain why the three live members of the Slansky conspiracy, who had received only jail sentences, were being released. (COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31,

1958, pp. 2-4) (IMG)

The Czechoslovak communists opposed the Titoist opposition to Stalin's line, but did not come out openly against it, since that would have undermined the socialist state in Czechoslovakia. The US intelligence document further stated:

The episode spotlighted the embarrassing situation which the Czechoslovak holdovers from the Stalin era shared with most of their satellite colleagues. They were ... foresighted enough to oppose de-Stalinization and liberalization, yet unable openly to contradict Khrushchev, on whose support their continuance in power depended more than ever. A concrete proof of their disorientation was their failure to issue directives to the lower level apparatchiki who had the difficult task of presiding over local Party meetings in which the "historic" resolutions of the 20th Congresses were discussed. The result was an outburst of criticism at the lower levels, which it seemed expedient to calm by jettisoning some expendable ballast and granting some superficial concessions, but without sacrificing any of the material bases of power. (COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D:

Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, p. 4)
(IMG)

The stab in the back of the Czechoslovak communists led to the ouster of the well-known communist revolutionary Alexei Cepicka, a relative of Gottwald. It led to the colour revolutionary uprising of the liberal intelligentsia, the fifth column of the BND, Mossad, MI6, CIA, etc. It also caused some change in the budget and economic planning in general. The CIA reported:

The 1956 budget, introduced on February 9, showed a 17.4 percent increase over 1955 in investment in heavy industry, but, true to the Khrushchev line, an almost identical increase in agricultural investment.

As further proof of the regime's solicitude for the people, a price reduction on a number of consumer goods, estimated to increase purchasing power by 6.5 percent, followed on April 1. (...).

8. The victim selected to be thrown to the wolves was ... Minister of Defense, Alexej Cepicka. His expulsion from the Politburo and dismissal from the posts of First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense were announced on April 25, on the grounds of "shortcomings and mistakes he committed in the execution of state and party functions." But the fact that he was a son-in-law of Gottwald was certainly more important. (...).

9. Intellectuals also were restive. The Czechoslovak Writers Congress, meeting April 22-29, deplored the damage to literature caused by the cult of personality and condemned the "code of esthetics" which was supposed to guide writers as an "incredible collection of half-truths and regular inconsistencies.

Two writers, Jaroslav Seifert and Frantisek Hrubin, insisted that writers should represent the conscience of their nation and accused them of having betrayed their mission by indulging in evasions and lies.

Even the Congress chairman, Jan Drda, considered a Party stalwart, declared that in the future, writers must reflect the people's "justified dissatisfactions" and take into account the conflicts and "contradictions" of everyday life. Although the Party had, in a message read by President Zapotocky, announced its intention of giving writers "more freedom" and encouraged them to be "bold and fearless" in their creative work, it was getting more than it bargained for. Zapotocky took the floor a second time and rebuked the more outspoken writers for their wholesale condemnation of the past and for their failure to understand the Party's present policy. Nevertheless, Hrubin and Seifert were elected members of the new "collective leadership," while two orthodox writers sponsored by the regime were blackballed.

12. Student meetings were even more outspoken. Typical resolutions demanded, besides greater freedom for students, numerous political reforms: release of political prisoners, permission for opposition parties to function effectively, an end to newspaper censorship and to jamming, access to banned Western literature, and freedom to travel abroad. Some resolutions protested against the unjustified idealization of the Soviet Union and the privileges accorded Soviet citizens, and asked pointed questions about the Jachymov uranium mines.

13. Even the Communist Youth League was the scene of stormy sessions. Mlada Fronta (April 27) reported that besides excessive study hours, compulsory attendance and overcrowding, the "unpersuasive and dogmatic lectures in Marxism-Leninism" and the Minister of Education were sharply criticized. On May 6, the paper announced that the Minister had received the delegates of the Youth League and that many of the demands would probably be met.

14. More sensational still was the permission granted the students to hold the Majales, a traditional student parade, for the first time since 1938. On May 20, columns of students carrying placards reproducing many of the student protests and demands and dragging floats biting satirizing conditions in Czechoslovakia marched unmolested down the streets of Prague. The chants of the marching students are reported to have included demands for the removal of President Zapotocky and First Slovak Party Secretary Bacilek.

(COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, pp. 1-7)
(IMG)

There was also a rise in Slovak separatism:

The resurgence of separatism within Slovakia since the Soviet 20th party congress in February 1956 has been of mounting concern to the Prague regime, and since the Slovak party congress in April 1957 has been condemned in increasingly stronger terms by Czech party boss Antonin Novotny. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN[15772430], CIA, January 17, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

Further reporting on decentralization in Czechoslovakia, the CIA reported:

Prague's implementation of an economic decentralization program this year has caused popular discontent to spread. Over 100,000 have been hit by labor relocation plans and large-scale reductions of the central

administrative staffs, but the population does not seem generally disposed to make trouble.

Within the party, underlying discontent – possibly extending into the top echelon – is hidden from the public behind an appearance of solidarity. Serious differences are not likely to break into the open before or during the party congress in June. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN [15772422], CIA, April 15, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

The industrial sector of Czechoslovakia was being sabotaged through decentralization, causing widespread popular discontent and an economic downturn. Without simultaneous advancements in industry, however, the swift advancement in collectivization would be very difficult, and perhaps would be also premature. Yet, a project for the swift ‘collectivization’ of agriculture in the absence of industrial advancements began:

The program for economic reform recently begun in Czechoslovakia has caused widespread popular discontent. Over one hundred thousand persons have been affected by the labor relocation plans, and the lives of several hundred thousands, primarily in Prague and other cities, have been unsettled. Furthermore the government has renewed last year's collectivization offensive, with the intention of increasing the area of agricultural socialization from the present 65 percent to more than 80 percent by the end of 1959. It hopes to socialize all agriculture in the country within the next three years. The collectivization campaign will be carried out primarily in Slovakia and may intensify existing separatism there.

There are no signs, however, that the population is any more disposed than in the past to make trouble. The regime is alert to this dissatisfaction and has indicated, both through propaganda and a vigilance campaign specifically directed against Slovak nationalism, that it will permit no interference or challenge.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN [15772422], CIA, April 15, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

As a result of the prematurely swift advancements in ‘collectivization’, the CIA-backed Slovak separatist tendency gained strength. The industrial decentralization also gave the Slovak separatists greater leverage over the rest of the economy of Slovakia. According to the CIA:

Slovak Nationalism Increasing Problem for Czechoslovak Regime

Nationalist elements in Slovakia apparently are attempting to use the Czechoslovak regime's economic decentralization program to benefit their own regional interests at the expense of nationwide goals.

In a strongly worded speech to the Slovak party central committee plenum meeting of 9-10 January, Slovak Party First Secretary Bacilek complained that there were separatist tendencies in various sectors of cultural, political, and scientific life, and even in some of the central offices. The dismissal on 13 January of Slovak Deputy Premier Stefan Sebesta, responsible for industrial and urban construction, probably is the first step to remove officials with nationalistic tendencies, who, according to Bacilek, have appeared at the highest levels of the Slovak government.

(...). The tone of Bacilek's speech indicates that the situation now demands the ruthless stamping out of “bourgeois nationalist” elements promised by Novotny last April when he first publicly warned the Slovak dissidents to conform or suffer the consequences.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN [15772430], CIA, January 17, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

The Czechoslovak intelligentsia, the fifth column of the Yugoslav regime, argued that the economy was damaged because it was not decentralized enough, whereas the Novotny faction, the communist agents of the proletariat, argued that the sabotage of the economy was the direct result of the counter-revolutionary strategy of decentralization. The CIA reported:

Basically the serious concern with economic reform and the radical nature of some of the proposals being entertained in Czechoslovakia stem from the near absence of economic growth during the past [two and a half] years. As early as 1962, Czechoslovak economists were pressing for reforms, and the need to improve techniques of planning and management was emphasized at the Party Congress in December 1962. Party leader Novotny, however, continued to blame some of the country's economic difficulties on the partial decentralization of 1958-60 and called for a tightening of central controls. (CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM, Current Support Brief, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

The economic sabotage that the intelligentsia caused allowed for the Titoist fifth column to push such prominent communists as Viliam Siroky (Vilem Siroky) out of power, push Novotny to the wall, and install Titoist elements – particularly the neoliberal economist Ota Sik – into the heights of power:

In 1963, as the economic situation deteriorated further and cultural ferment accompanied a new wave of “destalinization,” criticism of the regime's policies increased greatly, and some of the critics argued – in direct contradiction of Novotny – that the error in 1958-60 had been in decentralizing too little. Novotny and his followers were forced to admit that planning had been overambitious, that serious mistakes had been made in the allocation of investments, and that incentives did not give enough stimulus to technical progress and improvement in the quality of output. Then, in the wake of a Party and government shakeup of September 1963, which replaced some of the dogmatic officials (especially Vilem Siroky) by more pragmatic men such as Jozef Lenart and Drahomir Kolder, the Party gave official blessing to a thoroughgoing debate on the economic system.

A group of economists, headed by Ota Sik, a member of the Central Committee of the Party and Chief of the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences, was charged with an intensive study of possible reforms and asked to present its recommendations to the leadership through the newly organized Economic Commission of the Party. Sik told a Central Committee Plenum in December 1963 that the traditional Soviet forms of socialist management no longer worked in Czechoslovakia.. (CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM, Current Support Brief, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

Led by Ota Sik, the Czechoslovak intelligentsia proposed liberalizing the Czechoslovak economy. A report by the RAND Corporation stated:

The Czech economists proposed – they referred to their proposal as the New Economic Model – to imitate the Yugoslav Marxists and introduce a Socialist market, a hybrid combining state ownership with a restricted play of market forces. Over a period of years the central planning machinery would be dismantled, prices would be permitted to seek their own level, the domestic market would be opened to Western competition, and the management of factories (as distinct from their ownership) would be turned over to men who, regardless of their politics, could make a profit. Factories which did not turn up in the black would be closed, and the temporary unemployment of their workers accepted as the lesser evil. The general direction of economic development would be regulated by the manipulation of such indirect levers as taxation and monetary policy. (THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Richard V. Burks, DTIC: AD0676274, p. 6) (IMG)

The Novotny faction, the faction of the communist blue-collar workers in the Party, was referred to by Anglo- American media as the ‘conservative’ faction, a propaganda term used to imply that the communists wanted ‘backwardness’ and that the liberals were seeking to ‘rejuvenate’ Czechoslovakia. The communist faction continued to resist such a counter-revolutionary policy line promoted by the intelligentsia:

It seems unlikely that the present leadership will give enterprises anywhere near the amount of authority desired by the liberals or allow market forces to determine output except within narrow limits. According to Novotny, reforms will be introduced “step by step ... with much prudence” and “without upsetting upheavals.” This cautious approach gives the conservative forces every opportunity to prevent fundamental changes.. (CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM, Current Support Brief, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), 1964, p. 7) (IMG)

Novotny and his comrades were well aware of how destructive such liberalization would have been. The NEM would have brought a corrupt bourgeois system, with greater autonomy for the local bureaus increasing bureaucratic corruption; the NEM would have fostered the chaos of the market; the NEM would have gotten workers out of their jobs, resulting in widespread unemployment. Longer-term unemployment promotes the lumpen-proletarian mentality, the mentality of bandits, terrorists, and violent reactionary protesters haunted by bestial frenzy, unwilling to reason. Over time, the further immiseration of the unemployed could create a massive lumpen-proletarian force, rather than a proletarian force, that would be exploited by finance capital and the corrupt bureaucrats to launch a reactionary rebellion against the communist faction in the Czechoslovak state, thus giving the intelligentsia greater leverage for even greater economic liberalization and Titoization. The RAND Corporation report stated:

It was not long, however, before it became apparent that the introduction of the New Economic Model seriously threatened the power of the party apparatus. It was not so much that the NEM ran counter to the traditional teachings of Marxism-Leninism, though that was important. It was rather that the emergence of an autonomous class of industrial managers chosen on the basis of ability would deprive the apparatus at local levels of its main employment, the detailed supervision of the enterprise, and would consequently bring about the downgrading or unemployment of large numbers of the faithful. There were other, even less pleasant implications. If managers were granted autonomy in a market situation, should not trade unions be permitted to protect the interests of the working class, even if this involved a restoration of the right to strike? If factory managers should have autonomy, why not collective farm managers? Indeed, if the management of factories, under the general supervision of the party, were turned over to man who knew how to turn a fast crown, perhaps the management of ideas should be given to writers and others professionally concerned with communication. The NEM soon became a political football, conservatives opposing it because of the danger that its implementation would lead to other liberalizing changes, revisionists pushing for it in the hope of changing much more than the economy and bringing into being, perhaps, a new political model. Novotny tried to compromise by accepting economic reform in principle, but withholding the personnel changes necessary to implement it. After heavy infighting he was replaced (January 1968) by a leadership which meant to carry out wide-ranging political reform as the prerequisite not only of market Socialism but of the conciliation of an angry public opinion as well. (THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Richard V. Burks, DTIC: AD0676274, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

The Moscow Titoists covertly imposed sanctions on socialist Czechoslovakia. The excommunication of China and Albania by the Kremlin Titoists did not just undermine People's Democratic Albania and the people of China, but also undermined the Korean, Romanian, and Czechoslovak Peoples' Democracies. The expulsion of China was a means of sanctioning not only China, but also the Peoples' Democracies, Czechoslovakia included. A document by the RAND Corporation stated:

Aside from the general slow down in intra-Bloc trade, Czechoslovakia's new Eastern market was also affected by a series of more immediate disasters. The quarrel between Soviet Russia and Communist China ended with a virtual severance of trade between Prague and Peking, ending the Czech dream of penetrating the huge Chinese market and leaving Prague stuck with enormously expensive turbogenerators designed to Chinese specifications. The Romanian national deviation brought further trouble; as a proportion of total Romanian imports Czechoslovak machinery dropped rapidly from 50 to 10 percent. The Russians also began to refuse delivery of various shipments of Czech machinery, on the ominous grounds that they were below world market standards. (...). The decline in machinery shipments to the East not only precipitated the recession of 1962-65 but it also suggested that, if Prague wished to maintain a high rate of economic growth in the future, Czechoslovakia should re-enter the capitalist market on a major scale and necessarily, reduce the degree of her economic dependence on the USSR. Such a shift in the patterns of trade would, however, have political significance. (THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Richard V. Burks, DTIC: AD0676274, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Again, since Czechoslovakia was under siege by Titoists from all the countries around her, and because Czechoslovakia faced counter-revolutionary Mossad-backed bourgeois-nationalist elements in Slovakia, it was not so tough for the intelligentsia to lobby for the NEM to be implemented. The NEM thus became the policy of Czechoslovakia. In mid-1967, the US Congressional Subcommittee on International Trade reported:

Now the command economy is being dismantled. The role of the central authorities in determining production has been reduced. Ministries will play a smaller role in day-to-day operations. Production will respond to the world market through the introduction of flexible prices and by the pressure of imports on domestic prices. Enterprises will produce to make a profit rather than to fulfill centrally determined targets. (Initially, some profits may be illusory because some raw material inputs are subsidized by the entire economy). This is entailing a rebirth of cost accounting. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

The report went on:

New investment will be largely made from enterprise profits or from loans approved by the State Bank in coordination with the Central Planning Commission. Loans from the State Bank will bear interest rates, working from a prime rate of 6 percent, which will reflect the Bank's estimate of the soundness of the proposed investment. Should the Bank not be willing to make the loan, an enterprise may proceed from its own funds. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

And:

When enterprises cannot make a profit they must nevertheless pay workers a minimum wage. State subsidies to cover wage deficits: tax deficits and loan arrears will be on a selective basis for limited periods. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

Most importantly, the unprofitable factories (such as in heavy industry) would have to be not just closed down, but also outright dismantled, with their industrial equipment and physical capital to be taken away for profitable use:

Enterprises which cannot make a go of it must close and their resources (labor, capital, equipment) must be shifted to profitable use. This introduces the capitalist concept of "business failure" and "frictional unemployment" to the Communist world. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

For example:

a coal mine and two coke ovens in Bohemia were closed on grounds of unprofitability. Some of their workers are to be retrained and some absorbed into more efficient mines as part of a program which is designed to ease the frictions of shifting labor into more efficient uses. The official trade union movement has been given

responsibility for being prepared to retrain over 502000 workers a year. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

In other words, the policy line propagated and enforced by the Czechoslovak Titoist intelligentsia was that in order for Czechoslovakia to have economic 'growth', it has to have its industrial infrastructure dismantled! The counter-revolutionary effects of this need no mention and are quite obvious: (1) the destruction of the military-industrial backbone that would assist Czechoslovakia against an invasion by NATO and Yugoslavia; (2) large-scale unemployment and misery in Czechoslovakia to cause a lumpen-proletarian colour revolutionary uprising against the socialist state, which would create further costs for the communist faction and bring to power the Titoists.

As a result of such a large-scale program for Titoist sabotage against industrial Czechoslovakia, there came: economic troubles for the most highly industrialized nation in eastern Europe. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, p. 3) (IMG)

The severe economic damage inflicted upon People's Democratic Czechoslovakia reduced the amounts of funds available to the communist faction, rendering it more difficult for the communist faction to pursue its secret service conflict against the Titoist faction. The result was the ascendancy of the Dubcek faction and the demotion of the Novotny faction, the communist faction.

The rise of the Dubcek faction in Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s, however, also coincided with the rise of the Brezhnev faction in Eurasia. Again, although Brezhnev was a Titoist at core, he nonetheless was coopted by the communist anti-Titoist faction in Moscow, which is what led Novotny to call for Brezhnev's aid against the Titoist faction of the Party. However, this time, Brezhnev apparently showed his Titoist face and, ever the double-faced opportunist, reportedly refused to strongly support Novotny, tacitly backing Dubcek instead. According to the leader of the modern revisionist 'Communist Party of Moravia and Bohemia' (KSCM):

Dubcek, replacing Novotny, was a Moscow's choice, too. Novotny was, on the contrary, sacrificed as a scapegoat. ('50 years after the Prague events of 21 August 1968: The Guardian interview with Josef Skala, leader of the KSCM Leninist wing'. In: Marx21, August 21, 2018) (IMG)

The CIA too stated:

Initially backed by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Dubcek had replaced ... Antonin Novotny in December 1967. ('A Look Back ... The Prague Spring & the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia', CIA, 2008) (IMG)

A document published by the US Naval War College stated:

Novotny's attacks on his critics — [bourgeois-minded] economists, writers, and intellectuals — did not help the situation, for all of these enemies were highly capable of expressing themselves. Coupled with discontent among the Slovak minority, these troubles led to a revolt against Novotny which reached its climax at the January 1968 plenum of the Czechoslovak Central Committee when Alexander Dubcek, a Slovak, was elected party secretary. The change was seen as no cause for alarm at the Kremlin, as Dubcek was an old associate of Brezhnev. According to one account, the two men had known each other when they were students in Moscow. The Soviet leader had spoken personally with Dubcek only a few weeks before the latter's elevation to the party secretaryship, when he was still First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party. Novotny had invited Brezhnev to visit Czechoslovakia in December of 1967, in hope of receiving support in the face of increasing political opposition. Before returning to Moscow, Brezhnev had surprised Dubcek with a visit during which he took the measure of the young "firebrand."

When he left, Brezhnev abandoned Novotny, saying "Eto vashe delo" ("It is your affair.") and gave Dubcek de facto endorsement by doing nothing to interfere in the events which were taking place. Dubcek of course was no firebrand but a fairly unassuming and unimpressive if serious party functionary with a good record as a loyal communist party member, educated in the Soviet Union. William Shawcross' recent biography cites him as a man who had,

in the Kremlin's eyes, an almost perfect pedigree. Son of working-class parents, brought up and educated in the Soviet Union, loyal apparatchik, university in Moscow, a man whose regard for Russia had always been quite unconditional, who seemed, in many ways, more Russian than Czechoslovak—this was someone of whom the Kremlin need have no fear.

That Brezhnev's assessment of the situation was faulty and the responsibility for succeeding events rests with him is historically accurate.

(The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

Already, the economy of Czechoslovakia was in shambles, and the Brezhnev group (intentionally) failed to provide the necessary support to the Novotny faction in the Party. The communist industrial blue-collar workers' contingent in the

Party, therefore, was on the verge of removal from dominance. The more immediate cause of the ouster of team Novotny and the rise to power of the Dubcek faction was the final tactical blow: the defection of General Sejna. Sejna, a corrupt Titoist element in the Czechoslovak military and intelligence sectors, was politically weak. The agents of the Novotny faction had encircled Sejna and compelled Sejna to cooperate in undermining the other corrupt Titoist elements in Czechoslovakia. However, the Titoist faction of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, already with tremendous power by the late 1960s, was able to utilize Sejna to its own advantage. The severe economic damage inflicted upon the Czechoslovak economy had reduced the funds for the Novotny faction of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, causing Sejna to be less encircled by the Czechoslovak counter-intelligence, allowing Sejna more room to maneuver not as cooptee of the communists but as the true agent of Titoism he had always been. Sejna, an imperialist intelligence agent, defected to the West almost certainly via Yugoslavia. Beside the provision of military and political intelligence to the West, the defection of Sejna also had propaganda advantages for the Dubcek faction. It must be remembered that Dubcek and his Titoist faction were already accused of being agents of Yugoslavia, Israel, the Anglo-Americans, etc. Through the defection of Sejna, Dubcek's Titoist faction were able to reverse the tide in the propaganda war and to denounce Novotny's ostensible 'ally' Sejna as a means by which to denounce Novotny himself and the communist elements in the Czechoslovak military and intelligence. Not only were Dubcek and his Titoist faction able to present themselves as purgers of foreign spies and corrupt elements, they were also able to purge the faction that actually opposed corruption and foreign anti-communist anti-Czechoslovak espionage. The result was a large-scale purge that encompassed Novotny, his comrades in the Party, and the communists in the military and intelligence of Czechoslovakia, paving the way for the rise of the Titoist agents of the Anglo-American imperialists in Czechoslovakia. The Titoist agents were expanding their influence over the means of violence, paving the way for the establishment of a comprador bourgeois state, and the liquidation of the proletarian state. Regarding the case of Sejna, the following is a part of the report by the US Naval War College document:

Consider the curious case of General Sejna, the man who precipitated the fall of Novotny and set in motion a series of events in intelligence and security circles which culminated in the August invasion – the man who, in Aristotelian terms, could be viewed as the material cause of the invasion. The first public notice he received appeared in the New York Times datelined Prague, March 2, 1968, and headlined, "General Accused of Theft Flees From Czechoslovakia." The brief story was that "Czechoslovakia's military prosecutor said today that Maj. Gen. Jan Sejna, wanted on charges of 'large-scale machinations with grass seed,' had fled the country." Subsequently it appeared that Sejna had fled through Yugoslavia to the West, and had requested and received approval for permanent residence in the United States. He was accompanied by his son and girl friend, leaving his wife in Prague to report his disappearance to the newspapers and giving his defection more the air of escapade than escape. The 22-year-old girl friend was described by the State Department as the son's fiancee and by the Czechs as the General's girlfriend. The wife's plight as well as her comments to the press tended to make the State Department's claim suspect or the young lady's position ambivalent.

But who was General Sejna, and why did his disappearance cause such a stir? Surely his grass seed manipulations would not have caused Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, the Soviet commander of all Warsaw Pact forces, to make a hurried trip to Prague to "learn the extent of damage to Communist-bloc security." Part of the answer was that Sejna, as a Major General in the Czech Army, was in a position to provide Western intelligence with considerable information concerning Czechoslovak and Warsaw Pact forces and plans. But why the arrests and suicides which followed and the wholesale reorganization of the security section of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior? Major General Jan Sejna, forty years old at the time of his defection, was a "political general," a senior communist party official assigned to the military and given a military rank to perform his assignment – security. He was a friend of the Novotny family and a close friend of the President's 37-year-old son, Antonin Novotny, Jr. As secretary of the Party Committee in the Ministry of Defense, Sejna worked for Miroslav Mamula, the head of the Central Committee's Department of State Administration, a euphemism for Czechoslovakia's security organization. It was Mamula who was the first senior official ousted by Dubcek after election as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee. On the military aide, Sejna had worked for Colonel General Valdimir Janko, a Deputy to the Defense Minister, General Bohumir Lomaky. Sejna was a member of Parliament.

In the unprecedented climate of the Prague Spring questions arose in Parliament and in the press, with the result that the Sejna story became public very quickly. When it was all out, Sejna stood accused of masterminding a military putsch to restore Novotny's power. The plan, which he is accused of having actually set in motion, was developed with the approval of Mamula and implemented by Sejna together with Deputy Defense Minister Janko. As a result, in mid-December 1967, Czech armored units were moving toward Prague and Bratislava. They were stopped by order of Dubcek upon learning of the moves from General Vaclav Prchlik, who was then head of the Army's Military Political Administration and who was instrumental in arranging their return to base

without incident.

Named to investigate the Sejna affair was General Prchlik who in January 1968 had been appointed Mamula's successor as head of the Central Committee's Department of State Administration. As the investigation proceeded, a scandal unfolded which led to the suicide of General Janko, dismissals of the Minister of the Interior and the Attorney General, and resignations of a Deputy Premier, two Central Committee secretaries, and the Defense Minister. Finally, on the twenty-first of March, less than three weeks after Sejna's flight became known. President Novotny himself, in response to intense pressure and apparently having abandoned hope for support and intervention from the Soviet Union, resigned.

The after-effects of the Sejna affair went further. One theory holds that Marshal Yakubovsky's hurried visit to Prague on February 28 served a dual purpose—to consult urgently with Czech political and military officials regarding the security implications of Sejna's defection and to examine the feasibility of military intervention in Czechoslovakia. This view is based on retrospective estimates made by Czechoslovak intelligence officers and by the Czechoslovak Defense Minister, General Martin Dzur, that six months were needed to develop the necessary plans for the 22 August invasion. Whether or not this was the case and whether, if so, Yakubovsky was acting from personal motives, for the Soviet military, or for the Soviet government, remains a puzzle. At least one commentator, however, has marked the Yakubovsky visit as the beginning of Soviet military pressure for action against Czechoslovakia:

Within a couple of days of General Sejna's flight. Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, commander-in-chief of the forces of the Warsaw Pact organization, arrived in Prague. It was no ceremonial visit. The marshal went straight to see Mr. Dubcek, Mr. Novotny, who was then still President of the country, and Mr. Josef Lenart, who was still Prime Minister. Though little is known about what passed between the Russian marshal and the Czechoslovak leaders on that occasion, there is every reason to believe that it marked the beginning of the long campaign of pressure by the Russian military to restore their control of Czechoslovak territory. It was nearly six months later before the campaign succeeded, with the invasion of Czechoslovakia by troops of the Warsaw Pact.

The Prague housecleaning which began with the ouster of Mamula continued through the spring and summer and resulted in removal of some 150 Czechoslovak nationals who worked directly for Soviet advisers in the Ministry of the Interior. Care was taken not to interrupt the flow of intelligence made available to the Soviets, but merely to isolate the advisers from their Czech contacts. At the same time a large number of Czechoslovak officers with known conservative leanings were ousted from higher commands. The [so-called] merit system, which excluded party membership or loyalty to the Soviet Union as requisites for promotion to high positions, was strengthened.

(The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 9-12) (IMG)

Through Dubcek, the intelligentsia of Czechoslovakia rose to higher ranks, and the blue-collar industrial workers' element in the Party lost the battle for the membership composition. A CIA document confirmed that whereas Dubcek represented the intelligentsia and bourgeois reformers, the industrial blue-collar workers in Czechoslovakia supported the Novotny faction, the faction opposed to Dubcek. The document stated:

The conservative tactic is aimed particularly at compounding workers' fears that reforms will mean loss of jobs, rising prices, and a general drop in the standards of living. An attempt is being made to alienate industrial workers from intellectuals and from "radical economic reformers," and by implication from Dubcek, who has the support of the reformers.

Dubcek has rallied significant support from other sources. Association of writers, journalists, and farmers have pledged their aid. The chairman of the parliament and the key party boss of the city of Prague have deserted Novotny. Dubcek probably can count on most of the party in Slovakia and Moravia, but the extent of his support in Bohemia is unclear. He has taken steps to control the armed forces and the secret police.

Novotny's strength, in turn, lies among ideological conservatives, industrial workers, and the government and party bureaucrats at regional district levels.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, February 29, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

Beyond the comprador-minded intelligentsia, the corrupt politicians, and the agents of Anglo-American finance capital in Czechoslovakia, the Dubcek gang had no other socio-economic base. Hence, Dubcek decided to make the intelligentsia the dominant element in the Party. By May 1968, the intelligentsia formed the largest group in the Party. Since the and thus decisively overthrew the dictatorship of the proletariat in Czechoslovakia, establishing the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie:

Since the Party leadership was worried about the constant tendency to deterioration of the social composition of the membership from the class point of view, the CC of the CPC in May 1959 decided that the Party organizations had to carefully select new candidates and attract among them 60 per cent of workers and 20 per

cent of collective farmers or 80 per cent of workers and farmers plus 20 per cent of "other working people. The main Party organ then claimed that "workers represented half of the membership of the Party and out of the total number of workers engaged in production almost every fifth is a member of the Party." But it was admitted that if only workers actually engaged in production were counted, the half would shrink to 36 per cent and in addition 9.6 per cent workers, members of the party, were pensioners. Till 1967 a further deterioration would take place: "If in 1947 workers formed 50 per cent of the Party membership, then in 1967 the number of active manual workers represented only 26.4 per cent." And till 1969 the number of retired workers went up to 15-9 per cent.

At the end of May 1968, the CPC had 1,687,565 members. It represented 12 per cent of the Czechoslovak population and 17 per cent of persons older than eighteen years. *The intelligentsia formed the largest group – 40 per cent of economically active members.* Almost 34 per cent of the intelligentsia was organized in the CPC, and among them up to 40 per cent of teachers were represented.

(Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, Peter Hruby, 1980, p. 142) (IMG)

Via the intelligentsia, the corrupt bureaucrats controlled the Czechoslovak state and linked the comprador regime of Czechoslovakia to Anglo-American and West German finance capital. The pace of the Titoization program in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was far higher than the pace of the Titoization program in the Soviet Union in 1956. That is because the influence of the proletariat over the Czechoslovak means of violence was far lower in 1968 than the influence of the proletariat over the Soviet means of violence in 1955-1956. In the Soviet Union, only in 1956, when the white-collar elements gained a membership composition above 50%, did the forces of Titoist counter-revolution gain the margin over the proletarian forces throughout the entire state apparatus and not just the Party. By contrast, in Czechoslovakia, the Titoist counter-revolutionary forces did not so badly need the white-collar elements to be more than 50% of the Party membership and could achieve their objectives at a far higher base even without the white-collar elements (which formed the largest percentage in the Party) reaching above the 50%. In Czechoslovakia, the Titoist agents representing the white-collar elements in the Party had already ascended to dominance over enough of the Czechoslovak means of violence, the Czechoslovak military and intelligence bodies, to quickly pursue the Titoization of Czechoslovakia from the anti-imperialist camp. Only a few months more of Titoization in Czechoslovakia could pass and the Czechoslovak people would have found themselves in NATO or Yugoslavia. Had the Titoist agents not had the upper hand over the Czechoslovak means of violence, then there would have been no need for Warsaw Pact deployment of troops, and the Czechoslovak communists would have been able to resolve that land's Titoism problem for years to come. Yet, the very fact that the Warsaw Pact deployed its troops, coupled with the very rapid pace of Titoization in that country, all serve to reinforce the thesis that in Czechoslovakia back then, the Titoist agents of the comprador bourgeoisie already had gained the upper hand in the military and intelligence bodies, rendering the Czechoslovak state into a comprador bourgeois state. Only as a result of Warsaw Pact intervention was this pace of Titoization 'reforms' kept in check and even then only partially – Dubcek's group retained the white-collar majority, Dubcek continued as Party leader until a year later, Egypt was militarily and economically defunded by the Dubcekite Czechoslovakia in 1969, and Husak, a Slovak separatist, became leader after Dubcek. The fact that Titoization went on even after Warsaw Pact intervention is proof of how vigorous the pace of the Titoists in Czechoslovakia had become, and is demonstrative of the fact that the counter-revolutionary situation in Czechoslovakia resembled more so that of Yugoslavia in early 1948 and was much more severe than that of the Soviet Union in 1956. The communist faction of the Red Army and the of the CPSU agreed that they who controlled the means of violence in Czechoslovakia were highly untrustworthy:

The concern that Soviet leaders had about the proposed nuclear weapons sites in Czechoslovakia—and about Czechoslovakia's policy more generally—increased still further when it turned out that Prchlik, rather than being fired ignominiously, was merely reassigned to other military-related duties. In his new capacity, the general was even able to continue working on drafts of the national security Action Program, an arrangement that infuriated Soviet officials when they found out about it. Soviet leaders were equally dismayed that neither the KSC nor the Czechoslovak defense ministry would formally repudiate any of Prchlik's comments until 15 August, a month after the general's news conference. In the meantime, Prchlik received an outpouring of public admiration and expressions of support from many of his colleagues and subordinates in the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry. Needless to say, these reactions produced even greater Soviet consternation and led to serious doubts in Moscow about Czechoslovakia's military alignment.

Thus, well before the invasion in August 1968, Soviet Army commanders had lost all confidence in their Czechoslovak counterparts and had become convinced that the risks of deploying nuclear warheads on Czechoslovak soil would be too great unless the storage sites were converted into larger bases for Soviet forces.

(THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, Issue 3, Wilson Center, Mark Kramer,

Fall 1993, p. 10) (IMG)

With the rise to power of the intelligentsia and the Titoist faction of the Czechoslovak 'Communist' Party, there came a further purge of the communist elements of the Czechoslovak military and intelligence and the decline in the influence of Eurasian intelligence services:

The result of these changes following the defection of Sejna was that the Soviet military lost its eyes in Czechoslovakia and, worse, lost its influence in the selection of senior military leaders. This was tantamount to shifting the Czechoslovak army from its previous position as the most reliable element in the Warsaw pact to the least reliable. (...). The effective loss of contact in the security field must have resulted in both alarmist reporting by the advisers and severe distortions in the perspective with which the Soviet political and security leadership viewed developments in Czechoslovakia. At a seminar on the Czechoslovak reform movement held at the University of Reading in 1971, Pavel Tigrid, the Paris- based Czechoslovak emigre journalist and publisher, pointed out that

the Soviets used to get accurate information from Czechoslovakia when Soviet liaison officers were directly connected with the Ministry of the Interior, the security and they lost this control with the personnel the army, and changes and simply did not have adequate information on what was going on.

According to a former Czechoslovak intelligence official who was there at the time, the advisers replaced their sources with new ones, hastily recruited and unvetted, selected from the ousted ultraconservatives who, of course, had a built-in bias.

(...). Marshal Yakubovsky, Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact forces, must have been alarmed at the Czechoslovak situation in 1968. When he came to Prague to explore the security repercussions of General Sejna's defection to the West he found not only the problems created by the presumed compromise of key Czechoslovak and Warsaw Pact secrets to Western intelligence but a situation in which top military and security leaders, known and trusted by their Soviet associates and counterparts, were being replaced with known liberals or politically untested unknowns.

(The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 12-18) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Yugoslav agent Dubcek and his Titoist comrades promoted the influence of the Yugoslav secret service in Czechoslovakia. The fact that Dubcek's Titoist clique was backed by Yugoslavia's regime was indeed a fact that fostered the prospect of a 'Little Entente', a Titoist-dominated 'Federation', against the Eurasians, the paper published by the US Naval War College admitted. The document stated:

Support for Prague also came from Marshal Tito, the one Eastern European leader who had broken from Soviet domination and survived both the break and the subsequent introduction of many of the measures for which Dubcek was fighting. Both Ceausescu and Tito visited Prague in August 1968, just a few days before the invasion. Tito was in Czechoslovakia on August 9 and 10 and Ceausescu on August 15. Both were received with enthusiasm; Tito's welcome is described as "tumultuous" and "triumphant." The contrast of their reception to that of Ulbricht on August 12 was marked and ominous. Also ominous were references to a revival of the Little Entente, which Rockingham Gill suggests would have been "directed, not against the imperial pretensions of Budapest like the first Little Entente, but against the hegemony of Moscow." The prospect of an alliance of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, heretics in the middle of the Warsaw Pact, must have produced violent reactions in Moscow. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, p. 30) (IMG)

The Yugoslav agent Dubcek was moving Czechoslovakia into Yugoslavia's sphere of influence:

There is little doubt that, had the conservatives been nullified and Czechoslovakia able to continue with an independent foreign policy, some closer relationship to the maverick Yugoslavs and recalcitrant Rumanians would have taken place. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, p. 38) (IMG)

Furthermore, Otto Klieka – regarded as an obstacle to relations with the West German regime – was removed from his position as deputy foreign minister and was demoted to be the ambassador to the United Arab Republic (UAR). Being an ambassador to the UAR was no doubt important, but certainly was a demotion. The CIA reported:

On 14 January Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Otto Klieka, through to be a staunch anti-German, was named Czechoslovak Ambassador to Cairo. Klieka, an intelligent and capable diplomat, spent some five years in Nazi concentration camps, and later became known as an expert on Germany in the foreign ministry. Since he is a dedicated Communist and a Novotny man, he may be one of those hardline leaders opposing rapprochement with Bonn. Klieka's wife, Karla, is known to be outspokenly anti-German. (EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER, CIA, January 15, 1968, p. 2) (IMG)

The Titoist regime in Czechoslovakia, following the footsteps of the Gestapo agent Tito, was moving Czechoslovakia

towards subjugation by West German finance capital. American finance capital, the ally of West German finance capital, of course encouraged this process; the US encouraged the West Germans (FRG) to provide tied 'aid' to Czechoslovakia:

With regard possibility West European countries, including FRG, extending financial assistance to Czechs, we would encourage such action. (Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, Washington, April 27, 1968, 0045Z., 154242. Ref: Bonn 11211. Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Batjer; cleared by Lisle, L, and E; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Prague, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Brussels for Petrow, USNATO, and Berlin. Washington, July 23, 1968.) (IMG)

Dubcek and his Titoist comrades in the Party pursued precisely what the US Department of State called for. Regarding Czechoslovakia's cooperation with the US-led camp, especially with West Germany, the Vienna Domestic Service reported:

The second point concerns economic cooperation. On this issue there are also certain fears that Prague might orient itself more to the west. We know that last week there was talk about a Western loan for Czechoslovakia. The amount was about 400 million dollars. Here in Prague, official sources do not want to talk about this. However, according to unofficial reports, the Soviet Union said to be very much interested in the further course of these talks. It had been intended that the Soviets grant such a loan to the Czechs, but so far they have not evidenced any reaction. Should the Soviet Union continue to leave this matter unsettled, Czechoslovakia would be forced to make use of this Western loan, however, carries 7-percent interest, very expensive for Czechoslovakia. But Czechoslovakia would have to swallow the bitter pill, since these million dollars would be the least needed for an upswing in the Czechoslovak economy. (MACHER REPORTS ON ULBRICHT'S PRAGUE VISIT, Vienna Domestic Service in German, 11:24 GMT, August 13, 1968. In: Federal Broadcasts Information Service (FBIS), CIA, August 14, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

The cooperation with the West Germans of course came with Czechoslovakia liberalizing its border – rendering itself defenseless against NATO invasion. Karen Dawisha of the CIA's Brookings Institute confirmed that under the Dubcek faction in 1968, there came:

the official policy of removing the barbed wire along the Czech-Austrian border. (The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, Karen Dawisha, 1984, p. 205) (IMG)

Alongside Austrian tourists, Austrian 'tourists' entered Czechoslovakia. The Vienna Domestic Service reported:

During the first half of 1968, 166,000 Austrian tourists visited Czechoslovakia. Compared to the same period of 1967, this means an increase of 20,000 tourists. (MACHER REPORTS ON ULBRICHT'S PRAGUE VISIT, Vienna Domestic Service in German, 11:24 GMT, August 13, 1968. In: Federal Broadcasts Information Service (FBIS), CIA, August 14, 1968, p. 7) (IMG)

Ladislav Bittman, a Czechoslovak intelligence officer who defected to the West and provided intelligence to the Western secret services wrote:

A wave of tourists were flooding the country [in 1968], as they had thronged on the eve of the Munich agreement [in 1938]. (The Deception game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare, Ladislav Bittman, 1972, p. 195) (IMG)

Furthermore, in the words of a document published by the CIA's 'Woodrow Wilson Center' (also known as the George Kennan Institute):

since the early spring of 1968 ... it was announced that Czechoslovak border guards had dismantled a series of barbedwire and electrical fences along the border with West Germany. (THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, Issue 3, Wilson Center, Mark Kramer, Fall 1993, p. 10) (IMG)

Fascist aggression by the cross-border infiltration of undercover terrorists – history was repeating itself. The Titoist ruling elites in Czechoslovakia opened up the country for a NATO aggression by cross-border infiltration of NATO terrorists. In a critically important memorandum for the US State Department and NATO, George McGhee – a top US intelligence operative, military commander, oil businessman, and at the time, the US ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany – wrote:

It is inevitable, of course, **to recall the Hungarian experience**. A major difference in the case of Czechoslovakia, however, is the presence of substantial US forces in Germany. This means that, contrary to the Hungarian case, we could in theory signal our support for the Czech Government by moving our troops closer to the Czech border or, indeed, **cross the border** to assist the Czechs in warding off a Soviet attack. I cannot, of course, on the basis of my responsibilities in Germany, make any significant contribution to whether this is desirable per se. Not only Germany but NATO would be deeply involved. (11943. Subj: Czechoslovakia. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USNATO, Prague, Munich, USEUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE,

George C. McGhee, Bonn, May 10, 1968. Bold added.) (IMG)

During the 'Hungarian experience' of 1956, the Panzerwaffe troops stationed in Yugoslavia were infiltrated across the border into Hungary in order to assist the Horthyite and Nazi Arrow Cross troops to fight off the advancing Red Army troops (see C20S13). The American imperialists were advocating an aggression against Czechoslovakia by crossing the border. In this midst, the Dubcekite policy of liberalizing the borders with the West Germans and the Austrians was nothing short of high treason. Another US military and intelligence document written by US National Security Council (NSC) staff to the US president Johnson's Special Assistant Walt Rostow, had the following excerpts for the invasion planning:

—Forces for possible intervention in Czechoslovakia could involve 1 U.S. brigade, 2 French divisions, and 2 FRG divisions.

—Employment of anything more than 1 brigade ought to be accompanied by NATO mobilization, which would require six months to reach planned force levels.

(Memorandum From Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow), Washington, July 23, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czechoslovakia, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret) (IMG)

As support for the increased potential of a covert Atlantic invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Dubcek regime decided to reduce the troop count of the Czechoslovak military:

The Czechoslovak Army is being reduced by 20,000 troops.. [T]he reduction would involve only support personnel and would not affect the number of tactical units. A reduction in the size of the 195,000-man armed forces was reportedly planned by the Czechoslovak Government prior to the intervention by Warsaw Pact forces, but the size of the cut planned then is not known. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, November 14, 1968, p. 5) (IMG)

Note that the strengthening of the Czechoslovak military would not have helped Dubcek against a Red Army intervention since the main part of troops of the Dubcek group were not the Czechoslovak military units but were rather the NATO terrorists. The Eurasians were concerned about the cross-border infiltration of fascist terrorists via Austria and West Germany:

Soviet concerns about the security of the depots had been growing rapidly since the early spring of 1968, when it was announced that Czechoslovak border guards had dismantled a series of barbed-wire and electrical fences along the border with West Germany. These concerns gave rise by mid-1968 to "deep anxiety and fear" in Moscow about the "laxity of those responsible for Czechoslovakia's western frontiers." From then on, Soviet leaders were determined to rectify "the absolutely abnormal and dangerous situation on Czechoslovakia's borders with the FRG and Austria," which was enabling "imperialist spies and subversive elements to carry out subversive activities in a region where largescale defense forces of the Warsaw Pact governments are deployed." (THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, Issue 3, Wilson Center, Mark Kramer, Fall 1993, p. 10) (IMG)

The Zionist agents of the American secret service, having risen to important positions in the leadership of the student/intelligentsia activist movements in Czechoslovakia, provided information to the US spy den (embassy) that they would launch a colour-revolutionary uprising of the intelligentsia in Czechoslovakia in support of the pro-Zionist tendency headed by Dubcek, giving the pro-Zionist tendency in the Czechoslovak government greater leverage. The CIA reported:

Representatives from the Student Parliament of the Philosophical Faculty at Charles University in Prague on 20 June petitioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. Students parading outside the ministry carried placards which claimed that over 13,000 people had signed the petition. The students also tipped off the US Embassy that they would take this action.

The students' petition again illustrates the popular feeling that the present government should undo the work of the Novotny regime, which broke relations with Israel after the June 1967 War. The Foreign Ministry has modified its stance since January, declaring it recognizes and respects the existence of all Middle East states, including Israel..

(Eastern European Intelligencer, CIA, June 21, 1968, p. 3) (IMG)

Media outlets and intelligence circles in Moscow highlighted the drastic increase in the pro-Zionist sympathies in the Czechoslovak regime. At the same time, the economy was being decentralized even further, and thus the Czechoslovak economy was being sabotaged. This had a negative influence on Czechoslovak relations with the UAR, since socialist Czechoslovakia – when dominated by the communist faction and at the height of Anglo-American and Moscow Titoist sanctions on Czechoslovakia – had provided military support to the UAR. As mentioned before, so vigorous was the Dubcekite tides in Czechoslovakia that well until 1969, some reactionary Titoization 'reforms' were taking place, even

after the Warsaw Pact intervention. Till, the last days of his rule, Dubcek, the agent of Tito, ensured that maximum damage is inflicted upon the Gamal Abdel-Nasser faction. Richard Nyrop, a political officer of the US State Department in Pakistan, wrote:

The turning point for Egypt came on April 14, 1969, when Czechoslovakia, a heavy supplier of arms to Egypt, announced that its arms shipments would be reduced and that there would be no further arms contracts, concluding with a warning to the Arab states against any moves toward a new war. (Area Handbook for Egypt, Richard F. Nyrop, 1976, p. 46) (IMG)

The halt occurred in 1969 when Yugoslav agent Dubcek and his Titoist friends had not yet been fully ousted despite the Warsaw Pact intervention.

In the sphere of political economy, the usual counter-revolutionary pro-bureaucracy policies were implemented. In order to create a dual bureaucracy of the Party and the government both controlling the same fields, the role of the Party was reduced and the role of the government was elevated:

The role of the party in the process of government was reduced, and the National Assembly was directed to assume its constitutional role as the "supreme organ of state power." (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: COUNTRY PROFILE, CIA, May 1974, p. 12) (IMG)

Although the intelligentsia dominated the Party, there still existed a contingent of proletarians and kolkhozniks in the Party. The percentage membership of proletarians in communist party cadres was usually more than the percentage composition of the government ministries by proletarians. In the event of continued domination of the Party over the bureaucracy of the economic bodies, such a proletarian and kolkhoznik contingent in the Party could influence the bureaucracy of the economic bodies and to slow down the Dubcekite promotion of the corrupt bureaucrats. Hence, the Dubcek group aimed to weaken the Party, as a means of further weakening the hold of the proletariat and the kolkhozniks over the economy, even though the Party was run by the pro-Dubcekite intelligentsia as the largest membership percentage. Directly correlated with such an anti-Party trend was the project to proliferate bureaucracy and chaos through economic decentralization:

Plans were made to establish a decentralized and market-oriented economy, akin in spirit if not in detail to the Yugoslav model. (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: COUNTRY PROFILE, CIA, May 1974, p. 12) (IMG)

The notorious Slovak separatist Gustav Husak (see C15S8) became the deputy head of the country. And:

Gustav Husak was called out of political obscurity to lead a drive to federalize the state. And while the Dubcek regime repeatedly reaffirmed its basic loyalty to Moscow, it delighted its prideful domestic constituency by simultaneously serving notice that Czechoslovakia would thenceforth maintain a less subservient stance. (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: COUNTRY PROFILE, CIA, May 1974, p. 12) (IMG)

In this midst, it should become increasingly clear how dangerous the strategic reorientation of Czechoslovakia away from the camp of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the kolkhozniks onto the camp of the bureaucrats, finance capital, mercantile capital, kulaks, etc. would have been. It is no slander to say that the agenda of the Dubcek group was to subordinate the Czechoslovak homeland to the likes of the Yugoslav-harboured Panzerwaffe troops as had happened in Hungary in 1956. The Titoization agenda of the Dubcek group was paving the way towards a Greater Yugoslav Empire ('Little Entente') subordinate to the West German Nazis

the threat of a Little Entente independent of the Soviet political and eventually military sphere of influence, or the threat of a total loss of political influence in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs in connection with predictable changes resulting from the 14th Party Congress. Or it was a combination of these two threats. The more fundamental cause of the decision was, of course, the perceived loss of Czechoslovakia as a political or military ally, due to the forces of an uncontrolled liberalization that would rapidly drive the country into the hands of the revenge-seeking West Germans. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, p. 43) (IMG)

No, the socialist and progressive forces in Eastern Europe could not stand by and watch as Czechoslovakia was being converted into another Kosovo. The presence of the Eurasian military and intelligence services in Czechoslovakia was of vital importance for preventing the full seizure of Czechoslovakia by the army of rapists and assassins serving Tito's fascist secret service. It was also vitally necessary to support the presence of the Eurasian army in Czechoslovakia – in a strictly legal and non-aggressor manner – so to deter a covert invasion by hordes of West German hooligans. It was unacceptable to allow the Mossad to influence Czechoslovakia, turning this major center of arms for into a center of arms for the IDF terrorists under the command of the Moshe Dayan faction. The US State Department's high command certainly agreed that Eurasian hesitation on intervention in Czechoslovakia helped US objectives in Eastern Europe and the Middle East:

On the other hand, if the Soviets hesitate and withdraw, allowing the process of liberalization to proceed in Eastern Europe, the political atmosphere should improve fundamentally, in ways most favorable to us. Poland would almost surely follow the Czech example. Ulbricht would be isolated. New possibilities for a settlement in Europe would be opened. We could hope for a toning down of Soviet imperialism in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Soviet leaders responsible for the failure of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe might well be thrown out, as Khrushchev was, to be replaced by leaders who would at least be weaker for a time than the present group. (Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk, SUBJECT: Deterrent action with regard to Czechoslovakia, Washington, July 20, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information but is initialed by Rostow. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the White House. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 14). In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

As can be seen, to hesitate was unacceptable. On the other hand the events in Czechoslovakia were going to impact the course of events in the Middle East as well:

The possibility of Russian military intervention in Czechoslovakia is a matter of basic concern to the United States. Ambassador Thompson and others think the risk is increasing. Such an event could well torpedo the NPT and set back the trend towards detente in Europe. Its effect on our relations with the Soviet Union would probably reduce the chance for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and Viet -Nam.... On net, Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia would probably change the political atmosphere fundamentally in ways that could harm our interests. (Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk, SUBJECT: Deterrent action with regard to Czechoslovakia, Washington, July 20, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information but is initialed by Rostow. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the White House. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 14). In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

Although Titoist influence was dramatically increasing in Czechoslovakia, it was not yet so strong as to be able to fully hand that country over to the Atlantic camp. This allowed room for the communist anti-Titoist elements in Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and Eurasian communist anti-Titoist elements on the other, to pressure Dubcek's group into accepting Warsaw Pact military 'exercises' in Czechoslovakia:

shortly thereafter Soviet pressures to permit stationing of troops in Czechoslovak territory became intense to the point where Dubcek had to agree to permit maneuvers on Czechoslovak soil as the lesser of two evils. Protestations by Defense Minister General Dzur that these were long-scheduled and purely staff or communications exercises were contradicted by the sudden arrival in Prague of Grechko with a large party of Red Army generals and marshals. Not long after their departure on May 22, well before the announced dates for the exercises, June 20-30, Soviet, Polish, East German and Hungarian troops were crossing the Czechoslovak borders in sizable numbers. In command was the Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact forces, Yakubovsky. He evidently had difficulty including the Czechoslovak military forces in the "joint military exercises." According to one later commentator, "Czechoslovak officers were not told what was going on, Czechoslovak journalists were not admitted to press conferences and even the Prime Minister, Mr. Cernik, was told he could contact Yakubovsky only through Moscow. In fact, Czechoslovak officials never learned how many troops were in their country or exactly what was their disposition. Well after the official closing date for the Warsaw Pact maneuvers, reports of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia were so frequent that Dubcek refused to meet with Soviet leaders in late July until the troops had all cleared out. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

Indeed, judging by the location and scale of Soviet troop movements during the crisis, the Pact's "exercises" seem to have been intended, in part, to protect the three sites chosen as nuclear weapons depots. (THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, Issue 3, Wilson Center, Mark Kramer, Fall 1993, p. 10) (IMG)

Of course, the exercise of the Warsaw Pact troops were there to establish the Eurasian intelligence and military presence in Czechoslovakia as a counter-weight to Dubcekite-approved imperialist secret service presence, and to counteract the political leverage of the Titoist commanders whom Dubcek's group had installed at the helm of the Czechoslovak military. The exercise was basically an excuse which assisted in the weakening of the Dubcek faction's leverage in negotiations vis-a-vis the Eurasians:

The USSR's full withdrawal [was] accomplished at a snail's pace.. It is generally accepted that their presence was a threat and a form of pressure and at the same time that it served as a rehearsal and as a cover for the

subsequent invasion. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

During the first meetings, Dubcek and a Titoist renegade ironically named 'Svoboda' ferociously stood against the Eurasian call for stationing troops in Czechoslovakia. However, as the US Embassy in Czechoslovakia stated, it was possible that during the later meetings, some concessions were secretly given to the Eurasians with regards to Red Army presence in Czechoslovakia. In fact, publicly, Dubcek and Co. agreed to give concessions to the Eurasians regarding censorship against Czechoslovakia's Titoist media (though Dubcek ended up breaking his promises). The following are excerpts of a report from the US Embassy in Czechoslovakia:

1. Dubcek regime can take considerable credit for saving its skin at Cierna and for staring down the Soviet threat of force. We understand this is what actually happened at first meetings, when Dubcek stood up against personal attack and Svoboda said he would resign if Soviets insisted on troop stationing in Czechoslovakia. Czechs also seem to have essentially preserved their ability to pursue their own domestic program.

2. Czechs however paid heavy verbal price in language of Bratislava Declaration (see below), which if nothing else clearly implies that Czechs will hew closely to Soviet foreign policy line. They also agreed at Cierna to hold down anti-Soviet material in media and reportedly agreed to restrict emergence of new political groups; both concessions spell trouble for Dubcek group's relations with progressive domestic allies. Additional concessions may have been made and not yet brought to light, e.g. on Soviet military presence here or on personnel adjustments (either removal of [Dubcekite] [pseudo-]progressives or retention of others).

(Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State, Subj: Assessment of Czech-Soviet confrontation, Prague, August 4, 1968, 1130Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, Sofia, Warsaw, and USUN. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968',

Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

Since Dubcek and his Titoist allies in Czechoslovakia broke their deal which had entailed a struggle against Titoists in the state and media, Brezhnev had a conversation with Dubcek. Remarkably, regarding what the Eurasians were to do towards the situation in Czechoslovakia, Dubcek responded as shown below:

DUBCEK. Cde. Brezhnev, you should resort to all the measures that your CC Politburo believes are appropriate. BREZHNEV. But if that's how you're going to answer me, I must say to you, Sasha, that this is a flippant statement.

DUBCEK. I'm not able to answer in any other way. We're working very hard to carry out the agreement.

But in these conditions over the last week to ten days we haven't yet fully coped with it. We're not able to do more than what we've been doing. This is a large matter to deal with, and we're not able to complete all our work in just 10-15 days. How could it all be done in such a short time? I'm not able to take responsibility upon myself for doing everything in just five to seven days; this is a complex process, which has encompassed the whole party, the whole country, and the whole nation. And the party must keep control of this process, bringing the nation along with it in the construction of socialism. In this we see our duty, and in this we see our obligation, but it's impossible to do this in as short a time as you are suggesting, Cde. Brezhnev. With full responsibility I am telling you that if you don't believe me, if you believe we are deceiving you, then you should take the measures that your Politburo believes are necessary.

(DOCUMENT No. 81: Transcript of Leonid Brezhnev's Telephone Conversation with Alexander Dubcek, August 13, 1968. Source: APRF, Prot. No. 38; Vondrova & Navratil, vol. 2, pp. 172-181. In: "The Prague Spring '68", The Prague Spring Foundation. In: NSA Archives) (IMG)

In other words, Dubcek was telling the Eurasians that they could send their troops to Czechoslovakia if they so desire. Since Dubcek had already come under Red Army pressure due to Warsaw Pact 'exercises' in Czechoslovakia, he was giving all these concessions to Eurasians.

During that time period, Eurasian diplomat Valentin Falin headed the 2nd European (British) Department of the Eurasian Foreign Ministry. According to Valentin Falin, on August 16, Dubcek himself asked Brezhnev to send Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia:

Often Leonid Ilyich would come to us in a small room near his office and ask ironically: "Still doing magic?" We insisted that the costs of military intervention would be greater than the profits. The answer was usually: "You don't know everything." Indeed, we did not know, for example, that on August 16, that is, four days before our invasion of the Czechoslovak SSR, Dubcek called Brezhnev and asked him to send in Soviet troops. No matter how hard the Czechs try to silence this fact, the recording of the phone conversation is stored in the archive. (Interview with Ambassador Valentin Falin, Ambassador of the Soviet Union, No. 8 (907), Society and Science, Special project, Itogi Magazine) (IMG)

Falin presents Dubcek's remarks in such a manner that as though Dubcek willingly told the Eurasians to intervene. Of

course, in reality, Dubcek would only have invited Eurasian intervention, if politically encircled to the point that he would be compelled to concede and make such a suggestion. The most important factor in the political encirclement and cooptation of Dubcek had been the brief Red Army presence under the pretext of 'exercise' in Czechoslovakia. Had Dubcek not been politically encircled, he would not have made any such concessions. Since Valentin Falin was speaking as a former Eurasian foreign ministry official (albeit he was arrested during Stalin era on imperialist intelligence activity charges and was released when Beria gang took over), his remarks of course cannot be so easily cited as a Western confession. Nonetheless, in terms of the logic of the story, his remarks certainly would make sense so long as one also adds the point that Dubcek was coopted to make such concessions and that he did not make such a suggestion on his own free-enough will.

As mentioned previously several times, the communist faction in the CPSU and the Red Army utilized its cooptee Brezhnev as a vehicle for anti-Titoist communist influence. The strategy of coopting Malenkov against Beria, coopting Khrushchev against Malenkov, and coopting Brezhnev against Khrushchev, was the Stalin-era strategy that was continued by the many comrades of Stalin after his death. After the death of Stalin, coopting Malenkov against Beria and Khrushchev against Malenkov was spearheaded by Genreal Konev, an old comrade of Stalin and a target of Beria and the Doctors' Plot. One of the most prominent figures in this midst was General Shtemenko, also an old comrade of Stalin and a target of the Doctors' Plot. Shtemenko put his support behind Brezhnev to coopt the latter to promote the communist elements in the armed forces. With the rise of Brezhnev's group, Shtemenko became the leader of the Warsaw Pact forces shortly prior to the intervention in Czechoslovakia:

The question of Stalin's place in Soviet history had been fiercely argued since his death, with his contribution clearly receiving more favorable appraisal after Khrushchev was ousted. In June 1968 a book was published entitled *The General Staff During the War*, by General Sergei Shtemenko, who praised Stalin's wartime leadership. In a review of the book, *Krasnaya Zvezda* commented that the General Staff had not been so unprepared for the Nazi invasion as some historians believed. The attack had not thrown the General Staff into disarray, thanks primarily to Stalin, who had remained in the Kremlin throughout, refusing to evacuate the Staff headquarters to underground shelters in Kirovskaya Metro. Shtemenko, who had been demoted by Khrushchev for his loyalty to Stalin, was soon to regain some of his former prominence. He was to become the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact only three weeks before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. (The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, Karen Dawisha, 1984, p. 205) (IMG)

Shtemenko indeed led the intervention. On August 20, 1968, the Warsaw Pact deployed its troops to Czechoslovakia. Since the intervention was upon the invitation – after the partial cooptation – of the Czechoslovak leadership, it was not an invasion according to international law. In the end, the purpose of abiding by international law is not really a communist belief in its sacredness but rather an attempt to showcase one's law-abiding behaviour while exposing the imperialist violations of international law. The Stalin-era USSR intervened in the Baltic areas and overthrew their regimes through such a cooptation-for-invitation strategy. Military intervention should have happened in Czechoslovakia, but it was necessary to do so using loopholes in international law.

Moreover, although from a "bird's eye view," looking at the troop movements from the top, the intervention superficially appeared as an invasion, it did not appear like an invasion at all, on-the-ground. The August 1968 intervention was a mere troop deployment into Czechoslovakia for the purpose of establishing a powerful counter-weight against Anglo-American imperialist secret service and terrorist presence in that territory. In an intelligence report to Washington, US ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Jacob Beam, noted the:

calm determined attitude of population and avoidance of anti-Soviet excesses.. (Telegram from the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State, 'Subj: Czechoslovak situation', Jacob D. Beam, Embassy, Prague, August 24, 1968, 1600Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, and USUN. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

Historical experience has shown time and time again that when proletarians hold anti-socialist views, in practice, they 'fight' against socialism like cowardly 'chickens', while creating splits in the anti-socialist camp by acting like 'lions' in the face of capitalism and wrongly accusing the bourgeoisie of not being anti-socialist 'enough'. In practice, those proletarians influenced by anti-socialist propaganda end up not fighting against socialism with much vigour. Such was why, during the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army had an easier time taking over the proletarian-populated Prussian northeast of Germany while not being able to take over the petit-bougeois agrarian southeast of Germany even though the Red Army was geographically proximate to the agrarian petit-bourgeois southeast. In Germany, the proletarians were under the heavy propaganda bombardment of the Nazis and although the pro-communist attitudes were fairly strong among the proletarians of Nazi Germany, inevitably a large contingent of those proletarians would have held Nazi anti-communist views. Yet, the Red Army had an easier time taking over the industrialized proletarian zones. The Czechian

proletarians had a reputation for being staunchly pro-Soviet, and felt alienated by the Dubcekite reforms. There is not even the slightest shred of evidence that the Czechian proletarians were opposed to the Red Army. The calm of the population and the avoidance of anti-Soviet activity in Czechoslovakia can be explained by the proletarian-ness of the population there.

Remarkably, Jacob Beam, the head of the US intelligence station in Prague, acknowledged that the Warsaw Pact and Eurasian military presence in Czechoslovakia did not have the characteristic appearances that a military coup or an invasion-and-occupation would have, nor was there much of an active physical resistance against the Eurasian and Warsaw Pact military presence. Jacob Beam wrote:

1. As occupation goes into fourth day, following is situation as viewed from here.

2. This is bizarre kind of occupation. Although occupying forces have taken over key points they have not established martial law (except in some provincial cities), have not imposed military government, and have not yet installed puppet government. Legally constituted government claims to be still in being:

22 out of about 30 Ministers attended Cabinet meeting yesterday, apparently in Hradcany Castle. National Assembly claims to be in continuing session in its own building. Communist Party organs not only continuing to operate but managed to convene Party Congress under noses of occupying forces despite fact that Congress severely complicates Soviets' problems in installing compliant regime. Several district and regional committees have announced they will respect new CC elected by Congress.

(...).

3. Population in Prague has conducted itself very well. (...). Actions of population and slogans (including many which equate Soviets with Fascists) are highly provocative, but with few exceptions people have been able to avoid provoking extreme reaction by occupiers. Widespread calls for neutrality represents wishful thinking which could embarrass reformist leaders seeking realistic solution. Cancellation of mass demonstration late Thursday afternoon with enforcement by young Czechs is best example of self-discipline practiced by population. Silent clearing of streets during general strike at noon yesterday also impressive.

4. Public transportation in Prague is reduced and few private cars are in circulation, probably because of gasoline unavailability (gas stations no longer operating). Most shops remained closed through yesterday but are beginning to open this morning. Prague factories were open yesterday but did not seem to be working. Food still available in limited supplies, for which long queues wait, but we have seen little evidence of obvious hoarding.

5. Scene [Serene?] attitude of Soviets perplexing in many respects. Except for resistance and firing first day in vicinity Prague Radio building (Embtel 3054)³ they have not used much muscle and sporadic apparently aimless firing may primarily be intended as reminder of military presence. At beginning Prague populace inclined to talk to soldiers asking them why they were here but this has stopped and silent contempt treatment may be making troops edgy.

6. Czechoslovakia presents remarkable demonstration of a country running itself without an effective central government. Main direction so far being provided by strong party elements controlling clandestine radios. Interesting Soviets have not used their own means of issuing proclamations and their decisions, which have to be heeded, such as curfew, are carried on resistance radios. In some other cities, notably Pilsen which has been observed, accommodations of mutual non-interference have been worked out between commanders and local party chiefs. Lacking a Quisling administration Soviets were obviously unprepared to take over the country and had not called forward conventional instruments of occupation such as a pervasive secret police and military government commands.

(Telegram from the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State, 'Subj: Czechoslovak situation', Jacob D. Beam, Embassy, Prague, August 24, 1968, 1600Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, and USUN. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

The military intervention into Czechoslovakia was not really an invasion, nor a coup. It did not even immediately topple the Dubcek group.

Years of Titoization in Eastern Europe had resulted in East Germany being almost alone, among the Eastern European countries outside Eurasia, in enthusiastically favoring a Warsaw Pact and Eurasian military intervention into Titoist-dominated Czechoslovakia:

With the exception of East Germany, no Eastern European country appears to favor Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslav counselor in Warsaw reports that the Polish leadership is adamantly opposed to military intervention, while the Turkish foreign minister has said that visiting Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter told him that the Hungarian Government opposes armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. (CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, July 25, 1968, p. 2) (IMG)

People's Democratic Albania, at the time officially in an 'alliance' with China's Trotskyite terror regime, would not have possibly spoken out in support of the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Since the Chinese regime's Titoists 'opposed' Dubcek and Co. in words but not in deeds, Albania, under Chinese regime influence, followed China publicly. It therefore joined the Chinese regime in denouncing the supposed 'Soviet social-fascist' and 'Soviet social- imperialist' 'invasion and occupation' of Yugoslav satellite Czechoslovakia.

Hoxha himself believed in at least some of the nonsense that the Albanian government parroted from Chinese regime propaganda. Although Hoxha was a communist, he had a poor understanding of some of the concepts of the historical materialist science and dialectics, and thus apparently misunderstood the situation in Czechoslovakia. Hoxha therefore publicly took an anti-communist stance on this issue, and officially supported the Chinese regime's line and hence also the Yugoslav regime's line on the matter, even after the Sino-Albanian 'split'. Although a seriously erroneous line adopted by the Albanian leader, this is not large enough to cause a leap from quantity to quality to transition him from being a communist to a non-/anti-communist, because this pro-Titoist deviation that Hoxha publicly endorsed as result of his apparent misunderstandings, could only be an exceptional deviation from his general anti-Titoist course. On the other hand, Ulbricht took a more correct line on this matter.

Also worth mentioning is the fact that the UAR and Abdel-Nasser himself personally took a stand against the pro-Zionist Dubcek regime and supported the Warsaw Pact intervention. Abdel-Nasser, as mentioned elsewhere in C21S2.1, criticized Tito for the latter's 'reckless' stance on Yugoslavia. Gromyko, in a conversation with Abdel- Nasser thanked him for his stance:

I take the opportunity to confess to your honor what we have said officially, that the leadership in Moscow and the Soviet government highly appreciated your position regarding the events in Czechoslovakia last August, and we considered the position of the socialist countries to be good. (Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Cairo, El-Qubba Palace, December 23, 1968, p. 17)

Dubcek's Titoist deputy Gustav Husak was encircled by anti-Titoist agents in a variety of ways, which meant that for his own political survival, he had to take a stand against his own Titoist brethren. Speaking in the usual anti-Eurasian propagandistic manner, the CIA sheds light on the nature of Husak's politics:

The failure of the Soviets to install Novotny or a trusted agent like Indra does not detract from the completeness of their victory. Husak – a man once jailed for nationalism, a man who had preceded even Dubcek on the liberal road, a man with a reputation for independence – is, like Kadar in Hungary and Gomulka in Poland before him, well suited for Soviet control. He has been, as he said at the September Plenum, an involuntary student of history. He will carry out the essential Soviet orders as long as the prerequisites exist. The Soviets have seen to it that they do. (Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Soviet Control (Reference Title: ESAU XLIV), Intelligence Memorandum, January 16, 1970, p. VI) (IMG)

Husak did not carry out the 'orders' of the Eurasians because, as Jacob Beam had stated, the Eurasians did not treat the Czechoslovak Party as though it was a branch of their own military. However, insofar as the above CIA quote means that Husak was compelled to carry out the plans of some of his own anti-Titoist opponents, the US intelligence document quote is correct. Husak turned against Dubcek kind of like how the Anglo-Yugoslav agent and fascist colour-revolutionary Janos Kadar turned 'against' Imre Nagy and opportunistically denounced Yugoslavia.

Thus, the CIA also stated:

Another leader who has emerged in the wake of the invasion is Gustav Husak, an aggressive, outspoken individual who heads the Slovak party. Husak spent most of the 1950s in jail on charges of "bourgeois nationalism," and after his release was politically inactive until this year. When Dubcek took over, however, Husak was one of the first to raise his voice in support of liberal reforms. In the present situation, Husak has become a centrist.. (CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP FACES UNCERTAIN FUTURE: Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 29, 1968, p. 7) (IMG)

Remember that Husak had been arrested by the Soviet-backed Czechoslovak counter-intelligence service on the correct charges of being a Slovak separatist. The CIA too reported that they were Slovak separatists:

Separatism in Slovakia has resulted from the opposition of the Slovak Communist leaders Husak, Clementis, Novomesky, Okali, [and] Smidke.. (Crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, CIA, December 10, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Hindered by the increasing attacks of Slansky and his followers (Geminder, Frank and Koehler), and almost paralyzed in its activities by the dangerously growing Slovak separatism of the Husak group.. (Crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, CIA, December 10, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Vladimir Clementis was a prominent Mossad spy in Czechoslovakia. Husak was linked to Clementis through their joint struggle for the partition of Czechoslovakia. Yet, as further evidence of how bad the situation was, Husak, who had been

elevated to deputy leadership by Dubcek himself, was supported by the communist agents to replace Dubcek. Undoubtedly, coopting Husak against Dubcek was useful and a correct strategy, but surely from a communist perspective, it was annoying that not a communist hero like Novotny but a Mossad-linked Yugoslav-backed Dubcek agent and Slovak separatist was becoming the leader of 'socialist' Czechoslovakia. Husak was not one man standing on aid but had an entire Dubcekite faction behind him, opposing him insofar as he was coopted by the communists and supporting him insofar as he showed his true Titoist face.

What characterized the Husak leadership was that only partial de-Titoization was to occur, as opposed to full de-Titoization, because full de-Titoization meant the purge of Husak as well, and Husak had been a Titoist Slovak separatist linked to the Mossad agent Clementis. Gustav Husak – an ally of Yugoslavia, and a Mossad-linked Slovak separatist – opportunistically presented himself as a lesser-Dubcekite and thereby was able to replace Dubcek. He did nonetheless implement some anti-Titoist reforms in Czechoslovakia. The US intelligence stated:

Despite the apparent urgency of the need to correct the "distortions" of the Dubcek era, Husak sought to establish a relatively moderate regime, one which would gradually win both popular [read: intelligentsia's] acceptance and support by turning back the clock as gently and selectively as possible.

In this, he was hampered to some degree by his own authoritarian bent, a trait which was reflected in his willingness to employ firm and occasionally brutal methods in suppressing the open manifestations of dissent which marred his early months in office. More important, however, his room for maneuver – never very great – shrank markedly as the forced exodus of liberals from public life gradually deemed him the traditional centrist option of playing both ends of the political spectrum against each other. Husak's problems of this score were compounded by the Soviets who, suspicious about his reformist past and true intentions with respect to the future, not only withheld the support he needed to consolidate his domestic position but also actively sought to prevent him from becoming too powerful by giving measured encouragement to his hardline critics. In keeping with this strategy, flattering attention was paid to prominent conservatives, especially to those like Alois Indra and Vasil Bilak who were potential contenders for party leadership, and their willing cooperation was enlisted in keeping a close watch on Husak and in prodding him to further rapid compliance with Soviet wishes.

Because of these pressures, Husak was forced into a series of damaging political retreats. He yielded to his opponents on some key cadre appointments. Bit by bit, he backed away from his early positions on a number of vital issues, including his initial and highly popular contention that the 1968 intervention had been both uninvited and unneeded, his promise that there would be no massive purge of the party membership, and his advocacy of a policy of "reconciliation" with the deposed liberal community. Indeed, as he shifted toward a more orthodox and conservative posture, his policies at times became indistinguishable from those of his hardline rivals.

But Husak's retreat never became a rout. A tough and battle-scarred master of the art of political survival, he yielded just enough to steal his conservative opponents' thunder and to bolster his standing with Moscow. By so doing, he was able to prevent his rivals from converting the party purge of 1970 into a witchhunt that would have deprived the organization of its mass character and reduced it to an elite core of hardliners. He also managed to stave off demands for Stalinist-style political trials and for a wholesale purge of technicians, managers, and other members of the technical intelligentsia.

(NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: COUNTRY PROFILE, CIA, May 1974, p. 15) (IMG)

The new KSC leadership launched a purge of the intelligentsia. Encircled by communist anti-Titoist elements, Husak partially supported these purges. The US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported:

intellectuals in the cultural-educational sectors and in the mass media were among the hardest hit in the series of purges undertaken by the Husak leadership since April 1969. (World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Issue 23, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 1971, p. 66) (IMG)

Although conditions improved during the Husak years, they were far, far from enough. Husak the Slovak separatist saboteur was reflective of his own Party's membership composition which was white-collar majority, but a weaker-than-before majority:

On January 1, 1970, workers comprised 26.1% of the party membership, the lowest in the post-World War II period; 5.2% were collective farmers. (In 1946 workers comprised 58% and farmers 13% of the party membership.) The majority of the party is now made up of white-collar workers (party functionaries, technicians, intellectuals). (World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Issue 23, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 1971, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

C22S10. Struggles in Poland, the Ouster of the Gomulka Group

*** IMG-All-{Poland}

The rise to power of the Brezhnevians in Eurasia created pressures against the Titoist intelligence network in Poland,

leading to the mounting of opposition to the Gomulka faction:

Poland: A purge of middle echelon officials is gathering momentum.

Dismissal of a deputy minister of foreign trade and the head of the nuclear energy program probably signals further shifts on this level. Numerous lesser ranking party and government officials have already been fired, A number of working level officials reportedly have not been seen at their regular duties.

Trade union functionaries, dissident writers, and academicians have also lost their jobs.

Most of the victims are ... veteran officials who have long been under fire by the party's hardline elements. They probably will be replaced by hard-liner appointees.

New voices are being raised at party meetings and in the press for additional "unmasking" of the "enemies of Poland." The prodding is beginning to take on aspects of a directed campaign and includes hints that some in the upper reaches of the leadership will also be affected. The creation of such a charged atmosphere adds weight to reports of imminent changes in the top levels of the government at a parliamentary session next week.

The situation in Poland, and perhaps even some of the planned changes, may have been discussed at a meeting on 2 April between the Polish ambassador in Moscow and Brezhnev's trouble shooter, Kirilenko,

The purge is being carried out in party leader Gomulka's name, but it appears certain that he is no longer in control of the party elements conducting it. If the process affects Gomulka's supporters, he might become so weakened that he would be little more than a figurehead.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, April 5, 1968, p. 7) (IMG)

Anti-Zionist rhetoric was on the rise in Poland, and the surge in anti-Titoist activity led even Gomulka to officially denounce 'revisionism' even though he himself officially was a revisionist as well:

After they raised the issue of "Zionist" disloyalty, the hard liners played on Gomulka's [official denunciation] of "alien revisionistic" elements. He has been susceptible to this canard, although anti-Semitism as such is not part of Gomulka's make-up – his wife is Jewish. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

A number of the targets of the anti-Titoist purges in Poland were Yiddish in national origin. This however did not mean a hostility of the communist anti-Titoist faction towards the Yiddish proletarians. Rather, it entailed the hostility of the communist faction towards the white-collar elements and Titoist agents some of whom turned out to be Yiddish. Because some of them were Yiddish, the Anglo-American media accused the anti-Titoist purges in Poland of being 'anti-Semitic' in nature. No surprise. However, against this slander, the CIA makes an important confession here:

Moczar's forces acquired their anti-Semitic image by exploiting the role of Jews in the Polish Communist movement and the latent anti-Semitism of the Polish people. The campaign they unleashed in the fall of 1967 was **not aimed at all of Poland's 30,000 Jews**, the remnant of the prewar Jewish population of over 3 million. Rather, it was aimed at removing from party, state, and cultural organizations **those influential Jews who** were prominent during the Stalinist period and **had managed to survive by supporting Gomulka's return in 1956**. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 6. Bold added.) (iMg)

The Anglo-American media, which supported the rise of the Gestapo spy Spychalski and the virulent anti-Semite Gomulka, was in no position to call such purges 'anti-Semitic'. Amongst the Yiddish people, there existed reactionary elements, such as the intelligentsia. The counter-revolutionary Yiddish intelligentsia, the enemies of the Yiddish proletarians, were the natural allies of the Gestapo spy Spychalski and his henchman Gomulka. It was time, high time, to purge off the intelligentsia, both the Yiddish intellectuals and the Polish intellectuals.

Secondly, as the CIA pointed out, the Moczarists acquired their reputation in the West as 'anti-Semites' when they unleashed the campaign against the Titoist elements among the Yiddish people. Moczar and his gang were indeed anti-Semites, as incontrovertibly evidence by their active and comprehensive promotion of the intelligence presence of the Home Army (AK) pogromists in Poland since as early as the 1950s. When the Moczar gang was actively promoting the MI6-backed AK pogromists in the Polish state security bodies, when the AK pogromists were savagely spilling Yiddish blood in schools, in different neighbourhoods, when the MI6-backed AK operatives were sending letters to the Yiddish households in Poland threatening the Yiddish citizens and their children with total incineration unless those Yiddish families would leave Poland – during such a time, the Anglo-American media outlets were more than deafeningly silent, hardly speaking a word to denounce the atrocities, and only further praising the 'brave' anti-Soviet 'warriors', the AK 'anti-Nazi' 'freedom-fighters'. As soon as the Moczar group was coopted by the communists, as soon as the Moczar group was encircled by communist agents and compelled into action against the Gestapo spy Spychalski and his henchman Gomulka, only then did the Anglo-American media began to highlight the virulent anti-Semitism of the Moczar group. Even then, in the late 1960s, having been coopted by the communist agents, the Moczar group was forced to drastically reduce its targeting of the Yiddish proletarians and focused mostly on the Yiddish Titoist bureaucrats and intellectuals.

Of course, added to the Anglo-American media was of course the CIA-backed MI6-backed media outlets, the mainstream media, in Israel. Even now, Israel refused to loudly condemn the Home Army terrorists, mainly because the Home Army was backed by the Anglo-American imperialist allies of the Israeli regime. Israeli condemnation of the Home Army has been limited to people like the Yad Vashem Holocaust researcher Yehuda Bauer and other Mapam-linked activists, and Bauer himself condemned the 'collaborationist' policy of the Israeli government on the historiography of the AK terrorists. Back in the 1960s, when the erosion of the influence of the Gomulka gang was occurring, the anti-Titoist purges were condemned as 'anti-Semitic' by the Zionist organizations. This is not surprising in light of the fact that the Zionist agents of the American secret service, the agents of the American imperialist enemies of the Yiddish proletarians, were themselves collaborators with such anti-Semitic terrorist Gestapo spies as Spychalski. A case in point was the Mossad operative Yitzhak Zuckerman, who, as may be recalled from C16S2, had collaborated with Spychalski:

As far as I'm concerned, all Spychalski's later sins in general issues and Jewish matters cannot obscure his sympathy toward us in this case. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 665-668) (iMG)

The purges against the Titoists in Poland were partially successful:

Over the years, Moczar's faction became more cohesive and managed to remove [Titoist] Jews from the public security apparatus and, more recently, from the public media. Moczar's control of these sectors ... enabled the hard-line faction to exploit ... various problems, incidents, and crises. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 6) (iMG)

Anti-Titoist and anti-Zionist purges therefore occurred in the military:

Moczar called into question the loyalty of one of the key sectors of Gomulka's system, the military establishment. He exposed the widespread dissent among the military caused by the party leader's strongly [officially] pro-Soviet and pro-Arab policies. Many officers apparently questioned the value of the Polish-Soviet military alliance in the light of the crushing defeat of Moscow's clients in the Middle East. Moczar's campaign, at that time conducted strictly out of public view, ultimately resulted in the removal from key positions of several generals, mainly Jews, and in reported shifts of scores of lesser ranking officers. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (iMG)

So much for the 'anti-Semitism' of the anti-Titoist campaign, the campaign was so threatening that it led Gestapo spies such as Blanka Kaczorowska felt it necessary to escape. The Gestapo spy Kaczorowska, who had been arrested during the Bierut era, had been released after the 1956 colour revolution, had been successfully able to infiltrate the ranks of the Polish intelligence service, and had been elevated to the position of controlling sensitive economic sectors such as CIECh. The purges against the Titoist faction in the late 1960s were so strong that Blanka Kaczorowska had to escape to France:

Naturally, I was curious to see what happened to Blanka Kaczorowska from the moment she decided to emigrate to France in 1968 to the events of the spring of 1984, when her presence in Lailly-en-Val was discovered. (Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (iMG)

Note especially that she emigrated to France in particular. Many imperialist-fascist spies who defected to the 'West' usually settled in France. There are secret service reasons for this. During the Cold War and even much beyond then, the fact that the American imperialists were able to turn France into not a colony but a satellite of the USA meant that imperialist France was forced to submit also to West German imperialism because the US preferred a German-dominated Europe as a bulwark against Soviet and Eurasian influence. This in turn led the French imperialists to covertly ally with the Soviets/Eurasians as means of reducing Anglo-American-German imperialist influence. The deployment of Anglo-American and West German agents into France assisted the CIA in continuing the secret service occupation of that country, for these agents served as the troops and intelligence officers occupying France. Such an occupation increased the Anglo-American and West German lobby and pressure over France, helping to prevent France from pursuing with as great a vigour its desired strategic partnership with the Soviets/Eurasians. Anyways, from Blanka Kaczorowska to Marian Spychalski, the Gestapo spies one after another were losing their positions. The Polish intelligentsia intuitively felt threatened by a surge of anti-Titoist, anti-Nazi, and anti-Zionist tendencies in the Polish state. The Polish intelligentsia saw themselves as 'anti-Nazi' but like most intellectuals, they had a very poor understanding of the world and refused to see the truth right in front of them. Therefore, they ended up fighting on the same side as the Nazis. The Polish intelligentsia thus launched a colour revolution to compromise the anti-Titoist drive ostensibly 'led by' Moczar:

By the beginning of the year, Moczar was stalemated and the spontaneous student demonstrations from 8 through 23 March must have come as a Godsend. The students, who initially sought redress of genuine academic grievances, were emboldened to widen their demands into the political sphere by events in Czechoslovakia and

by the stalwart resistance of dissident intellectuals to regime dictates a month earlier. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (IMG)

Moczar, the agent of the Home Army, was an agent of the MI6, for the Home Army was an MI6 network. The MI6 agent Moczar covertly supported the colour revolution of the intelligentsia as a whole by launching terrorist attacks against its individual members. That Moczar publicly and overtly denounced the Titoist faction does not change the fact that he was on their side in the more covert levels. Indeed, he supported Gomulka by using the police force to launch terrorist attacks on the students so that the students would be provoked into expanding their uprising against the Polish state. And through rallying the young pro-revisionist and pro-Titoist intelligentsia, the communist elements encircling and coopting the MI6 agent Moczar would have been duly compromised, allowing Moczar greater room for maneuver in the favour of the Titoist faction. Thus, by provoking the students into a colour revolutionary uprising, the British agent Moczar was supporting Gomulka and the Titoist faction on the more covert level, helping them to temporarily partially break the anti-Titoist encirclement:

There is abundant evidence that Moczar's use of excessive police force as well as provocateurs among the students was the key to the rapid widening of student resistance. By the end of March, the party was faced with student calls to divest itself of its monopoly of power. The quick end of the demonstrations appears to have been less the result of Moczar's repression than of the student leaders' realization that their movement lacked worker support and was being exploited in the intraparty struggle. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (IMG)

While Moczar was covertly on the side of the intelligentsia's pro-Titoist colour revolution in March 1968, the Moczar faction's agents – if not Moczar himself – were overtly engaged in launching an intra-Party counter-demonstration against the Titoist faction, and hence indirectly against the colour revolution of the intelligentsia. The Moczarist-linked counter-demonstrators within the Polish Party began chanting for Gierek. Gierek, as may be recalled, had been the representative of the Party in the industrialized Katowice area. There, Gierek had amassed around himself technocrats, bureaucrats, and intellectuals, but because he was stationed in an industrialized area, he had come under the pressure of the agents of the proletariat in the industrial zone as well, a factor that coopted Gierek, the agent of the white-collar elements, to be also of some service to the blue-collar contingent. Hence, Gierek was a 'lesser Titoist' when compared to Gomulka, and a Titoist by communist standards. In the 'Salami Tactics' field, Gierek was to be coopted and supported by the communists against Gomulka. Hence, the reason why the Moczarist-backed counter-demonstrators chanted Gierek's name instead of Moczar was that, at the time, installing Moczar at the helm was not feasible, whereas installing Gierek – a lesser-Gomulka allied to Gomulka – was more feasible. By chanting Gierek's name, the Moczarists sought to widen the narrow wedge between Gierek and Gomulka so to pit Gierek more overtly against Gomulka as replacement for Party leader:

[Rolicki:] You mean the memorable rally in the Congress Hall on March 19, when the hall, chanting your name, indicated you as Gomulka's successor. Did this demonstration take place with your permission?

[Gierek:] Believe me, this was a clear provocation. I suspect Moczar of being behind it. This room was overwhelmingly influenced by him and "cooking me" [for replacing Gomulka as leader] in such a primitive way was absolutely so for the partisans.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 56-57) (IMG)

In addition to his covert alliance with Gomulka, Gierek was indeed overtly allied to Gomulka at the time too. This is why, rather than join the Moczarists, Gierek supported Gomulka:

[Rolicki:] Was March 1968 aimed against Gomulka?

[Gierek:] Undoubtedly yes, that is why I was the first to support Wieslaw at the great rally in Katowice, for which Moczar always held a grudge against me.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 68) (IMG)

Note that 'Wieslaw' was the pseudonym of Wladyslaw Gomulka during the Polish People's Liberation War and his nickname after the War.

The Moczarists actually succeeded in elevating the position of Gierek against Gomulka, even though Gierek himself covertly and somewhat overtly was on the side of Gomulka:

What is clear is that Gierek's influence on the national level has significantly increased since the "March events," and that, in braking Moczar's drive to power, Gomulka has had to make major compromises with Gierek's forces. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 11) (IMG)

Therefore, while Gierek did not belong to Moczar's immediately surrounding agents, the mere attempt to pit of Gierek's faction on the overt level against Gomulka's inner circle compelled Gomulka to promote a slightly lesser Titoist line. This increased Moczarist influence and hence it increased the influence of the communist agents encircling and coopting

Moczar. In late March, therefore, the Moczarists won in widening Gierek's wedge with Gomulka and got Gierek to partially denounce Zionism even though the colour revolution of the intelligentsia helped Gierek to move away from anti-Zionist speeches as well:

Gierek's decision to take the plunge into the factional struggle probably accounts for his strong speech in late March when he appeared to endorse Moczar's ... positions, including the attack on "Zionism." In retrospect, however, it is clear that the speech was an effort to tap many of the same forces of frustrated ambition within the party that had answered Moczar's call. In all of his subsequent public statements, Gierek has ignored the "Zionist" issue... (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 9) (IMG)

Gomulka's sympathies definitely lied with the colour revolutionary intelligentsia, but, as the head of the Party, he also was under pressure to denounce the revisionists, even though he himself was a revisionist:

Gomulka's ... major speech on 19 March ... absolved the students of blame, but he endorsed the line that "revisionists" were responsible for the outbursts. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (IMG)

The speech demonstrated in many ways, the erosion of Gomulka's authority. The Moczar-controlled press characterized it as a "report of the politburo delivered by Gomulka," an unprecedentedly slighting reference and a clear indication that one-man rule had already been transformed into collective leadership. More importantly, however, Gomulka failed to prevent the subsequent widespread purges of prominent Jews and liberals from nearly all the major spheres of national life. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, pp. 8-9) (IMG)

Nevertheless, 'thanks' to the colour revolutionary uprising of the intelligentsia and Moczar's covert support for it, the purges of the Titoists in Poland was slowed down and almost halted for the while:

Moczar probably estimated that conditions were not yet ripe for a major onslaught on Gomulka... Although the hard-line faction gained some significant posts in the months to follow, especially that of ambassador to Moscow, the removal of Jews and Gomulka supporters from the bureaucracy was generally limited to those in the middle and lower echelons. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (IMG)

On the net, Titoist influence in Poland relatively declined as a result of these purges, but the colour revolution of the intelligentsia, covertly sponsored by the Moczar gang through provocative terror, helped Moczar compromise the overt anti-Titoist campaign which the communist agents had made him to engage in. Hence, the Gomulka faction still retained some significant influence:

Although Moczar was able to force the removal of many of Gomulka's followers, he was generally prevented by Gomulka and Gierek from placing his own men in the vacated positions. In mid-April, Gomulka's close associate, former defense minister Spychalski, was shifted to the ceremonial post of head of state, but the other governmental changes neither enhanced Moczar's position nor adversely affected Gomulka's. In the Foreign Ministry, where an entrenched group of Jewish moderates was susceptible to hard-line attack, the situation is yet unresolved, but Moczar's forces have been so far denied a decisive voice in the implementation of policy .

These stalemates apparently impelled Moczar to try for the first time to force changes in the party leadership. Drawing on his strength in the middle and lower echelons of the party organization, he evidently attempted to convene an early central committee plenum. Gomulka, who could still rely on his politburo colleagues but was less confident of his support in the central committee, reportedly resisted these efforts in order to consolidate his forces. When the plenum was finally held in early July, Moczar's gains were substantial but not yet enough to give him control of the party.

Moczar was appointed to the junior (nonvoting) policy making post of candidate politburo member, but the pro-Gomulka majority was maintained by the simultaneous promotion of candidate politburo member Jaszczuk to full membership in place of ailing former head of state Ochab. Similarly, the luster was taken off Moczar's appointment to the party secretariat, where he assumed outgoing party secretary Wicha's security functions, by the dilution of his control over the Interior Ministry, where he was replaced by the deputy minister who reportedly was the least responsive to him. Moreover, the new interior minister is said to be related by marriage to Gierek. If true, this suggests that once again, in return for support, Gomulka had struck a compromise with Gierek's followers.

(POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 11) (IMG)

It is worth mentioning some more details about Gierek's line. Recall that as was mentioned before, Edward Gierek's social base lied in the white collar elements:

Edward Gierek ... draws his strength from his ... administration of Poland's major industrial center, the province of Katowice. Gierek has grouped around him discontented "technocrats," young party bureaucrats, and ideologically unassailable elements seeking economic and social reform. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

At the same time, his position in one of Poland's major industrial centers inevitably put upon him the pressure of the Polish proletarians living in that industrialized zone. In other words, this representative of the white collar elements was also significantly under the pressure of, and coopted by, the agents of the proletariat emanating from the Katowice zone. This led Gierek to adopt the line of a 'compromise candidate', the midpoint politician serving as the agent of the bureaucrats but also to a large extent coopted to serve the proletariat. Gierek was a Titoist on the covert level, and a midpoint politician on the overt level. It is worth reminding that in the covert level, in the level of the true cores and essences of things, there lies no midpoint between anti-Zionism and pro-Zionism, no midpoint between anti-Titoism and Titoism, no midpoint between the pro-imperialist and reactionary line and the anti-imperialist and progressive line, no gray zone between the black and white, no third side between the good and the evil. However, in the overt level, in the level of lies, appearances, and superficial matters, of course there are these 'neutrals', 'midpoints', and 'compromise politicians' – and Gierek was one of them. Gierek's semi-Titoist line was not really a case of a 'third opinion' in between the Titoist and anti-Titoist factions, but was rather a case of a Titoist agent of the white-collar contingent being under the pressure of the proletarians in the industrial Katowice region, hence being coopted by the communist agents of the proletariat.

Such was why in 1954, a few months after the purge of Beria, when the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies were fluctuating in their level of orientation towards Titoism vs. communism, Gierek became a member of the Central Committee, upon the request of Bierut. Bierut would have wanted communist revolutionaries to fill up the Central Committee, but in the face of Titoist opposition and Kremlin Titoists, he had to compromise at times. Gierek the vacillator precisely embodied the fluctuations of 1954 and the compromise that the communist faction in the Party had to make in the face of the Titoist faction:

[Rolicki:] When did you become a party activist at the central level?

[Gierek:] In 1954, more or less at the beginning of the year, I remember, it was winter, Bierut himself called me.

Immediately, when the secretary said: "Comrade Bierut will speak," I knew that this was something important, because he was not in the habit of calling ordinary voivodeship secretaries, and indeed – he informed me that by the decision of the Politburo I was appointed the head of the Economic Department Of the Central Committee of the party. I tried to dissuade him from this decision, but soon realized it was pointless, and so faced another move in my life.

[Rolicki:] Family matters have always played an important role in your life. From this point of view, the new promotion was probably not desired by the Lord, it must have caused a real family earthquake. [Gierek:] You guessed it. After ten days I had to come to Warsaw, and after two months I received a devastated apartment, requiring a major renovation, for which the loan was refused. From this I concluded that not everyone liked my transfer to Warsaw. Today I believe that I was a compromise candidate. It was already a period of collapse of the Stalinist system in its classic form, after the escape of Swiatlo, the political situation in the country became very complicated. As the head of the Department of Economics, I was reporting directly to Bierut, who usually called me once a week to discuss the main economic matters.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 40) (IMG)

After the 20th CPSU congress, there was an informal bloc in the Polish Party, called the Natolin group, which contrary to how they are presented in the media, actually endorsed the Titoization program, denounced Stalin, denounced the anti-Titoist purges in Poland, and supported Gomulka's rise to power. There was on the other hand, the Pulawy group which was even more militantly Titoist and which denounced the Natolin group as 'Stalinist'. And Gierek lied in between these factions:

I was a relatively new man in Warsaw, not related to the old guard. For Ochab, my neutrality in the ongoing dispute between the "Natolin" and "Pulawy" factions was also valuable. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 44-45) (IMG)

As maybe recalled from C20S15, Gierek had actually supported the anti-Stalin slanders and Khrushchev's line. He harboured anti-Soviet views. Yet, Gierek had also been promoted by the comrade of Stalin, Bierut, for Gierek was a man to be coopted against the people much worse than him. Furthermore, in the 1960s, in terms of the overt-level official stance:

Both Moczar and Gierek are trying to wrest control of the party from a leadership they consider anachronistic. Each has used the recent anti-Semitic [read: anti-Zionist and anti-Titoist] purges to his own advantage. The two seem also to stand for many of the same things: clearing deadwood from party ranks, better communication

between the rulers and the ruled, recognition of public opinion by the authorities, more decisiveness and consistency in policy, and strong party control of all spheres of national life. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

Further comparing and contrasting Moczar and Gierek, the CIA further stated:

Nationalism is one of the basic ingredients of Moczar's campaign but is less prominent in Gierek's movement. (...). Though more subtly, Gierek too has evoked the pride of national achievement in the postwar period. The implications of this veiled chauvinism for Polish-Soviet relations are not clear.

Both men have tried to establish their credentials with Moscow. Moczar, however, publicly attacks the "Muscovite" wing of the party, which returned to Poland on the heels of the Red Army, although he also pledges loyalty to the alliance with the USSR. They both espouse a viewpoint that realistically accepts the alliance with Moscow, but at the same time they try to demonstrate that Gomulka's fawning support for Soviet foreign policy needlessly demeans Poland abroad and causes unnecessary problems at home.

(POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 5) (IMG)

Recall from C20S15 that the Polish proletarians had launched the Poznan uprising against the Titoization agenda pursued in 1956. It is true that the spontaneous character of the Poznan uprising, and the lack of a socialist party leadership of the uprising, created the risk of it being exploited by the imperialists, and to some extent it was exploited. However, it is a fact that overall, the progressive forces held the upper hand in the uprising of the anti- Titoist Polish proletarians, leading to the weakening of the pace of Titoization, thus undermining imperialism. A similar event occurred in the year 1970. In December 1970, the proletarians of Poland rose up not against the Party, socialism, Sovietism, communism, alliance with Eurasia, etc. but against the Gomulka group. The CIA also admitted:

The workers' disturbances had no anti-Soviet coloration. Neither the party nor the [fake] socialist system was the main target of attack. The agitation was limited to the skilled workers, who felt they had the most to lose from Gomulka's price increases and changes in work rules. The peasantry, unaffected by Gomulka's proposed measures, was quiet. Intellectuals and the youth also were inactive. Finally, the powerful Roman Catholic Church kept its peace; it merely counseled non-violence. (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 2) (IMG)



The image of a fallen from among the demonstrators of December 1970 – said to be an 18-year old proletarian named 'Zbyszek Godlewski', he was murdered by the Gomulka gang's fascist agents in the Polish secret service. Photo source: Andrzej Wajda (1981-07-10). "Uzupełniam swój życiorys". Tygodnik Solidarność (2): 11.

As far as I am aware, the uprising was spontaneous. However, some have argued, possibly correctly, that the workers were agitated into such an uprising by undercover communist agents aiming to oust the Gomulka group. The bestially Sadistic gang of Gomulka savagely massacred the Polish proletarians, but the bloody sacrifices of the Polish proletarians did bear fruition in improving the conditions of the proletarians. The protests bogged down the fascist security forces aligned with Gomulka's terror network, giving the proletarian agents within the Polish state apparatus more room for maneuver against the Titoist faction. The proletarian mass demonstrations are known to have been a direct immediate cause of Gomulka's ouster and replacement by the more proletarian-coopted Gierek. With the support of the communist faction in Eurasia, Gierek was installed as the General-Secretary of the Party:

Since Polish party first secretary Edward Gierek took power from Wladyslaw Gomulka on 20 December 1970, a new style of rule has appeared in Poland. (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 2) (IMG)

Gierek, being the overt rival but covert ally of Gomulka, partially revealed his covert face again and rushed to slow down the purge of the Gomulka group:

I was aware that I was losing the crowd's applause while protecting Gomulka. However, I preferred to cut myself off from his methods, not accountable to him personally. I was forced to do so, on the one hand, by a sense of decency, for I was unable to sit for fourteen years in the party leadership of the country, never mind whether it was formal or real periods, to pretend that I was born yesterday; (...). Besides, by doing Gomulka a judgment, not even a formal one, but only the press, I would lead to the dismantling of socialism. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 91-92) (IMG)

Pay attention to the last sentence from Gierek quote: through a negative judgement of Gomulka in the media – let alone in the court – the way would be paved for the dismantlement of socialism, Gierek argued. Now, to be sure, sometimes one would need to publicly speak in 'defense' of one's enemies for strategic purposes of eventually eliminating those

enemies, but Gierek, being the covert and semi-overt ally of Gomulka, bore no such intentions.

Nonetheless, the tide was against Gomulka and he was being ousted. Gomulka certainly did not get the chance to commit crimes as large in absolute terms as those of Hitler, because the material conditions that encircled Gomulka limited him far more than the material conditions that encircled Hitler. However, to the extent that he could continue the path of the Nazis, Gomulka spared no effort. Outwardly, much like the Anglo-Americans, he spoke out 'against' fascism all the while pursuing fascist objectives. Gomulka had harbored and elevated the mortal enemies of the Polish nation; he actively promoted and supported the Home Army terrorists who had murdered the Yiddish citizens and the kolkhoznik Polish peasants, and who had allied with the very same UPA that carried out the anti-Polish genocide in Wolyn; Gomulka collaborated with the Nazi secret service, and had knowing harbored and promoted the Gestapo spy and CIA-Mossad agent Spychalski; he was responsible for expelling Yiddish proletarians from Poland to be sent as cannon-fodder for Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon. Gomulka had promoted the Moczar group and allied with them covertly to the end, the same Moczar group that terrorized the Polish students in order to foment colour revolutions to save Gomulka's gang. Gomulka had the blood of the Polish people in his hands. Historical circumstances, fortunately, prevented Gomulka from establishing a full-on fascist regime like the one in Yugoslavia, but the Gomulka group certainly got close to such a target.

Poland's top Hitlerite was finally ousted in the glorious day of December 20, 1970. For the first time after so many years of suffering and terror, the Polish proletarians could celebrate a Christmas devoid of a General-Secretary Gomulka – at least, at last. He was gone for good, and by 1982, he died. Upon his ouster, Titoist influence in Poland decreased, communist influence increased, and the Brezhnev phenomenon partially extended to Poland. Since on the overt level, the new General-Secretary Edward Gierek marked a compromise between the Gomulka group and the Moczar group, there was an effort to partially satisfy the parasitic class forces and to partially satisfy the workers and peasants. The situation in Poland began to improve mildly but nonetheless considerably. Whereas the Anglo-German agent Gomulka had relied entirely on the parasitic class forces inside Polish society:

Gierek has grasped political power, obtained the cooperation of nearly all strata of the population.. (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 1) (IMG)

Gierek was a midpoint politician who was compelled to reduce Titoist influence, but did try to ensure that the intelligentsia retain some of their influence:

Gierek has also struck an acceptable relationship with the intellectuals, students, and middle class. Initially, this relationship was ambiguous. These interest groups had fewer economic grievances than the workers, but Gierek must have understood from the beginning that he would need them to mobilize the population at large and to balance the ... influence of the workers on his regime. (...). Most Polish intellectuals, particularly of the older generation, seem inclined to accept the terms of this softer cultural policy. It has permitted many previously banned authors to reappear in print. It also has allowed more foreign travel for intellectuals. (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 4) (IMG)

Demonstrating his semi-covert Titoism, Gierek continued to surrender Poland to the Vatican mafia:

Gierek's big policy departure ... has been his willingness to reach an accommodation with the Church. Three days after taking office, the new government offered to "normalize" church-state relations, which for decades have alternated between truces and crises. A meeting in early March 1971 between Poland's Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, and Premier Jaroszewicz began a dialogue that has since been extended to negotiations between the government and the Vatican. In June 1971 legislation was passed granting the Polish church legal title to former German church property in the territories gained by Poland after World War II. (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 5) (IMG)

At first, I considered the possibility that the Polish government may have decided to make such a deal with the Catholic Church as means of coopting it, so to minimize its role under the cover of expanding it. However, upon checking other sources, I saw only minimal evidence of cooptation, and overall, the role of the Church seems to have genuinely expanded. This once again would reinforce the view that Gierek was a midpoint politician on the overt level and a Titoist renegade on the covert level.

The policy pursued by Gierek was not a genuinely 'big' departure from Gomulka team's policy line, contrary to how CIA-sponsored propaganda presents it. Gomulka team's approach to the Catholic Church was one of sabotaging the efforts against the Catholic Church, via a pincer approach: on the one hand, Gomulka's team had promoted the Vatican mafia and made it more popular via terrorizing the Catholic Church, and on the other hand he showed liberality and capitulation to the Catholic Church. Every once in a while, Gomulka would be forced to concede to anti-Titoist elements and to pursue a genuinely anti-Vatican policy line.

In economic planning, heavy industry gained slightly greater emphasis in the initial years and some snail-pace measures towards collectivization were undertaken. Kazimierz Poznanski, a Polish scholar and 'former' fellow at the Wilson Center think tank, wrote:

To conclude, in political terms, Gierek's expansionary programme of 'renewal' was an attempt to create a new and dynamic political equilibrium that would synthesize and reorient frequently conflicting forces within Poland's party and state administration. For the party's traditionalists, Gierek offered an ambitious investment programme, a return to collectivization of agriculture, and the rejection of genuine market-based economic reforms. For the upward-moving generation of industrial bureaucrats and state administrators, he provided increased access to sophisticated technology and fewer party/political checks on their exercise of discretion over its selection. ('Poland's Protracted Transition: Institutional Change and Economic Growth 1970-1994', Cambridge University Press, Kazimierz Poznanski, 1996, pp. 63-64) (IMG)

Thus, the Gierek era in its earlier years saw a growth in the economy, especially in heavy industry:

Growth goals for 1971 generally were met or exceeded throughout the economy. Investment grew by 9% and industrial output by 8%, as shown in Table I. There were no major shifts within industry. The largest gains in output came in machine building, nonferrous metals, and electronics — the only above average increase within light industry was in the clothing industry. There was a healthy growth in agricultural production.. (POLAND: GOMULKA'S ECONOMY IN GIEREK'S HANDS: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, p. 4) (IMG)

Overall, the situation definitely improved in Poland but only mildly.

Note that the Gierek era marked a slight shift away from the politically authoritarian terroristic, economically liberal, and foreign-policy-wise Trotskyite character of the Gomulka era. It implied a shift of Poland slightly towards Eurasia and away from the US-led camp. Polish anti-communists present the Gierek era as better than the Gomulka era, because Gierek era was supposedly more 'pro-Western' than the Gomulka era – when in fact it was less pro-Anglo-American, which is why the CIA's 'Solidarity' movement launched the colour revolution to depose Gierek. While Gierek's covert Titoism was appreciated by the counter-revolutionary networks, his overt semi-anti-Titoism was problematic from the CIA's lens. The 1980 ouster of Gierek helped oust along with him the communist agents that were partially encircling and coopting him.

C22S11. The 1981 Military Coup in Poland

The PZPR had been influenced by bureaucrats and intellectuals. Yet, a significantly large percentage of the PZPR was made up of proletarians (particularly blue-collar elements). The continued dominance of the PZPR over the state apparatus would have allowed the blue-collar contingent in the PZPR to vote for and promote proletarian agents in the state apparatus. Anglo-American finance capital and the bureaucrats in the Polish state opposed such proletarian influence. To this end, the bureaucrats in the Polish state aimed to overthrow the PZPR. In 1980-1981, the Polish General Jaruzelski spearheaded the efforts to overthrow the PZPR and reduce Soviet influence.

Jaruzelski had been an agent of the Berling network, established by Beria and the latter's henchman Merkulov so to increase the influence of the MI6 agent General Anders. Sergo Beria recalled:

The formation of a Polish army in the USSR was approved, but Stalin was extremely reluctant when it came to equipping this army. My father showed no surprise at this attitude. He had even expected it. Eventually, since this army seemed destined never to be used, my father interceded for it to be allowed to leave the USSR in spring 1942. (...). Merkulov nevertheless asked Anders to leave behind a group of officers whom my father planned to introduce into the Polish Communist army led by Berling. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 73) (IMG)

Jaruzelski's political fortunes had risen 'thanks' to the 1956 colour revolution of the intelligentsia, which increased the influence of Poland's fascist military generals led by Sychalski at the expense of the PZPR. Andrew Michta – a prestigious US military scholar at the US Naval War College, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hoover Institute and Harvard University – wrote:

Sychalski was on his way out, while Jaruzelski and his group of former junior line officers in the Berling army positioned themselves to move to center stage. ('Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988', Andrew A. Michta, p. 56) (IMG)

More important, the 1956 crisis made the military into an active, if indirect, participant in party politics on the highest level. The army's role in the upheaval and the period of "re-Polonization" of the armed forces under Sychalski laid the foundations upon which Wojciech Jaruzelski would erect the edifice of his political power in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. ('Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944 -1988', Andrew A. Michta, p. 56) (IMG)

Representing the bureaucrats and kulaks, Jaruzelski launched a military coup overthrowing the PZPR, much to the dismay of the Soviets, and increasing the influence of the Catholic Church over the state. The Jaruzelski gang brought 'moderate'

(i.e. decentralization) reforms that were ostensibly aimed at giving the workers a greater voice in managing the enterprise but actually directly repressed the workers and installed the corrupt bureaucrats in charge. Instead of the PZPR was installed a new military junta 'party' called PRON, made up of fascist commanders and liberal intellectuals. The CIA reported:

Pressure is mounting from party hardliners and the Soviets to restore to the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) the traditional power and authority it has lost during the last three years.

The abolition of martial law has removed any legal pretext for keeping the party from exercising its constitutionally guaranteed right to lead the state. (STATUS OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY: An Intelligence Assessment, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 1983, p. I. Bold added)

The party suffered a severe political decline during the last three years, losing by its own admission more than 25 percent of its membership since August 1980 and being relegated under martial law to a secondary role in political and economic decision making. There has been growing pressure from hardliners, party bureaucrats, **and the Soviets, however, to restore the party and, in particular, to return sole power to its civilian apparatus. (...).**

Jaruzelski's selection as party leader in October 1981 (see box) and the subsequent imposition of martial law in December accelerated the party's decline, especially at the lowest levels where, for all practical purposes, the party ceased to function. Although some hardliners probably expected that the party would quickly regain its political primacy under martial law, military men instead moved into many key political and economic posts, ignored the party apparatus, and took over many party supervisory, decision-making, and inspection functions at all levels.

Jaruzelski, in our assessment, ignored the party immediately after the imposition of martial law largely because of his preoccupation with the task of reasserting control. This required heavy reliance on the security apparatus and, of course, the Army – Jaruzelski's political power base. Jaruzelski also appears to have ignored the party out of deep distrust for its ability to run the country. The depth of this feeling among military men was such that Gen. Mieczyslaw Debicki, appointed governor of the city of Warsaw in called the party a "pigsty." Jaruzelski considered disbanding the party and building a new organization, **rejecting the idea only out of a calculation that Moscow would not tolerate such a move.** After the imposition of martial law, Jaruzelski relegated the party in his speeches to a secondary position, paying only lip-service to its "leading role" in society. He showed little interest in the details of PZPR activity and gave subordinates considerable autonomy in developing socioeconomic policies outside of normal party channels.

(...). As the pressures of long-delayed political and economic business have compelled Jaruzelski to give greater attention to the party, his actions suggest that **he is sympathetic to the moderate** viewpoint that the PZPR needs to improve its governing style dramatically before it can successfully resume its "leading role" in society. Party moderates have said that Poland can recover from its crisis only by "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism that involves not only political and economic reforms but also a more limited role for the party apparatus. Complaining that the distinction between the party and government bureaucracies had virtually disappeared under Gierek, some moderates have argued in the Polish press that the party should shed its traditional involvement in every aspect of policymaking and implementation **and allow government experts [read: bureaucrats] responsibility for the day-to-day running of the country, especially the economy.** In line with this view, Jaruzelski has publicly advocated upgrading the qualifications of party officials and bureaucrats, providing for broader discussion of policy options, and giving **the government [read: bureaucrats] instead of the party** a larger role in making lower level decisions and implementing policy. (...).

We believe that Jaruzelski has taken the advice of his moderate advisers that the party can adopt well-considered policies only by being better informed on popular attitudes and allowing broader discussion of policy options. He has tried, for instance, to improve party reporting of the populace's attitudes by having reports from local organizations sent directly to him rather than through the intervening bureaucratic layers, where information in the past has been altered to reflect favorably on the apparatus. Jaruzelski, according to his public remarks, **also wants the PZPR to take into account during its policy debates the viewpoints of Poland's semiautonomous political parties – the United Peasant Party, the Democratic Party, and the Catholic lay organization, Pax.** A joint meeting of the Communist and Peasant Parties in January 1983-the first since 1957-was clearly intended as an example of the consultative process he favors; although the session did not allow the Peasant Party to have significant impact on regime policy. Jaruzelski, also advocated in 1982 that other social groups hold 30 percent of the seats in the parliament after the 1984 national elections. **Moreover, Jaruzelski has privately argued that, while the PZPR should have the largest number of parliamentary seats, it should not have an absolute majority. This would force it to take into account the interests of the Catholic, peasant, and democratic groups.** Thus far, Jaruzelski has not followed through on these privately expressed

views [but he did later].

Jaruzelski has sought to give his new mass organization, the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), some inspection and legislative functions formerly monopolized by the party.

Parliamentary legislation according the PRON constitutional status indicates the body will replace the party-dominated National Unity Front **in proposing lists of candidates for parliamentary elections.**

(...). Jaruzelski has also publicly advocated greater participation of local self-governing bodies – the municipal equivalents of worker self-management bodies – in the formulation and implementation of local decisions.

Jaruzelski has sought to lessen the day-to-day involvement of party bureaucrats in running the economy through continued public support for economic reform. As outlined in the Polish press in mid-1983, **the reform is aimed at stimulating efficiency and growth by granting enterprises new freedom to make decisions on production, investment, and hiring. Workers would have a voice – although still strictly limited – in enterprise decisions through government-sponsored workers' councils and trade unions.** While there would still be central control of prices and, according to US Embassy reporting, provincial party officials would set general guidelines for economic policy, the close supervisory role of the party apparatus would be severely curtailed.

Jaruzelski founded the PRON in the first months of martial law to promote support for his policies and to serve as a surrogate for Solidarity in a dialogue with society. The PRON, **while ostensibly representing "society," nonetheless, according to the Polish press, has numerous military men among its members.** Despite the expansion of the PRON's national leadership **to include non-party intellectuals and artists,** the Church's refusal to participate appears to have severely limited movement's support.

(STATUS OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY: An Intelligence Assessment, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 1983, p. 5. Bold added.) (IMG)

What remained of socialism in Poland had been mostly abolished by 1981-1983. The economy was decentralized, a military dictatorship had been established, the influence of Moscow's communist faction in Poland was declining, while the influence of the MI6-backed Vatican agents was increasing. The Polish proletarians were against the military junta regime. Yet, the Polish Solidarity, led by the TTK central leadership, was the notorious CIA front established for the purpose of misleading Poland's proletarians ostensibly into confrontations 'against' the Jaruzelski regime but actually into confrontation with the Soviets. The Solidarity, which shared Jaruzelski's views in support of economic decentralization and marketization and worker 'self-management', did not really represent the Polish proletarians. The CIA reported:

Poland's economic problems are the focal issue in the national debate. The Jaruzelski regime is unable to secure improved economic performance without popular support for its programs, yet popular support will prove elusive without first some improvements in living conditions. Solidarity bases its continued existence on the failure of the regime to solve Poland's economic crisis or to expand workers' rights.

The regime, Polish workers, and opposition leaders have different perspective on the problem, so a consensus on solutions will be hard to find. (POLAND: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, December 18, 1986, pp. 5-6. Bold added.)

The opposition has made economic reform the most important plank of its platform. **Solidarity probably would lend its backing to wage controls and price reforms aimed at balancing supply and demand on domestic markets only if the regime made significant concessions in the area of workers rights. Specifically, the opposition seeks the right to re-establish independent trade unions and give workers greater input in management.** (...). Without some guarantee of union pluralism – which we do not expect – Solidarity will continue to be critical of the reforms and cite any austerity measures as further evidence of the regime's inability to manage the economy. The reform program has not gained acceptance among workers. They resist change because they equate reform with wage controls, price hikes, and possible unemployment. (POLAND: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, December 18, 1986, pp. 5-6. Bold added.) (IMG)

In reality, the Kautskyite and Trotskyite agents in charge of Solidarity were fighting on the same side as the Jaruzelski regime. Again, the Solidarity, a CIA front, aimed to mislead the Polish proletarians ostensibly into confrontations against the Jaruzelski regime but actually against what remained of the communist forces in Poland. Historical experience shows that usually the proletarians do not fall into such fratricidal traps. When they do superficially appear to be launching an uprising 'against' the anti-imperialist state, the uprising ends up actually against the comprador agents. The 1956 Poznan uprising and the 1970 uprising were cases in point. In the 1980s, Poland's proletarians, strongly antagonistic to the Jaruzelski regime, nonetheless intuited that they shall not fall into such a fratricidal trap laid before them by Solidarity and regarded such Solidarity-led protests as counter-productive:

Because of these operating restraints and internal disputes, a visible TKK [Solidarity's central leadership] strategy for challenging the regime has so far not yet emerged. There is every reason to believe that the overwhelming majority of the 10-million-strong membership remains sympathetic to the union and its ideals. But at least so far, the bulk of the blue-collar workers have generally opted for passive resistance as an expression of opposition in part because they believe street demonstrations to be counterproductive.

There are two reasons why the underground appeals have not attracted as much support as the union's former membership might have suggested. First, the industrial workers lined up behind the strikes and the union in 1980-81 because they believed they could extract significant wage and other economic concessions from the regime. They gradually came to realize that most of the wage increases were not covered by consumer goods and that future strikes for economic benefits would be meaningless.

(POLAND S PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT 12 TO 18 MONTHS: Special National Intelligence Estimate: Memorandum to Holders, CIA, Directorate of Central Intelligence, September 1, 1982, p. 8)
(IMG)

Though the aim of the CIA and Solidarity was to mobilize the workers into fratricide, the role of Solidarity ended up being the neutralization of the attempts of the Polish proletarians towards confrontations with the anti-Soviet Jaruzelski regime. That is, Solidarity prevented a proletarian uprising against the Titoist fascist faction of Jaruzelski. The latter gradually liberalized the Polish economy and Catholicized the Polish state, eventually transitioning Poland into an officially anti-communist NATO-aligned state. The '1989 overthrow' of the Polish state actually happened during the 1981 coup; in 1989, there rather simply occurred a mere reform of the Titoist military dictatorship into a more blatantly anti-communist state.

Chapter 23

C23S1. People's Democratic Development in Romania / Resisting Titoization / On Zionist Migration

*** IMG-All- {Romania}

The Workers' Party of Romania was compositionally proletarianized, i.e. the blue-collar elements held the largest percentage in the Party. This established a powerful backbone assisting Romania's communist faction led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej against the aggressive Titoization campaign launched by the Kremlin Titoist assassins and the latter's henchpeople in Romania. The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress reported:

During the early years of full Communist control, the party considered itself the vanguard of the working class and made a sustained effort to recruit workers. By the end of 1950, the party reported that 64 percent of leading party positions and 40 percent of higher government posts were filled by members of the working class. Efforts to recruit workers into the party, however, consistently fell short of goals.

By 1965, when the name Romanian Communist Party was officially adopted, membership had reached 1,450,000--about 8 percent of the country's population. Membership composition at that time was 44 percent workers, 34 percent peasants, 10 percent intelligentsia, and 12 percent other categories.

(Romania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Ronald D. Bachman, July 1989) (IMG)

The Kremlin Titoist assassins who had risen to power in 1953 wanted the Peoples' Democracies to remain as backward agrarian societies easy prey to the Anglo-American colonizers. As early as 1953, the Titoist 'New Course' emphasized by the Moscow Titoists inflicted pressure upon the Romanian communists for the latter to slow down the pace of collectivization. In spite of such pressures, the Romanian communists were able to proceed ahead with the collectivization program. Indeed, as confirmed by a publication of the US Information Agency:

While the new course acknowledged the continuing role of the independent farmers in Rumanian agriculture, the long-standing discrimination in favor of the collective farmers was maintained, though to a lesser degree. The concessions, incentives and advantages offered to peasants in the private sector were always just half those offered to the collective farms, with the agricultural associations holding an intermediate position.

The increased investment fund continued to benefit primarily the so-called socialized sector. Supplementary sums allocated to agriculture in 1953 and 1954 went to provide the collectives with more tractors and machinery, silos and other buildings, and were used in the education of technicians and special cadres for the gostats [state farms] and MTS.

("New Course" in Rumanian Agriculture, Daniel Norman. In: 'Problems of Communism', July-August 1955, Number 4, Vol. 4, United States Information Agency, p. 40) (IMG)

To be sure, the New Course certainly slowed down the pace of collectivization, but it did not stop it. Nonetheless, conflicts between the Romanian communists and the Kremlin Titoists had grown. As may be recalled, Lavrenti Beria and his henchmen had managed to dictatorially force a demotion of the communist leaders in the Peoples' Democracies. Such was the case of Hoxha, Ulbricht, and Rakosi. Such was also the case of Dej. As a result of the New Course, Dej was sharply demoted from leadership of the Party:

When he had to give up the post of secretary general of the Communist Party, it was rumored that Dej would be liquidated because of his [alleged] nationalist leanings. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Hence:

Dej is believed to be rather lukewarm about the Soviets. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

In mid-1953, the purge of the Beriaites began in the USSR, thus removing a major obstacle for the communists throughout the Peoples' Democracies. The communist faction in Romania was able to proceed ahead again fairly smoothly.

Then came the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. Romania's communists were uncomfortable with the Titoization agenda launched by Khrushchev and Eurasian Titoists. A paper by the Wilson Center stated:

Based on later statements and extemporaneous confessions, especially on what was revealed during the November-December 1961 CC Plenum, the members of the Romanian delegation to the Twentieth Congress were spending their evenings ... trying to figure out what was going on at the top of the Soviet party.

In short, after the Twentieth CPSU Congress, the Romanian communist leaders were ... outraged; their entire world was falling apart once their former idol had been attacked as a criminal, a paranoid monster and a military non-entity. Whatever his sentiments toward Khrushchev before February 1956, it is obvious that from that moment on, Gheorghiu-Dej deeply distrusted the Soviet First Secretary. For him, as for Thorez, Novotny, or Ulbricht, the disbandment of Stalin's myth was a major strategic and ideological blunder, a godsend for the imperialist propaganda and a concession to Titoist "rotten revisionism."

(Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 15) (IMG)

The Romanian delegation at the Twentieth Congress was headed by Gheorghiu-Dej, and included, Politburo members Miron Constantinescu, Iosif Chișinevschi and Petre Borila. Obviously, the delegation had no idea that such a bombshell like Khrushchev's anti-Stalin attack had been prepared. It is not hard to imagine that Gheorghiu-Dej, undoubtedly a genuine Stalin worshipper, must have been less than enthusiastic about the severe criticism of the former Soviet leader. According to Miron Constantinescu, Gheorghiu-Dej was profoundly upset by the revelations in Khrushchev's Secret Speech. In Gheorghiu-Dej's view, by denouncing the idol of world communism, Khrushchev was committing a historical blunder. In this respect, the Romanian leader shared ... Maurice Thorez's contempt for Khrushchev's "sensationalism." Actually this frustration with the Soviet leader's anti-Stalin initiative can be considered the first step in the development of the Romanian-Soviet dispute. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 14) (IMG)

The Romanian delegation to the 20th CPSU congress obviously had to present a report of what they observed and felt compelled to mention the 'revelations' of the Eurasian 'comrades'. To minimize the effects of this, like most of the other communist leaders in the bloc, Gheorghiu-Dej played the scorched earth strategy and tried to delay the spread of the lies promoted by the Khrushchevians. Not all communists were able to contain this Khrushchevian tide, and not all were able to delay the spread of the lies in their respective parties. Romanian communists were able to do this because they had a strong base in the Party and the state apparatus as well among the Romanian people. In terms of the tactical details of how the process was systematically delayed, the Wilson Center document provides the following:

After having read the full text of Nikita Khrushchev's Secret Speech, the Romanian participants at the Twentieth Congress had to determine how to discuss these documents with the rest of the RWP's leadership. Since the new line adopted at Kremlin personally threatened him, Gheorghiu-Dej had to procrastinate the debates that threatened to develop in the party leadership. Therefore, he invoked the crisis in the Greek Communist Party and his one-month involvement in that party's struggle, alleging that he had no way to direct the RWP's inner party discussions regarding the lessons of the Twentieth Congress. In fact, he was playing for time, cajoling different Politburo members, assessing their attitudes, and calculating the optimal strategy for the imminent discussions. In this, he counted primarily on support from Gheorghe Apostol, Chivu Stoica, Alexandra Moghioroș, Gheorghe Borila, Emil Bodnaraș, Alexandra Draghici, and, he had reasons to hope, Nicolae Ceaușescu. (...).

Eventually, in March-April 1956, a series of CC meetings were summoned in order to inform the top apparatus on the Twentieth Congress. These well-orchestrated sessions were meant to be a kind of purifying ritual in which every member of the communist supreme echelon was asked to engage in the notorious Leninist practice of criticism and self-criticism. At the March 23-25 Plenum, Gheorghiu-Dej presented a Politburo report (Dare de Seama) in which he criticized Stalin and especially the practice of personality cult.

(Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 15-16) (IMG)

I am not sure about Apostol, Borila, and Draghici, but I know that the true sympathies of all the other top ranking members who overtly sided with Dej, covertly lied with the Moscow Titoists. The reason why those officials sided with Dej, however, was that most of them had very close organizational contacts with the working class institutions and the communist elements in the army, hence causing them to be sufficiently encircled and coopted by proletarian elements. As such, these officials were coopted to side with Dej. One person on whom Dej could count on at least to some extent was Gheorghe Apostol. He was a leading figure in the trade union movement, a Dej faction stronghold, and stood against the CIA-Mossad faction of the Pauker-Luca group:

Gheorghe Apostol, at present first secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party, comes from the trade union movement. He is a rather energetic person and very ambitious and for this reason is feared many top-level Party functionaries. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

As is so often the case, the victors were unable to divide the spoils and bitter factionalism soon developed. Teohari Georgescu was promptly shelved by his three powerful colleagues who were themselves shortly at odds with one another. Luca attacked the General Confederation of Workers which was directed by Gheorghe Apostol and is the exclusive domain of Gheorghiu-Dej and his supporters.

In retaliation Gheorghiu-Dej commenced a campaign against the Hungarian Popular Union, the principal

support [base] of Luca. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

It is not completely clear to me if Apostol was a communist loyalist or if he was a communist-coopted Titoist, as the data about him sends mixed signals. What is clear is that, whether out of cooptation or out of genuine belief, he shared many of the stances of Dej.

Another person on whom Dej could rely on in the overt level – but not at all on the covert level – to combat Titoization was the communist-coopted Titoist agent Emil Bodnaras. It is worth examining his case in some details. During the 1930s, Bodnaras had been an adventurer and a terrorist who was released around the same time as when Antonescu's group rose to power in Romania in 1940:

Between 1933 and 1935, he plotted against the life of King Carol II. He was arrested and detained in prison until 1940. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

In 1944, he had returned to Romania with the Red Army:

After his release, he went to Moscow where he attended courses at the Soviet Military Academy. In 1944, he returned to Rumania as a general of the Red Army. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

At the time, the main figure of the Red Army in Romania was General Tolbukhin, who was an agent of the MI6 agent Beria. Back then, since Romania had switched sides during the Great Patriotic War, much of the Romanian military was dominated by MI6 agents loyal to Antonescu, Radescu, and King Mihai. The Beria agent General Tolbukhin had favorable relations with these MI6-linked anti-Soviet Romanian generals. Sergo Beria recalled in his biography of his father:

So long as he was commander-in-chief of our forces in Romania, Tolbukhin applied the policy advocated by my father, who counted on support from certain Romanian officers (Romania had an excellent officer corps). Tolbukhin had established contacts among these men. (...). But the Romanian Communists found nothing more intelligent than to complain to Stalin that 'reactionary anti-Soviet military men connected with Britain are coming to power.' They were, of course, unaware that my father was behind this policy. He was shaken by Tolbukhin's death because this meant he now had nobody to put his policy into practice. The task was going to be difficult in Romania, whereas the Communists, few in numbers, were fanatical. I think my father had some hope of the Minister of Finance, V. Luka, who later fell victim to the purges. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Emil Bodnaras was popular among such Romanian army staff:

Bodnaras is very popular in the Rumanian Army because of the reforms decreed by him. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

The Romanian army had by then been purged just enough so that the MI6 agents in it would not be able to launch a coup, but still there was a way to go with the purges in the Romanian army. The high command of the Romanian army had come under the influence of communist and communist-coopted generals but the middle ranks of the Romanian army were not necessarily so communist loyalist. The middle-rank generals were numerically larger but politically weaker, which is likely the reason that Bodnaras was popular among many generals but was not able to launch a coup.

At some point, Bodnaras definitely was able to establish positive relations with the Titoist infiltrators in the Kremlin. Certainly, by 1955, the Titoists had risen to power in the Kremlin; as such, Bodnaras's relations with Moscow began to improve back then:

Bodnaras maintains relatively good connection with the Soviets. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

Bodnaras was regarded as one of the people aligned with the CIA-Mossad agent Ana Pauker. He :

[Bodnaras's] closest assistants and friends are General Ion Cambrea, Colonel Tudor Sepianu and General Nicolae Fulga. It is believed that the strength of this group in conjunction with Dej's authority has so far saved Ana Pauker's life. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

In fact, the ties of Bodnaras with Pauker go back to 1920:

As a Communist [Bodnaras] went to Bucharest in 1920 and there got in touch with Pauker.. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

At the time, Bodnaras was also the defense minister:

Emil Bodnaras, Minister of National Defense and a vice president of the Council of Ministers, is believed to rank only after Chisinevski.. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

Bodnaras, while undoubtedly a suspicious element in the Romanian government, was on the liberal side of the spectrum

and thus on the overt level opposed the Trotskyite Chisinevski. Bodnaras had of course been a Trotskyite adventurer in the 1930s, planning a supposed 'assassination' against the King, but like most Trotskyite left- opportunists, he adopted a liberal right-opportunist line later in his life. On the overt level, therefore, he was useful in undermining Chisinevski's group. This is why the CIA stated:

Chisinevski also dislikes Bodnaras, the Rumanian Minister of National Defense, whom he fears because of his great popularity with the Army. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The 'hatred' of Chisinevski and Bodnaras was unlikely to be real on the covert level, but it did exist on the overt level, in outwardly pretensions. On the overt level therefore, team Bodnaras was a factor that kept team Chisinevski in check.

Anyways, like the rest of the communist parties in the bloc, the Romanian communists reaffirmed their communist anti-Titoism and 'Stalinism' under the cover of 'de-Stalinizing' and Titoizing. According to a document written by the CIA front think tank Wilson Center:

As for the manifestations of Stalinism in his own party, Gheorghiu-Dej spoke about Romanian Stalinists without mentioning names, but insisted that the RWP had expelled them in 1952, and, therefore, implied that the only Stalinists in Romania had been the demoted Pauker, Luca and Georgescu and, he, Gheorghiu-Dej, deserved credit for having courageously started a de-Stalinization avant la lettre, long before the Twentieth Congress. Also, he emphasized that that the Second Congress of the RWP marked a new phase by the fact that collective leadership was established and democratic centralism was truly governing inner party life. Simply put, Gheorghiu-Dej's game was to invoke the struggle against the expelled [Pauker] faction as an argument for his group's "presciently correct" political behavior. Compared to other East European parties, Gheorghiu-Dej maintained, the RWP leadership managed to avoid the worst excesses associated with Stalin's cult. Whatever needed to be rectified had basically been done as a result of the anti-Pauker purges. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 15-16) (IMG)

Hence, the result of the Politburo discussions was as follows:

The heated Politburo discussions of March-April of 1956 resulted in the decision to keep under strict control the mass party discussions on Khrushchev's de-Stalinization. Official explanations highlighted the righteousness of the party line and any attempt to question it resulted in immediate sanctions. All Politburo members were instructed to oppose revisionism and "liberal-anarchic" tendencies. Leonte Rautu was in charge with directing the propaganda efforts meant to conceal the genuine implications of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 18) (IMG)

The fact that the Romanian communists pretended to be anti-Stalinists does not mean that they actually were such. Romania's communists led by Dej opposed the anti-Stalin slanders of Khrushchev. It is worth reminding that when the junk of the 'Lenin Testament' attacked Stalin as 'rude', Stalin picked up the slander against himself, 'accepted' it, but reinterpreted it around in such a manner to actually help him pursue his 'rude' objectives (see C5S1). Stalin used an anti-Stalinist colouring so to push ahead with his 'Stalinist' agenda. Enver Hoxha as well as the Czechoslovak communists all overtly supported the 'anti-Stalin' nonsense, and used this as a cover with which to continue their 'Stalinist' activity. Dej was doing a similar thing through such fake 'anti-Stalinism'. Thus, in the words of the CIA even as late as 1964:

Dej ... has given only lip service to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program.. (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 1) (IMG)

Even as late as 1961, which was the time of the second wave of Titoization launched by the Moscow-based Titoists, the Romanian communists rightly claimed to have restored collective leadership in the Romanian Workers' Party by purging Pauker and her immediate associates. Paul Lendvai, a Zionist Hungarian defector to Austria and a journalist who participated in the CIA-backed MI6-backed colour revolution in Hungary, wrote:

At the Central Committee plenum in November-December 1961, Gheorghiu-Dej coped easily with the repercussions of Khrushchev's second de-Stalinization campaign. The Party leader, who since March 1961 had also been President of the republic, asserted that he had been a helpless prisoner of the Pauker group and, by purging them, had restored "collective leadership." (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 337) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha (see Hoxha's 'The Titoites' and 'The Khrushchevites') used to mention that Gheorghiu-Dej was a favorite of the Stalin-era Soviet officials. This makes sense because the Stalin-era Soviets had a Chekist mentality, and Dej embodied the Chekist mentality, for not only was he a purger, but he also was good at camouflaging. Partially for the same reason, Hoxha disliked Dej – Hoxha despised camouflaging, even though Hoxha himself engaged in it at times.

The camouflaging skills were manifested by 1956, when, whereas Mao proved to be a boss at being a fake 'anti-revisionist', Dej proved to be excellent at being a fake 'revisionist', a 'Stalinist' camouflaged as 'anti-Stalinist'. Dej also rigidly adhered to historical materialist step-by-step methods instead of rushing. The dialectical concept of the 'negation of negation' is manifested in his entire record of policies, strategies and tactics. The Stalin-era Soviet officials therefore naturally saw much similarity between themselves and the Dej faction in Romania. And of course, as has been mentioned in C15S1, Dej had excellent relations with the Stalin-era Soviet Politburo.

To maximize pressure for Titoization and to install Titoists at the helm of Romania, the Eurasian Titoists joined the Anglo-American imperialists in the blockade against People's Democratic Romania, and imposed economic sanctions on People's Democratic Romania:

No Soviet credit is known to have been extended to Rumania after 1956.. Credits from the more developed East European countries also had been small. (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

The economic sanctions on Romanian heavy industry had already been partially imposed, 'thanks' to the 'New Course' campaign to pressure the Romanians to prioritize the consumer goods sector. However, they became more severe after the official declaration of Titoization in 1956. The Romanian communists responded much like many of the rest of the freedom forces around the world, by courting China's left-deviationist regime in order to keep the Khrushchevian right-deviation in check:

Gheorghiu-Dej began to court the Chinese; indeed, after 1956, the Romanian communists had more in common in their treatment of the Stalin issue and de-Stalinization with Mao's China and Hoxha's Albania than with Gomulka's Poland. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De- Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 14-15) (IMG)

In spite of these measures, the Romanian communists obviously could not fully avoid the inevitable wave of Titoization striking Fortress Romania. The effects of this mighty wave was reflected in Romania's policies towards Israel and Yugoslavia. The Dej faction, despite taking some hits, was able to skillfully block this wave from achieving its big goals. Having purged Ana Pauker and a number of her associates, the communist forces in Romania had enough strength to block and minimize the Zionist migration until the late 1950s. The Israel Defense Magazine, an Israeli magazine on military and intelligence affairs, stated:

During the 1950s, Romanian authorities denied departure approvals to Jews possessing higher education or in-demand qualifications. In those years, the stream of immigrants coming out of Romania was not overly regular or continuous, and immigration often stopped and resumed, for various reasons. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

However, the Titoization line promoted by the 20th congress of the CPSU assisted in the release of Zionist leaders in Romania:

A considerable part of Rumanian Jewry ... had left by 1951. For next seven years virtually no exit permits were issued. (...). It was an indication of the unrest and embitterment in the Jewish community that even after Stalin's death in 1954 scores of Zionist leaders were sentenced to long prison terms at secret trials. They were released only during the period of the relative thaw after the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress in 1956. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 342) (IMG)

As can be seen, the Titoization agenda of the Kremlin Titoists headed by Khrushchev was a score in favor of the Israeli regime. Nonetheless, Romania was able to resist this as well. Years of Stalin-era Soviet assistance had strengthened the communist intelligence agents' presence in that country. Hence, the Romanian People's Democracy had a relatively robust counter-intelligence apparatus that assisted it in surveiling the Israeli employees in Romania, and to impose a freeze on the 'reunion' of Jews in Romania with their respective families in Israel. Indeed, the Israeli intelligence document from the Mossad station in Bucharest stated:

Summary

The East European division informs the Israel legation in Bucharest that they have complained to Chitic about the following:

- 1) The delay in authorising the arrival of the minister, Harel.
- 2) The following of and spying on the Israeli employees in Bucharest, which interferes with their regular legal activities and which is in contradiction of the Romanians' repeatedly expressed desire for proper and normal relations.
- 3) The freeze imposed on the reunion of families. Despite the many promises, the government of Romania ignores this humanitarian problem. This inflexible attitude can no longer be ignored and causes growing discontent both in Israel and abroad.

(Coded Tel. 368, Outg.:130.23/3123/16', East European Division (Jerusalem) to the Israel Legation in Bucharest', February 19, 1957. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol. 12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 – March 1957,

Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, pp. 409-410) (IMG{PD – Post-1953 Migration to Israel})

It deserves to be said that Israeli employees do not deserve to be spied on just because of their Israeli background, as that constitutes anti-Israeli chauvinist 'ethnic profiling'. However, it is a fact that Romania was not a destination of Israeli citizens' migration, and many Israelis who worked in Romania were not there to live for the long-term as citizens of Romania, but were rather working there for commercial relations or diplomatic relations between the two countries. I therefore speculate that in the above report, 'the Israeli employees' spoken of were the employees in the commercial/diplomatic organizations and were planning to stay in Romania for only the short-term. I doubt that they were migrants to live and work under a socialist system for the rest of their lives. Certainly, the employees in the commercial and diplomatic bodies subservient to hostile anti-socialist states were the kinds of employees to be carefully monitored, and this was not just limited to Israel but all of the allies of the United States and Britain.

The reason why Romania was able to bloc Zionist migration was that, during the Stalin era, the USSR had assisted communist loyalist intelligence agents to permeate the apparatus of Romania, thus making CIA-Mossad infiltration difficult. Indeed, an Israeli intelligence document sent from the Mossad station in Bucharest stated that the continued existence of the 'old Stalinist officials' was a key reason why Zionist mass migration was not happening:

Summary

Since the Romanians have not permitted any emigration for two months and in light of recent developments in Poland and Hungary, the Israeli minister proposes that he request a meeting with [deputy Foreign Minister] Rudencu and present him with a demand for mass emigration. In addition, he would try to put this claim to government members and in talks with the Russians.

The main reason for this state of affairs in Romania is its complete subordination to the [Stalin-era]

Soviet Union, the intransigent political line and the old Stalinist officials. However, even if current conditions are unfavorable, the issue must still be broached.

(Coded Tel. 681, Inc.: 130.09/2297/4, 'Israel Legation in Bucharest to the East European Division', December 27, 1956. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol. 12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 – March 1957, Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, p. 215) (IMG{PD – Post- 1953 Migration to Israel})

Contrary to the statement of the above excerpt, however, Romania was not 'subordinated' to – as in, colonized by – the Stalin-era USSR. It was however dominated by communists that operated as faithful comrades sharing the views of the communists in the USSR and who were thoroughly aligned with the Soviet comrades. Obviously, this was troubling for the Moscow Titoists, which is why new plots were hatched against People's Democratic Romania.

As always, the communist revolutionary blue-collar faction of the Party faced the pincer assault of the left-opportunists and right-opportunists. The wave of Titoization launched by the Moscow-based Titoists caused the full activation and mobilization of the this pincer assault. Back in 1956, the leading left-deviationist in Romania was the vengefully anti-Romanian Iosif Chisinevski, who showed 'zeal' in 'supporting' the Stalin-era USSR. Chisinevski, as confirmed by the CIA media 'Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty' was a Pauker agent:

Chisinevski, once a Pauker protege, was a Bessarabian Jew whose command of Romanian was comparable with Luca's, only the accent was Russian rather than Hungarian. ('Stalinism With a Human Face?', Part 3: No 'Nice Jewish Girl', Michael Shafir. In: East European Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 13, RFE/RL, July 11, 2001) (IMG)

Pauker, as was shown in C15S1, although from a Jewish background, betrayed millions of Yiddish proletarians by pursuing Trotskyite left-sectarian policies aimed at undermining the communist efforts against the Nazis. Chisinevski was a 'Bessarabian Jew' of the Pauker type, and belonged to her camp. Chisinevski's vengefully anti-Romanian show of zeal in 'favor' of the USSR was merely the usual Trotskyite diversionary weapon of driving a wedge between the Soviet and Romanian peoples. The CIA reported:

Chisinevski hated the Rumanians and was waiting for the day of revenge. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

On the other hand, according to the Wilson Center document:

Iosif Chisinevski represented the pillar of the Soviet influence in the Romanian Communist Party. Born in 1905 in Bessarabia, Iosif Roitman, later on Chisinevski after his wife's name, played a fundamental role in the Bolshevization, respectively Stalinization, of the RCP in the underground years. Unlike Leonte Rautu, his main disciple after 23 August 1944, Chisinevski was self-taught: born in a poor family, he entered in the communist movement since his early youth and did not finish high school. However, in his case, the cultural void was

compensated by a terrible confidence in the educative virtues of the clandestine communist sect. Ignoring and detesting the real intellectual problems, unaware of the theoretical debates of the Marxist left, Chisinevski venerated the Stalinist ideological surrogate. (...).

The history of the Romanian culture and the drama in the past of this country were not at all his concern.

For Chisinevski, the attitude toward the USSR was the most important criterion of Leninist orthodoxy. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

Again, Chisinevski was never a real supporter of the Stalin-era USSR, but, being a Trotskyite left-deviationist, he certainly posed as such for Trotskyite wedge-driving and opportunistic camouflage purposes. In implementing his Trotskyite pseudo-'Stalinist' terror, Chisinevski was infamous, for he spared no brutality. He first became a chief of the Romanian counter-intelligence sector:

In 1950, Chisinevski joined the Rumanian Government as chief of the Rumanian Security Police. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

He used to:

humiliate [others] in a ... cruel manner ... in the name of the [communist] cause. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

Even by 1956:

Chisinevski [was] by far the most detested party leader.. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

However, Chisinevski was:

hoping to cover his own past, full of crimes and abuses. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

The Trotskyite diversionary Chisinevski sought to terrorize, not in order to suppress dissent of course, but to provoke more of it and then redirect resentment towards Dej and other communists in the Party by presenting them as responsible for the terror he had committed. For his conspiratorial agenda, Chisinevski had his own network of agents:

Iosif Chisinevski has been Vice President of the Rumanian Government and representative of the Rumanian Communist Party with the Cominform since 1952. He is generally called the "eminence grise" of the country and is believed to pull all the political strings, although he likes to stay in the background. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

In order to survive the anti-Pauker purges, Chisinevski had opportunistically turned against his covert boss, Ana Pauker, and thus saw a promotion in official rank when she was purged:

In 1952, [Chisinevski] became Vice President of the Rumanian Council of Ministers. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Of course, through the purge of Pauker, Chisinevski's network of influence had weakened, but his official rank did increase through his participation in the anti-Pauker purge. Dej's faction had promoted Chisinevski against the Mossad spy Ana Pauker and her group but that did not mean that Dej had any good relations with Chisinevski:

Gheorghiu Dej is not on good terms with Chisinevski on whom Dej looks down because Chisinevski was not one of the founders of the Rumanian Communist Party. The antipathy between the two is mutual. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Chisinevski, a Pauker agent, had opportunistically denounced his own boss so to survive the purges. Parallel with Khrushchev and Tito who used to praise Stalin to the heavens and then denounce him to mud, Chisinevski the 'Stalinist' pursued such an agenda, actively and ferociously pursued an anti-Stalinist line, and began to pursue Khrushchev-style Titoization:

Once the Soviet leaders decided to denounce Stalin, Chisinevski followed the new line with the same zeal he had once applied Stalin's directives. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

Thus:

After the Twentieth Congress [Chisinevski] started immediately to spread insidious critical allusions to

Gheorghiu-Dej.... (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Dej faction – which as documented before, had its base on the communist blue-collar workers in the Party – was targeted by the right-deviationist elements headed by Constantinescu, who, like most revisionists of the liberal right-deviationist type, had his social base in the intelligentsia:

The other member of the Central Committee that confronted Gheorghiu-Dej was Miron Constantinescu, one of the very few authentic intellectuals accepted in the hegemonic group of Romanian communism. Partner rather than accomplice for Gheorghiu-Dej, he saw in the de-Stalinization process started by Khrushchev the chance of a lifetime. After 1954, Miron Constantinescu began to intensely cultivate his image as a fighter for liberalization in the party. He initiated a series of meetings with some of the outstanding intellectuals of the interwar period, especially after he was appointed Minister of Education and Culture on 18 November 1956. No less significant was his meeting in February 1956 in Moscow with the leader of Italian communism, Palmiro Togliatti, whose heretical opinions would be disclosed in the following months. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 26) (IMG)

Like Chisinevski, Constantinescu had been close to the CIA-Mossad agent Ana Pauker. However, once it became clear that she was about to be purged, he overtly distanced himself from her:

Miron Constantinescu was at one time fairly close to Ana Pauker, but he was cautious enough to keep a certain distance and maintain his independence of her. He was thus able to get out from under the crash very cleverly. (HARMONY AMONG LEADING COMMUNISTS IN RUMANIA, CIA, January 28, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

It must be remembered that although the CIA-Mossad agent Pauker herself was removed from power, she still retained a network within the Party:

Pauker's influence on the other Communist leaders in the country is still so great, however, that her word may still have some weight in the decisions of the Party. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p.3) (IMG)

Constantinescu was a successor to Pauker. In his struggle against the communist faction and the blue-collar elements:

Constantinescu believed that he could also count on the support of intellectuals within the party, as well as among some major cultural figures that had been thrown to the periphery of social life after the communist takeover. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 16-18) (IMG)

The Trotskyite left-deviationist group of Chisinevski represented the corrupt bureaucrats in the Party, and the liberal right-deviationist group of Constantinescu the ally of Mossad agent Pauker, represented the intelligentsia in the Party. Team Chisinevski and team Constantinescu banded together to launch a pincer assault on the Gheorghiu-Dej faction, which had its base in the communist blue-collar worker elements of the Party:

The ... alliance between Chisinevski and Constantinescu in the spring of 1956 had been dictated by pragmatic considerations. At that time, they believed that Gheorghiu-Dej was so compromised as a result of the revelations about Stalinist abuses, that he should be removed from power. In order to obtain a majority of votes within the Politburo, probably encouraged by Khrushchev, they tried to persuade other members of the Politburo to join in their efforts to topple Gheorghiu-Dej. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

In every country, the liberal intelligentsia and the torturers are allies. The alliance of the Chisinevski and Constantinescu teams is a local case in point demonstrating the worldwide alliance, an alliance naturally emanating from the alliance of the intelligentsia and the corrupt bureaucrats, for the corrupt bureaucrats in the intelligence services are the pool from among whom torturers arise.

One of the covert allies that Chisinevski had was Moghioros:

On the other hand, Chisinevski is on good terms with Alexandry Moghioros, a Vice President of the Council of Ministers. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

However, according to Vladimir Tismaneanu, Moghioros – probably feeling that he had no chance against the Dej faction at the time – decided to overtly denounce his own covert ally. Referring to the Chisinevski-Constantinescu alliance, Tismaneanu wrote:

Although they were successful in drawing Pirvulescu, the president of the Party Control Commission, into the conspiracy, they did not manage to win over Alexandra Moghioro?, who informed Gheorghiu-Dej about the

plot. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

He adds:

Actually, Miron Constantinescu's attempt to enroll Moghioro? on his side backfired: Moghioro?, who had earlier betrayed Vasile Luca and Ana Pauker, went immediately to Gheorghiu-Dej to inform him about the formation of an "anti-party platform." Iosif Chi?inevschi went to the less astute Pirvulescu, who, anyway, despised Gheorghiu-Dej, and tried to attract his assistance in this effort to blame the First Secretary for the abuses. Pirvulescu either did not understand that Chi?inevschi's suggested action amounted in fact to Gheorghiu-Dej's ouster, or pretended that he did not get the message clearly. His failure to inform on Chi?inevschi's courting and invitation to "discuss the past in the light of the Twentieth Congress Leninist course" greatly cost him. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 16-18) (IMG)

The Chisinevschi-Constantinescu group thus launched their pincer attack. One of them attacked the 'Stalinists' from the left and the other attacked them from the right:

At this Plenum, Iosif Chi?inevschi and Miron Constantinescu, both members of the delegation to the Twentieth Congress, and each for very different reasons, challenged Gheorghiu-Dej's authority, so that the meeting was transformed in a real debate, as there was no other since the purge of the right-wing deviators. This is the reason why from the documents of this Plenum only Gheorghiu-Dej's Report on the Twentieth Congress was published (and even that one in a sanitized version). Constantinescu, supported by Chi?inevschi, argued for the "regeneration" of the party in the spirit of the anti-Stalinist line promoted by Khrushchev. They invoked the slogan of the Twentieth Congress about the "restoration of Leninist norms of internal party life" in order to weaken Gheorghiu-Dej's position and restructure the party's leadership. Also, Miron Constantinescu criticized the Securitate, including the fact that secret police operated within Ministries without consultations with top officials, even if those, as it was his case, served on the Politburo.

In Leninist parlance, this was an overall attack, and Gheorghiu-Dej did not miss the point. To Constantinescu's and Chi?inevschi's criticism, Gheorghiu-Dej, who was able to combine a seductive personal affability with the icy requests of the Stalinist logic, opposed the theory that the personality cult had indeed existed within the RWP, with abominable and tragic consequences, but all this had come to an end with the elimination of the factionalist villains, the arch-opportunists Pauker, Luca, Teohari.

After 1952, Gheorghiu-Dej and his supporters claimed, "collective leadership was re-installed." Later, at the Central Committee Plenum in November 1961, Gheorghiu-Dej maintained, seconded by a cohort of sycophants, that normal party life had started only after 1952, and this was due primarily to the great Leninist militant, Gheorghiu-Dej himself.

It is worth emphasizing that the two main opponents of Gheorghiu-Dej attacked him for very different reasons. In the case of Chi?inevschi, it was about his enduring opportunism, his unsurpassed chameleon-type of political conduct materialized in his will to associate himself with the group that was most probable to win the battle. A true follower of Moscow's line, whatever its twist or turn, he grasped an opportunity to undermine Gheorghiu-Dej and re-compose for himself the image of a fighter for intraparty democracy. As Khrushchev seemed to run the show in Moscow, Chi?inevschi thought, it was likely that a critical re-assessment of the Stalinist purges in Romania was inevitable. Miron

Constantinescu, at his turn, thought that he was the one destined to promote a new political course in Romania, and hoped that he could overthrow Gheorghiu-Dej. Actually, at the next Politburo meeting, he attacked Gheorghiu-Dej directly, saying that, although he acknowledged the merits of the First Secretary, he wanted to underline his defects, considering that the hitherto completely uncritical attitude towards Gheorghiu-Dej was a mistaken, non-Leninist position. (...). Gheorghiu-Dej's main confidants and supporters at that moment were Gheorghe Apostol, Emil Bodnaraş, Alexandra Moghioroş, and Petre Borila.

(Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 16-18) (IMG)

Further emphasizing the fact that on the overt level, the two allies Constantinescu and Chişinevschi were on different sides of the political spectrum, the Wilson Center document stated:

With regard to this episode, mention should be made of Gheorghiu-Dej's anti-intellectual sentiments, which may explain the particular bitterness and violence of the purge that followed the internal party debates in 1956. No doubt, Miron Constantinescu ... internalized the lessons of the Twentieth CPSU Congress.. Gheorghiu-Dej used

Constantinescu's uninspired alliance with Iosif Chişinevschi – by far the most detested party leader – as an argument against the “group.” The two communist leaders were, actually, very different in intellectual background, in the way they understood the relationship with the policy promoted by Moscow, and in the significance they attributed to de-Stalinization. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

While the pincer assault against the Dej faction was being spearheaded by the Constantinescu-Chişinevschi bloc, there also came the Red Army intervention in Hungary, a factor which would contribute to the demise of the Constantinescu-Chişinevschi bloc. Like Hoxha, Dej was thanked for pressuring the Moscow Titoists into accepting Red Army intervention into Hungary:

After the crushing of the Hungarian [colour] revolution, Dej appeared to the most conservative among the Kremlin leaders as a trustworthy comrade. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 21) (IMG)

The events of Hungary's colour revolution elevated the position of the communist faction throughout the bloc, after having suffered a wave of Titoization. This elevation of the communist faction was observed not only in Hungary itself but also in Albania, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The case of the Romanian communists was no different:

The Hungarian uprising and the Polish crisis in the autumn of 1956 placed Gheorghiu-Dej in an advantageous position in his behind-the-scenes confrontation with the Khrushchev leadership. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

As mentioned, the rollback of the fascist forces in Hungary in 1956

On the other hand, as a result of the discrediting of Titoization after Hungary's colour revolution:

Miron Constantinescu, the head of the State Planning Committee, was appointed Minister of Education on 18 November 1956, a decision that covered a degradation of his status. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 21) (IMG)

Due to Eurasian Titoist pressures and Anglo-American sanctions, the communists could not purge the Pauker agent Chisinevschi just yet, but he was gradually demoted over time:

After March 1956, in spite of his renewed declarations of faith to Gheorghiu-Dej, there was no chance for Chişinevschi's political survival; Gheorghiu-Dej surpassed him in ability and duplicity. In June 1957, he was excluded from the Politburo, and in 1960 the Third Congress of the RWP did not reelect him in the Central Committee. (...). Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceauşescu, Maurer, Rautu, Borila, Moghioroş, Sencovici, Valter Roman, all accused the one whom they had once celebrated as the “brain of the party,” then only the director of the Printing Combinat “Casa Scintei.” (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

Parallel with the decline of the Pauker agent Chisinevschi was the decline of his ally, the Pauker agent Constantinescu:

Associated with the tendencies for liberalization inside the party, caught in the traps of Gheorghiu-Dej and Rautu, Constantinescu was ousted from the Politburo at the June Plenum in 1957 together with Chişinevschi for their “attempt to orient the party towards the liberalist and revisionist anarchy.” (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 26) (IMG)

Pirvulescu too, another member of the Chisinevschi-Constantinescu group, was demoted:

At the June 1957 Central Committee Plenum, Pirvulescu was severely criticized, at the Third RWP Congress in 1960 he lost his Politburo seat, and at the November-December 1961 Plenum he was criticized for political myopia and opportunism. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 16-18) (IMG)

Nevertheless, the effects of the failed attempt of Chişinevschi-Constantinescu faction to question Gheorghiu-Dej's responsibility for the Stalinist's period misdeeds were felt once again: Constantin Pirvulescu, one of the party old-timers, lost his place in the Politburo and the Central Committee, as well as his position as chairman of the Party Control Commission (he was replaced by the veteran hard -liner Cominternist, Dumitru Coliu). Clearly, Pirvulescu's expulsion was related to his attitude toward the Chişinevschi-Constantinescu actions against Gheorghiu-Dej. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to

the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 33-34) (IMG)

In short:

The Plenum of the CC of the RWP on 28-29 June and 1-3 July 1957 played a crucial role in the restructuring of RWP's Politburo and the expulsion of the so-called "factionalist group" Chi?inevschi- Constantinescu. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

The Dej faction coopted Maurer to replace and help purge the Chisinevschi-Constantinescu group. Stoica too was demoted:

Ion Gheorghe Maurer, at the moment nominal chief of state, took his place in the Politburo. One year later, Maurer replaced the notoriously mediocre Chivu Stoica as chairman of the Council of Ministers, a position he held until his retirement in 1974. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 33-34) (IMG)

Never really a communist loyalist, Maurer was coopted by the Dej faction. Maurer later came out as a Titoist agent as well.

At the same time, there was a partial rehabilitation of Stalin. In its historical context, the attack on the personality of Stalin marked the ground zero of propaganda in favor of Titoization, because the plan was that through attacking the personality of the teacher, the teachings of the teacher were to be discredited. By contrast, the loyal comrades of the teacher operated in the reverse way, namely that they first defended the teachings and then later on went for the defense of the personality of the teacher. This makes sense from a historical materialist lens because while anti-Stalin slanders did help in denouncing Stalin's decisions as the 'decisions of an evil dictator', the defense of Stalin's personality in itself could not mark the ground zero of anti-Titoist and anti-revisionist resistance. The reactionary policy implications of the 1956 Titoization speech were to be resisted first. Romania, like some other Peoples' Democracies in which the communist faction was strong enough, successfully resisted much of the Titoization, and thereupon proceeded to defend Stalin as a person in 1957. The Titoist forces in Romania were weak enough that not just Titoist infiltrator Ceausescu but even the Chisinevschi agent Moghioros felt compelled to defend the legacy, line, and personality of Stalin in 1958:

One of the most interesting speeches delivered to the Plenum was that of Ceausescu.. Therefore, Ceau?escu's speech deserves a closer analysis.... Although he [stated] that there were some mistakes in Stalin's activity, Ceausescu stated that one should be aware of Stalin's major merits, and that his works were worth studying. Ceausescu further [officially] expressed admiration for Stalin when he bluntly declared: "Actually, we did not proceed like others, who threw away from their homes Stalin's works." This was a direct reference to Miron Constantinescu who had expressed doubts regarding many of Stalin's theses. However, Ceausescu was not alone in praising Stalin's legacy: in their speeches, both Rautu and Moghioro? referred to conversations they had with workers and, respectively, old-time members of the party who allegedly had asked them not to exaggerate Stalin's mistakes. (Gheorghiu- Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 27-29) (IMG)

The year 1958 gave the Dej faction another opportunity for further undermining the Chisinevschi-Constantinescu group, because, given pressures from communist elements, there came about an assault from Moscow and even from Khrushchev himself on the Yugoslav regime. Khrushchev did this because he had to concede to pressure. Romania joined in with the attack:

When, in the summer of 1958, ... the Soviets criticized the Yugoslav Communist League's new program as "revisionist," the Romanians completely endorsed the Kremlin's stance. At least officially, the relations between the RWP and the CPSU top leaders had never been warmer. Based on documents from the RCP archives, it appears that this was far from being the complete truth: on various occasion, in private discussions, Gheorghiu-Dej insisted that his party had matured and that relations between socialist countries should be governed by the principles of complete equality and national independence. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 32-33) (IMG)

The renewed attack on Titoism afforded the Romanian communists the leverage they needed for further demoting the Pauker agents Chisinevschi and Constaninescu and their network. Chisinevschi and Constaninescu both had bases throughout the Party and state apparatus, because they had the support of the terrorist bureaucrats and liberal intellectuals. As such, there began a purge of people whom the Romanian communists accused as associated of the Chisinevschi-Constaninescu group:

in June 1957, Constantinescu was accused of many sins ... and, through a typically Stalinist stroke, Gheorghiu-Dej associated him with one of the most compromised and hated Stalinist personalities, Iosif Chişinevschi, removing both from their posts. In 1958-59, thousands of party members experienced again the frightful moments of terror from Stalin's years. At Gheorghiu-Dej's order, the Party Control Committee headed by Dumitru Coliu-Ion Vinfe (Vincze Janos), started a new wave of ... interrogations that encouraged denouncement and speculated the lowest instincts of upgrading. People who thought that Stalinism was dead in 1956 faced it once again in the years after the Hungarian Revolution. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 22) (IMG)

I of course cannot independently verify if all of those people purged were guilty, but there is no doubt that the intelligence network of Chisinevschi's gang had to be purged off and that Chisinevschi could not have lasted that long in the Party without having thousands of torturers, bureaucrats, and renegades as his support base. A much-despised traitor like him did not stand on air, after all. Plus, one must remember that the Pauker network in the Romanian Party had not been fully purged and that a large portion of the Pauker network would have backed the Pauker agent Chisinevschi.

Thanks to the partial denunciation of the Yugoslav regime in 1958, great advances were made in Romania against the network of the Israeli agent Ana Pauker.

The Eurasian Titoists knew that the Red Army was still under a significant though not dominant influence of the comrades of Stalin. The stationing of Red Army in Romania provided for the communist and progressive elements remaining in the Red Army to help that People's Democracy in the face of much larger swathes of intelligence operatives from the CIA, MI6, and Mossad, swathes of operatives whose infiltration Romania could not resist as much alone. The Eurasian Titoists therefore decided to leave Romania almost alone in the face of such a massive intelligence war, and through new waves of Titoization, increased the leverage of Titoist agents who sought to rehabilitate the CIA agent Ana Pauker:

in July 1958, Khrushchev made the unexpected decision to withdraw the Soviet troops that were stationed in Romania. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 31) (IMG)

It was however only after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1958 and in the wake of the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress in 1961, that the long forgotten Pauker affair became a political factor of prime importance. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 337) (IMG)

It was no coincidence that in that same year, in 1958, the imperialist media assisted the Kremlin Titoists by trying to isolate Romania from its Arab allies. Hence in 1958, Western media launched a massive propaganda campaign, claiming that there was Zionist mass migration from Romania:

Western sources reported that over a hundred thousand Jews had registered for emigration. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 343) (IMG)

While a few were able to lobby for emigration permits for Romania during that period, the evidence leaves no doubt that the 'mass migration' of Jews and 'Jews' from Romania was a myth promoted by the media outlets owned by the imperialist-fascist secret services. The accusations of the reactionary media could not possibly be correct, because in fact, in addition to an outright ban of the choosing of Israel as a destination for migration, the Romanian authorities had also placed additional restrictions on Jewish/'Jewish' migration to outside of Romania in general and not just to Israel. The reason for this was that even migration to a Western European country could be exploited by the Mossad as a covert means of having those Jews and 'Jews' to eventually end up in Israel. In fact, regarding this question of Zionist mass migration from Romania, there was:

a secret document sent by the director of the Eastern-European desk at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the office of Minister Golda Meir on December 25, 1958, so that she may present the report to the government.. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The December 1958 document, which demonstrates how the Romanian People's Democracy sought to sabotage the 'Aliyah' plans of the Mossad and its Titoist-Zionist fifth column in Romania, was as follows:

"On December 17, the Israeli Consul in Bucharest received notice to the effect that henceforth, immigration applicants should no longer report to the Consulate to receive their visas. Instead, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would send their passports en masse and ask the Consulate to stamp the passports with the visas.

Additionally, the Romanian government will assume responsibility for arranging the medical examinations as well as for obtaining the laissez-passer documents and for organizing transport. The official explanation was that the new arrangements were intended to make life easier for the immigrants and save them a lot of running around between the consulates, as well as to eliminate the risk that owing to the need to obtain various visas,

etc., the validity of the passport might expire in the meantime.

The Israeli Consul immediately protested the new 'arrangement', claiming that a state wishing to absorb new immigrants must not be denied the option of seeing the potential immigrants, examining, directing and guiding them. The head of the Consular Department at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the decision had been made by a higher echelon, and that she has no authority to challenge it."

(‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

So much for Gheorghiu-Dej’s fake ‘friendship’ with Tito, the Romanians had blocked Jewish/‘Jewish’ migration ‘even’ to Yugoslavia, the country that, under Tito’s fascist regime, had been a major hub for numerous CIA-Mossad stations. Israeli suggestions of a direct travel to Israel were again flatly rejected. The IsraelDefense Magazine, an Israeli magazine on military and intelligence affairs, continued:

The same document [cited above] went on to say that the Romanian authorities began marking all of the immigrants' passports with only one departure station – the train station out of which trains departed for Hungary, so as to revoke the option of transporting the immigrants through Yugoslavia or any option of transporting them by air. Israel's suggestion to organize a direct transport service, by boat, from Constana (a Romanian seaport on the coast of the Black Sea) was flatly rejected. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Migration to Hungary would have meant migration an area under the influence of the Red Army and the communist agents it had promoted in the Hungarian state apparatus. That would have made the Mossad’s ‘Aliyah’ activities much harder. The Romanians aimed to retain their correct diplomatic relations with Israel, and expressed their opposition to the Zionist migration through a combination of flat rejection, severe restrictions, excuses, as well as suggestions that are ostensibly meant to ‘help’ Zionist migration but are actually creating more trouble. The same strategy had been pursued by the Peoples’ Democracies for years, as can be seen in C16S2, and has been documented throughout the numerous pages of the documents of the Israel State Archives. The countries of the socialist camp aimed to overthrow the Israeli regime but their opposition to it was not the same kind of opposition of many in the Arab countries; it was an attempt to overthrow the Israeli regime so to install a new Israeli state, Arab-friendly and socialist; it was not a “Destroy the Zionist Entity!” kind of campaign of opposition to Israel. That is the communist factions in the Peoples’ Democracies kept expressing a desire for good relations with Israel and provided suggestions to ‘help’ the ‘Aliyah’ process when in fact those suggestions were more trouble than ‘help’. Out of a desire of not losing contact with the people of Israel, the Romanians were keen to, as much as possible, not give the Israeli regime the excuse to bash Romania for its anti-Zionist policy.

Furthermore, throughout the 1950s, there were Romanian political-cultural campaigns against Zionism:

During that period, [i.e. until the 1950s] the Romanians went as far as holding anti-Zionist rallies at work places, where they encouraged the participants to protest against Jewish immigration and influence those who wished to immigrate to Israel to withdraw their applications. Those who reconsidered were asked to sign letters that were subsequently published in the Romanian press, in which they described "how they had been deceived" and "the dire situation that awaited them in Israel." (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The evidence therefore indicates that the CIA-Mossad sensationalist accusations against Romania were baseless. There certainly must have been some scattered, illegal, and low levels of Zionist migration in 1958, but no ‘mass migration’. Hence, the Romanian government denied the accusations of CIA-MI6-Mossad media:

On February 25, 1959, the Rumanian Government issued a statement accusing “Israeli and imperialist circles of unleashing a diversionist campaign trumpeting abroad the crude invention that there was a mass migration of Jews too Israel.” It denied any suggestion of a “mass migration,” assured the Arab nations of Rumanian sympathy, deplored the fact that they had been led astray by a slanderous campaign, and accused the Israeli Embassy in Bucharest of spreading Zionist slogans among Rumanian Jews. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 343) (IMG)

In 1959, and in response to the lies by the Zionist media, another of wave arrests by People's Democratic Romania against Zionist centers was thus launched:

The regime replied with a mixture of propaganda barrage and a wave of arrests. Dozens of Jews [whom Romanian authorities claimed to be Zionist Jews] were arrested and tried in 1959 on charges of espionage and treason. Within eighteen months three Israeli diplomats were expelled because of “abuse of diplomatic privileges.” (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 343) (IMG)

So why would the Mossad media propagate the myth that Romania allowed for Zionist mass migration? The answer is very obvious: to drive a wedge between the Arab nation and People’s Democratic Romania. Indeed, such false reports of Zionist mass migration in 1958 resulted in:

Arab protests. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 343) (IMG)

Romania was aiming to retain friendly relations with Israel as a country without allowing such diplomatic relations to strengthen the CIA-backed pro-fascist tendency in Israel; the Mossad misused the desire for good relations with Israel as a country in order to portray Romania as a hub for promoting Zionist mass migration. Romania was partially isolated from its Arab allies. Not all Arab states would have doubted Romania's anti-Zionist policy line, but the CIA- Mossad media exaggerations certainly increased pressure on Romania's Arab allies to reduce relations with Romania. One person with much knowledge of the Mossad presence in Romania is:

Historian and researcher Shlomo Leibowitz, another one of the founders of "Nativ" who also served as the head of the Eastern-European desk at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs for many years, recounts that direct negotiations only began in May 1965. Until then, negotiations had been indirect and covert. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The Mossad official and historian Shlomo Leibowitz stated:

the ambassadors of the Arab countries reported together to the government offices and threatened to leave Romania. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Bendor, the head of the Israeli legation in Romania, reported on his meeting with the Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica in 1960. The following Israeli intelligence document sent from the Israeli legation in Romania to Tel Aviv states:

Bendor reports on his meeting with the Rumanian Prime Minister, who made the following declaration: (...). The Israeli press has also raised the Arab world against Rumania. ('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960. Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

Romania was not getting economic, political and military aid from Eurasia, the Titoization waves were being launched by the Eurasian Titoists, and a wedge was being driven between Romania and its Arab allies. These factors weakened the communist faction in Romania, leaving them with fewer funds to wage the secret service conflict against imperialist-fascist intelligence penetration into Romania. This increased the influence of the Titoist faction in the Romanian state, thus allowing for the countries of the US-led camp to begin expanding their economic influence in Romania:

No Soviet credit is known to have been extended to Rumania after 1956, although one probably was promised for the proposed Galati steel combine. Credits from the more developed East European countries also had been small. On the other hand, several West European countries began to expand their markets in Rumania in 1959 by extending small credits for industrial plants – the first provided by the free world in a decade. (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

A larger share of Romania's economy was taken as captive by the imperialists. Naturally, with the increased influence of the front companies of American finance capital, British finance capital, and German finance capital in Romania, imperialist-fascist secret service penetration into Romania increased. The slight increase in the lobbying power of the Anglo-American finance capital in Romania meant a slight increase in the strength of the lobby for Zionist migration. Khrushchev, who had pursued a Cold War against the United Arab Republic (UAR) (see C21S2.1), wanted the communistic-minded Ashkenazim and Sfaradim of Romania to no longer be the loyal citizens of a People's Democracy but to become the cannon-fodder of Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon:

When Nikita Khrushchev visited Romania in the late 1950s, Gheorghe Gheorghiu- Dej, the leader of the Romanian Communist Party and ruler of Romania until 1965, told him about Israel's proposal – Jews for goods. Khrushchev approved the proposal.. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

In this midst, with Khrushchev blocking economic aid to Romania and favouring Zionist mass migration as his suggested 'solution' for Romania's economic problems, and with Anglo-American-German finance capital's influence in Romania increased, the Titoist faction saw an increase in its strength in Romania. As a result of such increased lobbying power of Titoist pro-Zionist lobby, the mass migration of Romania's Ashkenazi and Sfaradi citizens began:

According to Leibowitz, following that incident, the Jews received, over a certain period, visas to various countries in Europe. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Jewish families were granted exit permits provided they gave as their destination any country other than Israel. While most of them proceeded there from Vienna, the Rumanians could in good faith assure the Arab governments that they were not encouraging emigration to Israel. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 344) (IMG)

Of course, many of those Jews would have ended up travelling from Europe onto Israel eventually. Leibowitz stated: "They [the Romanian Jews] were flown all over Europe, and from there they travelled to

Israel." ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

In a report to Tel Aviv, the Mossad station in Bucharest, the head of which was Bendor, reported:

Bendor reports that the Rumanian authorities have begun to issue emigration permits to Jews for various countries, but not for Israel. Those who apply for a permit to another country can expect a positive answer within a month, the permit being valid for six months from the date of issue. A number of Jews have already applied for emigration permits to countries like France, Switzerland, Austria, Britain and West Germany. In all cases investigated by the Legation, these people said that their final destination was Israel. Several Jews have requested the Legation to help them in obtaining visas for the countries named, and foreign diplomats have been asking the Legation staff for guidelines. Most of the applicants will not be granted visas without the Legation's help. ('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni and M. Carmil', January 6, 1960. Coded Tel. 545; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, p. 442) (IMG)

To those who criticize Romania for being unable to stop Zionist migration and the lobbying of the CIA-Mossad agents in the Romanian government, it is worth reminding that Egypt during the Abdel-Nasser era, and Syria during the Hafez Al-Assad era in the 1990s, both had a problem of Zionist mass migration as well. Syria during the 1990s was under immense pressure as well. This does not 'prove' 'Zionist-collaborationism' by the dominant factions of those governments; it only proves the presence of a significantly powerful imperialist lobby that allowed for such Zionist-collaborationism.

That the migration policy line was liberalized was 'thanks' to CIA-Mossad pressures and increased lobbying, but that the direct migration to Israel was still not allowed reflected the power of the communist faction in creating additional costs for the Mossad in their migration projects. Waves of relatively large mass migration to Israel did begin from that point onwards, albeit the communists in Romania did everything they could to hamper that process. Recall that the influence of 'the old Stalinist officials' was cited by the Mossad as the factor for why 'the Romanians [had] not permitted any emigration', and, that as shown in C16S2, it was the Dej faction which campaigned against Zionist migration. Recall further that even as late as 1958, the Romanians 'revoke[d] the option of transporting the immigrants through Yugoslavia or any option of transporting them by air' – because they knew that Yugoslavia was the center of the Mossad in Eastern Europe – and that 'Israel's suggestion to organize a direct transport service, by boat, from Constana (a Romanian seaport on the coast of the Black Sea) was flatly rejected.' In fact, the communist faction's opposition to Zionist influence was the reason that until 1965, the Mossad had to ensure that its operations in Romania was covert, and covert operations are always costlier:

Historian and researcher Shlomo Leibowitz, another one of the founders of "Nativ" who also served as the head of the Eastern-European desk at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs for many years, recounts that direct negotiations only began in May 1965. Until then, negotiations had been indirect and covert. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

May 1965 was approximately two months after the murder of Gheorghiu-Dej, a phenomenon that would be explored in further detail later. Regarding the annual number of Jews and 'Jews' migrating to Israel, Mossad official Leibowitz also stated:

"(...). There were ups and downs, it ranged between about 40,000 people annually and only 54 people that were allowed to leave. It was like that all the time. It was never even.

"Shaikhe had to iron out the difficulties every month to six weeks, by re-discussing the terms. There were never any written agreements. In the end, there was some kind of paper that no one could understand – it lacked any substance. (...)."

('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Shaikhe, as may be remembered by the reader from C16S2, was among the most important Mossad operatives who founded 'Nativ'. Mossad official Leibowitz also stated:

"No Jews had ever left Romania without payment. (...)." ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Romania accepted a lot of money for the release of the Jews in its territory. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The Mossad's financial payments for Zionist migration worked like a bribe of local officials. Through providing these financial payments to the local Mossad agent that had infiltrated the ranks of the Romanian government, the Mossad was able to on the one hand get its means of promoting the mass migration, and on the other hand to provide financial backing for the Israeli intelligence infiltrators' network in the Romanian state. This is likely why Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoika stated to Israeli diplomat Bendor that there was no agreement between Israel and Romania with regards to migration to Israel, implying that any Zionist migration promoted by Romanian state officials must have been a crime of local employees:

Bendor reports on his meeting with the Rumanian Prime Minister, who made the following declaration: (...). There is no agreement between Israel and Rumania, and thus no room for cooperation between with regard to emigration. The local employees have broken the law and have confessed to their crimes. ('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960. Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

The strong resistance of the communist faction against Zionist migration is the reason why the Israeli intelligence had to pay very much to win its intelligence war:

Romania accepted a lot of money for the release of the Jews in its territory. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The sanctions relatively weakened the Romanian economy, which relatively valued the Dollars, Shekels, etc. and devalued the Romanian currency. This meant that as a result of the sanctions policy, the CIA and Mossad had to pay less by American-Israeli standards whereas the CIA and Mossad payments were regarded as more by the standards of the local Romanian officials. Overall, though, the CIA and Mossad achieved their objectives in Romania at great cost, thanks to communist resistance.

The fact that treasonous Romanian officials accepted money from Israel for helping Zionist migration was of course a bad thing, but the fact of the high costs to be paid by the Mossad is an indication that the strength of such corrupt Romanian officials daring to commit such pro-Zionist betrayals was low, because the existence of revolutionary forces in Romania, belong to the Dej faction, was still strong enough to increase the risk of facing punishment for committing such a crime. As such, the fact that the Israelis had to bear large costs for their subversive activities is a positive sign, for it is a sign of the relative strength of the communist faction in Romania, even in the face of sanctions and sabotage. Clearly, people who condemn People's Democratic Romania for the fact of Zionist migration from there hugely exaggerate the extent and intensity of the migration, because even in such a phase, when Romania was under the most intense of pressures, Zionist migration was low as Bendor remarked; when Romania was under less pressure, the Zionist mass migration did not exist.

Furthermore, thanks to the Romanian government's sabotage of the Mossad plans, the rate of migration remained very small even as late as May 1960, when Romania was facing an extremely intense level of foreign pressure. The low rate of migration in fact led the head of the Mossad station Bendor to suggest to Tel Aviv that the Romanian intelligentsia, the stratum which had bourgeois and feudal familial origins and which served as the base for Titoism, to be rallied against the Romanian state:

Bendor remarks that at the present rate of emigration the exodus of Rumania's Jews will take some fifty years. Efforts should be made to increase the rate and to rescue the maximum number of Jews as long as the present liberal policy lasts. The ban on publicity should be re-examined. Pressure must not be relaxed at any possible point. "Pressure groups" of well known artists and scientists should be organized to persuade the Rumanian authorities to issue emigration permits to all who have applied. These groups should be supplied with instances of people whose applications had been rejected, but no names should be mentioned for obvious reasons. Israel, says Bendor, will be sinning against thousands of Jews if it does not exploit all possible ways to help them emigrate. ('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y.L. Gideon, May 11, 1960. Coded Tel. 8; Inc.: 130.09/2298/2. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, p. 449) (IMG)

The Israelis were not going to have much success in this regard, because:

Domestically, the post-1958 repressions ensured ... the widespread conformity among the intelligentsia. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 31-32) (IMG)

The Romanian Foreign Ministry upheld the policy of opposing Mossad agitation for 'Aliyah' in the synagogues and warned the Israeli 'diplomats' against Zionist agitation:

Bendor reports on his meeting with E. Majincescu (spelling uncertain), one of the Rumanian Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The latter protested against the activities of the Legation's staff who create the impression among the hundreds of applicants that the Legation played a role in the implementation of Rumania's policy of the reunification of families. He requests that this activity be stopped, as it goes beyond accepted diplomatic usage. He also protested against the staff's visits to synagogues being exploited for propaganda for emigration, against the distribution of money among inimical circles, and against other activities contrary to diplomatic usage. The administrative body of the Jewish community has received complaints from Jewish citizens about these actions, and has therefore decided to designate one synagogue for the visits of the Legation's staff, who are requested to refrain from visiting other synagogues.

Bendor replied that the Legation is open to all, and the applicants are advised that the decision in their case rests with the Rumanian government. As to visits to synagogues, Bendor rejected the accusations and stressed that the bounds imposed on the Legation's staff contravened diplomatic usage. Following further discussion, it was agreed that the designation of one synagogue for the visits of the Legation's staff should be considered as a wish expressed by the directive body of the Jewish communities in Rumania, and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends that the Legation's staff honour that request.

(‘Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y.L. Gideon, July 19, 1960. Coded Tel. 196; Inc.: 130.09/2298/2. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960,

Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 450-451) (IMG)

It must be noted that the Israeli legation in Romania was a Nativ front, and that the Nativ was a branch of the Mossad: The entire Israeli embassy in Bucharest was a "Nativ" station. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The following is another case of the Romanian Foreign Ministry officials denouncing Israeli agitation:

Bendor reports on his leave-taking meeting with Dumitrescu, one of the Rumanian Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The Deputy Minister utilized the meeting for accusing the Legation's staff of espionage, of Zionist propaganda, of illicit trading in currency and jewelry, and of using their trips and visits to the synagogues for these purposes. He based himself on Prime Minister Stoica warning and pointed to possible grave results if these acts were not sopped. He also repeated the recommendation about visits to synagogues. Bendor categorically rejected these accusations.

(‘Israel Legation in Bucharest to A. Dagan and Sh. Avigur, December 29, 1960, Coded Tel. 594; Inc.: 130.09/2298/3. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, p. 455) (IMG)

The Israeli document continues:

Bendor remarks that Dumitrescu's outburst was puzzling on several points: Why did he deliver such a grave warning on the eve of Bendor's termination of service in Bucharest? What is the reason for such anger at Israel? What exactly are they angry about – is it about the refusal to follow their recommendation about visits to synagogues? Why do they hurl baseless accusations at the Legation's staff? Are they preparing the ground for renewed restrictions on the Legation (travelling visits, blockading the Legation)? Are they about to expel some official? Will they renew their attempts to prevent contacts between the Jews and the Legation staff?

Bendor recommends as follows: His replacement should be dispatched to Bucharest as soon as possible.

The possibility should be considered that someone from the Legation would be expelled even before Bendor left the country? Plans should be made for helping the Jews in case their contacts with the Legation are severed. The policy of visits to the synagogues and travel outside Bucharest should be

reviewed. Bendor concludes with saying that his impression is that the Rumanians' manifestations of anger will not stop the emigration.

(‘Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to A. Dagan, December 29, 1960. Coded Tel. 597; Inc.: 130.09/2298/3. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 455-456) (IMG)

The Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica had also warned against Israeli agitations:

Bendor reports on his meeting with the Rumanian Prime Minister, who made the following declaration: (...). Staff of the Israel Legation distribute money and gather information, perhaps to pass it on to foreign [intelligence] services. The distribution of money by the [Israeli] Legation and chauvinist propaganda have brought most of the Jews to sell off their movables and stop working. Just as the government has not tolerated antisemitism in its country, so will it not tolerate chauvinist Zionist propaganda. (‘Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960. Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

Prime Minister Stoica specifically remarked:

“Let the people return to their work and resume their regular lives.” (‘Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960. Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

He further declared that:

The emigres from Rumania are members of the bourgeoisie and the World Jewish Congress exploits them for imperialistic ends and for propaganda against Rumania. (‘Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960.

Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

Stoica was not an anti-Zionist at heart, but he was sufficiently encircled by communist officials so to be coopted into an 'anti-Zionist'.

Again, the Romanians opposed Israeli agitation not just in words but also in deeds. As admitted in an Israeli Foreign Ministry document, the Israeli Legation in Romania was severely limited in the travel of its agents to the synagogues:

Y. L. Gideon reports on the meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with Manu, Rumania's Minister to Israel. Mrs. Meir expressed [that] ... she viewed with the utmost seriousness the limitation imposed on the Legation staff's visits to synagogues.. ('Y.L. Gideon (Jerusalem) to the Israel Legation in Bucharest', August 18, 1960. Coded Tel. 247; Inc.: 130.09/2297/10. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, p. 451) (IMG)

As mentioned, the Moscow Titoists wanted the Peoples' Democracies to remain as backward agrarian societies so that the Atlantic camp would find it easier to conquer them. The 20th CPSU Congress increased pressure on the Romanian communists with regards to industrialization and collectivization. Nonetheless, given the high strength of the blue-collar elements in Romania, the Romanian communists were able to resist. Khrushchev vigorously pushed for a de-emphasis on heavy industry. People's Democratic Romania resisted the Eurasian Titoist line on this matter:

The importance of the 3rd RWP Congress resides, however, in the launch of the long-term economic program (extending to the year 1965), which focused on the sweeping industrialization of the country, with a special emphasis on metallurgical and machine-building industries. The congress discussed the results of the previous Five-Year Plan and approved the draft of the new Six-Year Plan, and the key priority that stayed at its core: the project of the huge steel plant to be erected in Galati. With regard to the agriculture, Gheorghiu-Dej stated in his report to the congress that 680,000 peasant families, owning 1.8 million hectares, were not yet included into the socialist sector; however, the Romanian communist leader affirmed that the collectivization of Romanian agriculture would be completed in 1965. (...). At the same time, the congress approved the strategy of an unprecedented mass-mobilization for the fulfillment of the economic objectives of the party. In fact, communist Romania's economic policy constituted the starting point of the violent polemic between Bucharest and Moscow, which reached its climax in April 1964, with the Romanians publishing a bold "Declaration" regarding the crisis within world communism and proudly defying the Soviet claim to supremacy within the bloc. For the Romanians, developing their own industrial potential in addition to the agricultural sector was a matter of dignity. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 34-35) (IMG)

The CIA too stated:

Rumania's determination to assert its national economic interests was not revealed fully until 1963, when the leadership successfully opposed efforts to broaden the powers of the Moscow-sponsored Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and disregarded Soviet opposition to the building of the Galati steel plant.

The USSR and some East European regimes, trying to initiate a "new stage" in bloc economic cooperation, had proposed closer coordination of national plans, more joint investment projects, and more extensive product specialization in manufacturing. Moreover, Khrushchev had proposed formation of a joint planning staff for CEMA. The Rumanians feared that a CEMA with greater authority would make decisions which would hamper Rumanian industrialization. Bucharest consequently opposed any change in the organization that would limit Rumanian economic sovereignty.

Other satellites probably were also opposed to the Khrushchev proposal for a CEMA planning staff, but Rumania alone was publicly hostile. Rumania, in addition, refused to accept some new forms of cooperation which were supported by other satellites.

(RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

In spite of the campaign of lies, sabotage, and siege by the Eurasian Titoists, the Yugoslav regime, many NATO member states, and Israel:

In recent years, Rumania has enjoyed political stability and has maintained the highest economic growth rate of the bloc. Progress in industrialization and in the socialization [collectivization] of land – 83.7 percent of arable land is now in the socialist sector – has been continuous in spite of the continuing in spite of the continuing low standard of living and ... poor quality of goods. (Rumanian Regime Reorganization. In: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, March 22, 1961, p. 7) (IMG)

There were indications of an increased living standard for the population, the industrial base was expanding, and the collectivization campaigns were continuing. The main tasks were summed up in the strategic goal

completing the building of the material and technical base of the socialist formation. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 31-32) (IMG)

By 1964, Romania publicly declared that it would not allow Eurasian Titoist subjugation of the Romanian communists:

The Rumanian regime's now more definitive declaration of its right and intention to act independently in the Communist world came in the form of a resolution adopted by an extended session of the party central committee which met from 15 to 22 April. Bucharest specifically stated that it would not participate in any supranational Communist economic or political organizations, which it considered infringements on the sovereignty of socialist states. It also instated that "there can be no parties which are 'superior' and parties that are 'subordinate'" and that "nobody can decide what is and what is not correct for other countries and parties." (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

the ... Romanian communist leadership proved to be extremely successful in constructing a platform for anti-de-Stalinization around the concepts of industrialization, autonomy, sovereignty, and national pride. The point for Gheorghiu-Dej was to maintain close relations with the Soviet leaders without emulating their efforts to demolish Stalin's myth. The struggle against the "personality cult" amounted for the Romanians to emphasizing their impeccable internationalist credentials while fostering the image of the leading party nucleus as a stronghold of Leninist orthodoxy. The two main events that took place at the beginning of the 1960s, the Third Congress of the RWP (20-28 June 1960), and the Plenum of the Central Committee (30 November – 5 December 1961) emphasized the focus on rapid industrialization, which would create the basis of the mass support for party's policy and, respectively, strengthen the patriotic, "anti-hegemonic" claims of the Dej team. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, p. 32) (IMG)

Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, Romania did increase trade ties with the US-led camp, a behaviour that led Western observers to compare Romania's commercial relations to Yugoslavia's commercial relations. Nonetheless, it was clear that Dej-era Romania did not really go as far as Yugoslavia did in this respect, never allowed the volume of trade to become so large as to make it very dependent on Anglo-American trade vs. embargo. The CIA reported:

Although the Rumanian regime in its relations with the Soviet bloc seems to have moved into a position not unlike that of Yugoslavia, it remains ideologically conservative, especially in regard to its domestic policies. There is no evidence of ideological deviation toward the more decentralized Yugoslav economic system, about aspects of which the Czechs and even the Bulgarians have permitted on some public discussion. On the contrary, the Rumanian economic system continues to be characterized by detailed central planning and nearly complete socialization of agriculture. (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 4) (IMG)

It is also worth mentioning that increased trade ties with USA during the early 1960s could, if properly managed, be beneficial to the cause of socialism and be devoid of US 'trickery' against Romania, because back then, the Kennedy faction, the agents of the American proletariat disguised as the liberal apologists of American imperialism, had gained a significantly high influence over the US Army, US State Department, and major US security agencies. The Kennedy faction had gone so far as to stage military coups against several CIA puppet regimes and had provided plenty of arms to the states hostile to American imperialism. Therefore, good trade relations with the United States were not necessarily so counterproductive to socialism at the time, and were not necessarily going to lead to a huge abuse of trade relations by the US side, although it was important to retain high vigilance against the CIA attempts to use such trade for its malicious agenda.

Furthermore, Romania boosted ties with China, North Korea, and Albania. Under the pressure of the Eurasian Titoists, many communists in the bloc, such as Ulbricht and Dej had partaken in the denunciation of Albania. Hence, it is true that Dej overtly took a stance against Albania in the early 1960s, but:

during the preparations of the 1964 Declaration, Gheorghiu-Dej confessed to his associates that he had been practically compelled by Khrushchev to take this anti-Albanian (and implicitly anti-Chinese stand). (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 34-35) (IMG)

Therefore, in 1963, relations with People's Democratic Albania were restored, and Romania resisted pressures to partake in activities hostile to China:

Since March 1963, when Rumania sent its ambassador back to Albania after having withdrawn him in late 1961 as had other Soviet bloc states, Rumania has been more reticent than any other Eastern European country

– except Albania – in support for Moscow against Peiping. Bucharest ... is apparently even more concerned than Poland or Hungary over the probable effects on its bargaining position with the USSR should Khrushchev carry the dispute with China to a final break.

In recent months, Rumania has printed numerous articles agreeing with Moscow's peaceful coexistence line, but has done little to criticize Peiping for not adhering to this line. It has also failed to support Moscow's plans for dealing with the Chinese. Dej has absented himself from meetings particularly concerned with the dispute, such as occurred during the East German party congress in January 1963, the celebration of German party chief Ulbricht's birthday the following June, and Khrushchev's 70th birthday gathering a month ago.

In February and March 1964, the Rumanian party attempted to prevent the dispute from moving further toward a formal split by making a mediation effort, which included sending a delegation of its leaders to Communist China, North Korea, and the USSR. When this effort failed, the Rumanians made public the details of their attempt and recommended that the international movement form a commission that would include the Soviet and Chinese parties to induce the two major parties to ease tensions.

(RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 6) (IMG)

The counteracting of Titoist pressures in Romania by the communist faction's partially successful efforts to strategically realign Romania with the Sino-Albanian-Korean bloc assisted that country in resisting pressures for Titoization, hence why Romania was able to continue to operate as a socialist state and an economy growing, socializing, and collectivizing.

In my humble opinion, the Romanian communists performed far better than all the other communists in the countries of People's Democracy, and I certainly sympathize with Stalin-era Soviet officials for whom Dej was a favorite and who were happy that the Cominform was based in Romania. The Romanian communists combatted the different deviations, remained pragmatic, and yet simultaneously struggled against revisionism under the cover of being 'revisionists' themselves. They struggled against the Khrushchevians and used their cover of 'sympathies' with Khrushchev as a means of access to the communist anti-Titoist opponents of Khrushchev in the USSR, so to receive the assistance of the communist faction and to more vigorously confront Khrushchev. They posed as friends to Tito's gang, and yet refused to seriously collaborate with that fascist butcher. Romania also industrialized very rapidly, the Party was compositionally proletarianized, i.e. filled with numerous blue-collar elements, and many Titoist agents and Zionist agents were purged. In the end, the Romanian communists advanced greatly towards socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Romania transitioned from a first-stage People's Democracy, a proletarian-led bourgeois-democracy, to a second-stage People's Democracy, a workers' state, even though the bourgeois parties continued to operate in Romania; there is no evidence that the bourgeois parties in Romania had a role much more than the symbolic role; they did have some material influence to be sure, but one cannot exaggerate the extent of such a thin level of material influence. The Party of the proletariat was the real and main party in Romania, and unlike some of the other ruling parties that emerged as the parties of the revisionist intelligentsia and the corrupt bureaucrats, the Party in Romania was compositionally proletarianized and remained socialist.

C23S2. Setting Romania on the Path of Titoization

*** IMG-All-{Romania}

Rightist circles present communism as a 'disease'; certainly, being a communist does tend to shorten one's life. Dimitrov died when he was 67, Bierut when 64, Thorez when 64, Gottwald when 57, and Choibalsan when 57, not to mention Zhdanov who was proven to have been murdered when 52. During the Slansky trials, it was said that a freemason killer-doctor working for Slansky had plotted to shorten Gottwald's life; during the Doctors' Plot case, suspicion was raised regarding the potential role of the doctors in the shortening of the lives of Dimitrov, Thorez, and Choibalsan; and during the Kostov trials, there was much discussion regarding Tito's plot to assassinate Dimitrov via Yugoslav agent Kostov. And finally, there comes the case of Dej, who died at the age of 64. Dej was vigilant of assassination plots against him. Referring to the assassination plots of the General-Secretaries of the communist parties, Gheorghe Apostol, a prominent official in the Dej government, recalled:

Dej ... knew that ... the leaders of the parties in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, [and] Mongolia ... were eliminated. (Duplicates: A History of the Intelligence and Security Services of the Communist Regime in Romania (1965-1989), Cristian Troncota, 2003, pp. 28-29. Citing: Gheorghe Apostol's interview with journalist Adriana Oprea Popescu) (IMG)

What is notable about Bierut is that he died when he was in Moscow, and Gottwald died one week after Stalin died after having attended Stalin's funeral. These raised the widespread suspicion that they were murdered by the Eurasian Titoists. Hoxha pointed to this fact in his memoirs 'The Khrushchevites'. Dej too was vigilant of this matter. Nonetheless, according to Cristian Troncota – an intelligence official from the Ceausescu era, who also became a security official in post-1989 Romania – Dej was irradiated in Moscow:

The fact that Gheorgiu-Dej was irradiated in Moscow in June 1963 was also confirmed by a former security

officer who wanted to remain anonymous. The argument is shocking, namely, that three of the four officers who provided Dej's personal guard also died of cancer. The sure survivor was the memorialist, who on that mission to Moscow had received protective duties only outside the buildings where Dej had passed. (Duplicates: A History of the Intelligence and Security Services of the Communist Regime in Romania (1965-1989), Cristian Troncota, 2003, pp. 28-29) (IMG)

Having attended Stalin's funeral, Gottwald had returned to Czechoslovakia and there he died. Dej's death reminisces the death of Gottwald.

The death of Dej promoted in rank Ceausescu – of all people. Ceausescu was a Titoist agent and a foe of Gheorghiu-Dej, having masqueraded for years as a communist comrade of Dej. The rise of team Ceausescu in the Party led to a gradual rise in the influence of the white-collar elements over the Party. As early as 1968, Ceausescu himself proudly declared:

It is gratifying that among the party there are almost 300,000 intellectuals, a huge force, which far exceeds the total number of intellectuals that the whole of Romania had before the war. I also point out that in some areas, almost 40 percent of the total category of intellectuals, and sometimes even more, are party members. We can be satisfied with the way the party's activity is carried out among the intellectuals and with their contribution to the implementation of the party's policy. (Speech at the Party Assembly at Bucharest, Nicolae Ceausescu, April 26, 1968, pp. 9-10) (IMG)

The CIA too stated that since 1965:

Young professionals and white-collar workers have nevertheless found admission to the party ranks considerably easier, giving the party new sources of fresh ideas, energy, and strong political support. ('NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 22; RUMANIA; GENERAL SURVEY', CIA, July 1970, p. 92) (IMG)

Major steps in the path of Titoization were taken in Romania. Naturally, it occurred in all sectors and fields, be it in the sphere of political economy – in favor of decentralization and selling the country to the IMF – or in the strategic orientation in favor of Yugoslavia, West Germany, America, the Israeli secret service, and the Dubcek group, and against Eurasia/USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

The Ceausescu agenda was to strengthen the corrupt bureaucrats at the expense of the proletariat. Hence, the Ceausescu faction embarked upon a program of decentralization. In an interview with Marie Rose Pineau of the French Communist Party's (PCF's) L'Humanite journal, Ceausescu admitted that he sought to give greater autonomy to the local enterprises:

if a complete picture of our future concerns has to be given reference to, the development of socialist democracy is a must. Parallel to strengthening and improving economic and social management based on central planning we are concerning ourselves with extending the powers and the autonomy of the economic and administrative units; ('Interview granted by President Nicolae Ceausescu to L'Humanite', Interview by: Marie Rose Pineau (Secretary General of the "L'Humanite" Editorial board), in: Agerpres: Romanian News Agency, From: 'Documents, articles and information on Rumania', No. 17, May 26, 1970, p. 11) (IMG)

The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress corroborated:

In 1969 the regime launched an ephemeral economic reform that promised to increase efficiency and boost incentives by decentralizing economic control, allowing private enterprise greater freedom, and increasing supplies of consumer goods. (Romania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Ronald D. Bachman, July 1989) (IMG)

In another interview, this time with the Yugoslav regime agent Gavro Altaian who was the chief of the Tito regime journal 'Komunist' and published by Ceausescu government's Agerpres Romanian News Agency, Ceausescu provided some greater details on the decentralization of industry. 'ANSWER' is Ceausescu's response and 'QUESTION' is Gavro's question. An excerpt of the interview is as follows:

ANSWER: As I have also pointed out at the Tenth Congress, Romania lays special stress on the organization of a modern industry, based on new technique. We also pay special attention to agriculture as it is one of the basic branches of our economy. We may say that we have obtained satisfactory results on these lines, the present Five-year Plan is being implemented in good conditions.

The growth of industry, of our economy as a whole, posed the problem of improving the managerial and planning patterns for economic activity. On proceeding to the implementation of these tasks, we set out from the necessity of a most rational tie-in of plan-based national and single management of economy, and broad autonomy and independence of the economic units. A set of measures have been taken on this line, while other measures are under way of being made final. These measures refer to more powers to the enterprises, to the setting up of economic centrals or combines to have extensive powers in the matter of planning and management of economic activity of the group of component enterprises. We work for the decentralization of some tasks, improved planning and improved financial activity, increased responsibility of enterprises and of centrals,

relieving economic ministries of certain duties.

The results are generally positive, although the activity of the centrals has just started; they were inaugurated less than a year ago. We want to lay more stress within the centrals, on streamlining the enterprises to a large-scale production, to an ample development of cooperation both on a national level and with other states. The organization of centrals or combines, of large economic complexes will create favourable conditions for a broader specialization and cooperation on a national as well as international level, it will ensure the possibility for a faster introduction of modern technique into production, the general improvement of the quality of the entire economic activity.

QUESTION: In the Report delivered to Congress, you said that the Romanian Communist Party proceeds in its activity from the premise that "parallel to the growth of the productive forces the constant improvement of the relations of production must be ensured. In this respect, you have emphasized the necessity of collective management of economic enterprises and of the direct participation of the working people in the conduct of economic activity, and you have insisted upon the development of socialist democracy and the combating of bureaucracy by control performed by the masses over the activity of all bodies of power. Please, refer to these questions.

ANSWER: We have proceeded to the organization and improvement of collective leadership! We have set up management boards in enterprises and council boards in the centrals and combines, which have the task of running the entire activity of the respective units. We have drawn into the managerial bodies of enterprises, which include executives and the finest experts, also exponents of trade unions and representatives of the employees designated at the general meetings of the working people. We have introduced the principle of collective work also in the leadership of ministries, to the effect that a deliberative character has been assigned to their leading bodies, they take decisions on the main problems of economic development.

Within the enterprises, we have assigned an important role to the employees' general meetings – which have to analyse the economic activity of the respective units, to exercise mass control over the work going on in the enterprise for the development of production and, at the same time, to mobilize the efforts of the entire collective for perfecting economic activity. Of course, we are only at the beginning, but experience will help us to steadily improve activity in this respect, I want to add that, in this field, we studied in beforehand the experience of other socialist countries and we continue to study it, we take into account everything that appears to be good in one country or another, e thus strive to constantly improve activity in economy. As to the future, the management of economic activity – the same as in all fields – will proceed upon a more and more democratic basis, with the broad participation of the collectives of working people; e will create a good background to enable broad discussion of the problems of our society's advancement, with a view to seeking out the most suitable ways and means of building socialism.

(Interview Granted by NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the State Council, to the Yugoslav "Komunist" Journal's Chief Editor Gavro Altaian', November 21, 1969, No. 16, Agerpres: Romanian News Agency, From: 'Documents, articles and information on Rumania', pp. 8-10) (IMG)

CIA further explains the decentralization process:

A major feature of the decentralization is the establishment of about 200 economic units — industrial centrals, combines, and groups -- between the ministerial and enterprise level, similar to those in East Germany and Poland [and the USSR]. These units have replaced and taken over the functions of many of the general directorates of the ministries. They have broad control over groups of enterprises and over many of the planning and management functions previously exercised by the ministries. Typically, one of the new units directs several enterprises grouped by product -- vertically, horizontally, or territorially.

Many Romanian officials have been moved from the ministries to the new centrals and even to enterprises and agricultural units. (ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE COMMAND ECONOMY LOOKS FURTHER WEST: Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, March 1972, p. 4) (IMG)

The new "Centrals" had so much power that they could conduct foreign trade; they therefore had the power to engage in international markets and commodity production:

The Romanian foreign trade conference held in early 1971 has resulted in some changes in the conduct of foreign trade. Industrial centrals and even certain large enterprises appear to have acquired some additional responsibility for foreign sales and purchases, and producers are to be paid for export shipments only when the Foreign Trade Bank has received payment from abroad. Also, Ceausescu re-emphasized in a recent speech that imports will require greater justification than in the past, and approval of import applications has become increasingly contingent upon a firm's ability to offset imports with exports. (ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE COMMAND ECONOMY LOOKS FURTHER WEST: Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, Directorate of

Intelligence, March 1972, p. 4) (IMG)

The corrupt bureaucratic class which Ceausescu promoted was also naturally allied to parasitic finance capital. In some cases, American finance capital would be indirectly involved in the takeover of a country, through 'industrial' front companies. In this case, however, the involvement was somewhat more direct. The Romanian government opened up Romania to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the front bank of the CIA. The IMF reported:

Romania joined the IMF in 1972.. ('HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: Tearing Down Walls: The international Monetary Fund 1990-1999', Author: The International Monetary Fund (IMF), James Boughton, 2012, Chapter II- 6-- The Death of Central Planning and the Birth of Markets, p. 255) (IMG)

The opening up of Romania's economy to the IMF allowed for greater influence over Romania by US intelligence, but it also served to smoothen the ties between the corrupt bureaucratic class in Romania and American finance capital, two reactionary class allies.

To transition Romania into a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, however, the Ceausescu faction needed to ensure that the comprador bourgeoisie, the corrupt bureaucratic class especially, would secure control over the means of violence, and that the agents of the proletariat lose their influence over the means of violence. As such, one of the first things that Ceausescu did, even well before the economic decentralization, was to criminalize the counter-intelligence measures undertaken by the Dej faction and to decriminalize the Trotskyite and Titoist 'victims' of the Dej faction. In particular, Ceausescu embarked upon the path of rehabilitating Patrascanu and Vasile Luca. Hence, reporting on the 'findings' of a committee on the rehabilitation of the 'victims' of the Dej era, Ceausescu declared: For the way they fulfilled their entrusted task, the plenary of the Central Committee expressed thanks to the comrades in the commission, to all the activists who worked for the restoration of the truth. Now it is beyond any doubt that **the arrest and conviction of Patrascanu have no justification**, that in fact a hideous framing took place, that Patrascanu is the victim of an inflicted assassination.

It is worth noting that this happened in 1954, **when [as] in other socialist countries, in the Soviet Union, the disclosure of such illegalities and the rehabilitation of their victims had begun**. That is why it is even more incomprehensible why exactly then there was this rush to try him and execute him after two days, in a hasty manner, by shooting him in the back. (...).

From the study of other cases and trials, including the trial of [Vasile] Luca, the trial of Canal and others, the unfoundedness of many accusations and convictions ... becomes evident. All these are acts that our party condemns and condemns with full determination. However, **they also serve to drastically accuse and condemn those who initiated and committed them**. The [findings] accuse and condemn Alexandra Draghici, as organizer and perpetrator of these criminal actions against the party and state assets, and **accuse and condemn Gheorghiu-Dej, who initiated and patronized these actions**. (Speech at the Party Assembly at Bucharest, Nicolae Ceausescu, April 26, 1968, pp. 16-17. Bold added) (IMG)

The Dej-era Romanian counter-intelligence chief Draghici was either a 'Dejite' communist loyalist or a communist-coopted Titoist engaged in anti-Titoist purges. If a communist, then he surely was going to be a target of the Ceausescu faction purges; if Draghici was a communist-coopted Titoist, the Ceausescu faction still had a reason to demote him, for Draghici's name was closely associated with the 'Dejite' purges and, to the average observer, it would have made little sense to condemn Draghici-era purges but not to demote Draghici.

As may be recalled from C15S1, Patrascanu was correctly regarded by the Romanian communists as Romania's Tito. The CIA too had confirmed that Patrascanu was the Romanian Tito:

Patrascanu, formerly Minister of Justice, headed the intellectual group and adhered to a strict [read: Trotskyite] interpretation of Leninist Socialism. He became more and more critical of the Soviet spoilation of Rumania; he was, indeed, a Rumanian Tito before the advent of Titoism. Toward the end of 1947 he and his adherents were stripped of all political power and his ultimate fate is uncertain. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

By decriminalizing the venomous life and legacy of Patrascanu, the Ceausescu faction was decriminalizing Trotskyism-Titoism. Ceausescu could not so actively push for the rehabilitation of Ana Pauker herself, because Ana Pauker, having opportunistically defected to the anti-Patrascanu camp when Patrascanu's fortunes went down, had loudly denounced Patrascanu. Therefore, instead, the Ceausescu faction rehabilitated Vasile Luca, the close agent of Ana Pauker:

It is because Ana Pauker aspired to real influence within the Rumanian Central Committee that she was eliminated. She tried to form her own group with Luca and Georgescu in the Politburo. (...). The ambitious Luca and Georgescu wished to use Pauker's popularity [among revisionists] but were easily broken by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Dej's most dangerous antagonist was Vasile Luca.. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

As was extensively documented in C15S1, CIA-Mossad agent Ana Pauker had 'formerly' been a Trotskyite pro-Nazi anti-Semitic traitor to the Yiddish people during the Romania freedom-fighters' anti-Nazi struggle. For her intelligence activities for the CIA and Mossad, and for her Trotskyism, Ana Pauker was purged by the Dej faction. Ceausescu himself drew a parallel between his own 'rehabilitations' of Dej-era 'victims' and the 'rehabilitation' of Stalin-era 'victims' after the death of Stalin, when Ceausescu said: 'in 1954, [as] in other socialist countries, in the Soviet Union, the disclosure of such illegalities and the rehabilitation of their victims had begun.' Like anti-Stalin denunciations after Stalin's death by the Kremlin Titoists, Ceausescu condemned Gheorghiu-Dej, who, according to Ceausescu, 'initiated and patronized' 'these criminal actions against the party and state assets'.

The decriminalization of Luca, henchman of a CIA-Mossad agent Ana Pauker, means more than its face-value meaning. The criminalization of Draghici and Dej means more than just historiographical revisionism. This Titoization speech by Ceausescu was a pretext for promoting the agents demoted by the Dej faction and demoting the agents promoted by the Dej faction. Such was why Draghici and Apostol, two statesmen who were either communist loyalists or communist-coopted politicians, were sharply demoted by the Ceausescu group. And such was why the CIA and Mossad were able to take over the Romanian intelligence service, with the help of the Ceausescu group. Just as how Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' against the Stalin faction was a means of purging the communist agents in the Eurasian state apparatus and elevating Anglo-American intelligence agents throughout Eurasia and the Peoples' Democracies, so too did Ceausescu's criminalization of the 'Dejites' and decriminalization of the Pauker agents and Patrascanu result in the elevation of the CIA-Mossad agents in the Romanian intelligence service and in the strategic partnership of Romania with Titoist Yugoslavia against the socialist forces.

Ceausescu was elevating his ally Constantinescu, who was in turn an agent of Pauker. Constantinescu, as will be recalled, was also an enemy of the Dej faction, was an ally of the Trotskyite renegade Chişinevschi, and represented the intelligentsia in Romania. During the years of the Dej era, Ceausescu had disguised himself as a staunch 'enemy' of Titoism, and had denounced the Constantinescu-Chişinevschi group. By the late 1960s, he came out in support of them, elevating Paukerism and the intelligentsia. As the document from the CIA front Wilson Center stated:

It was only after 1965, in the context of the struggle against Gheorghiu-Dej's phantom, that Ceausescu made use of Constantinescu's services. He was again on the list of the nomenklatura, first as Deputy Minister, then as Minister of Education, as Secretary of the Central Committee, candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and, towards the end of his life, president of the Grand National Assembly. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No.

37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 26-27) (IMG)

With regards to the retaliation against Chişinevschi and Constantinescu, Ceausescu put it clearly: they constituted anti-party elements who exaggerated some shortcomings of the party's activity, misrepresented the activity of the party and its leadership, focused on facts isolated from their context and tried to link all these problems with Gheorghiu-Dej's figure, in order to make him the sole responsible person for the terror unleashed within the party and throughout the country during the entire period that followed the communist takeover. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismaneanu, May 2002, pp. 27-29) (IMG)

The well-known CIA-Mossad front 'American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee' (Joint) was in fact invited by the Ceausescu regime to set up its intelligence bases in Romania. The World Jewish Congress, another top CIA- Mossad front, could also establish closer ties with the Romanian Jews since Ceausescu's rise to power. Praising the Ceausescu regime for 'supporting' 'the Jews', Paul Lendvai, a Zionist Hungarian defector to Austria and a journalist participant in the 1956 pogromist 'revolution' in Hungary, wrote:

The [Romanian] Jews ... alone in the Communist world have been allowed since 1965 to have close relations with the World Jewish Congress and outside Jewish communities. In 1967 the Joint was invited by the Rumanian Government to resume its welfare activities. In view of the official Soviet-sponsored myth that the Joint is an espionage agency, this was an action of some political significance. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 327) (IMG)

The fact that the Ceausescu group invited the CIA and Mossad to establish spy bases in Romania and to promote Zionist migration is no coincidence. The Ceausescu faction used the Yiddish sons and daughters of Romania to stockpile cannon-fodder for Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon. In exchange, the Romanian regime received CIA- Mossad financial support as a bulwark against Eurasian influence. Note also that the Romanian government's intelligence service was by then under the heavy influence of the CIA and Mossad, and of this Ceausescu approved. Ion Mihai Pacepa, the long-time chief of the Romanian foreign intelligence service during the Ceausescu era who migrated to the 'Atlantic' zone in 1978, admitted:

Emigration provided Ceausescu with political gain, and he soon decided to use it for financial profit as well, in a highly confidential operation kept so secret that at his direction it was handled only through the [Romanian intelligence service, known as the] DIE.

The DIE initiated discreet contacts in Israel and West Germany and cautiously suggested that, if Rumania could be reimbursed in hard currency for the social and education expenses incurred for the ethnic German and Jewish emigres seeking to leave Rumania, the emigration process might be accelerated.

Secret unwritten agreements were made with the Israeli foreign intelligence service and with the West German Ministry of Interior. The Israelis and the West Germans paid thousands of dollars for each Rumanian Jew and ethnic German granted an exit visa, in some cases as much as \$50,000 per person, depending on his or her level of education and profession.

Over the years, many hundreds of millions of dollars were secretly paid to Rumania, along with low-interest credits issued through the DIE as bonuses for increasing the emigration quotas. For reasons of secrecy, most of the payments were made in cash and only in US dollars.

(THE DEFECTOR'S STORY, Washingtonian, Ion Mihai Pacepa, p. 6. In: CIA Archives. Bold added) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha made note of Ceausescu's activity in support of the Israeli regime and Ceausescu's suspiciously cordial meetings with Israeli regime officials. Hoxha wrote:

Undoubtedly, Ceausescu has undertaken this role and will try to carry it out, because, like all his other attempts at mediation, it might bring him some economic advantage. However, I think that the greatest aid which he is trying to give Israel at these moments and in this situation is to somewhat reduce the indignation of international public opinion towards the criminal anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian policy of Tel Aviv.

This is not the first time that Ceausescu has come out on the side of Israel and he frequently has cordial meetings and talks with the heads of Tel Aviv. Next to Washington, the capital city to which the heads of the Israeli government go most frequently, is Bucharest. The heads of a number of Arab countries go there, too. It is regrettable, however, that Arafat and some others in the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization have illusions about these meetings.

(‘CEAUSCESCU, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL’, Enver Hoxha, August 17, 1983. In: ‘The Reflections on the Middle East’) (IMG)

Indeed, as Hoxha mentioned, this was not the first time in which Ceausescu was coming out on the side of the Israeli regime. Ceausescu had held cordial meeting with Mossad representatives such as the Donald Robinson, the president of the JDC/Joint, and had expressed support for Zionist mass migration:

President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania assured Donald M. Robinson, president of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, that any Jew wishing to leave Rumania for family reunion in Israel or any other country would be able to do so, it was reported here today.

The Rumanian leader made the statement during an audience last Friday morning with Robinson, Ralph Goldman, JDC executive vice president, and Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Rumania. Stefan Andrei, Rumanian Foreign Minister, was also present.

The JDC leaders were in Bucharest for the dedication of the new Olteniei Home for the Aged, a 220-bed facility, and also nursing cases. The home was named The Amalia and Rabbi Moses Rosen Home in honor of the Chief Rabbi's 40 years of service and leadership to the community. Amalia is the rabbi's wife.

Calling the meeting “historic,” Robinson said “It was the first time a President of an East European country met with the president of the Joint Distribution Committee for a face-to-face talk on the condition of the Jewish Community and the work of the JDC in that country.” The JDC, Robinson said, “spends close to \$3.5 million for a variety of social assistance programs aiding over 10,000 of the 40,000 Jews estimated to reside in Rumania.

Ceausescu was very much interested in the “most favored nation” status for his country, Robinson said.

He assured Ceausescu that he would present his personal feelings to leaders of the American Jewish community that it should be continued.

(Special to the JTA Ceausescu Says Rumania's Jews Able to Leave for Family Reunion, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 10, 1979) (IMG)

The JDC was cooperating with Romania's regime-owned ‘Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania’ (FEDROM) since as early as 1969. In its history timeline, the JDC wrote:

1969: [JDC] Partners with Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania (FEDROM)

In partnership with the Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania (FEDROM), JDC provides financial and professional support for a network of Jewish institutional and social welfare services in Romania. An extensive social welfare system is established to assist elderly Holocaust survivors. This care includes cash assistance, medical care, home care, food, and support for old age homes.

(History Timeline, JDC Archives, JDC) (IMG)

The JDC, with its history of pro-Axis activities, was in no position to claim to be the friend of the Holocaust victims. Obviously whenever the JDC speaks of 'social welfare', 'humanitarian aid', etc., it is almost always a cover for espionage and fascist subversion on behalf of the CIA.

If the decriminalization of Luca was a pretext for the re-promotion of the CIA-Mossad agents in the Romanian intelligence service, the decriminalization of Patrascanu was a pretext for increased Romanian ties to fascist Yugoslavia. In an interview with the Yugoslav regime media 'Komunist', Ceausescu said:

All along their historical development, they helped each other in order to ensure their independent development. Under the new conditions, when socialism is being built both in Romania and Yugoslavia, - passing over the moments which for a period had cast a shadow on our collaboration - the relations between Romania and Yugoslavia have witnessed a strong development.

We reckon that today the relations between our countries and parties are of the best, that both on an economic, scientific and cultural level as well as in international life, Romania and Yugoslavia promote broad cooperation, making their active contribution to the solving of the problems of world peace and progress.

(‘Interview Granted by NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the State Council, to the Yugoslav "Komunist" Journal's Chief Editor Gavro Altaian', November 21, 1969, No. 16, Agerpres: Romanian News Agency, From: 'Documents, articles and information on Rumania', p. 11. Bold added.) (IMG)

Ceausescu spoke of Romanian-Yugoslav cooperation 'in international life' for 'solving ... the problems of world peace and progress'. That was not mere default diplomatic talk. Whether out of naivete or out of malicious intent, some would draw 'equivalence' between Dej-era post-1956 Yugoslav-Romanian diplomatic relations and the Ceausescu-era Yugoslav-Romanian alliance, arguing that on that issue, the Ceausescu faction 'continued' the project 'initiated' by the Dej faction. Such an 'analogy' is baseless. It is a slander against the Dej legacy, and a red-washing of the Ceausescu group. The Dej-era Romanian 'friendship' with the Tito regime bore a 'Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact' spirit, in that the communist faction of People's Democratic Romania engaged in some verbal and symbolic 'collaboration' with fascist Yugoslavia, while not practically and materially conceding to the Titoists. The Ceausescu-era Romanian regime friendship with fascist Yugoslavia was a real alliance against the socialist and progressive forces, a joint lifting of a dagger against the back of the liberationist forces of mankind.

A case in point of Romanian-Yugoslav cooperation 'in international life' for 'solving ... the problems of world peace and progress' was Ceausescu's support for the reactionary Dubcek group. Although the Czechoslovak proletarians supported the Novotny faction against the Dubcek faction (see C22S9), the liar and propagandist Nicolae Ceausescu swept such a fact under the rug and falsely claimed that the Czechoslovak people support the 'leadership of the party and the state' in Czechoslovakia, and implied that such a leadership in Czechoslovakia aimed 'to ensure the triumph of socialism'. On this basis, as a supporter of the Dubcek faction, Ceausescu condemned the Warsaw Pact intervention in 1968:

Dear comrades. The Plenary of the Central Committee of the Party, the State Council, the Government, the representatives of the management of public organizations, trade unions, youth, women's, creative unions, unanimously decided to express their full solidarity with the Czechoslovak people, with the Czechoslovak Communist Party! (applause, cheers).

Dear comrades. Citizens of the Country of Romania. The penetration of the troops of the 5 socialist countries into Czechoslovakia is a big mistake and a serious danger for peace in Europe, for the fate of socialism in the world! It is unthinkable in today's world, when peoples rise up to fight to defend their national independence, for equal rights, that a socialist state, that socialist states violate the freedom and independence of another state (applause). There is no justification and no reason can be accepted to admit, for a moment, only the idea of military intervention in the affairs of a socialist state. (applause).

Our party and state delegation that visited Czechoslovakia last week became convinced that the Czechoslovak people, that the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the Czechoslovak working class, old people, women, young people, unanimously support the leadership of the party and the state to ensure the triumph of socialism in Czechoslovakia (applause).

The problem of choosing the paths of socialist construction is a problem for every party, every state, every people. No one can become an advisor, a guide of the way socialism should be built! It is the business of every people, and we believe that in order to establish the relations between the socialist countries, between the communist parties, on a truly Marxist-Leninist basis, we must once and for all put an end to interference in the affairs of other states, other parties! (applause)

We are determined to act with all our strength, with all our responsibility, to contribute to finding ways to

resolve this situation created by the penetration of foreign troops into Czechoslovakia as quickly as possible, so that the Czechoslovak people can and carry out the activity in silence. We are firmly determined to act so that together with the other socialist countries, with the other communist and labor parties, we contribute to the elimination of differences, to the strengthening of the unity of the socialist countries, of the communist parties, because we are convinced that this is the only way to serve the interests of the people, the interests of socialism in worldwide! (applause)

(Ceausescu Speech on August 21, 1968. Bold added.)

Again, Ceausescu was not just one man but represented an entire faction that had risen to prominence in the command of Romania's means of violence, through the criminalization of the 'Dejite' communists in the Romanian counter-intelligence and the decriminalization of the Titoists, through the changes in the Romanian intelligence service, through the elevation of the bureaucratic oligarchs via decentralization at the expense of the proletariat's hold over the state, and through the elevation of the intelligentsia in the Party. Fortunately for the communists in Romania, the communist faction had resurged in the Red Army and the CPSU. The Brezhnevian tide had occurred in Eurasia, paving the way for a measure of communist resurgence. Against the Titoist agenda of the Ceausescu faction that dominated the Romanian regime, the Red Army mobilized its forces along the Romanian border. Anatoly Dobrynin, the then Eurasian ambassador to the United States, recalled how the Red Army mobilized in the border against Ceausescu-era Romania:

But nervousness persisted. On August 28 Rusk summoned me urgently to say he had learned of an unusually active movement of Soviet troops along the Romanian borders within twenty-four hours. There had already been speculation in the West about the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Romania, based largely on its refusal to take part in the joint action with other Warsaw Treaty states against Czechoslovakia. Indeed, Moscow was highly irritated with Romania's leader Nicolae Ceausescu, and Soviet troops engaged in demonstrative tactical movements near the Romanian border. But Moscow was not really thinking of invading Romania, because it never doubted the stability of the communist regime there. ('In Confidence', New York Times Books, Anatoly Dobrynin, 1995, p. 187) (IMG)

The goal of the communist faction of the Red Army was to menace the comprador Romanian regime and to feed the Romanian communists the excuse to promote a line of pro-communist dovishness and capitulation to the Red Army. The presence of a menacing military force along the border is a technique of feeding the capitulationists of the target country the excuse for lobbying for the promotion of dovish policy – in this case, a dovish and capitulationist policy in favour of the communist faction of the Red Army, and at the expense of the Titoist Ceausescu clique. Obviously, threats, as in contrast to action, can only work so far, and the Ceausescu clique, while undoubtedly weakened, was not overthrown.

In the late 1970s, Ceausescu demonstrated his pro-Atlantic orientation. In his memoirs, the prominent Soviet Red Army General Kraskovsky Makarovich recalled how in the late 1970s, he was:

a little confused by the large number of portraits of N. Ceausescu and his attraction to the West. (In the Service of the Unique Motherland: Memoirs, Kraskovsky Voltaire Makarovich. From: militera.lib.ru) (IMG)

In addition to standing with the Dubcek group in Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu sided with the Al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan by condemning the Soviet intervention there. Referring to Ceausescu, an article published by Russia's Sputnik stated:

He condemned the suppression of the Prague Spring and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, maintained diplomatic relations with Israel and Pinochet, while the USSR and its allies broke them off, and took a neutral position in the conflict between the USSR and China (during the armed clashes on Damansky Island). (30 Years of the Velvet Revolution in Romania: Ceausescu's Main Mistake, Sputnik, Rostislav Ishchenko, December 15, 2019) (IMG)

By the time of the Iran-Iraq War, the Romanian regime joined the CIA and MI6 in providing arms to the Iraqi regime in its fascist war on Iran. The Islamic Revolution Documents Center (IRDC), which is an official center for Iranian archives and government historical research, listed Yugoslavia, Romania, and China as sponsors of Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War:

In addition to the above list, countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Yugoslavia, China, Romania, Italy, Singapore, etc. should also be added to the list of Saddam's supporters. (The 80 Countries that Armed Saddam in the War against Iran, Islamic Revolution Documents Center (IRDC), September 22, 2015) (IMG{Titoist-Saddamite Connection})

Referring specifically to the race to arm Saddamite Iraq, the CIA stated:

Romania, in particular, has taken advantage of this opportunity by providing more than \$850 million in primary support equipment and ammunition. (IRAN-IRAQ: ARMS PROCUREMENT PATTERNS AFTER TWO YEARS OF WAR, CIA, December 3, 1982, p. 30) (IMG{Titoist-Saddamite Connection})

The regime of Romania also had extensive intelligence cooperation with Saddam's group even in the 1970s when Saddam's faction had not decisively defeated the revolutionary Ba'ath faction of Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr in Iraq. Examining the topic of Ceausescu regime's cooperation with Saddam in the field of intelligence and terrorist special operations is beyond the scope of this work, however. The Romanian regime's military support for fascist Iraq against the Islamic Republic of Iran comes as not a surprise in the slightest.

In the 1980s, Romania's government was requested by the CIA front bank, the IMF, to pay its debt through imposing austerity measures on its population. The Ceausescu regime, which had the funds to arm Saddam's gang but which somehow allegedly 'did not' have the funds to feed its own people, imposed austerity measures on behalf of the IMF. In the words of a Sputnik article:

Ceausescu launched a campaign for early repayment of Western loans. By the time of his overthrow, Romania, at the cost of a significant decade of tension and a decline in the standard of living of the broad masses, had fully paid off its debts. (30 Years of the Velvet Revolution in Romania: Ceausescu's Main Mistake, Sputnik, Rostislav Ishchenko, December 15, 2019) (IMG)

I hope that the reader has by now understood why I cited the Russian Federation's Sputnik, because (1) it is an 'Eastern bloc' media, and hence could not be CIA propaganda mouthpiece supporting a CIA colour revolution, (2) there was no Romanian state-owned anti-imperialist media outlet at the time of the 'ouster' of Ceausescu, and (3) at the time of Ceausescu, the Eurasian media was under Gorbachev's influence and so citing Eurasian media would not be regarded as reliable, whereas Putin-era Russian state is more under the influence of the anti-imperialist forces than the Gorbachev-era Eurasian state in 1989-1990 was.

The Ceausescu clique were agents of Anglo-American and West German imperialism, the agents of the corrupt Romanian bureaucratic oligarchs and the reactionary Romanian intelligentsia. Why, then, – some would ask – did the imperialist intelligence services launch a colour revolution to 'execute' Ceausescu and overthrow the Romanian regime? As will be seen, the only provenly correct presupposition of this question asked is that the imperialist intelligence services launched an anti-communist colour revolution in 1989 in Romania. The rest of the presupposed 'facts' in the question are either outright wrong or are problematic.

By the late 1980s, CIA colour revolutions had successfully ousted several of the Eastern European states: Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria. The situation with Romania, a country that was hostile to Eurasia on all fronts, was quite different than the Eurasian-aligned Eastern European states. Romania was a truly unique case in these waves of imperialist-fascist secret services' colour revolutions that swept Eastern Europe. Romania's intelligence service, a comprador secret service, launched waves of terror attacks at Romanian civilians in order to provoke some of them into a colour revolutionary uprising. In the meantime, as is well known, the CIA was engaged in propaganda and agitation for summoning the intelligentsia into a colour revolution. The question is: considering all these services that Ceausescu, his entourage, and the Romanian intelligence service provided by the imperialist-fascist secret services all those years, against whom, then, were the imperialist-fascist secret services launching the colour revolution? What was there about the Romanian state that antagonized the CIA, Mossad, BND, etc.? Was Ceausescu 'another Saddam', a former imperialist agent defecting to the anti-imperialist camp? Ceausescu was not a defector to the anti-imperialist camp, and the colour revolution was launched neither against him, nor against his entourage, nor against the Securitate, nor against the corrupt comprador bourgeois government that they headed. Rather, in what marked the remarkable uniqueness of the imperialist-fascist colour revolution in Romania, the colour revolution was launched against communist symbolism. It would have been awkward for those Titoist renegades preaching 'communism' and 'anti-imperialism' to go ahead and allow their country to be directly under the jackboots of NATO. It would have been awkward for the corrupt intelligence service bureaucrats whom Ceausescu and Co. had fostered to be openly billionaires and millionaires running the show in Romania. At the same time, it would have been awkward for NATO to openly cooperate with a government that still held 'communism' as its official ideology even though that comprador bourgeois state had betrayed communism decades prior. It would have appeared awkward for the CIA to be ousting all these ostensibly 'Stalinist' governments in Eastern Europe but to allow only Romania to stay there alone as the island of 'Stalinism'. There are volumes of evidence showing that the colour revolutionary upheaval that the imperialists launched in collaboration with the Romanian intelligence service did not target Romania's military and intelligence service, the Titoist party and state apparatus, the fake 'communist' elites, etc. As a matter of fact, the fake 'communists' and corrupt Titoist oligarchs in Romania, were behind the operation that replaced Ceausescu with Ionescu. The Russian Federation's Sputnik article stated:

Even then, many doubted the spontaneity of the uprising that cost Ceausescu his life. Now, virtually none of the responsible politicians or political experts doubt that a well-prepared coup d'etat took place in Romania, **organized by people from the party and state elite, including those from Ceausescu's inner circle.** (30 Years of the Velvet Revolution in Romania: Ceausescu's Main Mistake, Sputnik, Rostislav Ishchenko, December 15, 2019. Bold added.) (IMG)

It thus becomes clear that the corrupt Titoist oligarchs were not the target of the colour revolution. On the other hand, the

imperialist-fascist colour revolution not only did not target the Titoist pseudo-communist oligarchs, it also actually elevated them.

At times, imperialist secret service networks demote some of their agents so that in the future, if the imperialist agents at the helm of the pro-imperialist state would no longer have a stable government, the demoted agents can lead the 'revolt' against the ruling imperialist agents and thus serve as Plan B, as stay-behind agents, for the imperialists. By the accounts of all sides of the political and historical debate, Ion Iliescu, a prominent member of the Romanian 'Communist' Party's Central Committee, had been a Ceausescu agent and collaborator. However, in the 1970s, Ceausescu decided to demote him to a much lower level of the Romanian government. Years later, he did come out as NATO's 'Plan B' 'resistance' official. He, a 'former' Ceausescu agent, led the colour revolution that replaced Ceausescu as head of state, became the corrupt President of Romania, got his country to be controlled directly by NATO, and boosted his Titoist oligarchic cronies from the former 'socialist' Romanian state apparatus. Russia Today reported:

On this day, the capital of Romania turned into an arena of fierce clashes. Part of the army units went over to the side of the rebels. The rebels were supported by Ceausescu's former ally Ion Iliescu, who became president of post-socialist Romania in 1990. ("Carte blanche for any cruelty": how the Ceausescu regime was overthrown in Romania, Russia Today (RT), Alexei Zekvasin, December 16, 2017) (IMG)

The intelligence apparatus of Ceausescu-era Romania, a front for the CIA, Mossad and the BND, is now openly a network of old billionaires participating in Anglo-American imperialist aggressions in the Middle East. The openly comprador capitalist regime in Romania is dominated by the very same apparatus that Ceausescu fostered. The Balkan Insight – an institution funded by the European Union and other Western organizations – reported:

Even the premise that the revolution was contemporary Romania's proudest hour, once an article of faith, is now fiercely disputed. Trials against the perpetrators of the violence that followed Ceaușescu's fall on 22 December – which accounted for the lion's share of victims – have been shut down again and again, despite tireless efforts by [victims' associations](#) to bring them to justice. The associations and [contemporary historians](#) contend that it was largely the Securitate, the Communist police state's cruel enforcers, who shot at civilian demonstrators and army units between December 22-25, killing 940 persons across the country.

Notwithstanding numerous elections and EU membership [since 2007](#), the real winners of Romania's transition to democracy are the security elite – the former members of the Securitate, and their successor generation, who protect their elders' fortunes as they make their own.

(...). Today, nine security services, the heirs of the Securitate colossus, operate behind the scenes in Romania, or, in some cases, openly – to manipulate politics and enrich their members at the expense of ordinary Romanians. The country's main domestic security agency, the SRI, operates with a budget larger than that of Germany's equivalent, the Verfassungsschutz, and nearly 2.5 times that of the equivalent in the Netherlands, the EU country closest to Romania in population. It is estimated to employ [12,000](#) people – the official numbers are undisclosed, and my requests for an interview were refused – six times more than [the 17-million populous Netherlands](#). Despite a change of generations, Romania's security services are not only lavishly bankrolled but largely unchecked by other government agencies. Although much progress has been made, Romania still has a long way to go to internalize the rule of law.

(Long Shadow: How Romania's Securitate Turned the Revolution into Riches, Balkan Insight, February 3, 2021) (IMG)

Denouncing NATO's agenda, a prominent political science academic from the 'Academy of Sciences of the USSR' and Russia's prestigious 'Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences' noted how Ceausescu's secret service, 'which had already' 'changed its orientation', was responsible for 'the implementation of the dark plan' to get the public to believe the propaganda of the colour revolution:

It should also be recalled that it was in Romania in these December days that a disgusting spectacle was first played out, similar to what the West will later cynically play out in Kosovo, ungodly exaggerating the number of victims of "ethnic cleansing" in order to justify NATO's military intervention. And during Ceausescu's farcical "trial", he was found guilty of the deaths of 60,000 people in Timisoara, a city in western Romania. The mixed Romanian-Hungarian population made it possible to provoke violent ethnic clashes here, but there was no question of any "tens of thousands". The 100 bodies that were presented to the press and the public were taken from the anatomical theater of the Medical Institute. Ion Iliescu and Petra Roman needed strong arguments to get the public to accept Ceausescu's execution, and **the Securitate, which had already "changed its orientation", took over the implementation of the dark plan.** And although two weeks later the truth became known to the Western media, this does not prevent them, as was the case with [their lies against] Russia as well, from spreading the myth of a spontaneous democratic revolution to this day. (Russia and the Last Wars of the Twentieth Century (1989-2000), Ksenia Grigorievna Myalo, Moscow, 2002. From: [militera.lib.ru](#). Bold added.) (IMG)

The colour revolution was aimed towards strengthening the reactionary core of the Romanian regime apparatus at the expense of the 'socialist' facade of the Titoist Romanian regime; until 1989, the 'socialist' facade was an asset, for it allowed infiltration by the CIA and MI6 into the Warsaw Pact; from 1989 onwards, it was a liability, for it served as a cosmetic obstacle against expanded cooperation with NATO and the IMF, against further privatization and proliferation of the bureaucratic oligarchic mafia, etc.

Ceausescu's Titoist secret service ran the show then in Titoist Romania, the Romanian government that was comprador at heart but 'socialist' in appearance, and now in the blatantly comprador capitalist state that has taken off the mask of 'socialism'. Clearly, the colour revolution was not aimed at ousting the corrupt Titoist oligarchy and the intelligence service mafia. The colour revolution was aimed not at the Romanian regime apparatus, but was aimed solely at 'communist' symbolism of the Romanian state. Communist symbolism is an obstacle to cooperation with NATO. Ceausescu, while a Titoist, was nonetheless regarded as a symbol of 'communism' and 'Stalinism' by many. Insofar as Ceausescu was a Titoist, he was to continue his rule, as a result of the colour revolution, but insofar as he was a symbol of 'communism', the imperialist-fascist secret services were to oust him.

According to the mainstream Romanian state media at the time, Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena were arrested, summarily tried and filmed while being 'executed'. The videos 'documenting' the 'execution' were released by the state media. The 'execution' did not happen.

For start, the videos of Ceausescu being 'executed' turned out to be fake, and according to forensic specialists, the bodies shown in the video – allegedly the bodies of the Ceausescus – were dead long before the 'execution'. Furthermore, one forensic specialist Guy Nicholas said that it was not clear if the Ceausescus had died hours prior. The following are excerpts of an AP News report on this matter:

BORDEAUX, France (AP) _ A Romanian government videotape purporting to show the execution of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, is faked in part, forensic experts here believe.

After examining a 90-minute tape shown last week on French television, the scientists doubt the official claim that the couple was killed by firing squad. Instead, they say the couple was apparently killed hours earlier with gunshots to the head.

Dr. Loic le Ribault, director of a private criminal science laboratory in Bordeaux, said Sunday that the only signs of fatal wounds on the bodies were in the right temples, indicating the Ceausescus had been shot in the head.

In the tape, the Ceausescus, hands tied behind their backs, appear in the video to have been gunned down with automatic weapons. But the camera angle is too low and the lens is obscured by gunsmoke, preventing a clear look at the couple being shot, experts say.

Later footage shows a medic checking Mrs. Ceausescu for signs of life as she lies in a stream of blood pouring from a wound in her head.

Le Ribault and others say the state of the bodies show the [bodies that were believed to be the] Ceausescus died hours before the medic checked them. The corpses were stiff with rigor mortis, and there was virtually no sign of blood on Nicolae Ceausescu.

Also, the bullet holes on the brick wall behind the couple are too low for a firing squad theoretically aiming at the chest, le Ribault said.

"It's technically impossible that this film was made immediately after the death of the Ceausescus," said le Ribault. "The fusilade ... is a simulation made solely for the camera."

(...). Guy Nicolas, another forensic scientist working for the French criminal courts, said the evidence of a prior execution is not conclusive.

"I don't think we can draw any definitive conclusions from such mediocre images," he said.

(Ceausescu Execution Video Faked, Experts Say, AP News, April 30, 1990) (IMG)

As stated in the above, there is no evidence that Ceausescu and his wife were executed on the hour of the 'execution', nor any evidence that it happened prior to the hour of execution. Ruxandra Cesereanu, a Romanian historian and journalist, did a review of a number of documents regarding the circumstances of the 'execution' of Ceausescu. While Ruxandra Cesereanu stated in the beginning of her document that Ceausescu was 'executed' in 1989, she nonetheless also provided materials that, contrary to her intentions, indicate that there was no evidence that the man and woman executed were Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. She wrote:

In Dupa executie a nins, Viorel Domenico interviews the military who got the mission to execute Ceausescu. According to their testimonies and to those of some other actors in the garrison, Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu were shot by tens of bullets, their bodies being riddled (as in an extreme release).

They were shot before the order was given; but not only by those who were part of the commando, it was a chaotic outbreak of all those who had guns and who, not being among the ones who were assigned the execution mission, were only spectators. In Dupa executie a nins one can read a series of morbid details about Ceausescu

couple's death. For instance, one soldier declares that near the execution wall he picked a bone piece of Elena Ceausescu's skull, in order to keep it. Some other tells about the garrison dog which ate Elena Ceausescu's brain from the pavement. Many soldiers took out bullets from the execution wall as a souvenir; some even dipped a handkerchief in Ceausescu's blood (p. 165, 167).

In *Procesul Ceausescu [Ceausescu Trial]* (1996), Ardeleanu, Savaliuc and Baiu record some witnesses' statements supporting the idea that the bodies of the two Ceausescus were riddled by tens or even hundreds of bullets and that during the autopsy, Ceausescu's corpse was even mutilated.

(CEAUSESCU'S TRIAL AND EXECUTION, Ruxandra Cesereanu, *Metabasis*, May 2009, No. 7, p.

4) (IMG)

The bodies were 'riddled' and the alleged body of Elena was torn apart, the skull turned into several shred, and the brain eaten by a dog. Their faces became undetectable, the bodies were mutilated, and the murder and burying happened really quickly in an unfair, unjust manner. There is no evidence that Ceausescu and his wife were executed on the hour of their official 'execution', nor is there any evidence that the 'execution' happened prior to the filming, nor is there any proof that the bodies of the dead were actually the bodies of the Ceausescus. On the other hand, there is every indication that the entire execution of Ceausescus was faked. Why would the murder of the Ceausescus be faked? One can speculate.

This is an old secret service method. For a spy, one way to live on is to 'die'. In the initial years after World War II, it was said that Dr. Mengele was dead. Later it turned out that he was alive and 'well', having escaped via a ratline provided by the CIA and MI6. The public was told that Vice Fuhrer Bormann was dead, but years later it was revealed that he was alive and that he escaped Europe via a ratline provided by the CIA and MI6. As was mentioned before in C15S8, during the purge against the Slansky ring, Jan Bojko, a prominent agent of the Slansky faction, aimed to escape to Yugoslavia by exploiting the false rumours of his 'death':

Bojko was a close collaborator of Gen. Bredich Reicin, executed during the purge of the Slansky group.

Bojko, a Slovak, generally believed dead, had actually been concealed by Slansky's followers and was detected trying to reach Austria on the way to Yugoslavia with important documents.

His capture revealed a conspiracy involving the highest circles of Communist leadership and increased Soviet suspicion with regard to Czechoslovak unwillingness to purge unreliable elements. Soviet authorities have placed the responsibility on Dr. Stefan Reiss, a former Minister of Justice, a Hungarian Jew by birth, but considered a Slovak. He is a protege of President Zapotocky.

(Investigation of Czechoslovak leaders, CIA, February 15, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

In an operation coordinated by the CIA, SAVAK, and Saddam's Mukhaberat, the MEK Rajavist operative Masoud Keshmiri infiltrated the highest ranks of Iranian intelligence, and then planted a bomb killing the Islamic Republic's President, Prime Minister, and many other officials. MEK agents within Iranian state apparatus then presented Keshmiri as one of the victims of the MEK bombings, fabricated his fake corpse, prepared the coffins, shed fake tears in grief for him, dug his grave, and placed the fake corpse inside the grave – all of this was so to give him the time and chance to escape to Iraq. The Iranian government later found out that the 'dead' Keshmiri was behind the explosion, and went on a hunt for the numerous imperialist agents who had assisted Keshmiri by presenting him as 'dead'; Iranian government efforts failed since the MEK launched another wave of terror operations to prevent the capture of those who had deliberately presented Keshmiri as dead. There are numerous other cases in which agents 'die' so that they can continue to live, and cases in which entire intelligence services are 'abolished' so that they can continue to operate as before.

I readily admit that I have no proof that the Ceausescus escaped through their 'death', but I theorize that this was the case. Accounting for the strong evidence of the fake character of the 'evidence' of the Ceasuescus' death, and in light of the continued rule of the Ceausescu faction in Romania even after 1989, there is little reason to believe otherwise. Much as how there was continuity in the rule of the Ceausescuist faction over Romania even long after 1989, as exemplified by the oligarchs and the elites of the security bodies, there was reason to believe in the continuity of the biological life of Ceausescu himself as well. And such a belief is reinforced by the fact that the 'documentary' 'evidence' of Ceausescu 'execution' each turned out to be faker than the other. In this probable conspiracy, Ion

Iliescu's group must have been an accomplice, as they were directly involved in the fake 'execution' video, and the other circumstances of the 'death'.

Anyways, the colour revolution ousted the pseudo-communist coloration of the Romanian state, while actually prolonging its core comprador bourgeois essence. The task of communists in 1989 in Romania was to do the opposite of whatever the CIA wanted: (1) to oppose all the colour revolutionary plots, (2) to support the 'communist' symbolism of the Romanian regime, because although doing so would not have directly benefited the working class, it would have been indirectly beneficial because it would have caused more trouble for the CIA, (3) to oppose the covert face of Ceausescu as the imperialist agent he was, (4) to support Ceausescu's overt existence as the official leader of Romania, just to hamper the CIA efforts aimed at ousting the 'communist' symbolism for smoother collaboration with Romania's regime.

C23S3. Class Struggles in the People's Republic of Korea in the era of Titoization

*** IMG-All- {Korea}

Throughout its history, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) pursued the correct policy of laying emphasis on heavy industry over light industry:

The industrial sector has benefited from Kim's policies. Over 50 percent of state investment went to the industrial sector during most of the 1950s and 1960s, and new industrial plants and equipment accounted for 49 percent of state investment during the Six-year Plan. As a result, industry's share of the combined total of gross agricultural and industrial output (see Glossary) climbed to well over 90 percent in 1980.

At the start of the 1980s the country had a variety of industries, ranging from mining to textile manufacturing, located in nine major industrial centers. The government also had expanded the transportation and communications networks and increased the utilization of domestic energy resources.

Per capita supplies of many industrial items were comparable to those of many of the world's middle- income countries, if not to the most technologically advanced nations.

(...). Like the Soviet Union, North Korea concentrated on heavy industry first, while investing only modestly in the light and consumer industries.

(‘North Korea: a Country Study’, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1981, p. 119) (IMG)

Nonetheless, there were brief periods in time when the DPRK was forced to prioritize light industry. By the early 1960s, pressure and stabs in the back by the Moscow Titoists was enough to push the DPRK to enact a series of economic policy changes of a revisionist and counterproductive character. The Moscow Titoists did not just defund revisionist China and People's Democratic Albania in 1960-1961, but also defunded the DPRK, and used these funding and defunding mechanism as a carrot-and-stick means with which to lobby for DPRK's shift away from heavy industry and onto light industry / consumer goods. First, through imposing sanctions on North Korea, the Moscow Titoists sought to push North Korea towards the US-led camp ("Free World"). The CIA reported:

In an apparent effort to find alternate sources of supply for goods formerly obtained from the Soviet bloc, Pyongyang embarked during 1963 on a vigorous but so far largely unsuccessful program of trade expansion in the free world. Recent trade agreements with Western suppliers involve some items formerly purchased from the USSR and the European satellites. Pyongyang apparently also desires to develop new sources of capital goods to aid industrial expansion. (‘NORTH KOREA, COMMUNIST CHINA'S INDEPENDENT ALLY’, Special Report, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), March 6, 1964, p. 4) (IMG)

In conditions of economic distress, it would make sense to emphasize heavy industry even more, as Kim Il Sung and his faction would have desired. However, the sanctions imposed by the Moscow Titoists and the Westwards shift of North Korean trade weakened the leverage power of the faction headed by Kim Il Sung, and thus the vacuum was filled by the counter-revolutionary faction in the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Hence, the sanctions by Moscow Titoists boosted the lobbying power of the counter-revolutionary anti-Kim faction in the DPRK, allowing for the emphasis on light industry over heavy industry. The CIA reported:

Pyongyang's decision to concentrate on consumer production during 1964 was a drastic shift from its past emphasis on development of heavy industry. During 1963, however, the rate of North Korean industrial development had already begun to slacken. According to statistics released by Pyongyang, the increase in gross value of industrial output for 1963 was only 8 percent. This compares with the 11 percent planned, and 20 percent claimed, for 1962.

The shortfall probably resulted in part from problems in the allocation of manpower. However, it may also have reflected a partial disruption in the flow of Soviet assistance. For example, Moscow has reportedly been stalling on delivery of equipment for key Korean thermal power projects.

Pyongyang has implicitly accused the Soviet Union of using economic aid as a weapon for imposing its political views, and has also publicly rejected the concept of an international division of labor as espoused by the bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Pyongyang has labeled it a Russian scheme to perpetuate the backward economic status of some bloc countries and make them mere economic appendages of the USSR. Late in 1962, Pyongyang publicly adopted a policy of economic self-reliance and announced that it was planning to build a self-sufficient economy.

(‘NORTH KOREA, COMMUNIST CHINA'S INDEPENDENT ALLY’, Special Report, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), March 6, 1964, p. 3) (IMG)

While the Koreans pursued the correct policy of laying emphasis on the development of heavy industry, they also began a series of policies that were problematic, populist, and left-deviationist, but which they partially mitigated later on. It was called the Tae'an Work System, which ended the efficient and speedy system of one-man management of enterprises, which had been advocated by Lenin, in favour of a kind of a management by technicians, the Party, and the workers in

the factory. As always, these kinds of solutions appear beautiful because of their 'democratic' aura and the involvement of the party of the workers and kolkhozniks in the management, but in practice they are demagogical and left-deviationist. A report sponsored by the Headquarters of the US Department of the Army stated:

According to official claims, all management decisions were arrived at by consensus among the members of the party committee. (...). The Tae'an Work System was a departure from the previous "one-man management system" inherited from the Soviet Union. The purpose of the change was to reinforce the "mass line" (see Glossary) by allowing the workers' active participation in management, in order to inspire increased production and newer and better technology. ('North Korea: a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1981, p. 131) (IMG)

Indeed, emphasizing the Maoist revisionist concept of the mass line in the management of the economy, the North Korean government media stated:

The Tae'an work system created by Kim Il Sung, as a system enabling the masses of the people to give full play to their responsibility and role as the masters of the state and society by combining the Party's monolithic leadership and the revolutionary mass line, is the application of the fundamental principle of the socialist state in its activities. This system is significant not only as a socialist economic management system but also as a political mode by which to manage socialist society as a whole. (Kim Il Sung: Condensed Biography, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2001, p. 224) (IMG)

Unsurprisingly, the establishment of the revisionist 'mass line' in running the state enterprises did not solve the problems, for worker self-administration was a smokescreen for decentralization and hence chaos and bureaucracy. Fortunately, during the mid-to-late-1960s, when Kim Il Sung's faction in the Workers' Party of Korea began to gain greater strength, some steps were reportedly taken against the Maoist revisionist mass line. At least according to official North Korean government media:

At the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Party Central Committee [Kim Il Sung] took steps to abolish the trade unions' old patterns of collective bargaining with factory management and performing the function of supervision and control over the operations of enterprises, and to make them act entirely as organizations of ideological education. He also saw that a new work system was established accordingly. (Kim Il Sung: Condensed Biography, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2001, p. 233) (IMG)

Such a move against the 'mass line' or worker self-administration in state enterprises was a step in the correct direction. However, unfortunately, there was continuity in the fact of state enterprises being run by a collective body of the party committee and the engineers and managers. North Korean government media admitted:

The Tae'an work system is the supreme economic management system suited to the intrinsic nature of the socialist system, a system by which factories and enterprises conduct all their management activities under the collective guidance of their respective Party committees. In this system, the economic task in hand is fulfilled by giving priority to political work and rousing the producer masses, the higher echelons are responsible for helping their subordinate units, and the economy is managed and run in a scientific and rational way. (Kim Il Sung: Condensed Biography, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2001, p. 224) (IMG)

The establishment of a collective body for management led to inefficiency in the management of enterprises. Multi-person-management is objectively less efficient than one-person management. Again, unsurprisingly, this Tae'an management system which went against the one-person management principle did not really solve the management problems:

Ideally, the Tae'an Work System should have solved North Korea's management problems once and for all, but repeated references in the press and in Kim's own speeches to difficulties in the "normalization" and "regularization" of industry told a different story. Kim especially criticized the management of materials supply work, equipment maintenance, labor administration, and finance. In 1973 he even went so far as to say "economic guidance functionaries have not made one single definite regulation to administer properly the independent accounting system." As a result, inefficient practices were not penalized and may have been rewarded. The typical response to these malpractices was to launch a campaign to straighten out production and management. ('North Korea: a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1981, p. 133) (IMG)

According to the report by the US Department of the Army, the North Korean government, in its drive to resolve the problems which the Tae'an work system was unable to resolve, established another parallel bureaucracy throughout Korea: the special planning departments, which were meant to check the activity of the Tae'an management. In other words, more bureaucracy was established to counter the negative effects of the Tae'an system. According to the report:

One measure of the [political] success of the Tae'an Work System has been its longevity. Only one major

organizational change has occurred since its inception. In 1964 the government established special planning departments at the provincial, city, and county agencies, which were responsible directly to the State Planning Committee as well to the local agency where they were based. The government was apparently afraid that some of the problems that had characterized the “one-man management” system were also threatening the Taean Work System. The planning departments were supposed to check the tendency of local agencies to misrepresent their achievements to superior agencies and their hesitancy to risk innovations. Kim praised the accomplishments of the revised system in his report to the Fifth party Congress in 1970 and maintained its importance again ten years later in his report to the Sixth congress. (‘North Korea: a Country Study’, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1981, p. 133) (IMG)

The Taean system emerged as a Titoist-Maoist deviation in economic policy, but was later partially mitigated.

In sum, DPRK pursued a communist line with regards to the question of heavy industry vs. light industry, but pursued an erroneous line with regards to management of enterprises. Of course, the effect of the WPK’s revisionist line on the management of enterprises should not be exaggerated. The correct policy of emphasis on heavy industry had a positive impact of a much greater magnitude than the magnitude of the negative effects of the Taean system. Over the years, the heavy industry created the backbone for North Korea’s conventional and nuclear weapons program, not only for self-defense but for directly assisting anti-imperialist forces. The heavy industry also created the backbone that paved the way for infrastructure developments, healthcare, education, etc. Such industrialization also enlarged the proletarian class and assisted the mechanization and collectivization of agriculture. The rise of the proletarians and kolkhozniks made it harder for Anglo-American imperialism to penetrate Korea, and helped keep the bureaucrats in Korea in check. By contrast, the Taean system had the effect of promoting decentralization, bureaucratic chaos, officials’ corruption, and inefficiency in production, all of which was bad; but in the specific context of North Korea, because of the many other programs, the negative effects of the Taean system were not so big as to stop the general tide of economic development resultant from heavy industry and centralized industrialization. As well, the Taean system was a pro-decentralization deviation from an economy known to be generally very centralized. Therefore, corruption and bureaucracy did not grow much and economic chaos did not greatly ensue in that land.

In countries in the path of centralized industrialization and collectivization, a large population of the proletarians are former peasants. Among these proletarians, some of the vestiges of feudal thinking would remain. At times, this takes the form of the cult of personality around the main leader – a supposed God solves all problems whereas the peasant has to bother himself/herself only with his/her farm. If Kim Il-Sung supported a cult of personality around himself, he sure erred greatly and vacillated away from socialism. I have not seen Kim Il-Sung ever promote a cult of personality around himself, though people in his family and throughout the North Korean state, perhaps or perhaps not at Kim Il-Sung’s connivance, did foster such a cult of personality. And these individuals had an obvious social base. Some were careerist bureaucrats playing the usual game of praising to heavens and then denouncing ‘the leader’ to mud, the way that Khrushchev and Tito had done to Stalin. The forming of a cult of personality also had a base in the ordinary masses of Korean society, however, and was rooted in the continued existence of agrarian petit- bourgeois attitudes in Korea even after the proletarianization of a large segment of these peasants. Take a look at the membership composition of the Korean Party. In 1956, Kim said:

The present composition of our Party ranks is workers—22.6 per cent, poor peasants—56.8 per cent, middle peasants—3.7 per cent, office employees—13 per cent and others—3.9 per cent. Compared with the time of the Second Party Congress, the number of workers has increased by 2.4 per cent and poor peasants, by 3.7 per cent, altogether amounting to 79.4 per cent of the total membership.

The majority (51.7 per cent) of the present Party membership are those who have joined the Party since the outbreak of the Fatherland Liberation War. Not only that, while the Party has many members who have a strong Party spirit and a high level of work qualifications, quite a few members are still below the mark in their political tempering.

(REPORT TO THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE WORKERS’ PARTY OF KOREA ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Il Sung, April 23, 1956. In: Kim Il Sung Works – Jan-Dec 1956, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, DPRK, 1982, p. 242) (IMG)

Over time, the proportion of the proletarians in the WPK grew:

The proportion of workers in the entire Party membership has risen from 17.3 per cent at the time of the Third Party Congress to 30 per cent today.

This growth of our Party reflects the increase of the revolutionary force of our country’s working masses..

(REPORT TO THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE WORKERS’ PARTY OF KOREA ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Il Sung, September 11,

1961. In: Kim Il Sung Works – Jan-Dec 1961, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, DPRK, 1983, pp. 230-231) (IMG)

The increase in the hold of the proletariat and the kolkhozniks over the Party, as a replacement for the petit-bourgeois contingent in the Party, undoubtedly strengthened the Korean communist faction in the confrontation with the Titoists at home and abroad. However, although a peasant's class-behaviour would radically shift as a result of the transformation of such a peasant into a proletarian or kolkhoznik, vestiges of petit-bourgeois thinking continue amongst them, as Stalin had pointed out. The continued existence of petit-bourgeois mentality was reflected in the strength of the tendency to form a cult of personality around Kim Il-Sung. Though the significant level of state power exercised by the proletariat and kolkhozniks in North Korea nullified many of the negative trends generated by the reactionary culture of hereditary leadership and thus – contrary to bourgeois media narratives – prevented the rise of a real monarchical tyranny in the East Asian state, it remains a fact that the culture of hereditary leadership, inspired by royalist political culture, persisted, fed the imperialists with anti-socialist propaganda weapons, and yielded its negative cultural impact. The culture of hereditary leadership was not material enough a factor to yield tyranny. Nor was it a factor so material as to nullify the state power of the proletariat in North Korea, but undermined it nevertheless. The abating of Anglo-American imperialist encirclement and concurrent with it the increased influence of the proletariat and kolhozniks over the North Korean state shall undermine the parasitic class tendencies that generate the culture of hereditary leadership, paving the way for the latter's abolition.

There is not enough data for the time period after 1961 concerning the membership composition but it is a fact that a larger portion of the society became proletarians and kolkhozniks and this must have inevitably influenced the membership composition of the Party as well. In the absence of data on the level of the influence of the proletariat over the Party, it cannot be so easily determined whether or not the DPRK did become a dictatorship of the proletariat. Note that like most Peoples' Democracies, North Korea was to go into two stages, the proletarian-led progressive bourgeois-democratic stage, and the dictatorship of the proletariat stage. North Korea certainly made steps towards transitioning from the proletarian-led progressive bourgeois-democratic stage onto the dictatorship of the proletariat stage, but it is not completely clear (at least to me) as to how far they went.

C23S4. The Titoist-Imperialist Cooperation in Afghanistan

*** IMG-All- {Afghanistan War}

Progressive classes elevate in strength concurrent with the development of the productive forces. Afghanistan was a mountainous country in which the development of the productive forces was difficult, a factor leading to the delay in the rise of the progressive classes. The feudal elites had a high influence over that country, and the majority of the population there was petit-bourgeois. The petit-bourgeoisie were unwilling to take the risk of grand projects in the struggle against imperialism and were thus materially dominated by the reactionary classes, a material domination that translated to ideational (ideological) domination through religious fundamentalism.

A communist revolution in Afghanistan in 1978-1979 was impossible. The anti-communists do not lie when they say that what is referred to as the 1978 'Communist Revolution' in Afghanistan was not really a communist revolution but a coup d'états without popular involvement. A new junta, after the coup d'états, can quickly establish itself as a popularly-backed government. Indeed, there have been numerous progressive coups that brought to power little-known juntas and these progressive juntas quickly became popular due to their revolutionary and progressive measures. The 1978 coup was undoubtedly progressive. The new government was, in the broad definition, progressive as well. It was led by the 'People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan' (PDPA), an amalgam of a number of other parties, the two main of which were the Khalq Party and the Parcham Party.

The Parcham advocated the smuggling of communist ideas into Afghanistan using the cover of 'Islamic socialism' and progressive bourgeois-democracy, rather than a leap to socialism. Once enough industrialization and the proletarianization occurs in Afghan society, the Party can then proceed to drop the 'Islamic' in 'Islamic socialism' and to pursue a scientific socialist line. The Parcham was very pro-Soviet. To the Parcham party belonged Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah.

The other sub-party in the PDPA was the Khalq Party, a left-deviationist grouping that branded itself as 'anti-revisionist'. This Maoist 'Khalqi' grouping aggressively pushed for a Trotskyite leap to 'socialism', and benefited Al-Qaeda on all fronts. As the Khalq, not the Parcham, came to dominate the PDPA right from the start, it was inevitable that Al-Qaeda would grow in Afghanistan. The Khalq party was able to pursue such a reactionary line which it pursued, because the reactionary forces in Afghanistan were strong and pervasive. The upper hand of the Khalq over the Parcham was itself the reflection of such a mighty presence of the reactionary classes.

Led by the Khalq, the new junta described itself as 'communist' and discard the Islamist and patriotic cover which the Parcham party had spent years to cultivate:

The US Embassy in Kabul believes that, in revealing themselves as Communists and in discarding their Islamic nationalist cover, the coup leaders may have made a serious miscalculation in a deeply religious and traditionalist country. (Afghanistan: New Government. In: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, May 1, 1978,

p. 1) (IMG)

There was no more green coloring in the Afghan flag:

PDPA set out to change Afghanistan quickly. To symbolize their intent, the party leaders eliminated the time-honored green flag associated with Islam and substituted a red flag of the future. (Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 8. In: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER", January 3, 1980) (IMG)

Once the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan occurred, the red-and-blond flag was replaced by black, red, and green again.

When the Bolsheviks launched their revolutions throughout the predominantly Muslim areas of the Russian Empire, they made sure to antagonize Islam as little as possible and permitted the temporary existence of the 'Islamic socialist' eclectic current in the predominantly-Muslim SSRs, and used such an eclectic current as a means of smuggling socialism into the minds of the conservative Muslim population. The RAND Corporation actually did a useful study of this matter, contrasting Bolshevik policy with Khalqi policy, and examining the many anti-Islamic measures committed by the Khalqis which resulted in an uprising against the Afghan state. The document has been cited extensively in C4S1 in this book. Some of the policies mentioned in this section have been documented by the RAND report. See the following for more details: 'THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981.

The development of the productive forces, the class struggles in the sphere of political economy, and struggles for cultural change have to be developed in parallel with each other. Therefore, during its first two years of existence, at the very least, Afghanistan needed to go through a period of New Economic Policy (NEP), some level of political pluralism such that the leadership of the communist party was recognized, and a higher level of religious tolerance. A few years later, concurrent with the shift away from the NEP, Afghanistan could have gone forward and unified the political system into a democratic centralist single-party state, hence to dissolve parties; and in this process, the correct policy would have been a campaign against religion through persuasion, and a crackdown on reactionary elements among religious clerics. In the initial years, Islam and socialism should be portrayed as completely compatible. None of these steps occurred in Afghanistan.

In the Khalq party too there were factional disputes. There was the more pro-Soviet Taraki faction, and there was the Titoist faction led by Hafizullah Amin. Despite the general problems existing in the Khalq party, many progressive reforms were pursued by the faction of Mohammad Taraki:

Taraki, in his role as party elder statesman, decreed the party's major reforms: education was to be secularized and females admitted to all schools throughout the country; the estates belonging to lay and religious families were to be confiscated and the land redistributed to peasant farmers; (Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 8. In: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER", January 3, 1980) (IMG)

These progressive measures however were not enough to turn the tide against the Trotskyite policy in Afghanistan. Note the similarity of the PDPA's Trotskyite policy with that of Tito during the Yugoslav People's Liberation War, when Tito promoted the red flags thus pursuing a sectarian policy that undermined the popular front policies promoted by the Comintern and drove a wedge between the YCP from its potential bourgeois anti-fascist allies (see C12S1). The Trotskyite elements of the Party were centered around Hafizullah Amin, the brutal head of the security services, who terrorized the Afghan masses so to provoke them into an anti-state rebellion:

Amin, the party strongman, sent military contingents – some with Soviet advisers – party loyalists, and dedicated cadres of young people to the provinces to see that the reforms were enacted. In a land where "no government has ever tried to govern the countryside directly," the vast majority of the population saw a threat to their way of life.

In their efforts to demonstrate their revolutionary authenticity and establish control, the Communists overstepped the limits by which Afghan governments traditionally had legitimated their rule. Although Amin shared his ruthlessness with past rulers, he sought – in contrast to his predecessors – to eliminate, rather than to compromise with, the old elite, to enhance the prestige of the Army over the fighting habits of the tribes, and to diminish the stature of Islam. He ended by affronting the Afghans' pride of national independence by relying on thousands of hated Soviet civilian and military advisers. Although it retreated somewhat (to save face and concentrate on fighting, the regime declared that land and educational reforms had been achieved), the regime brought upon itself tribal wrath and civil war.

(Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 8. In: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER", January 3, 1980) (IMG)

While reliance on Eurasian civilian and military advisors was useful for Afghanistan's development and for Soviet spying on the Amin faction, poking these advisors onto the people's eyes simply antagonized the tribal nationalist population, thus further undermining the Afghan government. And that was the point, for by promoting anti-Sovietism through such Trotskyism, the Amin faction was helping to weaken the Soviet intelligence presence hence to weaken the presence of those spying on him and his gang. Similarly, the cruelty and terroristic behaviour shown by Amin was further counter-productive, fueling the flames of the insurgency in Afghanistan. By provoking the masses into a rebellion against the Soviet-backed Taraki faction, Hafizullah Amin systematically undermined the Afghan government and ceased power:

Amin, while working in Taraki's shadow, slowly stripped him of his real power. (Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 7. In: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER", January 3, 1980) (IMG)

Such terrorist and Trotskyite activity by Amin – who sought to shift the blame on Taraki – also annoyed the Soviets:

The Soviets are known to believe that Amin's ruthless and hasty implementation of Marxist "reforms" in Afghanistan was a major mistake, provoking the country-wide insurgency. Most of these reform programs have been halted by the expediency of declaring them "completed." Since the inauguration of the new Amin government, the emphasis has been on "legality, security and justice" and the drafting of a constitution. In this connection, Amin has tried to shift the blame to Taraki for the large numbers of political arrests and executions in the preceding months. However, Amin is widely regarded to have been the strong man in the Taraki regime and the one responsible for its ruthless policies. (SUBJECT: Internal Situation in Afghanistan, Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Mark) to Secretary of State Vance, Washington, December 16, 1979. In: "FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1977-1980", Vol. XII, US Department of State, pp. 245-246) (IMG)

While masking his regime as legalistic and constitutional, Amin – just like Tito – continued his terrorist and torturous activities, savagely eliminating critics, and covertly attacking the Soviets:

Amin was a ruthless, dedicated man who liked to be firmly in charge. After the coup, he steadily eliminated competitors and rival centers of power, even risking an extreme reduction of support for the Khalq in the party and military; alleged enemies of the regime were jailed and tortured in ever-larger numbers. With the purging of Taraki and his closest aides – most of whom had already been stripped of their power – Amin surrounded himself with trusted subordinates and placed members of his family in key military and internal security positions. Like many Afghans, he was suspicious and distrustful of the motives of others, including Soviet backers. His absorption in consolidating his own power and his independence finally cost him the support of the Soviets. (Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 8. In: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER", January 3, 1980) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document further details the purge of pro-Soviet communists and progressives in Afghanistan:

Of fundamental interest to us will be whether the U.S. can woo, to any degree, Afghanistan away from Moscow's orbit and can discourage any inclination by Amin to be irredentist..

3. Though Hafizullah Amin has [officially] welcomed the massive support of the Soviets, I believe him nonetheless to be a nationalist – and the only strong Khalqi leader around. Amin ... is also ruthless; otherwise he would not be where he is.

While in part one of this message, I expressed concern that the Soviets may now have a commanding influence in this country, I believe also it would be a mistake to characterize Amin as a Soviet toady.

We have lots of evidence that he wants to run his own show, and that Moscow is less than ecstatic over the successive purges which have caused division in and depleted the ranks of the "progressive forces."

(...). Last week, when I asked the [Titoist] Hungarian Ambassador about Moscow's alleged unhappiness over the purges of Taraki and Watanjar, and the reported coolness between Amin and Moscow, he cautioned against reading too much into this. He said, "As long as Afghanistan does not change its basic policies (read Communism and a pro-Moscow foreign policy), Moscow doesn't care who is in charge."

From Moscow's and Amin's behavior since September 14, I think the Ambassador may be right.

6. This is not to say that the Amin-Soviet relationship has been or will be an easy one. Before Sept 14, there was tugging and pulling on both sides—and now there may be distrust. A few days ago, an Asian Ambassador here aptly described the situation when he said: "They are like a husband and wife who don't much care for each other but nightly keep climbing into the same bed, because each has compelling needs and no options."

(Subj: The Position of Amin and Afghanistan's Independence: Part Two of Two. Ref: Kabul 7326, Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, Kabul, October 9, 1979, 0835Z 7392. In: "FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1977-1980", Vol. XII, US Department of State, pp. 203-

204) (IMG)

While Hafizullah Amin was up against the Soviets, he was keen on being on CIA payroll (receiving “material assistance” from US imperialists). Indeed, the following excerpt from a document by US ambassador Archer Blood shows that Amin sought to re-orient Afghanistan’s strategic orientation towards a pro-US direction. The following 3. U.S.-Afghan relations. I had forty minutes alone with President Hafizullah Amin on the morning of Oct. 27. After the photographs were taken, we got down speedily to business. Following the talking points proposed in refetel, I mentioned those recent areas (Ariana DC- 10, narcotics control, etc.) where we had found we could work cooperatively with the DRA in our mutual interest and with a view to improving our bilateral relationship. Amin did not comment on any of the examples I cited, but merely nodded his assent. He then went on, with considerable eloquence, to stress his personal commitment to improving U.S.-Afghan relations, expressing his affection for the U.S. acquired during his residence in our country. Amin made a particular point of drawing my attention to the DRA’s forbearance in refraining from public attacks on the U.S. Even when Afghanistan is attacked by VOA, he said, we have deliberately resisted the temptation to respond in kind. The DRA does not want to do anything to “blacken the name or fame of the U.S.” He said that each country must act in its own interest but was confident that the U.S. and Afghanistan could continue to find ways and means that could serve their own interests but be of mutual benefit.

(...). 5. Development assistance. Amin made a strong pitch for U.S. “material assistance.” Afghanistan, he said, is in desperate need of foreign aid. Even a small portion of the development assistance which the U.S. provides worldwide would be of very great help to Afghanistan. The DRA would be grateful for any assistance, no matter how small. Amin said he would be happy to publicize U.S. aid to Afghanistan, adding that he would like to see more buildings in Afghanistan with plaques denoting that they had been built through U.S. aid. He allowed as how “your philosophy” can make it difficult for the U.S. to help in some areas and “our philosophy” makes it difficult for Afghanistan to accept some kinds of aid. Still, he said, we could doubtless find areas where we could work together.

(...). 12. Impressions. The man is impressive. His survival to date is by itself impressive, as is the air of quiet self-confidence he exudes. Clearly, he is aware of the mortality rate of Afghan leaders; several times he said “even if I am killed tomorrow.” He masks his ruthlessness and toughness quite well by his soft-spoken manner. In remarkable contrast to his turgid public speeches, his private discourse is refreshingly free from Marxist cant and cliché's. His English is quite good and very easy to understand.

Only once did he seem to have difficulty in expressing himself and that was when, perhaps in an attempt to convey great sincerity, he was declaiming how he could never sacrifice Afghan independence to any foreign demands, including from the Soviets.

14. I think he wants an improvement in U.S.-Afghan relations. His reasons could be varied: Soviet coaching; a long-range hedge against over-dependence on the Soviet Union; concern over the trouble which open U.S. animosity can create for his regime; conversely, an interest in bringing about the doubts and confusion which friendlier U.S. relations could sow among the supporters of the insurgency, the Pakistanis, Iranians and Saudis; a genuinely felt need for economic assistance.

(7726. Subj: Meeting With President Amin. Ref: Kabul 7645.2, Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, Kabul, October 28, 1979, 0728Z. In: “FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1977-1980”, Vol. XII, US Department of State, pp. 218-221) (IMG)

The evidence presented shows that Hafizullah Amin was striving to establish – and had much success in establishing – a Titoist regime in Afghanistan, a fascist dictatorship masked as socialist and backed by American intelligence. It is a well-known fact that Taraki had invited the Red Army into Afghanistan in order to help combat the Amin gang and the Al-Qaeda terrorists. The Red Army eventually utilized this invitation as a pretext to deploy troops into Afghanistan so to force the demotion and eventual execution of Amin and to combat the Al-Qaeda. The Red Army brought with itself the Parcham faction, and installed them into the primary leading cadres of the new Afghan government in cooperation with the Taraki loyalists.

C23 S5.1. Titoism in China / Mao Zedong, a Titoist agent of Anglo-American imperialism / Ties to American agent Anna Louise Strong / The Purge of the Kao Kang faction / The Deng faction, fascist agents of Anglo-American Imperialism

*** IMG-All-{China}

Years of colonial terror against China had left that country economically underdeveloped, resulting in the predominance of the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie in the Chinese population. Unlike the proletarians, who have nothing to lose except their ‘chains’ in the struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie have small business which they may lose. At the same time, unlike the national bourgeoisie and the cooperative peasants who have big businesses with which they can take the risk of engaging in a struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie do not have such big businesses and therefore cannot afford to take major risks in the struggle against finance capital. The inability of the petit-

bourgeoisie to wage a struggle against imperialism results in the areas populated by the petit-bourgeoisie to become easy prey to material domination by finance capital. Such material domination can take the form of direct military and political control, or through indirect secret service influence via the dominance of the pseudo-progressive agents of comprador forces allied to imperialism – the corrupt bureaucrats, counter-revolutionary intelligentsia, etc. all disguised as ‘anti-imperialists’. China since the mid-1950s was dominated by precisely these pseudo-progressive and pseudo-communist elements pursuing a reactionary line under the cover of pursuing a ‘progressive’, ‘communist’, or ‘socialist’ line; the pseudo-communist agency for imperialism took the form of both Trotskyite-style left-opportunism and liberal right-opportunism, depending on the context, time period, and location. Either way, however, the fact that since the mid-1950s and until 1989-1990, China was a major hub of opportunism, left- and right-, is irrefutable.

In a predominantly-peasant country, the efforts of the communists must be directed towards the elevation of the proletariat in the communist Party, the subsequent elevation of the Party's proletarian agents over the revolutionary means of violence, and the subordination of petit-bourgeois agents by the Party's proletarian agents. Such was the strategy pursued in the Korean and Vietnamese peoples' liberation war and in the communist-led popular struggles for the liberation of Eastern Europe. By contrast, in China, the Party was too open to the membership of peasants, thus allowing petit-bourgeois agents – rather than proletarian or agrarian cooperativist agents – to take the leadership of the military, resulting in a total disaster.

In a 1949 letter to Mao, Stalin predicted the rise of bourgeois-nationalist pro-US elements in the CPC:

As far as I know in the CPC there is a thin layer of the proletariat and the nationalist sentiments are very strong and if you will not conduct genuinely Marxist-Leninist class policies and not conduct struggle against bourgeois nationalism, ... China may become a dangerous toy in the hands of American imperialists. (J.V. Stalin, Sochinenia, Tom 18, Informatsionno-izdatelskii tsentr ‘Soyuz’, Tver, 2006, pp. 531- 533. Revolutionary Democracy) (IMG)

It should come as no surprise that Stalin was vigorously pushing for the industrialization and collectivization of China. He was aware of the great potential that existed in China, but also was very wary that China might become an epi-center of fascist subversion by Anglo-American intelligence. Industrialization increases the population of the proletariat. Collectivization would bring kolkhozniks and would sharply reduce petit-bourgeois tendencies.

Yet, the struggle against Titoist subversion and the petit-bourgeois currents could not be regarded as disconnected from the struggle against the Mao group itself, for Mao was a Titoist ally of the United States in the struggle against the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. This was indeed the correct attitude of Stalin and many of the communist officials in the camp of the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies towards Mao Zedong and his gang. Mao admitted this fact several times. For start, Mao himself admitted that Stalin regarded China’s leadership as having a Titoist character:

when fighting did erupt, he took us ... half sceptically. When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very strong indeed. (ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS: Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, April 25, 1956) (IMG)

While slandering Stalin with regards to his policy line on China, Mao further admitted that Stalin regarded Mao as a Titoist counter-revolutionary and China as another Yugoslavia:

They [i.e. the Soviets] did not permit China to make revolution: that was in 1945. Stalin wanted to prevent China from making a revolution, saying that we should not have a civil war and should cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, otherwise the Chinese nation would perish. But we did not do what he said. The revolution was victorious. After the victory of the revolution he next suspected China of being a Yugoslavia, and that I would become a second Tito. Later, when I went to Moscow to sign the Sino- Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, we had to go through another struggle. (Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC (Sept. 24, 1962), CMTTP, p. 191. (Most of this passage is also in TMT, pp. 146-7.). In: Mao’s Evaluation of Stalin, massline.org. Note: the website ‘massline’ is a Maoist organization.) (IMG)

Mao’s own speeches made it absolutely clear that Stalin regarded Mao as bearing a similar character to that of Tito. Hence, this fact has already been confirmed and cannot be doubted. This fact has also been reinforced by a primary source released by the think tank Wilson Center, presenting excerpts of Mao’s conversation with the Yugoslav regime intelligence agents. In this conversation, Mao admitted that Stalin:

regarded me [i.e. Mao] as a half-hearted Tito or semi-Titoist. Not only in the Soviet Union but also in other socialist countries and some non-socialist countries were there some people who had suspected whether China’s was a real revolution. (Mao’s Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

Stalin ... regarded me as a half-hearted Tito. (Mao’s Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

The Chinese people’s revolutionary struggle was real, but Mao Zedong was never a loyal member of the Chinese

revolution. He took leadership of the Chinese revolution in order to mislead it – somewhat like how the Yugoslav people's struggle against the fascists was real but Tito's leadership of such Yugoslav struggle was for the purpose of leading the struggle into the wrong and pro-fascist path.

Stalin was correct to regard Mao as a Titoist because that is exactly what Mao was. Mao did not hide this fact. On the contrary, he denounced Stalin's line regarding Yugoslavia's fascist regime and made it clear that he sided with the Yugoslav fascists. Regarding the break with Yugoslavia, Mao Zedong clarified his views:

My comrades, let me advise you that you should also watch out for this potential. Your industry is much modernized and has experienced a more rapid growth; Stalin made you suffer and hence, justice is on your side. All of this, though, may become your [mental] burden. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 5) (IMG)

Mao added:

Khrushchev already corrected the mistake concerning Yugoslavia. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 6) (IMG)

Mao made it clear that he had sided with Tito during the 1948 Split. Enver Hoxha too testified:

At first, Mao Tsetung said that Tito was not wrong, but it was Stalin who had been wrong about Tito. (Imperialism and the Revolution, Enver Hoxha)

The US military confirmed:

That China's Balkan policy has been essentially a derivative of the Sino-Soviet relationship is most clearly attested in the case of Yugoslavia. From 1948 to 1953 Peking followed Moscow's lead in exorcising the enemy of socialism embodied in Belgrade, even failing to acknowledge Yugoslavia's early diplomatic recognition of the PRC in 1949. Then, as Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved following Stalin's death, the Chinese discovered unsuspected virtues in Tito's brand of socialism. (THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE, Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering & Defense Nuclear Agency, US Air Force, Joseph Douglass, Jr., p. 63) (IMG)

Hoxha also wrote:

Mao Tsetung ... expressed his great desire to meet Tito. Tito himself declared recently: "I was invited to China when Mao Tsetung was alive. During the visit of the Chairman of the Federal Executive Veche, Djemal Myedich, to China, at that time, Mao Tsetung expressed to him his desire that I should visit China. Chairman Hua Kuofeng also told me that, five years ago, Mao Tsetung said that he should have invited me for a visit, stressing that in 1948, too, Yugoslavia was in the right, a thing which he (Mao Tsetung) had declared even then, to a narrow circle. But, taking into consideration the relations between China and the Soviet Union at that time, this was not said publicly". (From Tito's speech at the meeting of activists of the SR of Slovenia, September 8, 1978). (Imperialism and the Revolution, Enver Hoxha)

After the murder of Stalin, Anna Louise Strong, the promoter of Titoism and Maoism, was rehabilitated by the Moscow Titoists, as part of the Khrushchev group's attempt to strengthen Titoism-Maoism:

Soviet reversal of charges against Anna Louise Strong seen as gesture to Peiping: Moscow's recent reversal of the charges of espionage made against Anna Louise Strong in 1949 appears to be a gesture to the Chinese [Maoist] [pseuo-]Communists, whose cause she vociferously championed for years.

Miss Strong had frequently proclaimed Peiping's independence from Moscow and had advanced the "Yenan way" as the pattern for colonial Asia. She was arrested and expelled from the USSR in 1949 while attempting to return to North China after a visit to Tito. Prague radio hinted at the time that she was a Yugoslav spy – peculiarly sensitive charge in view of her planned trip to rejoin the Chinese Communists as they made their final push for victory in China.

Miss Strong's exoneration at this time may be intended to show that Moscow is sensitive to Peiping's feeling of independence. It ... may also have been published during the negotiations now being carried on in Moscow between Yugoslavia and Peiping to show that the USSR has no fear of Titoism in China. (SOVIET REVERSAL OF CHARGES AGAINST ANNA LOUISE STRONG SEEN AS GESTURE TO PEIPING, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

As confirmed by the renegade Chairman, Stalin enjoyed overwhelming popularity in China. This, Mao noted, was why he could not publicly denounce Stalin the way that Tito did. As he admitted:

You [Yugoslavs] wholeheartedly support Khrushchev's campaign to criticize Stalin, but we [the Chinese leaders] cannot do the same because our people would dislike it. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

Tito was an Anglo-American spy and a fascist terrorist. This fact was the reason behind Stalin's struggle to overthrow the Yugoslav regime and to encircle Tito's gang. For Stalin and communists aware of the crimes of Tito, to state that Mao was China's Tito had very serious implications. Take a look at the cases of the other Titoists. The Czechoslovak Tito, Slansky, was rightly accused of being an MI6-Mossad-UDB agent and was purged. The Bulgarian Tito, Kostov,

was rightly accused of being an CIA-MI6-UDB agent and was purged. The Hungarian Tito, Rajk, was accused of being a Nazi agent and a CIA-MI6 agent and was purged. The Albanian Tito, Xoxe, was accused of being a CIA- MI6-UDB agent and was purged. The Romanian Tito, Patrascanu, was purged. They were executed. All of these happened with the approval of Stalin himself. The question then becomes: was Mao the Chinese Tito? Was he an Anglo-American agent and a terrorist hostile to the freedom movements?

For start, Mao made it clear that he had sympathized with Tito's gang in the struggle against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Some may believe that Mao's praise for Tito was merely a series of diplomatic gestures aimed at buying time, or that Mao was under severe pressure from the Khrushchev gang to start embracing Yugoslavia even against his own will. This was indeed the case for some of the communist officials in the bloc, but it certainly does not apply to Mao and his group, for as Stalin rightly assessed, Mao was a Titoist, Mao and his group were allies of Anglo-American intelligence in the struggle against the socialist forces, and China did eventually become another Yugoslavia.

Stalin, the officials of the Peoples' Democracies, and the Yugoslav officials were by no means the only ones aware of Mao's Titoist character. Josephine Adams, a close Browderist friend of Earl Browder, stated that Browder had worked on Mao since as early as the Great Patriotic War, during the tenure of Mao and his group in Yan'an. Browder accurately believed that Mao was a bourgeois-nationalist and a Titoist that would seek to make China separate from the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Josephine Adams briefed the US Congress by stating: Browder was on very good terms at that time with Mao Tse-tung. He had been interested in China in the past. And, of course, I may say for Browder the first rebellion against Stalin started with him. Tito came later. It was really instigated by Browder and went around the world. That I know, because I watched it happen. He was way ahead of the others. He had insight enough to know. I am bringing this in – it is extraneous, but I believe it has a connection here. Because he thought Mao Tse-tung was going to be the kind of Communist that Tito became, and he was very interested in him. In other words, he thought he would work out some kind of national movement in China that was not as much associated with the Soviet Union. And he was watching him with great interest for that reason. (SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, Washington DC, February 26, 1957) (IMG)

Mao Zedong remained hostile to the strategic relations and foreign policy line of the Stalin-era USSR. In 1964, he basically admitted that he opposed the Stalin-era USSR's foreign policy and regarded it as social-imperialist in character:

The places occupied by the Soviet Union are very many. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed that country under its domination. Mongolia covers an area much greater than that of the Kurile Islands. (...) They annexed a part of Rumania. They cut off a part of East Germany.. They cut off a part of Poland and included it in Russia, and as compensation gave Poland a part of East Germany. The same happened in Finland. They cut off everything that was possible to cut off. (Interview With The Japanese Socialists On The Theory Of The Intermediate Zone, Japanese journal Sekat Shuho, August 11, 1964, MIA) (IMG)

In that same interview, Mao seems to have praised the invasion of the United States and the rape of Vietnam and other East Asian countries by the 'Japanese people':

The Japanese people are a great people. They waged war with the United States, with England and France. They carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor; they occupied Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia.

Their advance reached the eastern part of India. (Interview With The Japanese Socialists On The Theory Of The Intermediate Zone, Japanese journal Sekat Shuho, August 11, 1964, MIA) (IMG)

Was Mao supporting the colonization of the East Asian countries by Japan or was he insulting the 'Japanese people' by attributing to them such barbarity? Both? I will let the reader decide. Many years prior, so much for Mao's supposed struggle 'against' Japanese fascism, Mao had aimed to prioritize waging war against the KMT instead of fighting fascist Japan. When Chang Hsueh-Liang (Zhang Xueliang) launched a military coup to coopt Chiang Kai-Shek to abandon the conflict with the CCP and to wage war on fascist Japan, the USSR, Stalin himself included, supported the effort to coopt the KMT for the fight against Japan. Mao, on the other hand, was advocating the killing of Chiang Kai-Shek which would have provoked the prolonging of the KMT-CCP conflict, thus benefiting fascist Japan. Mao was deeply angered at Stalin for that move. This interesting episode in Mao's relations with Stalin in the 1930s and Mao's stance on the fight against fascist Japan is something worthy of further research through the archives.

Anyways, in a conversation with Yugoslav officials, Mao also said:

Before I met with Stalin, I did not have much good feeling about him. I disliked reading his works, and I have read only "On the Basis of Leninism," a long article criticizing Trotsky, and "Be Carried Away by Success," etc. I disliked even more his articles on the Chinese revolution. He was very different from Lenin: Lenin shared his heart with others and treated others as equals whereas Stalin liked to stand above every one else and order others around. (...). After I met with him, I became even more disgusted: I quarreled a lot with him in Moscow. Stalin was excitable by temperament. When he became agitated, he would spell out nasty things. (Mao's

Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 5) (IMG)

Hence, as can be seen, Mao was someone that could be trusted by the imperialists in the efforts to contain the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies for he was hostile to what he portrayed as Stalin-era Soviet 'imperialism' and 'chauvinism'. One person who promoted Mao's group against the USSR was the US intelligence operative Anna Louise Strong. Anna Strong had been famously arrested in the Stalin-era USSR on charge of being an 'American agent'. The media of People's Czechoslovakia indicated that Anna Strong was a Tito agent:

She was arrested [by] the USSR in 1949 while attempting to return to North China after a visit to Tito. Prague radio hinted at the time that she was a Yugoslav spy.. (SOVIET REVERSAL OF CHARGES AGAINST ANNA LOUISE STRONG SEEN AS GESTURE TO PEIPING, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

Remarkably, staff members in the CIA stated that Strong's Titoist/revisionist anti-Soviet propaganda made her: a running-dog of American imperialism.. (INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 40 16 FEBRUARY – 23 FEBRUARY 1949, CIA, p. 14) (IMG)

There was no quotation marks around that phrase, nor could the quote be semi-sarcastic when one examines the context of the quote. In that excerpt, it was made clear that Anna Strong spread lies against the USSR. Anna Louise Strong promoted propaganda against the USSR and that CIA reference to her as 'a running-dog of American imperialism' came in that context. Anyways, long before her arrest, Anna Strong promoted the concept of the Yan'an Way – the Maoist way – and sought to encourage China to separate from the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies:

Miss Strong had frequently proclaimed Peiping's independence from Moscow and had advanced the "Yenan way" as the pattern for colonial Asia. (SOVIET REVERSAL OF CHARGES AGAINST ANNA LOUISE STRONG SEEN AS GESTURE TO PEIPING, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

For further context on Yan'an, it is worth mentioning that during the Second World War:

In July of 1944, one month after D-day in Europe, the U.S. Observer Group, including the OSS (the World War II precursor to the CIA), U.S. military personnel, and China Hands like John Service, flew into Yan'an [where Mao was]. At that moment the interests of the Americans and Mao Zedong coincided; (The China Mirage: The Hidden History of American Disaster in Asia, James Bradley)

Officially, Anna Strong was portrayed as an American journalist and a communist sympathizer before being arrested by the Soviets as an American spy. During her visit to China, she spread lies and vicious slanders against the Soviets, lies that have been debunked in C18S2. In the document in which Strong was referred as the 'running-dog of American imperialism', the CIA made the following reports summarizing Strong's reports on Sino-Soviet relations:

According to Miss Strong, the Chinese Communists "acquired an empire in Manchuria" almost solely through their own efforts; while Soviet forces did capture the cities, that contribution was nullified by the fact that they installed his (CHIANG Kai-shek's) appointees ... and protected them there for months." Not content with mere obstructionism, the USSR attempted to sabotage the province economically: Manchuria was blockaded on three sides.. Not only no arms came over, but no even peaceful trade." As if that were not bad enough: "What help did Lin Piao get from the Russians? According to Lin Piao: 'No troops, no weapons, no advisors, nothing!'" Even more scandalous if not downright counterrevolutionary: "From the Russian-protected cities Chiang's officials instigated a civil war against the farmers of the countryside.. They (the Soviets) saved these officials from the Manchurian people." (In fact, the Soviet withdrawal was so managed as to allow the Chinese Communists to occupy Manchuria to 'capture' enormous quantities of Japanese materiel. (...) Miss Strong's version is false.. (INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 40 16 FEBRUARY – 23 FEBRUARY 1949, CIA, p. 13) (IMG)

The CIA continues:

Miss Strong's book makes Soviet designs in the border areas appear particularly nefarious, in that, by her account, the USSR did not assist, in fact impeded the Chinese communists in those regions. In Miss Strong's reports, the Soviets refused to cooperate even in the operation of the Manchurian railway network in which the USSR is a treaty partner. Miss Strong, asking a group of Chinese railway workers why they did not get lubricants and spare parts from the USSR, learned that "'We didn't even ask. We knew they would refuse.'" In addition to the above, which might be construed by a hostile reader as indicating that the workers' fatherland is both ungracious and pauperized, Miss Strong's account goes so far as to reflect unfavorably on Soviet economic theory itself. She writes of the moderate Chinese Communist land reform that "every family felt the stimulus of free enterprise, knowing that there was freedom at last to advance." Still worse, after the Chinese Communist refusal to admit their debt to the Soviet economy, either in fact or in theory, it appears that they would not even grant the supremacy of Soviet military strategy. The Chinese Communist victories have "come from a unique organization of the armed forces and a remarkably realistic strategy worked out by Mao Tse-tung." Most incredible of all, the Chinese Communists were not always meticulous in acknowledging their obligation to their own spiritual ancestors. At a ceremony celebrating the founding of the Chinese republic there "were no pictures

of Marx, Lenin, Stalin.” And to Mao himself Miss Strong attributes a remark which is highly suspect: “‘The fight is between a democracy and anti-democracy, not between Soviet and anti-Soviet.’” (INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 40 16 FEBRUARY – 23 FEBRUARY 1949, CIA, p. 14) (IMG)

Another person who could correctly observe that China was on the same path as that of Yugoslavia was the ‘Iranian Tito’ and CIA agent Khalil Maleki who later participated in the 1953 coup (see C17S7). Homa Katouzian, a top scholar on Khalil Maleki, remarked (note: the square brackets in the following quote were by Katouzian): as early as 1949, Maleki wrote:

I am not concerned with the details of Tito's policies, nor even his major policies which may well be open to criticism and about which I know very little. [I am only concerned with the view] that having regard to one's national self-interest is not in conflict with healthy and proper international relations.

The special reference to the Balkan countries in the above quotation was not accidental, for, surprisingly, Maleki also predicted a rift between Russia and China, despite the apparently solid bond that existed between them at the time, and for many years to come:

The movement that ... Mao Tse-tung now continues, will not in the end remain a satellite of the Soviet Union. Indeed it can be confidently predicted that similar developments to those of Yugoslavia will also take place in China. The forms which these developments will take will doubtless be different from what happened in Yugoslavia. But their substance would be similar resistance against [Soviet] pressures and expansionist behaviour.

(Khalil Maleki: *The Human Face of Iranian Socialism*, Homa Katouzian, 2018) (IMG)

Among most intelligence circles both in the imperialist camp and in the anti-imperialist camp, it was a well-known fact that Mao's group would eventually follow the path of Tito's group although the forms by which Mao's group presented themselves was going to be different and was going to be in a fake ‘anti-revisionist’ clothing.

One of the key slanders launched by Mao against Stalin-era USSR was as follows:

They [i.e. the Soviets] did not permit China to make revolution: that was in 1945. Stalin wanted to prevent China from making a revolution, saying that we should not have a civil war and should cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, otherwise the Chinese nation would perish. But we did not do what he said. (Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC (Sept. 24, 1962), CMTTP, p. 191. (Most of this passage is also in TMT, pp. 146-7.). In: *Mao's Evaluation of Stalin*, massline.org. Note: the website ‘massline’ is a Maoist organization.) (IMG)

In spite of the generous assistance which the USSR had provided the Chinese communists (see C18S1), Mao Zedong slandered Stalin by asserting:

At the time of the War of Liberation, Stalin first enjoined us not to press on with the revolution, maintaining that if civil war flared up, the Chinese nation would run the risk of destroying itself. (ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS: Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, April 25, 1956) (IMG)

To the Yugoslav officials, Mao also said:

Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give the whole of China to America and Jiang Jieshi. In terms of material and moral support, especially moral support, Stalin hardly gave any to us.. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

In 1964, Mao once again condemned Stalin, this time under the cover of ‘comradely criticism’ of Stalin:

Stalin ... made mistakes in dealing with Chinese problems, and they were no small mistakes. We are a great country of several hundred millions, and he opposed our revolution, and our seizure of power. We prepared for many years in order to seize power in the whole country, the whole of the Anti-Japanese War constituted a preparation. (TALK ON QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, Mao Zedong, August 18, 1964. In: *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. 9: years 1963-1971, 1st edition: 1994, p. 130) (IMG)

Those are interesting slanders launched by the man who said that China could industrialize only through ‘foreign capital’, particularly American investments and even including ‘the most conservative American businessman’: Even the most conservative American businessman can find nothing in our program to take exception to.

China must industrialize. This can be done – in China – only by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together, economically and politically. We can and must work together. (Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service) of a Conversation With Mao Tse-tung, Yenan, August 23, 1944. In: ‘Subject: Interview with Mao Tse-tung’. Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service), No. 15, Yenan, To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF- CBI, APO 879, August 27, 1944. In: *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS*, 1944, CHINA, Vol. 6, 893.00/9-2844) (IMG)

Regardless of whether or not US economic involvement in China after the Great Patriotic War and during China's early NEP period was going to be beneficial to China, the remarks of Mao about Stalin allegedly seeking to give China to the United States are hypocritical. Mao also accused Stalin of not having faith in the Chinese people:

You [Russians] have never had faith in the Chinese people, and Stalin was among the worst. (Mao Zedong and Pavel Iudin, 22 July 1958 in Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms*, pp. 348, 352, and *cWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 155-159., Cited in: *Wilson Center, One Finger's Worth of Historical Facts*, p. 11) (IMG)

Mao's remarks are reminiscent of the remarks of his supporters who claim that those who condemn the Mao-era and Deng-era Chinese regime are 'Sinophobe' 'racists', 'orientalists' distrusting the people of China.

Later on, when Mao went to Moscow, Stalin did not receive Mao. In an interview with Feliks Chuev, Molotov said that Mao after having arrived in Moscow:

talked about meeting Stalin and when it would be convenient. (Molotov Remembers, Feliks Chuev, p. 81) (IMG)

Due to the disrespectful behaviour of Mao behind Stalin's back, the Soviet leader did not receive Mao:

Stalin hadn't received him for some days after he arrived. Stalin told me, "Go and see what sort of fellow he is." (Molotov Remembers, Feliks Chuev, p. 81) (IMG)

Mao himself stated:

Stalin ... was not willing to sign a treaty. After two months of negotiations he at last signed. When did Stalin begin to have confidence in us? (Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC (Sept. 24, 1962), CMTTP, p. 191. (Most of this passage is also in TMT, pp. 146-7.). In: *Mao's Evaluation of Stalin*, massline.org) (IMG)

Later, when I went to Moscow to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, we had to go through another struggle. (Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC (Sept. 24, 1962), CMTTP, p. 191. (Most of this passage is also in TMT, pp. 146-7.). In: *Mao's Evaluation of Stalin*, massline.org. Note: the website 'massline' is a Maoist organization.) (IMG)

It was Washington's goal to liquidate communists and to replace them with Titoists. China's ruling clique pursued such an agenda of American imperialism so as to stabilize the influence of the Titoist faction in China. Within China, the clash intensified between the communist faction headed by Kao Kang and Rao Shushi and the Titoist faction led by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping. Mao himself admitted:

Some people opposed Lenin, saying that he was a dictator. Lenin's reply was straightforward: better that I should be a dictator than you! Stalin was very fond of Kao Kang and made him a special present of a motor car. Kao Kang sent Stalin a congratulatory telegram every 15 August. (Talks at the Chengtu Conference, Mao Zedong, March 1958) (IMG)

Mao told the Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin in 1954, that:

The basic content of the letter [to Stalin] was that apart from Gao Gang [alternative name for Kao Kang] himself, there wasn't a single good comrade in the Central Committee. Of course, Gao Gang was leading Kovalev when he characterized some members of the CC as pro-American in inclination and the others as anti-Soviet. It is clear that Gao Gang has had intentions of that sort for a long time. (From the Journal of Ambassador Pavel Yudin: Memorandum of Conversation with Mao Zedong, March 26, 1954) (IMG)

Kao Kang correctly noted to Stalin that the Central Committee of the CPC were Titoists. Mao accused Kao Kang of being a Soviet agent:

Are there such people in our country who provide foreigners with information behind the back of the Central Committee? I think there are. Kao Kang is a case in point. Many facts have proved this. (Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eight Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, November 15, 1956, Mao Zedong) (IMG)

In terms of the intra-Party power struggles in China, Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution was famously launched and directed ostensibly 'against' Chinese revisionists Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi – ostensibly. Kao and Rao sought to purge those whom Mao himself agreed were the main figureheads of Chinese Revisionism: Liu and Zhou. Yet, Mao's record shows that he rushed to defend those right-deviationists. Kao and Rao were planning to form an overt-level 'alliance' with Mao Zedong to combat Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi. Understanding this, Mao sided with Zhou and Liu. According to the memorandum recording the conversation of the Soviet Ambassador with Mao:

Typical was this: having returned from Moscow Gao Gang did not go home, but immediately headed for the Beijing Hotel, where party workers who had come from the provinces on business were staying, and began to work on them. The Gao Gang-Rao Shushi anti-party group adopted this tactic for its underground activity: to avow support for Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, but struggling in the first instance against Liu Shaoqi and then against Zhou Enlai. "But of course," Mao remarked, "it's not a matter of names, but of the party and its unity." To my response that this was the usual tactic of factionalists, that to act openly against Mao was beyond their power, Mao replied that by hiding behind his name the factionalists had deceived many comrades and that was

precisely why he (Mao Zedong) must swiftly and clearly state his point of view and show where he stood, otherwise “an epidemic of factionalism would quickly spread inside the party.” When the Gao Gang affair was revealed, the majority of party members correctly understood the actions of the CC, but some of them could fairly charge it with sluggishness. In this connection Mao Zedong, half in jest, said, “Mao Zedong proposed Gao Gang for membership in the Politburo, and he named him as deputy chairman of the central government. Now the comrades are having to approve all sorts of measures in relation to the Gao Gang affair, and they are asking why the CC overlooked this matter. Mao replies that evidently it was because he was blind. Then the comrades ask how Mao can work if he has gone blind-to which Mao replies that he has now recovered his sight.” (From the Journal of Ambassador Pavel Yudin: Memorandum of Conversation with Mao Zedong, March 26, 1954) (IMG)

When the Stalin faction was still dominant over the Soviet state, the USSR was able to strengthen the Kao Kang faction, whose social base was the industrial and hence proletarianized areas in China’s north, to encircle and co-opt Mao Zedong into supporting Kao Kang’s rise. With the decline of the Stalin faction, Mao ‘recovered his sight’ and was able to take action against his long-time foe.

Kao and Rao were purged. Officially, they were said to have committed suicide.

However, according to a Red Guard pamphlet during China’s Cultural Revolution, Kao Kang:

was put to death. (Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950 -1965, Frederick Teiwes, p. 526) (IMG)

Subsequently, Mao rewarded Liu Shaoqi with more power:

In the reorganization of the party structure at the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, Mao Tse-tung delegated a substantial amount of political power to Liu (as the senior Vice-chairman of the newly established Standing Committee of the Politburo) and to Teng (as head of the Secretariat charged with "attending to the daily work of the Central Committee"). (FACTIONALISM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: MAO'S OPPOSITION SINCE 1949 (Reference Title: POLO XXVIII), CIA, p. II) (IMG)

Hence, the high-ranking Chinese ‘Stalinists’ were murderously eliminated after Stalin’s death, and the Chinese Titoists headed by Mao, Liu, Zhou, and Deng emerged victorious. China was on the road of joining American Imperialism. In the absence of a strong Soviet support for the Chinese communists, the Titoization of China, at the time a predominantly agrarian petit-bourgeois country, was not very difficult.

In 1956, when Khrushchev had already given his infamous ‘Secret Speech’, Mao said:

During [Stalin’s] time people’s minds were so tightly controlled that even the feudal control had been surpassed. While some enlightened feudal lords or emperors would accept criticism, [Stalin] would tolerate none. (Mao’s Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 6) (IMG)

After the Sino-Russian Split, in order to contrast himself with his new Russian enemies led by Khrushchev, Mao opportunistically went so far as to adopt the banner of defending Stalin’s legacy. To be fair, Mao did defend Stalin on some minor issues – but so did Khrushchev in his Secret Speech. Khrushchev defended Stalin on the anti-Trotsky campaign:

We must affirm that the party had fought a serious fight against the Trotskyites, rightists and bourgeois nationalists, and that it disarmed ideologically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological fight was carried on successfully, as a result of which the party became strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a positive role. (The Crimes Of The Stalin Era, Special Report To The 20th Congress Of The Communist Party Of The Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 13, underline added)

The two leaders denounced Stalin as a dictatorial figure. In his famous piece to supposedly ‘defend’ Stalin, Mao said:

Stalin ... failed to rely upon the working class and the masses in the struggle against the forces of capitalism.. (On Khrushchov’s Phoney Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World, Mao Zedong, July 1964, MIA) (IMG)

Mao completely distorted the picture, promoted strawman’s fallacy, and denounced his opponents as ‘dogmatic’: There are two kinds of Chinese: one kind is a dogmatist who completely accepts Stalin’s line; the other opposes dogmatism, thus refusing to obey [Stalin’s] instructions. (Mao’s Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

Yet, as Mao admitted years prior to the Sino-Eurasian split, the Chairman’s praise for Stalin was fake, and in reality, he never believed in his praise for the Soviet leader:

I have written altogether three pieces praising Stalin. The first was written in Yanan to celebrate his sixtieth birthday [21 December 1939—ed.], the second was the congratulatory speech [I delivered] in Moscow [in December 1949], and the third was an article requested by Pravda after his death [March 1953—ed.]. (...). When I was in Moscow to celebrate his birthday, what else could I have done if I had chosen not to congratulate him?

Could I have cursed him instead? After his death the Soviet Union needed our support and we also wanted to support the Soviet Union. Consequently, I wrote that piece to praise his virtues and achievements. That piece was not for Stalin; it was for the Soviet Communist Party. As for the piece I did in Yanan, I had to ignore my personal feelings and treat him as the leader of a socialist country. Therefore, that piece was rather vigorous whereas the other two came out of [political] need, not my heart, nor at my will. Human life is just as contradictory as this: your emotion tells you not to write these pieces, but your rationality compels you to do so. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

In 1956, Mao had said:

Some people have asserted in the past that China has no intention to be friends with other countries [of the Eastern Bloc], but wants to split with the Soviet Union, thus becoming a troublemaker. Now, however, this kind of people shrinks to only a handful in the socialist countries; (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 4) (IMG)

Mao in fact did split with China's northern neighbour, contrary to Mao's earlier promisory remarks. What was the reason for this split? The narrative that Mao split with Khrushchev over Khrushchev's revisionism is a hoax. Mao actually agreed with Khrushchev on all the key questions of revisionism. For start, they were both strategically aligned and supportive of the Anglo-American agent Tito and the Yugoslav regime. On the economy and foreign policy, their position were very similar to each other's.

What follows is a documentation of the Mao clique's collaboration with Anglo-American imperialism and the Deng faction's expansion of such imperialist-collaborationism.

Mao's group was in cahoots with the Iranian regime, the regime of the SAVAK, the regime of the Shah. The martyr Bizhan Jazani, the founder and one of the primary theorists of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG) and a former Tudeh Party activist, wrote:

After the establishment of relations between China and Iran, after the telling [as in: signifying something beyond the superficial] trips of the members of [Iran's] Royal Family to China and the observation of their welcoming, and in short after People's China outpaced the USSR in flirting with the horrific dictatorship of Iran, [the Maoists] tried to justify the new policy of China in the region by promoting the concept of 'the grave dangers of social-imperialism'.

When China announced that the menace of 'social-imperialism' is greater than imperialism and presented 'social-imperialism' as the number one threat to the world, when [China] ... calls for closer relations between Iran and Pakistan, when Chinese aid to Yemen, the Zofar movement, and the Eritrean movement ceases and in correlation with it, the Iranian armed forces take on the role of the gendarmerie in revolutionary Zofar at the behest of the imperialists, the apologists of China are faced with the task of choosing in between the anti-imperialist popular struggle and the continued acceptance of this incorrect policy line [promoted by China].

The government of China, for the purpose of its own interests and rivalry with the Soviet Union, a rivalry that has reached the point of enmity, seeks to reduce Soviet influence in the region via an alliance with the imperialists and their [comprador] allies. Now, under such a policy, what are the tasks of the peoples of the region? Are we under the yoke of 'social-imperialism' or are we under the yoke of America, England, and the others?

(A Struggle against the Shah's Dictatorship as the Major Imperialist Force and the Gendarme of the Region, Bizhan Jazani, Date: some time between 1971 to 1975, p. 79) (IMG)

In a 1972 conversation with Kissinger and Nixon, the Shah noted that Mao Zedong wanted a stronger Iranian regime and that Maoist China was a 'reliable friend' of the Iranian regime as shown in Pakistan (in which China, Iran, and USA collaborated against Bengalis and Indians):

"So you ascribe your success to staying ahead of the discontent?" the President asked. The Shah said "yes. Our farmers own their own land. As for the universities, we just put subversives into jail." The Shah even thought Mao wanted a strong Iran; he had the impression that the PRC preferred to have good ties with Iran. The Chinese were reliable friends, as they proved in Pakistan. The Empress was going to visit Peking. (Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 31, 1972, Participants: Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger. In: 'FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969-1976', Vol. E-4, DOCUMENTS ON IRAN AND IRAQ, 1969-1972) (IMG)

For what it is worth, a memorandum of conversation between Ruhollah Khomeini and Arafat confirms the Chinese regime's support for the Shah. In this conversation, Ruhollah Khomeini told Arafat:

The Shah too relied on the United States, Britain, China, Israel, etc. But such a support could not possible be strong. The only thing that can be so strong that one can rely upon it is Allah. God is the fulcrum. And I always advise him [i.e. Yasser Arafat] and my nation and his nation, to always keep God in mind.. Do not trust in

material things, but trust in the divine. (Memorandum of Conversation with Yasser Arafat on the Victory of the Islamic Revolution and the Situation in Palestine, February 17, 1979) (IMG)

The Chinese regime's collaboration with the Iranian regime for support for Pakistan against India goes back to China's own history of strategic partnership with the ultra-reactionary pseudo-Islamic fascist government of Pakistan back in the 1960s:

In a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Sino-Pakistani relations on February 14, 1964, Mr. Suslov said: "The leadership apparatus of China, in addition to deteriorating its relations with India to an extraordinary level, has reached a point which, as you are aware, while not being a member of any official military pact, is practically an ally of Pakistan, a member state SEATO and CENTO, military pacts that pose a danger to the peace and security of the nations of Asia. The fact is that the leaders of China, by throwing away "all the revolutionary statements" of their own, have gone down a road which cannot be reconciled with the principled approach of the united front of the socialist countries in the struggle against the imperialist blocs. What can be said? The methods of the Chinese leaders about choosing their friend and ally is very strange. A question must be asked:

How can they dishonor and tarnish the socialist countries and the communist parties, and at the same time to flatter the reactionary regime of Pakistan right in front of the whole world? It is really incomprehensible. Would there be anyone who would believe that close relations with Pakistan is rooted in the interests of the progress and the development of the revolutionary struggles of the nations of Asia against imperialism, about which the Chinese leaders have stirred up controversy?"

(Suslov's Report, Persian translation, p. 27)

Indeed, what can be said! We ask, in particular, Mr. Suslov and the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, which justifies Soviet policy: does anyone believe that approaching the Shah's regime and providing military and economic assistance to the Iranian government and political and propaganda support for the monarchy results in the advancement of the interests and the development of the struggle of the Asian nations against imperialism?!

(The Problems Facing the Iranian People's Anti-Colonial and Liberation Movement & the Most Critical Tasks of Iran's Communists in the Current Conditions, Bizhan Jazani, Autumn 1967. Reprinted by the: The Organization for the Unity of the Iranian People's Fedayeen, Winter 2003, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

During that time period, China had gone to war against India in order to overthrow the anti-imperialist government of the Nehru faction. Such hostile behaviour by the Chinese regime, the alliance with ultra-reactionary Pakistan and the hostility to the progressive bourgeois-democratic India, are cases in point demonstrating the criminal and pro-imperialist collaborationist character of Chinese strategic relations. **China's alliance with Pakistan in the 1960s was an alliance with American imperialism.** China's excuse for aggressing India was that India maintained relations with the Dalai Lama. The fact that India had diplomatic relations and diplomatically courted the Dalai Lama is not a legitimate reason for China launching an invasion against it, nor is it any 'proof that India was behind the colour revolutionary agitations in Tibet in the 1950s. On the contrary, India was the country that advocated China's cause in the UN, lest one forgets. India's cultural and diplomatic relations with the Dalai Lama was an excellent opportunity to crack down on the pro-fascist and feudal forces which the Dalai Lama led in Tibet, for China could utilize India's soft power influence over and relations with the Tibetan religious reactionaries as a channel for intelligence penetration into the Tibetan reactionary forces. This is much like how the Stalin-era USSR rightly exercised its soft power influence and established excellent diplomatic relations with Israel as a channel for supporting the Arab-friendly progressive Israeli generals that had been catapulted into the ranks of the anti-Arab and reactionary Israeli regime. Through diplomatic relations with the Dalai Lama, India was not really 'siding' with the Tibetan rebels against China, just like how the USSR, by having relations with Israel, was not stabbing the Arabs in the back. In any case, by allying with the CIA-backed Pakistan, China allied with the CIA itself since the early 1960s.

By the 1970s, China's alliance with American imperialism only became more official. In collaboration with the SAVAK and the CIA, China funded the regime of Yahya Khan, the regime that infamously launched a campaign of mass-slaughter of an estimated 3 million Bengalis and a rape of an estimated 400,000 Bengali women:

Prime Minister Chou: He also told us that he was taking good care of him and protecting him, and that if he didn't do so, some other generals would want to take care of him (Yahya) differently.

Of course we don't want to interfere in others' internal affairs, but Yahya really did not lead his troops in East Pakistan well. Even though we assisted with armaments, we didn't send a single military personnel, what the Soviet Union calls military adviser. We only sent some people to train in the use of the planes and guns we sent, and afterwards brought those people back. At the time of the ceasefire they (the Pakistanis) still had 80,000 troops in East Pakistan. It was not a situation in which they couldn't keep fighting.

(Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, NSC Staff John Holdridge

and Winswton Lord, Zhou Enlai, Chang Wen-Chin, Chiao Kuan-Hua, February 23, 1972. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, China, October 1971 to February 1972, US State Department, pp. 724-725) (IMG)

Bourguiba, a staunch foe of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, hailed the Chinese stance on Pakistan:

Dr. Kissinger: We had a letter from Bourghiba expressing approval of your stand on India/Pakistan. Prime Minister Chou: Even Bourghiba, who is considered to be a rightist, has supported Pakistan. As Chairman Mao mentioned yesterday, sometimes it is a good thing to be on the right. (Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, NSC Staff John Holdridge and Winswton Lord, Zhou Enlai, Chang Wen-Chin, Chiao Kuan-Hua, February 23, 1972. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, China, October 1971 to February 1972, US State Department, p. 729) (IMG)

For what it is worth, Sadeq Tabataba'i, a close relative of Ruhollah Khomeini and an official of the Islamic Republic of Iran, recalled that the SAVAK was promoting the views and ideas of Mao Zedong as early as 1970. The following is an excerpt of his memoirs published in the Islamic Republic's official website on the life of Ruhollah Khomeini: **THE SAVAK IS THE PROPAGATOR OF MAO'S VIEWS**

SAVAK did not cease its activities. In 1970, a newspaper called "Parcham e Sorkh" ['Red Flag'] was published promoting Comrade Mao's ideas. In this publication to the differences comrades, it was strongly encouraged in the various and diverse communist organizations. Although the newspaper's affiliation with SAVAK was soon exposed, both through the type of content and through organizations affiliated with the confederation, it showed that the regime was also involved in creating organizations. The term has become popular and communist. The affiliated organizations mentioned above, although they competed and were hostile to each other, knew each other, so they were soon able to find traces of SAVAK in the "Red Flag". Another of SAVAK's activities was an incident that took place during the tenth congress of the Confederation (December 26, 1969 to January 5, 1970) in Karlsruhe. The congress was attended by about 400 representatives of the Confederate affiliates. The Union of Islamic Students Associations has sent a message to the above Congress; And appreciated the organization's struggles in support of the Muslim people of Iran and their struggles under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. (The Socio-Political Memoirs of Dr. Sadeq Tabataba'i, pp. 257-258) (IMG)

The case of the Maoists' espionage for the SAVAK is a very large case to examine and will not be examined here, but will be explored more in another book. However, it is worth mentioning that there have been numerous books written (in Farsi) about the espionage activities of the Maoists for the SAVAK. The espionage activities of the Maoists for the SAVAK goes back back to as early as the mid-1960s. During the 1970s, the SAVAK dispatched its intelligence agents to Lebanon via a Palestinian organization that was not officially self-described 'Maoist' but had very clear and explicit Maoist tendency. One of the major bases of the Maoists was Saddamite Iraq. The numerous Maoist grouplets and terrorist gangs were based in Iraq since the mid-1970s. The Iranian Maoists moved their main base to Iraq by the time of the 1979 revolution, although they cultivated a close alliance with Abu Nidal Organization and Saddam's Mukhaberat long before the 1979 revolution.

One of the most horrifying Maoization programs engineered by the SAVAK is with regards to the 'Shia Socialist' eclectic terrorist organization, the 'Mojahedin e Khalq' (MEK). Not many people are aware that the MEK used to be a secular Maoist organization for a while. In an operation often referred to as 'THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION', the SAVAK engineered a bloody terrorist campaign in which the MEK for a while became a 'secular' 'Marxist-Leninist' organization of the Maoist type. Through this program, the Maoists and Trotskyites jointly and systematically slaughtered the Shia Islamist anti-Shah warriors in the MEK. One of these Shia Islamist fighters murdered was a man named Sharif Waqefi, after whom the top Iranian university, the 'Sharif Institute of Technology', is named for his martyrdom. Later on in 1979, Mas'ud Rajavi, a SAVAK spy who pretended to oppose the Maoization of the MEK, was dispatched from the SAVAK prison and established another 'Shia socialist' eclectic terror organization, also named the MEK. Rajavi's MEK was parallel to the Maoist MEK. After the Islamic Revolution, the main intelligence base of the Maoists, the 'semi-Maoists', and the Rajavists was fascist Iraq, even though Maoist presence in fascist Iraq goes back to years before 1979.

No, the Maoist espionage for the SAVAK was not an aberration away from 'true Maoism'. It was and remains true Maoism itself. Nor was the SAVAK's extensive sponsorship of Maoism a coincidence. It reflected Mao's and China's collaboration with the Iranian regime.

The expansion of the Sino-American intelligence cooperation goes back to long before 1971. Note that during the 1960s the Kennedy Administration and the Johnson Administration both had many progressive-minded officials affiliated with the Roosevelt faction of the Democratic Party. There is no doubt that the influence of the pro -communist F. D. Roosevelt faction in the Democratic Party served as an obstacle against the Sino-American alliance. The rise of the Nixon-Kissinger group, which was under the minimal pressure of the Roosevelt-Kennedy-type Democrats, facilitated the consolidation of the Sino-American alliance. Had the Nixon-Kissinger group been in power since the early 1960s, the alliance with China would have come much earlier than 1970-1971.

Anyways, 1971 certainly marked a new stage in this process:

the White House in November 1971 set up a "back channel" to China through the Chinese delegation to the United Nations in New York. From that point until May 1973, Kissinger traveled secretly to New York about 20 times for talks with the head of the delegation, Huang Hua, later foreign minister. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

The Chinese and the Americans expanded military and intelligence cooperation with each other as early as 1972: They usually met, Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "in a CIA-provided 'safe house' in mid-Manhattan, a seedy apartment whose mirrored walls suggested less prosaic purposes." In the fall of 1972, Chinese military officials in New York, sources said, initiated another important contact, with Michael Pillsbury, a Mandarin-speaking U.N. bureaucrat who soon joined the Rand Corp. to work on highly classified research for the Air Force and Defense Department. He kept up his contacts with approval from the think tank and high-level U.S. officials, a fact that sources say had to be established at one point for skeptical FBI agents who kept watch on the Chinese delegation. Pillsbury met regularly with the Chinese -- a three-star general and his aides -- until 1976, sending a stream of still-classified memos to a select circle of U.S. officials, including Kissinger's office. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.- CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

In February 24, 1973, Mao met with Henry Kissinger. Mao made it clear that he supported the US military occupation of Europe:

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we will do our best to strengthen European defenses and keep our armies in Europe.

Chairman Mao: That would be very good.

(My Meeting with Chairman Mao, Memorandum for The President from Henry A. Kissinger, February 24, 1973. I would like to thank my friend Lorant Szabo for sending me the source for this.) (IMG)

Zhou Enlai ('Chou Enlai') too supported NATO and the US agenda throughout the world including in Chile:

—[Chou] thought we should come closer to Japan on defense matters (i.e., the nuclear umbrella) and indicated he agreed that it was preferable for us to join the Japanese in Siberian development than to leave them alone. I emphasized the importance of keeping the Japanese tied to us and not subjected to too many pressures.

—Chou criticized Allende's rashness in Chile and Che Guevara's adventurism. In response to my comments, he in effect said that the PRC would not cause trouble in Latin America.

—I went over our Soviet strategy in some detail, including our rationale for the agreement which you had used during the Middle East alert. He continually sounded their by now familiar preoccupations.

—Chou strongly supported NATO and our troop presence in Europe. He said he would continue to educate European leaders, beginning with Heath who will visit Peking soon.

(SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973-1976', US State Department, p. 438) (IMG)

China formed an alliance with the US, Japan, and pro-American countries in Europe:

Confirmation and deepening of the close identity between you and the Chinese leaders' strategic perspectives on the international situation. As I pointed out after my February 1973 trip, we have become tacit allies. We share essentially the same views about the Soviet strategy (though the Chinese are firmly convinced of Soviet hegemonial ambitions while we still hold out the possibility that our combination of firmness and negotiation can steer Moscow on a constructive course); the necessity of a strong American world role and defense capability; and the strategic importance of Europe, Japan, the Middle East, and the Near East-South Asia axis. (SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973-1976', US State Department, p. 431) (IMG)

Indeed, Mao seemed basically optimistic about containing the Soviet Union, citing his familiar axis of potential or tacit allies in China, Japan, the United States, Europe and the Near East-South Asia axis.

He again stressed the importance of our working closely with these countries—maintaining close ties with Japan; keeping our military presence in Europe; and countering Soviet influence in the Middle East (as we were now doing), Pakistan, Iran, India, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. I outlined our efforts to support these various countries; offset Soviet influence; maintain a strong national defense; keep forces in Europe; anchor Japan securely, etc. (SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973-1976', US State Department, p. 436) (IMG)

China's regime and the Anglo-American imperialists fostered military relations with each other since the Mao era, not

since after Mao's death. The British military provided the arms to Mao-era China in 1975 and the Americans did not veto this deal:

Before leaving office as secretary of state, Kissinger took the first steps toward sharing, persuading President Gerald R. Ford in 1975 not to veto a \$200 million British deal with China for military jet engines and in 1976 secretly approving a U.S. sale of two advanced computers with military applications. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

Mao and his gang were indeed militarily sponsored by the MI6. Not for nothing did Stalin regard Mao as a Titoist, and China as another Yugoslavia.

China and Yugoslavia were allies. Hoxha testified:

Mao Tsetung ... expressed his great desire to meet Tito. Tito himself declared recently: "I was invited to China when Mao Tsetung was alive. During the visit of the Chairman of the Federal Executive Veche, Djemal Myedich, to China, at that time, Mao Tsetung expressed to him his desire that I should visit China. Chairman Hua Kuofeng also told me that, five years ago, Mao Tsetung said that he should have invited me for a visit, stressing that in 1948, too, Yugoslavia was in the right, a thing which he (Mao Tsetung) had declared even then, to a narrow circle. But, taking into consideration the relations between China and the Soviet Union at that time, this was not said publicly". (From Tito's speech at the meeting of activists of the SR of Slovenia, September 8, 1978). (Imperialism and the Revolution, Enver Hoxha)

A document declassified by the US State Department confirmed Hoxha's remarks on the Sino-Yugoslav alliance:

Minister Huang: President Tito is the only survivor of the leaders of the Second World War, who led the people in the fight against fascism. Now he is already 85. President Tito expressed the desire to visit Chairman Mao long ago. Chairman Mao had high regard for President Tito. When the Foreign Minister visited China, in 1975, Chairman Mao passed his high regards to Tito. His name means the same as iron, and Mao described him as strong as iron. So, when President Tito came, we paid him a warm welcome. (SUBJECT: Secretary's Dinner for PRC Foreign Minister Huang: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 28, 1977. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1977-1980', Vol. XIII, US State Department, p. 248) (IMG)

The alliance between Mao's group and Tito's group goes back to as early as 1956 when Mao explicitly endorsed the Yugoslav regime's efforts against the USSR. However, China and Yugoslavia for a while posed as 'enemies' – until 1968. In 1968, China joined the butcher of Kosovo in condemning the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. A document co-written by Colonel Donald W. Bernier – the former Director of Foreign Intelligence Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the US Department of the Army – stated:

Chinese-Yugoslav relations remained [ostensibly] hostile until mid-1968 when the Peking government suddenly quieted its anti-Yugoslav propaganda. In early 1969 the Chinese invited Yugoslavia to send representatives to Peking to discuss the restoration of political and economic relations, and in February the two countries concluded a trade agreement. Belgrade sources indicated that the resumption of full diplomatic relations was imminent in mid-1970. Initiated by the Chinese, the reconciliation came at a time when both governments were under renewed pressure from the Soviet Union. (Area Handbook for Yugoslavia, Gordon McDonald, Donald Bernier, September 1970, p. 285) (IMG)

A document by the US Air Force confirmed that China and Yugoslavia cultivated ties for a military alliance:

since 1969 Chinese leaders have come to value Belgrade's tenacious independence. (...). The resumption of Sino-Yugoslav contacts in the spring of 1969 through the medium of trade was clearly prompted by anti-Soviet motives, and the cessation of Chinese polemics and a generally warmer atmosphere soon led to the exchange of ambassadors in June 1970.⁸⁸ Just one year later, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac visited Peking. The process of normalizing Sino-Yugoslav relations has been marked by the exchange of economic and cultural delegations, including the perhaps inevitable table tennis teams. By October 1974 things had improved to the point where a Yugoslav army delegation led by Lt. General Branko Jokovic, Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army visited Peking to "enhance cooperation between the armies of Yugoslavia and China and friendship between the two peoples." A year later, in October 1975, Premier Djemal Bijedic visited China amidst a flurry of publicity. Mao Tse-tung received the premier and even conveyed his regards to Tito. Vice -Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing's welcome speech lauded Yugoslavia's adherence to a policy of nonalignment.. (THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE, Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering & Defense Nuclear Agency, US Air Force, Joseph Douglass, Jr., p. 63) (IMG)

Some would argue that Mao Zedong was 'forced' by the 'revisionist majority' in the Politburo, Central Committee, etc. to make 'concessions' to the American imperialists, that by the early 1970s, Mao had become a 'puppet' of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. This kind of an argument reflects a poor understanding of how being a puppet looks like. First of all, had Mao been opposed to collaboration with American imperialism, then Mao would not have survived until 1976.

He would have died a 'natural' death. Such a massive level of collaboration with American imperialism could only possibly occur with the agreement of a large part of the Chinese state apparatus with the CIA, and such a pervasive CIA influence would have annihilated the first alleged 'obstacle' to the CIA-collaborationists: the allegedly 'anti-imperialist' Mao Zedong. This would have taken either the form of Mao resigning due to 'poor health' or 'aging'. Alternatively, it would have taken the form of Mao being given an extra-'exalted' position devoid of any real power. Alternatively, it would have taken the form of Mao dying 'naturally' or in an 'accident'. None of these occurred, and Mao survived politically and physically all the way until 1976; a 4-5 year period (from 1971-1972) is way too long a survival for an anti-imperialist leader so highly encircled by pro-imperialist elements.

A supplementary point to mention is that when a leader disapproves of the other government officials' treasonous collaboration with the enemy, such a leader would often refuse to meet the enemy officials who have arrived to one's country; or if having to meet with these officials, such a leader would deliberately signal his/her unease to the world media through facial expressions that signal unease or anger. Mao showed no such signals. On the contrary, he was extremely happy as demonstrated by Kissinger's memorandum and by the photos. If the 'revisionist majority' were able to 'force' Mao to even signal such a great approval of the treasonous collaboration, then again, the 'revisionist majority' would have certainly been so powerful as to ensure that Mao gets demoted or dies. This point about signals does not prove anything, for signals are not concrete evidence. Nonetheless, the point about signals is useful as a supplementary point for the remarks about how Mao survived for so long until 1976.

Nor could there be any motivation on the side of Deng and Zhou to keep Mao in his official position for the purpose of pursuing their agenda while 'hiding behind' Mao's 'charisma'. Deng and Zhou had no shame in pursuing their agenda out in the open, and Mao by then lacked charisma due to such anti-Chinese crimes as the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Cultural Revolution'.

Describing the mood of Mao Zedong in the meeting with Henry Kissinger, Kissinger reported:

Mentally [Mao] was extremely impressive, improving his previous performances. He led the conversation, covered all major international issues with subtlety and incisiveness and an unerring knack at striking the essential chords in a seemingly casual way. By the time he was finished he had sketched their strategic vision comprehensively and laid down the essential elements of their policies region by region. He went from issue to issue in an ostensibly random, but always purposeful, manner. And all of this was done without a single note of his own or prompting by Chou, who once again was clearly deferential in his presence.

The Chairman obviously enjoyed himself. Throughout he employed his earthy phrasing and bawdy humor to illustrate a point or color a tone; the females present laughed easily, almost coquettishly and were again at ease in his presence. After the conversation had gone beyond one and three quarters hours, several on the Chinese side looked at their watches and made tentative moves to close out the meeting, but Mao prolonged the talk and toward the end engaged in exchanges on philosophy.

Indeed one of the striking aspects of the visit was the fact that this time Mao presented the bulk of the Chinese positions while Chou generally stuck to details and asking questions and making comments on our positions. Before, Chou had taken his cue from Mao but made extensive substantive presentations of his own.

The Chairman was vigorously supportive of *you* as I have reported. He praised your strong policies, singling out the recent alert and Middle East policy generally. He found your actions much firmer and steadier than the Cuban missile crisis scenario.

(SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973-1976', US State Department, p. 435) (IMG)

Another argument that some seek to push for in order to justify Mao's crimes is that China needed the approval of the US for replacing Taiwan as the legitimate representative of China. Helping the CIA in destroying so many countries just to prove to America that China, a very large country, is more worthy than a small island in the Pacific – there are no words available to describe the pettiness and foolishness of such a 'justification' of the crimes committed by China's government. However, even if in the impossible-case scenario, such a point was legitimate, it is still not so empirically correct, because the issue with regards to China was not and could not have been Mao's main priority. Kissinger recalled:

Mao was both patient and somewhat inscrutable on Taiwan and diplomatic relations. He said that the Taiwan issue "is not an important one; the issue of the overall international situation (i.e., the Soviet Union) is an important one." the PRC would not rush us on this question or that of diplomatic relations, he stated. (SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973 -1976', US State Department, p. 436) (IMG)

Mao's priority was not Taiwan. Mao's priority was with regards to assisting Anglo-American finance capital, the kulaks, the corrupt bureaucrats, etc. to conquer the world; to this end, he collaborated with American imperialism. The favorable attitude towards the CIA goes back to decades earlier when he sympathized with Tito's cause in the fight against the Soviet Union. The military collaboration with Anglo-American imperialism expanded from the 1960s, since the time of China's alliance with comprador Pakistan and its hostile action against India.

Nor did the Eurasians seek to launch a nuclear strike on China; recall the following excerpt of a CIA document:

In the strongest public threat to use nuclear weapons against China ever made by Khrushchev, he warned that it would be "dangerous" to encroach on Soviet borders "given up-to-date weapons of annihilation" in the Soviet arsenal (speech of 15 September 1964). His policy was thus now to "rattle" nuclear weapons toward China, as he had done in the past to many other countries.

However, Mao and his lieutenants were able, given this clearly marked pattern of Khrushchev's behavior, to distinguish a bluff from a real threat of imminent attack. Chinese perception of the credibility of a Soviet threat was highly context-dependent, keyed to the positioning of Soviet forces. Khrushchev had failed to frighten the Chinese into ceasing their border probes because he had not mad his threats sufficiently credible, either by deploying tactical nuclear weapons or by a big conventional buildup of regular forces on the frontier.

(THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, pp. 5-6)



Above: Mao with Kissinger – as Kissinger correctly described, Mao was exhilarated for his meeting with Kissinger. To the world media, Mao was not facially signalling disapproval of Zhou's or Deng's meetings with the US officials

(IMG)

Baseless is the argument that the Soviet 'plan' to launch a nuclear-strike on China 'forced' Mao to collaborate with American imperialism. Lastly and above all, Mao's pro-American views are proven by his hostile attitude towards the Stalin-era USSR and his favorable attitudes towards the CIA-MI6 agent Tito and the latter's fascist gang; such attitudes existed in Mao as early as the 1940s and came fully out in the open by the 1970s; the policies of Mao in the 1970s are mere reflections of Mao's views in the 1940s.

Until the early 1990s, China's regime was dominated by the comprador classes – such as bureaucrats and kulaks – allied to finance capital, the Titoist spies of the American secret service. China was allied to all the CIA-sponsored fascist forces in Latin America, including the Pinochet junta. China was allied to the regimes of Sadat, Mubarak, and Nimeiri, to the South African Apartheid and the Titoist gang of Siad Barre, to NATO and the West Germany dominated by the Nazi BND, and to the MI6. One needs not mention China's invasion of Vietnam and the support for the Khmer Rouge. All of these facts have been confirmed by Fidel Castro. Interestingly, ignorant of Fidel Castro's stance on China's regime, the modern-day apologists for Deng also have acknowledged Fidel Castro as an anti-imperialist. Hence, the remarks of Castro will be presented here as evidence (and after reading this, the apologists for Deng will probably denounce Fidel Castro as 'pro-imperialist' 'Hoxhaist' 'orientalist' 'Sinophobe' and 'CIA agent'). Fidel Castro remarked:

We would not be honest if we denied that the progressive and revolutionary movement itself is in serious trouble. The disgusting betrayal of the cause of internationalism perpetrated by the Chinese leaders, their insane political conduct and their shameless alliance with the imperialist powers have been a severe blow to the progressive forces of the world.

Viet Nam, Angola and Cuba, small countries that gained a solid and recognized prestige in the world for the heroic pages they wrote and still write in their determined, firm and unwavering struggle against imperialism **today suffer brutal attacks, hostility and slander campaign of the treacherous Chinese leadership.** In the case of our own homeland, after almost 20 years of aggression and harassment by the United States, which failed to bring it to its knees, we see today the incredible and infamous fact that **the current Chinese leadership justifies the economic blockade of Cuba and the presence of a Yankee naval base in our territory.**

Between the imperialist cable [news] agencies [such as CNN] and those of China, there is absolutely no difference in their foul and intriguing language, in their perfidious and vicious arguments to attack Cuba. Soviet collaboration, which was so decisive for the consolidation and survival of the Cuban Revolution in its most critical years, when the imperialists seized the sugar markets from us and cut off our supplies of food, medicine, fuel, spare parts and essential raw materials, is vilely maligned [in Chinese regime media]. Together with the decisive economic support received, we Cubans will never forget that the weapons with which we defended ourselves in Giron against the imperialist aggressors were weapons supplied by the Soviets (APPLAUSE). And if the United States could not commit genocide against Cuba, with direct aggression, this is largely due to the solidarity and support of the USSR. The historical facts cannot be so blatantly denied. The human word was devised for more noble ends.

The internationalist policy of Cuba, the unlimited generosity of our people, whose children fought in Angola against South African racists to prevent them from taking away from their people the independence they won with 15 years of heroic struggle, and our solidarity in the fight against the Ethiopian Revolution against foreign aggression, promoted by the United States, the NATO powers and the Arab reaction, **are described by the Chinese leaders in the same crude, vulgar and even worse terms than those of the [official] spokesmen of imperialism, in ways more subtle, less downright liars.**

(...). Ever since they turned a ridiculous mortal [Mao Zedong] into a god in the People's Republic of China, destroyed the party and its best cadres in the days of the mad adventure of the Cultural Revolution and allowed themselves to be carried away by the petty bourgeois spirit and great- power chauvinism, which led them to betray internationalism and to the conversion of a socialist state into a nepotic satrapy, where the rulers' wives and sons-in-law became members of the Political Bureau, everything was made possible.

What surprise is there that the Chinese government today supports the fascist and bloodthirsty regime of Pinochet and the repressive and reactionary military governments of Latin America? What surprise is there that [China's government] collaborated with Mobuto and with NATO interventionist forces? Why be surprised that it joined South Africa against Angola; Somalia in its aggression against the Ethiopian Revolution; [the Sadat-Mubarak regime in] Egypt in its policy of separate peace and surrender; to the conservative and reactionary forces of England [i.e. MI6] and the Federal Republic of Germany; to NATO in Europe; to Yankee imperialism everywhere; and to bet rudely and dangerously [China's role in] the inevitability of a third world war?

But of the crimes of the Chinese leadership, the most reprehensible is its hostility to Viet Nam. Everyone

knows that **behind Cambodian extremism is Maoism and the Chinese ruling clique**. No one is unaware that they are behind the provocations against Viet Nam. Nobody ignores that it is they who are behind the artificially-created so-called 'Hoa problem'. A whole great chauvinistic propaganda campaign is currently being developed in China against the Vietnamese and all economic collaboration has been suspended. In this criminal and unscrupulous way the Vietnamese effort to rebuild the country cruelly devastated by the imperialist war is sabotaged.

These attitudes of the Chinese government remind us of the Yankee arrogance against Cuba. In the first years of the Revolution, the imperialists also tried to bring ships without our authorization to transport Yankee citizens; They promoted the emigration of tens of thousands of Cubans, essentially professionals, specialists, and skilled workers; They launched a colossal smear campaign against Cuba and adopted severe economic blockade measures.

Viet Nam, the homeland of the most modest and consistent Marxist-Leninist of our time, the unforgettable and beloved Ho Chi Minh (applause); Viet Nam, the a thousand times heroic people whose patriotic and revolutionary feats astonished the world, is also today a victim of Chinese aggression and betrayal.

Days ago the cables reported violations of the Viet Nam border by squadrons of Chinese military aircraft. If the criminal hand is not stopped in time, we will witness more serious military provocations and aggressions by China against the heroic Viet Nam. That is why we must offer the people of Viet Nam our most determined solidarity and support (EXTENDED APPLAUSE). Our Party intends to reactivate the Solidarity Committees with Viet Nam against the threats of imperialist aggression, implemented this time, however absurd it may seem, through its new and brand-new allies in the field of counterrevolution.

Contempt for peoples, norms and principles has to have a limit, it has to stop at some point, it has to really meet a resistance in the universal conscience.

Not even Albania, a small socialist country that supported it in the initial days of the division of the revolutionary movement, follows China today. The economic collaboration was also withdrawn from her.

The Chinese people themselves, hardworking, combative, self-sacrificing, heroic and revolutionary, will sooner or later settle accounts with the traitors who have laid down their beautiful internationalist flags at the feet of imperialism.

(SPEECH MADE BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, IN THE NATIONAL CENTRAL ACT FOR THE XXV ANNIVERSARY OF THE MONCADA BARREL ASSAULT, HELD IN THE SCHOOL CITY "26 DE JULIO", SANTIAGO DE CUBA, ON JULY 26, 1978, "YEAR OF THE XI FESTIVAL". (SHORTHAND VERSIONS – COUNCIL OF STATE), Cuba.cu. Bold added.) (IMG)

That China's regime was extensively collaborating with the CIA-backed fascist forces around the world is voluminously backed up and corroborated by CIA-sponsored sources, by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other sources.

To knowingly and willingly allow the CIA to establish a base for military intelligence-gathering in one's own territory constitutes a form of espionage for the CIA. This Deng Xiaoping and his group pursued wholeheartedly. In collaboration with Joe Biden, the American spy Deng Xiaoping and his group promoted the presence of the CIA bases in China as part of the efforts for gathering military intelligence on the Soviets and on any pro-Soviet opposition force that could exist in Chinese territory:

However, a senior administration official, speaking on condition that he not be identified, said in an interview last week that intelligence-sharing has been part of a substantial U.S. "investment" in China since President Richard M. Nixon's historic 1972 visit opening new ties to the West. The official said both countries had profited from this investment and "it is that which we have to balance against our current, justified outrage" over recent Chinese actions. A number of diplomats, legislators and officials said they think the U.S.-China intelligence connections are relatively secure, barring a full-scale trade embargo or a break in diplomatic relations. "The relationship has been mutually useful," said one retired U.S. diplomat. "Both sides have taken care to isolate that cooperation from the ups and downs" of political ties. Knowledgeable sources, who assert that the United States gains more than China does from the intelligence ties, praise President Bush for his relatively low-key reaction to the executions in China and his emphasis on maintaining the U.S.-China "strategic relationship." They said a less measured response could jeopardize the arrangements. But several congressional sources familiar with the ties contend that they are not important enough to muzzle official U.S. criticism of Beijing's behavior, partly because the United States in recent years has developed alternative sources for some of the information. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), for example, declined to discuss any aspects of the partnership but said, "Whatever military or intelligence arrangements may or may not exist, they cannot add up to a sufficient rationale for failing to act swiftly and on principle with the Chinese government."

It was Biden's 1979 conversation with senior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping during a visit to Beijing that showed Deng's willingness to permit the U.S.-equipped listening posts to help monitor Soviet compliance with

the proposed SALT II arms limitation treaty. Deng, The Washington Post reported at the time, made clear that the monitoring stations would have to be run by the Chinese and that Beijing would share the collected data with Washington. The tapes are analyzed in the United States. White House and State Department spokesmen have declined in recent weeks to comment directly on the status of the listening posts or other intelligence ties. At a news conference June 5, however, Bush characterized U.S. Ambassador James R. Lilley as "one of the best listening posts we have in China."

Lilley, an old friend of Bush, was the Central Intelligence Agency station chief in China in the mid- 1970s when Bush headed the U.S. liaison office there. Several sources indicated that U.S. experts are working at the stations in tandem with their Chinese counterparts and that there now may be more than two stations. "It depends on how you count them," a longtime intelligence expert said. And a former defense official said, "It may very well be that there are principal stations and lesser stations." The intelligence expert said the Chinese "may be doing the low-tech while we do the high-tech" functions.

He added: "They might tell us to get out. We have lost facilities in other countries because of political change. But I think it would be one of the last relationships {with China} to go. It was one of the first to arrive." U.S. intelligence-sharing with China goes back to 1971 when Henry A. Kissinger, then White House national security adviser, secretly flew to Beijing to pave the way for Nixon and showed "internal {U.S.} studies" to Premier Zhou Enlai. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

After the 1979 overthrow of the Iranian regime, the CIA and NATO intelligence bases that existed in Kapkan, Iran, were transferred to China for espionage against the Soviets. In particular, the CIA bases were established in Xinjiang. A Military Review journal based in the Russian Federation stated:

Special mention should be made of the EWS radar located on the outskirts of the town of Korla in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Very interesting history the appearance of this object. After the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlavi in January 1979, American intelligence stations in Iran were eliminated. In this regard, amid the aggravation of relations between the USSR and the PRC, the Americans secretly proposed to create posts in China to monitor Soviet missile tests conducted in Kazakhstan. In Soviet times, this Union republic was home to the Sary-Shagan missile defense range and the Baikonur cosmodrome, where, in addition to launching launch vehicles, ballistic missiles and anti-missile systems were tested.

The official agreement between the two governments was concluded in 1982. Initially, the United States offered to place American stations on Chinese territory on lease terms. The Chinese leadership insisted that the joint facilities be managed by the PRC, and the operation was conducted in complete secrecy.

CIA stations were based in Korla and Tsitai. Missile launches were tracked using radars and by intercepting radio telemetry signals. After the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Sino-American cooperation in this area was curtailed, but the intelligence stations, which now functioned only in the interests of China, continued their work.

(State of the Early rocket warning and space control system in China, Topwar, Military Review, Linnik Sergey, November 14, 2019) (IMG)

The Washington Post stated:

The electronic listening posts, at Qitai and Korla in Xinjiang Autonomous Region, were set up in 1980 after the loss of two in Iran. CIA Director Stansfield Turner nailed down some final details on a secret visit to Beijing, complete with disguise, shortly before leaving office. The stations produce better information than those in Iran did concerning Soviet missile tests at Tyuratam and Saryshagan, the sources said. John Pike, an analyst at the Federation of American Scientists, characterized the Saryshagan weapons research center roughly 700 miles to the northwest as "right across the street, electronically speaking." The Reagan administration, despite initial tensions over Taiwan, extended its cooperation to arms sales and dual-use technology. The sources said that China, meanwhile, began selling the CIA most of the small arms it needed for the Afghan rebels. U.S. officials declined to say whether the Bush administration has been holding up its end of the intelligence-sharing relationship since the Tiananmen Square massacre of students three weeks ago. But a knowledgeable source stated without hesitation that "I don't have a high level of concern" about a possible halt in cooperation because of recent official U.S. criticism. "That's not a front-burner issue between our governments and nothing has happened {so far} to push it there," said the official, who is privy to current intelligence reports on the subject. U.S. intelligence-sharing and military ties with China developed slowly, in part because of the Watergate scandal that engulfed Nixon. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

The espionage relationship between Deng's group and the CIA was of course in continuation of the project initiated by Mao Zedong and his gang for the purpose of promoting CIA interests in China. During their intelligence activities for

the United States, the American spy Deng and his fascist group were also sponsored militarily by the United States. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency confirmed:

We are now in the seventh year of American military exports to China—exports which began in 1981 as a result of an overall liberalization of U.S. trade policy toward Beijing and continued in 1986 with the signing of a multi-million dollar avionics package to upgrade the Chinese F-8 air defense interceptor.

Until the 1980s China was proscribed by U.S. policy from receiving any military items whatsoever. Americans had spilled blood in combat against Chinese forces in Korea, had fought in part to contain China in a long and bitter war in Vietnam, and were not about to assist militarily a real or potential enemy. By the late 1970s, however, what had begun years earlier with the Sino-Soviet split and the subsequent opening to China under the Nixon Administration, crystallized into a major strategic realignment of China. Beijing not only normalized relations with the United States and other Western nations, but also further distanced itself from Moscow in wide areas of human endeavor-political, economic and military.

These sweeping changes soon impacted strongly on American arms transfer policy. In March 1980, the Department of State issued Munitions Control Newsletter No. 81 (MC81), opening the People's Republic of China for the first time to exports of combat support equipment such as trucks, recovery vehicles, certain cargo/personnel-type aircraft and helicopters, some training and communications equipment, and airborne cameras. The following month, the licensing of civilian goods with possible military use (so-called dual-use items) was facilitated by the creation of a new and unique category, P, for China under commodity control export regulations administered by the Department of Commerce.

The new policy permitted exports at a significantly higher level of technology than those for most other communist countries, although certain important restrictions were established:

Approval is not likely when the potential military application is so significant that the export would present an unacceptable risk regardless of the stated end-use. Of particular concern are technologies that would make a direct and significant contribution to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, electronic and antisubmarine warfare and intelligence gathering.

(Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China, Henry J. Kenny, reprint of an essay originally published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in its report, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986, dated April 1987, p. 63) (IMG)

In subsequent years, the liberalization process continued, highlighted by the removal of China in 1981 from the list of those countries for which it is U.S. policy to deny approval for munitions list exports ..

The military and espionage collaboration with the CIA was in part aimed at assisting US intelligence in its war against the Red Army and the central government in Afghanistan.

Through this military intelligence cooperation, the American spy Deng actively aided Afghanistan's Al-Qaeda terrorists:

Soviet-U.S. relations worsened in December 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, on the eve of a projected trip to China by Defense Secretary Harold Brown. Deng had already made his public offer of Chinese-operated listening posts and, sources said, Brown picked up the discussion on his arrival in January 1980. Another goal of Brown's visit was to win what one official described as a "significant acceleration" in Chinese shipments of arms and military equipment to the Afghan rebels, shipments that continued to grow under President Ronald Reagan. Washington considered the shipments of Soviet-style arms highly valuable because they afforded "deniability" for what was then a largely covert U.S. operation. Both China and the United States bought small arms for the rebels, sources said. They said the United States initially paid to transport China's supplies of arms to rebel bases in Pakistan, and beginning around 1983, the CIA began purchasing most of its own supplies directly from Beijing. The two governments agreed to establish the seismic monitoring posts as

Table 2

**Licenses and License Values of
U.S. Commercial Arms Transfers to China**

	Licenses Issued (number)	License Value (thousands dollars)
FY1982	28	185
FY1983	47	71,459
FY1984	109	82,994
FY1985	154	286,418
FY1986	<u>163</u>	<u>79,527</u>
TOTAL	501	520,583

(Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China, Henry J. Kenny, reprint of an essay originally published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in its report, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986, dated April 1987, p. 63) (IMG)

part of an "earthquake prediction" program supervised by the U.S. Geological Survey, but funded largely by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. A 1986 Pentagon budget document said the stations would improve identification of underground Soviet nuclear blasts and estimates of their explosive force. Construction of five primary stations, including one that is closer to the Soviet test site than any other in the world, and four secondary stations began in 1984. The construction was completed by 1987. Tapes are mailed every two weeks from the \$3 million stations to Beijing, where they are copied by the Chinese and carried to the embassy for transport to a research center in Albuquerque under diplomatic seal. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

In 1979, the Deng gang launched the invasion against Vietnam in order to sponsor the Khmer Rouge headed by the Yugoslav agent (see C23S7) Pol Pot. This too was at the instigation of the CIA:

President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has admitted, "I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. ... Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him but China could." But the U.S. did support Pol Pot covertly, including whitewashing his crimes. As Ben Kiernan points out in an indispensable Yale University Law School monograph entitled "Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia," the CIA in May of 1980 "denied that there had been any executions in the last two years of the Pol Pot regime." In fact, half a million innocent people were killed during that period. Even well after the "killing fields" were unearthed, the U.S. continued to legitimize the Khmer Rouge, voting at the U.N. Geneva Conference in 1981 to defeat an ASEAN proposal that the Khmer Rouge be disarmed. (In the Dock With Pol Pot: Uncle Sam, Los Angeles Times, Robert Scheer, June 24, 1997) (IMG)

national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski kept pressing for closer ties and scored a breakthrough on a 1978 visit to Beijing, assuring Deng that the United States would accept Chinese conditions for severing relations with Taiwan. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

The Deng regime invaded Vietnam, thus rolling back communist influence in that country while strengthening the leverage power of the Titoist agents of the CIA. Vietnam's government as a result became heavily influenced by CIA-collaborationist Titoist elements that assisted the American imperialists in the efforts to contain the post-Deng anti-imperialist Chinese government.

China's murderous terror regime also supported all the anti-Arab and anti-Shia forces in the Middle East and North Africa. For example, it is a well-known fact that the Sudanese regime headed by the notorious Mossad spy Ja'afar El-Nimeiri and the Sadat-Mubarak group in Egypt fostered a close alliance with China on all fronts, be they military, economic, political, etc. As Castro had stated, China was supporting 'Egypt in its policy of separate peace and surrender'. China's regime also was a sponsor of Saddam's fascist war against Iran. The Islamic Revolution Documents Center, which is an official archives center of the Islamic Republic of Iran, listed Romania, China, and Yugoslavia as three of the sponsors of Saddam's fascist regime in the war:

In addition to the above list, countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Yugoslavia, China, Romania, Italy, Singapore, etc. should also be added to the list of Saddam's supporters. (The 80 Countries that Armed Saddam in the War against Iran, Islamic Revolution Documents Center (IRDC), September 22, 2015) (IMG{Titoist-Saddamite Connection})

The CIA reported:

China is the major new entrant into the Iraqi arms supply sweepstakes. Beijing has signed contracts for fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery, ammunition, and spare parts totaling almost \$3 billion. Several reports indicate that China is committed to supply 2,000 tanks over the next five years, some of which have already arrived. Its equipment is attractive because they are similar to much of Iraq's Soviet-supplied arsenal. This avoids the loss of combat effectiveness that would occur if Western equipment were substituted too rapidly for Soviet items. Arms ordered from Egypt, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia provide a similar advantage.. (IRAN-IRAQ: ARMS PROCUREMENT PATTERNS AFTER TWO YEARS OF WAR, CIA, December 3, 1982, p. 29) (IMG{Titoist-Saddamite Connection})

Also well-known is the Chinese regime's support for Yugoslavia:

The revisionist leadership of China is loyally carrying out this "will" of Mao Tsetung. Hua Kuo-feng seized the opportunity of Tito's visit to China, and especially of his own visit to Yugoslavia, to eulogize Tito, to present him as a "distinguished Marxist-Leninist", a "great leader" not only of Yugoslavia but also of the international communist movement.

In this way the Chinese leadership also openly endorsed all the attacks of the Titoites on Stalin and the Bolshevik Party, on the Party of Labour of Albania, the international communist movement and Marxism-Leninism. The close political and ideological relations of^f the Chinese revisionists with the Titoites,

"Eurocommunists", like Carrillo and company, the backing they give the anti-Marxist, Trotskyite, anarchist and social-democratic parties and groups, show that the Chinese leaders, inspired and guided by "Mao Tsetung thought", are setting up a common ideological front with the renegades from Marxism-Leninism, against the revolution, against the interests of the peoples' liberation-struggle. (Imperialism and the Revolution, Enver Hoxha)

A Chinese state media article documented the Chinese regime's hailing of Tito as follows:

Tito's most outstanding characteristic is that he upheld the truth and defied brute force, said President Li Xiannian when he was interviewed by Momcilo Stefanovic of the Yugoslav daily Politika. Li Xiannian also characterized Tito as far-sighted, broad-minded, optimistic and ready to seek truth from facts.

Li described Tito as a great Marxist who made outstanding contributions to the communist movement and the national-liberation movement.

"Tito had profound feelings for the Chinese people. Through his visit to China in 1977, relations between the Parties of China and Yugoslavia were resumed, laying a solid foundation for the steady development of relations between the two countries. Tito was a great friend, and will always live in the hearts of the Chinese people," the President said.

(Li Xiannian Gives Impression of Tito, Beijing Review: A Chinese Weekly of News and Views, Vol. 26, No. 36, September 5, 1983, p. 9) (IMG)

Lest one forgets that Pol Pot had worked for Tito's gang in the 1950s, and that China was sponsoring Pol Pot's group in the 1970s and the 1980s.

The Deng faction were the enemies of communism. In a 1988 speech, Deng Xiaoping explicitly said:

None of the works of Karl Marx or of Lenin offers a guide for building socialism in China, and conditions differ from one country to another, each having its own unique experience. (We must emancipate our minds and think independently, Deng Xiaoping, originally: May 18, 1988, published online in China Daily: October 10, 2010) (IMG)

No doubt one should not be dogmatic about applying the scientific ideas of Marx and Lenin but to say that none of the works of those gentlemen offered any guide to the construction of a socialist society in China is to grossly exaggerate, and is an indication of Deng's real intention, namely class struggles in favor of the anti-socialist forces. Fidel Castro also had remarked in that speech cited above: 'What surprise is there that the Chinese government today supports the fascist and bloodthirsty regime of Pinochet and the repressive and reactionary military governments of Latin America?'. Indeed there is no surprise. There was also military collaboration between the Pinochet junta and the Chinese regime. A research paper by the US State Department confirmed that Dengist China provided military support for Pinochet Junta:

Shortly after the coup, China announced that it would continue to support strongly Chile's sovereignty claim over the Antarctic. In 1982, with Chile's acquiescence, China built a base in the Antarctic inside Chile's officially-claimed territory. There was even an attempt at a joint venture for producing military weapons through a negotiation between NORINCO (China North Industries Cooperation) and FAMAE, the Chilean army's weapons company. The venture did not prosper, but according to our sources, General Pinochet was very much interested in reducing Chile's military dependence on the United States, particularly after an arms embargo established by the Carter administration against Latin American dictatorships known for violating human rights. Not surprisingly, after leaving office General Pinochet twice visited China as Commander in Chief of the Army, invited by his Chinese counterpart. (Chile and China: Building Relations Beyond Trade?, Juan Diego, Asian Pacific Program Universidad Diego Portales – Santiago, Chile, Patricio Navia Adjunct, Center for Latin America and Caribbean Studies New York University; Universidad Diego Portales – Santiago, Chile This paper expands upon remarks delivered at the second session of the China-Latin America Task Force, March 6, 2007. The research of the China-Latin America Task Force financed by: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Department of State) (IMG)

China's social-fascists hailed the settlement of borders between fascist Chile (ruled by the Pinochet junta) and Argentina as a means of containing 'Soviet social-imperialist' designs and Cuban 'infiltration' in the region. China's regime media stated:

The border dispute affects not only the two countries but also peace and security on the South American continent as a whole, and Soviet and Cuban infiltration into southern Africa has made Latin American countries quite uneasy. If armed conflict occurs between Latin American countries, it could present the Soviet social-imperialists with openings to exploit. So the agreement to settle the two countries' border issue through peaceful means is not only welcomed by the people of Argentina and Chile, it is also conducive to maintaining peace and security in this region. (Soviet Strategy in Asia, Beijing Review, No. 3, January 19, 1979, p. 27) (IMG)

Of course, that regime media article did not come out directly hailing the Pinochet junta, but the kind of rhetoric they used did reflect the pro-Pinochet attitudes which they harbored. China's regime also provided funding to Nicaragua's

fascist 'Contras':

Nicaraguan contra leader Adolfo Calero has confirmed to us an astonishing development that had long been rumored: Arms purchases from communist China help the guerrilla war against the Marxist regime in Managua.

"We have obtained weapons from the People's Republic of China," Calero told our reported in Central America, Jon Lee Anderson. "In fact, the SAM-7s [antiaircraft missiles] we got were not Soviet, as everybody thought; they were Chinese."

(Red China Sells Arms to Contras, Washington Post, May 5, 1986) (IMG)

In that speech cited previously, Fidel Castro also stated that China collaborated with South Africa. Castro said: 'What surprise is there that [China's government] collaborated with Mobutu and with NATO interventionist forces? Why be surprised that it joined South Africa against Angola?' The claim of Chinese collaboration with fascist South Africa is proven by the declassified documents. Denouncing the Chinese collaboration with the Apartheid regime, a modern-day South African newspaper presented the documents on collaboration and commented:


In this case, the weapons were sent from China's state-owned arms company, the military industrial behemoth Norinco [i.e. North Industries Corporation], to the South Africans. From there it was distributed with the complicity of the Chinese state to Pretoria's allies: Unita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique. The list of weapons paints a morbid picture and in one recorded deal included rocket launchers, AK47s, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, and 200 bombs weighing 250kg each.

To hide the trade from prying eyes, and to allow both parties to keep a discreet distance, a middleman was needed. They found a mutual friend in Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC). Mobutu a renowned kleptocrat, was an ally of Unita's Jonas Savimbi's, close to Washington and Paris and enjoyed a good relationship with Pretoria's military intelligence.

A classified Foreign Affairs memo dated 2 March 1983 details how the conduit was set up. Zaire, with Mobutu's sign-off and for a fee, provided the end user certificates fraudulently identifying Zaire as the final destination for the weapons. In order to complete the ruse, an Armscor front company registered in Geneva, named Adam Export, was used to obscure South African involvement. Zaire agreed to allow two South Africans, through Adam Export, to act on Zaire's behalf in contracting with Norinco.

(Declassified: Apartheid Profits – China's support for apartheid revealed, The Daily Maverick, Open Secrets, October 31, 2017) (IMG)

The newspaper article cited above provided many documents on such collaboration. Some of these documents have been attached to the end of this book in the 'Screenshots' section. I checked the declassified top secret military intelligence documents from fascist South Africa. The documents largely match the claims made by the South African newspaper article cited above. While the larger part of the documents has been attached in the 'Screenshots' section of this book, a screenshot of the list of the types of weapons supplied by China in this case is provided here.



Both Mao-era and Deng-era China collaborated with American imperialism in all directions in space, in every region of the world. China's reactionary pro-fascist regime very much was the East Asian equivalent of Titoist Yugoslavia. There is no doubt that they who defend the legacy of Deng Xiaoping are objectively supporters of Titoism, international fascism, and Anglo-American imperialist designs.

C23S5.2. Mao-era Chinese Economic Revisionism Decimates China's Economy

Imperialist pro-fascist powers at times create infrastructure (such as railroads) in the colonized zones so to further facilitate the destruction of the productive forces surrounding the imperialist-built infrastructure, but such infrastructure investments do not in the least imply imperialist support for the development of the productive forces; rather, they merely reflect the imperialist-fascist forces' sober analysis that the destruction of productive forces in a colonized zone requires the limited development of the military infrastructure in the colonized zone as a launching pad for the destruction of other productive forces. It is in the nature of finance capital and its comprador allies to seek the dismantlement of the industries and rollback of the productive forces of the colonizable zones. In correlation, it is in the nature of imperialist finance capital to seek the advancement of the industries it dominates in the imperialist heartland to create the mighty industrial backbone at home for imperialist military programs abroad. Hence, the Maoist reactionaries that dominated China, representing the comprador classes allied to Anglo-American finance capital, desired the undermining of China's industry, for with the rollback of industry in China the progressive classes that advance in correlation with industrialization would be rolled back, allowing for the reactionary classes to dominate for longer.

The pro-fascist imperialist powers aim to conquer and colonize territories, not to develop their productive forces. A comprador regime allied to American finance capital will seek to develop its military in order to embark upon pro-imperialist agendas on behalf of its American imperialist allies. Yet, that same comprador regime hinders the development of the productive forces, the industrial backbone that could assist the development of its comprador military. How is such a contradiction to be resolved? It is to be resolved by the fact that such a comprador regime has much more to lose from the numerical rise of a proletarian class in its own territory, whereas economic underdevelopment will prevent the advancement and rise of the progressive classes in the society ruled by the comprador state. The comprador state can expand its military without developing its economy's productive forces – the expansion of the military can occur through purchases of arms from the imperialist powers. Such is part of the reason as to why American finance capital does not develop the productive forces of the countries it colonizes. For the same reasons, China's government could be comprador, aggressively hostile to the communist forces in the Red Army, while still hindering the development of the productive forces in China.

The Mao-era policies decimated China's economy. Strategically to this end, Mao Zedong slandered the Stalin-era USSR by claiming that the Soviets gave "everything" to the central authorities and gave no decision-making power to the local authorities. Clearly, this was a lie, since not "everything" regarding the economic planning was in the hands of the central authorities. By slandering the USSR and presenting the Soviet model as lacking the proper balance between central and local authority, Mao fed himself the excuse to render China's economy more decentralized than what the Stalin-Era Soviets would have advised:

The relationship between the central and the local authorities constitutes another contradiction. To resolve this contradiction, our attention should now be focussed on how to enlarge the powers of the local authorities to some extent, give them greater independence and let them do more, all on the premise that the unified leadership of the central authorities is to be strengthened. This will be advantageous to our task of building a powerful socialist country. Our territory is so vast, our population is so large and the conditions are so complex that it is far better to have the initiative come from both the central and the local authorities than from one source alone. We must not follow the example of the Soviet Union in concentrating everything in the hands of the central authorities, shackling the local authorities and denying them the right to independent action.

(...). In short, if we are to promote socialist construction, we must bring the initiative of the local authorities into lay. If we are to strengthen the central authorities, we must attend to the interests of the localities.

At present scores of hands are reaching out to the localities, making things difficult for them. Once a ministry is set up, it wants to have revolution and so it issues orders. Since the ministries don't think it proper to issue orders to the Party committees and people's councils at the provincial level, they establish direct contact with the relevant departments and bureaus in the provinces and municipalities and give them orders every day. These orders are all supposed to come from the central authorities, even though neither the Central Committee of the Party nor the State Council knows anything about them, and they put a great strain on the local authorities. There is such a flood of statistical forms that they become a scourge. This state affairs must be changed.

(ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS, Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, April 25, 1956. In: Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, MIA) (IMG)

Mao also said:

Even industries directly under the central authorities need assistance from the local authorities. And all the more so for agriculture and commerce. (ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS, Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,

Mao Zedong, April 25, 1956. In: Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, MIA) (IMG)

No reasonable individual disagrees with the notion that some level of local economic authority would have been needed

for the material conditions of China. For the material conditions of China, furthermore, China could not swiftly leap to becoming as centralized as the Stalin-era USSR in its economy; centralization needed to happen gradually, but China was not ready to be as centralized in its economy as the USSR.

However, notice what Mao does with regards to the Soviet economic model. He first slanders the Stalin-era Soviet economic model by portraying it as unreasonable and saying that the Soviet system gave everything to the central authorities. And then Mao presents an economic argument that would have been reasonable if and only if his slanderous remarks against the Stalin-era USSR had been correct: China should not follow Stalin-era USSR in centralizing 'everything' into the hands of the central government. In practice, this would mean that China would deviate profoundly from central planning model because unlike what Mao slanderously said, the Stalin-era USSR did not give everything to the local authorities. Such remarks by Mao were a subtle way to promote decentralization and to launch an ideological assault on the central planning system. Mao was so blatantly revisionist.

The Chinese media admitted that the regime has pursued the Yugoslav-style "self-administration" in industry, which was a highly demagogical policy aimed not only towards undermining the efficiency of the management of industry, but was also aimed at decentralizing the economy, hence creating more bureaucracy, under the guise of fighting bureaucracy. China's Premier Po I-Po (Po Yibo) wrote for the Peking Review:

To develop industry at high speed, it is necessary that ... centralized leadership be combined with large-scale mass movements. In 1958, because large-scale mass movements to run industry and to smelt iron and steel were launched, because mass movements in large enterprises with modern methods of production went hand in hand with mass movements in small enterprises with indigenous methods of production, the dreary situation in which a handful of people were relied upon to run industry was brought to an end. and a new, vigorous situation in which the entire people run industry has arisen. This "all the people run industry" movement did more than bring big advances in output; it has also enabled large numbers of people to acquire industrial and technical training and to participate in physical labour, and contributed to the tempering of the people in the course of steel-making. At the same time it has brought about closer integration between industry and agriculture, and between town and countryside. (INDUSTRY'S TASKS IN 1959, Po I-Po, January 6, 1959. In: PEKING REVIEW, January 6, 1959, No. 1, p. 10) (IMG)

The strengthening of the bureaucratic class would entrench the influence of the reactionary forces over the state, at the expense of the influence of the proletariat. The increased influence of such a comprador class would thereby further entrench imperialism. Again, the imperialist-fascist finance capital is often not very keen on developing the industrial backbone of the military of the country it colonizes, for fascist finance capital finds it more efficient to concentrate industry in its own heartland and then to export weapons to the comprador states of the colonized zones. Therefore, it is not at all 'strange' that the comprador forces in China were hindering that country's industrial development.

The Mao faction decentralized the industrialization into the hands of the local communes, and got the Chinese peasant households to establish home-made blast furnaces in their backyards, resulting in the production of extremely poor-quality "iron" and "steel," as opposed to producing such metals in state factories. While denouncing Mao Zedong as a non-communist, Molotov corroborated:

Mao ... was far from a Marxist, of course – he confessed to me that he had never read Marx's *Das Kapital*. Only heroes could read *Das Kapital*. When I was in Mongolia talking with the Chinese ambassador – he was nice to me – I said, "You want to create a metals industry quickly, but the measures you have planned – backyard blast furnaces – are improbable and won't work." I criticized the Chinese, and our people reproved me later. But it was such obvious stupidity! ... Backyard blast furnaces to produce worthless metals – nonsense. (Molotov Remembers, Interviewer: Feliks Chuev, Interviewee: Vyacheslav Molotov, p. 81) (IMG)

The Chinese media admitted that it pursued such a policy of decentralizing the production of iron and steel:

Fenghuangwo ("Phoenix Nest") is the name of a small iron and steel complex operated by the "May 4" People's Commune in Central China's Hupeh Province. It is among the first to turn out rolled steel produced by small local iron and steel works in the country. This heralds the beginning of a new phase of development for the local steel industry which grew out of the national drive for steel, i.e. the formation of small integrated iron and steel works that combine indigenous and modern methods in the mining of ores, the production of fuels, refractory materials and steel products in addition to pig iron and steel.

An on-the-spot conference was convened in December by the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry in Macheng County, Hupeh Province, where the "May 4" People's Commune is located, to popularize the methods employed there. Small iron and steel complexes that combine indigenous and modern methods are now being set up in many parts of the country.

The Fenghuangwo steel complex has four small blast furnaces, three low-temperature steel-making furnaces, rolling mills, forging hammers, wire-drawing machines, and nail-making machines. It has already produced square sections, strips, round bars, sheets, wire and nails. The rolled steel produced has been used to make diesel

engines and electric motors by a local machine-building plant.

This is the culmination of a series of developments in the local iron and steel industry. In August 1958, iron-smelting furnaces employing indigenous methods began to spread like a prairie fire throughout the country as the nationwide battle for steel got under way. They were followed two months later by numerous home-made steel-making furnaces to turn the pig iron produced into steel. As experiences accumulated, the inefficient furnaces were eliminated and those that had stood the test began to be grouped together to form integrated iron and steel making systems and rolling mills and other equipment were introduced.

In this way, production has become normalized and rationalized, the large quantities of steel produced from home-made furnaces can be processed locally and a reliable source of supply has been found for rolled steel and machines urgently needed by the people's communes. This is helping to lay the material foundation for the gradual industrialization of the communes and the mechanization and electrification of agriculture.

(ROUND THE WEEK. In: PEKING REVIEW, January 6, 1959, No. 1, p. 10) (IMG)

The CIA too reported:

By late 1958, according to Chinese Communist propaganda, 6 million new industrial enterprises had been established by rural communes, and as much as one-third of the rural labor force was engaged in such industrial efforts as the ill-fated drive to produce iron in native blast furnaces. (ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S COMMUNES 1959-60, Economic Intelligence Report, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORE), October 1960, p. 29) (IMG)

The decentralization of industrial "development" to the local communes resulted in the production of useless metals, and hence sabotaged the economy. The promotion of Yugoslav-style self-administration created chaos in the economy and prevented the development of industry, and hence prevented heavy industry from coming to the rescue of agriculture. The result of such reactionary, revisionist 'Great Leap Forwards' policies was the disastrous famine in China, which the Chinese regime media downplayed as a "natural" famine, the likes of which had not been seen for "a hundred years past":

China's agriculture suffered extremely serious natural calamities in 1960. Of the more than 1,600 million mu cultivated land in the country, 600 million mu were affected in 1959 and 900 million mu — more than half the total cultivated land — were affected in 1960. The damage done to 309 to 400 million mu was particularly serious last year. Natural calamities of this order have been unknown for a hundred years past. The damage inflicted and the losses have been to a very great extent reduced due to the fact that we have further consolidated the people's communes, which possess great vitality, carried out large-scale construction of water conservancy projects on the farmland and organized the forces of industry and in other fields in an overall way to support the battles against natural calamities and for rehabilitation; and particularly, because the peasants throughout the country waged an intense, stubborn and fearless under the leadership of the Party. Nevertheless, the damage is still very serious. The 1960 production plans on agriculture and light industry which relies on agriculture for its raw materials have not been fulfilled. ('Unite, Rely on the Masses and Struggle For New Victories for World Peace And in Building Socialism at Home'. In: PEKING REVIEW, January 6, 1961, No. 1, p. 8) (IMG)

The famine began "[s]hortly after [the] establishment" of the communes, and the ostensibly-"natural" famine lasted for three consecutive years, according to Chinese media:

Shortly after their establishment, the rural people's communes underwent the severe test of three consecutive years of extremely serious natural calamities. (Collectivization of Agriculture in China, Written for "Cuba Socialista" of Cuba, Liao Lu-Yen. In: PEKING REVIEW, November 1, 1963, No. 44, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

Centralizing agricultural holdings into kolkhozes through the voluntary process is undoubtedly a necessary measure for bringing economic growth, because economic centralization increases efficiency in whichever sector it occurs. However, the collectivization of agriculture would need to occur within the correct pace. Aggressive, forceful, and hasty 'collectivization' of agriculture is a reactionary Trotskyite policy that undermines the economy and brings collectivization into disrepute. The Mao regime refused to acknowledge this fact, and thus launched a Trotskyite leap not into kolkhozes, but into mega-'collectives' that were referred to as the 'People's Communes'. The 'People's Communes' were excessively large pseudo-'collectives' into which the peasants had gotten — and since there was great haste into entering them, suspicion should be raised that the peasants were forced into these so-called 'People's Communes'.

The large-scale economic sabotage and famine inflicted on China resulting from the revisionist decentralization policy of Mao's group, handed Mao the leverage he needed for countering the Lenin-Stalin thesis in support of the prioritization of heavy industry. In his infamous 'critiques' of Stalin's book 'The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR', Mao explicitly denounced Stalin's theses which entailed the prioritization of heavy industry over light industry and the prioritization of technological growth. In order to promote his own idealist notion of 'mass line', Mao also slandered Stalin for allegedly not caring about the masses at all. Mao said:

Stalin emphasized only technology, technical cadre. He wanted nothing but technology, nothing but cadre; no politics, no masses. This too is walking on one leg! And in industry they walk on one leg when they pay attention

to heavy industry but not to light industry. Furthermore, they did not point out the main aspects of the contradictions in the relationships among departments of heavy industry. They exaggerated the importance of heavy industry, claiming that steel was the foundation, machinery the heart and soul. Our position is that grain is the mainstay of agriculture, steel of industry, and that if steel is taken as the mainstay, then once we have the raw material the machine industry will follow along. (Concerning Economic Problems Of Socialism In The USSR, Mao Zedong, November 1958, Source: Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, a Red Guard Publication) (IMG)

A few years later, what Mao wished for, i.e. the de-emphasis on heavy industry, was implemented. By 1960, when the Chinese economy was greatly damaged, when the development of the productive forces and the rise of a proletarian class in China was hindered, it became easier for the Mao faction to lobby for the further rollback of what remained of the scientific socialist economic policies. Indeed, again, Mao stated that the de-emphasis on heavy industry for which he had long fought, was "truly put into effect in 1960," and – in contrast to the scientific socialist line which promoted the allocation of not only money but also goods (e.g. steel) for the development of more heavy industry – proudly boasted that China prioritized the allocation of steel to agriculture as opposed to allocating steel to the development of more heavy industrial infrastructure:

38. Priority Growth in Producing the Means of Production;
Concurrent Promotion of Industry and Agriculture

On page 466 the problem of priority growth in producing the means of production is addressed.

Priority growth in producing the means of production is an economic rule for expanded reproduction common to all societies. If there are no priorities in producing the means of production in capitalist society there can be no expanded reproduction. In Stalin's time, due to special emphasis on priority development of heavy industry, agriculture was neglected in the plans. Eastern Europe has had similar problems in the past few years. Our approach has been to make priority development of heavy industry the condition for putting into effect concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture, as well as some other concurrent programs, each of which again has within it a leading aspect. If agriculture does not make gains few problems can be resolved. It has been four years now since we proposed concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture, though it was truly put into effect in 1960. How highly we regard agriculture is expressed by the quantity of steel materials we are allocating to agriculture. In 1959 we allocated only 590,000 tons but this year (including water conservancy construction) we allocated 1.3 million tons. This is truly concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture.

Here the text mentions that between 1925 and 1958 production of the means of production in the Soviet Union increased 103 times, while consumer goods increased 15.6 times. The question is, does a ratio of 103:15.6 benefit the development of heavy industry or not? If we want heavy industry to develop quickly everyone has to show initiative and maintain high spirits. And if we want that then we must enable industry and agriculture to be concurrently promoted, and the same for light and heavy industry.

Provided that we enable agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry to develop at the same time and at a high rate, we may guarantee that the people's livelihood can be suitably improved together with the development of heavy industry. The experience of the Soviet Union, no less than our own, proves that if agriculture does not develop, if light industry does not develop, it hurts the development of heavy industry.

(A Critique of Soviet Economics, Mao Zedong, originally published in: 1967. Translated version published by: Monthly Review Press, Translated by: Moss Roberts, Annotated by: Richard Levy, With an Introduction by: James Peck, New York and London, 1977) (IMG)

This revisionist and reactionary policy continued on in China, with Mao's full support. As late as 1964, Mao remarked:

Whom is Industry to serve? It should be made to serve agriculture. Of course, there is the question of interrelationship between sectors of heavy industry, but the whole spectrum of industry should be made to serve agriculture. (SOME INTERJECTIONS AT A BRIEFING OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION LEADING GROUP, Mao Zedong, May 11, 1964. In: SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. 9: years 1963-1971, 1st edition: 1994, p. 85) (IMG)

On the surface, Mao's claim is obviously 'true'. After all, as Mao rightly claimed, industry should indeed serve agriculture; however, agriculture should serve industry as well, since the economic sectors are interconnected. So why was Mao making such an obvious point? The policies pursued by the Chinese regime shed light on Mao's intentions from stating this. The reason why this kulak-minded intellectual was making such a point was to promote his reactionary line against the emphasis on heavy industry over light industry, and to subordinate the process of industrialization to the agricultural communes. In its context, the phrase 'Industry ... should be made to serve agriculture' really meant subordinating industry to the agricultural communes, and emphasizing the role of agricultural light industry over heavy industry. In doing so, Mao could demagogically promote self-administration in industry, since the self-management principle was the principle by which communes were run, hence to systematically decentralize industry. In doing so, Mao

could also prevent the prioritization of heavy industry, and thus to prevent the rapid industrialization of China. This is why at that time period:

All industrial sectors are now going over to following the policy of taking agriculture as the foundation of the national economy, and an industrial system in the service of farming is gradually being set up. (Collectivization of Agriculture in China, Written for "Cuba Socialista" of Cuba, Liao Lu-Yen. In: PEKING REVIEW, November 1, 1963, No. 44, p. 13) (IMG)

C23S5.3. The Great Anti-Proletarian Anti-Cultural Counter-Revolution

China was burning. As though inspired by Goebbels's book-burning campaign and the Mongol invasion, Maoist barbarians launched a campaign of savage terror to turn libraries into ashes, ransack houses, humiliate as they please, etc. During that time period, Albania had pursued the correct policy of temporarily allying with China's left- deviationist regime in order to counter the right-deviations advocated by the Kremlin Titoists. As a country that was officially friends with China, the Albanians were not uncritical, however. In a speech to the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania in October 1966, Comrade Hoxha remarked:

The "Red Guards" are changing the names of the streets and restaurants, because they had a reactionary content, writing dazibaos and criticizing anyone just as they please, ransacking houses and putting the dunce's cap on kulaks and reactionaries and parading them through the streets and squares; it is said they are wrecking the graves of foreign imperialists and, what is more dangerous, they are attacking party committees, burning libraries and paintings, destroying old monuments, etc. (Some Preliminary Ideas about the Chinese Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Speech to the 18th Plenum of the CC of the PLA, Enver Hoxha, October 14, 1966. Source: Text from Enver Hoxha. Selected Works Vol. IV. Toronto: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin Institute. 1983. pp. 94-114. MIA) (IMG)

At the instigation of Mao Zedong, Maoist barbarians started a civil war in China, attacked China's military sites, "badly battered" the supposed 'capitalist-roaders', and thus sowed anarchy in China. They were assisted in this process by the Mao regime's military force, the "People's Liberation Army," and thus launched a Trotskyite military coup against local party committees, all in the name of fighting revisionism. The Chinese state media reported:

PROLETARIAN revolutionaries are uniting to seize power from the handful of persons within the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road. This is the strategic task for the new stage of the great proletarian cultural revolution. It is the decisive battle between the proletariat and the masses of working people on the one hand and the bourgeoisie and its agents in the Party on the other.

This mighty revolutionary storm started in Shanghai. The revolutionary masses in Shanghai have called it the great "January Revolution." Our great leader Chairman Mao immediately expressed resolute support for it. He called on the workers, peasants, revolutionary students, revolutionary intellectuals and revolutionary cadres to study the experience of the revolutionary rebels of Shanghai and he called on the People's Liberation Army actively to support and assist the proletarian revolutionaries in their struggle to seize power.

Chairman Mao's great call received an immediate enthusiastic response from the revolutionary masses and the commanders and fighters of the Peoples Liberation Army. The proletarian revolutionaries who have formed a mighty force are capturing one citadel after another in certain places and units, where the handful of persons within the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road have been entrenched, and are then consolidating these captured positions one by one. The storm of the "January Revolution" is now sweeping the whole country.

The ranks of the handful of persons within the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road have been badly battered.

(On the Proletarian Revolutionaries' Struggle to Seize Power, In: Peking Review, Vol. 10, No. 6, Feb. 3, 1967, pp. 10-15) (IMG)

To combat the right-deviationist, revisionist, Titoist, and/or "capitalist-roader" elements in the Party, the correct policy would have been to purge the Central Committee through socialist legality and strong counter-intelligence operations. Rallying the workers and peasants into the streets to create pressure from below so to force the right- deviationists to back down would have also been a useful means of pursuing the purges. Such methods would have been employed had there been a communist leadership. However, Mao's group were not communists, but more so reminisced the Mongol invaders. Mao's group instead got the masses into the streets, not so much to create pressure from below for pursuing legal purges, but to launch a unique combination of a colour revolution, a series of local military coups, and a civil war. At a time when China was not even remotely resembling the dictatorship of the proletariat, Mao's group launched a colour revolution against the people of China. China's state media, reporting on the remarks of Mao Zedong, stated:

Our present revolution – the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and we have launched it ourselves. This is because a portion of the structure of proletariat

dictatorship has been usurped and no longer belongs to the proletariat, but to the bourgeoisie. Thus, we had to make revolution. The Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group must ponder over it and write articles. This is called "Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." This is a very important theoretical problem. (Talks At Three Meetings With Comrades Chang Ch'un-ch'iao And Yao Wen-yuan, February 1967. In: Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. SOURCE: Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought, a Red Guard Publication. In: MIA) (IMG)

Additionally, in line with the 'Cultural Revolution' agenda, Mao seemed to be implying that people coming from bourgeois or feudal family backgrounds should be named publicly. Mao said:

Class identifications should be drawn in all units, factories, streets, schools, and official organs. (SOME INTERJECTIONS AT A BRIEFING OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION LEADING GROUP, Mao Zedong, May 11, 1964. In: SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. 9: years 1963-1971, 1st edition: 1994, p. 85) (IMG)

Was this a campaign of naming-and-shaming people just because of their bourgeois or feudal family background? To analyze an individual's personality and motivations, an examination of the individual's class roots is very important; however, to publicly name and shame swathes of individuals exclusively for their family class roots, and without regard to whether or not the individuals' behaviour and actions are in line with their class roots, is a disgracefully left-opportunist measure. One may hope that the parasitic kulak-rooted left-opportunist intellectual Mao Zedong was intending no such a disgraceful move.

C23S5.4. The Sino-Eurasian Split / China's Social-Chauvinist Aggression against Eurasia

*** IMG-All-{China}

The Bukharinites and Trotskyites were overtly 'hostile' to each other but covertly allied in a pincer secret service assault against Soviet power. There is much evidence that the Maoist left-opportunists of China and the Khrushchevian right-opportunist administration in Eurasia were overtly 'hostile' but covertly allied, so to engineer a split in the international communist movement. One thing is for sure and well-documented: the Mao clique and the Khrushchev group were both agents of the Yugoslav regime. Hence **the avenue of the covert alliance, the key link, between the Mao clique and the Khrushchev group was via Yugoslavia.** Not all secretly-allied ostensibly- 'contradicting' reactionary forces foster their secret alliance via secret direct connections. Sometimes, they add an additional layer of covertness, by having an intermediary – such as Yugoslavia – serve as the bridge linking them. Furthermore, throughout their careers, both the Mao clique and the Khrushchev group supported the same agendas. The Khrushchev group and the Mao clique both supported an alliance with USA, both denounced Stalin, both praised Tito and supported Yugoslavia, both supported the Sino-Eurasian split (and no, neither side's contribution to the Sino-Eurasian split was unintentional), both supported economic decentralization, both supported the shift of emphasis away from heavy industry onto light industry, both supported the partition of Eurasia, both supported de-budgeting the Red Army, and both opposed the Peoples' Democracies in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, and Cuba. Deceptively, however, they divided their tasks such that one side pursues such agenda through left- deviation and ostensible 'anti-revisionism' whereas the other side pursues such an agenda through right-deviation and blatant revisionism. I do not seek to imply that either of Khrushchevian Eurasia and Maoist China were at the time anywhere as dominated by the reactionary forces as the regimes of Israel and Saudi Arabia, but I also cannot avoid seeing a major functional analogy in one respect: the Saudi regime and the Israeli regime, both allied to the United States, vehemently denounced each other, aiming to polarize the Middle East situation into 'Ishmaelite' anti -Semitism vs. Zionist anti-Arabism; analogously, the Chinese leadership was virulently Maoist left-opportunist, whereas the 'enemies' of the Maoists – the Khrushchevians – were sickening right-opportunists, and these two reactionary currents – both allied to the Yugoslav regime, the number fifth columnist state of the Anglo-American imperialists – were aiming to split the anti-imperialist camp through such polarizations into the left-opportunist and right-opportunist 'poles'. Critics would say that this is a conspiracy theory. Actually, in light of the evidence that both China and Eurasia were allied to Yugoslavia and both fought for Titoism, one from the left flank and the other from the right flank, the mainstream media narrative that the Maoist-Khrushchevian dispute was 'genuine' sounds all the more conspiracy-theoretic. I ask such critics: in light of Peking's and Moscow's alliance with Yugoslavia and their pursuit of a Titoist agenda worldwide, what evidence do you have that the Maoist-Khrushchevian dispute was any more real than the many fake 'disputes' and fake 'conflicts existing between the many CIA-backed factions worldwide? The evidence for the Maoite-Khrushchevian connection via Yugoslavia and the service both of them to the same reactionary causes has been provided throughout this chapter. This all the more exposes the fake character of the Mao-Khrushchev 'dispute'. The split between Eurasia and China was very real, but the 'split' between Mao and Khrushchev was not – both of those men and their respective cliques were, through Yugoslav intelligence, allies in engineering such a real Sino-Eurasian split. It is the turn of the critics to provide evidence supporting their hypothesis that the Maoite-Khrushchevian 'dispute' was real.

Note that the Khrushchevians are not to be confused with the Brezhnev-era Eurasians. During the Brezhnev era, the

communist faction saw a partial resurgence in its influence, and hence the Sino-Eurasian conflict became a real thing. However, before the Brezhnev era, there is not even a shred of evidence of seriousness in the 'fight' between the Khrushchev group and the Mao clique.

Khrushchev definitely needed an excuse with which to expel China from the bloc; the excuse he had was given to him by Mao's fake 'anti-revisionist' stance.

Khrushchev's group served American interests through blatant advocacy for capitulationism and liberality, whereas Mao's group served American interests through left-wing sectarianism. Mao and Khrushchev both had open friendly contacts with the CIA operative Anna Louise Strong. Khrushchev's group would blatantly bash Stalin, whereas Mao's group would – under the cover of 'comradely criticism' – slander Stalin as a pro-American tyrant worse than the feudal lords. Khrushchev's group would seek to hand Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania over to the West through capitulationism and 'liberalism', whereas Mao's group would conspire to give those countries over to the West by slandering their parties as 'revisionists', renegades, 'cliques', etc. That the Kremlin Titoists headed by Khrushchev ended almost all Eurasian economic cooperation with China was certainly beneficial to Mao's group, firstly because it gave the latter greater leverage for pushing China into the camp of the United States – as it finally happened all the more blatantly in the 1970s – and also helped them severely cut China's economic ties to the 'revisionist' 'clique' of the Czechoslovak communists headed by Novotny, and hence to undermine the 'revisionist' Czechoslovakia (see C22S9). The ceasing of Eurasian economic cooperation with China also helped undermine the DPRK, whom the Chinese regime frequently insulted since the 1960s. Hoxha recalled:

Many a time later I have turned back to this period of the history of the Communist Party of China, trying to figure out how and why the profoundly revisionist line of 1956 [adopted by the Chinese] subsequently seemed to change direction, and for a time, became "pure", "anti-revisionist" and "Marxist-Leninist". It is a fact, for example, that in 1960 the Communist Party of China seemed to be strongly opposing the revisionist theses of Nikita Khrushchev and confirmed that "it was defending Marxism-Leninism" from the distortions which were being made to it, etc. It was precisely because China came out against modern revisionism in 1960 and seemed to be adhering to Marxist-Leninist positions that brought about that our Party stood shoulder to shoulder with it in the struggle which we had begun against the Khrushchevites.

However, time confirmed, and this is reflected extensively in the documents of our Party, that in no instance, either in 1956 or in the '60s did the Communist Party of China proceed or act from the positions of Marxism-Leninism.

In 1956 it rushed to take up the banner of revisionism, in order to elbow Khrushchev out and gain the role of the leader in the communist and workers' movement for itself. But when Mao Zedong and his associates saw that they would not easily emerge triumphant over the patriarch of modern revisionism, Khrushchev, through the revisionist contest, they changed their tactic, pretended to reject their former flag, presented themselves as "pure Marxist-Leninists", striving in this way, to win those positions which they had been unable to win with their former tactic. When this second tactic turned out no good, either, they "discarded" their second, allegedly Marxist-Leninist, flag and came out in the arena as they had always been, opportunists, loyal champions of a line of conciliation and capitulation towards capital and reaction. We were to see all these things confirmed in practice, through a long, difficult and glorious struggle which our Party waged in defence of Marxism-Leninism.

(The Khrushchevites, Hoxha)

With the rise of the Brezhnev faction, Titoism saw some – albeit not total – decline in Eurasia and some of the right-deviations by Khrushchev's group were checked. Since Mao's group could no longer so easily attack Brezhnev from the left, Mao's group decided to attack from the right and thus in 1971 unmasked itself as the ally of US intelligence that it had always been. Failing to distinguish between the People's Republic of China and the leadership of the People's Republic of China, some naively think that US conspiracies against China meant US conspiracies necessarily against Mao's group. In fact, contrary to what some naively think, during the first years of the People's Republic of China, when the Anglo-American intelligence services hatched plots against that country, waging bloody battles against it, the People's Republic of China undoubtedly would have seen damage from such US actions, but Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping – representing the anti-Soviet kulak elements in the Chinese Party and state apparatus – would have benefited from US hostility towards revolutionary China, for it would have allowed them to weaken the leverage of the 'Stalinist' Soviet intelligence agents in China, hence to leave greater leverage for the enemies of 'Stalinism', namely Mao, Liu, Deng and other Titoists who had their social base in kulak reaction. There is no doubt that US action against China helped Mao's group in their secret service conflict to reduce 'Stalinist' Soviet influence in China.

Nikita Khrushchev desired to make extreme threats against China so to increase leverage for Titoist elements in China so that the latter can push China farther and faster into America's camp. This is why Khrushchev made his famous nuclear threats against China:

In the strongest public threat to use nuclear weapons against China ever made by Khrushchev, he warned that

it would be “dangerous” to encroach on Soviet borders “given up-to-date weapons of annihilation” in the Soviet arsenal (speech of 15 September 1964). His policy was thus now to “rattle” nuclear weapons toward China, as he had done in the past to many other countries.

However, Mao and his lieutenants were able, given this clearly marked pattern of Khrushchev’s behavior, to distinguish a bluff from a real threat of imminent attack. Chinese perception of the credibility of a Soviet threat was highly context-dependent, keyed to the positioning of Soviet forces. Khrushchev had failed to frighten the Chinese into ceasing their border probes because he had not made his threats sufficiently credible, either by deploying tactical nuclear weapons or by a big conventional buildup of regular forces on the frontier.

(THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

The CIA and RAND Corporation official Myron Rush wrote:

Moreover, despite the heightened tension between the Soviet Union and China in the early 1960s, Khrushchev made no serious effort to build military power along the Soviet border with China. This began only after Brezhnev came to power. (The Soviet Military Build-up and the Coming Succession: A Review Essay. Reviewed Work: ‘Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union’ by Seweryn Bialer. Review by: Myron Rush. Source: International Security, Spring, 1981, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring, 1981), p. 183. Published by: The MIT Press) (IMG)

While engaging in nuclear threats against China, Khrushchev did nothing to actually build up the Red Army presence in the border with China – and that was the point; the whole point of Khrushchev’s nuclear threat-statements was not to actually bully the Chinese regime but to rather strengthen it, by giving it the excuse to boost its CIA-backed hostility towards Eurasia. The nuclear threats were not for the purpose of suppressing China, but were rather aimed at wedge-driving and division-sowing, so to push China further away from Eurasia and onto the US camp. Again, if that was not the case, then why did Khrushchev not build up and militarize the Eurasian border against China? If Khrushchev was so serious about confronting the Chinese, so serious and fanatical as to ‘plan’ a nuclear attack on China, then why did he act as an obstacle to the militarization of the border against China? Some would say that Khrushchev did not militarize the border because that would have strengthened his communist rivals in the Red Army, but that only goes on to reaffirm the strong positive correlation of the interests of the Khrushchev faction and the Mao faction exemplified in their pincer opposition to the communist faction of the Red Army – they both were hostile to the communist faction of the Red Army, and were thus fighting on the same side of history.

On the other hand, the rise of the communist-coopted Brezhnevian group meant that Khrushchev's nuclear threats against China would be abandoned:

By contrast, the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership avoided threatening China with a nuclear strike.. (THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 6) (IMG)

By refusing to make these nuclear threats, the communist-coopted Brezhnevian group also refused to hand the Mao- Liu group the excuse for pushing China further into America's camp. This helped Eurasia weaken imperialist influence in China. At the same time, knowing that the Chinese regime was a Trotskyite state and a covert satellite of Yugoslavia, the communist-coopted Brezhnevian group strengthened Eurasian defenses against China. Referring to the Brezhnev Administration, the CIA stated:

The Soviet leaders were willing, however, to make moves which were more costly in terms of committing military manpower and resources to the border area. (THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 6) (IMG)

Recall that Myron Rush too had remarked:

serious effort to build military power along the Soviet border with China ... began only after Brezhnev came to power. (The Soviet Military Build-up and the Coming Succession: A Review Essay. Reviewed Work: ‘Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union’ by Seweryn Bialer. Review by: Myron Rush. Source: International Security, Spring, 1981, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring, 1981), p. 183. Published by: The MIT Press) (IMG)

The Eurasians therefore pursued the correct policy of strengthening their defenses against Yugoslavia's East Asian satellite and ultra-reactionary Pakistan’s ally, China:

Since 1966 the Soviets have more than doubled the total number of tactical aircraft opposite China. A new tactical air was created in the Transbaykal MD Mongolia area which now has 300 aircraft, making it the second largest Soviet tactical air army. Another 230 combat tactical aircraft are in the Far East. These numbers continue to grow. Over 30 airfields have been either renovated or constructed along the Chinese border. Eight of these are in Mongolia and are as yet unoccupied. Most of the newly activated tactical air regiments are equipped with older model aircraft (MIG-17 and IL-28). These aircraft are better suited for ground attack and reconnaissance missions than for air defense. The air forces opposite China have a much higher percentage of the new Hip MI-8 helicopters than do those opposite NATO. (THE SOVIET BUILDUP AGAINST CHINA: DIMENSIONS

AND IMPLICATIONS: SPECIAL MEMORANDUM, CIA, Board of National Estimates, May 6, 1969, p. 5)
(IMG)

The communist-coopted Brezhnev group militarily confronted China's regime while minimizing nuclear threat-statements, whereas the Khrushchev group maximized provocative nuclear threat-statements without a tough military stance against China. The communist-coopted Brezhnev group materially contained the Mao group, whereas the Khrushchev group opposed the material containment of the Chinese regime and phrasemongered in a manner ostensibly 'opposed' to, but practically beneficial to, the Chinese regime.

Deng Xiaoping and Zhou En-Lai both began to covertly promote the narrative that China will go to war with Eurasia: The Chinese were aware of the Soviet buildup, and they seem to have had an increased sense that a war with the USSR, including the engagement of major ground forces, was a real possibility. This view was privately expressed by Chou En-lai in early 1966 and by Teng Hsiao-ping (among others) in mid-March. However, they still apparently did not perceive the threat of a major war as imminent: they spoke only of an "eventual" or an "inevitable" war with the USSR. Nevertheless, the USSR in fact had become the PRC's principal enemy, although not yet in official statements and documents. (THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 6) (IMG)

China's leaders, hypocritical opportunists as ever, suddenly began to trumpet the narrative that China would be nuclear-attacked by the 'Soviet social-imperialists', just when the Eurasians gave up on their nuclear threats:

Chou and Teng in early 1966 had been speaking about Soviet conventional forces, but shortly thereafter, the Chinese for the first time seemed to take seriously the possibility that the Soviets would use nuclear weapons against them, whether in escalation of the border conflict or in a massive disarming strike. This new assessment was reflected in a public interview given by former Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who declared that:

Soviet missiles may one day fly from Moscow to Peking. Peking is already an atomic target.

(Quoted by a Uruguayan newsman in Marcha, 1 May 1966.) (THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 6) (IMG)

With regards to China's military-industrial complex vis-a-vis the Eurasians and the Red Army, the Maoist infantile left-deviationists in China actually played an ironically progressive role. While the Chinese regime's so-called 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' was overall reactionary, it did have a progressive aspect to it: it weakened China's military-industrial complex vis-a-vis Eurasia. The Mao-Deng group represented comprador bourgeois elements serving American imperialists under the cover of 'socialism'. One must remember that later on, Mao's group launched an aggression against the Eurasians by ambushing and terrorizing the Red Army troops. It follows that embracing damage to China's military and economy for that time period, far from being a chauvinist stance, is actually anti-chauvinist because China, a Yugoslav satellite, was pursuing an aggressively pro-American and anti-Eurasian chauvinist agenda. Whether out of opportunism or out of naivete, they who argue against the infliction of material damage upon the Maoist Chinese military are promoting a chauvinist line. Make no mistakes! Insofar as it damaged China's military-industrial backbone, the so-called 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' was objectively great, proletarian and revolutionary in character.

By undermining China's economy and military at the time, the so-called 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolutionaries' also unintentionally punished the Chinese regime for its violent, aggressive, and hostile stance against India, the country that had allied to Stalin-era USSR and which had assisted the UAR in hijacking Tito's 'Non-Aligned Movement' and which had refused to join the Moscow Titoists in slandering Abdel-Salam Aref for his non-existent 'genocide' 'against' Kurds. China's aggressive measures against India in 1962 had assisted the CIA in boosting its direct intelligence presence in India and thus had severe repercussions in the South Asia region. It is interesting to note that China's aggression against India took place around the same time as Morocco's invasion of Algeria and the Saudi regime's war on pro-Nasserist fighters in Yemen. On the surface, these three wars of aggressions may appear as irrelevant. In reality, they are very relevant, for they were all wars launched against the trade partners and allies of the United Arab Republic, and were in part aimed at containing and bogging down the UAR on several fronts. They had a direct role in causing inflation and severely weakening the Abdel-Nasser faction in Egypt by 1965. The social-chauvinist Mao-Deng group had the blood of so many Indian and Eurasian troops on their hands.

The CIA and DIA had differing intelligence assessments with regards to how much China had militarily recovered from the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution', but they both agreed that the 'Cultural Revolution' had indeed damaged China's military:

The upheavals of the Cultural Revolution interfered with military training and degraded the combat capabilities and readiness of the Chinese Armed Forces. But the extent of this degradation and the degree of its persistence up to the present time is in dispute. CIA and INR believe that the level of training is still well short of normal in the army because of continued heavy involvement in non-military activities and that progress in extricating the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from these tasks will be slow. DIA and NSA, on the other hand,

believe that training in the army approached normal levels in 1968 and that any residual degradation in combat readiness and effectiveness is slight. (...). In conventional combat against a modern opponent, however, each branch of the PLA would have critical weaknesses. Army units are believed to be seriously deficient in motorized transport and heavy armament; the air defense system probably lacks an adequate communications and data processing capability and could not withstand a large-scale, sophisticated air attack; and China's navy, while growing, is still little more than a coastal defense force. (...).

Air Forces. All elements of China's air defense apparently have been improved. Command and control capabilities have probably increased, more and better radars have been deployed at an increasing rate, and Mig-19 production probably has recovered from the Cultural Revolution. SAM deployment, however, has been proceeding slowly and we are increasingly uncertain about Chinese plans for producing the Mig-21. There is some evidence that an aircraft of native design based on the Mig-19 has been produced in China. (...).

Naval Forces. With few exceptions, naval shipbuilding programs appear to have recovered fully during 1969 from the Cultural Revolution, and current expansion of shipyards indicates that new programs could be planned. Greater emphasis is being placed on production of larger, longer range ships capable of extended patrols. Construction of R-class submarines now averages about two units a year, and China has begun to build destroyers. Old destroyers are being converted to carry cruise missiles.

(COMMUNIST CHINA'S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-3-70, Washington, June 11, 1970. In: 'National Archives, RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 13-3-70. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Another copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R1012, NIC Files. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on June 11 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678.' In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 30, US Department of State, pp. 218-220) (IMG)

Why did the Red Guards and other student pseudo-revolutionaries end up decimating China's comprador military force? A 'cultural revolution' instigated by such comprador forces as Mao Zedong would have normally been organized very well by the CIA such that it would not undermine China's military, the enemy of the Red Army. And yet, the Red Guards or student 'revolutionaries' ended up undermining China's military. Why? It was because the students came from cooperative peasant family backgrounds, a factor which pitted them against imperialism, against the enemies of the Red Army. They may well have praised the Chinese military, but ended up unable to escape their own class behaviour, and thus damaged the Chinese military which they may have praised. Owing to their class origins, they were susceptible enough to agitation by the agents of the proletariat to engage in such sabotage against China's reactionary armed forces.

Unfortunately though, the Chinese army and Zhou En-Lai eventually succeeded in establishing stability in that country's military-industrial complex:

2. The prestige and authority of the Party have been damaged, but dissolution has stopped short of wrecking the Party's machinery; the concept of revolutionary communes, which Mao seems earlier to have envisaged as supplanting the Party, has been shelved. "Three-way alliances" are a far cry from "Paris communes," and are consonant with Chou's policies of stability and reason.

3. The damage to industry and agriculture is doubtless considerable, but will probably not be ruinous if present efforts to restore order are successful. Much depends upon peasant — and Army — reaction to increased Army participation in production. We should know more about the extent of damage in another month or so.

4. As expected, the Army is playing the crucial role in the Revolution's apparent denouement. The Army earlier would not back Mao's revolutionary rebels' take-overs, but is now backing Chou's efforts at preservation of nationhood and attention to the economy.

5. "Regionalism" is not a likelihood: the Army wouldn't have it.

6. The Army's crucial loyalty proved to be ... to stability — to the status quo. Most elements of the society seem to be preponderantly of like mind — and the status quo is "creeping revisionism."

7. However, the battle is far from over. The prestige of Mao himself is probably still high; support for Maoism is obviously less, but of unknown proportions.

(Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow), Washington, March 6, 1967. In: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. 9. Secret. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 30, US Department of State, p. 527) (IMG)

Zhou had the support of both of the two extremes: Mao's left-deviation and Deng's right-deviation. Under his influence,

stability was returning to China's reactionary army. It was therefore natural that he would be having an increase in his power. The following excerpts of a communication between Taiwan leadership and US Secretary Rusk provides the related information:

Answering a question of Secretary Rusk's about Chou En-Lai, the Vice President doubted that Chou could ever become a "third force" in the Communist hierarchy. He was well-known to many GRC leaders, and he was clearly identified as a man who always tried to side with the winner. He had once been close to Teng Hsiao-ping, the No. 2 man in the Liu group. Then he had wavered when he thought the Liu group was losing ground and had gone over to the Mao side. He had then tried to exercise a mediating influence between the Red Guards and the Communist Party elements. He had then been subjected to some censure. He did not have the strength to emerge as a third force. Yen thought Chou would be used by Mao as long as the struggle continued, and that he would lose favor with Mao after the eventual purge of Liu. He would have a place of some importance during the struggle. ('SUBJECT: Meeting of Chinese Vice President C.K. Yen with the President: Review of Events on Mainland China; Sino-Soviet Relations; Viet-Nam', Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: His Excellency Yen Chia-kan (Vice President/Prime Minister of Republic of China), Chow Shu-kai, (Ambassador Chinese Embassy), Li Kwoh-ting (Minister of Economic Affairs, Republic of China), Liu Chieh (Ambassador to the United Nations), Sampson C. Shen (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China), Lai Chia-chiu (Director of the Information Department, Republic of China), The President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Walter P. McConaughy (Ambassador of American Embassy Taipei), James W. Symington (Chief of Protocol), William P. Bundy (Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), Washington, May 9, 1967, 12-12:55 p.m. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 30, US Department of State, p. 558) (IMG)

The damage inflicted by the 'Cultural Revolution' of course was not enough to prevent China from invading Eurasia, but it did weaken it in relative terms, delaying and sabotaging its advance. Therefore, in spite of this progressive aspect of the 'Cultural Revolution', China clearly was able to recover enough to be able to aggress Eurasia in 1969. Whereas the Chinese regime presented the 'Soviet social-imperialists' as the aggressors in the war, the CIA, a foe of the communist faction resurging to dominance in the Red Army, admitted:

The Chinese leaders in 1969 tested the degree of Soviet tolerance of provocation as they carried out a policy of forward patrolling to contest Chinese defined "disputed" areas, keeping the probes down to small-scale encounters. Mao and his aides undoubtedly calculated that they had leeway to engage in such encounters with conventional weapons without provoking a major Soviet attack against China.

They seem to have anticipated retaliation by small Soviet conventional-force units only. They guessed right about the level of Soviet retaliation.

Between 2 March and mid-August, every Soviet riposte to Chinese patrol probes was carried out with such conventional ground weapons as artillery, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and automatic rifles.

No aircraft were used, nor did the Soviets expand the conflict from the immediate areas of the skirmishes. Soviet conventional weapons, and the mobility supplied by their armored personnel carriers were sufficient to defeat each of the Chinese border units they were used against. (...).

The Chinese ambush of a Soviet border guard unit on Chen Pao Island on 2 March was a definite escalation. Mao and his aides appear to have chosen that particular Ussuri River island which provided them with the strongest case of Chinese ownership: Chen Pao was not only on the Chinese side of the main navigational channel in the Ussuri, but also 'was virtually a part of the Chinese bank. The opposing Soviet border guard unit at least twice previously (in late January and early February; in the latter instance, riflebutts were used by both sides in a fight) had come out across the river ice to the Chinese side onto Chen Pao to order Chinese forces to withdraw. Mao undoubtedly had been angered by this bullying .. The ambush of Soviet forces at Chen Pao escalated the dispute to a major shooting incident.

In subsequent engagements at Chen Pao and other points along the border, the Soviets used their superior firepower to effectively defeat Chinese units entering Soviet-controlled territory.

(THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 8) (IMG)

While some apologists for China like to denounce Fidel Castro as a 'social-fascist' 'puppet' of 'Soviet social-imperialism', some of the other apologists for China rightly acknowledge that Fidel Castro was an anti-imperialist and far from a 'Sinophobe' or 'orientalist'. It is therefore worth examining what Castro said about China. Referring to Mao as 'a ridiculous mortal', Fidel Castro denounced the 'great-power chauvinism' of China's nepotist regime and 'the mad adventure of the Cultural Revolution':

they turned a ridiculous mortal into a god in the People's Republic of China, destroyed the party and its best cadres in the days of the mad adventure of the Cultural Revolution and allowed themselves to be carried away by the petty bourgeois spirit and great-power chauvinism, which led them to betray internationalism and to the

conversion of a socialist state into a nepotic satrapy, where the rulers' wives and sons-in-law became members of the Political Bureau.. (SPEECH MADE BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, IN THE NATIONAL CENTRAL ACT FOR THE XXV ANNIVERSARY OF THE MONCADA BARREL ASSAULT, HELD IN THE SCHOOL CITY "26 DE JULIO", SANTIAGO DE CUBA, ON JULY 26, 1978, "YEAR OF THE XI FESTIVAL". (SHORTHAND VERSIONS – COUNCIL OF STATE), cuba.cu) (IMG)

Maoist left-opportunists exaggerate the extent of the influence of the counter-revolutionary forces in Eurasia, and argue that the correct thing to do was to pursue a war against Eurasia, as Mao's Trotskyite gang did in 1969. The left-opportunists refuse to acknowledge the incontrovertible fact that communists still retained some influence in Eurasia as a large minority, and that exaggerating the level of the influence of the counter-revolutionary elements would undermine the communist minority while playing into the hands of the counter-revolutionary majority. Such was why the Vietnamese communists opposed the Kremlin Titoists, while still maintaining relations with Eurasia; such was why Abdel-Nasser launched a Cold War against Khrushchev's group while still maintaining positive relations with Eurasia; such was why the Romanian communists confronted the Khrushchevians while also retaining relations with Eurasia; such was why even the Albanians loudly denounced the revisionists in Moscow all the while strategically reorienting trade away from China onto Eurasia's Eastern European allies in the late 1960s when the Brezhnevians rose to power. By launching their 1969 social-fascist aggression against Eurasia, the Maoist Chinese armed forces were waging a war of terror against not the Titoist reactionaries but against the resurgent communist faction in the Red Army, the faction of the comrades of Stalin, the faction of the generals Shtemenko and Vasilevsky.

C23S5.5. Deng Faction Sabotages China's Economy

By 1985, the communist faction in Eurasia had already become very weak. The Chebrikov-Gorbachev group, the leaders of the Titoist faction, had risen in strength. The communist faction was no longer able to strongly pressure Titoist China, a factor which gave the Deng faction much greater leverage at home. No longer did the funds available to the Titoist Deng faction have to be spent as much on countering the menace of the communist faction in Eurasia. Rather, the funds could be used for waging the secret service conflict against the communist faction in China. The Deng faction thus was able to win further in the struggle for control over the so-called "Chinese Communist Party", to elevate the white-collar contingent in the Party. The conference of September 1985 was a great victory for the Deng faction. The CIA reported that the National Conference of the Chinese 'Communist' Party in September 1985 had resulted in a drastic change in the cadres of the Party in favour of the Deng faction:

From 12 to 24 September, the Communist Party of China held an unprecedented series of meetings that together constitute a major milestone in Deng Xiaoping's decadelong struggle to restructure the party leadership. In two plenary sessions of the Central Committee and an extraordinary conference of party delegates, Deng managed to significantly weaken the conservative party old guard, promote his allies to the top party organizations, reduce the influence of China's senior military officers, and win a new party endorsement of economic reform.

Specifically:

- One-quarter of the 210-member Central Committee, including 10 of the 27 members of the Politburo, resigned.
- Ninety-one younger leaders were named full or alternate members of the Central Committee.
- Six new members joined the Politburo – five for the first time and one promoted from alternate – and five were added to the Secretariat.
- The Central Committee approved guidelines for the 1986-90 Five-year Plan that strongly reaffirm the reformist course of economic policy.

We believe Deng accomplished most of his short-term objectives at the meetings:

- The balance of forces in the Politburo and the Central Committee has shifted to the reformers.
- The influence on decision-making of the party's old guard, and especially its military contingent, has been significantly reduced.
- The leading reformers placed proteges on both the Politburo and Secretariat. Hu Yaobang put three on each body and Zhao Ziyang one.
- Serious economic performance problems, and growing conservative criticisms of reform policies, were not allowed to derail the economic development program approved in 1984.

(CHINA'S PARTY CONFERENCE: THE WANING OF THE ANCIEN REGIME, CIA, November 1985, p. III) (IMG)

Deng Xiaoping said in his speech during the Conference that a shake-up had occurred in the Party cadres:

A number of veteran cadres have taken the lead in abolishing the system of life tenure in leading posts,

furthering the reform of the cadre system. This deserves mention in our Party's annals.

The members newly elected to the Central Committee as well as ministers and provincial Party committee secretaries who were recently appointed are comparatively young. They are generally in their fifties, with some just over forty. In the early days of the founding Of the People's Republic, many of the ministers and provincial Party committee secretaries were in such age groups.

(Deng Xiaoping's Speech At the CPC National Conference. In: Beijing Review, September 30, 1985, pp. 17-18) (IMG)

Indeed, reports by the Beijing Review, China's state media, confirmed the CIA claims that the Dengist reformers had the upper hand in the National Conference. During the Conference, the Central Committee of the Chinese 'Communist' Party provided its proposal for the Seventh Five-Year Plan. Excerpts of the document, which leaves no doubt as to the fact that the pro-decentralization 'reformer' current spearheaded by Deng Xiaoping emerged triumphant in the policy-making, are as follows:

48. To ensure the successful fulfilment of the Seventh Five-year Plan and sustained and balanced economic growth beyond that period, the most important thing is for us to restructure the economy, prudently but steadfastly, in accordance with the decision of the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee and in the next five years or more to lay the foundation for a vigorous socialist economic structure with Chinese characteristics.

49. Building a new type of socialist economic structure depends primarily on successes in the following three related areas. First, further stimulating all enterprises, and especially the large and medium-sized ones owned by the whole people, so that they will work efficiently as socialist producers and distributors of commodities, each enjoying relative independence and full power of management and bearing complete responsibility for profits and losses. Second, further expanding the socialist planned commodity markets, and gradually improving the market network. And third, gradually reducing state management of enterprises from direct to indirect control, and supervising and regulating economic activity mainly by economic, statutory and, if necessary, administrative measures. Focusing on these three areas, we must introduce a series of mutually reinforcing reforms in the planning system, the pricing system, the fiscal system, the banking system and the labour and wage system so that these mechanisms will function together, integrating planning with market regulation, and micro-flexibility with macro-control. Accomplishing this will lead to a satisfactory handling of various economic relations, making it possible to harmonize the interests of the state, the collectives and individuals, to achieve greater uniformity in the speed, proportion and efficiency of economic development and to bring about self-sustained growth in our national economy as a whole.

50. Invigorating enterprises is the key element in the economic restructuring with its focus on the cities. We must implement the decision and regulations issued by the Central Committee and the State Council for expanding the decision-making power of enterprises and continue to adopt measures, both inside and outside enterprises, to enhance their vitality, especially that of the large and medium-sized ones. These measures should include the following: 1) Further streamline administration and delegate more power to lower levels. With the exception of certain departments and trades where conditions are somewhat unusual, ministries of the central government, the provinces and autonomous regions should no longer directly control enterprises. In the cities, we must also draw a clear distinction between the responsibilities and functions of government and those of enterprises, reduce the intermediate levels, and grant enterprises the managerial power to which they are entitled. 2) Gradually reduce regulation taxes on large and medium-sized enterprises, lighten irrational burdens on them and gradually improve management policies and the taxation system for collective and individual businesses to allow all enterprises to compete with each other on an equal footing. 3) Systematically reduce mandatory planning to give enterprises greater decision-making power over production, supply and marketing and over the use of manpower and financial and material resources. At the same time, improve microeconomic mechanisms to enable enterprises to shoulder full responsibility for their own management. 4) Exercise control over total social demands, maintain a balance between demand and supply and bring the pressure of market competition to bear upon enterprises, so as to encourage them to improve their management and achieve better economic results. 5) See to it that all enterprises do their best to perfect various forms of the responsibility system. It is particularly important to reform the personnel system and promote to leading posts persons of ability and political integrity. Depending on specific conditions in each enterprise, this may be done through appointment after observation, democratic election, self-recommendation and recommendation, recruitment by advertisement and examination or through invitation. The responsibilities and power as well as rewards and penalties for such administrators as managers and factory directors must be clearly defined to give full scope to their initiative and pioneering spirit. Efforts should be made to strengthen democratic management, to encourage the workers and administrative staff to play their part as masters of the enterprises and to make best use of their

intelligence and talent. 6) Turn some of the small state-owned enterprises over to collective or individual management, by contract or lease.

51. In order to invigorate enterprises, barriers between different departments and between regions must be broken down, and provinces, autonomous regions, cities of all sizes and all rural areas should open their doors to each other and expand their commodity markets, under the guidance of planning. We must not only continue to expand the consumer goods market, but also gradually reduce the varieties and quantities of means of production allocated by the state, so as to expand the market for them as well. To meet the needs of market expansion, we should gradually open up or expand the market of funds and of technology and encourage a rational flow of labour. Only by establishing an integrated network of markets under the guidance of state policies and plans and by improving market management can we enable competitive forces to play their role in selecting the superior and eliminating the inferior and allow economic levers to perform their regulatory function to fundamentally improve economic efficiency in enterprises and society as a whole. As the market network steadily improves, we must gradually reduce the scope of mandatory planning in favour of guidance planning, strive for an overall balance and shift the emphasis of planning to exercising indirect but more comprehensive macro-control through various economic policies and measures.

52. The key to the gradual establishment and perfection of the market system is reform of the pricing and price control systems. Except for a few major commodities whose prices should continue to be determined by the state, price controls on everyday consumer goods should be systematically relaxed and replaced by market regulation. As for major means of production, we should gradually reduce the proportion of goods whose prices are set by the state, increase the proportion of those whose prices are determined by the market, and steadily readjust planned prices so that the disparity between the planned and market prices will gradually diminish. The increase in production costs due to the rising prices of major means of production should be offset as much as possible by raising labour productivity, reducing consumption of energy and materials and making full use of enterprises' potential. We must strictly control the extent of price increases. The fees charged by certain major public utilities and service trades should remain under state control and should be readjusted in a planned way. Price controls in tertiary industry should in general be gradually relaxed. Through these reforms, we will establish a pricing system that combines uniformity and flexibility by controlling prices on a few commodities and services and allowing prices for most of them to float. Thus we will expand the regulatory role of prices as the most important and efficient economic lever in production, distribution and consumption. In reforming the pricing and price control systems, we must consider the capabilities of the state, the enterprises and the people and maintain the basic stability of overall price levels to avoid excessive social repercussions.

This is a principle we must strictly observe. Industrial and commercial administration departments must enforce rigorous control over prices. All state-owned industrial and commercial enterprises, supply-and-marketing departments and co-operatives should accumulate enough materials and economic means to take an active part in regulating the market and in keeping prices stable through purchases and sales.

This is indispensable to the smooth progress of price reform, and is an essential element in the planned commodity economy.

(Proposal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic And Social Development – Adopted at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, September 23, 1985. In: Beijing Review, October 7, 1985, pp. 18-20) (IMG)

There is no doubt that the Deng faction held the upper hand in the Conference, for otherwise, the pro-market and pro-decentralization 'reforms' which the Deng faction advocated would not have been pursued as the Party line. However, in case there is need for a direct quote to affirm that Deng did support the 'accomplishments' of the National Conference, here it goes:

Comrades,

This National Conference is a very good one. It has successfully accomplished the scheduled texts.

(Deng Xiaoping's Speech At the CPC National Conference. In: Beijing Review, September 30, 1985, p. 15) (IMG)

The National Conference strengthened the Deng faction's already-existing policy of getting China into massive debt. Proudly boasting of China's selling of bonds as though bonds are some kind of a real product made in China, the Beijing Review reported:

International Bond Flotatlon

In the first five months of this year, the China International Trust and Investment Corp. (CITIC) and the Bank of China issued bonds in Tokyo, and Hong Kong and Singapore, totalling an equivalent of 60 billion yen and US\$200 million. Between 1982 and April 1987, China floated 25 bond issues valued at US \$2.789 billion on the international financial markets, as an important means of raising foreign exchange.

In January 1982, CITIC issued individual bonds of 10 billion yen on the Japanese market for the first time. Over the last few years, more and more foreign exchange has been required in China, and as a result, the flotations have also grown.

Year	Bond values (US\$ million)
1982	43.58
1983	20.23
1984	83.17
1985	786.46
1986	1,255.53

The Bank of China floated 9 bond issues of US \$1.317 billion in Tokyo, Frankfurt and Singapore; CITIC, 10 bond issues worth US \$1.03 billion in Tokyo, Hong Kong and Frankfurt; the Investment Enterprise Co. of Fujian Province, 3 bond issues of US\$ 120 million in Tokyo and Singapore; the trust and investment corporations of Guangdong Province, Shanghai and Tianjin one issue each in Tokyo with a value of US\$129 million, 131 million and 61.73 million respectively.

The Bank of China and the Investment Enterprise Co. of Fujian Province are making preparations for issuing new bonds.

(Beijing Review, June 15, 1987, p. 29) (IMG)

Two years later, the government was forced to admit to being on the verge of a debt crisis. Calling the 'bold' borrowing policy 'A Knife Cutting Both Ways', an article titled 'China's Borrowing: The Key to Preventing a Debt Crisis' published by the Beijing Review stated:

Ten years ago, China neither external nor internal debts. However, through the pursuit of the policies of opening and reform, China has rapidly learned how to raise foreign loans and make [alleged] effective use of them. (China's Borrowing: The Key to Preventing a Debt Crisis, Chen Jian (Renmin Ribao Correspondent). In: Beijing Review, April 3-9, 1989, p. 23) (IMG)

At the same time, China faced a massive inflation in 1989. The Deng faction's 'solution' for such an inflation problem was to call for "a 649-million-yuan budget cut," a massive reduction of spending on the development of the productive forces:

The Chinese have declared war on public enemy number one--inflation--calling for a 649-million-yuan budget cut. Finance Minister Wang Bingqian said that governments, both central and local, will have to balance their books to stop state deficits pegged at 7.4 billion yuan this year. The chopping of 8.1 percent from government spending announced March 21 at the Second Session of the Seventh National People's Congress (NPC) continued Beijing's rectification programme. Wang's report hit out at government overspending for being a "contributing factor in inflation" -- the worst since liberation (1949), that has disrupted economic stability by chewing into the limited savings of common people. The exceptions to these cuts include increased payments to the farm community as well as wage increases to workers and staff members of administrative organs and public institutions. The State Council has also decided to increase subsistence allowances for retirees in these public and state-owned enterprises at an opportune time this year. Overall, Wang said, this year's budget will pursue a financial policy of retrenchment, curb demand for funds, reduce expenditures and control deficits. Plans will also be made to build up revenues. The state budget projects revenues of 285.68 billion yuan, an increase of 10.4 percent over last year, and expenditures of 293.08 billion yuan, a 9.8 increase. Revenues in the budget include domestic receipts of 269.18 billion yuan and foreign loans of 16.5 billion yuan. And expenditures in the 1989 budget include 276.58 billion yuan covered by domestic funds and 16.5 billion yuan by foreign loans. Major items of expenditure include aid to rural production and other operating expenses for agriculture, 17.396 billion yuan, 1.886 billion yuan or 12.2 percent more than in last year; expenses for culture, education, science and public health, 51.388 billion yuan, an increase of 3.481 billion yuan or 7.3 percent; capital construction, 62.792 billion yuan, an increase of 843 million yuan; servicing the internal debt, 2.548 billion yuan and the foreign loans, 7.02 billion yuan. The increase of expenditure for salary and wage readjustments in administrative organs and institutions will be 3.5 billion yuan. NPC representatives have won concessions from the State Council to include specific budget breakdowns on both the central and local levels in the future, said the Finance Minister.

Total expenditures in 1988 came to 266.831 billion yuan with revenues totalling 258.782 billion yuan, leaving a deficit of 8.049 billion yuan, said Wang. The figures might change when the final accounts comes out, but the deficit is not likely to exceed the estimated amount. (Thrift Policy Holds Inflation. In: Beijing Review, April 3 - 9, 1989, p. 6) (IMG)

All of the economic problems which Deng-era China was promoting could have been avoided, and all the problems that arose could be easily resolved, provided the existence of political will, of course. As confirmed by China's Ministry of Commerce, in 1986 and 1989, the GDP growth saw a slow-down, and 1988 saw a double-digit inflation:

3. Disordered investment behavior will cause economic fluctuations: After the implementation of the opening-up policy, economic fluctuations have become a common phenomenon. This two-decade growth cycle occurs frequently. **The slowdown in GDP growth in 1986 and 1989 and the double-digit inflation in 1988** and 1993-95 were the result of the business cycle. While these fluctuations in growth and inflation may be caused by temporary imbalances in certain sectors, they do not appear to have a significant impact on the economy as a whole. These imbalances are most likely caused directly or indirectly by investment anomalies. (Rapid Development and Fluctuation of China's Economy (1980 -1999), Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, July 17, 2002. Bold added.) (iMg)

As confirmed by China's Ministry of Commerce, unemployment grew from 1985 onwards all the way till 1990, the main years of the Deng period:

Imprecisely, its trending direction should suggest the orientation of unemployment. Figure 1.h shows that the unemployment rate bottomed out around 1985, then turned to rise until it reached equilibrium during 1990-93. (Rapid Development and Fluctuation of China's Economy (1980-1999), Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, July 17, 2002) (IMG)

Furthermore, there were recessions in 1986 and 1989, and there were economic fluctuations rather than rapid growth:

These time curves show economic fluctuations rather than rapid growth. Fluctuations in real GDP growth rates show the chronology of business cycles over the past two decades. Figure 2.a shows that the business cycle peaked in 1984, 1987 and 1992, and troughed in 1986 and 1989-1990 (these records are consistent with the findings of Liu Xiucheng in the 1995 Blue Book). The recessions of 1986 and 1989 were short-lived and the economy rebounded quickly. (Rapid Development and Fluctuation of China's Economy (1980-1999), Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, July 17, 2002) (IMG)

The double-digit inflation, the great debt, the recessions and unemployment, and the corruption all arose out of the economic Titoization reforms undertaken by the Deng faction. Decentralization, the promotion of the market, and the de-emphasis of heavy industry all directly contributed to getting China on the verge of economic collapse.

From the text of the previously-cited excerpt of the economic plan adopted by the Chinese 'Communist' Party in the 1985 conference, this quote is particularly astonishing:

We must not only continue to expand the consumer goods market, but also gradually reduce the varieties and quantities of means of production allocated by the state, so as to expand the market for them as well. (Proposal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic And Social Development – Adopted at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, September 23, 1985. In: Beijing Review, October 7, 1985, pp. 18-20) (IMG)

In other words, the Chinese 'Communist' Party was arguing that in order to expand the consumer goods sector, the state should reduce the allocation of the means of production to the consumer goods sector. And the interesting aspect of this point by the Party is that it is within the context of the Party emphasizing consumer goods (light industry) over producer goods (heavy industry):

To ensure rapid growth of the consumer goods industry, we must continue to give it priority in procurement of loans, access to foreign exchange. the use of energy, raw and semi-finished materials and transport services. Price differences must gradually widen between ordinary products and brand- name, high-quality and new products, in order to encourage greater variety, better quality and the manufacture of new products. (Proposal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic And Social Development – Adopted at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, September 23, 1985. In: Beijing Review, October 7, 1985, p. 10) (IMG)

In other words, the Party line was to 'prioritize' light industry over heavy industry but not to provide the light industry sector with the factory pieces for growth, because, the Party alleged, the allocation of factory pieces to the light industry sector will prevent the market from providing the factory pieces! Basically, the argument of the Party was as follows: "We should make the consumer goods sector grow, but we, the state, should not help it grow, because if we help it grow, the share of the market in making consumer goods grow will reduce." Not only is that a next-level clownish neoliberal argument, it is a policy of systematic industrial sabotage committed against the Chinese proletariat. The decline of China's heavy industry, the massive corruption and double-digit inflation were completely natural results of this policy

along with other decentralization measures.

The CIA is infamous for its promotion of liberal economic reforms and decentralization. And yet, despite its massive campaign of propaganda in favour of decentralization, even the CIA could not hide the fact that economic decentralization actually results in a failing economy struck by corrupt bureaucracy, heavy debt, and inflation, amongst other economic ills. No, citing the CIA on the economic damage inflicted upon China due to Dengist decentralization is far from being CIA 'propaganda'. On the contrary, it debunks the CIA propaganda narrative that decentralization in China boosted that land's productive forces, when in fact, contrary to CIA propaganda, and as admitted by declassified CIA internal documents, decentralization decimated the Chinese economy.

The CIA confirmed that China's 'conservatives' were correct in stating that decentralization had caused China's massive inflation:

Conservatives have cited China's inflation, excessive investment, budget deficits, and foreign exchange shortfalls to criticize reformers for economic mismanagement, arguing that relaxed central controls are responsible for the economic dislocations. They are probably particularly alarmed by State Statistical Bureau figures showing that China's inflation rate has increased each month since April. Conservatives may argue that social stability is jeopardized because living standards for about one-fifth of urban workers have fallen this year; wage gains for some workers have not kept pace with inflation.

Conservatives are correct in believing that by relaxing central controls Beijing has increased inflationary pressures. Since the early 1980s, Beijing has broadened enterprise autonomy – particularly by allowing state factories to retain a larger share of their revenues and permitting them to sell overquota production of industrial goods at "negotiated," above-plan prices. However, it has not implemented effective measures to make enterprise managers accountable if funds are used inefficiently.

Judging from past responses to economic problems, we believe conservatives want to strengthen administrative controls over economic decision making and increase reliance on central plans. Conservatives would also like to lessen enterprise discretion over investment, and tighten controls over prices, wages, land use in the countryside, and foreign trade.

(China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 8) (IMG)

A solution to an issue like inflation is to pursue the policy of 'material balances', according to which the inputs and outputs would be measured so as to correspond to each other – e.g. X amount of rubber for Y amount of tires for Z number of cars. The 'material balances' system ensures that the amounts of inputs and outputs are carefully calculated, centrally, so as to minimize waste and maximize production. This system of material balances, of course, required central planning, something to which the Deng faction was hostile.

The neoliberal model of the economy relies on monetary policy for 'improving' the conditions of industry and bringing about economic 'growth'. Actually, reliance on 'monetary policy' is reliance on the supply of pieces of paper and some thin air. Idealistic is the belief that changes in the supply and demand of pieces of paper can somehow be so great in effect as to be able to boost production. Reliance on the supply of pieces of paper in order to determine the level of the production of iron and steel – such is the idealism of the neoliberal model, not much better than the Maoist policy of 'producing' metals using blast furnaces. The Deng faction pursued the neoliberal model of the economy, relying on 'monetary policy', within the context of a decentralized market, for 'developing' the productive forces. There should be no surprise as to the fact that China's economy was devastated. The CIA confirmed that the strengthening of the local governments, resultant from decentralization, had prevented even the market mechanisms from easing inflation – as if the market, fiscal, and monetary policy was ever going to ease inflation. The CIA further confirmed that the empowering of the local governments had disabled the Chinese central government from blocking local governments' excess spending on low-priority construction projects. The CIA reported:

Political infighting this year, however, has prevented reformers from effectively using monetary and fiscal policies to ease inflationary pressure. Beijing [i.e. central government] has been unable, for example, to stop spending by local governments on low-priority construction projects, such as hotels and municipal halls:

Branches of China's central bank are ignoring head-office directives to limit credit and continue to fund whatever projects local officials want.

Previous reforms gave local governments a greater share of tax revenues, making them less dependent on funds from central coffers.

(China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 9) (IMG)

The centralization of the economy in practice means a tighter coordination of the different sectors of the economy, as information from different local sectors is collected, centralized, and used for a central plan. Economic decentralization,

by contrast, results in the empowering of local enterprises such that these local enterprises fail to coordinate with each other for production. The chaos resultant from the lack of coordination is precisely the key factor that allows for so much corruption and mafia, as was seen in Dengist China and elsewhere. The CIA further confirmed that the Chinese bureaucrats were using the loopholes resultant from the decentralization reforms as a means of filling their pockets:

Some Chinese bureaucrats, for example, are exploiting loopholes in reform policies by using their connections to purchase goods at low in-plan prices and resell them at much higher market prices. Public cynicism toward reform reportedly has begun to grow because many of the people involved are the children of senior officials. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US- PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 10) (IMG)

Mao Zedong was a believer in the decentralization of the industrial sector. Deng Xiaoping pursued Mao's policy to as extreme as he could, and thereby proliferated a huge corrupt bureaucracy that produced millionaire and billionaire oligarchs in the Party and state, oligarchs that generate their profits through increasing corruption, 'biting' from production rather than expanding production, and in brief, sabotaging the economy. The Dengist right-deviation presents the corrupt oligarchs as the class force behind economic growth, as a national industrial bourgeoisie, when in fact such oligarchs have been a comprador bourgeoisie, a saboteurial and diversionary bourgeoisie allied to finance capital, an anti-industrial bourgeoisie. Only in the heartland of imperialist powers allied to the reactionary classes do the corrupt bureaucrats serve to expand military-industrial production.

'Thanks' to decentralization, the central government of China did not have a consolidated record of local finances:

With the compartmentalism of the Chinese bureaucracy, in any case, Beijing does not have a consolidated record of all the borrowings of its regional and state agencies. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

The 'conservative' faction in China had a difficult time reasserting central government control over the decentralized finances:

Leaders who are counting on local officials to carry out broader reform objectives have rejected proposals to restrict provincial control over bank loans and taxes, according to US Embassy contacts. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 9) (IMG)

As explained in C1S6, the collectivization of agriculture was necessary for economic growth. However, the "Peoples' Communes" system in China was a left-deviationist policy that, in contradiction with the policy of collectivization, aggressively pushed the kolkhoz peasants into so-called 'communes' at a suspiciously too a high pace. Such an excessively high pace and such a leap from small farms and farm collectives into large communes was undoubtedly a left-deviationist policy that decimated the welfare of the Chinese people. The Deng regime undid the so-called 'People's Communes', and moved from the reactionary left-deviationist policy of the Mao era to the reactionary right-deviationist policy of de facto opposition to collectivization. It was inevitable that during the transition from this left-deviationist policy onto the right-deviationist policy, there would – for a very brief period of time – be a period of moderate economic policy as the transitional midpoint in between the Maoist left-deviationist and the Dengist right-deviationist policy lines. The moderate line that lies in between the left-deviationist and right- deviationist lines, is the line that brings economic growth. And this brief period of moderate policy, in the swing from left-opportunism to right-opportunism, did yield some acceleration in economic growth initially. However, the transition to the right-deviationist policy of opposition to collectivization inevitably boosted the parasitic kulak class that corrupted China's agriculture.

The policies of the Deng faction concerning the 'Cultural Revolution' bore some analogy to its agricultural policy in that it marked a swing from left-opportunism onto right-opportunism. Yes, the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' was a reactionary Maoist left-opportunist policy line that was damaging the Chinese people's economic welfare. Yet, so is it also true that the excess cultural liberality promoted by the Deng faction emboldened and agitated the counter-revolutionary intelligentsia, allowing the imperialist-fascist secret services to freely agitate for one student colour revolution after another, of which the protests in Tiananmen were only the most infamous. Prior to Tiananmen, the student colour revolutions were occurring, which the CIA admitted was the result of the 'liberal rhetoric of the spring':

Moreover, the student demonstrations in December, which were encouraged by the liberal rhetoric of the spring, aroused fears of instability and lent credence to conservative arguments that excessive liberalization was undermining party control. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 3) (IMG)

Even in the recent years, China has suffered from the student colour revolutions. Therefore, while the left-opportunist 'Cultural Revolution' was something from which to liberate China, no doubt, the Deng faction's right-opportunist cultural liberality also promoted the CIA-backed student colour revolutions. And much as how the left-opportunist Red Guards

were disrupting China's production, so too did the right-opportunist liberal Chinese student protesters – and the Dengists certainly deserve the blame for the latter if not also the former.

Double-digit inflation, massive debt, unemployment, recessions, a decentralized economy that wastes massive amounts of resources, student colour revolutions resultant from a liberal cultural policy and disrupting the economy, a corrupt bureaucratic class made up of millionaires sucking the wealth of the economy without contributing to production – such was the 'economic growth' which the Deng Xiaoping faction brought to China. The Dengist intellectuals babbled the reactionary narrative that China was an exception, that decentralization in Eastern Europe and the USSR was pro-imperialist and anti-proletarian, but that somehow it was not pro-imperialist and anti -proletarian when applied in China. The Dengist intellectuals parroted the reactionary narrative that somehow, decentralization and pro-market policies by the Deng Xiaoping faction 'grew' China's economy. No such a thing ever happened. Such severe economic problems in China were entirely avoidable, provided that there was political will to resolve them. The solution, as was mentioned in greater detail before, was to re-centralize the economy. However, the Deng faction were hostile to such an idea.

C23S5.6. CIA agent Deng Supports CIA-backed Tiananmen Colour Revolutionaries

Slowly, as a result of the growing manifest opposition of the Chinese proletarians to the proliferation of bureaucracy and double-digit inflation by the Deng faction, the anti-imperialist forces in the Chinese 'Communist' Party were gaining greater power in their struggle, at the expense of the Deng faction. One of Deng Xiaoping's henchmen was of course Zhao Ziyang. Zhao's career as a Premier of China and a General-Secretary of the Party was directly correlated with the rise of the Deng faction. When the Deng faction saw an elevation in influence, Zhao too was promoted in his rank as a Chinese regime official. Furthermore, Zhao Ziyang shared Deng Xiaoping's views of economic Titoization 'reforms'. Take for example the following remark by Zhao in which he declares support for the reactionary Titoist 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics' and endorses a drastic economic decentralization and the expansion of the role of the market. Zhao said:

The period of the Seventh Five-year Plan is a crucial one for general reform of the country's economic structure. We must give the reform top priority if we want to lay the foundation, over the next five years and beyond, for a vigorous socialist economic structure with Chinese characteristics.

The restructuring of the national economy with focus on the cities is a tremendous, complicated task of social systems engineering. A new economic structure should serve to develop a planned commodity economy based on public ownership. To this end, we must do the following three things. First, further invigorate enterprises, especially state-owned large and medium-sized ones, and make them socialist commodity manufacturers and dealers that are relatively independent in management and responsible for their own profit and loss. Second, further expand the planned socialist commodity market and gradually improve the marketing system. And third, gradually relax the state's direct control over the economic operation of enterprises in favour of indirect controls, in the form of economic, legal and, if necessary, administrative means. All three things must be well coordinated.

(Explanation of the Proposal for the Seventh Five-Year Plan — Made at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, Zhao Ziyang, September 18, 1985. In: Beijing Review, October 7, 1985, p.

10) (IMG)

The above remarks were a part of Zhao's proposals in the Chinese Party conference for economic 'reform' in 1985, the reforms, adopted by the Party in that conference, that produced the double-digit inflation, unemployment, recession, corruption, etc. Yet, as confirmed by the CIA, Zhao Ziyang, who had the support of Deng Xiaoping and was a major ally of Deng, saw a slow erosion of his influence thanks to the rise of the anti-imperialist ('conservative') faction, the faction backed by the Chinese proletariat, in the Party:

Perhaps the single most important issue will be how Zhao Ziyang proves himself in his new position as party head. Zhao has many advantages – he is respected by both sides, has a generally successful record as premier, and has a personal political style much better suited to Chinese politics than was the abrasive Hu Yaobang's. He also has Deng Xiaoping's support, crucial to his success but a two-edged sword – he will have to find a way to establish himself as heir without alienating Deng. On the down side, Zhao is constrained by the continued influence of powerful conservative elders; he also has a decision-making machinery not entirely of his own choosing and not entirely in sympathy with his ideas. Ironically, this is especially true in economic policy bodies that Zhao once dominated. Finally, Zhao as party chief must deal with sensitive and messy issues such as the party's role under reform, or the ideological legitimacy of progressive economic proposals, that, as premier, he generally tried to avoid. If Zhao successfully manages the next few months, however, the long-term advantage is with him, view, as age will erode the ranks of prestigious party elders. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 4) (IMG)

Despite the weight of argument in the favour of the so-called 'conservative' faction, the latter only slowly increased its

influence in the Chinese state apparatus, with ups and downs in this current:

Conservative criticism of reform policies received a boost when reformers encountered problems in the economic area – inflation, a growing budget deficit, foreign exchange shortages – that forced a slowdown in implementation of economic reforms. Conservatives had warned against some of these problems, which lent weight to their arguments that reform had moved too fast and it was time to retrench. (...).

The marked conservative shift has been moderated somewhat since last May. We believe the turning point came when some conservative leaders overplayed their hand and attempted to push the "anti -bourgeois liberalization" campaign into the economic sphere. Deng moved against this threat to his reforms, and the balance began to shift. Ideological pronouncements once again praise reform and promise continued experimentation, but they are still careful to stress the socialist nature of reforms-- providing an opening for conservative pressure.

Recent evidence indicates that Deng and his allies have had to settle for a patchwork of compromises that includes a Politburo younger in average age but evenly balanced between reformers and conservatives. While reformers have made some gains in staffing party organs, conservative influence on economic policy making has increased. Political structural reform-- a reformist code term for further reduction of party influence over government and economic decision making--seems stalled at the general discussion" stage. In the months after the congress, we look for continued tensions and jockeying for power as leaders, including recently "retired" party elders seek to consolidate their positions and press their advantages.

(China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 3) (IMG)

By 1989, the anti-imperialist faction was seeing yet another boost in its influence, as the Chinese proletarians expressed discontent towards the state of affairs in the Dengist economy and increased pressure against the Deng faction. Against the tide in favour of the anti-imperialist ('conservative') faction, the CIA and its allied comprador forces in China mobilized the Chinese intelligentsia to launch the Tiananmen colour revolution. The Anglo-American media propagates the myth that Deng Xiaoping was the main figure behind the suppression of the counter -revolutionary intelligentsia in Tiananmen. Not true. The Tiananmen colour revolutionaries, far from contradicting the Deng faction, were the combat units confronting the anti-imperialist faction of the Chinese Party, the faction opposed to the Deng gang. There was no reason for the CIA-backed Chinese intelligentsia to contradict the fascist spy for the CIA, Deng Xiaoping. As a matter of fact, the key agent linking the Deng group with the student colour revolutionaries was none other than Zhao Ziyang. The Deng henchman was regarded by the CIA-backed student colour revolutionaries as the leader of the Tiananmen protests. Prominent Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International official Andrew Nathan admitted that the Western narrative that Deng was the main figure behind the 'crackdown' on Tiananmen was false. Nathan wrote:

The Tiananmen papers show that during the crisis Deng participated intimately in every important decision. His personal aide, Yang Shangkun (whose formal position was head of state but whose real job was Deng's business manager within the leadership), attended all important Politburo meetings. The most important decisions were made at Deng's house. It was Deng's idea to label the demonstrations "turmoil." He made the decision to declare martial law, he accepted the resignation of Zhao Ziyang, he engineered the selection of Jiang Zemin, he gave the order for the military to move on the Square, and after the crackdown he set the policy direction of trying to continue the ten-year project of economic reform and opening to the West despite the setback dealt to those projects by the events of the spring. Deng did not play this role happily. (The Tiananmen Papers, Compiled by: Zhang Liang, Edited by: Andrew J. Nathan, Perry Link, Orville Schell, 2002, p. XXXV) (IMG)

Indeed, the primary source documents presented by Nathan show that Deng Xiaoping was not so powerful, and had been compelled to nod on the decisions during the time of the confrontation against Tiananmen protesters. To his friend Yang Shangkun, Deng Xiaoping complained:

These last few days I've been thinking. I've never been formally number 1 in the Party, but everybody keeps hanging around me, showing me deference. I have to give the nod on every important decision. I carry too much weight, and that's not good for the Party or the state. (Deng Xiaoping's sense of injury, Excerpt from memoranda of conversations supplied by a friend of Yang Shangkun who cannot be further identified. In: The Tiananmen Papers, Compiled by: Zhang Liang, Edited by: Andrew J. Nathan, Perry Link, Orville Schell, 2002, p. 288) (IMG)

Deng added:

You know that I've taken a lot of heat inside the Party since this whole thing broke out. After Zhao's speech to the ADB, Xiannian told me this was the voice of a second headquarters inside the Party, and he wanted me to say something about it. Later Chen Yun, Xiannian, and others telephoned me with their views time and again. In their view, the students went to Tiananmen because the Center let it happen, and we should do something about it. (Deng Xiaoping's sense of injury, Excerpt from memoranda of conversations supplied by a friend of Yang Shangkun who cannot be further identified. In: The Tiananmen Papers, Compiled by: Zhang Liang, Edited

by: Andrew J. Nathan, Perry Link, Orville Schell, 2002, p. 287) (IMG)

Deng was referring to the immense pressure of the anti-imperialist faction in the Party to compel Deng and his group to denounce their own henchman Zhao and the latter's subgroup. In any case, as a means of undercutting Deng Xiaoping's base of support in the Party, and as a means of dismantling the network led by the Deng group, the proletarian-backed anti-imperialist faction, the so-called 'conservative' faction, spearheaded the anti-Zhaoist purges. Anti-Zhaoist purges were really in practice anti-Dengist purges, since Zhao was Deng's close henchman. The George H.W. Bush advisor Richard Baum confirmed:

In the face of strong conservative pressures to prosecute Zhao Ziyang, spearheaded by Chen Yun and supported by Li Peng and Yao Yilin, Deng Xiaoping refused to be drawn into an anti-Zhao vendetta. Counseling caution and restraint in the handling of Zhao's case, China's senior leader once again revealed his underlying concern for carefully counterbalancing fang and shou [i.e. opening and closing].

"Let us not get tangled up in who is responsible for what right now," he said on 16 June; "Let those questions be raised two or three years from now." Deng prevailed, and no formal charges were filed against Zhao; however, for the next several months the former general secretary remained confined to quarters, living in relative comfort at Hu Yaobang's former residence in Fuqiang Lane, Beijing.

Although Deng's personal intervention enabled Zhao to avoid criminal prosecution, CAC old comrades nonetheless went forward with their attempt to root out remnant Zhaoists within the Party apparatus. At the end of June 1989, the CDIC, under Peng Zhen protege Qiao Shi, launched a new rectification drive, in the course of which all Party members in Beijing and other cities were required to undergo investigation and reregistration in connection with their attitudes and behavior during the six weeks of turmoil.

(‘The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s’, author: Richard Baum. In: ‘The Politics of China:

The Eras of Mao and Deng’, Cambridge University Press edited by: Roderick MacFarquhar, 1997, p. 466) (IMG)

The Chinese anti-imperialist forces and the agents coopted by them in China's 'Communist' Party resisted opening up to the Anglo-American imperialists as advocated by the faction of the CIA agent Deng.

The purge against the Zhaoists weakened Deng's influence over the Party. This is corroborated by the Boston University scholar on Chinese history, Joseph Fewsmith, whose work was published and edited by Roderick MacFarquhar, the former Parliamentary Private Secretary to the minister of state at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Fewsmith wrote:

Tiananmen shook the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to its core. The charge leveled against former general secretary Zhao Ziyang was that "[a]t the critical juncture involving the life and death of the Party and state, he made the mistake of supporting turmoil and splitting the Party, and he bears unshirkable responsibility for the formation and development of the turmoil. The nature and consequences of his mistakes are very serious." The issues the Party faced, however, ran far deeper than even this charge suggested. Tiananmen threw open a whole series of questions that had been simmering just below the surface for years.

The most fundamental of these was the nature of reform itself. Tiananmen, many Party leaders believed, was the inevitable denouement of the reform program that Zhao led and symbolized; more important, the content of that reform program was inextricably intertwined with Zhao's patron, senior leader Deng Xiaoping. The question raised by Tiananmen, then, was the nature of Deng's leadership and thus whether or not the Party should continue reform as Deng had defined it. Many believed it should not.

(‘Reaction, resurgence, and succession: Chinese politics since Tiananmen’, author: Joseph Fewsmith. In:

‘The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng’, edited by: Roderick MacFarquhar, 1997, p. 472) (IMG)

The denunciation of Zhao would have served to question the level of Deng's vigilance against Anglo-American intelligence conspiracies against China, and would have raised the question of whether Deng was linked to counter-revolutionary forces, which he obviously was. As Baum said, this 'Zhao question' would have questioned Deng's leadership:

The question of how to deal with Zhao Ziyang was inevitably linked with the question of Deng Xiaoping's leadership, not just because Zhao's selection first as premier and then as general secretary now seemed to reflect poorly on Deng Xiaoping's judgment, but because Zhao had been implementing a political-cum-economic line long supported by Deng. Deng clearly recognized that dismissing a second successor (following former general secretary Hu Yaobang's ouster in January 1987) would raise doubts about his own judgment, and he was determined to salvage as much advantage as he could by denying the fruits of victory to the winners. (‘Reaction, resurgence, and succession: Chinese politics since Tiananmen’, author: Joseph Fewsmith. In: ‘The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng’, edited by: Roderick MacFarquhar, 1997, pp. 473-474) (IMG)

Fewsmith also noted the deep division in the Party over Zhao's counter-revolutionary sympathies with the Tiananmen oppositionists:

The Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee, which convened on 23-4 June 1989

following a three-day enlarged Politburo meeting, confirmed Deng's decision to name Jiang Zemin as general secretary and added him, veteran planner Song Ping, and Tianjin mayor Li Ruihuan to the PSC.

Li Ruihuan and Ding Guan'gen, Deng's bridge partner, were added to the Secretariat in partial replacement of Zhao associates Hu Qili, Rui Xing wen, and Yan Mingfu, who were removed. On the critical question of Zhao, however, the plenum could not come to a final resolution. Having judged Zhao's actions harshly, the conclave nevertheless could only declare that the party would "continue to investigate his problem."

The plenum's failure to conclude Zhao's case reflected the depth of division within the Party. Obviously, some within the Party wanted to pursue the issue of Zhao's guilt, perhaps even to the point of criminal prosecution, a course that would have had profound implications for Deng Xiaoping and the continuation of reform. For instance, Yuan Mu, the hard-line spokesman for the State Council and protege of Premier Li Peng, stated that Zhao's case would be handled "in accordance with the criterion based on law," suggesting the possibility of legal prosecution. Some Party elders were blunter. PRC president Li Xiannian allegedly called Zhao the "root cause of the riots and rebellion," while Party elder Peng Zhen accused Zhao of "attempting to topple the Communist Party and wreaking havoc with the socialist system in coordination with hostile powers at home and abroad."

(‘Reaction, resurgence, and succession: Chinese politics since Tiananmen’, author: Joseph Fewsmith. In: ‘The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng’, edited by: Roderick MacFarquhar, 1997, p. 475) (IMG)

Anyways, the Party, against the wishes of the Deng-Zhao clique, finally put down the Tiananmen colour revolutionaries. A report by the Political Officer (POLOFF) of the US intelligence den in Beijing provided a thorough description of the CIA conversation with the Pinochet-era Chilean second secretary Carlos Gallo and his wife. The following are excerpts of the intelligence report, which confirm that there was no bloodshed in the Tiananmen square itself, despite the fact that there was bloodshed elsewhere in Beijing:

1. CONFIDENTIAL – ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY DURING A RECENT MEETING, A LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT AND HIS WIFE PROVIDED POLOFF AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR MOVEMENTS ON JUNE 3-4 AND THEIR EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF EVENTS AT TIANANMEN SQUARE. ALTHOUGH THEIR ACCOUNT GENERALLY FOLLOWS THOSE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THEIR UNIQUE EXPERIENCES PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT AND CORROBORATION OF EVENTS IN THE SQUARE. THEY WERE ABLE TO ENTER AND LEAVE THE SQUARE SEVERAL TIMES AND WERE NOT HARASSED BY TROOPS. REMAINING WITH STUDENTS BY THE MONUMENT TO THE PEOPLE'S HEROES UNTIL THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL, THE DIPLOMAT SAID THERE WERE NO MASS SHOOTINGS OF STUDENTS IN THE SQUARE OR AT THE MONUMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING A RECENT MEETING, CHILEAN SECOND SECRETARY CARLOS GALLO AND HIS WIFE (PLEASE PROTECT) PROVIDED POLOFF AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR MOVEMENTS ON JUNE 3-4 AND THEIR EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF EVENTS AT TIANANMEN SQUARE. ALTHOUGH THE GALLO'S ACCOUNT GENERALLY FOLLOWS THOSE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THEIR UNIQUE EXPERIENCES PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT AND CORROBORATION OF EVENTS IN THE SQUARE. (...).

8. GALLO EVENTUALLY ENDED UP AT THE RED CROSS STATION, AGAIN HOPING THAT TROOPS WOULD NOT FIRE ON THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL THERE. HE WATCHED THE MILITARY ENTER THE SQUARE AND DID NOT OBSERVE ANY MASS FIRING OF WEAPONS INTO THE CROWDS, ALTHOUGH SPORADIC GUNFIRE WAS HEARD. HE SAID THAT MOST OF THE TROOPS WHICH ENTERED THE SQUARE WERE ACTUALLY ARMED ONLY WITH ANTI-RIOT GEAR--TRUNCHEONS AND WOODEN CLUBS; THEY WERE BACKED UP BY ARMED SOLDIERS. AS THE MILITARY CONSOLIDATED ITS CONTROL OF THE SQUARE'S PERIMETER, STUDENTS AND CIVILIANS GATHERED AROUND THE MONUMENT TO THE PEOPLE'S HEROES. GALLO SAID WOUNDED, INCLUDING SOME SOLDIERS, CONTINUED TO BE BROUGHT TO THE RED CROSS STATION.

9. THE TROOPS BEGAN A SLOW ORDERLY APPROACH TO THE MONUMENT FROM THE NORTH WITH SOLDIERS ON FOOT PRECEEDING APCs. FROM WHAT HE COULD SEE, GALLO FELT THAT MOST OF THE TENTS ON THE SQUARE WERE EMPTY WHEN THE ARMORED VEHICLES ROLLED OVER THEM. THE FIRST LINE OF TROOPS TO REACH THE MONUMENT AREA, PASSED BY THE RED CROSS STATION AND IGNORED THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND WOUNDED. AS A SECOND LINE OF TROOPS APPROACHED, THEY CIRCLED THE RED CROSS STATION AND BEGAN YELLING AND THROWING STICKS AND DEBRIS OVER THE

HEADS OF THE PEOPLE AT THE STATION. THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL PANICKED AND FLED, LEAVING BEHIND THE WOUNDED. MOST PEOPLE, INCLUDING GALLO, FLED TO THE MONUMENT AREA WHERE THE STUDENTS WERE GATHERED.

10. ALTHOUGH GUNFIRE COULD BE HEARD, GALLO SAID THAT APART FROM SOME BEATING OF STUDENTS, THERE WAS NO MASS FIRING INTO THE CROWD OF STUDENTS AT THE MONUMENT. WHEN POLOFF MENTIONED SOME REPORTEDLY EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF MASSACRES AT THE MONUMENT WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, GALLO SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH SLAUGHTER. ONCE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED FOR THE STUDENTS TO WITHDRAW, LINKING HANDS TO FORM A COLUMN, THE STUDENTS LEFT THE SQUARE THROUGH THE SOUTHEAST CORNER. ESSENTIALLY EVERYONE, INCLUDING GALLO, LEFT. THE FEW THAT ATTEMPTED TO REMAIN BEHIND WERE BEATEN AND DRIVEN TO JOIN THE END OF THE DEPARTING PROCESSION. ONCE OUTSIDE THE SQUARE, THE STUDENTS HEADED WEST ON QIANMEN DAJIE WHILE GALLO HEADED EAST TO HIS CAR. THEREFORE, HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON REPORTS THAT STUDENTS WERE AMBUSHED AND SLAUGHTERED IN THE ALLEY JUST WEST OF THE SQUARE NEAR THE BEIJING CONCERT HALL.

(LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF JUNE 3-4 EVENTS ON TIANANMEN SQUARE, 89BEIJING18828_a, from: US intelligence, to: US Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command, US Secretary of State, US Secretary of Defense, US Information Agency, July 12, 1989) (IMG)

The bloodshed that existed elsewhere during the 1989 colour revolution could only mainly be because of either of the following: (1) the provocative terrorist agents of Deng and the CIA inside the Chinese security apparatus aimed to assist the CIA-MI6 colour revolutionaries by terrorizing civilians so to provoke civilians into an uprising against the Chinese state; the uprising against the Chinese state would have undermined those elements that resisted the Dengist reforms and would have strengthened Deng's leverage in liberalizing China enough so that China gets partitioned; for years, the PLA and Chinese intelligence had cooperated with the CIA in espionage against Eurasia, in funding Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, in waging war on Vietnam, etc.; hence the PLA and the Chinese intelligence were infiltrated by enough CIA-MI6 elements so that the mentioned outcome (i.e. provocative terror aimed at expanding the colour revolution) would inevitably happen. (2) Chinese colour revolutionaries engaged in violence against anti-Dengist elements in the Chinese security forces, so that the Deng faction could become stronger against the anti-Dengist elements in the Chinese security apparatus; hence, in response, the anti-Dengist elements in the Chinese security engaged against the colour revolutionaries and 'spilled the blood' of the pro-Deng colour revolutionary terrorists.

As a result of the purge of the Zhaoists, the influence of the Deng faction began to diminish, and correlated with this was the diminishing of the influence of US intelligence. The influence of US intelligence in China began to decline since 1989 but the decline was very slow, contrary to what the right-deviationists would have their readers believe. This is demonstrated, for example, in the fact that the CIA was still able to operate freely in China for the purpose of gathering military intelligence against the Eurasians (and against the anti-imperialist faction in China):

Trucks with highly classified tapes from two U.S.-built listening posts are still traveling from remote sites in western China to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, despite a steadily worsening relationship between the two nations' governments, according to informed sources. At the same time, Chinese scientists have assured their U.S. counterparts that they will continue to furnish unique information on Soviet nuclear tests and other seismic disturbances recorded at nine other stations built by the United States in China, other sources said. In short, they said, the Chinese government has not allowed its public anger over the sanctuary provided to dissident Fang Lizhi at the U.S. Embassy or the U.S. cutoff of military sales and diplomatic contacts to interfere with a secret partnership that began more than a decade ago. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

In replacement of Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping, the anti-imperialist faction coopted and promoted Jiang Zemin. Jiang Zemin was a distant agent of Deng Xiaoping. An ally of Deng, he had been elevated during the Deng era, but was not in Deng's immediate entourage and did not have much power. As such, the anti-imperialist faction promoted him in exchange for him being a coopted yes-man. Chen Yun was not necessarily a loyal fighter for the progressive anti-imperialist cause and did not always promote a socialist revolutionary line, but he was coopted by the progressive anti-imperialist faction and thus was compelled to promote correct stances on many issues. In spite of promoting many Dengist right-deviations, he was nonetheless coopted to be the leading Party official spearheading the campaign against the Maoist 'Cultural Revolution', the 'Great Leap Forward', and the Trotskyite pseudo-collectivization of agriculture into 'Communes', while also campaigning against Deng-era cultural liberality, supporting the suppression of the student colour revolutionaries, denouncing many of the decentralization measures of the Deng group, and supporting

confrontation with the United States. Admired by the Chinese proletarians for many of the correct stances he was coopted to adopt, he was one of the most influential leaders of the Party in the 1980s and the 1990s. It was he who engineered the rise of Jiang Zemin against the will of Deng:

At a preliminary meeting on the issue on May 21, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian favored Jiang Zemin, a career factory boss, while Deng Xiaoping and Deng Yingchao proposed Li Ruihuan, a nationally well-known model construction worker. Wang Zhen voted for Li Peng, the son of a revolutionary martyr and a career technocrat, while Yang Shangkun supported Qiao Shi, the only candidate with extensive experience in the party center (Party Central Office Secretariat 2001a). Although multiple candidates emerged at that stage, Jiang Zemin might have been the front-runner even then due to backing from two major groups in the party, the central technocrats led by Chen Yun and the New Fourth Army faction represented by Wang Daohan (Gilley 1998: 3 5). Because Li Xiannian and most of the FFA voted with Chen Yun, Jiang also obtained the support of FFA veterans along with Chen Yun's support. The others were backed by smaller coalitions. (Coalitions of the Weak, Cambridge University Press, Victor Shih, 2022) (IMG)

China's economy was saved thanks to the rise of the 'conservative' faction, really the progressive anti-imperialist faction, in China's so-called 'Communist' Party. Had the 'conservative' faction not increased its influence, had the Deng faction not seen such defeats in its factional conflicts, had China not began to reassert central economic controls over the localities, had the liberal cultural policy not been curbed, all such factors would have resulted in China being a country like how Afghanistan was for so many decades. The 'conservative' re-centralization drive, and the 'conservative' anti-Dengist/anti-Zhaoist purges saved that country from partition and destruction. And all of this was thanks in part to the pressures inflicted upon the Deng faction by the Chinese proletariat in the favour of the anti-imperialist faction which had coopted the Chen Yun group. In describing the ideology of present-day China, Chenyunism (Chen-Yun-ism) is a more accurate term than Dengism, as Dengism would have resulted in the partition of China into several CIA-backed comprador warlord regimes. Dengism would have done to China what Dengism (China's funding of Al-Qaeda in the 1980s) did to Afghanistan.

Due to the influence of the progressive-coopted Chen Yun group, China transitioned from a comprador state to an anti-imperialist state by the early 1990s. The anti-imperialist 'conservatives' in China's Party, not the CIA-backed Dengists, have been the force behind China's strategic partnership with the Russian Federation and the Iranian anti-imperialists. Forget not that as confirmed by Iran's archives center, Dengist China was a major supporter of the Iraqi regime, Iran's foe, in the Iran-Iraq War, and forget not that Dengist China was hostile to Eurasia, to which Russia is the successor. All the more naturally, the rise of the anti-imperialist 'conservative' faction since the late 1980s resulted in China being closer to the Russian Federation and the anti-imperialist faction of Iran's regime. Some two decades later, China emerged as the primary financial supporter of the Russo-Iranian military and intelligence campaigns against the Anglo-American imperialists, thanks not to the fascist Dengist reaction but to the 'conservative' re-centralizers.

Understand this: owing to the predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie in China and the small percentage of the proletariat, the corrupt bureaucrats could easily take over the Chinese state while meeting minimal resistance. The petit-bourgeoisie tend to not risk losing their businesses in a fight against the parasitic class forces. China's 'collectivization', done excessively quickly in the 1950s, appears all the more fake, leading me to believe that real collectivization did not actually take place in China. Owing to the continued predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie in that land, the parasitic classes take over China easily, a factor which led to that country being dominated by opportunists – left-opportunists as manifested in the form of Maoism, and right-opportunists as manifested in the form of Dengism. Both were reactionary pro-fascist comprador currents directly allied to Anglo-American finance capital. The opportunism was not spontaneously generated; it had a historical explanation, which was precisely the predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie in China. All the opportunist intellectuals around the world hail the opportunists in China, either in the form of Maoism or Dengism, and all such opportunist intellectuals whine and babble such identity politics terms as 'orientalism' and 'Sinophobia' in order to condemn scientific and legitimate criticism of the regime dominating China until the late 1980s. In reality, by supporting Mao Zedong group, the gang that via decentralization inflicted a pseudo-'natural' famine on the Chinese people, or by supporting the Deng group – the terror gang that brought double-digit inflation, unemployment, recession, corruption, and CIA-backed liberal student colour revolutions to China – the willing supporters of Chinese-style opportunism only prove their own vicious hostility to the Chinese proletarians and to China's existence as a country.

Due to the outbreak of the Dengism disease in 'communist' parties in recent years, some scores must eventually be settled with the Dengists outside of China as well. Not out of an outburst of rage and excess passion, but out of a coldest of calculations, and armed with a wealth of personal experience, I say: almost all of the Dengist intelligentsia are hopelessly reactionary, and there should be no waste of effort to persuade them to ideologically change, for almost all of such intellectuals cannot escape the influence of their parasitic class roots over the depths of their psyche. The proletariat, not the intelligentsia, will determine the course of history in favour of communism. In time, the might of the proletariat will circumvent the venomous influence of such arrogantly opportunistic intellectuals and will force them to recant and

submit to the will of the workers' state. Hence, in attempting to 'change' the poisoned minds of such 'innocently ignorant' right-opportunist intellectuals, waste your time not, I advise. When, under the influence of the anti-imperialist 'conservative' faction, even China itself – at a snail pace, but steadily nonetheless – continues the process of dismantling the legacy of Deng Xiaoping and his fascist terror gang, that is when it becomes clear that the Deng-loving intellectuals stand no chance.

Whereas anti-Dengism is the new anti-Bukharinism, anti-Maoism is the new anti-Trotskyism. It is crucial that Maoist terrorist espionage networks be ruthlessly exposed by communists around the world. It is crucial that the Maoist spies and assassins in the payroll of the imperialist-fascist secret services be exposed, and that the sincere believers who have been misled into adopting such a reactionary ideology, be helped, if at all mentally capable of and susceptible to receiving such help, in freeing themselves from such left-opportunist reaction. The attacks on both Maoism and Dengism have to be done in a responsible manner, because while the Maoists and Dengists are covertly on the same side, they 'oppose' each other on the overt level; such an overt-level 'hostility' between Maoism and Dengism must be exploited in order to gradually annihilate both of them. The left-opportunists are useful for speeding up the pace of the revolution and the right-opportunists are useful as anti-leftist antidote when pace is too high, when things begin to go too far, when left-deviationist excesses begin to emerge.

C23S6. The Shehu Faction after Official Sino-Albanian 'Split'

*** IMG-All-{Albania}

While trade with the West was not a bad thing in itself, a reorientation of commercial relations towards mostly the West would have given imperialist-fascist front companies a dramatic increase in economic leverage over Albania, thus strengthening the hand of the traitor Shehu. This is why:

Hoxha insisted on maintaining the principle of self-reliance, whilst Shehu argued for more economic interaction with the West. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

As mentioned before, Hoxha's insistence on self-reliance did not mean full-on autarky, however, because Albania began to reorient trade with the Eurasian-aligned states in Eastern Europe in the late 1960s.

The decline in the influence of the Trotskyite/Titoist regime in China meant a decline in the influence of the anti-Albanian renegade Mehmet Shehu, who, as mentioned in C13S1.3, had been a brutal intelligence official pursuing Trotskyite terrorist measures in Albania, against Hoxha's will. Hence:

In April 1980 [Shehu] was relieved of his duties as minister of defence during a government reshuffle, but managed to retain the post of prime minister. As Albania faced mounting social problems and economic slowdown in the wake of the break with China, Hoxha had apparently decided that Ramiz Alia was better equipped than Shehu to carry the heavy responsibilities and burdens that his own successor would inherit. Alia was seen as less unpredictable and extremist than Shehu. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

Ramiz Alia was a right-deviationist, but at the time, he was useful for containing Shehu's Trotskyism. Subsequently, a part of the military and the intelligence service was purged:

Since Shehu's main power base had been the military and the Sigurimi, Hoxha quickly instigated sweeping purges of a number of military and Sigurimi officers who were supporters of Shehu. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

Shehu was later found 'dead' under mysterious circumstances. Vickers of the Soros-funded ICG remarked: According to his nephew, Luan Omari, Hoxha was badly shaken for several days following Shehu's death. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

The 'death' of Shehu was indeed a real tragedy; had he been captured by Albania's counter-intelligence, Shehu could be duly interrogated and have his accomplices in the crimes against Albania be revealed. For this reason, Shehu was silenced.

Of course, Western media blames Hoxha, claiming that Shehu was murdered by him. Then,

almost a year after Shehu's death Hoxha announced to a bewildered Albanian populace that Shehu had all along been a multiple agent, in the pay of the British, Yugoslav, American and [Titoist elements in the] Soviet secret services. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

C23S7. The Vietnamese Freedom-Fighters against Titoism / Pol Pot, a Yugoslav agent

*** IMG-All-{Vietnam- Cambodia}

Tito's regime assisted the US in containing the Vietnamese freedom fighters. According to Mao Zedong:

When U.S. imperialism stepped up its intervention in Laos in January 1961, the Tito clique spread the view that the United States "is really concerned for the peace and neutralization of Laos". When U.S. imperialism engineered political assassinations and armed conflicts in Laos in May 1963, the Tito clique attacked the Laotian patriotic forces for "putting all the blame on the United States." (Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?, Mao, 1963, MIA)

The Vietnamese Communist Party was one of the signatories to the 1960 declaration in Moscow which denounced the fascist regime in Yugoslavia. The text of the 1960 declaration is as follows:

The Communist Parties have unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist "theories" in concentrated form. After betraying Marxism- Leninism, which they termed obsolete, the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia opposed their anti-Leninist revisionist program to the Declaration of 1957; they set the L.C.Y. against the international Communist movement as a whole, severed their country from the socialist camp, made it dependent on so-called "aid" from U.S. and other imperialists, and thereby exposed the Yugoslav people to the danger of losing the revolutionary gains achieved through a heroic struggle. The Yugoslav revisionists carry on subversive work against the socialist camp and the world Communist movement. Under the pretext of an extra-bloc policy, they engage in activities which prejudice the unity of all the peace-loving forces and countries. Further exposure of the leaders of Yugoslav revisionists and active struggle to safeguard the Communist movement and the working-class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists, remains an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist Parties. ('STATEMENT OF 81 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES MEETING IN MOSCOW, USSR', 1960, Source: Statement of 81 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow, USSR, 1960. New York: New Century Publishers, 1961. MIA)

In a highly diplomatic manner, the Vietnamese Communist Party also criticized the Moscow Titoists for their favorable stance towards the Yugoslav regime. The CIA, which records foreign media statements declassified its 'Foreign Radio Broadcasts' 'Daily Report', which contained a massive load of copies of media broadcasts and statements from different countries around the world. The CIA published the full text of a top article by the Vietnamese Communist Party's Hac Top Editorial in 1963, in which the Yugoslav regime was denounced. By now, it should become clear enough that citing the CIA for exposing Tito's hostility to the communist movement does not generate bias, but on the contrary reduces it, because Tito and his gang were indeed CIA agents, as has been clearly proven by the Stalin-era Soviet statements and mildly even by the Khrushchev-era Moscow statement in 1960 cited above. In that respect, therefore, using a CIA source for exposing the hostile attitude of the Vietnamese communists towards the CIA agent Tito is not an act of spreading imperialist lies. More importantly, citing the CIA source is actually a way of defending the Vietnamese communists against the imperialist media accusation that Vietnam's communists had 'friendly' relations with Yugoslavia. Anyways, here are excerpts of the statement by the Vietnamese communists' Hac Top editorial:

The attitude toward the Tito revisionist clique is one of the most important questions which have caused differences in the international communist movement. Concerning the Tito group, the 1960 statements of the conferences of representatives of communist and workers parties pointed out:

"The Communist parties have unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist theories in concentrated form. After betraying Marxism- Leninism, which they termed obsolete, the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia opposed their anti-Leninist revisionist program to the declaration of 1957; they set the League of Yugoslav Communists against the international communist movement as whole, severed their country from the socialist camp, made it dependent on so-called 'aid' from the United States and other imperialists, and thereby exposed the Yugoslav people to the danger of losing revolutionary gains achieved through a heroic struggle.

"The Yugoslav revisionists carry on subversive work against the socialist camp and the world communist movement. Under the pretext of an extrabloc party, they engage in activities which prejudice the unity of all peace-loving forces and countries. Further exposure of the leaders of the Yugoslav revisionists and active struggle to safeguard the communist movement and the working class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists, remains an essential task of the Marxist- Leninist parties."

The question of the attitude toward the Yugoslav revisionist clique is a question of principle of the Moscow documents. It is a question of choosing either Leninism or revisionism, a question of either strictly following the two Moscow statements or cancelling them.

At present, a number of persons are claiming that the analysis of the Tito clique by the 1960 statement is wrong. They eulogize the Tito clique. They take up Tito and draw his group into the ranks of the Marxist-Leninist parties in the world to create more conditions for it to undermine in the international communist movement. Meanwhile, they seek every means to isolate a number of the true Marxist- Leninist parties. They declare that Tito's Yugoslavia is a member of the great family of socialist countries. In fact, the 1960 Moscow statement pointed out that the Tito clique "severed its country from the socialist camp." Yugoslavia is not on the list of socialist countries mentioned by the 1960 statement. (...).

These two statements constitute the common program of the international communist movement. They have defined the strategic and tactical principles of the communist movement, the rules governing the relations among the communist and workers parties, and the methods to overcome the differences through meetings and

consultations if they arise among the parties. All communist and workers parties have an obligation to abide strictly by all provisions of the statements which they have recognized. Vietnamese communists have strictly respected the provisions set out in the two statements.

(Hoc Tap Editorial on Moscow Documents, Hanoi VNA International Service in English, November 16, 1963. In: Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, CIA, JJJ, pp. 6-9) (IMG)

The Vietnamese communists pursued the correct policy of criticizing Nikita Khrushchev's gang while remaining wary so as to not completely sever relations with Eurasia because that would have actually cut off relations with the communist faction in Eurasia and would have benefitted the Moscow Titoists in forcing Vietnam into America's hands. For this, the Vietnamese freedom-fighters were denounced by the Moscow Titoists. Regarding the mistreatment of the Vietnamese comrades by the Kremlin Titoists, Enver Hoxha recalled:

From a number of reliable sources, we are hearing what occurred in Moscow with the delegations of China, Korea and Vietnam, which had gone «to celebrate» the great anniversary of the Revolution with the «Soviet brothers» and «to assist the Soviet comrades». It is said that these delegations were humiliated by the Soviet revisionists.

Only Kosygin, quite alone, reluctantly received the delegation from Vietnam, having previously warned it that he could spare it no more than one hour. Kosygin received it coldly and disdainfully, listed the aid which the Soviets had provided for Vietnam, and then criticized them because their papers published anti-Soviet materials. In regard to the question of Khrushchev, he barely mentioned it and said that the Soviets were not changing their line one iota.

The same arrogant and humiliating behaviour with the Korean delegation, too, indeed with it he cut down the time of the meeting, because the Vietnamese had taken up fifteen minutes more than Mr. Kosygin had deigned to reserve for them.

(THE DEFEAT OF CHOU EN-LAI IN MOSCOW, Enver Hoxha, November 21, 1964. In: Enver Hoxha Selected Works, Vol. 3: June 1960 to October 1965, Published by Decision of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania)

The Vietnamese communist-led anti-fascist forces launched a war against 'Titoism with Cambodian Characteristics'. Among Tito's agents, Pol Pot was perhaps the cheapest of all – literally. In 1978, Pol Pot not only declared his camaraderie with Yugoslavia's fascist dictator but also confessed that he traveled to Yugoslavia to work for Tito for free. When thousands of Yugoslavs were hunted by the regime and taken to work as slaves for the anti-Soviet military-economic construction projects in the Belgrade-Zagreb Highway, Pol Pot was busy working as a volunteer for Tito's fascist regime during 1950 – that is two years after Tito's group had been unmasked by the Cominform. The following excerpts of the Khmer Rouge regime media are instructive:

At 08:30 on 17th March 1978 at the state guest house, Comrade Pol Pot, Secretary of the CPK Central Committee and Premier of the Democratic Cambodian Government, received and answered questions in an interview with the Yugoslav press delegation which is now on a visit to Democratic Cambodia.

First of all, our Comrade Party Secretary said to the journalists from the friendly country: We are very pleased with the Yugoslav press delegation's visit to our country. The visit of our comrade Yugoslav journalists will further strengthen the ties of friendship between our two peoples and countries. Like our Democratic Cambodia, Yugoslavia is a non-aligned country which has adhered to the position of preserving independence. Friendship between our two countries is therefore based on the same principle.

We have always esteemed and respected Comrade President Tito and the friendly Yugoslav people. Comrade President Tito and the Yugoslav people have always supported and helped us. We have sympathy for them and wish to express our thanks to Comrade President Tito and the friendly Yugoslav people. In 1950, I went to Yugoslavia to work in a work unit in the Zagreb area. I have sympathy for President Tito and the Yugoslav people. Comrades, you come to our country as friends.

(Pol Pot's Interview with Yugoslav Journalists: Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 8, No. 3. Phnom Penh Home Service, March 20, 1978, 23:00 GMT. Description: 'Text of report of interview given on 17th March by the Cambodian Premier, Pol Pot, to a visiting Yugoslav press delegation'.) (IMG)

There were reports that whenever Yugoslav humanitarian aid was sent to the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, Yugoslav arms also arrived at the Pol Pot regime territory in Cambodia at the same time, indicating that the Yugoslav regime was providing military support for the Cambodian regime under the cover of 'humanitarian' aid. However, as the reports do not explicitly confirm that Yugoslav arms were sent under 'humanitarian' cover, they cannot be cited as concrete evidence of Yugoslav regime military support for the Cambodian regime. One such report is by the Chicago Tribune:

Sok Pha said her job in Thor Maroy was to cook and prepare rooms for special guests of such Khmer Rouge officials as Ieng Sary, one of the Khmer Rouges most senior leaders,. She said the guests included Chinese and Yugoslav officials, who came in groups of 10 to 20 every month or so. "The Chinese and Yugoslavs wore

military uniforms," she said through an interpreter. "Every time they came, new shipments of ammunition came too."

Although the Chinese have long been known as the Khmer Rouge's main military backer, the only previously known Yugoslav aid to the Khmer Rouge has been "humanitarian" aid such as baby food, pencils, medicine and sports shoes.

Yugoslavia has given similar aid to the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and the forces of former Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Those noncommunist groups are united with the communist Khmer Rouge in fighting the Vietnamese-backed regime in Cambodia.

(KHMER ROUGE ISLAND REPORTEDLY AN ARMS BASE, Chicago Tribune, Mary Kay Magistad, April 12, 1989) (IMG)

In the eyes of most reasonable observers aware of the truth about fascist Yugoslavia, it would seem utterly naive to believe, even for one second, that the outreach of Yugoslav 'humanitarian' aid to the Cambodian 'Khmer Rouge' fascists – completely simultaneous with the arrival of arms and Yugoslav military advisors to the Cambodian 'Khmer Rouge' fascists – could be anything but a case of Yugoslav military aid, under the cover of 'humanitarian' aid, to the 'Khmer Rouge' fascists.

Chapter 24

C24S1. The Titoist Role in the Fall of Yugoslavia as a Country

*** IMG-All-{Partition of Yugoslavia}

The imperialist-fascist reaction, which promoted the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as a bulwark against Soviet and later Eurasian influence until 1989, saw 1989 as the year in which to abandon such a policy of territorial integrity and to pursue the partition of Yugoslavia. The year 1989 was the year in which the Eastern European allies of Eurasia were collapsing one by one, and thereupon, from the lens of NATO, the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was of use no more, and rather was detrimental to the imperialist camp. As such, the Anglo-American and German imperialists unleashed a policy of supporting the partition of Yugoslavia.

It may appear as though the elevation of the much-slandered Milosevic faction, the anti-imperialist faction, to the 'leadership' of Yugoslavia was the rise to dominance of the anti-imperialist faction in the Titoist fascist regime; it is true that the Milosevic faction was anti-imperialist, but the truth is that the Milosevic faction never at any point in time dominated Yugoslavia, never reaching anywhere close to even a 50% stake in control over the Yugoslav state apparatus. The 'balance' of power in Yugoslavia continued to decisively remain in the hands of the Titoist fascist forces throughout the 'Milosevic era'. For Anglo-American finance capital, by 1989, a territorially disintegral Yugoslavia was far more useful. Hence, all of the Titoist agents who had been striving to bring about a territorially integral powerful fascist Yugoslavia until 1989 suddenly went for weakening Yugoslavia and making it a territorially disintegral fascist-occupied territory. Such was why in Croatia, the Ustase faction of the notorious Tito agent Franjo Tudjman was in charge. Such was why in Bosnia, although the Libyan-backed Iran-backed anti-imperialist Alija Izetbegovic faction was ostensibly in charge, in reality Bosnia was taken over by the Afghan Al-Qaeda terrorists whom Tito had endorsed many years prior. In Serbia, although the Milosevic faction held the upper hand, much of the power was in the hands of the Stanisic faction, Stanisic being the Titoist UDB agent who rose to be the leader of the Serbian intelligence service and carrying out anti-Albanian pogroms so to provoke CIA-backed Kosovar Albanian rebellions. In Kosovo, the anti-Titoist warrior and Kosovar Albanian hero, Adem Demaci, along with his comrades, unofficially supported a strategic partnership with the Milosevic faction against NATO, but the Demaci faction was quickly sidelined in the KLA and the narco-terror gang of the UDB-backed KLA commander Hashim Thaci retained its decisive upper hand over the KLA. Until 1989, the Titoists dominated a territorially integral Yugoslavia. From 1989, the Titoists dominated a territorially disintegral Yugoslavia – no change in the fact of the Titoist domination. In this section, the case of the Ustase operative and Titoist commander Franjo Tudjman as well as the case of the UDB official Jovica Stanisic and UDB-backed KLA commander will be explored, documenting their works as accomplices of the Titoist fascist secret service and their role in the collapse of Yugoslavia as a country.

The USSR Information Bulletin, the media of the Soviet embassy in the United States, reported in 1952:

Ruthlessly dealing with genuine patriots of the Yugoslav people, the Tito-Rankovic clique flung open the of the officers corps and the army to the enemies of the people – fascist and bourgeois nationalist elements – reactionary officers of the old royal army, Chetniks and Ustasi. Senior and higher officers are promoted from their midst; crimes against the people are their common bond with the Titoite clique. (The Tito Clique Has Turned Yugoslavia Into a Military Camp, V. Nemchinov, June 9, 1952. USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 11, p. 352) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

Recruiting from the army of the ancien regimes was something that the USSR did too. However, the USSR recruited these elements while remaining vigilant so to eventually purge the reactionary infiltrators into the army and to replace these infiltrators were communists and pro-communist sympathizers, whereas the Tito regime exterminated communists and pro-communist individuals in Yugoslavia. As may be recalled from the reader from C15S5, the Tito regime and the Ustase officials collaborated for the purpose of colonizing Macedonia in the post-war years. Tito and the Ustase were both backed by the Gestapo and later the CIA and MI6, the Yugoslav regime's secret service headed by Rankovic was made up of Gestapo officers, and the Yugoslav regime military was open to the Ustase elements. Let us not forget that Franjo Tudjman, an Ustase terrorist who rose to become a prominent military official in Croatia during the Tito years, was and remained an Ustase terrorist and tried to partially re-establish Ustase rule in Croatia in the 1990s.

In the 1960s, Franjo Tudjman went to the academia in order to agitate for Titoism and fascism there:

In 1961 Tudjman gave up his army career, and moved to Zagreb to become the director of the Institute for the History of the Working-Class Movement in Croatia, commanding a team of more than 200 researchers. In 1963 he was also appointed professor of history at the Zagreb University Faculty of Political Sciences, the only applicant without the usual prerequisite of a Ph.D. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, pp. 300-301) (IMG)

However, by the mid-1960s, it became ever more obvious that Tudjman was associated to the Ustase terrorist networks. Yet, Tito continued to support Tudjman, knowing that Tudjman was a vicious enemy of the Yugoslav people. Evidence

of the collusion of Tito with the Ustase terrorists lies in the fact that Ustase leader Franjo Tudjman was saved from prosecution upon the personal intervention of Tito:

During the mid-1960s, Tudjman became involved in Matica Hrvatska, especially in its relations with the Croats of diaspora, and in 1967 he signed the declaration about the language. For this he was thrown out of the party and stripped of his two official positions. During the crackdown on nationalists in the winter of 1971 -2, Tudjman was arrested and charged with espionage, presumably because of his contacts with Croats abroad. However, Tito intervened to drop the more serious charges, and Tudjman spent only ten months in gaol. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 301) (IMG)

During the late 1960s, the partial resurgence of communist influence in Eurasia had given greater leverage to the communist 'Cominformists' in Yugoslavia in the secret service conflict against the Tito faction. Such was why by the 1970s, Tudjman was arrested. However, Tito's gang still retained dominant influence, a key factor that allowed the release of Tudjman, the Ustase general that would later destroy Yugoslavia. Tudjman, an agent and protege of Tito, later on by the 1990s became the leader of the Ustase terrorists and established the new 'independent' state of Croatia, waging the Anglo-American and German imperialists' war against the Milosevic faction in Serbia. Patriotic Serbian scholars have already written plenty with regards to the Tito-Tudjman connection and Tudjman's role as Ustase leader in the 1990s.

Considering such an extensive cooperation between Tito's regime and the Ustase criminals, there is no way that the Ustase terror attacks launched on Yugoslavia would have occurred without the approval of the Tito regime. The dialectical laws of history dictate that since there was such a vast network of intelligence cooperation both directly (in the case of Macedonia) and indirectly (through CIA, MI6 and Gestapo) between the Tito regime and the Ustase, the case of the terror attacks by the Ustase could only have been with the – at best, tacit – approval of Tito and his fascist secret service. The goal of such operations was obvious: to terrorize the Yugoslav population into submission to the Yugoslav regime, to make the real opposition – i.e. the 'Cominformist' opposition – appear as being on the same side as the Ustase, and to perhaps also eliminate some persons regarded as potential threats to Tito's regime in the process of such Ustase terror operations. As for the Bosnian branch of Al-Qaeda, lest we forget that Tito officially condemned the Soviet 'invasion' of Afghanistan, and that Tito supported the Afghan 'resistance' against the Soviet Red Army; those same Al-Qaeda terrorists returned to Bosnia later and prevented the Libyan-Iranian agent Alija Izetbegovic from pursuing his anti-NATO agenda.

Less known than the case of the Ustase leader and Titoist commander, Franjo Tudjman, are the cases of UDB chief Jovica Stanisic and the UDB-backed KLA commander Hashim Thaci, and their roles in the destruction of Yugoslavia. The UDB had recruited a man named Jovica Stanisic in 1975:

Stanisic joined the Yugoslav service in 1975, when the country was still under the communist rule of Josip Broz Tito. He was never regarded as an ideologue or rabid nationalist. But he had a rare aptitude for espionage.

"Stanisic was not an ordinary intelligence officer," said Dobrica Cosic, a writer and former dissident who was president of Serbia in 1992 and 1993. "He is an intellectual, not a radical policeman. He was educated and skilled, and he knew how to organize that service."

(Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance, Los Angeles Times, Greg Miller, March 1, 2009) (IMG)

Naturally, since the Yugoslav intelligence service was a front for all the imperialist-fascist enemies of Milosevic, the latter had to choose not between good and evil but between the evil and the lesser evil. Hence, Milosevic felt no choice but to appoint Stanisic as the head of the Serbian secret service, because although Milosevic never really trusted the imperialist-fascist spy Stanisic, the latter was nonetheless enough of an intellectual to be easier to control:

Milosevic made Stanisic his top spy, despite long-standing distrust between the two. (Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance, Los Angeles Times, Greg Miller, March 1, 2009) (IMG)

That Stanisic was easier to control of course did not mean that the Yugoslav intelligence service which Tito-Rankovic founded was going to be less of a CIA-MI6-Mossad front. Stanisic simply continued his service to the CIA as early as 1992, the year in which he became the chief of the Yugoslav intelligence service, and he provided all kinds of services to the NATO enemies of Milosevic:

in 1992, as the former Yugoslavia was erupting in ethnic violence, ... a wary CIA agent made his way toward the park's gazebo and shook hands with a Serbian intelligence officer.

Jovica Stanisic had a cold gaze and a sinister reputation. He was the intelligence chief for Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and regarded by many as the brains of a regime that gave the world a chilling new term: "ethnic cleansing."

But the CIA officer, William Lofgren, needed help. The agency was all but blind after Yugoslavia shattered into civil war. Fighting had broken out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milosevic was seen as a menace to European security, and the CIA was desperate to get intelligence from inside the turmoil.

(...). So on that midnight stroll, the two spies carved out a clandestine relationship that remained undisclosed:

For eight years, Stanistic was the CIA's main man in Belgrade. During secret meetings in boats and safe houses along the Sava River, he shared details on the inner workings of the Milosevic regime. He provided information on the locations of NATO hostages, aided CIA operatives in their search for grave sites and helped the agency set up a network of secret bases in Bosnia.

At the same time, Stanistic was setting up death squads for Milosevic that carried out a genocidal campaign, according to prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which was established by the U.N. Security Council in 1993 to try those responsible for serious human rights violations in the Balkan wars.

Now facing a trial at The Hague that could send him to prison for life, Stanistic has called in a marker with his American allies. In an exceedingly rare move, the CIA has submitted a classified document to the court that lists Stanistic's contributions and attests to his helpful role. The document remains sealed, but its contents were described by sources to The Times. (...). This account is based on dozens of interviews with current and former officials of U.S. and Serbian intelligence agencies, as well as documents obtained or viewed by The Times. Among them are official records of the Serbian intelligence service, and a seven-page account of that bloody period that Stanistic wrote while in prison in The Hague.

In that memo, Stanistic portrays himself as someone who sought to moderate Milosevic, and who worked extensively with the CIA to contain the crisis.

"I institutionalized cooperation with the U.S. intelligence community in spite of the notoriously bad relations between our two countries," Stanistic writes. That collaboration, he continues, "contributed significantly to the de-escalation of the conflict." (...). In spring 1993, at CIA prodding, Stanistic pressured Ratko Mladic, military commander of the breakaway Serb republic in Bosnia, to briefly stop the shelling of Sarajevo.

Two years later, Stanistic helped secure the release of 388 North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops who had been taken hostage, stripped of their uniforms and strapped to trees as human shields against NATO bombing runs. In his own written account, Stanistic said he negotiated the release "with the support of agency leadership."

That same year, Stanistic tried to intervene when French pilots were shot down and taken captive. Mladic "refused to admit that he was holding the pilots," Stanistic wrote. But "my service managed to discover the circumstances and location of their captivity," and shared the information with the CIA and French authorities.

By then, the Clinton administration was engaged in an all-out diplomatic push to end the war. Stanistic accompanied Milosevic to Dayton, Ohio, for peace talks, then returned to Serbia to carry out key pieces of the accord.

It was left to Stanistic to get the president of Bosnia's Serb republic, Radovan Karadzic, to sign a document pledging to leave office. And Stanistic helped the CIA establish a network of bases in Bosnia to monitor the cease-fire.

Doug Smith, the CIA's station chief in Bosnia, recalled meeting with Stanistic and a group of disgusted Bosnian Serb officials in Belgrade. As Stanistic instructed them to cooperate with the CIA, Smith said, the assembled guests "shifted uneasily in their seats."

Smith began meeting with Stanistic regularly, including once on a boat on the Sava. In typically dramatic fashion, Stanistic arrived late at the docks.

"He emerged out of the darkness with bodyguards" and spent much of the evening talking about his boss, Smith said. "He intensely disliked Milosevic. He went off on how awful Milosevic was -- dishonest and crooked."

(Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance, Los Angeles Times, Greg Miller, March 1, 2009) (IMG)
Stanistic set up death squads throughout Yugoslavia in order to terrorize the different ethnic minorities. The international judicial bodies decided to prosecute Stanistic but the CIA rushed in to protect its agent. However:

The chief prosecutor, Dermot Groome, says that Stanistic's actions to help the CIA and counter Milosevic only underscore the power he had. In his opening argument, Groome said that the "ability to save lives is tragically the very same authority and the very same ability that [Stanistic] used to take lives."

(...). At one point, Groome introduced a videotape showing images of Muslim men and boys -- their hands bound with wire -- being led into the woods and shot, one by one, by members of the Scorpions. "Jovica Stanistic established these units," said Groome, an American lawyer. And Stanistic made sure "they had everything that they needed, including a license to clear the land of unwanted people, a license to commit murder."

(Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance, Los Angeles Times, Greg Miller, March 1, 2009) (IMG)
The goal of such terror by Stanistic though was not to commit genocide against the ethnic minorities but to rather provoke those ethnic minorities into revolting against the central government of Yugoslavia in order to bring about the partition of that country. The intelligence service that Tito's fascist gang established launched campaigns of terror until 1989 in order to suppress the voices that called for freedom from Titoist yoke. From 1989, however, the intelligence service was

engaged in terror attacks not to suppress but to provoke. This was in addition to the vast economic inequality and the countless years of socio-economic oppression of ethnic minorities that Tito's fascist gang established in Yugoslavia. Stanisic's use of terror operations as a means of provoking Kosovar Albanian rebellions against the Milosevic faction was no coincidence. On the contrary, it was a part of the broader effort of the UDB network in Yugoslavia to support the Al-Qaeda terrorists and drug lords that made up the dominant faction of the KLA.

Stanisic's henchman in the KLA was the infamous Hashim Thaci, the drug lord and bloody assassin, savagely betraying the Kosovar Albanian people. Years of the repression of the Kosovo national liberation movement by the Titoist fascist regime in Yugoslavia had resulted in the jailing or killing of Albanian revolutionaries and had allowed the elevation of fascist UDB agents in the ranks of the Kosovo Albanian militants organizations. One person backed by the Titoist UDB agent was none other than the notorious Hashim Thaci. Stanisic's UDB fascist secret service promoted Hashim Thaci, the head of the KLA, thus assisting the KLA war effort against the peoples of Serbia and Kosovo. Naim Miftari – a former KLA commander and a former special agent of the post-socialist Albanian regime's intelligence service, SHIK – confirmed that Hashim Thaci was backed by the Titoist fascist UDB. Indeed, Thaci's connections to the UDB have been documented by:

Former KLA superior and former SHIK agent Naim Miftari.. ('Naim Miftari: Gjykata Speciale e fliroi Kosoven nga regjimi i profierit dhe perfaresit te luftes Hashim Thafit', Bota Sot, Interview with SHIK official Naim Miftari, July 20, 2022) (IMG)

One of Thafi's comrades-in-arms, Naim Miftari, [who] has explained in chronological order, all the tricks and political bargains in which he was involved. He also mentioned the fact that Thafi has been accused many times of murder, not only of LDK members, but also of his associates. "Hashim Thafi, neither today nor in the future, can escape conspiracies or games behind his back, since he himself came to power with the help of games, where he is sometimes accused of many murders, not only of LDK members, but for most of his former colleagues. Let's go back before the war. (...)" ('Thafi i lidhur me UDB -en, tradhetoj U£K-ne?', Bota Sot, Interview with SHIK official Naim Miftari, March 13, 2016) (IMG)

Indeed, in the interview with Bota Sot, Naim Miftari, the SHIK agent and KLA official, noted that a senior UDB official had helped Hashim Thaci 'escape' from the UDB prosecution and go to Switzerland:

Hashim Thafi was a bad student, then after a while he was punished in absentia because he was a member of the KLA. With those "convictions" missing, **he and some friends secure political asylum in Switzerland, where the main help is provided by the statements of B-S [abbreviated name], a senior member of the Serbian UDB in Belgrade..** Surprisingly, H[ashim] Th[aci], with their own group, are sentenced in absentia, as they surprisingly escape the arrests of the UDB, but Nait Hasan's group is arrested and some are killed in an ambush, like Zahir Pajaziti, and some are killed by torture in prison.. ('Thafi i lidhur me UDB -en, tradhetoj U^K-ne?', Bota Sot, Interview with SHIK official Naim Miftari, March 13, 2016. Bold added.) (IMG)

Baton Haxhiu, an agent of the UDB and of Jovica Stanisic, was a liaison officer linking Thaci to the UDB. Documenting the UDB-Stanisic-Haxhiu-Thaci connection, Miftari said in an interview with Bota Sot:

"When Sali Berisha mentions the connections between Hashim Thafi and Baton Haxhiu and Serbia ... he is completely right. Let's not forget that Sali Berisha has been the main man of the Albanian government for many years and had access to the military intelligence service and SHISH, so these are very serious words. I justify it by the fact that our data from the ZKZ (G2) of the U£K and TMK, then the Kosovo Police and the SHIK show that there is no doubt that Baton Haxhiu was before the war a collaborator and coordinating postman of Jovica Stanisic, the head of the Serbia [branch of] UDB, SDB, mediator of the meetings in Brezovica by the head of the UDB and the former communist leaders of Kosovo, so Batoni was important and is still important for the UDB (BIA) and a professional friend of Hashim Thafi", Miftari said. ('Policia e Kosoves, ZKZ (G2) dhe SHIK-u kishin te dhena se Baton Haxhiu ka qene bashkepunetor i Ivica Stanishifit', Bota Sot, Interview with SHIK official Naim Miftari, December 8, 2018) (IMG)

As can be seen, the UDB from 1989 launched terror operations against Kosovar Albanian civilians in order to provoke riots, and simultaneously supported the 'escape' of Thaci in order to make a 'hero' out of him. Thaci was protected by the Titoist secret service agency, UDB.

As mentioned before in C12S6, the Yugoslav Titoists were master pan-chauvinists. They supported the Albanian terrorists that massacred Serb civilians, while also supporting Serbian terrorists massacring Albanian civilians. There should be no surprise that the bourgeois-nationalists were stabbing their own nations in the back, through such bloody reign of terror, for such a thing as 'nationalism', in its classless meaning, bears no material reality, unless in extremely rare accidents. The question is not whether or not 'nationalism' is good or bad; the question is whether it exists beyond just one's imaginations. And the truth is that nationalism, in its classless sense, has never materially existed, unless by accident. For almost all of the time, there have been two types of 'nationalists': (1) proletarian pseudo -nationalists, really just proletarian internationalists with a spirit of socialist patriotism instead of rootless cosmopolitanism, and (2)

bourgeois-nationalists (not to be confused with national bourgeoisie), imperialist agents who preach the greatness of their own nation while allying with the chauvinist terrorists savagely massacring the nation whom the bourgeois-nationalists ostensibly uphold; the most cited case of bourgeois-nationalist betrayal of their own people has been the Zionist anti-Arab chauvinist collaboration with the Nazi anti-Semites, but the truth is that the Nazi-Zionist connection is only one out of thousands of cases in point. Such an alliance of seemingly 'contradictory' chauvinisms is rooted in the fact that the chauvinists or bourgeois-nationalists of different ethnicities are all agents of the same reactionary parasitic classes, and have the same class interests, making them natural allies despite appearances to the contrary.

The history of Yugoslavia goes on to prove the point made by the Cominform in 1949: that the Titoists were not 'nationalists'. The Titoists were not loyal to Yugoslav 'national' interest, but were rather agents of imperialist-fascist finance capital, committing a betrayal of even the narrow national interests of Yugoslavia. The very same Titoists that promoted a Balkan fascist 'federation' when the US-led camp needed it against the USSR and Eurasia, began to push for the crumbling of Yugoslavia when the Anglo-American imperialists needed a crumbled 'Yugoslavia'. Added to Tito's fascist secret service were the fake 'anti-Titoists' and the fake 'communist' 'anti-revisionists' (e.g. the Maoists, as well as countless – though not all of – the 'Hoxhaist' parties) who were deafeningly silent on the genocide in Kosovo by Tito's gang, preferring instead to launch operations against those whom they called 'Soviet social-imperialists', but who suddenly 'woke up' in 1989 and started supporting the partition of Yugoslavia just when the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was necessary. There are also of course those who are nostalgic towards the 'glorious' days of His 'Eminence' the Marshal of the Renegades Tito, when Yugoslavia resembled an inferno. Many in this category will continue to slander anti-Titoists as 'pro-imperialist' and 'pro-NATO', much as how Tito himself several times in his speeches slandered Stalin-era USSR and the Cominform as being in cahoots with NATO, the MI6, and the Italian Fascists. In reality, these Titoism apologists – and they are numerous – are at best useful idiots, and at worst fascist agents, of NATO, MI6, CIA, etc.

C24S2. Some Last Remarks on Titoist Yugoslavia in this Book

It may come as a surprise to future generations reading this book; however, the fact is that, at the time of writing, Tito is loved and romanticized by the overwhelming majority of 'communists', the majority of the self-described 'staunch supporters' of Stalin-era USSR, and also the majority of Serbs, new generations of Yugoslavs systematically brainwashed to worship the sanguivore that made long streams off the blood of their grandparents. These facts speak volumes about the terrifying propaganda power which Tito's gang obtained. Tito's fake 'friendship' with Abdel- Nasser and Nehru cultivated around the Yugoslav tyrant an image of a 'freedom-fighter' and 'proletarian internationalist', whereas NATO's fascist nuclear assaults on Yugoslavia fostered the infantile feeling of nostalgia for the years of Titoist fascist occupation, with many foolishly ignorant of the fact that the Yugoslav Titoist agents assisted NATO in the war effort against Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Increasingly dominated by intellectuals rather than proletarians, the 'communist' parties have been Titoized in recent years. Yet, handled carefully, this global Titoist propaganda dominance in the communist movement's discourse can be broken, torn asunder, scintilla by scintilla. Armed with evidence and reason against Titoist propaganda, the communists worthy of the name can wage the class struggle to oust the intelligentsia and bureaucrats from communist parties and to increase the percentage membership of proletarians and cooperativists in these parties, so to pave the way for the de-Titoization of the communist movement.

Worldwide, the thousands of fake 'communists' join the CIA propaganda bullhorns in preaching the myth that Tito's regime was 'more democratic' than the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, that Tito's regime was a 'democratic' 'federation' of different nationalities living with each other peacefully, that religious minorities were 'tolerated', that the Yugoslav regime stood up 'heroically' against 'both' the 'totalitarian Soviet Union' and the 'imperialist West'; that there were 'improvements' in the conditions of women, that 'worker self-management' allowed for 'lower' bureaucracy and greater 'workplace democracy', that Tito was 'a benevolent' leader 'popular' among Yugoslavs, that the slavery and feudal modes of production were 'eradicated'; that Tito was a 'anti-fascist' and that he made the situation in Yugoslavia 'less hellish'; that the Yugoslav regime was 'simultaneously' 'tolerant towards the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim at home' and 'anti-Zionist' and 'favorable to Arabs abroad'; that the denouncers of Tito are 'pro-NATO', 'pro-American', 'Zionist apologists', 'pro-imperialist', 'CIA propagandists', and 'Trotskyite'; and that the supporters of the Cominform's line are all 'too radical' 'left-sectarian' 'petit-bourgeois' 'Maoist' 'lunatics' when denouncing Tito's regime as the fascist regime it actually was. The CIA portrayed Titoist Yugoslavia as every infantile leftist's dream country. Yugoslavia's fascist regime was able to cover up its genocides and crimes against humanity with the facade of 'democratic' and 'federative' 'non-aligned' 'socialism'. Certainly, there are many well-meaning individuals who are misled into genuinely believing this junk about Tito's gang, and while they deserve much criticism for their low vigilance, they should not be condemned for making such an error; however, there are those fake 'progressives' who push for such junk vigorously and aggressively, and it is essential that these elements be ruthlessly exposed, isolated, and quarantined, so that their venomous influence may be contained. Apologetics for Tito is better than apologetics for Himmler only and only because Tito has not yet been unmasked before the whole world. Shame be on those fake 'communists' and fake 'Yugoslav

patriots' who continue to support, even when faced with so much evidence, the virulent legacy of this massive club of Nazi assassins. When different places in the territory of former Yugoslavia are named after Tito, Rankovic, Kolisevski, etc., such namings should spark worldwide outrage and should receive international condemnation; alas, the cries of them who suffered are completely ignored, and so many in the territory of former Yugoslavia have been brainwashed on the Titoism question. There are those who are aware of such crimes, but who show a soft attitude towards these crimes; they too have no place in the anti-imperialist movement in the long-term. The case of Yugoslavia also has much to teach not only to the present generations but also to the future generations who may face such a propaganda bombardment. It is essential that they understand the way that 'Third Force' propaganda was utilized in the Yugoslav context as a cover for imperialist intelligence penetration into the anti-imperialist camp. It is also important that they learn to remember the cries of the peoples of Yugoslavia who were subjected to such terror and the fact that so few people actually exposed such massive crimes, so many were deafeningly silent, and instead believed the lies of the CIA's media mercenaries and the thousands of pseudo-'communist' helpers of the CIA.

C24S3. The Titoists' Second Coming

One can split the history of Titoism in post-Stalin USSR/Eurasia into two phases: the Khrushchevian Titoism and the Andropovian-Gorbachevian Titoism. We know that although Brezhnev himself was a Titoist 'at heart', so encircled and coopted he was by the communist forces that the Brezhnev era saw a resurgence of communist influence at the expense of the Titoists. Already, there were improvements in the composition of the CPSU, and a dictatorship of the proletariat had been restored by around the year 1980. What, then, resulted in the tide to be turned again? What caused the communist faction to go on the decline yet again, while the Titoist faction saw an increase in its influence in the early 1980s? The answer to this question lies in the campaign in Afghanistan, the military campaign in which the Red Army lost, hence resulting in the communist faction in the Red Army to have to reallocate some of its funds away from the secret service conflict against the Titoists and bureaucrats at home and onto fighting Al-Qaeda and the H. Amin gang in Afghanistan.

This then begs the question of why the Red Army began to lose in Afghanistan in the first place, why the Afghan communists were in so weak a condition that they had to invite the Soviets. And the answer to this question lies in the Algiers Accord of 1975, by the time of which the Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr faction of Iraq had gone on the decline and Vice President Saddam had become the main leader of Iraq. By 1975, a coup d'etats had occurred against the King Faysal faction, allowing the United States to more firmly control Saudi Arabia, while the Saddam faction ascended to de facto dominance in Iraq, and the Shah in Iran was able to crush the anti-Shah guerrilla movement. With Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq under the control of the Anglo-American imperialists by 1975, most of the petroleum of the world was in the hands of the allies of the American imperialists; such an advantage in turn gave an advantage in financing the military spending by the allies of the American imperialists. Iran and Iraq, by then allies, went ahead and began setting the Middle East on fire, starting from the Sadat group gaining the full upper hand in 1975, the PLO terror bombing of Lebanon in 1975, the boost in Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in Syria in 1976, the Yitzhak Rabin team's influence over the state reducing in 1976, the Abdel-Fattah Al-Ismael faction in South Yemen beginning to decline in 1976, the MEK forces in Iran becoming completely a SAVAK front by 1975, the Fedai guerrillas in Iran being crushed in 1976, etc. Throughout the Middle East and North Africa, there came either a temporary decline or a collapse of the revolutionary forces. The huge shake-up affected Afghanistan too. Despite the rise of the progressive forces there in 1978, the new communist-led progressive government was fragile right from the start. There, Al-Qaeda, allied with the Titoist faction headed by Hafizullah Amin, was reducing communist influence. Then occurred the rest of the story, the military defeat of the Red Army, the strengthening of the leverage of the Gorbachevian Titoists, etc. The Titoists' "Second Coming" in the 1980s was 'thanks' to American imperialism, but the key strategic turning point in favour of American imperialism, which offset the chain reaction resultant in the Titoists "Second Coming" was the 1975 Iran-Iraq alliance, which caused American imperialist control over all the major oil resources of the world outside Eurasia (and Libya), hence an advantage in financing military spending. Such an upper hand in military spending resulted in the defeat of the Red Army in Afghanistan, which yielded the Titoists' "Second Coming" in the forms of Gorbachev, Andropov, Chebrikov, Yeltsin, Primakov, etc., causing the 1989-1991 collapses.

C24S4. Anglo-American Spy Gorbachev and his Henchpeople

*** IMG-All-{Gorbachev}

Mikhail Gorbachev was a British spy, providing top secret nuclear-military intelligence to the MI6. In his 1990s memoirs, Gorbachev confessed:

I laid out in front of the British Prime Minister a large map on which all stocks of nuclear weapons were drawn in thousandths. And each of these cells, I said, is quite enough to destroy all life on Earth. This means that all living things can be destroyed by the accumulated nuclear reserves 1000 times! (Life and Reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, Chapter 8) (IMG)

The Gorbachev group helped entrench the corrupt bureaucrats in the Eurasian state, while allowing the Gorbachev faction to suppress the proletariat. Such class struggles were reflected in the strengthening of the Titoist faction at the expense of the communist faction in Eurasian institutions.

Under the guise of fighting the corrupt bureaucracy, the British spy Gorbachev embarked on a project of systematically expanding bureaucracy, hence to expand economic corruption and the wealth of the oligarchs. Under the guise of fighting the chaos and the corrupt mafia, Gorbachev expanded the very things he pretended to oppose. This is confirmed by Gorbachev's own neoliberal economic advisor at the time, Yuri Maltsev, who defected to the United States in the late 1980s, served on such US government agencies as the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), and provided advisory on national security and economic matters to the US Congress. Maltsev wrote:

The budget cuts appeared to be a reality when Gorbachev sacked 600,000 bureaucrats from central operations of the ministries — which amounts to 30 percent to 50 percent of each department. Alongside that, however, he also created a set of new mega-enterprises to substitute for the ministries. A study I did of these new enterprises at the time showed they hired 720,000 people, most of them just-fired bureaucrats, but with a generous 35 percent salary increase. Gorbachev's "cuts" actually represented a twenty percent increase in the managerial sector of the Soviet State, which was exactly the point of the move. The old structures of the command economy began to evaporate with all these changes, reversals, and talk of creating a market. But since no market was actually set up, everything [in terms of the corrupt bureaucracy] came to a standstill. (Requiem for Marx, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Yuri N. Maltsev, 1993, p. 22) (IMG)

Maltsev continued:

Thus Gorbachev's new "market" ... piled new regulations and ministries on top of the old.... (Requiem for Marx, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Yuri N. Maltsev, 1993, p. 22) (IMG)

Gorbachev also created a privatized corrupt bureaucratic mafia structures which he falsely named 'cooperatives' to make them appear socialistic. Maltsev wrote:

The Law on Cooperatives – a new regulation allowing pseudo-private ownership – seemed to be a step in the right direction. But in fact, the newly created cooperatives became an organized mafia themselves, extracting and paying out bribes at an unprecedented rate. As soon as a person would start a business, the fire department would arrive to close everything down and then wait for bribes. A person could sue the fire department, but he would have to pay a bribe to the judge. In the Soviet Union, people learned that it is better to pay bribes directly. (Requiem for Marx, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Yuri N. Maltsev, 1993, p. 22) (IMG)

The cooperatives, which were ostensibly meant to benefit the consumers, largely did not sell to the consumers hence further driving the process of consumer goods up, making Soviet people poorer, and expanding the profits of the mafia oligarchs:

During 1986-88 the Soviet Government passed legislation legalizing a wider range of individual private enterprise and encouraging the formation of cooperatives, particularly in the area of consumer goods and services. (...). These measures allowed the emergence of a new group of high-income earners.

Although cooperatives did provide some consumer goods and services, this boost was smaller than hoped for because of a series of restrictive amendments to the Law on Cooperatives, changing tax laws; supply difficulties, obstruction from local officials. and negative popular reaction to private activity.

Many cooperatives simply ... stole cheap state goods and resold them at much higher prices. Other cooperatives avoided harassment by tying themselves closely to state-controlled firms and producing goods and services for these enterprises rather than directly for the early 1991, public. According to [CLASSIFIED CIA SOURCE], only 15 percent of what the cooperatives produced was sold directly to the public.

Growing shortages and higher incomes encouraged growth of legal and illegal private economic activity, which diverted more goods away from state stores. High prices and high profits transferred money from workers to entrepreneurs. black-marketeers, and racketeers. Private incomes began to dwarf state wages.

Even with more rapid wage increases, the average state worker's wage still trailed that of the average cooperative member. Moreover, much private and shadow-economy business transferred to a hard currency basis, promoting the development of a de facto parallel currency that further devalued the rubles earned by state workers and pensioners.

(WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. 2) (IMG)

The Gorbachev-engineered mafia promoted inflation:

Even with more rapid wage increases, the average state worker's wage still trailed that of the average cooperative member. Moreover, much private and shadow-economy business transferred to a hard currency basis, promoting the development of a de facto parallel currency that further devalued the rubles earned by state workers and pensioners. (WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER

SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. 2) (IMG)


The Nazi Germans supported Russian chauvinism as means of driving a wedge between the Russian people and the other ethnicities in the USSR, hence to partition the USSR and isolate the very Russia they pretended to support; Tito's gang picked up Hitler's mantle and Yugoslav spies in the USSR promoted Russian chauvinism so to drive this wedge and pave the way for the partition of the USSR. Gorbachev and Eurasian Titoists continued the legacies of Hitler and Tito and privileged the Slavs over the Caucasian and Central Asian populations, hence driving a wedge between these nationalities and provoking bourgeois-nationalist separatist sentiments:

Under Gorbachev, income differences among the republics increased. The change in average monthly wages since 1985 shows that the Slavic and Baltic republics were clear winners, while the Caucasus and Central Asian republics, whose wages were already below the country average, slipped even further behind. In addition to relative differences among republics in wage compensation, income differences within republics also widened. Differentials tend to be the widest in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where the mean wage is low and the shadow economy is particularly active. (WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. 4) (IMG)

The economy was Balkanized, and bourgeois-nationalist officials were able to promote their own region's 'interests' over the rest of the Eurasian Heartland, hence widening the gap between nationalities, paving the way for partition:

The devolution of economic authority to republic and local governments and the economic decline led to a Balkanization of the union market that helped to increase regional disparities in the supply of food and consumer goods. To protect their own consumer markets, local officials created barriers to trade, forbidding the export of certain deficit goods or limiting the purchase of some items to local residents only. Agricultural regions increasingly preferred to use their output locally or barter it for scarce consumer goods rather than sell it to the state for devalued rubles. The Soviet Union's former "showcase" cities, Moscow and Leningrad (St. Petersburg), and centers of heavy industry in the Urals suffered most. With a weak local agricultural base, few attractive goods to barter, and panic buying by the population, these cities became the most poorly stocked of urban centers. (WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

USSR: Average Monthly State Wages by Republic,
1985 and 1989



(WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. 4)

To summarize:

Economic policies introduced under the banner of perestroika resulted in a general slide in Soviet living standards and a growing inequality between socioeconomic groups. (WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. III) (IMG)

With the 'need' for medical 'humanitarian aid' in Moscow as her excuse, Raisa Gorbacheva received money from the United States in the 1980s. As the New York Times reported:

Raisa M. Gorbachev, wife of the former Soviet President, ... helped secure thousands of dollars worth of Western aid. (Medical Care in Russia Seems Near Collapse, New York Times Archives, May 9, 1992) (IMG)

One of the CIA operatives providing financial aid to the Gorbachevs' 'humanitarian' project was Sun Myung Moon. Sun Myung Moon was a South Korean CIA spy arrested in 1947 by the North Korean government and released in 1950 during the Korean War. He subsequently founded the Unification Church which was a front for the South Korean CIA (KCIA), which was the South Korean comprador intelligence service established and run by America's CIA:

In Congressional hearings [of the United States,] Moon was accused of working with South Korean intelligence in order to buy influence with the US government, with some US officials regarding the Unification Church as a "front" for the Korean CIA. (Reverend Sun Myung Moon: Self-styled 'prophet' and founder of the Unification Church, The Independent, September 4, 2012) (IMG)

The Rev. Sun Myun Moon's Unification Church was founded by a director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Chong Pil, as a political tool in 1961, according to intelligence reports released by a House investigating subcommittee. (Moon's Church was Founded by Korean CIA Chief, Panel Says, reprinted in CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

Among the financial sponsors of Raisa Gorbacheva was the South Korean spy Sun Myung Moon. A 1990 report by The Economist stated:

Even the Rev Sun Myung Moon is getting in on the act: he has given \$100,000 to Mrs Raisa Gorbachev.. (The Economist, Volume 317, Issues 7683-7687, 1990) (IMG)

The funds provided to the Gorbachev family could only be of a money-laundered nature. Note that the Gorbachev family systematically destroyed the economy of Eurasia and the health of the Soviet peoples. That same family which destroyed the health and welfare of the people was setting up a 'humanitarian' project for 'medical assistance' to the people, and ostensibly for this 'medical' 'humanitarian' project, they were receiving these funds from the Anglo – American intelligence agencies. Actually, it was obvious that the 'medical' 'humanitarian' project, run by a Gorbachev family that destroyed the medicine of Eurasia and which caused a massive humanitarian crisis, could not have been anything but a money-laundering cover through which to receive funds from Anglo-American intelligence agencies and their front organizations, such as the Unification Church.

All along, behind Gorbachev lied the KGB chiefs Yevgeny Primakov and Viktor Chebrikov. They were the real and main figures behind Gorbachev. Gorbachev was a cover for the corrupt and traitorous chiefs of the KGB.

The class struggles in society always reflect themselves in the configuration of the power positions held in a state. It is therefore quite common for one of the high-ranking security officials of a state to be a traitor to that state. Already, in the 1980s, the Mossad Director Nahum Admoni was a revolutionary socialist anti-imperialist warrior who had infiltrated the highest rank of the Mossad, the Reagan-era US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was an anti -imperialist freedom-fighter who decimated the US military and was responsible for opening the front for the Lebanese martyrs to bomb the US Marines Barracks in 1983, and the Saudi Mukhaberat chief Turki Al-Faysal was the son and loyal protege of his pro-Soviet pro-Nasserist father Saudi King Faysal bin Abdel-Aziz. All of this may seem strange at first, but it is not surprising in the slightest when we account for the fact that class struggles in a society affect the positional configuration in the cabinet, i.e. they affect the question of whom from what faction becomes the head of which government institution. Socialist class struggles help the proletariat destroy the material bases of the anti-proletarian classes, thus allowing for the workers' state to consolidate control over its own state and to launch a great purge against the intelligence agents reliant upon the anti-proletarian classes in the society. Unfortunately, in Eurasia by the Gorbachev era, the state was not a workers' state but was rather a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, particularly of the corrupt bureaucrats. This gave the upper hand to the anti-communist bureaucratic traitors who were leading the KGB, and such anti-communist bureaucrats pursued their agenda through the face of a 'pro-democracy' intellectual, Mikhail Gorbachev.

The root of the Gorbachev group emanated directly from Yuri Andropov, who, as was mentioned in C20S13, was a Beriaite operative assisting the MI6-backed Nazi rebels in Hungary in 1956 and collaborating with Tito's group. Sergio Beria recalled how the Anglo-Yugoslav agent and KGB chief Yuri Andropov told Sergo Beria:

'I have closely studied your father's proposals on economic and foreign policy fields. Many of them are absolutely correct.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 277) (IMG)

The rise of Gorbachev to power brought Andropov's allies in the KGB back to power.

Former KGB official Vyacheslav Matuzov confirmed that Gorbachev-era KGB leader Primakov was implementing Andropov's plans regarding Eurasia:

The personality of Primakov is conspiratorial to the limit to this day. I believe that he was the main actor who completed Andropov's plan to reorganize the Soviet Union. In simple terms, Primakov was overseeing the process – all these years. ('Vyacheslav Matuzov: Mikhail Gorbachev was a pawn in the plan for the collapse of the USSR', EurAsia Daily, interviewer: Sarkis Tsaturyan, March 11, 2019) (IMG)

The KGB as a whole was progressive and anti-imperialist, just like how the Mossad, Pentagon, and the Saudi Mukhaberat were, as wholes, reactionary. Yet just as how the Mossad, Pentagon, and the Saudi Mukhaberat were led by revolutionary traitors to such reactionary institutions, so was it also the case that the KGB was led by reactionary traitors to such a progressive institution. Such was why the KGB chief Yuri Andropov distrusted the medium ranks of the KGB command. During his years as KGB chief, Yuri Andropov established Eurasian think tanks that lied outside of the KGB. The Eurasian think tanks were centers in which American intelligence agents would begin their career in the Eurasian state hierarchy. Andropov first planted his agents in these think tanks and then would, over time, elevate these agents in the Eurasian state hierarchy:

The KGB was a system that did not allow to deviate from the general line. Andropov, himself creating this system, understood that if information gets into it, then it automatically becomes utilized by many employees who may be dissatisfied with one or another political position of the leadership.

Therefore, further changes ("restructuring") were carried out not on the basis of the KGB, but with the help of the KGB, but outside the framework of the KGB. Where did Primakov come from? This is not the KGB system. He is from the side shoots that Andropov created, being already the chairman of the KGB and a member of the Politburo. Director of the Institute of USA and Canada, Georgi Arbatov, director of IMEMO Nikolai Inozemtsev, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies Bobojan Gafurov .

These were parallel structures that duplicated the KGB. Outwardly, they worked in conjunction with the party apparatus. But in reality, these institutions were so strong, being under the patronage of Andropov, that the influence of the leading departments of the Central Committee on them was zero.

('Vyacheslav Matuzov: Mikhail Gorbachev was a pawn in the plan for the collapse of the USSR', EurAsia Daily, interviewer: Sarkis Tsaturyan, March 11, 2019) (IMG)

Bronfman, the President of the Zionist pro-imperialist intelligence front (chapter 16) 'World Jewish Congress', noted that the intelligentsia and the KGB were the only two categories supporting Gorbachev:

IN THE USSR, BRONFMAN SAID, THERE HAD BEEN A VIRTUAL "SEA CHANGE" IN DOMESTIC ACCEPTANCE OF JEWS AND JUDAISM. THIS EVEN INCLUDED THE IMPENDING OPENING OF A JEWISH CULTURAL CENTER IN WHAT HAD BEEN A MOSCOW SYNAGOGUE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE ADDED, THE COMMITMENT WAS REAL TO RESOLVING JEWISH EMIGRATION.. THE PROBLEM WAS, HE FELT, THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON GORBACHEV "AND I AM SKEPTICAL ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO SURVIVE." HE ACCOMPANIED THIS JUDGMENT WITH A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS GORBACHEV FACES, NOTING THAT THE ONLY TWO GROUPS NOW BACKING HIM WERE THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE KGB. (SUBJECT: WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PRESIDENT BRONFMAN ON MIDDLE EAST, SOVIET UNION; ASIDES ON US ADMINISTRATION, AUSTRIA; GOL BALANCED', US State Department, January 27, 1989, p. 4. Bold added.) (IMG)

The Gorbachev group, backed by the Chebrikov-Primakov group in the KGB, also gave a major boost to the CIA- Mossad presence in Eurasia. The Joint Distribution Committee, a CIA-Mossad front, was invited to and welcomed in Moscow. In an article for Jerusalem Post, Isi Leibler wrote:

In 1959 as a young graduate visiting Israel, I was recruited by Shaul Avigur, the talented head of Nativ (the then-covert agency dealing with Soviet Jews) who played an enormous role behind the scenes in the formulation of policy during the early years of the state. (Candidly Speaking: A triumph of light over darkness, The Jerusalem Post, Isi Leibler, November 2, 2010) (IMG)

As may be recalled by the reader from C16S1, Shaul Avigur was the founder of the Mossad. There were co-founders of the Mossad, but the most well-known and most prominent among all of them was none other than Shaul Avigur, who was also the head of the Nativ (the organization in which the Mossad official Ya'kov Kedmi was a prominent official), as well as a co-leader of the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee ('Joint') which was the CIA-Mossad intelligence organization condemned for being involved in the assassination plots during the Doctors' Plot case. For his subversive activities for the Mossad, Leibler had been arrested by socialist Soviet counter-intelligence:

Before the collapse of the USSR, Leibler made numerous visits to the Soviet Union and developed close associations with the leading Jewish dissidents and refuseniks. The visits came to an end in 1980 with his arrest and expulsion from the Soviet Union. (Isi Leibler z'l (Honorary Vice-President), World Jewish Congress) (IMG)

However, soon enough, the time for Leibler's return came. Under the cover of 'glasnost', the MI6 spy Gorbachev opened up Eurasia for imperialist-fascist secret services to gather intelligence. As such, Leibler wrote in reference to his brief

expulsion in 1980:

Ironically, it was only seven years later, in 1987, that my wife and I were invited by the Moscow chief rabbi of the KGB-controlled Archipova Synagogue to be his guests over Rosh Hashana and address worshipers from the pulpit. Giving a Zionist address in broken Yiddish to a packed synagogue in the presence of refusenik friends who had previously refused to set foot in this KGB-controlled center was an unforgettable experience. I subsequently learned that I was the first international Jewish leader invited to evaluate the Gorbachev reforms.

That was followed by a series of visits which culminated in the establishment of the first Jewish cultural center since the revolution, named after Solomon Mykhoels, the famous Yiddish poet murdered by Stalin in 1948.

(Candidly Speaking: A triumph of light over darkness, The Jerusalem Post, Isi Leibler, November 2, 2010) (IMG)

The World Jewish Congress too stated:

Paradoxically, when Gorbachev liberalised the system with the introduction of perestroika, Leibler became the first international Jewish leader to be invited to the Soviet Union to evaluate the changes. He subsequently launched the first Jewish cultural centre in the Soviet Union – the Solomon Mykhoels Centre in Moscow – together with the first Hebrew Song Festivals in Moscow and Leningrad. (Isi Leibler z'l (Honorary Vice-President), World Jewish Congress) (IMG)

It should also come as no surprise that the Gorbachev group permitted the JDC to officially establish a base in Moscow:

Reflecting the profound changes unfolding in the Soviet Union, the Solomon Mikhoels International Cultural Center opens in Moscow, with the help of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC or "The Joint"), a social welfare agency whose mission is to assist Jews throughout the world. (Timeline of the American Soviet Jewry Movement, American Jewish Historical Society (AJHS)) (IMG)

Gorbachev was keen on sending Eurasia's Yiddish and Juhuri peoples ('Soviet Jews') as cannon-fodder for Ariel Sharon:

Although the lack of direct flights was not hampering the exodus per se (a record 71,196 Jews were to leave in 1989), it did slow the potential emigration to Israel, which, nonetheless, had risen rapidly in the last three months of 1989 (1,565 Jews arrived from the USSR in October, 1,936 in November, and 3,590 in December). Indeed, the head of the Jewish Agency's Aliyah (immigration) Department, Uri Gordon, had predicted that with direct flights, about 1,000 Soviet immigrants a day could land in Israel. (Soviet Policy Toward Israel Under Gorbachev, Robert Owen Freedman, p. 85) (IMG)

The Washington Times, an American news media founded by the prominent South Korean CIA operative Sun Myung Mun, reported that CIA director Webster had remarked that Gorbachev, under the cover of joint anti-terrorism efforts, has been getting the KGB to cooperate further with the CIA:

CIA Director William Webster said yesterday that the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have discussed establishing a joint CIA-KGB cooperative effort to combat international terrorism.

(...). A tape recording of his remarks was obtained by The Washington Times.

(...). Soviet officials first approached Western governments in late 1986 about working together to oppose terrorism as part of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's new foreign policy initiatives.

Moscow was linked to the support and training of international terrorists by Reagan administration CIA chief William Casey, who said in a 1987 speech that the Soviets have been training up to 600 terrorists each year in training camps in Eastern Europe.

(...). The Soviet overtures on joint cooperation appear to be gestures resulting from Mr. Gorbachev's glasnost, or openness, policies, Mr. Webster said. The January meeting in Moscow between KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov and U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock was another similar gesture, he said.

State Department officials said at the time of the meeting that Mr. Kryuchkov assured Mr. Matlock that the KGB is fully supporting the Gorbachev reform program.

Mr. Webster said he has not seen any indications that the KGB is opposing Mr. Gorbachev's reforms.

But he said the KGB is "a potential source of trouble" for Mr. Gorbachev if his reform program fails.

Rand Corporation Sovietologist Jeremy R. Azrael stated in a report on the KGB released last week that former KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov is the leading candidate to replace Mr. Gorbachev if hardliners pull off a coup to oust him.

Mr. Webster said the KGB currently appears to be on Mr. Gorbachev's "side of the aisle" in the struggle between reformers and hardliners.

(JOINT CIA-KGB TARGETING OF TERRORISM TALKED ABOUT, Washington Times, Bill Gertz, April 7, 1989, p. 1. In: CIA Archives) (IMG)

Again, the KGB as a whole was an anti-imperialist body – and rumours to the contrary are baseless – but the high command of the KGB were utter traitors. Gorbachev's rise to power brought the KGB chief Chebrikov swiftly to power

as well:

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, moving with unprecedented speed to consolidate his power, has elevated the head of the KGB and two other key party officials to the ruling Politburo.. ('KGB chief, 2 others elevated to Politburo', Washington Times, Michael J. Bonafield, April 24, 1985, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

Mr. Chebrikov, who is a colonel general, was named director of the KGB in December 1982. His was one of the late Yuri V. Andropov's first major personnel changes after he took control of the party in that year. Mr. Chebrikov had worked under Mr. Andropov during the 15 years Mr. Andropov headed the KGB. ('KGB chief, 2 others elevated to Politburo', Washington Times, Michael J. Bonafield, April 24, 1985, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

In his memoirs, the CIA-Mossad arms contractor Ari Ben Menashe has documented extensively the contacts of the KGB chief Chebrikov with the MI6, CIA, and Mossad. Another of the KGB elements from Andropov's group was Viktor Sharapov and he too was closely associated to Gorbachev:

Soviet relations with socialist countries are the domain of Viktor Sharapov, the one carryover on Gorbachev's inner staff. He appeared frequently at the side of Andropov and later Chernenko and now assists Gorbachev during meetings with the leaders of socialist countries. Sharapov has ties to Andropov and the KGB, experience in the media, and expertise in Asian affairs--an area receiving significant policy attention under Gorbachev. All of these factors, in our view, make him a logical choice for Gorbachev's circle of advisers. (...). Sharapov's position as an aide to Gorbachev on Socialist Bloc affairs is probably due as much to his personal connections as to his expertise. He may have been associated with the KGB since about 1972, and he served as a personal aide to Andropov from about 1976 (when Andropov was still chairman of the KGB) to his death in February 1984. In addition, while Andropov was ailing during the last few months of his tenure as General Secretary, only Sharapov and Gorbachev were permitted to see him. Sharapov retained his job as bloc affairs adviser throughout the brief tenure of Konstantin Chernenko. He was elected a member of the Central Auditing Commission at the close of the recent party congress on 6 March 1986. (USSR: GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL ADVISERS, CIA, May 8, 1986, p. 5) (IMG)

Two other major Gorbachev allies were Ligachev and Ryzhkov:

Yegor Ligachev, 64, and Nikolai Ryzhkov, 55, were named directly to the Politburo from the party Secretariat. The new Soviet leader has had a close working relationship with these men, who skipped the normal step of being named candidate members. ('KGB chief, 2 others elevated to Politburo', Washington Times, Michael J. Bonafield, April 24, 1985, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

Only much later when Gorbachev became extremely unpopular, Ligachev opportunistically 'defected' to the camp of Gorbachev's 'critics'.

Screenshots & Photos of Sources Used

How to Navigate the Screenshots section

As mentioned in the Foreword, the screenshots and photos of the sources used throughout this book have been provided in the 'Screenshots' section. To find the screenshots corresponding to each part of the text of this book:

- Step 1. See the title. For example, the phrase '*** IMG-All-{Mongolia}' corresponds to the title 'Mongolia'. The '(IMG{GDR})' corresponds to the title 'GDR'.
- Step 2. Find the title in the following table of contents.
- Step 3. See the page number of the title.
- Step 4. Look for the screenshot(s) of the source used under that title.