

The History of the USSR & the Peoples' Democracies

Part 1, Chapters 0 to 5

by
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Screenshots

Acknowledgements, Methodology, and How to Use the Book

COS1. Acknowledgements

I would like to thank:

Lorant Szabo for providing me with the following three sources:

- (1) 'Russia Helped 1,750,000 Jews to Escape Nazis, Says James N. Rosenberg'. In: JTA Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 153, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), July 2, 1943, pp. 3-4.
- (2) 'My Meeting with Chairman Mao', Memorandum for The President from Henry A. Kissinger, February 24, 1973.
- (3) TURNING POINT: A HISTORY OF GERMAN PETROLEUM IN WORLD WAR II AND ITS LESSONS FOR THE ROLE OF OIL IN MODERN AIR WARFARE, Air Command and Staff College Air University, Shawn P. Keller (Major, US Airforce), Independent Elective Advisor: Dr. Michael May, pp. 5-6.

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an anonymous friend for transcribing some of the screenshots into text. I had taken screenshots of the sources I used and needed the texts in the screenshot images to be transcribed into a kind of text usable in Word documents. Almost all the screenshot texts were transcribed by myself. However, a number of them were done by this anonymous friend.

Disclaimer: The remarks expressed throughout this book do not necessarily represent the views of the people whose contributions were acknowledged.

COS2. Methodology Outline

This book derives the vast majority of its evidence from the following kinds of sources:

- (1) American intelligence and military, and the related fronts and subordinate organizations
- (2) British intelligence and military, and the related fronts and subordinate organizations
- (3) Nazi German intelligence and military, and the related fronts and subordinate organizations
- (4) Israeli intelligence and military, and the related fronts and subordinate organizations
- (5) Trotskyite enemies of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies
- (5) the SAVAK
- (6) the media (including speeches, official statements, articles, and memoirs) from the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies.
- (7) the declassified archives of the United Arab Republic (UAR)
- (8) prestigious universities, such as Harvard, Yale, Cambridge, Oxford, etc.

Corroboration of information occurs when the same information is confirmed by more than one source. The validation of an information refers to the case when a piece of information serves as an additional data point in a general trend observed.

Example of validation:

Source 1: Person X is on CIA payroll.

Source 2: Person X provided top secret intelligence to US State Department.

Source 3: Person X closely collaborated with the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel.

The three sources above do not corroborate each other as much but they validate each other; fit together, they logically and dialectically match each other. That is an example of validation. Where they do corroborate each other however is that they all imply that 'Person X' collaborated with American intelligence or with American imperialism. Another example of validation is with regards to the conclusions arrived at. The conclusions can be validated through an understanding of the laws of dialectics and historical materialism. Consider the following example:

Evidence 1: Person X, who had a position in the Soviet state, was a Nazi intelligence agent who had infiltrated the Soviet

government.

Evidence 2: Person X carried out economic sabotage against the Soviet state.

Conclusion: Person X carried out economic sabotage in order to and for the purpose of serving the Nazi objectives. In the above example, the phrase 'in order to and for the purpose of' would be denounced by anti-dialecticians as 'merely' an 'assumption' that is 'devoid of evidence'. However, someone with even a basic level of dialectical intuition would regard that phrase 'in order to and for the purpose of' as just so highly logical and natural that it would be virtually impossible for such a phrase as 'in order to and for the purpose of' to be incorrect. It follows that – unless there is any strong evidence contradicting the 'in order to and for the purpose of' phrase – the conclusion derived from the two evidence pieces in the above example is validated as true according to the laws of dialectics and historical materialism.

Not every phenomenon in physics necessarily needs full data to be proven, since many phenomena can be already well-predicted according to the laws discovered. Much as how empirically collecting the data for acceleration and mass will suffice for calculating the amount of force, without directly going about and measuring the amount of force, so is it also sufficient to use the laws of history, the laws of dialectics and historical materialism, to connect and make sense of the several pieces of evidence in order to arrive at a big picture, an ultimate conclusion, even if one does not find the evidence that directly confirms the ultimate conclusion itself.

There were two directions in which the corroboration occurred throughout this book: (1) checking both US-led bloc and Soviet-led bloc, anti-communist intelligence service and pro-communist intelligence service, etc. sources so to see if the source claims match up more or less; (2) corroboration using two sources from the same alliance (e.g. one source from US intelligence and the other from British intelligence), etc.

As mentioned, this book utilizes the methodology of finding confessions to support conclusions. There were cases in which 'rogue' elements within the anti-Soviet camp made pro-Soviet 'confessions', but that these 'confessions' were by anti-Soviet agents, who, on the overt level, showed sympathies with the USSR. For example, at the instigation of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), **James Klugmann, an MI6 officer**, made numerous 'confessions' in favor of the USSR, even though it is not completely clear if he was genuinely pro-Soviet at heart. Hence although Klugmann's works were and are very valuable, it would not be entirely so easy to cite his pro-Soviet remarks as a 'confession' even though he was an officer of an anti-Soviet intelligence service, the MI6. In addition, there were 'Western' government officials whose sympathies were genuinely with the USSR and the international communist movement. Citing them would not be incomparable to citing Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's 'confessions' against the USSR. Going over the details of all these 'rogue' 'confessors' is beyond the scope of this particular section of the book; however, what can be stated here is that the cases of these 'rogue' 'confessors' have been quite strictly taken into account and duly adjusted for. The use of these rogue 'confessors' has been minimized in this book; as such, the citation of US officials affiliated with **the Roosevelt-Kennedy faction or Israeli officials from the Mapam-Palmach faction** has been minimized, as these **were pro-Soviet currents inside anti-Soviet governments**.

One misconception that may arise from the examination of some of the CIA documents presented in this book is from a phrase contained in some of the CIA documents: 'unevaluated information'. The following was the CIA's definition of the term:

Unevaluated information is defined as raw intelligence material ordinarily issued by OO/C and OSO. (Dissemination of CIA Unevaluated Information Reports, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

The OSO stood for the Office of Special Operations. According to another CIA document:

The mission of the Office of Special Operations is the conduct, under the direct supervision of the Director, of all organized espionage and counterespionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign Intelligence information required for the national security. Such espionage and counterespionage operations may involve semi-overt and semi-covert activities for the performance of the mission. (Functions of the Office of Special Operations, US Intelligence, October 25, 1946, p. 1) (IMG)

The 'Unevaluated Information' is in fact a type of highly sensitive intelligence content evaluated as accurate or reliable by the CIA spy and some of his handlers and case officers sending the report to the central intelligence offices in the United States. The reason why it is labelled as 'unevaluated' is that it serves as 'raw' data yet to be analyzed and synthesized by the CIA agent's bosses in the United States for a final report to the President and other members of the National Security Council (NSC). Those CIA reports which contain such a phrase are in reference to reports and analyses that the CIA receives usually from individual CIA agents or employees, some of whom are top ranking and in the high command of the CIA and some of whom are medium-ranking or lower-ranking. That they are referred to as 'unevaluated information' simply means that the report cannot so easily be shared with the central analysis offices such as the Directorate of Analysis (DoA), the Office of Current Information (OCI), the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), etc. The documents that are by 'Office of Current Information' or 'Office of Research and Reports' are at times given more attention

by the CIA than the 'unevaluated information', for they bear the organizational prestige of being 'final' reports sent to the President and high-ranking commanders. However, it goes without saying that this too is not always the case since sometimes CIA operatives would be cautious not to share the sensitive intelligence with some of the central analysis offices of the American intelligence service, for so doing could expose the intelligence material to potential moles in the US intelligence offices and thus undermine CIA efforts. This potential was in the minds of the CIA commanders when they devised CIA protocols such that:

[some] unevaluated information reports ... will have a limited dissemination within the IAC [Intelligence Advisory Committee] agency because of local IAC agency responsibility and sensitivity of source. These reports will be distributed not through reading panel units but through one officer designated by each IAC agency and shall be in a separate report series. (Dissemination of CIA Unevaluated Information Reports, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

The above quote – especially, though not exclusively, the fact that the distribution of the sensitive intelligence is limited to a single IAC-designated officer rather than an entire IAC-affiliated panel – means that the highly sensitive intelligence content cannot be always thoroughly shared with the central offices of the CIA. In such situations, the CIA operatives in countries outside of the US might keep the intelligence among themselves and not share it with people outside of their circle. This in turn means that the central analysis offices of the CIA would not be as informed as some of the CIA operatives lying outside the US, and hence it would mean that the reports of the central analysis offices of the CIA are not always more reliable than the reports of the local operatives. Since, in practice, neither the central analysis directorates of the CIA nor the 'unevaluated information' reports of individual CIA agents are necessarily always regarded as superior to one another, the methodology in this book is to examine documents from all the different segments of the declassified CIA documents, to check the level of their reliability either through corroboration or validation or a combination thereof, to extract from among them the confessions contradicting the propaganda of imperialist reaction, and to thereupon arrive at conclusions. For the purposes of this book, little difference in value exists between a (1) medium-ranking CIA case officer with plenty of access to intelligence sources and networks of spies, and (2) a CIA staff member in a central office tasked with analysis of the intelligence documents – both such CIA employees have plenty of access to vast amounts of intelligence materials, are highly informed, and thus render confessions of almost-equal reliability.

Another point deserving mention is that the CIA has a 'Foreign Documents Division' (FDD) in which the media broadcasts, speeches, articles, etc. of foreign countries are examined, translated, and analyzed. In such a case, the FDD would at times translate an article from the Soviet media and present it in full. Obviously, such articles cannot be cited as 'confessions' by the CIA since they are articles by the Soviet media. And thus, they are not cited as confessions. However, there are FDD documents that present articles/broadcasts from anti-Soviet countries or individuals and those articles are at times cited in this book. There are also CIA FDD documents that analyze and summarize the things mentioned in the Soviet media. In analyzing what is stated in the media of the Soviet-led bloc countries, the CIA actually renders a number of very remarkable confessions and some of them have been cited in this book regarding media freedom in the USSR.

With regards to the kind of corroboration that involves looking at the archives and works of the Soviet Union and then comparing them to what is confessed to by the CIA, MI6, etc., I would like to mention that I have examined the archives and remarks made by the media of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies much. However, those documents have not always been cited in this work since a major part of the focus of this book is to present the anti-Soviet secret service documents that corroborate or validate the information provided by the Soviets and the Peoples' Democracies. Hence, in case the reader has doubts as to the remarks made in this book using the CIA, MI6, etc. documents, the reader can duly go and check the Soviet, Popular-Democratic, or Comintern-linked sources on their own and to corroborate and validate the information. I warn the reader though that in a relatively small minority of cases, the Soviets published articles for the purposes of psychological warfare instead of exposing the full truth, such as when they presented the Nazis as unwilling to invade the USSR, shortly before the Nazi invasion. That of course does not mean that all of the remarks made by the Soviet media are unreliable; it simply means that a minority of remarks made by the Soviet media deserve extra efforts in validation and corroboration. As some of the remarks made in this book have been controversial enough to need me to present documents on both sides of the conflict, I have presented some of the Soviet-led bloc sources in addition to the CIA-MI6 documents cited.

Sometimes, anti-Soviet intelligence or military sources acknowledge a Soviet or communist claim as true, and they may cite Soviet/communist sources for this. That the anti-Soviet source would cite the Soviet/communist source though does not mean that the confession by the anti-Soviet source cannot be used. Rather, it means that the anti-Soviet intelligence and military source making such a citation has independently, and on its own, validated or corroborated claims by the USSR and its camp as true and points them out. Therefore, yes, it would be fair to cite anti-Soviet sources that in turn cite Soviet sources, as a not insignificant portion of intelligence gathering by anti-Soviet agencies involves dissecting the

truth from falsehood from the Soviet media sources.

Some institutions such as the US State Department, German Ministry of Interior, Radio Free Europe, BBC, or Wilson Center are very exclusive and do indeed operate as intelligence services. Those kinds of authors affiliated with such institutions obviously count as affiliates of American, British, or German intelligence agencies. However, there are other kinds of political bodies that are not necessarily intelligence services in themselves although they contain many subsidiaries that operate as intelligence services. An example to this is the European Union (EU). When emphasizing an author's receiving of financial aid from the EU's educational subsidiaries, I am not necessarily implying that the person is an 'EU agent' or a 'German agent'. Rather, by emphasizing that the person's research is funded by the EU, I am implying that the conclusions of the research are under the cooptative pressure of EU funds and thus cannot be automatically regarded as having an anti-EU 'bias'.

If an author has written a book and, after writing the initial edition, has been promoted to an intelligence official position, and after promotion, published a new edition of the book, then this new edition of the book can be cited as remarks of an intelligence official whereas the earlier edition might not be worthy of being cited for such. An example to this is the work of Miranda Vickers who wrote a book on the history of People's Democratic Albania, but was later promoted to serve as a scholar affiliated with the International Crisis Group (ICG), the CIA-MI6-BND front organization, and after such promotion, published a 2014 edition of the book. The 2014 edition can be cited as confessions by an ICG agent whereas the earlier edition might not be confessions of an ICG agent since she was not (necessarily) an ICG agent at the time of writing her first edition.

When I describe something and then present the quote, I am only endorsing those parts of the quote that correspond to or do not contradict my description, and not the whole content of the quote. Therefore, usually though not always, the entirety of the quote I cite does not necessarily represent my views; only parts of it would.

The term 'MI6' was first used to describe British intelligence since World War II; however, in this book, in line with the tradition of other authors, the term 'MI6' will be used to describe the British intelligence prior to World War II as well.

The 'Marxists Internet Archive', a database of left-wing literature, has been abbreviated in this book as 'MIA'.

The title may or may not have quotation marks around it. The quotation marks are there to prevent confusion with the names of the authors. Dots are at the end to separate the terms.

C0S3. Citation Format / Titles Format

The style of citation in this book differs with that of the mainstream. The following is the order of the title, publication, volume, contributor, and date used in this book.

[Text of the quote]. ('Title', Publication, Vol. Authors & Editors/Translators, Date, Year)

The phrases 'Bold added' and 'Underline added' respectively mean that bold and underline were added by me. 'Bold original', 'Underline original' and 'Ellipsis original' respectively mean that the bold, underline, and ellipsis were original to quote. The ellipsis in brackets symbol '(...)' which I put in some of the quotations simply means that one or more statements have been omitted such that there would be no change in the meaning. When using the ellipsis sign '...', I have separated such a sign by a space from each word. The template style is thus as follows: 'Word ... words.' It is not 'Words. words', nor is it 'Words . . . words'. Ellipses of other template styles are almost always original to the texts cited and not by me.

When quoting a text within the normal paragraphs, the quote is surrounded by quotation marks. However, in the indented quotes, no quotation marks have been placed, as the indentation of the text and the fact that it is followed by the template citation '(Title', Publication, Vol. Authors & Editors/Translators, Date, Year)' already signals that it is a quote.

The titles of each section are followed by the title code C#S#, which represents the Chapter (C) and Section (S) numbers. In some parts of this book, several generally-related topics have been amalgamated under one section. The topics have been separated by the slash symbol '/'. The slash symbol normally (including in this book) would imply 'or'; however, in the context of the section titles, it is simply a separator of the topic titles and does not imply 'or'.

C0S4. The Screenshots/Photos Corresponding to the Sources Cited

Throughout this book, the screenshots/photos of the original sources of the cited quotes have been provided under their relevant titles at the end of the book. The titles above each screenshot series are in turn placed throughout the text, so to guide the reader as to which section of the book the reader shall refer to find the screenshots/photos for the sources to the relevant quotes. The 'IMG' represents the screenshots/photos of the quotes' sources. The template phrase 'IMG-All-{' means that, unless otherwise indicated, the screenshots/photos of the sources to the quote in the text that therein follows are located under their corresponding title. For example, 'IMG-All-{'Mongolia}' means that, unless otherwise indicated, the screenshots of all of the quotes that follow are located under the section titled 'Mongolia' in the source

photos/screenshots section. Sometimes, almost all quotes of one section of the text may belong to, for example, the 'Mongolia' section of the screenshots but the screenshots of a few particular quotes in that text section are to be found not in the 'Mongolia' section of the screenshots but in another section of the screenshots. In that case, the quote will end with the template phrase '(IMG{ })' which thereby guides the reader to refer to another section of the screenshots rather than the section of the screenshots to which 'IMG-All- { }' refers. Throughout the text there also exist the '(IMG)' behind most quotes. The reader may ignore those, since those ones are meant to help me keep track of whether the quotes have corresponding screenshots.

To provide information on the degree of reliability of the sources used, the description of each source has also been screenshot; the screenshot of the source description is usually provided next to the screenshots of the source excerpts cited.

For those viewing the book online, finding the screenshots of the relevant sources are far easier. The online readers merely need to copy the code, title, or at times the author name, of the source and then search the code or title or author name, having pressed Ctrl F, so be directed straight to the source screenshots.

Some CIA documents' links have the "/library/" in them. To access such CIA documents online, simply delete the phrase "library/" in the link and thus the reader shall be able to access the documents via the link.

Some of the screenshots involved the use of Google Chrome, in which some extensions were installed. The extensions portion of some of the Google Chrome screenshots have been redacted by me.

Of course, numerous British Foreign Office documents have been cited in this book. The British Foreign Office documents have been amalgamated by their original publishers into series of books categorized by their years. Citing each of those book series would have rendered the quote citations far too long; to shorten the citations, the template phrase 'Foreign Office (dates)' has been used. For example, 'Foreign Office (1945)' refers to the British Foreign Office book of documents for the year 1945.

Some of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Hoxha have been cited but without corresponding screenshots, since the works of those authors are already widely available online and in print.

While seeking to ensure that the text in the screenshots would be visible to the reader, the screenshots have been compacted in size so to take less space in the book. The pages screenshot have not always necessarily been placed in the order of page numbers, since, in some cases, placing them in the order of page numbers may compromise the compacting process. Nonetheless, to prevent confusion regarding the order of pages screenshot, the page numbers of the documents have been screenshot so that the reader can navigate through and read the texts of the screenshots properly.

C0S5. On Grammatical/Mechanical Errors in Writing

If the reader notices any mechanical or grammatical errors, please inform me using the email provided on the website sovinform.net.

Chapter 1:

The Blueprint of History

*** IMG-All-{The Blueprint of History}

C1S1. The Foundations of Historical Materialism

One can semi-metaphorically regard materiality as the mass of objects: that which is more material contains more matter and thus bears a higher mass. And the higher its mass, the more the other objects gravitate towards it, giving it a more important role in space. In the same way, the more material a historical factor, the more it matters and has weight in the course of history. The less material, the less its influence over history. The more material factors affect the less material factors more than vice versa, much as how the heavier objects pull the lighter objects more than vice versa and bring such lighter objects into their orbit.

The minds of individuals who seek to determine the course of history are inevitably confined within history itself; the less material (e.g. the individual psyche) is confined within the more material (the military reality, geopolitics, economy, etc.). The less material factors such as the individual psyche can bring about change in the more material conditions only if utilizing, or supported by, a material force sufficient to overpower the material conditions they seek to change.

Materiality, though itself a continuous spectrum, can be divided into echelons or levels of materiality for historical materialist analysis, as summarized in the pyramid below. The more to the bottom the factors are, the more material they are, and thus the more they matter and bear weight as factors in history.

At the very bottom of the pyramid is geography. Marx and Engels in 'The German Ideology', under the heading 'First Premises of the Materialist Method', wrote:

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself – **geological, hydrographical, climatic and so on.**

The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men. (The German Ideology, Marx and Engels, MIA. Bold added) (IMG)

In a letter to Marx, Engels expressed his agreement with Marx that the geographic set-up in the Orient was a key cause of the difference of the region's mode of production with that of the Occident:

The absence of landed property is indeed the key to the whole of the East. Therein lies its political and religious history. But how to explain the fact that orientals never reached the stage of landed property, not even the feudal kind? This is, I think, **largely due to the climate, combined with the nature of the land, more especially the great stretches of desert extending from the Sahara right across Arabia, Persia, India and Tartary to the highest of the Asiatic uplands.** (Engels to Marx in London Manchester, June 6, 1853, evening. In: Marx-Engels Correspondence 1853, Marx-ists Internet Archive. Original Source: MECW Vol. 39, p. 355. First published in full in MEGA, Berlin, 1929.)

Geography affects the level of the development of the productive forces (industries and technical equipment), which in turn affects property relations and the class character of the state. Advancements in the productive forces lead to the advancements of the progressive classes in society. Historical experience demonstrates that the geographic areas in which the development of the productive forces has been naturally more difficult and slower, have seen a lower advancement of the progressive classes, and have thus been dominated by reactionary classes.

The desert areas (central Arabian Peninsula and much of Mongolia) as well as excessively mountainous areas (parts of western Ukraine and Chechniya), precisely owing to their geographic inability to develop productive forces, have seen a lower advancement of progressive classes concurrent with the low advancement of the productive forces. Such areas have thus been centers of barbaric ultra-reaction. By contrast, the areas more fertile or more resourceful, provided that basic incentives for economic development existed, naturally tended towards higher advancements in productive forces and thus the development of more progressive classes.


The physical/natural environment of a region indeed affects not only the level of the development of the productive forces, but also the very existence of the incentives for economic development – e.g. some societies may not have incentives to move out of hunter-gatherer mode, for the geographic setting they inhabit already provides enough food resources for them not to feel the need to develop sophisticated agriculture. Examples of these were seen in parts of Africa and North America.

The development of productive forces allow society to afford progressing from one type of property relations system to another:

Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist. (The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx, Abstracts (Chapter 2), 1847)

The development of the productive forces is correlated with the development of new classes, driving out the old classes. The advanced industries possessed by the industrial bourgeoisie renders them economically mightier, allowing them to undercut and drive out the feudal landlords. However, without labouring as much, the bourgeoisie gain a massive profit as the unpaid income of the proletarians, the latter being a class of individuals who have no private property (as in business property) but have only their labour to sell. Typically, though not always, the proletariat can be found in the densely urbanized areas. Advanced machinery can economically boost cities, thus concentrating a larger population of labourers in the cities. The larger population density in turn results in a greater supply of labour and hence lower wages. The result of such driving down of the price of labour is the great exploitation that gives rise to the proletarian class.

Depending on the context, the interests of some classes align and the interests of some classes are antagonistic. This



lays the basis for inter-class alliances in class conflicts. In some classes, there also exist intra-class competitions, just as there can be intra-class cooperation, depending on the contexts. There are individuals within classes that betray their own classes. In the current context, the two main classes in play are the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. There also exist outliers who betray their class.

Society is made up of individual actors (whom we can assume are often 'rational' and in the broad sense, 'self-interested') who, as a result of property relations, line up into different classes. It is indeed property relations which line up competitive-and-cooperative humans into different classes. It is important to make a distinction between the term 'class' and the term 'stratum'. Phrases such as 'the poor', 'the middle class', 'the intelligentsia', 'the mullahs', etc. do not really refer to classes, because such phrases do not really properly define how individual members of these categories are related to the property ownership. Rather, these categories are layers within society, i.e. the strata of society. These strata are nonetheless usually overlapping with or closely related to specific classes; 'the poor' usually refers to the proletariat or non-kulak peasants, the so-called 'middle class' is typically a reference to the petit- bourgeoisie or to white-collar workers, the intelligentsia, due to their bourgeois family origins, are often linked to the bourgeoisie, etc. Strata should be considered in class analysis, but strata are not the same as classes.

The productive forces give rise to classes. Yet, classes wage their struggles by employing the productive forces. The most decisive, the 'heaviest', subcategory of the productive forces, however, is that of the destructive forces: the weaponry, the military-industrial backbone, the means of violence. The extent of dominance over the military as a subcategory-annex of the productive forces affects the extent of dominance over the rest of the productive forces, and thus affects the outcome of class struggle itself. It thus follows that the question of class dominance over the means of violence determines the class character of the state.

The productive forces, the industrial power of a state, lay the basis for the military strength of a state. From there, emerges the military-industrial backbone, the decisive control over which automatically yields the decisive control over the state. The means of violence, as a subcategory of the productive forces, is distinct from the category of the 'Class Character of the State', though the control of the means of violence directly determines the class character of the state. The class character of the state, the question of which class alliance controls the means of violence, in turn determines the directions of the economy and hence the issue of control over the productive forces. The means of violence is therefore that subcategory of the productive forces through which is determined the control over the other sectors of the economy and other subcategories of the productive forces.

In all countries, without exception, the extent of dominance over the means of violence determines the extent of dominance over the means of communication. Whichever class dominates the security and intelligence bodies can, using carrot-and-stick measures, gain dominance over the mainstream media. By dominating the media, the class can propagate a culture favourable to its class interests. Culture in turn nurtures a mindset and psychological behaviour in the individual. Class culture thus affects the individual psyche.

The pyramid can be explained in a reverse way as well. An individual cannot transform society without having behind oneself a subculture, an ideological grouping. A subculture cannot transform society unless through dominance over the means of violence on behalf of the class tendency to which this subculture is affiliated. And productive forces cannot easily advance without the natural resources available by the geographic setting.

An individual can have more influence than a collective if the individual has access to material forces that can help him/her overpower the specific collective's power. Such access to material forces can include sufficient charisma to appeal to the culture of a larger collective so to overpower and outnumber the influence of the smaller collective; such access to material forces can include the support of a state whose character is in line with the views and aims of the specific individual, property relations favorable to the views and aims of the specific individual, productive forces under the influence of or controlled by the individual, etc. As can be seen, the individual in-itself cannot have much influence; he or she can exercise influence only with support from the more material forces so to be able to contradict the other material forces. This renders the individual psyche the least material of the factors listed in the pyramid. A military genius, for example is limited in his/her by the more material forces he/she is surrounded by: the culture of the troops, the quality of the productive forces to produce his/her weapons, the geographic terrain, etc. At the same time, what makes a military genius so, is the genius mind's ability to strategically use the contradictions between the material forces for reaching the desired military outcome. Hence, while material conditions may limit the military genius, they may also be used intelligently as sources of opportunity for reaching the desired outcome. Stalin explained this point well:

Marxism does not at all deny the role played by outstanding individuals or that history is made by people.

In Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy* and in other works of his you will find it stated that it is people who make history. But, of course, people do not make history according to the promptings of their imagination or as some fancy strikes them. Every new generation encounters definite conditions already existing, ready-made when that generation was born. And great people are worth anything at all only to the extent that they are able correctly to understand these conditions, to understand how to change them.

If they fail to understand these conditions and want to alter them according to the promptings of their

imagination, they will land themselves in the situation of Don Quixote. (Talk With the German Author Emil Ludwig, J. V. Stalin, December 13, 1931)

Theories, as thoughts, in-themselves are not material enough as a force to yield changes in history. However, once a sufficient mass begins to uphold a theory, the theory gains enough material force to bring forth a material change. This is why Marx said:

The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. (Abstract from The Introduction to Contribution To The Critique Of Hegel's Philosophy Of Right, Marx, 1844)

C1S2. The Nature of Imperialism and Fascism / Revolutionary Class Struggles against Fascist Reaction

Unlike industrial capitalism, which profits from the expansion of commodity production, mercantile capitalism generates profits from the exchange of commodities produced. The mercantile bourgeoisie – i.e. the merchant class – operate as middlemen for exchange operations. The middleman sector in the economy, the sector responsible for the exchange, is of critical significance for other sectors for it eases transfers and transactions. It therefore receives high demand from the rest of the economy, generating high revenue for those in control of the middleman sector. On the other hand, the middleman sector does not engage in as much material production as other sectors and is less labour-intensive. The result for middleman sectors is that, relative to the rest of the economic sectors, high revenues are generated at low labour costs, and hence high profits, but with relatively little production. The high profits without much production create a serious imbalance in the economy, for they allow the middlemen to 'suck' the wealth of the economy, which is precisely what makes mercantile capitalism parasitic. This is to be contrasted with industrial capitalism which, while exploiting the workers, nonetheless does expand production. It is therefore not difficult to understand how mercantile capitalist middlemen can become a parasitic class that 'bites' into production without producing as much. It is this parasitic middleman nature of mercantile capitalism that formed the class basis for pre-modern imperialism. In part IV of Das Kapital III, Marx intensively explored the nature of money capital and mercantile capital:

Of course, commerce will ... subordinate production more and more to exchange-value by making luxuries and subsistence more dependent on sale than on the immediate use of the products. Thereby it dissolves the old relationships. It multiplies money circulation. **It encompasses no longer merely the surplus of production, but bites deeper and deeper into the latter, and makes entire branches of production dependent upon it.** Nevertheless this **disintegrating effect** depends very much on the nature of the producing community.

So long as merchant's capital promotes the exchange of products between undeveloped societies, **commercial profit not only appears as out-bargaining and cheating, but also largely originates from them.** Aside from the fact that it exploits the difference between the prices of production of various countries (and in this respect it tends to level and fix the values of commodities), those modes of production bring it about that merchant's capital appropriates an overwhelming portion of the surplus- product partly as a mediator between communities which still substantially produce for use-value, and for whose economic organisation the sale of the portion of their product entering circulation, or for that matter any sale of products at their value, is of secondary importance; and partly, because under those earlier modes of production the principal owners of the surplus-product with whom the merchant dealt, namely, the slave-owner, the feudal lord, and the state (for instance, the oriental despot) represent the consuming wealth and luxury which the merchant seeks to trap, as Adam Smith correctly scented in the passage on feudal times quoted earlier. **Merchant's capital, when it holds a position of dominance, stands everywhere for a system of robbery**, so that its development among the trading nations of old and modern times is always directly connected with **plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves, and colonial conquest**; as in Carthage, Rome, and later among the Venetians, Portuguese, Dutch, etc. (Das Kapital, Volume III, Karl Marx, completed by Frederick Engels, p. 225. Bold added.)

Mercantile capitalism, as the dominant force behind imperialism during Marx's time, allowed commercial companies to use trade as means of colonization. As they were the class most associated with colonialism, they profited tremendously from 'plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves, and colonial conquest'. Whereas the industrial bourgeoisie utilize their money to enhance and expand the production of goods and services through higher techniques, the mercantile bourgeoisie utilize their money for exchanging and trading commodities between distant regions so to earn a surplus in monetary form. Whereas the industrial bourgeoisie aim to expand factories and mining and boost production, the mercantile bourgeoisie do not produce any new materials but rather exchange already-produced goods for profit. The mercantile bourgeoisie have a significant advantage over the rest of the society as they can use the fluctuations of international markets to generate tremendous profits, even when they work little to expand production. Such a parasitic role rendered them the class most associated with imperialism and colonialism at the time, forces hindering the development of the productive forces wheresoever they conquered. They suppressed the revolutionary anti-colonial aspirations of the colonized zone's

national-bourgeoisie and proletariat, the classes with the potential to develop the productive forces.

While the mercantile bourgeoisie could operate as the class behind national imperial and colonial expansion, they could also have an alternative role: that of the comprador bourgeoisie. Rather than help their own country conquer other countries, the mercantile bourgeoisie could lead their own country to be colonized by other countries. It is quite simple: the mercantile bourgeoisie could literally sell their own country.

What factor, then, determines whether the mercantile bourgeoisie of a specific country would be predominantly made up of comprador elements vs. predominantly made up of elements loyal to national imperial and colonial expansion? The key factor shaping the strategic orientation of the mercantile bourgeoisie is the level of the development of the productive forces. If the country to which the mercantile bourgeoisie belong has had a high level of development of the productive forces, then the mercantile bourgeoisie of that country would naturally seek to invest in their own country's industries in order to (1) have great influence over their own country's industries, and (2) to expand the military-industrial backbone of their own country so that they can use it to conquer other territories. In this process, therefore, the mercantile bourgeoisie base themselves in their own country, thereby strategically aligning themselves with the national imperial expansion of their own country, and in fact generate the national imperial tendencies of their own country. As a result of this alliance of the mercantile bourgeoisie with the military-industrial backbone of their own country, the imperialist mercantile bourgeoisie can generate enough funds to out-manuever any comprador mercantile bourgeois elements that exist in their country, and thus ensure that imperialist, rather than comprador, merchants dominate. Furthermore, the imperialist mercantile bourgeoisie can make overtures to the merchants of much weaker countries, countries with much lower development in productive forces, and offer those merchants in much weaker countries deals through which the merchants of the weaker countries would generate high profits while selling their own respective countries to the imperialists for cheap. As a result of this process, the comprador elements among the mercantile bourgeoisie of the weaker countries would be strengthened and the national or even anti-imperialist elements of the mercantile bourgeoisie of the weaker country would be largely cast aside. In the era of pre-modern imperialism, the mercantile bourgeoisie served as the key class base of imperialism. The merchants of the economically backwards countries could be bought off and be rendered into comprador mercantile bourgeois tools of the imperialist mercantile bourgeoisie. Hence there existed the comprador mercantile bourgeoisie.

It is worth reminding that any class tendency that seeks to resist imperialism is a friend of the proletariat and hence those national anti-imperialist elements of the mercantile bourgeoisie are allies to the working class; and although these merchants would have their businesses mainly in the exchange sector, they would nonetheless be helpful in the struggle for national liberation and the development of the productive forces. This is why Stalin famously praised those elements among the Egyptian merchants who resisted British imperialism.

In assessing the pre-modern imperialist powers, one must also not lose sight of the fact that some of the so-called 'Empires' were not really imperialist states, for their economy was so state-owned as to overwhelmingly minimize the influence of mercantile capital over the state. It is possible that some of the 'Empires' with the oriental-despotic mode of production belonged to this category of not really being real 'imperialist' states.

All states would seek to develop their productive forces. More powerful mercantile capitalist-imperialist states developed their productive forces faster than others. With the advancement of technology, the productive forces further develop, hence creating the advanced machinery that lays the material basis for industrial capitalist property relations, moving society away from the backwards feudal system. Under industrial capitalism, workers sell their labour for cheap to produce commodities that generate revenue for their company; the industrial bourgeois stock-owner(s) typically work less than their workers but earn more through profits. Capitalist profits are thus the 'legally stolen' extra wages which the workers would have deserved. The market system allows the bourgeoisie to drive down the wages through having workers engage in competition for jobs.

The expansion of the industrial capitalist mode of production would assist in not only eliminating the feudal property relations, but would also assist in replacing poor-quality technology with a more advanced technology that corresponds to the level of advancement in industrial capitalist property relations. It would also allow for the emergence of an army of proletarians, thereby benefiting the communist forces definitely in the longer term. Advancements in the productive forces of a reactionary state are always progressive for the longer term and reactionary for the shorter term. They are progressive for the longer term because they promote the rise of the progressive class forces, such as the industrial bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and they are reactionary for the shorter term because they involve a stronger military-industrial backbone under the influence of the reactionary regime. For communists and progressives, insofar as tactical decision-making is concerned, the shorter term comes as a priority in such cases.

While industrial capitalism in its first phase, and despite its exploitative nature, is a progressive force for economic development beyond feudalism, the development of monopolies as a result of the crisis of overproduction in industrial capitalism marks the threshold beyond which industrial capitalism starts to gradually become somewhat reactionary in the specific country experiencing overproduction. The crisis of overproduction marks the stage in which industrial

capitalism is industrialized to the point that potential deflationary effects are experienced, certain companies collapse and are devoured by other companies, as a result of which monopolies develop. The development of monopolies concentrates parts of the economy into the hands of centrally planned private microeconomies. Such corporate monopolization and private central planning, by the way, lay the ground for socialized central planning.

Upon establishment, the powerful capitalist monopolies in turn generate the demand for and thus lay the basis for more and more advanced institutions of exchange, represented this time by the more sophisticated banks instead of the merchants. In *Das Kapital*, Karl Marx described the historical link between mercantile capital and the banks, as well as the essential similarities between the banks and mercantile capital, although Lenin went into great depth with regards to how the banks laid the economic basis for modern imperialism. The similarity between finance capital and mercantile capital is not at all difficult to understand: like mercantile capital, finance capital is predominantly concerned with exchange rather than production of commodities. Naturally, this means that much like mercantile capital, the banks play the role of ‘middlemen’. There is much demand for the work of these middlemen while these middlemen do not produce much materially, and do not put in as much labour. The high demand – and hence high revenue and high profits – for this sector, combined with the low amount of real material production that this sector involves means that the financial bourgeoisie can generate high amounts of profit without actually contributing as much economically. And thus, much like mercantile bourgeoisie, the financial bourgeoisie gain a parasitic role in the economy.

The financial bourgeoisie of an industrially developed country, a country with industrial capitalist monopolies, would naturally be interested in investing in its own home country, and to merge its businesses with the industrial monopolies. The financial bourgeoisie would provide the investments that help the industrial monopolies operate more smoothly. In exchange, the industrial monopolies would provide the economic backbone for the military with which the finance capital would use in its global war quests. Furthermore, the industrial corporations would start serving as the front companies of the finance capital. The imperialist intelligence service, the arm of imperialist finance capital, would be in charge of the latter point. These industrial corporations, front companies as they are, would go to targeted countries in order to ‘invest’ in them and ‘build’ ‘factories’, ‘schools’, etc. there. These ‘schools’ and ‘factories’ would be built proximate to the host country’s military sites or other sensitive areas, so that the front companies can spy on them more closely, and when the front companies are to evacuate the targeted country, the things built by the front company would typically, though not always, be sabotaged or dismantled. Under the cover of ‘business contacts’, espionage contacts with specific officials are to be established. Etc. The fact that the investments are by the industrial bourgeoisie rather than by banks directly, and the fact that some real industrial development would appear to be happening, makes them appear less suspicious and thus provides cover for the secret service. On the other hand, in countries in which a comprador puppet regime has already been established, the front companies are to go there to strengthen the comprador regime, exploit the natural resources, but to make sure to do so in such a way that the industries do not actually develop too much, or else these advanced industries risk falling into the hands of the revolutionaries if the comprador regime is overthrown. Furthermore, the imperialist conquerors, contrary to the common misconception, are actually keen to prevent the rise of a class of exploited proletarians, for they fear that the rise of a proletarian class would serve to undermine imperialist presence in the colonies. Instead, through neoliberal measures, the imperialists generate widespread unemployment in the colonized area, so that such unemployment would generate a large lumpen-proletarian class – i.e. bandits. The bandit syndicates, the thug networks, would in turn be used by the imperialists as the foot-soldiers with which to suppress the proletarian uprisings or to stage coups against any revolutionary anti-colonial state that may arise in that land. Therefore, because the imperialists are keen to use the lumpen-proletarians as a counter-weight against the proletarians, the imperialist conquerors prefer to un-employ the workers of the colonized land rather than to employ-and-exploit them. Fascist bombing campaigns against civilizations are launched by the imperialists in order to destroy the productive forces that bring forth jobs, that bring forth an army of proletarians, and to yield the rubble that brings forth the army of the unemployed, and consequently, from a select few of the unemployed, an army of lumpen-proletarians. At the same time, the imperialists aim to maximize the exploitation of the natural resources of the colonized land.

Imperialist powers sometimes export industrial capital and develop transportation infrastructure, such as railroads, in the lands they colonize in order to smoothen the links in their vast colonial empire. That does not mean that colonial powers invest for the aim of developing the economies of the colonized zones; it merely means that practical necessities have gotten them to develop infrastructure which they would like to happily destroy when the time of decolonization comes so that minimal amounts of colonially-established infrastructure fall into the hands of the anti-colonial forces. The imperialists also at times assist the industrialization of their imperialist allies. Such was the case with the American economic assistance to West Germany and Japan after World War II. The purpose obviously was to prop up powerful bulwarks against the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. Such imperialist aid, however, while certainly assisting the development of the productive forces in some specific areas, is detrimental on the global scale for it impedes the anti-imperialist cause; ultimately, it is through anti-imperialism alone that the global development of the productive forces can occur effectively, most quickly, and at low costs.

Finance capital does not always directly engage in the conquest of a country. The more the influence of finance

capital in a geographic area, the more direct its influence safely becomes. Depending on the level of control it possesses over a zone, finance capital's colonial influence ranges from the installation of its intelligence agents at the helm of the state, all the way to a takeover via 'industrial' front companies, all the way to direct involvement in engineering debt traps and the like.

It is also worth mentioning that much as how imperialist mercantile capital would make overtures to potentially comprador elements of the mercantile bourgeoisie in colonizable zones, the local financial bourgeoisie of the weaker countries has comprador elements in it as well, and these comprador elements would be willing to sell the whole country if they could. Imperialist finance capital therefore makes overtures to the bankers of the economically much less developed countries and offers them deals with which to betray the less developed country in exchange for high profits, thus encouraging and promoting the comprador tendency among the private bankers of the industrially weaker country. That is why the financial bourgeoisie of the weaker countries are predominantly comprador rather than committed to their weak country's industrial expansion.

The mercantile bourgeoisie and the financial bourgeoisie only choose to become supporters of national imperial expansion if the productive forces of their nation are so mighty as to render that nation a suitable base to be used by the mercantile bourgeoisie or the financial bourgeoisie for world conquest campaigns. If the productive forces of their home country is no longer that strong in comparison to other empires, then the mercantile bourgeoisie and the financial bourgeoisie choose to instead become a comprador force opposed to national imperial expansion. Many formerly mighty empires of the pre-modern imperialist type soon ceased to be imperialist states precisely because their productive forces were no longer comparably/relatively so strong as to render them a heartland in which mercantile capital or finance capital could base itself. This resulted in such empires to cease to be empires and to instead become colonies of mightier empires that had undergone a higher development of the productive forces.

The powerful imperialist mercantile bourgeois class had as its allies the feudal class and/or the slave-owner class, much as how modern imperialist finance capital renders the companies of the industrial bourgeoisie into front companies serving the interests of the financial bourgeoisie. With the progression of certain societies towards the modern imperialist phase of capital development, the modern imperialist finance capital has so much of an industrial might as to make it more profitable for the pre-modern imperialist mercantile bourgeois class of the underdeveloped countries to sell out their countries to the mighty modern imperialists. In this phase, the pre-modern imperialist mercantile bourgeois class transforms into a comprador mercantile bourgeois class. The comprador mercantile bourgeoisie retains the feudal lords and slave-owners as its class allies and thus, by extension, the feudal landlords and slave-owner classes assist the modern imperialists in the subjugation and economic terror against the colonized countries. Another reason for the alliance of the slave-owners and feudal landlords with fascist finance capital is their common aim of rolling back the development of the productive forces in the colonized zones.

Anyways, as a result of the control of the financial bourgeoisie over not just their own banks but also over industrial capitalist monopolies, parasitic finance capital is developed – hence modern imperialism. Finance capital is the economic base of modern imperialism and marks the threshold by which the modern imperialist stage is reached. Naturally, owing to its parasitic and imperialist nature, finance capital seeks to conquer the world. In describing finance capital's quest for global domination, Lenin used the term 'exports of capital'. Opportunist elements deliberately misinterpret this phrase as to mean that imperialism is the export of industrial capital, such as factory piece, etc. This is a slander trumpeted against Lenin. Throughout his book 'Imperialism', Lenin made it explicitly clear that by that phrase, he meant exports of finance capital, the parasitic capital that hinders the development of the productive forces in the colonized territories, whereas he vehemently rejected the myth that imperialism is the exports of industrial capital, the kind of capital that progresses the development of the productive forces in the colonized territories. Finance capital, which is the capital of the parasitic middlemen as opposed to the kind of capital that boosts production in unproductive regions, is therefore the class essence of modern imperialism, as Lenin argued. Criticizing the theories of Kautsky, Lenin said:

The characteristic feature of [modern] imperialism is not industrial *but* finance capital. It is not an accident that in France it was precisely the extraordinarily rapid development of *finance* capital, and the weakening of industrial capital, that from the eighties onwards gave rise to the extreme intensification of annexationist (colonial) policy. The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex *not only* agrarian territories [in which industrial capital is yet to be developed], but even most highly industrialised regions.... (Imperialism:

The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vladimir Lenin, Chapter 7, 1916. From Marxists Internet Archive)

One person who fundamentally opposed Lenin on the issue of finance capital vs. industrial capital, and of the world conquest of finance capital was Leon Trotsky. Condemning anti-imperialist national liberation struggles as 'reactionary', Trotsky openly promoted imperialism as a 'progressive' force for 'economic development' and the building of 'a human economy on a global scale, freeing it from the constraints of the nation and the state'. In so doing, he implicitly stated that the class essence of imperialism is not the parasitic money-capital, but rather the exports of industrial capital, the means of production which bring economic development. In 1915, Trotsky wrote:

Imperialism is a capitalist-predatory expression of the progressive tendency of economic development: to build a human economy on a global scale, freeing it from the constraints of the nation and the state. A naked national idea opposed to imperialism is not only powerless, but also reactionary: it drags human economy back into the diapers of national limitation. (Imperialism and the National Idea, Leon Trotsky, May 6, 1915. Source: Marxist Internet Archive (MIA) available in Russian. Note: the MIA is a Trotskyite website.) (IMG)

The terrorist agent of imperialist secret services as he was, Trotsky's entire political career and movement this infamous quote defines.

Also, Trotsky's claim that imperialism builds a total-global economy was false, as inter-imperialist rivalry generates the fluctuations and intra-imperialist splits that prevent the rise of one imperialist power to total global dominance (more on this later).

Another reason why the phrase that Lenin used helped the diversionaries in misinterpreting what he meant, is that the term 'export' in the phrase 'exports of [finance] capital' could wrongly imply that the home imperialist country 'passes' its finance capital to the colonies, thereby causing finance capital to cease to exist in the home country – when in fact, what Lenin obviously meant by the term 'export' in that context was that finance capital expands its outreach, and takes over new territories outside of the home country. The economic basis for modern imperialism is the development of finance capital which has an inherent *tendency* to expand its outreach (or 'export' itself). This means that if every country in the world managed to successfully resist the 'export' of finance capital by an imperialist country, that does not automatically take away the imperialist power's character as an imperialist power, because the imperialist power still has the tendency to 'export' finance capital even though it has not done so successfully. Obviously, for its worldwide quest, finance capital seeks to constantly improve its home country's military-industrial backbone, the productive forces upon which it relies. The advancements in the productive forces, however, cause a critical plot twist. The advancements in the productive forces of one country can boost production on the worldwide scale to so high a degree that it would lead to overproduction in the world market. If all the countries of the world were anti-imperialist – not even necessarily socialist although socialism definitely smoothens and de-bureaucratizes the process much more than an anti-imperialist national-bourgeois state would – then the overproduction would have been welcomed for it would have allowed for large amounts of goods and services to be distributed relatively fairly at a very cheap price among the peoples of the world. However, finance capital, to which the industrial monopolies are subordinate, 'begs to differ'. To them, overproduction is a crisis that drives prices down. Worse yet, if another power – be it a rival imperialist power, or an anti-imperialist superpower such as the USSR – has had so high a boost in production to have been able to cause such an overproduction on the global market, then the other power would be able to sell its vast amounts of goods for cheap, thereby devastating the monopolies subordinate to the imperialist finance capital, and hence devastating the finance capital in question as well. This, finance capital cannot tolerate.

As with every war – inter-imperialist wars or anti-imperialist wars – the primary objective insofar as the productive forces are concerned is to first capture the productive forces and use it for oneself, and if that is not possible, then as Plan B, demolish/sabotage the rival's productive forces, so to deprive the rival from the productive forces and to drive up the prices of goods. Imperialist powers therefore have a completely natural tendency towards launching wars.

The crises of overproduction prevent the main rival camps of imperial powers from ceasing their rivalry and thus prevent imperial powers from making a lasting peace. This is the reason why the Kautskyite notion of 'ultra-imperialism', which preaches that major rivalling blocs of imperial powers can establish a lasting peace with each other is false. The notion of 'ultra-imperialism' was firmly rejected by Lenin who said:

The notorious theory of "ultra-imperialism", invented by Kautsky, is just as reactionary. (...). Kautsky:

"... Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capitals? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question." (...). No matter what the good intentions of ... sentimental Kautsky, may have been, the only objective, i.e., real, social significance of Kautsky's "theory" is this: it is a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present times, and directing it towards illusory prospects of an imaginary "ultraimperialism" of the future. (Modern Imperialism, Lenin, chapter 9)

Imperialist leaders are sado-masochistic, no doubt. However, to work for an 'ultra-imperial' peace, to work for a peace that drives prices down and destroys all the last hopes for the profits for which the imperialist leaders worked so hard, is far beyond just masochism. An 'ultra-imperial' peace would be finance capital's suicide attempt. An 'ultra-imperial' peace is impossible, as well because of the drive, the greed, of the financial bourgeoisie to conquer the world for themselves, rather than to share it with their rivals.

While imperialist powers cannot form a universal alliance with one another, there obviously occur alliances between imperialist powers against each other, such that rival blocs of imperial powers emerge. Furthermore, some relatively weaker imperial powers may seek to shift the balance of power in their own favor by allying with anti-imperialist states. The question of the crises of overproduction also influences the configuration of the alliances.

The configuration that the alliance between imperialist powers takes is in accordance to the balance of power. If, for instance, there is one really strong imperialist power against several disproportionately weaker imperialist powers, it would be natural that the weaker imperial powers would ally so to be able to match the power of the stronger imperialist power. Alliances shift in accordance the amounts of power that each imperialist state would have as well as the balances of power between the international alliances. The extent of the 'power' of these states is mainly determined by the productive forces, which includes not only the means of production but also the natural resources in the process of being extracted. Secondly (and in some cases more importantly), the power of states is to be assessed also based on the terrain, because having natural defense barriers definitely makes a state more powerful, and based on other miscellaneous factors such as manpower and combat readiness and operational training of individual units. Development of the productive forces generates funds for the training of individual units, and for managing manpower quantity and quality.

Of course, what is assumed in listing all of the above factors considered is that they are all actually under the influence of the dominant faction of the state targeted. If for instance, state A has a fifth column within state B, and this fifth column actually has under its influence a part of the productive forces, terrain, and armed forces, then it cannot be said that those fifth column-controlled factors are controlled by state A, even though those productive forces, terrain and armed forces officially/nominally belong within the jurisdiction of state A. Hence, the question of who controls the resources, the question of the dominance of the class tendencies over the productive forces is a fundamental aspect of the assessments. The sources of power – the productive forces, terrain, etc. – is the first dimension to take into account and who has the power and how much – the class forces controlling those productive forces, terrain, etc. – is the second dimension to take into account. Many 'analysts' completely ignore or forget the great importance of the second dimension, because they fail to see how class forces that exist in each country can catapult intelligence agents up against the dominant faction in the state.

Some hold the right-deviationist view that as a result of the development of nuclear weapons, nuclear-armed imperialist states will never wage war on each other. This view is distorted. Imperialist rivals wage war on one another, and being nuclear-armed only makes their war covert and shadowy. Covert warfare in this case implies firstly that they would fight via proxies and allies in other zones. It also implies direct assaults on each other, cross-border penetration and aggression against each other, through armies of regulars-disguised-as-irregulars – that is, the highly-trained troops 're-sign' from the military, form an underground army, and then on behalf of the imperialist state which covertly commands them, invade the other country. Alternatively, an army of irregular militants is trained and used for cross-border infiltration and attacks. Of course, the aggressor power can only go so far with this because if it goes 'far too far', then the aggressed nuclear-armed imperialist power will call out the aggression for what it is, would call on the aggressor to take responsibility in helping to clean up these 'irregular' troops, and would threaten nuclear retaliation otherwise. Regarding inter-imperialist conflicts, I need not mention false flag terror attacks and fomenting rebellions inside one another's territories.

It is by no means difficult to understand why capitalism really reaches its 'highest stage', the modern imperialist stage, through the crisis of overproduction. At this phase, capitalism is at the climax of its usefulness beyond which it starts to get a destructive, parasitic role. It does not immediately become parasitic as soon as the crisis of overproduction occurs, but certainly the crisis of overproduction is the stage leading to the development of parasitic finance capital. Finance capital is parasitic because it takes the 'middleman' role. It is parasitic because it profits from the continued backwardness of the colonized zones and the barbaric terror that promotes backwardness. It is parasitic because it seeks to start wars in order to destroy productive forces instead of promoting it. Parasitic as finance capital, the economic basis of modern imperialism, is, it sponsors the most degenerate, most backwards, and most savage programs in pursuit of profits. Thereupon may arise the terrorist regime of the most reactionary elements and agents of finance capital, of modern imperialism: the fascists. The Comintern thus scientifically defined 'fascism' as:

the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital. (The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism: Main Report delivered at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, Georgi Dimitrov, August 2, 1935. Citing: Thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Source: Georgi Dimitrov, Selected Works Sofia Press, Sofia, Volume 2, 1972. From: MIA, Mathias Bismo.)

Finance capital, as was mentioned before, has as its agenda not really the rendering of the colonized populations into exploited proletarians, for the development of a large proletarian class, however much exploited by the financial bourgeoisie, is still a menace to imperialist colonial holdings. Instead, finance capital allies with the other parasitic classes

that hinder the development of the productive forces and hinder the numerical rise of a proletarian class. Those parasitic classes include the mercantile bourgeoisie, the comprador bankers, the kulaks, the corrupt bureaucrats, the feudal landlords, the slave-owners, and the bandits (i.e. lumpen-proletarians). Finance capital also allies with those intellectuals family-rooted in the bourgeois or feudal classes, and since that usually constitutes the bulk of the intelligentsia, finance capital allies with the bulk of the intelligentsia. The alliance of finance capital with the parasitic classes and strata that hinder societal development lays the basis of fascism, the reign of terror suppressing the progressive classes and entrenching the ultra-reactionary vestigial classes loyally allied to finance capital.

Bringing mass destruction is natural to the parasitic classes, for the latter seek wars of desertification. The parasitic classes carpet-bomb, level off cities, carry out genocides, burn crops, pour salt on fertile soil, and mass-incinerate not 'just for the Sadistic fun' but to obliterate the productive forces of countries, for with the advancement of the productive forces comes the advancement of the progressive classes and with the obliteration of the productive forces of most of the world comes the massive rollback of the progressive classes. In this midst, there of course exist some ironies too: sometimes fascist assassins build railways, roads, mines, and oil extraction sites in the areas they colonize, so to facilitate their military-industrial production as the launching pad of the wars of desertification in the rest of the areas they colonize. In the imperialist heartland too, even finance capital, itself reliant on the productive forces, takes measures against the productive forces by destroying the overproduced goods so to drive up prices and profits. Yet, imperialist finance capital has not yet prioritized the complete level-off of the cities in its own imperialist heartland because for the while it needs the productive forces of the imperialist heartland for levelling off and desertifying much the rest of the world. To find the geographic areas in which the reactionary classes dominate or can come to relatively easily dominate, search for those areas in which the development of the productive forces, the rise of good agriculture or industry, has been naturally-geographically most difficult: the mountains of Chechniya and western Ukraine, the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula and Mongolia, out of all of which came the darkest and most barbaric among the forces of reaction. Out of such ultra-reaction and barbarism, finance capital benefits in the class struggles against the progressive classes. After such areas with low development of productive forces, imperialism has modeled the societies it colonizes: it seeks to turn areas into deserts with low productive forces, hence weak progressive classes, so that the barbarism, in the true style of the desert nomads of the Arab peninsula and the tribes of Gobi, can assist imperialism in the suppression of the progressive classes. Such are wars of desertification.

Fascism promotes corrupt mysticism at the expense of science, in correlated with its drive to promote feudalism and slavery at the expense of industrial capitalism and scientific socialism. Corrupt mysticism takes infinitely various forms. However, examples of it are Pagan religious-mania, animal worship, bestial behaviour and bloody Sado-Masochism, degeneration of sex, postmodern or anti-Enlightenment philosophy, abstract 'art', and chaotic atonal 'music'. Such trends gained a special boost with the rise of finance capital in the late 19th century. The end of the nineteenth century gave rise to the decadent fin-de-siecle (end of the century) culture, although such cultural corruption existed long before the late 19th century and only gained a new level of riot then.

The fascist forces recruit many of their foot-soldiers from among the petit-bourgeoisie and materially dominate the regions in which the petit-bourgeoisie predominate. The petit-bourgeoisie, unlike the proletariat, have a small business to lose, and, unlike the bourgeoisie, do not have a big business to use as a 'cushion' for taking big risks and competing against finance capital. As the petit-bourgeoisie have too small of businesses to be capable of taking the risk of a vigorous fight against the parasitic classes, the petit-bourgeois areas are materially dominated by the parasitic class forces, the fascist forces. Sometimes, fascist dominance occurs both covertly and overtly – through a blatant rule and open terrorist dictatorship of the fascist forces. At other times, fascist material dominance takes a covert form – what does this mean? If a progressive state territorially encompasses such a petit-bourgeois zone, the fascist spies and saboteurs who disguise themselves as 'supporters' of the progressive state would use these petit-bourgeois areas as their primary regional and social base for fascist subversion against the progressive state. Even if finance capital has been expelled from such a petit-bourgeois zone, the corrupt bureaucrats that form the class base of the crypto-fascist pseudo-progressives still remain in the petit-bourgeois zone and meet little resistance from the petit-bourgeoisie, whereas in the predominantly proletarian-populated zones, bureaucrats of the same kind would be under far greater pressure and would be far more easily susceptible to demotion or purge. Thus, upon these petit-bourgeois zones rely the fascist spies and imperialist secret service infiltrators, traitors to be purged. In a predominantly petit-bourgeois country, the agents and collaborators of fascism very quickly take over and extend their influence over the various institutions and bodies including at times the communist party that is supposed to resist such fascism. The influence of fascism in the communist party would take the forms of Trotskyism, Bukharinism, Kautskyism, Titoism, Maoism, Dengism, etc.

The petit-bourgeoisie do not play any role in generating a fascist tendency, but are nonetheless beguiled by fascist propaganda and recruited as foot soldiers by fascist organizations. From the petit-bourgeoisie, fascism does not emanate, but in them fascism immerses. The beguiling of the petit-bourgeoisie into becoming an electoral base and a soldier recruitment pool of fascism is what has misled many onto the false conclusion that fascism emanates from the petit-

bourgeoisie when actually fascism emanates primarily from finance capital and secondarily from the kulaks, bureaucrats, feudal lords, etc. Both the agrarian and urban petit-bourgeoisie bear the same class behaviour. There is, however, a slight psychic difference between them. A difference between the urban petit-bourgeoisie and the rural peasant petit-bourgeoisie is that, as a general pattern and all else constant, the urban petit-bourgeoisie, by residing in cities, is more exposed to the proletariat and hence the proletarian thinking, whereas the rural petit-bourgeoisie, is less exposed to the proletariat and hence to proletarian thinking.

The material control of the parasitic classes over these petit-bourgeois areas also translates to a high level of soft power influence and propaganda dominance in these areas. As such, the petit-bourgeoisie are more susceptible to accepting imperialist propaganda. Petit-bourgeois acceptance of imperialist propaganda again manifests in two forms: one is blatant imperialist propaganda, the direct and explicit belief in the theses promoted by the imperialist mainstream media. This happened in Germany, in which the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie, primarily based in the Bavarian south but also based in other areas, formed the majority, whereas the proletarians of Germany constituted a minority. Germany's petit-bourgeoisie, viciously pro-Nazi, formed the pro-Hitler majority. In Germany and Japan, the economy was semi-industrialized, a factor that led to the rise of finance capital in a society that was largely petit-bourgeois. Such predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie minimized resistance to fascism in Germany and Japan, while those countries were imperialist powers. As such, owing to their semi-industrial semi-agrarian character, Germany and Japan emerged as imperialist-fascist powers.

A bourgeois-democracy of the pro-imperialist type by contrast is a kind of a state in which fascism would have normally been the 'order' of the day, but, owing to the large class of the proletariat, the fascists have been pushed back and have been forced to accept the increase in and incorporation of the influence of the proletariat over the state through electoral democratization. Such a state therefore is a dictatorship of the fascist finance capital albeit a kind that has been forced to accept the incorporation of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. An imperialist bourgeois-democracy is thus the combination of an imperialist-fascist finance capital state with a workers' state, such that the finance capital component forms the main component of the state. Examples of such states are the United States and Britain; they are not fascist states not because the fascist finance capital of those countries was 'nice' and 'democracy-loving' but because the fascist finance capital of those states was under a far more immense pressure of the proletariat.

Even in the United States, the zones not industrially developed and proletarianized have historically been major power bases of fascist reaction. If with the development of the productive forces comes the advancement of the progressive classes, so too with the under-development of the productive forces often comes the decline of the progressive classes. The non-industrial non-proletarian south of the United States was the base of the slave-owners, Confederates, Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 'Dixiecrats', pro-Nazi 'neutrality' lobbyists, etc. The industrial north, the population of which was largely proletarianized, was the base of the anti-slavery activists, the pro-Soviet F. D. Roosevelt faction and Kennedyites, etc. The pro-fascist imperialist bourgeois-democracy in the United States is the 'compromise-state' system that has arisen out of the tug-of-war of these antagonistic class forces.

The political culture of 'tolerance for opposition media' has arisen out of the class antagonisms characteristic of imperialist bourgeois-democracies and absent in the anti-imperialist bourgeois-democracies. The 'tolerance for opposition media' in the pro-fascist imperialist bourgeois-democracies has arisen from the proletariat's imposition of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat over the imperialist state, the imposition of democratic freedoms for the proletariat's cause within the context of an imperialist pro-fascist state which would have otherwise repressed the proletariat's media. The anti-imperialist bourgeois-democracies are different, however, for they constitute the state alliance of the anti-colonial bourgeoisie and the proletariat, two classes with temporarily convergent class interests. Whereas in the imperialist bourgeois-democracies, the imperial bourgeoisie are forced to tolerate the proletariat's media work, in the anti-imperialist bourgeois-democracies the anti-colonial bourgeoisie and the proletariat need not tolerate each other for they are, after all, allied – indeed, upon firm domination of the state, they naturally will together repress the media outlets of the reactionary classes hostile to the proletariat and the anti-colonial bourgeoisie. As such, in the progressive bourgeois-democracies, only the socialist and progressive bourgeois-democratic media will be permitted to operate, unlike in the imperialist bourgeois-democracies wherein are tolerated the reactionary pro-fascist and progressive anti-fascist media activities. The question is not the level of virtue or vice in the Western-style media freedoms; the matter rather is the capability of such media freedom to, in the first place, survive and thrive. Such a capability is lacking for the longer-term in the West, in which the dictatorship of the proletariat will triumph, nor can it survive in a prosperous bourgeois-democracy of the anti-colonial type.

The same goes for the thriving of the bourgeois-democracies. Imperialist bankers are in a quest to advance the military-industrial backbone of their imperialist heartlands for global conquest; the bankers of the colonizable/non-imperial zones, by contrast, inherit a comprador character and usually seek to undermine their own nation's industries. As such, Western-style democracy – an uneasy and collusive democratic 'compromise' of the proletariat and its financial bourgeois foes – inherits imperialist bankers who advance their own country's industry, whereas Western-style democracy, when implemented in the non-imperialist countries, shall bring a collusive compromise of the proletariat, the class seeking

industrial advancement, and the comprador bankers, who aim to impede their country's national industrial expansion. Western-style democracy, when implemented in the non-imperialist countries, empowers the comprador bankers of the non-imperialist country to ruin the latter country's industry and thus bring forth a reign of economic terror. Such is the reason that no prosperous Western-style liberal-democracy has ever arisen in any decolonized country in the modern era.

At the same time, the existence of a proletarian class develops the tendencies that resist fascist finance capital. Such resistance is manifested not only in the form of the development of a communist party but also in the development of pro-democratic and pro-socialist intelligence agents that infiltrate fascist regimes and slow down the work of the fascist faction of the regime, which is the dominant faction of the regime.

While fascism is blatantly anti-democratic, it is not one-man rule, for one-man rule in general cannot exist and has never existed. The fascist dictator has always relied upon a clique, whose loyalty the ruler would need, in pursuing the fascist agenda. Without their support, the fascist dictator cannot rule. And the fascist clique is constituted by the terrorist ultra-reactionary agents of finance capital. Being a 'feared' dictator or changing the laws of the country to officially declare one as the absolute ruler do not actually turn one into the absolute ruler, for one would still need the clique behind oneself to rule absolutely. Furthermore, even then, having a clique behind oneself can help one to rule pervasively, but it cannot help rule absolutely. The latter is impossible because the existence of class antagonisms in society inevitably catapults intelligence agents into the high ranks of the state apparatus against the ruling class tendency. Surely, the state would be the dictatorship of the ruling class, but the enemies of the ruling class can still rebrand and recolour themselves as having the 'same' ideology as that of the ruling class and can then infiltrate the high ranks of the state, precisely thanks to the pressure generated by class forces antagonistic to the ruling class. As a result of such catapulting of agents upwards, the so-called 'one-man ruler' would have absolute 100% control over the state only on paper; in practice, the 'one-man ruler' would have pervasive powers but nowhere near absolute 100% rule; and the 'one-man ruler' would be impeded in one's progress towards one's objectives precisely by these antagonistic intelligence agents catapulted upwards. It follows that even totalitarian regimes can be infiltrated, even if it would appear otherwise.

The proletariat of every country utilize their influence to pressure for the upwards catapulting of proletarian agents into the ranks of the fascist state. The anti-fascist agents of the proletariat would recolour themselves as 'fascists' loyal to the fascist state and would then use proletarian pressures to lobby for gaining a foothold in the means of violence. In the name of fascism, the crypto-anti-fascist agents of the proletariat would sabotage the fascist agenda on all fronts, as steps towards democratization. Similarly, if a fascist movement gains the ability to pull the proletarians towards its cause, the proletarian membership within the fascist movement can indeed be mobilized as pawns for fratricidal wars against the progressive forces, but can also end up as a fifth column that catapults the crypto-socialist and crypto-democratic agents of the proletariat, disguised as 'loyal' 'fascists', onto the high ranks of the fascist movement. Historical experience, demonstrated in this book, emphatically supports such a conclusion. Even the most totalitarian of the fascist regimes can be infiltrated by agents of anti-fascist secret services.

Even if the proletarians in a fascist movement were, in the quasi-impossible scenario, not able to generate a crypto-anti-fascist ideological current within the fascist movement, they sure would have a crypto-anti-fascist role in practice. The class interests of the proletarian and the anti-proletarian classes are simply irreconcilable no matter how much a fascism-beguiled proletarian would seek to think otherwise. The class conflicts that exist between the working class and the bourgeois class will inevitably be used to engineer splits in fascist ranks; superficially, the class conflict would appear as a conflict between the fascist workers and the fascist capitalists, and would thus appear as to ultimately favor the fascists no matter which side – the fascist workers vs. the fascist capitalists – wins the conflict; yet, even the very sowing of division through such intensification of conflict is an anti-fascist phenomenon, and hence the struggle of the working class – even a working class made up of fascist workers – against the fascist finance capital, on its own is in practice an anti-fascist struggle.

One common fallacy, especially emanating from left-opportunist circles, is the idealist pseudo-'workerist' fallacy, which, whether explicitly or implicitly, redefines communism as the 'aggregate sum of the personal will or personal material interests of the workers' and the proletarian line as a line entailing the 'aggregate of individual consciousnesses of proletarians', and thereupon derives such false conclusions as: {(1) that the Soviet Union should 'not' have allied with Britain and USA against the Axis, since after all, the workers in Anglo-American countries suffer from capitalism too. (2) that blue-collar workers should get paid 'more' than engineers in socialist states since after all, dictatorship of the proletariat is all about privileging the blue-collar workers over everything and everyone else. (3) that every socialist Party line must be subject to a referendum of the class-conscious and class-unconscious workers.} Idealist pseudo-'workerism' confuses the concept of the 'working class' with the concept of the aggregate of individual workers' consciousnesses. Against idealist fallacies, communists mobilize the workers as a class rather than a mere aggregate sum of individuals.

Cases occur in which there would be an anti-imperialist state in country whose majority people adhere to a culture or religious ideology that favors imperialism. That a nation has a culture or religion that favors imperialism does not on its own mean that the people who adhere to that culture are pro-imperialist or will launch colour revolutions on behalf of imperialism. Rather, if a nation that has a pro-imperialist culture, that merely means that the imperialist- fascist secret

services would have greater propaganda leverage and greater soft power influence in that country. Greater soft power can serve as a channel for greater intelligence service penetration into the specific country. Greater soft power influence and propaganda leverage also means that the kinds of people who would be exposed to the propaganda and who can afford to act based upon the propaganda, would engage in colour revolutionary activity on behalf of the imperialists. The influence of soft power and culture must not be exaggerated, however, in the face of a much more material factor as class. Even proletarians that have been under the influence of a reactionary pro-imperialist culture will generate a tendency that superficially adopts the rhetoric and cosmetics of the pro-imperialist culture but actually pursues a proletarian internationalist agenda. Similarly, in the case of progressive anti-imperialist cultures, the reactionary classes promote a pro-imperialist and reactionary current that disguises itself with the appearance of the progressive anti-imperialist culture.

Due to the greater influence of the fascist finance capital in the agrarian areas, a government led by the agrarian petit-bourgeois majority would be a government under the influence of finance capital, and would thus yield a 'democratically elected' totalitarian fascist state – Hitler was elected by the majority of the Germans, particularly Germany's petit-bourgeois electorate. By contrast, a government that serves as the rule of the proletariat, even in a country in which the proletariat are a minority of the population, would be objectively more democratic than the 'rule of the peasant majority', because the interests of the proletariat are totally irreconcilable with the interests of finance capital and thus finance capital would not be able to render the dictatorship of the proletariat into a fascist regime, even if the workers themselves actually are influenced by the chauvinistic mentality. It follows that the dictatorship of the proletariat is more democratic than other class dictatorships, not because the proletariat would necessarily constitute the majority but because the proletariat have characteristics that inherently oppose fascist finance capital and hence oppose totalitarian rule.

The interests of the proletariat are irreconcilable with the reactionary classes. One of the defining characteristics of the proletariat is that do not own the commodities they produce and instead have only their own labour to sell. This lack of ownership distinguishes the proletariat from the petit-bourgeoisie, as the petit-bourgeoisie are concerned that they may lose their small businesses by risking confrontation with the reactionary classes, whereas the proletariat have 'nothing to lose but their chains' and are thus most willing – they have no better choice – to take the risk of confrontation against the reactionary classes. On the other hand, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, due to their ownership of big businesses, are capable of using their big businesses as cushion and to take the risk of confrontation against the reactionary classes. This feature of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie renders them into direct allies of the proletariat, despite they greatly differing features of their class conditions. Another class strongly resembles a combination of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the proletariat: the kolkhozniks, or the cooperativists. The collectivization of the small businesses would amalgamate such small businesses into big businesses, the owners of which can take the risk of confrontation against the reactionary classes. In this respect, the collective/cooperative businesses bear a characteristic of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. At the same time, these cooperative big businesses, precisely because of their collectivized character, are employee-owned. The employees are not exactly proletarians, for they own a share of the surplus, hence owning more than their labour; nonetheless, due to the mass distribution of the share of the surplus amongst the employees, the employees do not own greatly more than their own labour, and thus are similar to the proletarians. The cooperativists, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, and the proletarians constitute the three main progressive classes of the modern era. The serfs, not to be confused with the petit-bourgeoisie, can be progressive as well, for they would support land reforms that oust the feudal oppressors, strictly provided that such land reforms are properly managed.

Yet, the petit-bourgeoisie contradict the parasitic classes to some extent, even though to a low extent. If managed properly by the fascist secret service, the petit-bourgeoisie will remain docile and submissive to the fascist state. Yet, sometimes, the mismanagement of the situation, the extreme severity of the oppression of the parasitic classes, and, above all, the opening up of space for revolutionary agitation against the reactionary ruling classes, all can allow the revolutionary forces to agitate the petit-bourgeoisie into confrontation with the comprador or imperialist state. The mobilization of the petit-bourgeoisie into confrontations against the armed forces of the reactionary classes will allow the progressive classes – the proletariat, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, and the cooperativists – to gain a wider foothold in the struggle for control over the means of violence. If the progressive classes gain decisive leadership over the petit-bourgeois rebels, then all is well. If, however, the petit-bourgeoisie gain leadership of their own uprising, then a long-term disaster is in the making, for the petit-bourgeois rebels against imperialism, per every measure against imperialism, will undertake a measure of the same magnitude in favour of imperialism. The measures in favour of imperialism will be not so much in the form of direct petit-bourgeois alliance with the imperialists but more so through a cultish behaviour that sparks backlash in favour of imperialism. The petit-bourgeois 'revolutionary' citizens in China in the 1960s and the Khomeinist 'revolutionaries' in Iran are cases in point of such vacillations, such pro-imperialist and anti-imperialist measures, such a heads-and-tails approach to politics. Per every correct measure, they always took an adventurist step that would provoke a backlash favourable to Anglo-American finance capital.

Nonetheless, it remains a fact that the petit-bourgeois mode of production predominates in territories occupied by imperialism and its comprador allies, class forces that hinder the industrial production that would have proletarianized the petit-bourgeoisie. As such, there exists a strong overlap between petit-bourgeois geographic areas and areas

conquered by fascism. This means that in the overwhelming majority of the time, the petit-bourgeois end up as recruits of the agents of finance capital, and not as forces to be mobilized by the progressive classes. This is the reason that such petit-bourgeois 'revolutions' have been few, and that anti-colonial revolutions have usually been either national-bourgeois or proletarian. The national bourgeoisie and the proletariat in turn arise from the development of the productive forces in the colonies. Yet, the colonizers hinder the development of the productive forces, and thus aim to hinder the rise of the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie. Where from, then, do the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie grow in strength in the colonies? They grow in strength thanks to the fact of inter-imperialist contradictions, as exploited by the progressive classes for their self-advancement in the colonies and in imperialist heartlands.

The hypothetical global conquest of one imperial power's finance capital leads to a global dominance of a few private sector oligopolies, if not an outright monopoly. Such a phenomenon would hamper the development of productive forces, the material basis for the transition to communism. Such a process is fundamentally parasitic, damaging the economic development of nations. This is a reason for communists to foster inter-imperialist competition, and to support anti-imperialist movements, so to prevent the conquest of the world by one imperial power's finance capital. Nonetheless, it remains a fact that an imperialist alliance can never take over much more than 50% of the world. Why? Even if one single imperialist power defeats all of its major rivals and goes on the path of victory and total dominance of the world, such an imperialist power would be quickly partitioned into two imperialist powers, for each of the imperial elites dominating this imperialist power, out of utmost greed, would seek to conquer the pinnacles of power for oneself and not the other imperial elites. Hence, a segment of the imperial elites dominating this imperialist power would defect to the camp of the enemies of this single world-dominating imperialist power and would use its influence to rally massive parts of this empire with oneself so to pave the way for the partition of this empire. It follows that there cannot ever be a single colonial empire dominating the world. In the same ways, inter-imperialist alliances quickly break up. Precisely when an inter-imperialist alliance gets close to a conquest of the world, precisely when an inter-imperialist alliance begins to trespass the 50% threshold, the inter-imperialist alliance falls apart and the imperialist powers begin to wage colonial wars against each other. As such, inter-imperialist conflict frequently drives the wedge. Inter-imperialist rivalry is the primary contradiction that weakens global imperial dominance and allows for the breathing room, the operational freedom, for the cause of the proletariat, the kolkhozniks, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie to rise, exploit inter-imperialist contradictions, and achieve their revolutionary objectives. The inter-imperialist contradiction, the primary contradiction, allows for the proletarian-bourgeois conflict, the secondary contradiction, to result in the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Therefore, no matter how much defeat the proletariat face, they will win thanks to the imperialist bourgeoisie ensuring their own defeat. No matter how triumphant an imperialist alliance, it could not and cannot ever get too far beyond the equilibrium threshold of 50%, the percentage share of the world which an imperialist alliance can conquer.

One bloc of imperialist powers allies with the reactionary classes. That is all the more natural since finance capital, the parasitic class, would seek the alliance with the parasitic classes for rolling back the progress of mankind. When I speak of the pro-fascist evils of finance capital, it is this mainstream bloc of finance capital powers, the reaction-aligned imperialist powers, of which I speak.

Yet, another bloc of imperialist powers, in order to combat its menacing rivals, the reaction-aligned bloc of imperialist powers, would strategically align with the progressive classes. This progressive-aligned bloc of imperialist powers would, for the period in which it is allied with the progressive classes, pursue progressive objectives throughout the world, in all directions in space, and even in their own colonies. Class alliances, though temporally limited, are not geographically or spatially limited for the time period in which they exist. On the contrary, they extend in all directions in space, to every corner of the globe, deep under the ground and far beyond the sky. When a bloc of imperialist powers ally with the progressive classes, the alliance is not limited to one geographic zone but extends even to their own colonies. Even in their own colonies, the progressive-aligned bloc of imperial powers would ally with the progressive classes, would embark on the project of strengthening and expanding the productive forces of the areas colonized, expanding the size and power of the proletarian class, promoting real democratization. They would even be extending the influence of the anti-colonial national forces against which these imperialists had been fighting a few years prior. The progressive-aligned imperialists would need to ally with the progressive forces even in their own colonies, for the rival bloc of imperialist powers, the reaction-aligned imperialists, would support the reactionary classes hostile to the progressive classes in the colonies of the progressive-aligned imperialist powers; this in turn leads the progressive-aligned imperialist powers to ally with the progressive classes in their own colonies. There is empirical evidence in support of this, some of which will be presented in this book.

Why, then, did the rival blocs of imperialist powers prior to the rise of Nazi Germany appear 'equally reactionary'? Why, for example, was the French-led bloc of imperialist powers denounced as being as equally reactionary as the German-led bloc during the First World War? That is because the balance of power between these 'equally evil' blocs of colonial states changed so often so quickly that any policy of improving the conditions in the colonies could not gain momentum and stability; one week, the French-led bloc gains greater power and thus its weaker rival, the German-led

bloc becomes progressive by virtue of being so much weaker as to be willing to ally with the progressive classes so to resurge its strength; the next week, the German-led bloc gains greater power and thus its weaker rival, the French-led bloc becomes progressive by virtue of being weaker and willing to ally with the progressive classes. The imperialist powers in this phase behave like: (+), (-), (+), (-), (+), (-); progressive, reactionary, progressive, reactionary; they keep changing their dialectical charge. This frequent change of the balance of power which in turn led to the frequent change in dialectical charge prevented any stability in progressive policies from being implemented. As a result, all the colonial powers appeared at face value as 'equally' reactionary at the 'same' time, even though according to the laws of dialectics, it is impossible for two rival blocs of imperialist powers to be equally reactionary simultaneously. While it is impossible for two rival blocs of powers to be simultaneously 'equally evil', there is no doubt that in the longer run, the net effect would be that these colonial powers would be in sum equally reactionary. That is why we correctly state that during the First World War, all the blocs of imperialist powers were equally reactionary – they were equally reactionary in the longer-run sum, in the net effect; but they were not equally reactionary exactly at the same time. This is why the German imperialists wanted the October Revolution, the revolution of the proletariat, to emerge victorious, by which to undermine the French-led bloc, and shortly later, the French imperialists militarily supported the newborn Soviet state in order to undermine the very same German imperialists that had sought the October Revolution to emerge victorious.

Fascist finance capital has as its allies the parasitic classes, which, in the context of the anti-imperialist countries, constitute the comprador classes. Such class allies of finance capital include the feudal landlords, the slave-owners, the comprador mercantile bourgeoisie, the comprador financial bourgeoisie, the kulaks, and the bureaucrats. The kulaks, by owning large businesses, gain the financial ability to debt-trap the poorer peasants, thus operating as rural quasi-bankers, a parasitic class allied to finance capital. The kulaks often partake in economic sabotage – at times covertly, such as through 'mismanagement', and at times manifestly, such as through terrorist special operations and armed rebellions. The mercantile bourgeoisie and financial bourgeoisie under a socialist or anti-imperialist state regard the progressive classes as a greater menace and calculate that selling one's own country would be more profitable than the vain effort to gain control over, and imperially expand, the military-industrial backbone of one's own country. As such, the mercantile and financial bourgeoisie ally with the imperialists, finance wars against the progressive state, provide the imperialists with intelligence by which to target the progressive forces, and lobby for sanctions against their motherland. After socialization and collectivization, with the elimination of private commerce and banking, and with the elimination of the kulak class, the corrupt bureaucrats and the black-marketeers are the only comprador class bases that remain in socialist conditions. The black marketeers can undertake many roles, such as those of merchants, bankers, and kulaks. The bureaucrats, like finance capital, bite into production and oppose the progressive classes. Assisting the bureaucrats and black marketeers are the comprador strata (not to be confused with the comprador classes) which comprise mainly the ideologically parasitic intelligentsia.

Intellectuals from bourgeois or feudal family roots are often influenced by parasitic ideas, even when describing themselves as 'socialists' or 'anti-imperialists', though of course, in extremely rare cases, they may genuinely betray their own class roots and join the side of the proletariat and kolkhozniks. Some bourgeois-rooted intellectuals are well-meaning albeit on the wrong side of history. From among the well-meaning, some may defect to the camp of socialism. Intellectuals from bourgeois family backgrounds, usually influenced by Enlightenment thought, tend to adopt left-deviationism or liberal right-deviationism as their counter-revolutionary ideas. Intellectuals from feudal family backgrounds, usually not influenced by Enlightenment values, tend to promote religiosity and/or mysticism for their counter-revolutionary ideas, for the feudal class seeks to sponsor religiosity and/or mysticism as a counterweight against the secular and scientific ideas that, through technological advancements, yielded the decline of feudalism and brought the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The priests are a subcategory of intelligentsia, and, historically, usually came from feudal family backgrounds. At times, feudal-rooted intellectuals adopt a facade of 'socialism' in order to penetrate and sabotage the socialist movement. The ideologically-corrupted university professors as well as the student colour revolutionaries used to come mainly from feudal family backgrounds, but later, with the decline of feudalism, the bourgeoisie became the main family root of such professors and university students. While some may be intuitively inclined towards preferring the bourgeois-rooted liberal or left-opportunist intellectuals over the feudal-rooted intellectuals, historical experience and the nature of the intelligentsia shows an ambiguous picture: these bourgeois-rooted parasitic intellectuals were not necessarily any better than the feudal-rooted parasitic intellectuals. This would make sense, since an ideologically-corrupted intellectual could spread corruption under a conservative/feudal banner, under a liberal banner, or under a left-opportunist pseudo-socialist banner, and the severity of the ideological corruption will not necessarily differ; sometimes, a religio-mystical reactionary intellectual makes remarks more correct than that which a liberal or left-opportunist would say, and sometimes it is vice versa. All such corrupt currents can be so severely harmful that it would become difficult to prefer any of them, though of course any rhetoric that undermines feudalism and religious reaction, even if by liberals or Trotsko-Maoist left-opportunists, should be supported. Intellectuals from proletarian or cooperativist family backgrounds tend to have progressive views, however. A socialist society, by economically elevating the proletariat and cooperativists, gives such families the ability to send their children to good universities so to train good

revolutionary intellectual cadres that advance the socialist agenda. The rest of the cadres of a state have stories not dissimilar to that of the intelligentsia. For example, while there do exist a considerable percentage of cases of betrayals of one's own class origin, as a general trend the military commanders from proletarian or cooperativist family backgrounds tend to have progressive views, whereas military commanders from anti-proletarian class origins tend to have reactionary views. The intelligentsia includes doctors, engineers, artists, etc. Within their profession, the intelligentsia may well contribute positively to the society. The socialist state, while not permitting the reactionary-minded intelligentsia to exercise a significant level of political power, shall protect the reactionary-minded intelligentsia if (and insofar as) they can help advance the natural sciences. The reactionary-minded intellectuals, so long as not conspiring to materialize their reactionary ideas, can be protected by the socialist state to advance the arts and sciences. Humiliation of university professors, and terrorist action against doctors, engineers, lawyers, natural scientists, artists, etc. are all left-opportunist measures.

To combat imperialism-fascism, the Party of the proletariat must engage in strategic and tactical alliances with the parties, organizations, and states assisting in the struggle against imperialism and fascism. The Party of the proletariat must ally with that bloc of imperialist powers combating the pro-fascist bloc of imperialist powers. The Party of the proletariat, furthermore, must assess the amount of the influence of the progressive classes – the proletariat, the kolkhozniks, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie – in the non-communist parties, organizations, and states. The Party of the proletariat must maximize efforts to increase the influence of the progressive classes in all non-communist parties, organizations, and states. In so doing, the Party of the proletariat strengthens the progressive tendency among the non-socialist parties, organizations, and states, rendering them more susceptible to strategic partnership, a popular front alliance, with the Party of the proletariat against imperialism and reaction. Even those parties, organizations, and states that are vocally anti-communist or right-wing would, as soon as the progressive classes have come to dominate them, render their anti-communism and reactionary stances into a mere veneer underneath of which is a progressive revolutionary tendency emanating from the progressive classes. As such, even those parties that are vocally anti-communist would tone down their anti-communism and would, covertly or blatantly, become allies of the Party of the proletariat. Against those parties, organizations, and states in which the reactionary classes dominate, the Party of the proletariat must pursue the agenda of systematically decimating them. Various different efforts towards sabotaging those parties must be pursued; if it is a war condition, then armed struggle against those parties must be pursued at some point in time; if it is peacetime, then a combination of expressions of diplomatic 'friendliness' for the purpose of infiltration, coupled with economic boycotts, must be pursued. The decimation of the reactionary parties and organizations will roll back the dominant tendency, the reactionary tendency, in such organizations, thereby reducing the lobbying power of the reactionary forces, while catapulting upwards the crypto-progressive agents in those reactionary organizations. This would render the reactionary organization more susceptible to infiltration, which would pave the way for either (1) the annihilation of that reactionary organization, (2) the conversion of that reactionary organization into a progressive organization, or (3) an intra-organizational coup d'états that allows the crypto-progressive forces to fully hijack the command of the reactionary organization, or to coopt the reactionary leaders of the reactionary organization, so to render the troops of that reactionary organization into cannon-fodder used by the crypto-progressives for decimating other reactionary organizations. A 4th course could be that the crypto-progressive agents gain access to the funds of the reactionary organization, take the bigger share of those funds, and then split away from that reactionary organization, so that the reactionary organization would be destabilized and easier to be, in the political-military sense, devoured. More important than reducing the manpower of the reactionary organization as a result of the split, is the crypto-progressive agents' taking away of the funds of the reactionary organization.


Cases occur in which during a struggle against imperialism or fascism, some organizations that collaborate with the imperialist/fascist foes pretend to be struggling against it, so to mislead otherwise genuine anti-imperialists/anti-fascists. In their struggle against imperialism and fascism, the communists can expose such organizations by what I call "alliance offensives" or "invitation offensives." It entails exposing collaborationists through proposing an overt alliance with them. That is, the communists would propose an alliance to this organization for a joint struggle against the imperialist/fascist occupation. Owing to their collaborationist nature, the collaborationists would not benefit from establishing friendly contacts with the communists for that might expose their collaboration with the enemy. As such, it puts the covert collaborationists into a difficult position:

- (1) If they reject the proposal, they would lose face in front of the public by appearing not serious about combating the enemy occupation. By contrast, the communists would rightly appear serious in combating the enemy occupation. This would tilt the balance more so towards the communists and would expose to many the collaborationist nature of the organization. It would draw many of the genuinely anti-imperialist/anti-fascist supporters of the covert collaborationist organization away from the collaborationists and towards the communist-led popular front.
- (2) If the collaborationist organization accepts the alliance proposal, then they would face two options: (1) break their word/promise/deal and thus risk being exposed as collaborationists. Exposure would have

almost the same results as rejecting an invitation in the first place, except it would be more intensively in favor of communists and a more intensive blow at the collaborationists. Option (2) would be that they would actually go through with the deal, carry out their promises, which would indeed harm the imperialist/fascist enemy occupation. This would force the collaborationists into fighting their own imperialist/fascist bosses hence causing division and friction in the enemy camp. All of these cases are wins for the communist-led popular front and losses for imperialism/fascism and collaborationism.

In order to render it harder for the collaborationists to betray their deal, communists shall try to negotiate as precondition, some degree of transparency on the part the collaborationist organization, so that it would become easier for communists to gather intelligence on the collaborationists' potential betrayals of the deal, so to expose the collaborationists' betrayal of the deal more easily. The establishment of transparency measures would be useful in dissuading the collaborationists from betraying their deal in the first place.

Related to this strategy is the "invitation offensive" strategy. Socialist and anti-imperialist states can expose imperialists' Wilsonian hypocrisy by calling for universal disarmament. No one with a basic understanding of class struggles would ever seriously think that universal disarmaments are realistic in the epoch of modern imperialist warmongers. The point though is to show that contrary to their Wilsonian calls for peace and unity, the imperialists are but hypocrites committed to terror. The USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and the Comintern frequently used the peace offensives strategy.



Diagrammatic Representation of the Outcomes and Processes of Invitation Offensives

Explaining this concept in passing (regarding British politics as the example and case in point), Lenin said ‘If the [Kautskyites] reject a bloc with us on these terms, we shall gain still more, for we shall at once have shown the masses ... that the [Kautskyites] prefer their close relations with the capitalists to the unity of all the workers’:

It is true that the Hendersons, the Clyneses, the MacDonaldis and the Snowdens are hopelessly reactionary. It is equally true that they want to assume power (though they would prefer a coalition with the bourgeoisie), that they want to “rule” along the old bourgeois lines, and that when they are in power they will certainly behave like the Scheidemanns and Noskes. All that is true. But it does not at all follow that to support them means treachery to the revolution; If the Hendersons and the Snowdens accept a bloc on these terms, we shall be the gainers.... (...). If the Hendersons and the Snowdens reject a bloc with us on these terms, we shall gain still more, for we shall at once have shown the masses (note that, even in the purely Menshevik and completely opportunist

Independent Labour Party, the rank and file are in favour of Soviets) that the Hendersons prefer their close relations with the capitalists to the unity of all the workers. ("Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Vladimir Lenin, Chapter 10. From: MIA)

One common mistake often made is that the level by which an organization is reactionary or progressive is seen as a continuous, integral, atom-less spectrum not composed of individual parts. In the past centuries someone would have said "substance X is closer to calcium than substance Y is," whereas now, armed with knowledge of atoms, one would say that "substance X has more calcium atoms than substance Y." An equivalent of this can be found in the historical materialist analysis. In saying that a reactionary organization is 'more reactionary' than another reactionary organization, what is really meant is that such an organization is more under the influence of the reactionary classes than another reactionary organization is. This subtle conceptual distinction is important as it helps to analyze the class character of organizations using a relatively more quantitative understanding of the class composition of organizations. Instead of treating ideological differences between organizations as mere third, fourth, fifth, etc. opinions, this conceptual distinction categorizes organizations according to their class composition and the level of the penetration of progressive agents vs. reactionary agents in this organization. This helps to treat more quantitatively the class character of the organization. Such a concept can be applied to analyzing the differences between intelligence agents, politicians, etc. There cannot be a fascist politician 'less fascist' than another fascist politician. All pro-fascist politicians are fascistic to a virtually equal extent. However, the difference is that some pro-fascist politicians are more coopted by the progressive anti-fascist forces than others, a factor that leads those progressive-coopted pro-fascist politicians to be more favourable to the cause of the proletariat than the other pro-fascist politicians. The Kautskyite agents, for example, are undercover fascist agents tasked with penetrating the proletarian organizations in order to sabotage the labour movement. At the same time, the fact that such Kautskyite agents immerse themselves amongst the proletarians is a factor that allows the agents of the proletariat to encircle such Kautskyite agents hence to coopt the Kautskyite agents into a force to be used against the blatantly anti-proletarian agents. Lenin supported the Labour Party as a counter-weight against the Tories because Lenin was rightly assured that the rise of the Labour Party, however pro-fascist such an organization was, served as a factor increasing the influence of the British proletariat over the British state while weakening British finance capital. The Labour Party, under the pressure of and coopted by the proletarians, could be utilized to roll back the influence of the more reactionary Tories. Lenin wrote:

It is true that the Hendersons, the Clyneses, the MacDonalds and the Snowdens are hopelessly reactionary. It is equally true that they want to assume power (though they would prefer a coalition with the bourgeoisie), **that they want to "rule" along the old bourgeois lines**, and that when they are in power they will certainly behave like the Scheidemanns and Noskes. All that is true. **But it does not at all follow that to support them means treachery to the revolution**; what does follow is that, in the interests of the revolution, working-class revolutionaries should give these gentlemen a certain amount of parliamentary support. (...). On the contrary, the fact that most British workers still follow the lead of the British Kerenskys or Scheidemanns and have not yet had experience of a government composed of these people—an experience which was necessary in Russia and Germany so as to secure the mass transition of the workers to communism—undoubtedly indicates that the British Communists should participate in parliamentary action, that they should, from within parliament, help the masses of the workers see the results of a Henderson and Snowden government in practice, **and that they should help the Hendersons and Snowdens defeat the united forces of Lloyd George and Churchill.** (...). At present, British Communists very often find it hard even to approach the masses, and even to get a hearing from them. If I come out as a Communist and call upon them to vote for Henderson and against Lloyd George, they will certainly give me a hearing. And I shall be able to explain in a popular manner, not only why the Soviets are better than a parliament and why the dictatorship of the proletariat is better than the dictatorship of Churchill ... but also that, with my vote, **I want to support Henderson in the same way as the rope supports a hanged man—that the impending establishment of a government of the Hendersons ... will hasten the political death of the Hendersons and the Snowdens just as was the case with their kindred spirits in Russia and Germany.** ("Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Lenin, Chapter 9. MIA. Bold added.)

Note as well that Lenin did not support Britain's 'Labour' because 'Labour' was 'left' whereas the Tories were 'right'; he supported Britain's 'Labour' because the latter was more under the pressure of the proletariat whereas the Tories were less under the pressure of the proletariat. He did not explicitly mention this difference but that is clearly what he was implying, which is also why he put the word 'bourgeois' before the '[Tory] candidate' and implied that the Labour Party candidate was 'less bourgeois':

We would take part in the election campaign, distribute leaflets agitating for communism, and, in all constituencies where we have no candidates, we would urge the electors *to vote for the Labour candidate and against the bourgeois candidate.* ("Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Lenin, Chapter 9. MIA. Italics original.)

Lenin called on the British communists to support the 'Labour Party' candidate not as a blank cheque support but as a way of, to the extent that the communists had strength, partially coopting the Kautskyite politicians – that is, supporting the Kautskyite politicians in exchange for the Kautskyite fulfilment of certain promises to the Party of the proletariat. The Kautskyite agents of fascism, encircled by the proletarian agents amongst whom they had immersed, would have been compelled to increase the influence of the proletarian agents, who had encircled the Kautskyite agents, over the British imperial state. That is, the electoral rise of the proletarian-coopted Kautskyites brings to office not just the Kautskyite agents of fascism but also the proletarian agents encircling them. The increased influence of such proletarian agents within the Labour Party over the British imperialist state would increase pressures on a British military dominated by British finance capital, thus allowing for more intelligence penetration into the British imperial army's ranks by the agents of the proletariat. The greater influence of the proletariat over the means of violence would reduce anti-communist conspiracy, allowing the communists to better organize, enlarge their Party, as steps towards the overthrow of the British state – much as how the rollback of the influence of the reactionary classes over the Russian Army brought to power the Kautskyite democratic government of Kerensky, thus allowing the Party of the proletariat the operational freedom by which to organize the proletarians of Russia and to launch the October Revolution.

Note as well that Lenin did not support the British Labour Party because the latter was 'left-wing' but because it was easier to coopt by the proletarian agents. Indeed, there do occur cases in which the more proletarian-influenced party, the party less under the influence of the reactionary forces, would be at face value 'right-wing' whereas the more reactionary party would be 'left-wing'. Lenin had no problems with allying with right-wing forces so long as they served the agenda of promoting socialism:

When in February 1918 the German imperialist vultures hurled their forces against unarmed, demobilised Russia, who had relied on the international solidarity of the proletariat before the world revolution had fully matured, I did not hesitate for a moment to enter into an "agreement" with the French monarchists. Captain Sadoul, a French army officer who, in words, sympathised with the Bolsheviks, but was in deeds a loyal and faithful servant of French imperialism, brought the French officer de Lubersac to see me. **"I am a monarchist. My only aim is to secure the defeat of Germany," de Lubersac declared to me. "That goes without saying (cela va sans dire)," I replied.** But this did not in the least prevent me from entering into an "agreement" with de Lubersac concerning certain services that French army officers, experts in explosives, were ready to render us by blowing up railway lines in order to hinder the German invasion. This is an example of an "agreement" of which every class-conscious worker will approve, an agreement in the interests of socialism. **The French monarchist and I shook hands, although we knew that each of us would willingly hang his "partner". But for a time our interests coincided.** Against the advancing rapacious Germans, we, in the interests of the Russian and the world socialist revolution, utilised the equally rapacious counter-interests of other imperialists. In this way we served the interests of the working class of Russia and of other countries, we strengthened the proletariat and weakened the bourgeoisie of the whole world, we resorted to the methods, most legitimate and essential in every war, of manoeuvre, stratagem, retreat, in anticipation of the moment when the rapidly maturing proletarian revolution in a number of advanced countries completely matured. (Letter to American Workers, Lenin, August 20, 1918. Bold added)

The proletarians are not concentrated merely in the communist party of the proletariat but are to be found in the other organizations. A shift in rank-and-file membership class composition – so as to increase the influence and percentage membership of the proletariat, the cooperativists, and/or the anti-colonial bourgeoisie over non-communist movements – will assist in rendering that organization more susceptible to cooperation with the socialist forces and confrontation with anti-socialist forces.

Lenin said:

The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful and *obligatory* use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this reveal a failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism *in general*. Those who have not proved *in practice*, over a fairly considerable period of time and in fairly varied political situations, their ability to apply this truth in practice have not yet learned to help the revolutionary class in its struggle to emancipate all toiling humanity from the exploiters. And this applies equally to the period *before* and *after* the proletariat has won political power. ("Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Vladimir Lenin, Chapter 9. MIA)

As Lenin rightly emphasized, communists and progressives must sow and exploit rifts within imperialism and reaction, to divide and defeat in detail the enemies of the people. Communism necessitates the proletariat's alliance with feudalism

against slavery, and with capitalism against feudalism; it necessitates the alliance with anti-imperialist capitalist states against the capitalist-imperialist regimes. It also necessitates the alliance of communists with anti-fascist imperialist powers against the fascist or pro-fascist imperialist blocs. Lenin's remark does not mean supporting both fascists and anti-fascists as a 'divide and conquer' method. Rather, it means supporting those less under the influence of the pro-fascist classes against those more under the influence of the pro-fascist classes.

Lenin's remark emanated from the dialectical concept of so-called 'Negation of Negation', explained in depth by Engels in *Anti-Duhring*. The application of the so-called 'Negation of Negation' concept to socialist class struggles led to the concept of the 'Salami Tactics' concept of Rakosi. The idea calls for continuously supporting and coopting the forces less under the influence of the reactionary classes against the forces more under the influence of the reactionary classes. Slice by slice, the reactionary forces would be cut and put away, just like a salami, allowing for the greater influence of the communist agents of the proletariat.

As well, the rifts between left-opportunist and right-opportunist agents of reaction must be exploited to the maximum, so to systematically erode their influence and shred their networks. More on this will be mentioned later.

CIS3. The Quasi-Myth of the Third Force & the Tendency for Class Allies to Cooperate in all Spatial Directions

Dialectics rejects the existence of a void or intermediate gray-zone between any and all antagonistic forces. It rejects the narrative that there can exist an intermediate gray-zone between good and evil, progress and reaction, pro-fascism and anti-fascism, etc. Dialectical and historical materialism divides the world into two categories: the tendencies/forces that, willingly or unwillingly, serve progress and the tendencies/forces that, willingly or unwillingly, serve reaction. The notion of 'non-alignment' or the notion of being a 'third force' between progress and reaction, between good and evil, has always been but a fantasy. So-called 'non-alignment', 'third side to the conflict', etc. are all liberal anti-dialectical myths. This was very clearly pointed by Andrei Zhdanov in the so-called 'Zhdanov doctrine' speech. It is worth reminding individuals that the Zhdanov doctrine did not divide the world into the socialist camp and the imperialist camp, but rather divided the world into the anti-fascist 'democratic camp' and the pro-fascist pro-imperialist camp. However, perhaps more interestingly, Egyptian Arab leader Gamal Abdel-Nasser – a leader of the so-called 'Non-Aligned Movement' – agreed with Andrei Zhdanov. In a conversation with Houari Boumediene, Abdel-Nasser said:

non-alignment and impartiality has become empty talk, devoid of any truth! Because today, where is non-alignment to be found? We say be biased neither towards the East nor towards the West, but the West is standing against us and beating us! And we say 'we are neutral between East and West'? So how can I be neutral between the one who hits me and the one who does not hit me?! On the issue of neutrality and non-alignment, we are ready to reach [an agreement to] any extent, even to the point of making a joint defense agreement with the Soviet Union! (Minutes of the talks between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Algerian President Houari Boumediene, El-Qubba Palace, Cairo, July 10, 1967, from: nasser.bibalex.org (the archives of Gamal Abdel-Nasser's life, p. 12) (IMG)


A concept closely related to the above is the question of the strategic uniformity and depth of cooperation of the progressive forces in the struggle against the reactionary forces.

The small industrial base of the economically backwards countries renders weak the national bourgeoisie of such lands. In the absence of such a powerful industrial base, and to compete against the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie's imperialist rivals, the national bourgeoisie of the backwards zones seen no choice but an alliance with and reliance upon the proletariat of their country. In this attempt towards an alliance, the national bourgeoisie minimize tensions with the proletariat. A state controlled by the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie relies upon the proletariat for its anti-imperialist agenda. While the state in this context would be a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, it would strengthen the influence of the proletariat over the state through the establishment of a democratic system and advances proletarian objectives via progressive and democratic policies. **Indeed, the joint rule of the proletariat, cooperativists, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie is the basis for progressive bourgeois- democracy.** As the national bourgeoisie of the post-colonial countries is often rather weak, it cannot afford to purchase the big industries, thus leaving the heavy industry and many other key sectors in the hands of the progressive bourgeois-democratic state, the state of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the cooperativists. Through such nationalization, the progressive bourgeois-democratic state prevents these key industries from falling into the hands of the comprador bourgeois classes, and instead elevates the influence of the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie over such key big industries.

As always, one must distinguish between the workers as an aggregate of individual consciousness vs. the workers as a class. While as an aggregate of individual consciousness, the workers of each country would not necessarily hold a proletarian internationalist attitude towards the workers of other countries, the workers of each country as a class have fully convergent interests with the proletariat of other countries and thus have a natural tendency towards proletarian internationalism. Hence, the reliance and dependence of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie of each country on that land's working class entails the dependence of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie of each country upon the

international proletariat. In a hypothetical vacuum, the national bourgeoisie of the anti-colonial countries would partially compete with one another; however, given that such national bourgeoisie is firmly locked-in to the proletariat as a result of its desperate need to rely upon the proletariat, the national bourgeoisie of each country cannot afford to grossly contradict the internationalist tendency generated by its proletariat. The result of this ‘locking in’ of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie to the proletarian internationalism is a consolidated strategic alliance of the progressive bourgeois-democracies with each other and with the workers’ state(s). **The anti-colonial national bourgeoisie would not cooperate with the imperialists against the anti-colonial national-bourgeoisie of the other countries.** What does all of this mean? It means that anti-imperialist states, insofar as they are under the influence of the anti-imperialist faction, do not engage in major conflicts against the anti-imperialist factions of anti-imperialist states; any ‘fight’ that occurs between two anti-imperialist forces is almost always a deliberate deception operation, a division of tasks between two anti-imperialist states aimed at confusing the forces belonging to the imperialist camp. As a law of history, in fact, unless there is a misunderstanding, miscoordination, etc., two governments/movements that have aligned class interests do not struggle against each other. Any struggle that occurs between these forces of the same class alliance would either be a misunderstanding/miscoordination or a deliberate deception operation. I state this not as a matter of some load of theorizing devoid of reality but as something that actually has plenty of empirical evidence in support. Unfortunately, the limited space available does not permit me to provide all the evidence in this book but much of it will be provided throughout this work. Of course, the remarks made about the progressive bourgeois-democracies’ alliance with one another are even truer with regards to the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship of the proletariat would have the maximum tendency to pursue an internationalist and anti-imperialist policy line. And the more consolidated becomes the control of the proletariat over the state, the less the potential for pro-imperialist deviations to emanate from that state.

(Note as well that bourgeois-nationalism is different than the national bourgeoisie. Bourgeois-nationalism refers to the type of nationalism benefiting the parasitic classes, whereas the national bourgeoisie is the kind of the bourgeoisie that supports its own nation’s development of the productive forces and struggles against imperialist forces that seek to colonize the nation to which the national-bourgeoisie is loyal.)



Different than the story of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat is the story of the ‘anti-fascist’ petit-bourgeoisie. The petit-bourgeois organizations usually side with fascism; when they side against fascism, such as in the case of the Khomeinist petit-bourgeoisie in Iran or the some of the petit-bourgeois ‘Cultural Revolutionaries’ in China, they oppose fascism only half of the way, while the other half of the way promoting such monumental stupidity that benefits fascism. The ‘anti-fascist’ petit-bourgeois organizations do not oscillate – they do not keep switching sides as a way of maneuvering the two sides against each other. Rather, they vacillate – they fight half of the way in favour of the progressive forces, while committing outrageous stupidities that benefit reaction the other half of the way. Historically, the petit-bourgeoisie in the Chinese state collaborated more with the comprador and fascist forces while deviating in favour of the progressive classes in a minority of cases, whereas, due to specific historical circumstances, in Iran the petit-bourgeoisie ended up giving slightly, just slightly, more room to the progressive classes than they did to the reactionary classes. Again, generally, the petit-bourgeoisie side with the fascists, but in some specific spatial settings capitulate to, and behave passively conservative towards, the progressive forces, thus causing such petit-bourgeoisie to adopt a heads-and-tails/progressive-and-reactionary vacillatory behaviour.

The tendency of the progressive bourgeois-democratic states and socialist states to closely align in all spatial directions is also not shared by the imperialist powers, for the imperialist powers compete for global domination and shift their inter-imperialist alliances according to their plans for global dominance. Thus, whereas the progressive and socialist states tend not to oscillate in their strategic relations and remain more firmly on each other’s side, the finance capital states frequently oscillate in their strategic relations.

The story of finance capital is fundamentally different than the circumstances of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. Imperialist finance capital emerges in highly industrialized economies, rendering it capable of much lower reliance on the proletariat. A bloc of imperialist powers would ally with the proletariat, but are not as dependent upon the proletariat as the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, and would not be aligned with it for as long a term as the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie would align with the proletariat. Finance capital would only ally with the international proletariat in order to fight the finance capital of other countries, as was the case during the first two years of the Great Patriotic War

when Anglo-American finance capital allied with the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat against the greater enemy, Nazi Germany. Unlike the much-impooverished anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, finance capital can easily afford to defect, betray, and switch alliances, which is why Anglo-American finance capital swiftly turned against its ally the USSR, as soon as the balance of power shifted against Nazi Germany during the Battle of Stalingrad (see C11S1 & C11S2). Nonetheless, when finance capital does form an alliance with a specific class force, it forms such an alliance on the global scale in all spatial directions. Anglo-American finance capital's alliance with the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat in the first years of the Great Patriotic War was not manifested just in Europe and the Middle East; it was manifested in all the different corners of the planet. Similarly, the Anglo-American finance capital's alliance with the Nazi German finance capital, which came about since the Battle of Stalingrad and continues to this day, has been an alliance in all directions and in all corners of the planet. No, strategic alliances are not limited to just one specific region, for strategic alliances are class alliances. The alliance goes in all spatial directions, encompasses every part of the Earth, and even every part of the universe that can be accessed by humans (e.g. from 1943 onwards, the Anglo-Americans collaborated with the Nazis and Japanese fascists for the aerospace program as well). Strategic alliances are class alliances and class alliances by nature cannot be spatially limited. The reason is quite simple; deviation from the strategic alliance in one specific zone will assist the growth of the enemies of the strategic alliance in that specific zone and will thereby increase the likelihood of that zone being used by the enemy as a base and a launching pad for launching attacks against the strategic alliance in other zones. It follows that no spatial coordinate can ever be affordably sacrificed for a betrayal of the class alliance. Antagonisms and alliances between different forces will pervade in all directions and will permeate into all fields, thus entailing an antagonism not only present in the military and intelligence sphere, but also in the economic warfare, cultural warfare, psychological warfare, etc. Similar is the case of alliances. While two allied forces would not necessarily merge, they will nonetheless have the automatic tendency to ally with one another in all directions, in all parts of the world, in all fields of study, in the military and intelligence sector, in economic warfare, in cultural warfare, in psychological warfare, etc. There do exist some key differences, however, in the speed of implementing progressive vs. reactionary agendas. For instance, the proletariat have the natural tendency towards the most friction-less and greatest speed in moving forward for progress, whereas the national bourgeoisie are relatively slower and self-decelerated in pursuing the agenda against the reactionary classes. Nonetheless, as class allies, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the proletariat support each other in all spatial fronts, despite differences in pace, friction, and acceleration.

The countries of the world, even the autarkic countries, are not a set of islands totally separate from one another but constitute a highly interconnected web, especially in the field of intelligence service activities. As a result of such extensive and intensive interconnectedness, any activity in favor of the reactionary forces in one country will constitute an activity in favor of reactionary forces in all other countries, and any activity in favor of the progressive forces in one country will constitute an activity in favor of the progressive forces in all the other countries. For this reason, unless there is the phenomenon of miscommunication-miscoordination-misunderstanding, the progressive faction of a progressive state/organization will not collaborate with the reactionary forces anywhere. Similarly, unless there is the phenomenon of miscommunication-miscoordination-misunderstanding, the pro-reactionary faction of a reactionary state/organization will not willingly collaborate with the progressive forces in any spatial coordinate of the world. Where there does exist such a collaboration, it would either be the case that such a collaboration is a result of miscommunication-miscoordination-misunderstanding, or it is the case that such a 'collaboration' is a delusion deliberately promoted by either of the parties, a delusion aimed at providing a cover for covert operations.

Suppose there are two organizations/states A and B, such that A and B have converging class interests and are thus closely allied to one another. However, it turns out that funds from A are transferred to another organization/state C, and C is hostile to B. In other words, A, an ally of B, has some of its funds transferred to an enemy of B. How is such a contradiction to be understood? In this situation, there will be three main scenarios:

(1) there has been a miscommunication/misunderstanding between A and B, resulting in A and B to be mistakenly on opposing sides on a specific issue: given the advancement of technology in communication however, this first possibility is extremely rare since miscommunication between states and organizations has become rarer.

(2) a fifth column within A, representing class forces antagonistic to the dominant class tendency in A, has been carrying out sabotage against the alliance of A and B, by stealing funds and diverting them to C, so to further weaken B and hence to further weaken A, the ally of B.

(3) A and B are both hostile to C, but have covertly divided their tasks such that B would appear as hostile to C, whereas A would, on behalf of B, infiltrate C under the guise of 'funding' C. That is, A's 'funding' of C would not be real material support for C but would rather be utilized as a channel through which to buy influence in C, and to promote a faction within C that would sabotage C's conflict with B.

In such a situation, A's funding of C would often be deliberately in low quantity and quality so to minimize the

damage inflicted on B as a result of such funding of C. Though there will inevitably be some small damage inflicted on B as a result of A's 'funding' of C, the benefits that B gains from A infiltrating C on behalf of B are much higher, which is why B would approve of A 'funding' C. Too often, the question of who among A and B should take the role of 'funding' C depends on the level of soft-power influence that either of A and B can have on C. The extent of soft power influence in turn depends on the culture, ethnicity, or ideology of C. For example, if C is a Christian fundamentalist organization, and if A is an organization whose majority of members are Christians, and if B barely has any Christianity in it, it would make sense to say that A can have more soft power influence over the Christian fundamentalist C, because A has Christian appearances whereas B does not. As such, A can infiltrate C more easily using its soft power influence, and thus, A should take on the task of infiltrating C under the cover of 'funding' C.

Advancements in technology of communication have resulted in scenarios (2) and (3) listed above to be the most frequent cases. Especially, (3) is the most common scenario.

In some ways, miscommunication-miscoordination-misunderstanding is to politics what friction is to mechanics. In the presence of friction, many mechanical principles would become close to being true when tested empirically, whereas in the absence of friction, they would be always fully true empirically. Similarly, when there is miscoordination, miscommunication, and/or misunderstanding, the establishment of an alliance between the progressive class forces and the reactionary class forces would be almost always true, whereas in the absence of miscoordination, miscommunication, and/or misunderstanding, such an alliance would be exactly always true. And the technology of communication and coordination is to politics what lubrication is to mechanics. This is why the further we go back in centuries, the more we see miscommunications or miscoordinations and hence the more we may see accidental three-way, four-way, etc. conflicts in history.

CIS4. The Relationship between Military Victories and Secret Service Victories

The means of violence are virtually inseparable from the class agents controlling them. Wherever go the means of violence controlled by the agents of a class, the intelligence presence of that class goes together with those means of violence. This has several important implications.

Not until the proletariat's conquest of the world can a dictatorship of the proletariat entail a total control of the proletariat and the kolkhozniks over the state. Until that phase, until the export of socialist statehood and the socialist mode of production to all areas of the world, the dictatorship of the proletariat would entail the control of the proletariat and the kolkhozniks over the overwhelming majority of the state. As such, the comprador enemies of the proletariat, such as the bureaucrats and those intellectuals representing the interests of the kulaks and feudal landlords, will together be able to catapult their agents into the state of the proletariat so to obstruct and sabotage socialist projects. Most importantly, the catapulting of such anti-proletarian agents would manifest in the control of such anti -proletarian agents over a minority percentage of the means of violence. Hence, the military and intelligence bodies of a socialist state would be infiltrated by the comprador agents allied with fascist finance capital. Yet, as the dictatorship of the proletariat is essentially the control of the working class over the means of violence, the increase in the quantity of the means of violence controlled by the proletariat would – in relative terms – result in a lower quantity of the means of violence available to the class enemies of the proletariat in the workers' state. As such, the percentage 'share' of the means of violence controlled by the comprador agents would reduce, whereas the percentage 'share' of the means of violence controlled by the proletariat-kolkhoznik alliance would increase. With such an increase in percentage 'share' of control over the means of violence, there is also an increase in lobbying power of the agents of the proletariat. This in turn allows the proletariat to lobby for the installation of its agents in a greater number of critically important ranks in the working class state apparatus, thus allowing the proletariat to purge the comprador agents that have been catapulted into the ranks of the proletarian state. Why is this important? It is important because it means that a stronger military controlled by the proletarian-kolkhoznik faction (as in contrast to the comprador faction) of the proletarian state means that the workers' state would be capable of not only suppressing fascist rebels and defending itself against foreign imperialist aggression, but also would be able to pursue a purge against the comprador agents inside the proletarian state apparatus and to plant the proletariat's agents in replacement.

Military victories against anti-proletarian rebels and imperialist aggressors means a lower quantity and quality of the means of violence available to such anti-proletarian military forces, hence – in relative terms – a greater quantity and quality of the means of violence available to the agents of the proletariat, allowing the agents of the proletariat to have greater lobbying power in their secret service conflict against the comprador agents. This is the key factor that correlates the military victories against anti-proletarian rebels and imperialist militaries with the secret service victories over the comprador agents inside the proletariat's military. As such, **if the army of the proletariat achieves military victories against anti-proletarian armies, then the anti-proletarian commanders in the ranks of the army of the proletariat would also be purged.** A large series of tactical victories by the army of the proletariat in the war against an anti-

proletarian army would reduce the amount of the means of violence available to the anti-proletarian agents inside the anti-proletarian army, thus – in relative terms – increasing the amount of the means of violence available to the pro-proletarian agents in the anti-proletarian army. Hence, **a large series of proletarian army tactical victories would lead to the demotion of the anti-proletarian commanders in the anti-proletarian army and the upwards catapulting of pro-proletarian spies in the anti-proletarian army.** The reverse is true as well. **Military defeats suffered by the army of the proletariat result in the demotion, if not also the assassination, of the agents of the proletariat in the proletariat's army and the anti-proletarian army while leading to the upwards catapulting of the anti-proletarian agents in both the proletariat's army and the anti-proletarian army.** The point of revolutionary defeatism is to reduce the quantity and quality of the means of violence available to the reactionary forces so that – in relative, not absolute, terms – the quantity of the means of violence available to the revolutionary forces increases, thus allowing the revolutionary forces to become a separate proto-state of their own that then overthrows and replaces the reactionary state. The point of counter-revolutionary defeatism is the reverse. Sending military funds to the pro-proletarian faction of a movement would expand the means of violence, and hence the lobbying power, of that progressive faction, thus allowing the progressive faction to plant its agents in the more important ranks of that movement and to more easily pursue its progressive agenda. Deploying the troops of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a friendly country helps the progressive forces in that country to augment their military, hence to augment their lobbying power, leading to the triumph of the progressive agents over the agents of fascist reaction in the government of the country to which the troops were deployed. In short, military victories yield secret service victories. Inflicting military damage upon an enemy allows for the intelligence penetration into the ranks of that enemy. These very important points are almost always missing in the mainstream political commentary.

What has been said about the proletariat's army in the above paragraph can also be said about the progressive bourgeois-democratic armies, the armies representing the alliance of the proletariat, the kolkhozniks, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. The key difference though is that the progressive bourgeois-democratic army is easier to infiltrate than the proletariat's army, because the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, despite their positive and progressive role, have businesses to lose and are thus not as willing as the proletariat to risk confrontation with imperialism. They are not as militantly anti-comprador as the proletariat, thus rendering the progressive bourgeois-democratic armies relatively more vulnerable to intelligence penetration by comprador agents.

Armed rebel forces are an additional state, with their own means of violence controlled by their class agents, up and against the main central state. The rebel forces obviously aim to replace the central government with their own state, but the rebel forces, upon militarily striking the central state, also reduce the means of violence available to the rebels' class enemies in the central state and thus catapult upwards in central state hierarchy the agents of classes allied to the rebel forces. Such pro-rebel agents inside the state apparatus then secure the tactical sabotage against the central state's military during battles against the rebels. They also try to covertly divert state funds and state arms directly into the possession of the rebels or onto areas that are easy to be captured by the rebels. The pro-rebel agents inside the state in turn regard the rebels as their own unofficial private army by which to undermine the state whose ranks they have penetrated.

It goes without saying that a military conflict can kill well-trained and loyal staff of an armed force. The killing of the cadres can incur profound costs for the long-term. Military victories and the increased material dominance of the political scene can allow the class forces access to the productive forces by which to train new cadres. However, cases occur in which the damage of the war would be so deep as to prevent the use of the material dominance over productive forces for training and elevating new cadres.

Protesters are similar to an armed force. Human flesh and bones, not arms, are used as the quasi-weapons for confrontation. Peaceful protesters are like a much weaker version of a military force, but they still bear some of the characteristics of a military force confronting a certain faction in the conflict over the means of violence. The peacefulness of a protest can however make it look more moral, hence to draw more supporters to it in some countries, which would lead to the protests being bigger and thus a mightier quasi-military force. Such protests force the security apparatus to reallocate its agents onto opposing, violently or peacefully, the protests, thus reducing state allocation of agents into other security issues; this gives the intelligence agents hostile to the state the room for breath, the operational freedom, to engage in special operations against the state, while the state is bogged down in dealing with the protests. Mass demonstrations, even the peaceful ones, bog down the state security to the attempts to deal with the unrest, hence permitting the anti-state subversives within the ranks of the state apparatus the time and space for subversive anti-state operations from within the state. Explosions of military-industrial infrastructure, demotions or deaths of government loyalist officials, the opening of arms arsenals to the anti-state militants, are but some of the operations that can be easily performed by subversives as a result of protest bog-downs. To achieve success, the planners for the overthrow of a state shall attempt to convince the protesters of the need for maximal self-armament. Before the population's arrival at the conclusion that armed action is necessary for combat, the planners for the overthrow will need to combine peaceful mass protests – for bogging down state security – with support, covert or explicit, for armed struggle against the state. Pro-government protests, on the other hand, bog the intra-state anti-state subversives down to stopping the pro-government protests, thus

allowing the state security the room for maneuver against, and purge of, many such subversives.

So long as the armament production sector is controlled by the agents of the proletariat and not the anti-proletarian comprador agents in the workers' state, the expansion of the armament production of the socialist state is the expansion of the influence of the proletariat over the state. In the same ways, so long as the external provision of military funds to a socialist state is designated such that the military funds would end up under the command of the agents of the proletariat and not the comprador agents, the external provision of military funds to a socialist state increases the hold of the proletariat over their state.

In a society ruled by a pro-fascist state, the call for increasing the social welfare budget constitutes a call for reducing funds available to the pro-fascist military. This would undermine the reactionary classes dominating the military, rolling back their influence over their means of violence, thus expanding the influence of the anti-fascist agents of the proletariat, the cooperativists, and the anti-colonial bourgeoisie. The increased influence of the proletariat over the military, and thus over the state, also ensures a weakening of the influence of the parasitic classes over the welfare sector, thus reducing corruption and allowing the progressive classes to exercise greater influence and yield greater efficiency.

By contrast in a country dominated by an anti-fascist military, calls by the comprador or imperialist agents for increasing the welfare beyond the adequate level is an excuse by which the imperialist agents seek to reduce the quantity of means of violence available to the agents of the progressive classes hence reducing the secret service influence and lobbying power of progressive agents over the means of violence, while increasing the secret service influence and lobbying power of the reactionary class agents over the means of violence. The increased influence of the parasitic classes over the means of violence would also result in the greater influence of the parasitic classes over areas beyond the means of violence, such as the welfare sector. The parasitic class agents then use their influence over the welfare sector in order to promote bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency hence reducing the quality of the welfare sector. In other words, by calling for an undue increase in the welfare budget at the expense of the anti-fascist military, the agents of the parasitic classes increase their influence over the anti-fascist military and consequently over the welfare sector, thereby reducing welfare sector quality as well. Beware of such demagogical calls for 'improving' welfare which in fact worsen the quality of welfare.

There exists the infamous Third-Worldist theory of 'bribes'. According to this Third-Worldist narrative, in order to bribe the proletariat into support for colonialism, the colonial bourgeoisie provide the proletarians a share of the 'fruits of colonialism'; furthermore, according to this Third-Worldist narrative, welfare state projects such as free healthcare and education are 'bribes' by which to submit the proletarians into not launching a revolution. Actually, the Third-Worldist theory of 'bribes' is gravely incorrect. When the colonial bourgeoisie steal the wealth of the colonies, the colonial bourgeoisie, far too greedy to deliver anything to the proletariat beyond mere subsistence income, aim to retain the wealth for themselves. However, the class interests of the proletariat are inevitably in conflict with the interests of mercantile capital and finance capital, the class bases of premodern and modern imperialism respectively. As such, whether consciously or not, the proletariat engage in a proletarian internationalist solidarity with the colonized peoples by promoting welfare statist policies that compel the colonial bourgeois state to increase the welfare budget (e.g. healthcare and education budget) at the expense of the colonial military budget. In the context of revolutionary class struggles, more significant than increasing the budget of the welfare of the proletarians is cutting the budget of the armed forces of the sworn foes of the proletariat and the anti-colonial national- bourgeois allies. Forget not: the colonial powers lose much more from the de-budgeting of their own military than they gain from welfare-statist 'bribing' the proletarians. For the colonial bourgeoisie, it is more efficient to suppress them whom they oppress than to bribe the oppressed into loving their colonial bourgeois oppressors. This applies not just to the peoples of the colonies but also to the proletarians living in the colonial heartland itself. It is more efficient to be feared than to be loved if not both. Welfare-statist 'bribes' can bring 'love' for the oppressors but are nowhere nearly as efficient as the low-cost suppressive power that a mighty military brings the colonial bourgeoisie. Had the imperialist bourgeoisie been seriously interested in bribing the proletarians into loving them, then the imperialists would have applied this policy of non-terrorism and non-suppression to all of the people whom the subjugated; all of the anti-colonial warriors would have been 'bribed' into loving the colonizers; capitalism and colonialism would have ceased to exist. No, welfare-statist 'bribes' are not really bribes, but rather constitute an attempt by the proletariat to de-budget the colonial military under the guise of and in the name of expanding the welfare of the citizens. The Third-Worldists, by arguing that the 'First World' proletarians are a type of a sub-bourgeoisie benefiting from colonialism, imply that the proletariat should not be fighting for their own welfare because that is colonial exploitation, a 'bribe', a case of proletarians 'selling out' to the bourgeoisie. Actually, in implying so, the Third-Worldists are sabotaging the proletarian attempts to, using the welfare issue, cut the financing of the colonial state's military. It follows that the Third-Worldist argument is the ally of the colonial militaries. The Third-Worldists are nothing short of a fifth column for the colonizers 'against' whom they whine.

C1S5. The Proletarian Revolutionary Overthrow of Capitalism

State power comes derives inherently through signing policy papers but rather through enforcing them using law

enforcement agencies, the armed forces – the means of violence. A revolution against a reactionary state is the establishment of a proto-state dominated by the progressive classes for the replacement of a state dominated by reactionary classes. As such, a revolution is a process in which the enforcement agencies of two states – the revolutionary proto-state and the reactionary incumbents' state – ban each other and thus engage in militarized clashes. It is a process in which the means of violence dominated by the progressive classes strike the means of violence dominated by the reactionary classes. The means of violence is a spectrum. Some entities, such as bombs and guns, are more strictly under the category of the means of violence, whereas other entities, such as the flesh of a soldier or even of a protester, can be considered a sub-category of the means of violence though to a lesser extent. Under the conditions of fascist repression, labour strikes may grow horrendously difficult. As an alternative, the revolutionary vanguard cells shall spread among the workers leaflets that call for work slowdowns and purposive “mistakes” in the workplace, tactics of covert industrial sabotage that can wear-and-tear down the fascist-aligned enterprises, inflicting immense costs on the terror regime.

The Party plays a vital role in organizing the proletarian movement. Yet, so wrong it is to assume that a Party of the proletariat can form and operate as a real Party under the conditions of severe repression. Repression forbids the formation of vast networks of proletarian activists, let alone allow for the formation of a coherent mobile Party of the proletariat. If a real Party of the proletariat is formed under the conditions of severe repression, then is it not all the more natural that by amassing the proletarian activists into one amalgam, it renders the revolutionary proletarian network far more visible to the suppressive secret police and thus much easier to hunt down and annihilate in just one move? From here comes the view, absolutely correct, that under conditions of severe repression, when long-term socialist Party activity is impossible, there should instead be cells, sometimes separate and sometimes inter-connected, of socialist activists. Such proletarian cells must engage in armed struggle to roll back the reactionary fascist forces in the regime and to allow for the intelligence penetration of proletarian agents into the regime, so that is opened the path for democratization. The central command of these revolutionary cells shall be the Party located in sanctuaries outside the country or in the remote regions inside the country, such as in mountainous areas. Relative democratization gives these socialist cells the greater operational liberty which allows them to connect with each other and form bigger cells. Armed struggle against the anti-proletarian suppressive secret police must continue until more and more proletarian agents penetrate the ranks of the regime, further democratization occurs, and thus the revolutionary cells can merge more and more to eventually form a more coherent Party of the proletariat under the conditions of bourgeois-democracy. Before the February 1917 revolution, which democratized the Tsarist regime apparatus, proletarian organizations had low operational liberty and the Bolshevik Party inside Russia was a mere multicellular network, not so coherent a Party in that country. Only after the February 1917 revolution did the Bolshevik cells amalgamate to form a real coherent and mobile Party of the proletariat. During the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army partisans behind Nazi Germany lines operated as cells though such stay-behind partisan formations had been formed by the orders of the Party prior to the War. Inside Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe, the communist parties had deliberately split themselves into a mainstream Party wing which operated like a real-enough Party and the multi-cells wing which operated as guerrilla cells at times connected and at times deliberately dissociated with each other so to render harder a Nazi hunt-down of such cells. Party work must be done as much as feasible, but suicide must not be committed; under the conditions of severe repression, a jump from cellularity to full-scale regular Party work can in many cases be a Trotskyite leap that benefits the secret police at the great expense of Party work and the proletarian movement. Under the conditions of a lasting legality of the Party of the proletariat, multi-cellularity would usually be a vestigial and reactionary feature that allows for each cell to operate like a bureau and hence boosting bureaucracy and conspiratoriality in the proletarian movement. The absence of a Party of the proletariat, if Party work is permitted, means the disintegration of the proletarian movement into small shreds incapable of efficient coordinated work. Under the conditions of bourgeois-democracy, the Party of the proletariat can serve as the workers' proto-state unifying the trade unions, cooperatives, and workers' councils into a coordinative revolutionary body that manages the time and place of trade union protests, the deployment of demonstrators to key positions for bogging down regime security, etc.

The struggles of the proletariat, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, the kolkhozniks, and/or the progressive-aligned imperialists against a reactionary regime can roll back the influence of the reactionary forces dominating that regime, allow for an expansion of the minority stake of the progressive forces over the means of violence in that state, and thus pave the way for the ascendancy, such as via democratized elections, of a progressive leader to the role of the head of that reactionary state. In such a scenario, the reactionary state has not been overthrown and the reactionary forces still retain dominance over their state, but their weakened influence has been manifested in the rise of a progressive leader as the official head of the state without such a progressive leader having a dominant stake over the regime. If a progressive leader becomes the head of a reactionary state, does that mean that communists should descend into bourgeois reformism and give up revolutionary class struggles in favor of participating in the reactionary government? No. If the official leader of a hostile and reactionary state is favorable to the genuinely progressive and revolutionary forces, that does not mean that communists should give up revolutionary class struggles and descend into bourgeois reformism, the deception of the proletariat into having faith in imperialist regimes' electoral processes. On the contrary, when the leader of a reactionary

state is favorable to the progressive and anti-fascist forces, it is the duty of communists to come to the rescue of this progressive leader of the reactionary power, not through descension into bourgeois reformism, but rather through a stronger push for regime change in this reactionary power. Such a push for regime change will undermine the reactionary forces that encircle the progressive leader of the reactionary power and will therefore assist the progressive leader in enacting even a greater quantity and quality of progressive reforms. At a certain stage, if and only if the reactionary forces encircling the progressive leader of the reactionary state are sufficiently undermined, that will create the room for an expanded infiltration of the agents of the proletariat into the top ranks of the state, hence to cause a shift in the state away from its reactionary character and onto a progressive character. This will in turn smoothen the process of launching a proletarian revolution when the correct historical-material conditions arrive. Kautskyite counter-revolutionaries use the excuse of the rise to power of a progressive leader in a reactionary state as means of deluding the working class to give up its revolutionary struggles. In doing so, these Kautskyite counter-revolutionaries actually stab the progressive leader in the back, precisely by using the progressive leader's image and name as a means of sabotaging class struggles against the much more powerful reactionary forces that encircle the progressive leader. The reverse is also true; if a reactionary individual somehow manages to infiltrate the top rank of a progressive state, the imperialist and reactionary forces support this reactionary individual not through providing genuine aid to such a progressive state, but rather through intensifying their struggles against the progressive state, as means of rescuing the reactionary leader from encirclement by progressive elements. Any imperialist or reactionary 'aid' going to such a progressive state in such conditions would actually be used by imperialist reaction as a channel for infiltration for the purposes of sabotage, espionage, etc.

The correct policy regarding some bourgeois-democratic revolutionary states is for the socialist state to sponsor them, in part in exchange for the bourgeois-democratic revolutionary state allowing the free activity of the communist Party of that country. This the USSR did with its allied progressive bourgeois-democratic states. The Party of the proletariat would support the pro-proletarian (including anti-colonial national bourgeois) elements of the anti-imperialist bourgeois state while engaging in confrontations against the agents of the reactionary classes in the anti-imperialist bourgeois state. Such support for the progressive classes in the anti-imperialist state must also involve the use of such support as a channel for buying positions of power and influence for the Party in the anti-imperialist bourgeois state apparatus. At the same time such confrontation with the reactionary classes and their agents in the anti-imperialist bourgeois state must be used to roll back the reactionary classes and to ensure that the Party of the proletariat gains control over at least a part of the series of positions of influence captured from the reactionary class enemies.

The Party of the proletariat must beware of the limitations of non-socialist anti-imperialist forces, to recognize that the agents of fascist reaction would exist not only in the communist organizations of the labour movement but also in the non-communist anti-imperialist organizations. Especially upon the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the respective territory, reactionary elements in the non-socialist movements allied to communists may activate cells to wage a secretive struggle to backstab the dictatorship of the proletariat. Anticipating such a conspiracy, the socialist agents of the proletariat shall utilize their support for non-socialist anti-imperialists as a means of not only confronting finance capital, but also as an intelligence channel through which to strengthen socialist bonds with the anti-imperialist agents in the non-socialist anti-imperialist movements, so to further isolate the reactionary agents in the non-communist anti-imperialist movements. Developing such a strong network and isolating the reactionary infiltrators in the non-socialist anti-imperialist movement would facilitate the suppression of such reactionary elements under the condition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It would also facilitate the process of integrating non-socialist anti-imperialist elements into the state apparatus, though not into the Party of the proletariat itself since the latter cannot afford to demobilize and decelerate itself in favour of blatantly non-socialist dissenters.

Many incorrectly regard the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a purely qualitative question ('is the state a dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie?') when in fact the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat requires the leap from quantity to quality to occur. The decisive quantitative change will be in the percentage of the means of violence controlled, covertly or manifestly, by the proletariat and cooperativists vs. their enemies. The rise to dominance over the means of violence can be gradual, punctuated, or through a sudden once-and-for-all operation. Some Eastern European Peoples' Democracies, such as in Romania, were established through a process of punctuated, multi-phase, revolutionary transformation, rather than a single -step once-and-for-all operation characterizing the insurrection of the October Revolution. Yet, regardless of the process, the foundational question that distinguishes revolutionism from Kautskyite reformism is the question of whether or not the conquest of the command of the means of violence should be prioritized. The class-conscious proletarians shall seek to plant the proletarian agents at helm of the security, intelligence, and military sectors of the state, pursue a steady purge of the anti-proletarian agents within them, so to render ever more defenseless the enemies of the proletariat and to render the proletariat ever more in control of the means of violence. Increased intelligence penetration into the command of the means of violence allows the proletariat to minimize the bourgeois state opposition to the proletarian revolution. Increased influence over the means of violence also translates into increased influence over the means of communication, the media and cultural institutions, so that propaganda would be spread in favour of the cause of the proletariat whereas the anti-proletarian forces would

find themselves disabled in agitating against the socialist forces.

Mistaken are they who believe that nationalization, the promotion of cooperatives, and economic centralization lack a socialist character if promoted under the conditions of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. No, the promotion of cooperatives, state ownership and centralization all are steps in the path of the expansion of the socialist mode of production albeit in a capitalist economy. They all contribute to undermining the influence of the bourgeoisie, to crippling the economic base of the class enemies of the proletariat, thus creating the breathing room and the operational freedom for the expanded role of the proletariat. And such an expansion of the role of the proletariat at the expense of the bourgeoisie catapults the agents of the proletariat into the bourgeois state, to the command of the means of violence, to the command of the military, thereby allowing the proletariat to expand their minority stake over the command of the armed forces. Recall that the means of violence entails the military-industrial backbone, the weaponry, the armed forces and the security institutions. As such, not only does the expansion of the socialist mode of production in a capitalistic economy expand socialist influence in the economy itself, it also contributes steps towards the establishment of a workers' state as a replacement of the bourgeois state.

Undoubtedly, changes in property relations, changes in the mode of production, affect the issue of which class controls how much of the means of violence. Undoubtedly, changes in property relations affect the class character of the state. Yet, much more significant is the role of the control over the means of violence in yielding changes in property relations. Among the historical-material factors, the means of violence bears more mass, and thus is more material, than property relations. The greater mass, the greater materiality, of the means of violence renders it into a more influential factor in history than property relations. Understand this: class control over the means of violence affects property relations more than vice versa. This means that the proletariat's conquest of the command of the means of violence is a priority over the expansion of the socialist property relations in the economy. Such was why Marx and Engels, and even more so Lenin and Stalin all laid heavy emphasis on the prioritization of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the control of the proletariat over the means of violence, over such things as welfare statism, nationalizations, formation of cooperatives etc.

In a capitalist economy, every step of the way in favour of nationalization and the formation of cooperatives is favourable to the cause of the proletariat, for such economic measures cripple the material base of the enemies of the proletariat. The reduction of the material influence of the bourgeoisie gives the proletariat greater leverage and allows it more freedom to catapult its agents into the command of the means of violence. Yet, the nationalization and the formation of cooperatives is a lesser priority as compared to the actual and direct focus on the conquest of the command of the means of violence by the proletariat. One of the core treasons committed by the Kautskyites is that they promote the idealist view that reforms in property relations, a less material factor, are more important than changes in the question of the control over the means of violence, a more material factor. Through such idealism, they reverse the picture of the world, and thereupon reverse the prioritization of the means of violence over property relations. Through such a reversal of priorities, they diametrically reverse the allocation of funds, thus committing systematic economic sabotage against the cause of the proletariat.

C1S6. Economic Centralization vs. the Proliferation of Bureaucracy

An economy cannot efficiently and productively advance unless with the strong coordination of its different sectors for economic planning and operation. Yet, decentralization provides for each microeconomic body to plan and operate independently and devoid of coordination with other sectors. Coordination committees can at times be set up so to 'boost' coordination between such microeconomic bodies, but (1) the power vested in the hands of the microeconomic bodies will allow them to circumvent or ignore the coordinated plans, and (2) the split of the power of central economic bodies into multiple microeconomic bodies results in multiply (i.e. duplicate, triplicate, etc.) agencies with their own multiply taskforces, which in turn multiplies the costs of coordination between these multiply taskforces. Scientific central planning maximizes coordination between the different sectors and microeconomic bodies, increasing harmony and reducing chaos, disables the microeconomic bodies from circumventing the coordinated plans, and merges multiply agencies into fewer agencies so to boost efficiency and to ease supervision.

A core feature of central planning is the system of material balances. The system of material balances involves centrally planning the quantities of inputs corresponding to the specific quantities of outputs: for example, X amount of rubber is needed for producing Y number of wheels for Z number of cars. The precise amounts of inputs and outputs would be calculated and measured, while also planning the production of some extra inputs or outputs to save up for reserves. Central planning through the system of material balances allows for calculating the quantities and qualities of inputs that are to be produced in different sectors of the economy, in a manner that these quantities and qualities of inputs produced in each sector of the economy correspond to the quantities and qualities of inputs produced in the other sectors of the economy. Through material balancing, therefore, the entire production of the whole economy can be planned in an organized manner, helping to minimize waste. A decentralized system works in the opposite direction. Decentralization weakens coordination, hence fomenting economic chaos. The quantities and qualities of production in the different parts

of the economy would not correspond to each other. Such a lack of coordination in a decentralized economy increases bureaucratic inefficiency, while the lack of controls over inputs and outputs will reduce control over the supply thus boosting inflation. The system of material balances, through controlling the supply of inputs and outputs, also controls the price of goods derived from the level of supply.

Critics may argue that the centralization of economic decision-making into fewer larger bureaus would fail to account for local needs. What such critics fail to acknowledge, however, is that accounting for local needs is in fact almost *independent* of centralization, and insofar as it is dependent, it is favorably so. Much as how the local bureaus can engage in field work and scientific research on local needs, so too can the central bureaus establish research teams for each specific district regarding the local needs; similarly, just as there is no guarantee that the central planning bureau would feel obliged to consider local needs, there is no guarantee that the local bureau in the district would care for, let alone even research, local needs either. Thus, the argument that centralization ‘inherently’ ‘fails’ to account for local needs is baseless. Regarding information and studies of regional needs, so long as scientific research continues to be conducted for the regional needs, in no way would the centralized large bureau be at a disadvantage when compared to the previously existing regional bureaus. If anything, decentralizing the economy into these local enterprises would strengthen the bureaucrats who can afford to totally disregard local needs (more on this shortly later). Centralizing the economy weakens the corrupt bureaucrats thus reducing the tendency to disregard local needs. The central planning commission would increase the number of qualitative and quantitative indicators so to force the enterprises to fulfill their requirements. Some critics would argue that reducing the number of qualitative and quantitative indicators in state enterprises would help the managers take initiative from below. This argument, however, does not account for the fact that the enforcement of more and more quantitative and qualitative indicators regarding production actually forces the managers to increase the quantity and quality of production. Remember – the less planned are the details of the economic plan, the wider the absence of coordination between the different economic sectors, and thus the more the resulting mismanagement, misallocations, and abuses. In this case, ‘initiative from below’ is a propagandistic euphemism for cutting coordination. Of course, the day-to-day planning of the enterprise and the tinier details of the enterprise management shall be done by the enterprise manager rather than the central planning commission, not because decentralization of such micro-level tasks to the local management is in itself ‘good’, but because technology has not advanced to the level of efficiently centralizing the decision-making on micro-level issues. Assuming that technology has advanced to so suitable a level as to allow for the efficient central management of enterprises, then yes, even the tinier details of enterprise management should be centrally planned so to maximize enterprise efficiency. For the while, as technology has not advanced to so high a level, tactical efficiency in managing the details of the enterprise operations is to be maximized by the principle of one-person management – one main manager per each enterprise, aided by vice managers. The proletarians shall be gradually trained in management skills so that the composition of the state enterprises’ managerial cadres would grow proletarian, hence more susceptible to loyalty to communist ideas.

On the other hand, naturally, the absence of coordination in a decentralized economy and the resultant chaos and misallocations allow for many abuses that thus boost corruption and black marketeering. Centralization, by contrast, cuts corruption by reducing the mismanagement and misallocations that results from decentralization. What if the central planners themselves are corrupt? In that case, they would seek to decentralize, for decentralization increases the mismanagement that boosts corruption and multiplies the number of bureaus to so high a number that it would be difficult for anti-corruption counter-intelligence agencies to track their corrupt activities.

The concentration into fewer and fewer bureaus also facilitates anti-corruption supervision. The concentration of the economy into fewer bureaus renders it easier for supervisory bodies to monitor these fewer bureaus, whereas seeking to uncover/discover a case of economic sabotage/corruption in one bureau from among countless bureaus is like endeavouring to find a needle in a haystack. This is the reason that, contrary to the narrative of the bourgeois media, corrupt bureaucrats even in the high command of the economy in fact prefer economic decentralization, for it would help them in covering up their crimes. Money-laundering grows easier with the unnecessary multiplication of the number of bureaus. Some critics, acknowledging that centralizing bureaus into fewer bureaus reduces the number of bureaus, would counter by stating that the centralized bureau, arising out of the merger of fewer bureaus, would be so large that the sum size of these fewer bureaus would ‘equal’ the size of these many bureaus. According to this argument, these fewer but larger central bureaus would produce the ‘same’ amount of bureaucracy as the many but smaller non-central bureaus. Yet, such an argument fails to account for the ‘red tape’ phenomenon. Actually, the merger of a number of bureaus into one eliminates most of the duplicate, triplicate, etc. task units and merges their corresponding taskforces, thereby cutting the number of redundant staff and drastically cutting costs. The merger of bureaus into one and the elimination of duplicate tasks also greatly reduces the amount of paperwork for communication between these bureaus and duplicate taskforces, because, after all, the duplication has been eliminated. This is important as it implies that those notoriously bureaucratic months-long waiting periods for paperwork and formalities to be ‘processed’ would also considerably reduce. Furthermore, the reduction of costs through the elimination of unnecessary functional duplicity impedes money-laundering, since creating fake extra ‘jobs’ is a money-laundering tactic.

The concentration into fewer bureaus facilitates anti-corruption supervision. Yet, a question that arises then is: what if the counter-intelligence officers, who are tasked with supervising the centralized bureaus and purging the corrupt bureaucrats in the centralized economic bureaus, are themselves corrupt? Would that not compromise the anti-corruption purge process, and would centralization in that case not allow more room for the counter-intelligence officer's corrupt activity? To answer this question, it is necessary to first note that while command structures exist in intelligence services, they are not so rigidly enforced in practice. Rather, intelligence services are networks in which intelligence officers of the same intelligence service tend to spy on one another if they do not trust each other, even if they are not formally tasked with spying on one another. Lower-ranking intelligence officers would tend to report on their own bosses and would attempt to purge them if they regard their own bosses as unreliable. As such, intelligence services have a self-purging character; if the pro-corruption faction dominates the intelligence service, and so long as the historical-material circumstances are favorable to the pro-corruption faction, the latter will in time remove from power them who affiliate with the anti-corruption faction – and vice versa. Now, back to the question: what if the counter-intelligence officers, who are tasked with supervising the centralized bureaus and with purging the corrupt bureaucrats in the centralized economic bureaus, are themselves corrupt? Answer: decentralizing the economy to numerous bureaus would require numerous counter-intelligence officers to be placed for supervising the activity of each of the numerous local bureaus. By contrast, centralizing the economy into few centralized bureaus would require relatively fewer counter-intelligence officers to oversee these fewer economic bureaus. Supervising the activity of fewer counter-intelligence officers is easier than supervising the activities of numerous counter-intelligence officers. In the decentralized system, monitoring the activities of a hundred counter-intelligence officers is a hundred economic intelligence cases to study, whereas, in the centralized system, monitoring the activities of the counter-intelligence official supervising the centralized economic body is one single economic intelligence case to inspect. The sharp reduction in the quantity of economic intelligence cases to examine is itself a factor tightening the monitoring of the activities of the counter-intelligence officials. Thus, economic centralization not only facilitates the purge of corrupt bureaucrats in charge of the economic bodies but also the purge of corrupt bureaucrats in charge of intelligence matters. The members of the intelligence network unofficially oversee each other's activities even if such overseeing involves spying on an intelligence official higher in rank than oneself. The reduction in the number of bureaus and the consequent reduction in the number of supervisory intelligence officers for this specific task helps in this process of cleansing out the bad counter-intelligence officials and promoting the good ones.

The thesis that decentralizing the economy to the local levels causes the local bureaucrats to 'compete' with each other in the 'market' so to 'expand' production is no realistic argument. The corrupt bureaucrats running the local 'company'-like bureaus function as mafia oligarchs that hamper industrialization through economic sabotage, embezzlement, etc. This is a key reason for the alliance between corrupt bureaucrats and the imperialist secret services, for they both seek to undermine the productive forces of the anti-imperialist countries and countries colonized by the imperialists. In such cases, corrupt bureaucrats may have some personal rivalries much as how mafia bosses may have rivalries that can be exploited by the anti-corruption faction; corrupt bureaucrats may also outwardly denounce each other's corruption in order to present themselves as 'anti-corruption' fighters; however, in the end, these corrupt bureaucrats have a tendency to covertly cooperate with each other. The bureaucrats are a parasitic class hostile to the proletariat, cooperativists, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. In the struggle against the progressive classes, and in the drive to hinder the development of the productive forces in the colonized zones, they make common cause with finance capital. Espionage for the imperialist secret services is their way of self-empowerment, for such espionage would give coordinates to imperialist armies so that the latter strikes the productive forces dominated by the progressive classes. The undermining of the progressive classes brings more power and wealth to the bureaucrats.

Fascist finance capital lobbies for the decentralization of the imperialist regime's state-owned sector of the economy, for fascist finance capital seeks to promote bureaucrats in the imperialist heartland too, not just in the non-imperial parts of the world. Yet, the bureaucrats in the reaction-aligned imperialist state seek not to undermine the productive forces, particularly the military-industrial backbone, of the pro-fascist imperialist state, since such productive forces shall assist the bureaucrats in undermining the productive forces of much the rest of the world. Only in those imperialist states aligned with the progressive classes against the reaction-aligned imperialist states – only in the progress-aligned amongst imperialist heartlands will the bureaucrats seek to undermine the productive forces, for the undermining of the productive forces of a progress-aligned imperialist power shall by extension weaken the progressive classes allied to the progress-aligned imperial power, and thus will undermine the enemies of the bureaucratic class. Hence, the same bureaucratic class that, in a country dominated by the progressive classes, seeks to hamper the development of the productive forces under the sway of the progressive classes, promotes the further development of the productive forces, particularly the military-industrial backbone, in the imperialist heartland as a way of assisting the imperialist military defeat of the progressive classes hostile to the bureaucrats.

There exists a widespread misconception that bureaucracy is limited to the state-owned sector; there is no reason to believe such. Private-sector companies are not always necessarily run like bureaucratic mafia empires (though many of

them are owned by finance capital, the most supreme mafia), but they sure do inherit elements of bureaucratic mismanagement – in that latter specific respect, they constitute private-sector bureaucracies that compete with each other. Competition for producing a greater quantity and quality of work is absolutely necessary for economic growth; a socialist system indeed promotes economic competition (more on this later). However, the type of a competition existing in the decentralized economy is one in which the companies are almost separate from one another; the companies therefore operate as bureaucracies that fail to coordinate the quantities and qualities of the materials they produce, thus causing economic chaos, massive amounts of waste, and bureaucratic inefficiency. Surely, corporations set up contracts with each other and have agreements in which some coordination occurs, but such coordination encompasses again only a part of the economy; the inherent spirit of bourgeois competition promoted in a decentralized system slashes incentives for a macroeconomy-wide coordination, and inevitably involves corporations attempting to undercut each other and unnecessarily hide information from each other. Hence, in that specific respect, the private corporations certainly constitute private bureaucracies; they simply are not referred to as such in the mainstream media because these corporations are not state-owned. Insofar as these private corporations succeed, it is because such private corporations themselves are extremely centralized. A car-manufacturing company could not have possibly succeeded if it had given autonomy to its tyre-production division and its engine-production division, allowing these divisions to not coordinate the quantities and qualities of their production. Decentralization in these companies would cause one division to produce, for example, 1,000 tyres (to correspond to 250 cars) but the quantities of materials produced for the rest of each car would yield materials for only 150 cars. Hence, there would exist a large discrepancy in production. That is why even these corporations refuse to liberalize their own microeconomies. The nationalization of such private-sector bureaucracies is a major step in the path of centralizing the economy and reducing bureaucracy. However, even broad state ownership alone is not enough in the longer term. A decentralized state-owned economy would eventually proliferate bureaucratic chaos, leaving room for abuse by government officials, thus allowing local state officials to establish their own independent kingdoms. For bureaucracy to reduce, the economy does not suffice to be state-owned – rather it must be further and further centralized. Greater centralization of the state-owned sector enhances the system of material balancing, thus further smoothening the coordination of the quantities and qualities of production.

In the industrial capitalist system, the overproduction of commodities drives prices down, thus causing the collapse of microeconomies. Such is the reason that the bourgeoisie eliminate a part of their own produce, so to drive up profits along with prices. In the socialist system, the absence of a drive for profits eliminates the incentives for such anti-economic measures as the destruction of the overproduced. In the market economy in which the overproduction of goods and services will drive prices down, cause losses in private company profits, and cause economic downturn; by contrast, a state-owned centralized economy that provides full employment for all able-bodied individuals causes overproduction to be favorable the employees and society at large.

Economic decentralization, and with it corruption, naturally increases the tendency towards an end to full employment. Long-term unemployment in turn yields the rise of thievery as a source of income. It thus gives rise to the lumpen-proletariat, a class of bandits and gangs parasitically undermining production and allied to finance capital. Such bandits can then be mobilized by the fascist secret services into street clashes against the forces loyal to the cause of the proletariat. They can be mobilized for an orgy of terror against the citizens, damaging the production of a country, reducing the influence of the proletariat over the anti-imperialist state, thus strengthening the bureaucrats and paving the way for further decentralization and bureaucratization.

Controlling inflation also requires centralized control over the currency in circulation. Central state control over banking and commerce, the central plan of funds allocated to enterprises, as well as the central plan of the amounts of wages and bonuses paid to employees would all contribute to controls over the currency circulation. Eventually, by the time of the centralization of the entire economy into the control of the workers' state, the time will come for eliminating money itself and replacing it with labour credits. The difference between labour vouchers and money is that the former is based on the amount of labour whereas the latter arises out of a combination of labour and the market fluctuations in prices. Secondly, the labour credits have a one-time use, in that as soon as they are credited for purchasing a good or service, the labour credits cannot be re-used by the seller, whereas when money is used to purchase a good or service, the money can be re-used by the seller. Eliminating the seller's ability to reuse the financial funds used for purchase will help control the supply of financial funds in the economy, thus again contributing to the control of inflation, since the excess flow financial funds, such as excess money exchange, serves as a factor behind inflation. For international trade with the non-socialized or semi-socialized economies, the socialist state can utilize its labour credits to purchase currency reserves – the economy would thus be moneyless internally but money-based for external trade.

The confiscation of private mercantile businesses and the complete state ownership of commerce will also obliterate the mercantile bourgeoisie as a parasitic class allied to finance capital against the proletariat and the cooperativists. The elimination of the mercantile bourgeois mode of counter-production will thus reduce the influence of the comprador intelligence agents within the socialist state apparatus, thus allowing the latter to more easily purge the fascist spies, the spies which rely upon the comprador classes and which provide the imperialist militaries the coordinates for striking the

armed forces of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As well, under the guise of imposing sanctions upon an entire state, imperialist-fascist finance capital imposes sanctions upon the progressive forces within that state apparatus, while circumventing their own sanctions so to engage in trade relations with the comprador agents within the sanctions-targeted institutions. The imperialist sanctions ostensibly against the 'entire state' would undermine the progressive classes in the state, whereas the imperialist circumvention of imperialist sanctions, aimed towards covertly boosting trade with the comprador agents, will economically sponsor the comprador classes, allowing them to elevate their influence in the sanctions-targeted state. The comprador agents would in turn provide the imperialist finance capital with information about the progressive agents' routes of circumventing the sanctions, so that the imperialist powers can tighten the siege against the progressive state. Such strategies of class economic warfare are yet more reasons behind the need for the progressive classes to maximize control over the commercial sector, so that, if imperialist sanctions are imposed, the imperialists will not have a way of circumventing their own sanctions and will be disabled from extensive trade relations with the comprador classes (such as bureaucrats with mercantile bourgeois ties) in the socialist or progressive state. The socialist agents within the imperialist state apparatus in turn must maximize efforts to ensure that the imperialist sanctions ostensibly 'also' 'targeting' the comprador parts of the 'entire' sanctions-targeted state will be actually enforced whereas the sanctions targeting the progressive classes will not be enforced. Imperialist sanctions often do increase the propaganda leverage for anti-imperialist elements in the country sanctioned; however, imperialist sanctions clearly provide political, intelligence, economic, and at times, military benefits to the comprador classes in the country sanctioned. And since the benefits that imperialism brings for the comprador agents are objectively more material than the propaganda leverage handed to the anti-imperialist elements through the sanctions, the imperialists and their comprador allies benefit on the net. Furthermore, economic benefits for the comprador classes will be translated partially to propaganda benefits (i.e. financing media campaigns) for the comprador agents, thus allowing the latter to regain the temporarily lost ground in the media wars. Even if they would not be able to directly convince the public that the comprador path is the correct path, their media power, derived from economic power 'thanks' to imperialist sanctions, would allow them to denigrate the progressive agents and to engineer splits among the latter.

The anti-proletarian classes ruled by the proletariat, can use their positions in the economy to lobby for the upwards catapulting of anti-proletarian intelligence agents in the high ranks of the workers' state, in the ranks of the socialist state's military and intelligence bodies. Hence, the class enemies of the proletariat will have a significant minority stake over the means of violence. It follows that the more that the workers' state cripples the economic bases of the class enemies of the proletariat, the less will the enemies of the proletariat have a powerful intelligence network within the high ranks of the workers' state, the more the anti-proletarian intelligence agents inside the workers' state will be deprived of the material economic base upon which to rely and using which to lobby for their existence and operations in the ranks of the workers' state. Hence, the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat comes about through the crippling of slavery, then feudalism, then capitalism in that exact order/sequence. A Great Purge in 1937 could not come about had the socialization and collectivization of the vast majority of the economy not occurred in 1936. The NEP weakened the vestiges of feudalism in the USSR, thus allowing for the sharp demotion of the Trotskyite left-opportunists and with them also of the Bukharinite right-opportunists. Hence, the parasitic class forces that exist inside a country assist the foreign imperialist-fascist finance capital in catapulting the agents up to the top ranks of the state. Precisely for this reason is it easier for the socialist state to purge the agents of imperialist-fascist finance capital and the corrupt officials, saboteurs and spies. Through land redistribution and NEP, feudal forces are undermined; through collectivization, the kulak class that has risen in during the NEP can be undermined; through state capitalism, private capitalism awaits; through state ownership of industry, the government extends its control over the economy; through de-marketization, the economic chaos and the parasitic mercantile capitalist forces that operate within the economy are undermined; through gradual centralization of the economy, there comes about greater de-bureaucratization; and by the time the economy becomes overwhelmingly made up of the scientific socialist centrally planned industry and collectivized agriculture – as was the case in the USSR by 1937 shortly before the Great Purge – the class forces that create the pressure from below in favor of the imperialist-fascist agents are so sufficiently weakened that the imperialist-fascist agents would no longer have as strong a base. In such a condition therefore, imperialist-fascist secret service agents would almost entirely rely on thin air. And thereby would come about the time for a great purge, through which the enemy agents can be thoroughly interrogated and duly punished. The more the workers' state gains influence over the mode of production, the easier it becomes for the proletarian faction to purge the counter-revolutionary imperialist agents that have infiltrated the workers' state. The expansion of the socialist mode of production is not just about fulfilling 'socialist ideals'; it is also a counter-intelligence strategy. This is partially why even anti-imperialist bourgeois-democratic states seek to incorporate elements of socialism into their system. This is why successful great purges of counter-revolutionaries are mostly found in countries that not only have a dictatorship of the proletariat but also have a strongly socialist mode of production; this is to be contrasted with the countries that did not virtually wipe out the capitalist mode of production even if such countries were ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat; in such latter countries, counter-revolutionary class forces allied to foreign finance capital continued to operate freely enough to create the pressure from below, with which to catapult the

imperialist-fascist secret service agents up to the top.

One misunderstanding occurring too often is that under imperialist pressure, one 'should' decentralize and liberalize the economy more, so as to 'develop' the means of production. This view is mistaken however, for under the conditions of crises and severe imperialist pressure, the economic situation would resemble war conditions – and even bourgeois states begin to centralize the economy under war conditions or under severe economic downturns. Hence, as acknowledged even by bourgeois states, the decentralization of the economy, far from solving the problem, would actually increase the problem – hence the bourgeois states' need for greater economic centralization in such conditions. Why, then, do the weaker ones from among the socialist states decentralize in the face of imperialist encirclement? The reason for such decentralization, again, is not that liberalizing the economy would actually help counter imperialist encirclement. Such decentralization in socialist states must not be interpreted as the principled communists coming to an 'understanding' that under the 'present' crisis, liberalizing the economy would 'improve' the economy and that liberalizing the economy would be 'necessary'; rather, the real situation is that under imperialist encirclement, the lobbying power of the counter-revolutionary faction – especially the liberal right-opportunist contingent – has increased, thus allowing the liberalizers to lobby for greater decentralization. Of course, as mentioned, greater decentralization and liberalization of the economy would not reduce bureaucracy and corruption, but would rather boost it, hence weakening the military-industrial backbone while getting some among the proletarians unemployed, lumpen-proletarianized, and onto the streets to join the colour-revolution against the workers' state. Sanctions are a method of economic warfare. Like military combat, economic combat is aimed at undermining the faction of a state. Imperialist economic siege and military operations together help weaken the revolutionary faction of a state while strengthening the comprador classes within the society targeted. In such situations, if the military and economic warfare inflict a severe enough damage, the counter-revolutionary faction will gain the lobbying power to impose upon the revolutionaries the project for decentralizing/liberalizing so to strengthen the bureaucrats, weaken the industrial backbone of the military, and un-employ the workers. The long-term unemployment would lead to a large lumpen-proletarian class, an army of bandits and frenzied terrorists rioting in the streets against the revolutionary state. In so doing, the counter-revolutionary lobbyist faction within the party and state apparatus will be able to not only sabotage the economy and the military-industrial complex, but would also create a colour-revolutionary pressure from below by an army of lumpen-proletarians, so to undermine the power of the workers' state, to further rollback the communist faction, and to thereby impose even more decentralization. Likewise, when an anti-imperialist country facing a dire economic situation begins to accept foreign investments by its enemies, the acceptance of the foreign investment by its enemies is not because the anti-imperialist agents in the anti-imperialist country feel 'no choice' for economic growth except for foreign investment by the enemy; rather, it is because the dire economic situation has weakened the hold of the progressive classes over the state apparatus and has elevated the position of pro-imperialist agents in the anti-imperialist country enough so to force the anti-imperialist agents to accept imperialist enemy investments. Note that the 'investments' made by the sworn enemies of an anti-imperialist state could serve as a channel for imperialist-fascist secret services' front companies; the imperialist enemy companies deployed there to 'develop' the productive forces of an anti-imperialist state are there to carry out subversion, espionage, and sabotage. That of course is in reference to imperialist enemies of an anti-imperialist country; cases occur in which the weaker bloc of finance capital powers forges an alliance with the dictatorship of the proletariat and other anti-colonial classes and invests to boost the productive forces under the sway of the progressive classes so that the progressive classes would combat the reaction-aligned imperialist rivals of the progress-aligned imperialist powers. Espionage by reaction-aligned imperialist powers will fail to occur through such imperialist 'investments' only if additional forces are applied, such as proper revolutionary surveillance mechanisms, to ensure that the 'investments' would be realized and that the imperialist agents would not be able to access sensitive information. Even in the USSR, though imperialist investments were partially realized, the imperialist 'investors' tried to engage in intelligence contacts and, to a small though considerable extent, succeeded, unfortunately.

The market system rewards the goods and services more demanded, not the ones more necessary. The reign of the market system sets conditions by which the much-needed engineers get paid less than the much-demanded actors or actresses, the production of alcohol being prioritized over the production of machines and factory pieces. The dictatorship of the proletariat, through central planning, sharply cuts the market to size and prioritizes the sectors more needed – e.g. heavy industry, engineering, technological advancements – over the less-need but more demanded sectors. The lighter object shall revolve around the heavier object. Light industry is in the orbit of heavy industry. The expansion of heavy industry, the sector concerned with producing the factory pieces (producer goods, capital goods, iron, steel), has a multiplier effect on the economy, for it not only expands heavy industry itself but also produces the materials required for setting up the light-industry factories that produce consumer goods. Even in a highly industrialized economy, what is heavier still must be at the center and what is lighter shall be in the orbit. In a highly industrialized economy, perhaps industrial growth can no longer be so extensive but it sure can be very intensive. If investments cannot be made in building new factories, investments can no doubt be made towards upgrading factories. In upgrading factories too, the heavy industry's factories are a priority. In scientific and technological advancements too, engineering, especially though not

exclusively the one geared towards advancing heavy industry, is a priority. Simply put, heavy industry is always a priority, not as some temporary practical measure but as a historical law of development.

Unlike in capitalism, outputs, not profits, are the real indicators of enterprise success in a socialist economy. A dictatorship of the proletariat, through a centralized economy, establishes profits, outputs, and several other indicators as qualities and quantities to be fulfilled by the enterprise managers, but places outputs as a priority over profits. Competition should occur, not in the form of allowing state enterprises to operate as semi-independent business competing for profits, but rather in the form of state rewards for whoso performs one's tasks better, is better educated and trained, innovates creative ideas that advance production, etc. The profits generated in state enterprises can be augmented and converted into bonuses for overfulfillment of quotas. Competition in the bourgeois economy fundamentally is competition for maximizing one's profits out of one's private-sector bureaucracy; such a competition stifles production by over-emphasizing profits. By contrast, competition in the socialist system involves competing for more production as the priority.

While one must be forgiving towards genuine errors, cases occur in which counter-revolutionary managers, specialists, bureau employees, and/or ordinary workers (especially workers from bourgeois or feudal family backgrounds) engage in anti-communist industrial sabotage efforts in a variety of ways. While sabotage may take the form of deliberately causing outright explosions, it can also be in the forms of intentionally working slower than normal, misplacement of inputs, etc. Managers can cause sabotage by stealing enterprise funds, being excessively lenient on the employees and reducing discipline, hiring too many workers, over-spending on inputs, under-pricing outputs in cases of trade, false reports on the level of progress made, acting brutal towards workers so to provoke a worker uprising, all kinds of deliberate mismanagements of schedule, promoting a culture of taking bribes, etc. Workplace specialists can commit sabotage by, for example, presenting the wrong 'information'. Corrupt bureaucrats, allied to finance capital for the objective of undermining the cause of the proletariat and hindering the development of the productive forces in the colonizable lands, are easy recruits for imperialist secret services. Their espionage for the imperialists is seen by the corrupt bureaucrats as a method of informing the foreign imperialist armies to assist the latter in waging the shadow war against the proletariat, the class enemies of the bureaucrats.

As was explained in depth prior, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie have large businesses upon which to rely for the national-bourgeois combat against the parasitic classes. The petit-bourgeoisie have businesses too small and thus cannot afford to take the risk of standing up to the parasitic classes. The proletariat, alienated from the commodities they produce, have only their labour to sell, and thus have nothing to lose but their chains in the struggle against the parasitic classes. The petit-bourgeoisie, on the other hand, have a small business to lose. As the petit-bourgeoisie have businesses to lose and since their businesses are not so large as to afford for them the combat against the parasites, the petit-bourgeoisie tend to not stand up against the parasites. The collectivization of agriculture, on the other hand, amalgamates the small businesses of the petit-bourgeois farmers into employee-owned large businesses capable of standing up more vigorously against the parasitic classes. The large business character of such cooperatives thus gives the cooperativists characteristics of the national bourgeoisie, whereas the employee-owned character of the business renders it similar to a 'proletarian-owned enterprise'. The cooperativists thus emerge as the second most progressive class, second only to the proletariat. Collectivization, a socialistic centralization of small businesses into bigger businesses, creates a powerful class base that supports on all fronts the combat against the reactionary classes. At the same time, collectivization allows the cooperative peasants to mightily encircle the kulaks, to expand production, to render food resources cheaper, thus bankrupting the kulaks as a first step towards the elimination of the kulak mode of counter-production.

Small farms inherently have a low potential for the production of agriculture. The amalgamation of small farms into bigger farms will yield the synergetic effect of expanding agricultural production to a level higher than the sum production of small farms. Armed with the state provision of mechanical equipment and cheap loans, these collective farms will grow at the expense of the kulaks, and will produce plenty of food, a large part of which can be taken by the proletariat's state in exchange for the state provision of cheap loans and mechanical equipment. The remaining part of the produce can be sold in the market, for collective profits. The socialist state provision of cheap loans and mechanical equipment would in the first place also serve as a way of incentivizing voluntary collectivization. The industrial development of the agricultural sector, and the lift of the rural zones to the level of urban zones, will eventually bring agriculture to the threshold by which the state can gradually purchase more and more shares in the agricultural collectives so to eventually convert them into centrally planned state enterprises. Historically, geographic factors usually caused the rural centers to industrially lag behind the urban centers. Since the degree of the centralization of the economy shall be concurrent with the development of the productive forces, the relatively lower industrialization of the rural areas implies for a lower level of centralization – i.e. centralization in the form of collectivization, rather than centralization in the form of centralized state ownership. Only later, when the productive forces advance so greatly in the rural areas, would the high time come for the state purchase of collective farm shares for eventual state ownership of agriculture.

The centralization of the economy shall be concurrent with the development of the productive forces. The expansion of the productive forces serves as a material support base for the further centralization of the economy, whereas the centralization of the economy boosts the development of the productive forces. Though conceptually distinct, the

centralization process and the productive forces are inextricably bound. The left-opportunists and right-opportunists both seek to present the centralization process and the development of the productive forces as two currents rivalling each other. The left-opportunists ignore the need for the development of the productive forces and advocate a dogmatic leap onto 'socialist' property relations, which sabotages the productive forces, the material base that supports centralization. Right-opportunist currents outright ignore the need for class struggle in the sphere of the economy and pseudo-'pragmatically' pretend to 'care' only about economic 'growth'. Ignoring the irrefutable superiority of socialist central planning in the development of the productive forces, the right-opportunists oppose economic centralization, thus promoting mismanagement, non-coordination, bureaucracy, and inflation. In the eyes of some, socialist property relations and the development of the productive forces are not only conceptually distinct but also materially separate. From the view of a scientific socialist, inconceivable is the separation of the struggle for centralization and the development of the productive forces. Note that as Marx and Engels showed, even private industrial capitalism developed through centralization, albeit a private-sector centralization. Modern corporations too are amalgams of smaller companies and are highly centralized in planning. It is inconceivable how industrial capitalism could ever possibly develop without at least some key elements of amalgamation and centralization.

The proletariat's conquest of the world will eventually grow the productive forces to a hyper-expanded level concurrent with the hyper-centralization of the economy. The extremely high level of centralization, which shall come with the extremely high development of productive forces, will eliminate countless duplicate functions and will merge numerous bureaus into a minimal number of large central bureaus. Such elimination of the countless duplicate functions and such mergers and amalgamations of bureaus into fewer and fewer centralized bureaus, will wither away the state. The 'withering away of the state' refers not to a return to anarchy in the age of high levels of production but rather to an extremely high level of centralization of bureaus into an integral whole, a unified single central state body. This utmost unification and centralization will be in the era of the maximal state power of the proletariat, at a time of the absence of classes antagonistic to the proletariat. That is so, because the existence of anti-proletarian classes catapults anti-proletarian agents into the proletariat's state and the absence of anti-proletarian classes will cease the existence of intra-state anti-proletarian agents that seek to block the way for the centralization of economic power under the dominance of the proletariat's state. As such, the conquest of the world by the proletariat and the expansion of socialist property relations, concurrent with the expansion of productive force, all contribute to the process of withering away the state.

C1S7. The Dialectics of Secret Service Conflict

To kill the border guard of a powerful enemy state is to provide the latter a pretext for an invasion of one's own country. To kill a thousand border guards of the powerful enemy state at once may well prevent the enemy state from attacking one's own country. To kill one low-level dissident is to provoke an uprising or backlash from the movement to which that dissident was affiliated; to kill hundreds of such dissidents at once is to spread terror so as to suppress such dissidents. Therein lies the difference between provocative terror and suppressive terror. Suppressive terror is a form of terror, often relatively large in quantity and magnitude, aimed at mightily crushing opposition, whereas provocative terror is a type of terror, often relatively small in quantity and magnitude, which does not crush the opposition but mainly provokes a backlash by such an opposition force. The reactionary classes promote both types of terror. They suppressively terrorize so to maintain their rule; in the name of the progressive forces, they launch false flag provocative terror operations against certain groupings so to provoke such groupings into action against the progressive classes. Terror takes many tactical forms – killing, torture, and slandering are the most common among them. Killing, torture, and slanders directed towards a certain group can be used both for the suppression of that group or for the false flag provocation of that group into a backlash.

Provocative terrorism by reactionary agents within the ranks of a progressive movement provides the reactionary enemies of the progressive movement the excuse, the pretext, for an offensive. Such provision of pretexts through provocative terror has the effect of boosting morale for, and thus mobilizing and uniting, the opponents of the movement into strong action, while increasing the potential for demoralizing, demobilizing, deactivating, creating doubts and sowing dissension amongst, and reducing unity in the ranks of the supporters of the progressive movement.

To implode a movement from within, the general strategy is to reinforce two tendencies in the cause: (1) the extremists and (2) the liberalizers.

The extremists exhaust the movement and sow division through their hypocritical pseudo-purity. They play as adventurists who advocate the swift export of the cause, the absence of any negotiations or even the slightest compromise with foes, the sectarian refusal to form alliances against the greater enemy, the refusal to pursue divide and defeat strategy as advocated by Lenin, and the rejection of stage-based procession. The extremists may flatter to skies the leading proponent of the movement, while viciously slandering and conspiring against the leading proponent behind his/her back. They engage in both suppressive terror and provocative terror, although they are typically associated to the policy of provocative terror, since the latter sows division, precisely what the extremists desire. Through extremism, they exhaust

the movement enough to create the setting for the liberalizers to take over. In revolutionary movements, the extremist wing constitutes the counter-revolutionaries disguised as ultra- 'revolutionaries'.

The liberalizers preach equal rights and liberties to the just and the unjust, the friends and foes, while actually aiming to give those rights only to the foes, so as to open up the gates for enemy infiltration. Under the guise of 'moderation' and 'reforms', they openly challenge the fundamental principles of the movement while pretending to also belong to it. They oppose the purge of corrupt officials, embezzlers, enemy spies and saboteurs. Defeatists, they consistently concede to the enemy or even portray the enemy in a positive light. Ultimately, the liberalizers would 'open up' the gates of the fortress to the hordes of fascist barbarians camping outside the walls.

Dialectical inter-connections correlate extremism and liberalism, despite the appearances of contradiction between these two currents. To show extremist behaviour in one direction is to show liberalizer behaviour in another direction. This is why extremism and liberalism are inextricably bound. They are extreme ends of a horseshoe spectrum. Since there is no third side in any conflict between progress and reaction, the alignment of class interests can draw forces of different ideological appearances towards an alliance with one another. The alliance of the liberalizer vs. extremist camps is a case in point: despite the appearances of fundamental differences, the fierce hostility that both extremists and liberalizers will have towards the centrist/moderate faction of the proponents of the movement will orient the liberalizer and extremist contingents towards an alliance even if a covert or tacit alliance. The extremists play well into the hands of the liberalizers, by terrorizing the actual proponents of the movement on their behalf, and by giving liberalizers the excuse to depict the real proponents of the movement and the extremists as one. Upon exhausting the system/movement, the extremists give way to liberalizers who would then open up the system for the enemy to enter and strike. On the other side, the liberalizers would tolerate the extremists giving them the way for terrorist activity and extremism. This renders the liberalizers and extremists natural allies, backed by the enemies of the movement. Should the liberalizers and extremists succeed in gaining enough power, in the ultimate critical stage of the conspiracy though, when the counter-revolutionary coup plan is being finally carried out, the liberalizer and extremist contingents would sharply reduce their outwardly pretensions to hostility and would openly band together for striking the death blow to the cause.

Despite this covert alliance, however, the extremists and liberals, to sound credible, must pretend to be opposed to one another. And to truly appear credible in their opposition, they would not just speak but also partially act against each other. This helps the liberalizer-extremist alliance to diversify risk. Whichever of the two groupings rises to power, the liberalizer-extremist alliance would retain dominance. However, such diversification of options also carries the risk of the exploitation of outwardly differences between liberalizers and extremists by the third grouping: the faction of the proponents of the movement. Indeed, in order to appear credible as liberalizers or extremists, these two groupings have to not just speak but also really take action against one another outwardly, despite their covert conspiratorial alliance behind the scenes. Hence, the way to defeat this covert band of liberalizers and extremists is to maximize the exploitation of the overt pretensions of hostility between these two covertly-allied networks. The way to compel the two covert allies, the liberalizers and extremists, into acting against each other is through coopting. In intelligence studies, 'coopting' refers to a process in which a bribe-and-blackmail or carrot-and-stick combination is used against a hostile agent in order to encourage-and-compel that hostile agent to fight against other hostile agents. The bribe-and-blackmail can, for example, take the form of offering the targeted hostile agent a promotion in rank (hence higher income) in exchange for that hostile agent accepting the presence of one's 'advisors' (i.e. spies) in the hostile agent's office both to help the hostile agent fight against other hostile agents and to ensure that the to-be-coopted hostile agent actually behaves according to how he/she was coopted to behave. The promotion is like a bribe whereas the presence of 'advisors' and 'office assistants' engaged in espionage against the hostile agent is like blackmail or threats ensuring compliance. As a result of coopting, the agents of the enemy would be compelled to fight against the enemy itself. The policy of coopting is advantageous because it allows one to use a few loyal agents in order to compel some disloyal agents to serve one's cause against the enemy's cause. The disadvantage lies in the fact that, along the way, whenever not being sufficiently surveilled, the coopted agents would use the chance to deliberately betray the mission which they were coopted to fulfill.

The way to purge the extremist and liberalizer agents in the movement is to treat them as if they are two components of a thermostat. When the class struggles need to be intensified, the proponents of the movement can ally with, and coopt, the extremists against the liberals so to intensify the class struggle and speed up the process, while also using such an alliance to purge some of the liberalizers. Subsequently, to keep the excesses of the extremists in check, the proponents of the movement can ally with, and coopt, the liberalizers so to moderate the situation and to form a majority by which the extremist minority is partially purged. Then, when the liberalizers slow things down and there is again a need for intensification, the proponents of the movement would again ally with and coopt the remnants of the extremists to speed things up and to purge some of the liberalizers. And the cycle would go on and on until the movement is purified 'enough' from its fifth column, all the while advancing around the optimum speed or mode of class struggle.

When revolutionaries temporarily ally with and coopt the liberalizers to counter the influence of extremists, the extremists would use the opportunity to conflate the revolutionaries and liberalizers, to depict the revolutionaries as

'liberal' and 'counter-revolutionary', and thus to undermine the revolutionaries. Vice versa is true as well: when revolutionaries ally with and coopt the extremist contingent to counter the influence of liberalizers, the liberalizers would depict revolutionaries as being the same as extremists. One additional way in which the counter-revolutionary faction propagates against the revolutionaries is through exposing the past counter-revolutionary activities (e.g. espionage, torture, terrorism, corruption) of the liberalizer or extremist elements coopted by the revolutionaries, as means of again conflating the revolutionaries with counter-revolutionaries, hence to depict revolutionaries as spies, torturers, terrorists, corrupt officials, etc.

The demotion of powerful individuals often takes the form of moving them from the military and intelligence sector onto the economic sector and then onto the cultural and media sector. The more a person gets demoted, the more this person will feel compelled, for the sake of one's own political survival, to adopt ideological positions that are similar to those of their powerful demoters. Since the demoted person has become politically weaker, he/she has emerged easier to encircle by agents and thus easier to coopt. Hence, the demoted person would be compelled to help the demoters in purging the lower-importance sector to which the demoted person has been sent. This fact allows the demoters to, on the one hand, remove unfavorable elements from positions of higher importance while also helping to purge the lower-importance sectors.

Consider a case in which there is a power struggle between two dialectically antagonistic historical-material forces: force A, and force B. If force A firmly dominates an organization with force B being in a weak minority in the organization, then force A will obviously be able to pursue an agenda favorable to the interests of force A. In this case, force B would not dominate the organization but would have its infiltrators in this organization; in this situation, force B will maximize its efforts to sabotage the efforts of force A. If the force B's sabotage campaign is high enough, then the force A will be sufficiently weakened, leaving the power vacuum for force B to take over and to dominate the organization so firmly as to be able to reorient the organization from a direction favorable to force A's interests to a direction favorable to force B's interests. In this situation, where a qualitative change in the character of the organization has taken place, force B will cease its campaign of sabotage and will seek to strengthen the organization it dominates, further and further, since the organization's orientation has shifted. In response, force A will begin its campaign of sabotage, and will only cease such a campaign if the quantity of sabotage would be sufficient so as to yield a qualitative change in the form of the reorientation of the organization's line back to one that favors force A.

Into each state, the progressive classes and reactionary classes in each society catapult their respective agents. The agents of the progressive classes in the reactionary state cooperate with the progressive faction of the progressive state, whereas the agents of the reactionary classes in the progressive state cooperate with the reactionary faction of the reactionary state. Part of such cooperation is the transfer of intelligence materials. Such international intelligence cooperation between allied class forces renders espionage networks into partnership networks rather than rigidly-enforced command structures. Since intelligence webs are more like partnership networks as opposed to rigidly enforced command structures, the dominance of one partner over the other partner in the intelligence activity is more so determined by who controls more historical-material factors and forces; whosoever controls more historical-material factors automatically qualifies to become the senior partner in the intelligence service partnership. Intelligence services can however function like rigidly enforced command structures in the spheres that involve work in the intelligence directorates and bureaus, such as bureaus that deal with analysis of intelligence material received, bureaus that examine foreign documents, or directorates involved in psychological warfare and media analysis. There, the intelligence service employee is much more constrained virtually and physically by the environment surrounding them, causing the command structure to be much easier to enforce.

Is there such a thing as a 'former' intelligence agent? No, it virtually never is possible to be a 'former' intelligence agent. Once one becomes an intelligence agent, one remains an intelligence agent for the rest of one's life. (1) Firstly, one must remember that intelligence officers provide extensive compromising information about their own lives to specific intelligence services which they serve. As such, they make themselves extremely vulnerable to the intelligence service which they serve, and would only be able to minimize their vulnerability through systematically lying to and thus betraying their intelligence service. (2) Secondly, one must note that in exchange for service to an intelligence organization, intelligence officers also tend to receive protection from the intelligence service which they serve, although there are exceptions to this. Abandoning security-related work would leave the intelligence officer extremely vulnerable since they probably have shared much personal information to the intelligence service. Hence, such an action is extremely risky. If the intelligence service is able to catch an officer who quit serving it, the betrayer would face the severest punishments. Once an individual becomes an agent of an intelligence service, there is no way back from intelligence work.

There is, however, one way to abandon/betray an intelligence organization, and that is to become a double agent and/or to defect to a hostile intelligence organization. The hostile intelligence organization can provide the network to protect the intelligence officer who betrayed the intelligence service of which he/she was a member. For all practical purposes, therefore, being doubled or defecting is almost the only way to abandon an intelligence service. However in

being doubled or defecting, obviously the intelligence officer does not abandon intelligence work in general but merely changes allegiance.

All of this is to say that intelligence agents can change allegiances but, because intelligence agents make themselves extremely vulnerable to secret services, they can virtually never retire from intelligence work, and thus can virtually never become 'former' intelligence agents. This is why, as the former advisor to Margaret Thatcher once said, 'There is of course no such thing as a 'former' intelligence officer. (The New Underworld Order: Triumph of Criminalism, Christopher Story, 2006, p. 185) (IMG)

There can be rare exceptions of course. For example, an intelligence officer may become mentally handicapped and would thus be incapable of doing intelligence work, and would thus become a 'former intelligence officer'. Another way out of intelligence work is to go hide in some highly isolated part of the planet and manage to not be found by the intelligence service which one is serving. Obviously though, these cases are extremely rare and unlikely.

C1S8. The Structure of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

The dictatorship of the proletariat is essentially the dominance of the proletariat over the means of violence. Yet, it is necessary to clarify the structures and institutions through which this dominance of the proletariat over the means of violence is established.

The dictatorship of the proletariat requires governing bodies that represent the proletariat. Proletarian mass organizations such as factory committees, unions, and soviets (councils) are obvious choices for proletarian mass bodies that would inter-connect to form the democratic structure of proletarian statehood. However, such proletarian mass bodies are not enough. One can regard each proletarian mass body as quasi-bureaus; unions and factory committees have characteristics of quasi-bureaus; so many proletarian mass bodies, so many proletarian-influenced quasi-bureaus, cannot easily coordinate independently. Such a lack of proper coordination would be a factor which would boost bureaucratic chaos, allowing for various abuses. To ensure a proper functioning and coordination of these many proletarian mass bodies, there must be another proletarian body that tightly knits these many separate proletarian mass organizations into a coherent whole. Therein lies the role of the Party of the proletariat. The Party of the proletariat can serve as the mobile body that entrenches itself throughout society, encompasses the proletarian mass organizations, tightly knits them to each other to minimize bureaucracy, and ensures efficiency in proletarian control over the state.

The Party of the proletariat, a political organization controlled by the revolutionary class-conscious proletarians, will also serve as the body that tightly knits the state ministries and ensures proper surveillance over the cadres of economic institutions by the agents of the proletariat. Inside the ministries, there exist certain bureaucrats. The elevation of a Party of the proletariat over the government ministries allows the proletariat an upper hand over such bureaucrats, leaving the bureaucrats at the potential mercy of the workers' state. The disintegration of the Party, or the demotion of the role of the Party of the proletariat, is a means of reducing the surveillance of the agents of the Party of the proletariat over the ministries, thus a factor allowing the elevation of the bureaucrats. Even a bureaucrat-dominated Party over which the proletariat have a large minority stake would still pose a menace to the corrupt bureaucrats, which is why the bureaucrats dominating such a Party would pursue the agenda of reducing the role of such a Party over the state as a means of reducing even the little influence which the proletarian minority faction in the Party have over the ministries.

Historical experience, large parts of which are documented in this book, shows that the percentage of the membership of proletarians in a party, even a reactionary party, positively and strongly correlates with the influence of the progressive forces in that party. Without the numerical and percentage dominance of the proletariat and its kolkhozniks in the socialist Party membership, the socialist forces would lose their influence over the Party and the latter grows strongly susceptible to dominance by the reactionary classes and strata. In the context of the socialist Party, foremost among these reactionary forces are the bureaucrats and the reactionary intelligentsia. It follows that the membership composition of the Party is vital for ensuring the dominance of the proletariat over that Party. Within the intra-Party class conflicts, the rule of a democratic majority of the proletarian and the kolkhoznik members of the Party can be consolidated via the mechanism of democratic centralism. They who have no capital and have only their labour to sell automatically qualify as proletarians, be they pink-collar (restaurants/cafes) workers or blue-collar (factories and mines) workers. However, the blue-collar workers are employed in the industrial workplaces, at the proverbial 'locomotive' of industry, thus bearing the advantage of closer association to the advancement of the productive forces.

A democratic centralist party is a party in which there is democratic freedom of discussion and intra-party democratic election of the party's leading positions. At the same time, in order to become a serious force to reckon with, a democratic centralist party would present itself to the public as a quasi-monolith in terms of the message it delivers and the policy it pursues. This means that the minority which dissents against the stance of the democratic majority in the party discussions would not publicly challenge the stance of the party, and, when intra-party discussions are finished, would not materially block the path of the Party. In a public presentation by a team of scientists presenting their findings, the sudden rebellion of one team member against the findings and conclusions presented by the rest of the team would be counter-productive, portraying the presentation as unserious and the team of scientists as no force to reckon with. In much the same ways,

the publicizing of a rebellion of a minority against a Party line that has been decided by the majority presents the Party to the public as an unserious organization, not a force to reckon with. It reminisces the publicizing of a family feud which needed no publicizing. Democratic centralism adds seriousness to the Party.

There exists another very important reason for democratic centralism. Every party has two factions, the progressive faction and the reactionary faction. In some parties, the progressive faction dominates, and in others, the reactionary faction dominates. The formation of factions is inevitable. However, factions are different than sub-parties. Some promote the view that inside the Party, there should be multiple sub-parties in order to decentralize, and hence allegedly 'democratize', the Party structure. Actually, fracturing the Party into multiple sub-parties, far from 'democratizing' the Party, really entails fracturing the party into multiple parallel bureaucracies, since each sub-party would function as a bureau and bureaucracy of its own. Democratic centralism, which bans the formation of sub-parties, consolidates the Party away from such parallel bureaucracies from which Party bureaucrats thrive, thus ensuring greater efficiency for the Party of the proletariat at the expense of the fortunes of the corrupt bureaucrats in the Party. For the same reason, the existence of multiple Parties of the proletariat in the same state only brings additional parallel bureaucracy. Reduce such bureaucracy by amalgamating all the parties of the proletariat into one single Party of the proletariat. Forget not that decentralization brings more bureaucracy, not more democracy. Even more so – while in a bourgeois-democratic state, the existence of multiple parties representing multiple classes is sound – the existence of multiple parties representing antagonistic classes in a socialist state is against the very purpose of the socialist state. The socialist state is the dictatorship of the proletariat allied with the kolkhozniks, the interests of whom are almost the same; the dictatorship of the proletariat has no time for the representation of anti-proletarian parties in the workers' state.

The enemies of the socialist forces split into multiple currents so that they can hit the socialist forces from different sides. Left-opportunist and right-opportunist currents, which would have otherwise been attacking each other, join up into coalitions and launch a pincer assault, one from the left-opportunist flank and the other right-opportunist flank, against the moderate forces, the socialist centrist forces. Democratic centralism, by banning the formation of sub-parties, bans the formation of coalitions between such left-opportunists and the right-opportunists and thus renders costly the formation of such coalitions. Such coalitions do form covertly anyways, but, by being forced to be covert and secretive, they grow more costly.

For practical matters, democratic centralism would need the close cooperation, if not the complete merger, of the legislative and executive branches. The separation of these branches would foster a two-tier system of parallel bureaucracies in the socialist state, hence promoting inefficiencies and corruption. The separation of the executive branch from the legislative branch practically often results in, and is usually synonymous with, the rise of the Presidential system. The Presidential institution, with its emphasis not on the role of the Party but on the role of the individual leader, is a bourgeois vestigial institution. If the Party of the proletariat is to rule, the role of the Presidency should either be abolished or be nullified into a largely ceremonial role.

C1S9. On the 'Intermediate-Stage' State

Is 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie' possible? In some ways, yes it is possible: the laws of the state can be established such that they privilege the political rule of the petit-bourgeois organizations over the proletarian or bourgeois institutions. Sure, a state can be controlled by the petit-bourgeois class, a state can be a 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie'; but what is a 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie'? Depending on the circumstances, the petit-bourgeoisie either serve the cause of the proletariat and anti-colonial national bourgeoisie against feudal restoration, or end up as the beguiled mercenaries of the enemies of the proletariat. As such, a 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie' really is a dictatorship of the proletariat, a dictatorship of the anti-colonial national bourgeois allies of the proletariat, or a dictatorship of the comprador/imperialist enemies of the proletariat. It follows that, upon coming into existence, the control over the state of the 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie' ipso facto immediately falls into the hands of either the proletariat or the (comprador, anti-colonial national, or imperial) bourgeoisie. Such is why the 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie' is possible only if one defines it as a subcategory of either the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. A 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie' as a third category separate from dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is materially impossible and dialectically nonsensical. One must note that although the petit-bourgeoisie themselves are a class separate from the proletariat and the enemies of the proletariat, the class behaviour of the petit-bourgeoisie remains a combination of the binary of the pro-proletarian and (more so) anti-proletarian class behaviours, and not as some 'third' behaviour distinct from the pro-proletarian and anti-proletarian class behaviours. Such is why, although it is possible to have a state controlled by petit-bourgeois institutions representing the petit-bourgeois class, such a state cannot be separate from the binary of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

A 'dictatorship of the kolkhoz peasants', owing to its highly progressive socialist-leaning character, immediately, upon coming into existence, ends up either as a dictatorship of the anti-colonial bourgeoisie or as the dictatorship of the proletariat. A 'dictatorship of the intelligentsia', a rule of the council of philosopher kings and philosopher queens, immediately becomes most likely a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie owing to the liberal pro-imperialist

orientation of most of the intelligentsia. Historically, owing to the feudal background of many priests, the 'dictatorship of the priests' usually implied the dictatorship of the feudal class. There is no need to mention the dictatorship of the kulak class, the bureaucrats, etc., all of which certainly are variants of the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie.

As the state encompasses the means of violence controlled by the ruling class, there can be no class-neutral state. As such, there is no intermediate stage between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. There can be a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in which the proletariat have a very high level of influence and intelligence penetration – such is bourgeois-democracy. There can be a dictatorship of the proletariat in which the class enemies of the proletariat have a high level of influence over the workers' state – such are the fragile workers' states or states in the initial phases of the socialist transformation. However, ultimately, there can be no such thing as an intermediate state lying in between the state of the proletariat and the state of the class rivals of the proletariat. The strength of the forces that favor the dictatorship of the proletariat is in part manifested in the battle over the mode of production. Like the struggle for dominance over the means of violence, the battlefield of property relations too is a quantitative gradient composed of a dialectical binary. The extensive and intensive expansion of the socialist sector of the economy entails the strengthening of the manifestation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the realm of the economy. The more the steps towards the socialist mode of production, the more entrenched over the economy shall be the dictatorship of the proletariat. The weaker the socialist mode of production, the stronger would be the anti-proletarian class forces and hence the weaker would be the dictatorship of the proletariat. Stalin in his report on behalf of the Central Committee to the 14th Congress of the CPSU:

For all that, our system as a whole cannot yet be called either capitalist or socialist. Our system as a whole is transitional from capitalism to socialism — a system in which privately-owned peasant production still preponderates as regards volume of output, but in which the share of socialist industry is steadily growing. The share of socialist industry is growing in such a way that, taking advantage of its concentration and organisation, taking advantage of the fact that we have the dictatorship of the proletariat, that transport is in the hands of the state, that the credit system and the banks are ours — taking advantage of all this, our socialist industry, the share of which in the total volume of national production is growing step by step, this industry is advancing and is beginning to gain the upper hand over private industry and to adapt to itself and take the lead over all the other forms of economy. Such is the fate of the countryside — it must follow the lead of the towns, of large-scale industry. (Political Report of the Central Committee, The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Joseph Stalin, December 18-31, 1925. In: Works, Vol. 7, 1925, Publisher : Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954. In: MIA)

Almost immediately upon establishment, the dictatorship of the proletariat can nationalize banking and commerce so to better control the flow of currency and to close many of the routes by which the comprador bourgeoisie commercially contact the imperialist powers. Yet, banking and commerce are not the only sectors in which the dictatorship of the proletariat faces obstacles. A workers' state will, in the first stages of socialist transformation, inherently meet a non-socialist economy composed of many parasitic classes. Yet, in time, the balance of power in the gradient of property relations can turn in the favour of the dictatorship of the proletariat and cooperativists at the expense of their class enemies. In time, in the battle over the mode of production, the dictatorship of the proletariat would centralize and socialize industry, further centralize the state-owned sectors, centralize the farms into cooperatives, hence to obliterate the material bases of its class foes and to entrench itself throughout the economy via the proletariat and kolkhozniks. In the middle of such a socialist economic transformation, the property relations 'system as a whole cannot yet be called either capitalist or socialist', as Stalin said.

C1S10. On Dealings with Hostile States

Left-opportunist or left-deviationist currents call for the total cultural, diplomatic, and economic boycott of the reactionary states and organizations. They are wrong.

The socialist state must engage in diplomatic relations with as many states as possible including the most reactionary fascist regimes. Such diplomatic relations open a channel for the establishment of embassies and consulates in the enemy state. These can well serve as intelligence bases for contacts with the freedom forces in the struggle against the reactionary state.

The socialist state must engage in commercial relations with the imperialist and pro-fascist countries as a method of class struggle. If properly managed, socialist commercial relations with the hostile state can assist the workers' state to obtain from its foes the capital goods necessary for the expansion of heavy industry. If there are multiple socialist states with good industries and sufficient supplies of raw materials, then the preference must be given to trade with socialist states and not with capitalist states.

As well, the socialist state can engage in commercial deals with reactionary regimes such that the trade purchases from and thus sponsors certain institutions which continue to remain under the influence of the progressive class forces in the pro-fascist country. Reactionary states do not all eliminate entirely the economic institutions under the influence

of progressive classes (e.g. cooperatives). A trade that buys from and thus finances the progressive- dominated economic institutions in a reactionary state can strengthen the economic institutions that can mount opposition to the reactionary state.

Thirdly, commercial relations with a reactionary state must be as well geared towards economically sabotaging the reactionary state through legally cheating (via loopholes) against the reactionary state and using legal con art. Sometimes reactionary regimes make mistakes in their commercial deals. At other times, they are infiltrated by progressive agents which deliberately engage in economic sabotage against the reactionary regime. Such economic sabotage and con trade deals can bring forth much economically for the socialist state at the expense of its reactionary foes.

Commercial relations must also be used as points of contact for recruitment of agents or communications with progressive agents already existing in the reactionary regime apparatus.

If, however, commercial or diplomatic relations with the reactionary enemy state are imbalanced in the favour of the reactionary enemy, then the socialist state must come up with some excuse to severely cut diplomatic and trade relations with its enemies. In other words, diplomatic and trade relations with the anti-socialist state are for the purpose of advancing the proletariat's state at the expense of the sworn enemies of socialism.

The socialist forces must also participate in the institutions of the reactionary state as means of intelligence penetration. The socialist Party's participation in the electoral process, the gaining of parliamentary seats, and the obtaining of cabinet positions or other high-ranking positions especially in the military and security bodies all allow for the intelligence penetration needed for fomenting subversion against the reactionary forces that dominate a reactionary regime, so that these agents in the regime apparatus can serve as the fifth column that opens the gates to the proletarian revolutionaries, neutralizes state opposition to the communist resistance, diverts state funds away from reactionary projects onto communist front organizations, targets the allies of the reactionary regime under the guise of 'serving' the reactionary regime, provides coordinates on whom among the reactionaries to target, and facilitates a communist revolution.

If, however, the conditions for the participation of the socialist Party in the reactionary state are such that the socialist Party materially loses more than it gains from such participation and the anti-communist forces gain more than they lose, then the socialist Party must come up with a reason or excuse to cut participation.

C1S11. People's Democracy

The Peoples' Democracies were essentially of two stages. In the first stage, the People's Democracy was to be a progressive bourgeois-democracy led by the Party of the proletariat, whereas the second-stage People's Democracy was to be a dictatorship of the proletariat. The first stage would emphasize the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist unity of the progressive parties and sub-parties, as well as the promotion of private-sector capitalism against feudalism and state capitalism against private-sector capitalism. Emphasis on socialist transformation would be played down by the Party of the proletariat in favour of progressive bourgeois-democratic transformation. At the same time, in this midst, maximal efforts would be made to boost the Party of the proletariat as the leading political organization in the anti -fascist and progressive popular front, and to ensure the maximal influence of the proletarian agents over the means of violence. As a result of progressive bourgeois-democratic transformation, the feudal and fascist foes of the Party of the proletariat would be eliminated, paving the way for the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialization and collectivization would gradually replace state capitalism and private-sector capitalism. Such an elimination of anti-proletarian classes and the promotion of the proletariat and cooperativists would steadily eliminate the economic power base of the reactionary anti-proletarian agents in the Party of the proletariat and in the progressive bourgeois-democratic parties, thus allowing for a purge of such reactionary anti-proletarian agents. The purge would consolidate the influence of the proletariat over the Party of the proletariat and the progressive parties, would glue them more firmly together, and would reduce the barriers between them. The increased influence of the proletariat over the progressive parties would render them more susceptible to the ideological influence of communism, thus paving the way for the conversion to communism of many of their members. Eventually, these parties would merge into a single socialist Party of the proletariat. A classic single-party socialist state, dominated by the communist Party of the proletariat in a republic of councils, would emerge – a dictatorship of the proletariat. The progressives who did not convert to communism could continue to serve as employees of the state apparatus, but not as members of the Party since the Party shall be ideologically pure.

Stalin's views on the first stage of People's Democratic development are instructive, for he too emphasized that socialist rhetoric and symbolism must be played down in this phase. In conversations with the East German leaders, Stalin emphasized the Socialist Unity Party, a merger of Germany's Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, shall make minimal noises about the plans for socialist transformation, so as to not cause a riot by the anti-proletarian forces:

Comrade Ulbricht says that that would also have its consequences. So far in the GDR we were saying that we stand for democratic Germany, and did not carry out a number of measures that we would need to implement in the process of development in the direction of socialism. We also have never said that we were moving toward socialism.

Comrade Stalin says that this was correct.

Comrade Ulbricht asks whether we should continue this tactic after the deep split of Germany?

Comrade Stalin says that even now they should not shout about socialism. But production cooperatives represent little pieces of socialism. Enterprises owned by people also mean socialism.

Comrade Ulbricht says that so far we have never spoken about it, and did not point out that people's enterprises were socialist. We disguised the social relations that emerged in the GDR to some extent.

Comrade Stalin says that this mask helped you not to scare the middle class of West Germany. However, if you did not have that mask, then maybe you would have been able to pull the lowest strata of the population to your side. The workers would be glad if they found out that you nationalized the industry. Otherwise, they would say that you have the same government as the one in Bonn. One can say that the GDR has a public nationalized industry, whereas separatist capitalists--millionaires who own the industries--represent West Germany. You have to maneuver here; on the one hand, you should not scare the middle class away. But at the same time, you should not offend the workers of the West. We are selling you our joint-stock enterprises. It would be important for the German workers to know that by doing so we increased the scope of nationalized industry. Workers would be very glad to hear that. Of course, you need to maneuver and to disguise it in your relations with the middle class. If you say that you have state industry, it means that enterprises are in the hands of all the people and not in the hands of robber barons-capitalists. However, you should know for yourself that this is socialist production. Production cooperatives in the village are also little pieces of socialism. You should not make noise about it. When production cooperatives function well, all the peasants will see the benefits and the strength of cooperatives, and after that peasants will turn to the workers. But for now, you should not shout about it, because collective farms are not in your pocket yet. In my opinion, you should begin to do it. Although two states are being currently created in Germany, you should not shout about socialism at this point. You should not call these farms collective farms, but call them production cooperatives. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, pp. 6-7. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiisskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG{GDR})

Chapter 2

*** IMG-All-{October Revolution & Civil War}

C2S1. The Eve of the Revolution / Bolshevik Popularity

The First World War, a war between two rival blocs of imperialist powers, was fought over (1) the issue of the conquest and exploitation of resources, and (2) undermining the productive forces of their rivals so to resolve the crises of overproduction by driving up the prices. Point 1 is easy to understand. Point 2 basically means that these imperialist powers aimed to destroy each other's military-industrial backbones so that prices would be driven upwards so that these powers could more easily profit while ensuring that their rivals would be kept militarily/industrially weak. In simpler words, point 2 means that they wanted to wreck each other so that they could have more power. The productive forces, the military-industrial backbone, was the key determinant of the amount of power each of these imperialist powers had. Obviously, the war kept changing the amount of power each of these colonial states had, because the militaries and industries of these colonial states were damaged by the war.

Hence, the balance of power in the war frequently tilted in favor of one bloc or the other. Whenever one bloc of imperial powers became weaker, it sought to form an alliance with the proletariat in order to strengthen itself in the war against the more powerful bloc of imperial powers. Against this alliance of the proletariat with the weaker bloc of imperial powers, the stronger bloc of imperial powers aligned itself with the ultra-reactionary class enemies of the proletariat, particularly the feudal landlords, the slave-owners, etc. For a brief period of time during the First World War, the balance had shifted in the favour of the Anglo-Americo-Franco-Russian bloc, which caused the German-led bloc of imperial powers to de facto align itself temporarily with the proletariat in the struggle against the reactionary class enemies of the proletariat whereas the Tsarist Russian state, the enemy of imperialist Germany, entrenched its alliance with the enemies of the proletariat. The successes of the German imperialist war effort against Tsarist Russia, however, destabilized the reactionary class forces dominating the Russian state, rolled back the reactionary class forces dominating Russia, while giving greater operational freedom for the agents of the proletariat. This resulted in the revolution of March 1917, which overthrew the Tsarist government and established a more bourgeois-democratic form of governance. The establishment of a democracy as a replacement for autocracy increased the influence of the proletariat over the Russian state, since democracy 'opens up' the state for the influence of the masses, in this case especially the proletarian masses. Throughout the territory of the Russian Empire, 'soviets' – meaning 'councils' – were established. The soviets were the councils of the workers and the mechanism through which the proletariat was to exercise its influence. Furthermore, the Bolshevik party was able to drastically increase its presence in Russia.

With the overthrow of the monarchy, the Anglo-Americo-Franco-Russian bloc did weaken but not so much as to fully tilt the balance in favour of the German-led bloc of imperial powers. Hence, **Germany was still de facto on the side of the proletariat**. Further successes in the German war effort only further weakened the reactionary class enemies of the proletariat in the Russian state while giving greater operational freedom for the agents of the proletariat in Russia. The result was the expansion of the influence of the Bolsheviks, the communist party in Russian Empire. October Revolution. The CIA confirmed that the workers and peasant masses were attracted to the Bolsheviks:

In March 1917 the Tsarist government collapsed because reverses suffered in the course of World War I had exposed its inherent incompetence. The moderate coalition government that succeeded it also proved unable to cope with the deteriorating military and domestic situation, and on November 7, 1917, the **Bolsheviks seized power under the slogans of peace, bread, and land for the peasants. The promise of peace appealed to the masses of the proletariat and the peasantry. The promise of bread applied to the city workers, while the poor peasants, many of whom still lacked land, were attracted by the promise of land.** (JOINT ARMY NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDY EUROPEAN U.S.S.R. PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT, Joint Army Navy Intelligence Group, (in CIA archives, p. X-3. Bold added) (IMG)

Since Petrograd (later renamed Leningrad) was one of the most industrial, and hence most proletarian-populated, cities in Russia, the Petrograd Soviet emerged as the most prominent of the workers' soviets. The increased operational freedom of the Bolsheviks was manifested in the expansion of Bolshevik propaganda and agitation in the workers' soviets. Quickly, the Party began to grow in influence in the soviets. The Bolshevik hostility to the reactionary war waged by the Russian regime appealed to the general masses, Bolshevik opposition to colonialism appealed to the anti-colonial national bourgeois forces, Bolshevik call for the dictatorship of the proletariat appealed to the proletarians, the Bolshevik call for land reform appealed to the peasants, and the Bolshevik call for a republic of soviets appealed to the soviets.

The CIA document 'THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917' states in its introduction that some of the remarks it makes are 'open to question'. It does not clarify exactly what kinds of remarks it regards as 'open to question', but surely one aspect of the conclusions is not 'open to question': the growth of the popularity of the Bolsheviks amongst the proletarian and peasant masses who participated in the soviets. The Bolshevik popularity is already confirmed by the US Joint Army Navy Intelligence report cited above, whose conclusions are not tentative but

rather definitive. As those aspects of the remarks by the 'THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917' document are confirmed and cannot be tentative either, the relevant excerpts will be cited here to describe the process of the growth of the Bolsheviks movement amongst the masses of the Russian Empire.

Already at the time, there was much dissatisfaction with the war and the inefficiency of the Russian regime itself. The US intelligence reported:

The growth of the Party, and more importantly, the growth of its influence, was due to its skillful exploitation of social and economic discontent growing out of the war. The railway transport system had all but broken down and made the already bad food situation even worse. Prices were high. There was a general decline in industrial productivity – and consequently, in workers' incomes – owing to the wearing out of machinery, personnel turnover, unionization of technical and administrative personnel, declining profits, and a general closing-down of factories by owners unwilling to risk their capital to increasing worker unrest. Continuing military defeats ate into morale. The Bolsheviks sent agitators into the plants and army units and organised the discontent around their slogans for "peace" and "land" and workers' control of production. The regime could not offer what the Bolsheviks demanded and promised.

The Bolsheviks harped on these matters and made the regime and the parties supporting it appear both unwilling and unable to better conditions. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, pp. 4-5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Thus, the Bolshevik line against Russian participation in the imperialist war resonated with the masses. Anti-imperialist demonstrations reached violent proportions in Petrograd early in May. The Petrograd Committee of the Party was responsible for at least one of these. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The struggle for peace and the rule of the Soviets increased Bolshevik Party representation in the Soviets. Indeed: Committees in the factories and lower army units began to pass Bolshevik slogans (against the Government, etc.) and to elect Bolshevik delegates to the Soviets. Party representation in the Soviets grew. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Throughout the Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks enjoyed popularity in the elections. Indeed, in the words of the US intelligence:

The Party chalked up appreciable gains in factory [committee], trade union, Soviet, and municipal elections elsewhere: Finland, Kiev, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kronstadt, Urals; Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 9. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The "Bolshevik Revolution," the CIA stated:

was prepared for by organized penetration ... of non-Bolshevik organizations: factory committees of workers, soldiers' committees in army units (both front-line and garrison), sailors' committees in the fleets, and the semi-official political assemblies of workers' and soldiers' representatives called "Soviets." (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 2. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

For example:

In elections for district dumas in Moscow, the Party more than doubled its vote, winning about 52% of the total. The "compromisists" Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Parties lost enormous chunks of their previous vote. Whereas the Socialist-Revolutionary candidates had won 375,000 votes in June, they got only 54,000 in October. Mensheviks dropped from 76,000 to 16,000. Significantly, the bourgeois Constitutional Democrats lost only 8,000 votes. The lower middle class stayed away from the polls, and this accounted for much of the decline of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary votes. Evidently, considerable numbers in Moscow were either moving to the left or being politically "neutralized." It is also significant that in the Moscow garrison, Bolsheviks won 90% of the vote. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 8. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Bolshevik influence continued to spread throughout the Russian Empire:

The Bolshevik Party, in addition to capturing control of many Soviets, was able to put considerable pressure on non-Bolshevik Soviets – by getting control of factory committees and having them refuse to support the Soviet financially. The Bolshevik Soviets similarly refused to support the [pro-regime] "compromisist" Central Executive Committee. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 9. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

"During the summer" of 1917, the US intelligence noted:

a great number of strikes were carried out throughout the country, an increasing proportion of these were

engineered by Bolshevik controlled factory committees. In most cases the strikes were local and were called in opposition to trade union leadership, which in many unions remained loyal to the regime right up to the Revolution. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 9. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks also succeeded in getting the soldiers on their side. Indeed, in the words of US intelligence:

The military success of the October Revolution was largely due to the successful subversion of the Army, particularly of the Petrograd garrison. Bolshevik political and organizing work in the Army and Navy was carried on by a Party auxiliary called the Military Organization of the Bolshevik Party. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 12. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The Russian soldiers began to side with the Bolsheviks against the imperialist war:

On 16 July several thousand machine-gunners threw out their regimental committees, elected a Bolshevik chairman, and discussed the feasibility of an armed demonstration. They organised a provisional revolutionary committee, consisting of two men from each company, to replace the old regimental committee. They sent delegates to other units of the Petrograd garrison, to Kronstadt, and into the factories asking for support for an armed demonstration. One of the principal leaders of the machine-gunners commandeered vehicles from the factories, armed them with machine-guns, posted them at strategic points along the proposed line of march, got promises from other units that they would go with the machine-gunners. He kept the Military Organization of the Bolshevik Party informed of all his activities and sent sentries to guard Kshesinskaya Palace, where the Party had headquarters. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Large segments of the Tsarist army were compositionally proletarianized. Feeling threatened by the rise of communist sympathies amongst the workers, the anti-proletarian classes dominating pre-socialist Russia had deliberately demoted the communistic-minded workers to the level of being soldiers and sent them to war as cannon-fodder – on the one hand, the rivals of Tsarist colonialism would be killed, and on the other hand the proletarians of the Russian Empire would be expended and killed. While such was the agenda of the regime, and while it did work to a large extent, the defeats of the Russian military weakened the reactionary enemies enough to give room for communist organization of these soldiers who came from proletarian backgrounds. Indeed:

[one] factor that worked in the Party's favor was the fact that the Monarchy had made a practice of drafting worker malcontents for the army. Many of these had taken part in the 1905 uprising and were generally sympathetic to Bolshevik ideas. The practice also contributed to the further deterioration of economic health and the further expansion of the proletariat: unskilled peasants were brought into industrial centers to replace the drafted workers: they were less productive than the old workers and suffered the more with the economic decline. The "hereditary proletariat" that was drafted naturally sympathised strongly with the development of revolutionary sentiment among the workers who remained in the cities. A large party of the Petrograd garrison consisted of drafted workers. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

In addition:

Party work in the army capitalized on the peace and land slogans: the army consisted largely of peasants who, especially since the February Revolution, were easily persuaded that they had no real stake in continuation of the "imperialist war," particularly since they were suffering continual defeats. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Owing to their petit-bourgeois class mentality, the peasant-background soldiers were less against the fascist war than the proletarian-background soldiers, and they began to doubt the very 'philosophy' of the fascist war only when the Russian Empire began to lose.

"Party agitators," the CIA remarked:

were sent into the countryside to talk to soldiers on leave and deserters. Peasants were encouraged to seize land and engage in political activities, and to write about it to soldier relatives at the front. Conversely, Bolshevized soldiers wrote home encouraging their families to engage in the political struggle. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Thus, in the fight for Soviet power:

Wherever Bolsheviks got control of the committee of a military command, they set up a revolutionary committee, which took control of the command, helped local soviets seize power, and prevented commanders from sending reinforcements to the aid of the regime during the uprising. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK

REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 16. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

In each soviet, there arose revolutionary guards, known as the Red Guards, on which the Bolsheviks had a large influence: Factories organized and armed detachments of workers (Red Guards) to take part in the demonstration.

Seven garrison regiments joined with the machine-gunners and workers' detachments in the march to the Tauride Palace (then the headquarters of the Soviet), carrying the slogan "All Power to the Soviet!" (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Given the overwhelming support which the Bolshevik Party enjoyed in the factory and soldiers' committees:

The Bolshevik Party gradually got control of increasing numbers of factory and soldiers' committees, which elected the members of the Soviet, and thereby got control of Soviets in the Districts of the city, and finally, of the Executive Committees of the Soviets in Petrograd, Moscow, and several other cities. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 4. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Fearing the rise of the communists, the regime began spreading the myth that Lenin was a German agent and claimed that Lenin was financed by the German intelligence. Yet, the regime's claims contradict the intelligence report of its own ally, Britain. In this regard, the memorandum by Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart, the prominent anti-Soviet MI6 operative and British Consul General in Moscow, is instructive. Written to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and former British Prime Minister Lord Balfour, the memorandum by the top MI6 operative states:

I shall not enter here into the vexed controversy of the Bolshevik relations with the Imperial German Government. As far as the Bolshevik leaders are concerned and, in particular, Lenin, who is the brain and guiding force of the whole movement, I have never believed in such a combination, and the documentary evidence which has recently been published by the U.S.A. Government only strengthens [my] belief. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

Lockhart continued:

it is obvious to-day first, that even if Lenin took money from the German Government, he used it for his own ends and not for German ends, and, secondly, that Bolshevism has now gone far beyond the stage of any outside control. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Bolshevism is now a far greater danger to Europe than German nationalism. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

Even Stephen Kotkin, a prominent historian and fellow of the neoconservative Hoover Institute think tank and of the Wilson Center, admitted:

Lenin ... was not a German agent; he had his own agenda. ("Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928", Stephen Kotkin, 2014, p. 188) (IMG)

Although the Russian regime succeeded in temporarily dissuading some workers to not join the communist movement, soon enough the anti-Lenin myth was no longer believed in. From then on, the Party grew even more. "Extension of Party control in army committees," the US intelligence reported:

proceeded exactly as in the factories by political agitation for Bolshevik slogans resulting in the election of Party men to committees of lower units; these agitated for new elections to oust "compromisist" committees of higher units. As committees were won over, more Bolshevik delegates succeeded in being elected to soldiers' sections of various soviets. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Then came the historic moment: the Kornilov affair. Reactionary generals, in saving the ruling classes against the coming proletarian revolution, decided to stage a coup ostensibly against the bourgeois-democratic government of Kerensky, but actually against the Petrograd Soviet. On:

July 30, Kornilov had been appointed by Kerensky to replace Brusilov, Commander in Chief of Army. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 32) (IMG)

Kornilov's plan was to play good cop – bad cop with Kerensky. Kerensky, the 'good cop', would be overthrown by Kornilov, the 'bad cop', and the newly established Kornilov regime would be more suppressive against the communists and the Soviets, than the Kerensky administration was. Under the guise of overthrowing Kerensky's government, Kornilov would actually direct his troops towards defeating the Bolsheviks and the Soviets, all the while covertly assisting Kerensky in pulling the strings in the new Kornilov junta to be set up. According to a document from US intelligence:

Kornilov was surrounded by political opportunists. He intended to get rid, by annihilation, of the Soviet, by military force. He tried to win the cooperation of the provisional government; but if, at the last moment, he found

that he couldn't get their cooperation, he intended to get rid of both the provisional government and the Soviet. This was further complicated when a direct split was made evidence on August 27, at a National Political Conference, attended by Kornilov. Kornilov was applauded by the conservative members. The socialist half of the delegation applauded Kerensky. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 32) (IMG)

Kerensky would have a place in the new Kornilov government, as confirmed by a lecture in the CIA archives: Kornilov received the impression that Kerensky was prepared to hand over to him, Kornilov, dictatorial power in Russia, while Kerensky would be satisfied with a place in government. Kornilov agreed. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)

Many of the Constitutional Democrats supported Kornilov. Stephen Kinzer of the CIA's anti-Soviet think tank, the 'Hoover Institute', admitted:

By summer 1917, many prominent classical liberal Constitutional Democrats would join forces on both the traditional right and the radical right in seeing a redeemer in General Lavr Kornilov, the Russian army's supreme commander. (Stalin, Vol. 1, Stephen Kotkin, 2015, p. 184) (IMG)

The dialectical laws of history dictate that when two forces have converging interests, they would have a tendency to form an alliance. The alliance between Kornilov and Kerensky was natural, despite the outwardly appearances of fundamental differences: they were both anti-Soviet and anti-Bolshevik. However, in order for an alliance to take place, there must be proper communication, something which was absent in this context. In those epoch-changing days, things were happening far too quickly and there was little time for coordination, little time for proper and thorough communication between Kerensky and Kornilov. Kornilov tried to present his proposal to Kerensky via an intermediary, Lvov. However, it is said that Lvov's transfer of Kornilov's message caused a misunderstanding, leading to the lack of coordination between Kerensky and Kornilov, and thus apparently leading to Kerensky to mistakenly distrust Kornilov:

Then Lvov presented to Kerensky the proposal as an ultimatum from Kornilov. On September 8, Kerensky called Kornilov for confirmation of the report that he had delegated Lvov to convey information of his plans and purposes. Kornilov replied affirmatively, neglecting to ask Kerensky what Lvov said to him. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)

There were deeper reasons concerning the Kerensky-Kornilov rift. The Kerensky Administration, as a Kautskyite gang, sought to immerse itself among the proletarian mass bodies so to infiltrate them on behalf of finance capital and its allied comprador classes. In a way, the Kerensky group can be regarded as the Kornilov network's fifth column within the labour movement. Yet, such a Kautskyite immersion amongst the proletarians also meant the encirclement of these Kautskyite agents with proletarian agents. The proletarian encirclement allowed the proletarian agents to successfully coopt the Kerensky gang, forcing the latter to partially engage in policies favourable to the proletariat, one of which inevitably was partial opposition to the Kornilov group. Thus, despite the Kerensky network's alliance with the Kornilov network, the Kerensky network, thanks to cooptation by the proletariat's agents, could not entirely mobilize in favour of the Kornilov group, a factor that ended up favouring the proletariat.

In such a situation:

Kerensky, on September 9, dismissed Kornilov as Commander-In-Chief. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)

However:

Kornilov, on September 10, issued a proclamation to all Russian citizens refusing to give up his post and asked for support against the Provisional Government. At the same time he ordered General Krymov to move the third Cavalry Corps against Petrograd. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, pp. 33 -34) (IMG)

This condition of mutual distrust between two natural potential allies ultimately pushed Kerensky to form a pact with the Soviets and Bolsheviks as means of fighting back against the Kornilov coup:

Kerensky meanwhile joined forces with the left groups of the Petrograd Soviet and ordered the Petrograd garrison to prepare to fight General Krymov.

Propaganda by the Bolsheviks in the ranks of Krimov's forces had an important effect, and Bolshevik railroad workers deflected a number of Krimov's troop trains. When the two forces met, some distance outside of Petrograd, there was more fraternization than fighting. Kerensky ordered Krimov to report to Petrograd. Krimov did so.... Kornilov was arrested. In appreciation for the assistance given to him by the Petrograd Soviet, a number of the Bolshevik leaders ... were released. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, pp. 33-34) (IMG)

As mentioned, the immersion of the Kerensky network, as Kautskyite agents of the reactionary classes, amongst the proletarians went both ways: on the one hand, it meant the intelligence penetration of the Kautskyite agents of fascism within the proletarian bodies, and, on the other hand, it led to the proletarian agents' encirclement and cooptation of the Kautskyite agents in the ranks of the labour movement. The fact that the Kerensky Administration, as a pro -fascist Kautskyite anti-socialist cabinet, was compelled to ally with the proletarian mass bodies and with the Bolshevik Party

against the Kautskyites' covert ally, the Kornilov group, demonstrates the level of cooptation enforced by the proletariat's agents within the Kerensky movement. It shows that the armament of the Soviet was the result of a pro-Soviet tendency pervading throughout the Kerensky regime, a proletarian current that coopted the Kerensky gang and not only forced the latter to partially democratize the system in favour of the empowerment of the Bolshevik Party but also proactively supported, or compromised the reactionary attempts to block, the armament of such proletarian mass bodies as the Soviets. Thus, even if the Kerensky group's measure against its own covert ally, the Kornilov group, was an 'accident' or strategic 'mistake' committed by Kerensky, the 'mistake' still had the deliberate non-accidental support of and enforcement by the proletarian agents within the regime. The Kautskyites, as fascist agents within the labour movement, can help in the fascist overthrow of socialism, but so too can they, as fascist agents surrounded and thus coopted by proletarians, end up as the unwilling captives used by socialism in the struggle to obliterate fascism.

Hence:

The [Kerensky] Government issued arms to the workers during the Kornilov danger. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

And the Red Guard force:

was legalized by the Kornilov affair. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

To resist Kornilov, the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) was created:

On 9 September, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet created a "Committee of Struggle against Counterrevolution" to resist Kornilov. The Bolsheviks entered this committee, which was also known as the "Military Revolutionary Committee," as a dominant minority. The district soviets passed resolutions in favor of sending representatives to the committee, establishing control over the commissars of the Government, and of organizing mobile fighting squads to arrest Kornilov's agitators. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 7. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The Red Guards were increasingly under the control of the Bolsheviks, as it was the latter which each of the Soviets elected:

When the Red Guard was legalized, and wherever at any time the Bolsheviks dominated the local soviet, the Red Guard was able to purchase arms out of factory funds. The Military Organization of the Party obtained arms for the Red Guard from the stores of Bolshevized garrison units. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks would have already gained access to tremendous amounts of arms even without the Kornilov coup; this was because the Bolsheviks had successfully recruited numerous soldiers, who could not only become excellent fighters for the communist revolution but also had direct physical access to arms caches. The failure of the Kornilov coup did however bolster the Bolshevik-influenced armed forces.

Forget not that a liberal democratic state can directly militarily arm the very forces that shall, briefly after such armament, overthrow it. The Kerensky government's military armament of its Bolshevik and Soviet overthrowers, though as an immediate cause being upon the occasion of the Kornilov coup, bore a deep-rooted longer-term cause. A pro-fascist bourgeois-democracy, a state of an uneasy and fragile "compromise" between the proletariat and the anti-proletarian classes, had been imposed by the proletariat over the Russian regime, thus bringing forth the Kerensky government. Democratization, however, was a mere excuse by which the proletariat semi-unconsciously increased its power. That same proletarian class, ever seeking more power, lobbied to overthrow that liberal democratic order and to replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat, a state very democratic in favour of the proletariat but not so democratic when facing the proletariat's class foes. When the reactionary classes grow fragile in liberal democracies, the latter, under the increased influence of the proletarian lobby, can go so far as to literally and directly militarily fund the very proletariat that shall violently overthrow the liberal democratic state. This is an important historical fact to remember when examining the methods by which to exploit the irony of liberal democracy.

C2S2. The 'First' Anti-Socialist Treason of Zinoviev-Kamenev Group

Finally came the time of the October Revolution. Lenin called for an insurrection to be launched, but faced the opposition of elements in the Central Committee. The US Congress's 'House Committee on Un-American Activities', an infamously anti-communist congressional body that collected intelligence materials on the communists, reported:

The Bolshevik party was, however, divided by profound divergencies; the idea of seizing power by force was rejected by so many leaders.... Among the best-known leaders of that era ... Stalin sided with Lenin; top leaders like Zinoviev and Kamenev consistently fought [against] Lenin strategy and tactics. (Facts on Communism, Vol.

2, United States Congress, House. Committee on Un-American Activities, Chairman Francis E. Walter, January 7, 1959, p. 53) (IMG)

Zinoviev and Kamenev were anti-revolutionary spies who leaked the Party's secret to bourgeois forces. Stalin, on the other hand, stood with Lenin on the matter. Hence:

Lenin castigated Zinoviev and Kamenev in the sharpest terms because they had publicly (in a non-Bolshevik newspaper) disclosed the Bolshevik schemes. To him, Zinoviev and Kamenev were deserters. (...). Lenin was supported by ... Stalin. (Facts on Communism, Vol. 2, United States Congress, House. Committee on Un-American Activities, Chairman Francis E. Walter, January 7, 1959, p. 57) (IMG)

An excuse that the anti-revolutionary faction in the Party took for criminally delaying the insurrection was that the Congress of the Soviets was necessary to take place. Under the guise of sticking to the formality of the convention of the Congress of the Soviets, the anti-revolutionary faction in the Party was actually seeking to undermine the establishment of the republic of Soviets. Lenin launched polemics against this counter-revolutionary ideological view:

"Delay is criminal," Lenin said the same day in a letter to his Central Committee. Some of his comrades wanted to wait until the Second Congress of Soviets, expected to convene about November 4 [October 20], and then in the name of the congress to start the seizure of power. Lenin, the shrewd strategist, ... preferred to have it face a fait accompli:

To "wait" under such conditions is a crime.

The Bolsheviks have no right to wait for the Congress of Soviets, they must take power immediately. Thus they will save both the world revolution (for otherwise there is the danger of an agreement between the imperialists of all countries who, after the shooting in Germany, will be more agreeable to each other and will unite against us) and the Russian revolution (else a wave of real anarchy may become stronger than we are): thus they will also save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people engaged in the war.

To hesitate is a crime. To wait for the Congress of Soviets means to play a childish game of formality, a shameful game of formality; it means to betray the revolution. (Facts on Communism, Vol. 2, United States Congress, House. Committee on Un-American Activities, Chairman Francis E. Walter, January 7, 1959, p. 56) (IMG)

No doubt, when the revolutionary situation has not come about yet, it would make sense to try to stick to formalities as much as possible. However, when the revolutionary situation has come, the rules of the game differ since revolution by nature is an illegal act, meaning that the revolutionaries are obliged not so much towards the formalities and more towards the goals of the revolution, the correct path. During the revolutionary transition phase, what is morally right takes precedence over what is formally permissible. Lenin and Stalin acknowledged this, unlike the counter-revolutionary spies, the Zinoviev-Kamenev gang and their followers. Lenin was in the end successful:

On 23 October, Lenin forced the Central Committee to take a definite stand. Only members, Zinoviev and Kamenev, voted against the resolution which made "armed insurrection.. the order of the day," and called upon all Party organizations to "consider and decide all practical questions" on the basis of this decision. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 10. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Again, the above excerpt of the CIA document is already backed up by the definitive conclusions of other documents cited.

The Party took leadership of:

the two sections of the population – the city workers, particularly in Petrograd, and the peasant-soldiers – that were potentially strong enough to overthrow the Government. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 2. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The communists also:

got control of the army where it counted most – in the capital. When the revolutionary workers were led by the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Government, the latter found itself without effective defenses. The garrison had been subverted and either stood aside from the struggle or took the part of the workers. Bolshevik control over the workers was obtained through its normal Party apparatus: factory cells, neighborhood and city directing organs. Control over the garrison, however, was achieved by a special, secret auxiliary Party apparatus in the army and navy, the "military organization" of the Bolshevik Party. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 2. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

C2S3. The Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly

An article by the US Government's United States Information Agency (USIA) stated:

The Left SRs had already rejected the Provisional Government, agreeing with the Bolsheviks that it must be

replaced by a revolutionary socialist government. However, they had felt that it was preferable to wait for the Constituent Assembly to create such a government, counting on the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meanwhile, to defend their cause. (...). When the Bolsheviks ... succeeded in overthrowing the Provisional Government, the Left SRs were quick to join them. Feeling that the revolution was now in Bolshevik hands, the [SR] Leftists favored collaboration as a means of moderating Bolshevik policy.

The rejection of this course by the rest of the party initiated a break which became final when the Leftists refused to join the rest of the party delegation in a walkout from the Congress in protest against the Bolshevik coup [read: revolution]. (The Socialist Revolutionaries, Herbert J. Ellison. In: Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, Abraham Brumberg, November-December 1967, Vol. XVI, p. 6) (IMG)

Unlike the communists/Bolsheviks who represented the proletarian masses, the Social Revolutionaries were widely regarded as the party of the agrarian petit-bourgeois majority. Hence, it was somewhat predictable that:

in any free election throughout Russia the majority of the votes would go to the anti-bolshevik Socialist Revolutionaries. The left wing of this party only became a separate entity after 19 November when its first congress met, less than a week before the date fixed for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The lists of candidates for the elections had been prepared some time before the party had split. ("The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State First Phase 1917-1922", Leonard Schapiro, 1954, p. 81) (IMG)

That is according to Leonard Schapiro, a WWII-era commander of the MI6, a British intelligence Lieutenant-Colonel, a member of the General Staff of the War Office and a prominent British intelligence analyst on Soviet affairs. Schapiro's student Geoffrey Swain – who served as the Alec Nove Chair in Russian and Eastern European Studies, and worked for the BBC Monitoring Service – added:

Long promised by the Provisional Government, the elections to the Constituent Assembly took place on 12 November 1917. This gave 52.3 per cent of the votes to the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and 23.6 per cent to the Bolsheviks. However, the allocation of Socialist Revolutionary Party candidates took place before the split in the SR Party and the formation in late October of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries as a separate party. The victory of the Left SRs at the Extraordinary Congress of Peasant Soviets and the Second Congress of Peasant Soviets, both held in November, suggested that they would have secured a large number of seats if able to stand in the Constituent Assembly elections. The Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary Coalition Government requested that the Constituent Assembly should recognise what it termed the 'right of recall' and allow local soviets to call by-elections where the local SR deputy was not felt to represent the popular will. When the Constituent Assembly met on 5 January 1918 it refused point blank to agree to this, and so was forcibly dissolved. (Trotsky and the Russian Revolution, Routledge, Geoffrey Swain, 2014, p. XIV) (IMG)

As the facts above show, influenced by the ideological line of the Left SR faction of their party, the SRs went ahead towards the elections, but selected the Right SR politicians of their party as the candidates for the Constituent Assembly. In other words, the SR candidates were predominantly from the Right SR, whereas the party line was predominantly shaped by the Left SR faction. During the election to the Constituent Assembly, the peasantry voted for the SR because of its Left SR-influenced party line. Given the peasants were the majority in Russia, the SR party won a decisive victory in the election. The story became complicated when, shortly prior to the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the SR party split into two new entities: the Left SRs and the Right SRs. When the SR party emerged victorious, the Right SRs controlled the seats of the Constituent Assembly but no longer represented their platform which was that of the Left SR. The facts showed, further, that had the Left SRs had their own candidates, they would have decisively won against the Right SRs. The Bolsheviks and the Left SRs who were allies by then, called for the right to recall candidates, so to allow the peasant majority's vote for Left SRs to be represented in the Constituent Assembly. The Right SRs rejected. Hence, the Constituent Assembly lost its democratic legitimacy. It was thus abolished and replaced by a popular front coalition government of the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs:

Subsequently read out of the party by the Rightist leadership, the Left SRs moved toward closer collaboration with the Bolsheviks. By an agreement reached on November 15, the Left SR-controlled peasants' soviets were merged at the top administrative level with the Bolshevik-dominated workers' soviets. Three days later a Left SR, and former head Of the Peasants' Soviet of Kazan province, A. L. Kalegaev, became Commissar for Agriculture. (The Socialist Revolutionaries, Herbert J. Ellison. In: Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, Abraham Brumberg, November-December 1967, Vol. XVI, p. 6) (IMG)

Again, as stated previously, the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs formed a **popular front coalition government** at the time. The MI6 reported:

At the same time several social revolutionary members of the Constituent Assembly from Ufa have come to Moscow and entered into relations with the Bolsheviks. Though their terms were not fully accepted by the Bolsheviks they have agreed to compromise, and these so-called Social Revolutionary leaders appear to have accepted the conditions offered them. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET

GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 59) (IMG)

Swain too, from the Wilson Center and BBC, reported:

The Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary Coalition Government requested that the Constituent Assembly should recognise what it termed the 'right of recall' and allow local soviets to call by-elections where the local SR deputy was not felt to represent the popular will. (Trotsky and the Russian Revolution, Routledge, Geoffrey Swain, 2014, p. XIV) (IMG)

Hence:

When the Constituent Assembly met on 5 January 1918 it refused point blank to agree to this, and so was forcibly dissolved. (Trotsky and the Russian Revolution, Routledge, Geoffrey Swain, 2014, p. XIV) (IMG)

The Constituent Assembly was dissolved and the Bolshevik-Left-SR popular front state as a republic of soviets was firmly established.

C2S4. The Proletarian Composition of the Membership of the Bolshevik Party

The Bolshevik Party was compositionally proletarianized in membership and ranks. The Lenin-Stalin faction of the Party arose with the support of the blue-collar elements of the Party – the industrial proletarians – as well as the cooperative peasants in the struggle against the white-collar elements of the Party, the bureaucrats and intellectuals. The bureaucrats and intellectuals strengthened the Menshevik infiltrators, the Trotskyites and Bukharinites, whereas the percentage membership of the proletariat (blue-collar) was strongly correlated with the degree of influence exercised by the communist faction led by Lenin and Stalin. In the days of the October Revolution and Civil War, such was the case. Neumann, a prominent British historian, wrote:

The changes in the social composition of the Komsomol bore some analogy to those in the Bolshevik Party. Whereas by February 1917 the proportion of blue-collar workers in the party's membership had been around 60 per cent, and the combined proportion of students, intellectuals or white-collar workers about 32 per cent, by 1921 blue-collar workers had decreased significantly to only about 41 per cent. In terms of absolute numbers of members, between March 1918 and March 1921 the number of party members who were blue-collar workers rose by about 35 per cent, whereas the number of students, white-collar workers and intellectuals more than doubled. ('The Communist Youth League and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1917-1932', Matthias Neumann, 2011)

The increase in the percentage membership of the white-collar elements – the bureaucrats and intellectuals – was temporary. The early 1920s saw a great transformation of the Party membership in favour of the blue-collar elements. William Tompson, a high-ranking OECD-affiliated anti-Soviet researcher on the USSR and Eurasia, wrote:

Stalin's banner as the struggle to succeed Lenin got under way. The party of the mid-1920s was very different from that which had existed prior to 1917. It had grown enormously before Lenin's death, and it doubled again as a result of the 'Lenin Enrolment', a recruitment campaign initiated in 1924 to commemorate the leader's passing. Thousands of new people moved into the party and into full-time party posts in the 1920s, and they owed their advancement to Stalin. It was to him that they looked for leadership. These new recruits were more likely than the Old Bolsheviks to be workers, and they were distinguished by youth, [and] inexperience. They had ... little patience for intellectuals and their incessant theoretical debates. Stalin, who managed the party machine, understood these changes better than any of his rivals.

With such a constituency forming within the party, Stalin was able to turn even apparent weaknesses into assets. (Khrushchev: A Political Life, William Tompson, 2016 (originally published in 1995), p. 21) (IMG)

The 'Lenin Enrolment' had been embraced by Lenin himself in the struggle to maximize the percentage of the proletariat at the expense of the intelligentsia in the Party:

As was stipulated at the XII Congress (2.35), all decisions of a party conference had to be approved by the Central Committee. This Central Committee plenum publicly demonstrated that superior position by approving resolutions, with minor additions, adopted earlier in the month at the XIII Party Conference: on party construction, on the current tasks of economic policy, and on the 'petty bourgeois deviation' (2.38). It also took the occasion of Lenin's death to announce the 'Lenin Enrolment' of ordinary industrial workers into the party (2.39), a policy shift favoured by Lenin which tended to submerge the role of the intelligentsia in the party but also in the long run strengthened Stalin's position in relation to his various rivals. (Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – Vol. 2, University of Toronto Press, collected by Richard Gregor, 1974) (IMG)

The following table provides data on the membership composition of the communist Party of the USSR.

Social Composition (in terms of class or stratum) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Percentages			
Date	Blue Collar Workers	Peasants	White Collar Workers (Intelligentsia, Officials, etc.)
January 1924	44.0	28.8	27.2
January 1930	65.3	20.2	14.5
July 1932	65.2	26.9	7.9

(Communist Party Membership in the USSR, Princeton University Press, sponsored by: the Russian Institute of Columbia University, published under the auspices of the 'Studies of Russian Institute', author: Thomas Henry Rigby, 1968, p. 325. Citing: Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1st edition), Vol. 11, Col. 534; Partinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 21, November 1932, p. 48; Partinaya Zhizn, No. 1, January 1962, p. 47, No. 10, May 1965, p. 11 and No. 7, April 1967, p. 8; Pravda, March 30, 1966) (IMG {Titoist Coup})

The Gorbachev agent and anti-Soviet author Volkogonov wrote:

The first decrees of the Central Committee after Lenin's death affirmed that the Party leadership 'in its struggle to build the Communist society' would make Lenin's mummy and everything associated with it one of the most important tools for accomplishing the task. A first step was the so-called 'Lenin Enrolment', or the induction into the Party of some quarter of a million factory workers. Henceforth a new element arose in people's lives: the 'struggle for the purity of Leninism' and for its 'development'. (LENIN, Dmitri Volkogonov, 1994) (IMG)

C2S5. The Popularity of the Bolshevik Governance in the Territory of the Former Russian Empire

Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart – the prominent anti-Soviet MI6 operative and British Consul General in Moscow – in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and former British Prime Minister Lord Balfour, acknowledged:

Bolshevism and the Soviet idea have entered deeply into the mind of the Russian people and may be difficult to eradicate. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

The workers, Lockhart continued, were strongly supportive of the communists. In the words of the MI6 operative:

In spite of all reports to the contrary the workmen are still true to their Bolshevik leaders. This ... is ... due ... chiefly to the fact that under the Bolshevik regime the working man is in a peculiarly favoured position. Of such food as is available he has the first choice. He receives large wages, and his working hours are short. He complains, it is true, of the cost of living and of the dearth of food and manufactured goods. He is, however, better educated than the peasant, has been brought up on Socialistic doctrines, and readily believes that his present difficulties are due to the efforts of the capitalistic Governments of Germany and the Allies to suppress the anti-capitalistic proletariat revolution of Russia. He is inspired to a certain extent by the ideals of Bolshevism and class-warfare. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), pp. 35-36) (IMG)

The MI6 official's remarks regarding the communists and Soviet power, in the following paragraph, contained the usual hostile anti-Soviet propaganda. Nonetheless, as can be seen throughout the paragraph, Lockhart indeed admits that the peasants supported the communists:

It would seem at first sight that a regime of this kind would soon render itself hated to a large percentage of the population. (...). Since November of last year practically every Russian politician, and certainly every English expert on Russia, have assured us that the Bolsheviks could not last for more than a few weeks. There have been moments when the Bolsheviks believed themselves that their end was near; for example, after the first Brest peace, after the Czecho-Slovak revolt, after Count Mirbach's murder, and again on the 5th August, when Dr. Helfferich left Moscow for Berlin with the avowed purpose of persuading his Government to suppress the Bolshevik regime in Russia. In spite, however, of numerous crises the Bolshevik Government has maintained its position, and even if one makes the wildest allowances of the terroristic measures by which [the Trotskyite elements of] the Bolsheviks rule, it must be admitted that the success of Bolshevism in Russia is due to some more deep-rooted cause than the mere terrorism of a band of workmen. (...). In Russia the aristocracy and *bourgeoisie* (including the [urban] *petite bourgeoisie*) do not number more than 15 to 20 percent of the entire population and this small percentage is divided against itself into Monarchists, Constitutional Monarchists, Republicans, and [Kautskyite] Socialists. Some 70 per cent of the population, i.e. the majority of the peasantry, remain amorphous and inactive. But this very inactivity is in itself a certain advantage to the Bolsheviks whose influence amongst a non-Bolshevik peasantry is to be ascribed almost entirely to the Brest peace and the land reform. At

every congress, at every Soviet election, at every meeting, the Brest peace has saved the Bolsheviks time and again. Condemned as it was by many of the Bolsheviks themselves, the Brest peace from the Bolshevik point of view is a further proof of Lenin's clear-sightedness and sagacity. The peasant is by instinct petit bourgeois, and with certain reservations it seems probable that Russia will become a land of small holdings. The peasant however, must have land. He really requires it to live, and for years almost every party has encouraged him to expect it. The Bolsheviks gave him the land – not exactly as he desired, perhaps, and without any very great security of tenure, but still without any restriction or delay. Skillfully nursed by Bolshevik propaganda, and warned by the concrete example of the Skoropadsky regime in Ukraine, he believes that counter-revolution means the restoration of the land to the landowners, and as all other parties urge him to break the Brest treaty he prefers with his limited understanding a regime which gives him both land and peace to a regime which he does not know, and which will send him back to the trenches. The result of the German occupation in the Ukraine is an example and a warning of what one may expect from a reactionary and purely military intervention in Russia. The peasant, it is true, objects strongly to the Bolshevik requisitions of grain and foodstuffs. This may lead to trouble in the future, but in his present disorganized state it is unwise to hope too much from the peasant as an anti-Bolshevik element. He might welcome a deliverer who would relieve his wants, but he will, and can do little on his own account. And certainly he does not want to do any more fighting either for himself or for anyone else. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 35) (IMG)

The Tsarist regime, Lockhart continued, was extremely unpopular among the Soviets:

It is impossible to believe that the Russian people will ever accept Tsardom under its ancient form. Much as we like the educated Russian, we must not close our eyes to the fact that when the British press makes use of the phrase "all the best-thinking Russians," it is referring to a small minority amongst a vast ... population. Nor should it be forgotten that it is largely owing to the inherent weakness and incapacity of this class that we owe the present chaotic condition of Russia. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

MI6 operative Lockhart was by no means alone in maintaining such stances. Another British intelligence document states that communism appealed to 80% of the peoples of the Russian Empire:

The great mistake made by so many, especially the Russians, is that the combat against Bolshevism merely consists of killing Bolsheviks and conquering the territory they occupy, whereas the fight against Bolsheviks is in reality a struggle against an idea or doctrine. It is a doctrine which appeals to the uneducated classes in Russia of which there are over 80 per cent of the total population. Bolshevism appeals to them by holding out the achievement of the ideal socialistic state in a minimum of time. (Report on the Georgian Government by Major McDonnell, Constantinople, Major McDonnell, January 27, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 57) (IMG)

As late as 1922, William Lyon Mackenzie King – who during 1921-1926 served as the Prime Minister of Canada, a member state of the British commonwealth – admitted in his diaries:

I believe ... that the Soviet Govt. is after all the people's govt. as vs. the corrupt autocracy and vicious secret service allied to privileged classes. (Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, Saturday, January 27, 1922. Handwritten – p. 28. Item 8076 in the Library and Archives of Canada.) (IMG)

As for the Red Army, it must be stated that thanks to the influence of Lenin's faction, the terrorist activity of the Trotskyites was an anomaly, a deviation from the mainstream. Despite the serious crimes against humanity committed by the Trotskyite elements of the Red Army, the Soviet military had emerged as a force 'not altogether to be despised', as Lockhart admitted:

the Red Army ... to-day ... has become a force which is not altogether to be despised. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 37) (IMG)

C2S6. Trotskyite Provocative 'Red' Terror: A Wedge between the People and the Party

As the territory of the former Russian Empire was mostly agrarian, the peasants predominated. They had recently gotten land by the Soviet state, and this they appreciated immensely. However, the petit-bourgeoisie inevitably bear some class characteristics that can serve as a force of undermining communism. Unlike the proletariat who have nothing to lose but wage-slavery in the fight against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie are unwilling to risk their small businesses in the struggle against finance capital. The unwillingness of the petit-bourgeoisie to risk confrontation against finance capital results in a stronger presence of the reactionary anti-proletarian class forces in the agrarian areas, as in contrast to the proletarianized areas. Such a strong imperialist-fascist finance capital presence inevitably strikes the communist movement of the proletariat as well, leading to the intelligence penetration of the agents of fascism into the ranks of the Party of the proletariat. In the context of the Bolshevik revolution, the most important trend representing the intelligence

penetration of fascism into the communist party was Trotskyism. More details on Leon Trotsky's intelligence activities for the MI6 will be provided shortly later, but for now, let it be known that Leon Trotsky and his gang were aiming to provoke anti-Bolshevik uprisings by carrying out 'red' terror operations and 'excesses' in the name of communism, under the crimson banner, so that the masses would confuse the Bolsheviks with the Trotskyite terror and hence launch counter-revolutionary uprisings against the Bolsheviks. Once such an uprising takes place, the Trotskyites would then open up the front in the face of such a counter-revolutionary uprising so that the Bolsheviks would be decimated.

Two major MI6 reports at the time make truly enlightening remarks regarding the factional conflict amongst the Bolsheviks. One report is by the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office, written in early 1919. The other is by Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart – the prominent anti-Soviet MI6 operative and British Consul General in Moscow – in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and former British Prime Minister Lord Balfour. Both reports shed light on the fundamental clash between the factions of Lenin and Trotsky. As the Political Intelligence Department report stated:

Recently, ... the cleavage between Lenin's party on the one hand, and the party led by Trotski and Zinoviev on the other, has taken a different form. The cleavage is both on international and on internal policy. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 58) (IMG)

MI6 reports prove that whereas the Trotsky-Zinoviev fifth column in the Party advocated savage terrorism, wild orgies of bloodshed, mass extermination of innocents, and summary executions in the name of 'socialism', not to mention arrogant dictatorial behaviour and vicious attacks on freedom of speech and opinion, Lenin stood firmly opposed to such extremist behaviour. Instead, Lenin and his faction advocated the imprisonment of those actively engaged in hostile anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity, as well as the confiscation of property – the latter turned many anti-Soviet elite (bourgeois, aristocrat, etc.) families into commoners. No doubt, by confiscation of property, numerous elites-turned-commoners likely began to starve to death; but such deaths cannot be blamed on Lenin's faction of the Bolsheviks per se because extreme starvation was the condition of all the common people of war-stricken Europe, and not just the former bourgeois/aristocrat families of the newly born Soviet state. In fact, as the MI6 report suggests, when these starving Russian elite-turned-commoner families sought refuge in Sweden, even the latter country did not have the sufficient supply of resources to accommodate these individuals. Especially under such horrific conditions of mass starvation, confiscation and redistribution of elite property was only fair, unlike the savage Trotskyite terror. Anyways, excerpts of the mentioned MI6 reports are below:

The course of events at every stage of the Bolshevik regime shows that the real power has been coming more and more into the hands of adventurers whose one desire is to enrich themselves and maintain themselves in power.

This process became clearly marked as far back as last summer. It then became known that the Central Government, controlled by Lenin, was finding it increasingly difficult to control the Extraordinary Commission under Peters. The Extraordinary Commission was entrusted with the task of combating counter-revolution, speculation, and sabotage, which, literally interpreted, meant that it could get anybody out of the way who was inconvenient. **After the attempt on Lenin's life at the end of August the Extraordinary Commission indulged in a wild orgy of bloodshed, to which Lenin, on his recovery, immediately tried to put a stop.** There seems little doubt that **Lenin's influence helped to keep the terror less savage in Moscow than it was in Petrograd, where Zinoviev was able to give free play to his passions.**

This is, therefore, one point on which **Lenin is more moderate than the extreme Bolshevik leaders, such as Trotski and Zinoviev. At the same time it must be remembered that, though Lenin was opposed to the wholesale executions,** he was equally in favour of crushing the bourgeoisie by other methods hardly less brutal, viz, by confiscating the whole of their property and by imprisoning them on the slightest pretext if they refused to work for the Bolshevik Government. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 58. Bold added.) (IMG)

Closely linked up with Lenin's international policy is his present internal policy. Here again he differs from Trotski. It has recently been announced by the Bolshevik wireless that several Mensheviks have accepted the Bolshevik regime, and that their paper "Vperyod" ("Forward") has again been allowed to appear in Moscow. (In this connection it is interesting to note that **in Petrograd, where Zinoviev is Dictator, not even Maxim Gorki's "Novaya Zhisn" has had permission to reappear.**) (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 59. Bold added) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks have been for some months past in the habit of **summarily executing** their active opponents, i.e. active counter-revolutionaries. Some of these sentences may be said to have been justified, as for example

the shooting of the murderers of Uritsky, Mirbach, etc. Executions on a wholesale scale (i.e. systematic murders for which the Bolshevik Government can be held responsible) first began after the murder of Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin's life. On that occasion some five hundred people were shot in Petrograd, some 1920 in Moscow, and a large number in the provinces, many of them innocent people, purely as a measure of revenge and in order to terrorise the opponents of Bolshevism. In this connection, Major Wardwell, of the American Red Cross, possesses an original document of Chicherin's which might be published throughout the civilised world. In spite of their truculent answer to the Neutral Ministers, it appears certain that these executions were not wholly approved of by the Bolshevik leaders, and in particular by Lenin himself. At any rate, soon after Lenin's recovery, this particular form of terror was changed for another which is equally diabolical and even more effective. This terror consists of depriving all opponents of Bolshevism of everything they possess, and is indeed a systematic attempt to destroy every form of *bourgeoisie* in Russia. In Petrograd and Moscow the *bourgeoisie* receives practically nothing to eat. (They are placed on the fourth and lowest category of food cards.) Their houses and flats with the exception of one or two rooms have been taken away from them and been given to the workmen. Their money has long since been confiscated. Now their very clothes with the exception of one suit, are to be requisitioned. Up to the present they have been enabled to live by selling their art treasures, their furniture, and their jewellery. Of this last resource they have been now deprived by an official decree which is only too likely to be rigorously enforced. At the present moment many *bourgeois* families are literally dying of starvation. Indeed, their situation is too deplorable for words, and what their fate will be during the coming winter defies all description. (...). In this connection I should like to point out that at the present moment it is almost impossible for the *bourgeoisie* to leave Petrograd and Moscow. Even if they succeed in obtaining a Bolshevik foreign passport, the Swedish Government is now refusing *visas* on the ground that **there is no food in Sweden for these unfortunates**. I venture to recommend that His Majesty's Government, in the interests of humanity, and also friendship to a class who did well by us at the beginning of the war, should immediately come to some arrangement with the Swedish Government whereby this obstacle can be overcome. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 39. Bold added.) (IMG)

Already a good deal of use has been made of the above **facts** by the Socialist press abroad to show that the Bolshevik Government is now becoming more moderate and that it is receiving more widespread support. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 59. Bold added.) (IMG)

The fact that Lenin opposed "summarily executions" and terrorism is further evidence corroborating that Lenin was not behind the execution of the Tsar and his family, who after all, were indeed summarily executed. This is further backed up by an article titled "No proof Lenin ordered last Tsar's murder" by the Daily Telegraph, a prominent British and notoriously anti-Soviet newspaper, which reported:

A long-running probe into the murders of the last Russian Tsar and his family has closed after failing to find evidence that Lenin ordered the killings, the chief investigator has said. (No proof Lenin ordered last Tsar's murder, The Telegraph, January 17, 2011) (IMG)

Thanks to the counter-revolutionary lobbying network which he possessed within the Party, Trotsky had gained command over the Red Army, a critical position. In the Red Army too, Trotsky engaged in abusive terroristic behaviour:

Discipline has been established in the army by the same methods, and the death sentence is as common at the front as in Petrograd and Moscow. In particular, the position of the officer in the Red Army is **painful in the extreme**. Mobilised for service but mistrusted (many officers entered the Red Army some in order to gain their daily bread, others for counter-revolutionary purposes), they are placed at the head of their men find shot for the least failure of their troops. By **a recent order of Trotsky's the wives and children of officers who desert to the Allies or Czechs are thrown into prison**. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917 -1918), p. 37. Bold added.) (IMG)

Many fake quotes were created and attributed to Lenin, in order to make it appear that Lenin endorsed barbaric terrorism against anyone who was not a communist, or anyone not a peasant or worker, etc. For example, some fake quotes were created and attributed to Lenin, in which he allegedly said that prostitutes must be slaughtered! However, at least these quotes counter the accusation:

"I have heard strange things about that from Russian and German comrades. I must tell you what I mean. I understand that in Hamburg a gifted Communist woman is bringing out a newspaper for prostitutes, and is trying to organize them for the revolutionary struggle. Now Rosa a true Communist, felt and acted like a human being when she wrote an article in defense of prostitutes who have landed in jail for violating a police regulation

concerning their sad trade. They are unfortunate double victims of bourgeois society. Victims, first, of its accursed system of property and, secondly, of its accursed moral hypocrisy. There is no doubt about this. Only a coarse-grained and short-sighted person could forget this. To understand this is one thing, but it is quite another thing how shall I put it? To organize the prostitutes as a special revolutionary guild contingent and publish a trade union paper for them. Are there really no industrial working women left in Germany who need organizing, who need a newspaper, who should be enlisted in your struggle? This is a morbid deviation. It strongly reminds me of the literary vogue which made a sweet madonna out of every prostitute. Its origin was sound too: social sympathy, and indignation against the moral hypocrisy of the honorable bourgeoisie. But the healthy principle underwent bourgeois corrosion and degenerated. The question of prostitution will confront us even in our country with many a difficult problem. Return the prostitute to productive work, find her a place in the social economy that is the thing to do. But the present state of our economy and all the other circumstances make it a difficult and complicated matter. Here you have an aspect of the woman problem which faces us in all its magnitude, after the proletariat has come to power, and demands a practical solution. It will still require a great deal of effort here in Soviet Russia. But to return to your special problem in Germany. Under no circumstances should the Party look calmly upon such improper acts of its members. It causes confusion and splits our forces. Now what have you done to stop it?" (Lenin on the Women's Question, Clara Zetkin, MIA, chapter 2) (IMG)

C2S7. Trotskyite Secret Service Activities for the British Empire

Trotsky was no doubt an agent of the MI6 since the early days of the October Revolution. Several pieces of evidence when placed together prove this fact. According to a March 1918 US intelligence document sent to President Woodrow Wilson:

Lockhart ... was in daily touch with Trotsky.... (Enclosure, Gordon Auchincloss to Woodrow Wilson, March 16, 1918. In: "Gordon Auchincloss to Edith Bolling Galt Wilson". In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 – May 12, 1918, p. 59. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document more than a month later added:

Lockhart, who has always been a keen supporter of Trotsky, now seems to think the latter is losing his influence. (Enclosure, Edward Mandell House, London, April 27, 1918. In: "From Edward Mandell House", New York, April 29, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 – May 12, 1918, p. 465. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

Thus far it has been established that Lockhart, the top MI6 operative in Russia, (1) established close contacts with Trotsky, and (2) was keenly supporting Trotsky. There is more to this. Trotsky himself actively served the interests of the British Empire knowingly and directly during the Civil War. Among Trotsky's activities for the MI6 and against Soviet power was the fact that Trotsky advocated the British occupation of the territory that justly belonged to the Soviet Union. As noted by an April 1918 US intelligence memorandum:

It is to be noted that the British Embassy requested this Government to send a warship to Murmansk about two weeks ago. The Department is informed that the original landing of the British at Murmansk was made with the full consent and approval of Trotsky. (Enclosure: MEMORANDUM: American Warship for Murmansk, Frank Lyon Polk to Robert Lansing, April 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 – May 12, 1918, p. 226. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda) (IMG)

Some may argue that Trotsky was merely seeking to exploit inter-imperialist rivalries by getting British assistance against the German forces. This point by these critics is fundamentally wrong for two reasons: (1) back then, the imperialist Germans, who sought peace with USSR so to move troops from the Eastern Front to the Western Front, were less of a threat to Soviet power than the Anglo-American Allies who had invaded the USSR to re-install the warmongering anti-German regime of Kerensky or the Tsar. Furthermore, the balance of power was already against the German imperialists and in favor of the Anglo-Americans. In such conditions, German imperialism favoured strategic partnership with the progressive classes – including the proletariat that ruled the Soviet Union – so to regain the upper hand in the War. (2) Somewhat more obviously, **the USSR and the Germans had already signed the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk a month prior, on March 3, 1918; the Germans were already moving troops to the Western Front and hence were no longer a threat.** When the German imperialists were no longer a threat, there was no justification whatsoever for receiving the 'aid' of the British imperial rivals of the German imperialists. It thus logically follows that Trotsky's expression of concern about the German 'threat' was merely a cover for his activities on behalf of the MI6 and against Soviet power. As late as three weeks after the March 3, 1918 Brest Litovsk treaty, the top MI6 official Lockhart remarked:

On March 27 I had a very satisfactory discussion with Trotsky, who again mentioned the possibility of allied troops being sent via Siberia to Russia. Trotsky confirmed the remarks made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and said that Russia would welcome help from the allied countries, now that she is involved in a life and death struggle, even if to obtain this help it should become necessary for the socialist forces to fight in cooperation

with the army of the imperialists. Provided that the allies would give guarantees on certain points and that *other allied forces were present* he thought there was no objection to the use of Japanese troops. I do not doubt that it is more than possible to come to an arrangement in this question, but in order to do so we must act with caution. (Enclosure 4: PARAPHRASE of telegram from Mr. Lockhart, Bruce Lockhart, Moscow, March 28, 1918. Italics original. In a US intelligence report to Robert Lansing, April, 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 – May 12, 1918, p. 245. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda.) (IMG)

From here, Trotsky's collaboration and service to – not only the MI6 but also – the Japanese imperialist aggressors can be clearly observed. By the time the peace deal with Germany had been established, there was not even the slightest strategic reason for the Anglo-Franco-Japanese-American alliance to occupy the Soviet territory as 'counter-weight' against the German 'threat' because Germany was no longer a threat. Trotsky could not have missed this fact; yet, a traitor as he was, he advocated the occupation of Soviet territory by the Japanese imperialists. The loss of Sakhalin to Japan was 'thanks' to him. On April 18, 1918, the infamous British imperial leader Lord James Balfour wrote to Lord Reading:

Of late a very significant change has come over attitude at any rate of its ... Trotsky towards Allies. For sometime past he has begun to show signs that he recognises that co-operation with Allies in a war to free Russia from German domination is the only hope either for Russia or revolution or possibly for maintenance of his own power. Opinions differ as to Trotsky's honesty but he is evidently a man of decision and of late, whatever may be motives, he has not only curbed anti ally tone of Bolshevik Press but he has approved of allied co-operation at Murmansk and has suggested that British naval officers should assist in restoring discipline in Black Sea Fleet. (Arthur James Balfour to Lord Reading, London, April 18, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 – May 12, 1918, p. 245. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda.) (IMG)

In May 1918, Trotsky once again demanded the Anglo-American-led coalition assistance for his position in the struggle against the Lenin faction, under the pretext and cover of receiving aid against the Germans:

In recent reports from our representative at Moscow you will have noticed a most important change in the attitude of Trotsky, as described in these telegrams, and an even more noticeable alteration in Mr. Lockhart's estimate of the position. The embarrassment in which Trotsky now finds himself is caused by his belief, for which there is only too much foundation, that the Allies even if asked to intervene would not be ready to give him help for a long time, while Germany is in a position to make an immediate attack. His enemies would be able to crush him completely before his friends had been able to put even one division ashore in the Far East. (Enclosure 2: PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM MR. BALFOUR TO LORD READING – MAY 10TH, 1918, Handed to Robert Lansing from Lord Reading, Washington, May 11, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 – May 12, 1918, p. 607. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda.) (IMG)

As can be seen, Trotsky was (1) closely in contact with the top MI6 operative Lockhart, (2) was supported by the top MI6 operative Lockhart, (3) and promoted the British imperial occupation of the territory of the USSR so that he, a loyal agent of fascist reaction, may succeed in the factional conflict against the agents of Soviet power. Trotsky was an agent of the British Empire. Some would argue that, based on the above evidence, Trotsky was indeed treasonously collaborating with the MI6 but that treasonous collaboration with an intelligence service does not mean being an agent of that organization and that rather it only means treasonous partnership!

Such a remark, however, demonstrates an idealistic misunderstanding of intelligence service work. Intelligence services do formally have command structures but in practice such command structures are loosely implemented. Instead, in practice, intelligence services work like partnership networks as opposed to rigidly-enforced command structure networks. The reason for this is explained by the invincible theses of the historical materialist science.

The laws of historical materialism dictate that the power of an intelligence agent is derived from the amount of historical-material factors at the disposal and under the control of the intelligence agent. The more an agent has historical-material forces under his/her control, the more the agent has 'bargaining chips' and leverage in their collaboration with the intelligence service they serve and hence the more power the agent has in the intelligence service network. An ordinary terrorist guerrilla carrying out military operations for the MI6 listens to and accepts the orders of his/her superordinate officers in the MI6 not as much because MI6 protocols dictate such, but more so because the MI6 protocols are enforced by the fact that superordinate MI6 officers have more historical-material forces at their disposal whereas the ordinary terrorist has only a few grenades and guns. By contrast, a major country's Minister of Defense who becomes an agent of the MI6 would have far more historical-material forces at his disposal and thus can potentially have even more power than the MI6 officer that would formally act as his superordinate officer. This is why Trotsky being a partner, a willing accomplice, and a treasonous collaborator with the MI6 does indeed objectively make him an MI6 agent. Throughout the rest of his life, as shall be seen, Trotsky never really defected away from the MI6 but merely extended his intelligence activities to also serve secret services that were allied to the MI6, such as American intelligence and Nazi

German intelligence.

Assisted by Trotsky, the MI6 was able to launch an assassination attempt against Lenin, almost murdering him. The British landed troops in Murmansk, an area close to Arkhangelsk. Trotsky's approval of the British invasion of Murmansk in northern Russia assisted the MI6, especially Trotsky's boss Lockhart, in its plot to assassinate top communist leaders including Lenin. The BBC reported:

In late May, the British decided to send a small military force to Archangel in northern Russia.

The official line was that the troops were going to prevent thousands of tonnes of British military equipment, supplied to the Russians, from falling into German hands.

However, documents from the day suggest that plans were later drawn up for these 5,000 British troops to join forces with 20,000 crack Latvian troops who were guarding the Kremlin but could, it was thought, be turned against the Bolsheviks.

In the summer of 1918, Lockhart sent a telegram to London following a meeting with a local opponent of the Bolsheviks called Savinkov.

It read: "Savinkov's proposals for counter-revolution. Plan is how, on Allied intervention, Bolshevik barons will be murdered and military dictatorship formed."

Underneath that telegram is a note bearing the signed initials of Lord Curzon, who was then a member of the British War Cabinet.

It says: "Savinkoff's methods are drastic, though if successful probably effective, but we cannot say or do anything until intervention has been definitely decided upon." ('Did Britain try to assassinate Lenin?', BBC, Mike Thomson, March 19, 2011) (IMG)

The 'Bolshevik barons' included Vladimir Lenin, against whom there was an assassination in the summer of 1918. The person who plotted to murder Lenin was a Social Revolutionary. Lenin was severely wounded, and was about to die, but ultimately, survived. It is a well-known fact however, that the assassination plot damaged Lenin's body enough to cause his death in 1924, only at the age of 53.

C2S8. Merger into One Party

Many of the other Social-Revolutionaries, particularly the Left SRs in the popular front coalition government, agreed to merge with the Bolshevik Party to yield a single-party state. The single-party state was not single-party in the sense of excluding and brutally suppressing the non-Bolshevik progressives, but was rather single-party in the sense that it merged the two parties into one party as a means of cutting bureaucracy. Two parties is like two bureaus. Bureaus are needed, but there is no need for parallel bureaus. Owing to their agrarian petit-bourgeois base, fascist intelligence penetration into the Left Social-Revolutionary movement was higher and thus the fascist agents among them later duly purged.

Why was it important that a single-party state in the context of a republic of soviets would be established? Why not just have a party-less state that is controlled by the workers' councils? After all, the councils were democratic bodies and the control of the workers' councils in a manner devoid of the rule of a party could on the one hand ensure the democratization of the state and on the other hand rid the country of a party bureaucracy – no? No. The Party of the proletariat is the key institution that tightly knits the numerous local workers' councils into one coherent workers' state. Without a Party that tightly knits, the workers' state would disintegrate into numerous local semi-independent soviets. The disintegrated internally-partitioned workers state would then be so weak in the face of the enemies of the proletariat that the corrupt bureaucrats – the very enemies who supposedly benefit from the rule of the Party of the proletariat – would be able to take control of much of the state and to render the workers' soviets into de facto bureaucrat-controlled 'soviets'. Bureaucracy does exist in all institutions including in the Party of the proletariat. However, the way to reducing party bureaucracy is to increase the percentage of the communist blue-collar workers in the membership composition of the party while keeping the percentage of the white-collar workers (bureaucrats and intellectuals) low in the membership composition. And yes, the blue-collar workers percentage membership in the party did greatly increase in the years after the October Revolution. The local soviets represent the government fragments that come together to form the republic of the soviets, whereas the Party of the proletariat is the proletarian institution that glues these fragments together and ensures coherence. Worse yet, the absence of a Party of the proletariat that is accountable to the proletarians will actually enhance the powers of the non-Party-affiliated government ministers and high-ranking ministry officials, and many of these ministry officials would constitute the very bureaucratic class against whom the proletariat shall struggle; the non-existence of a party accountable to the proletariat is the non-existence of a major obstacle in the face of such bureaucrats. The elevation of the Party of the proletariat above the government ministries ensures the accountability of potential bureaucrats towards the Party of the proletariat and hence to the proletariat. It elevates the proletariat above bureaucrats.

C2S9. The Roots of Trotskyism in MI6-backed Fascism and Kautskyism / Trotsky's ties to Ze'ev Jabotinsky

The origins of Leon Trotsky's ties to fascist intelligence networks go back to many years prior to the October Revolution. Besides his extremely suspicious ties to Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who would become known as the 'founding father' of

'Revisionist Zionism' and would serve as the MI6-backed Zionist aide to the Mussolini regime in the Betar Naval Academy in Fascist Italy, Trotsky cultivated deep ties to the Menshevik Kautskyites. Nikolayev, one of the local Zionist-affiliated Jews in Ukraine, recalled:

After the first pogrom the Jewish community was shrouded in deep mourning.. Two days later my elder brother, an active member of the local Social-Democratic party, told me that the head of the party wanted to talk to me... It was Trotsky; my brother let me in on a secret, informing me that Trotsky had returned from abroad and was conducting revolutionary activities throughout the Ukraine from Kiev.

From time to time he also visited Nikolayev to encourage the local revolutionaries who remained faithful to him from the days—years ago—when he had been their leader, as yet in his former name – Bronstein. Trotsky invited me into his room and asked me to give him a detailed report of the students' meeting which took place at the Technicum on the day of the pogrom. Instead of showing interest in the details of the pogrom and the reasons for the impotence of the Russian defenders, he asked me to relate to him as fully as I could the speeches and the deliberations of the students, and then, referring to the question of self-defense, informed me contentedly: "You should know that we have entered into an agreement with the heads of the local Zionists with the object of establishing a common self-defense organization. This will consist of your Zionist friends and members of the Russian Social-Democratic party. You and your brother will serve as liaison officers between our forces and those of the Zionists.

It is my request that, as soon as new outbreaks occur, you should hasten to my apartment to receive full instructions, as the situation will warrant." Indeed, a week later members of the Black Hundred in our town made an attempt to organize a new pogrom, but this time they were met by strong and well-organized defense forces.. Trotsky's apartment served as headquarters. The first news we received by telephone was quite encouraging, but at noon the pogromists were joined by a number of policemen and armed cossacks, and the defenders applied to headquarters with a request for more arms Trotsky provided arms to all places attacked.. However, later on disappointment set in, for our belief that our "ally," the Russian Social-Democrats, personified by the great and famous revolutionary Trotsky, would supply us with most of the arms needed for our defense, had been misplaced.. Two days later, when I called again on Trotsky and raised before him the matter of arms supply, he had this advice to proffer:

"I am informed from reliable sources that your leader Jabotinsky has successfully organized the Jewish self-defense group in Odessa and that it is provided with plenty of arms. Apply to him and ask him to allot at least part of this supply for your branch organization." Having no alternative, we decided to send a delegation to Jabotinsky without delay asking for his assistance. (My Meeting with Trotsky in Matters Relating to Jewish Self-Defense, HaBoker (Tel Aviv), Nahum Yerushalmi, January 6, 1950. Cited in: 'Trotsky and the Jews', Joseph Nedava, pp. 60-61) (IMG)

While Ze'ev Jabotinsky's death squads and the anti-Semitic pogromists were both agents of fascist finance capital, they did officially oppose each other, because Jabotinsky promoted a Jewish supremacist line and the pogromists were anti-Semitic. The superficial contradiction between the Jabotinsky ideology and the anti-Jew terrorists could be exploited and arms could be obtained from that terrorist for a real self-defense against pogroms. To exploit such a contradiction for anti-fascist purposes is to pursue a correct policy line. However, considering Trotsky's consistently pro-fascist intelligence service activity, the military ties to Jabotinsky are unlikely to have been for self-defense against pogroms and probably had ulterior motives. Forget not that Jabotinsky at some point ended up as a military ally of Petlura, the head of the pogromist White Guards.

Leon Trotsky used his left-opportunist phrase-mongering to spearhead the struggle against communism in an alliance with the right. Indeed, Lenin himself said that Trotsky was the uniter of the (left-opportunist and right-opportunist) enemies of communism:

Trotsky groups all the enemies of Marxism.. Trotsky unites all to whom ideological decay is dear, all who are not concerned with the defence of Marxism; all philistines who do not understand the reasons for the struggle and who do not wish to learn, think, and discover the ideological roots of the divergence of views. At this time of confusion, disintegration, and wavering it is easy for Trotsky to become the 'hero of the hour' and gather all the shabby elements around himself, the more openly this attempt is made, the more spectacular will be the defeat. (Letter to the Russian Collegium of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, Marxist Internet Archive, Lenin, 1910)

Trotsky was infamous for his deliberate vacillations and in the fact that he was the bridge between the rightist Mensheviks and the traitorous elements among the Bolsheviks. Lenin wrote with regards to the year 1903:

At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik. (Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity, Lenin, 1914. MIA) (IMG)

In the period 1904-1905, Trotsky:

deserted the Mensheviks and occupied a vacillating position, . now proclaiming his absurdly Left “permanent revolution” theory. (Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity, Lenin, 1914. MIA) (IMG)
A CIA Office Memorandum admitted:

Prior to the actual establishment of the Fourth International, the basis for its existence was created by the rift among the leaders in the Russian Revolution of 1917. Pre-revolution maneuvering among the Russian Marxists had produced the right wing Mensheviks and the left wing Bolsheviks, the latter headed by Lenin. Trotsky, in 1910, had placed himself in a position between those extremes. In 1917 he aligned himself with the Bolsheviks. (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

As confirmed by Lenin, the left-deviationist Trotsky had formed an alliance with the right-deviation as early as February 1917 in order to undermine the so-called ‘Zimmerwald Left’, the alliance of anti-imperialist progressives and communists. Lenin said:

What a swine this Trotsky is – **Left phrases, and a bloc with the Right against the Zimmerwald Left!!** He ought to be exposed (by you) if only in a brief letter to *Sotsial-Demokrat!* (To: Alexandra Kollontai, Vladimir Lenin, February 17, 1917. Bold added.) (IMG)

Before then, Trotsky had formed a bloc with the right-deviation in the labour movement in 1912:

In the period of disintegration, after long “non-factional” vacillation, he again went to the right, and in August 1912, he entered into a bloc with the liquidators. He has now deserted them again. (Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity, Lenin, 1914. MIA) (IMG)

As can be seen, **Leon Trotsky, the leftist reactionary, had formed an alliance with the rightist reaction as part of the general secret service strategy of pincer assault on communist centrism.** The left-wing Menshevik Trotsky would attack anti-imperialism from the left, whereas the right-wing Mensheviks would attack it from the right. The leftist reaction would attack it for not being ‘communistic enough’ whereas the rightist reaction would attack it for being ‘too communistic’.

Since Trotsky was a Menshevik who at times made himself appear as a Bolshevik, he could be an excellent channel for Menshevik infiltration into the Bolshevik movement. And since the Mensheviks were serving the MI6 (see, for example, C4S4), what more natural than that Trotsky, the Menshevik infiltrator into the Bolshevik movement, would be an agent of the MI6 as well! And he was. At the time, the Bolsheviks accepted Trotsky's fake 'defection' away from the Mensheviks because through Trotsky, they were able to pit the left-wing Mensheviks against the mainstream, right-wing Mensheviks. Hence, the acceptance of Trotsky into the Bolshevik movement helped to engineer division among the Mensheviks. Therefore, initially, the acceptance of Trotsky was beneficial. It was no mistake. However, the course of the war damaged the Bolshevik movement, thereby giving greater leverage to Trotsky, which is what allowed him to commit his sabotage. The split engineered between the left-wing Mensheviks and the right-wing Mensheviks undoubtedly assisted the Bolshevik war effort, weakened the enemies of the Bolsheviks, and thereby prevented further damage from being caused to the socialist Soviet state.

In any case, in spite of the advantages of securing the defection of the left-wing Mensheviks and containing the left-wing Mensheviks inside the Party of the proletariat rather than allowing the Mensheviks to have a large troop count, the disadvantages obviously existed. Through the MI6 agent Trotsky, a counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet Trotskyite intelligence service continued its operations and was presented as the series of intelligence directorates of the Red Army. In particular, through infiltrating his operatives into the counter-intelligence sector, which was the most critical of the intelligence service branches since it was the branch meant to hunt down spies and traitors, the MI6 agent Trotsky compromised and undermined a portion of the Soviet Union's covert line of defense against enemy infiltration. The CIA reported:

Trotsky ... organized the Red Army and its military and counterintelligence components. (...). His entire adult life in the conspirational underground had been a rehearsal for revolutionary counterintelligence.

The bulky folders of his correspondence of 1917 to 1921 include many messages which reveal his dominant position in starting the Soviet secret services. He recruited and placed in the Red Army political commissars as adjuncts or staffers of the military intelligence units. In addition, he commandeered Cheka representatives for joint operations with the political commissars and the Red Army intelligence staffs. (‘LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD’, Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: ‘STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE’, Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 16-17) (IMG)

Thus, when we speak of Trotsky, we speak not of just one man but a faction, a network of agents. And let it be known that they did not distinguish based on class, so long as it was a reactionary class; they served the kulaks, feudal lords, slave-owners, bureaucrats, comprador mercantile bourgeoisie, comprador financial bourgeoisie. imperialist finance capital, imperialist mercantile capital, etc. Ultimately, Trotskyism served finance capital but like all reactionary currents, was not particularly limited to being based on finance capital per se.

Over time, Lenin, who already despised Trotsky, expanded the role of Joseph Stalin. The anti-Soviet Ian Grey, a Naval Intelligence officer of the British Empire and British Parliamentary official, admitted:

At the start of the war, Trotsky had exercised wide independent authority; by the time of the Polish War, he was to be found in Moscow and directly under Lenin's control.

Increasingly, Lenin had come to rely on Stalin, who was in most things the antithesis of Trotsky. He rarely addressed the troops or meetings of any kind, but when he did, he spoke in simple terms. He was the realist, who coldly assessed men and situations, and was usually sound in his conclusions. He remained calm and self-possessed. He was difficult only in his antagonisms toward certain people and when his advice was rejected. While demanding that others obey orders, he himself did not hesitate on occasions to be insubordinate, for he readily set his judgment above that of others. But he learned, too, that in war, a supreme commander, exercising unquestioned authority, was essential to victory. He never forgot this lesson. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Trotsky, himself agreeing that Joseph Stalin played a critical role in ensuring the victory of the communists during the Civil War, placed Stalin in charge of many war affairs:

In later years, when seeking every pretext to denigrate Stalin, Trotsky wrote contemptuously of his role in the Civil War. It is clear, however, from contemporary sources, including Trotsky's papers, that he had then rated Stalin high as a military organizer. In times of crisis when party interests and the revolutionary cause transcended personal rivalries, he turned to him. During the Polish War, for example, when anxious about an attack by Wrangel from the Crimea, Trotsky recommended that "Comrade Stalin should be charged with forming a new military council with Egorov or Frunze as commander by agreement between the Commander-in-Chief and Comrade Stalin." On other occasions, he made or supported similar proposals to send Stalin to resolve crucial problems at the fronts. Like Lenin and other members of the Central Committee, he had come to value Stalin's abilities. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Referring to Stalin's character traits, Ian Grey continued:

Stalin emerged from the Civil War and the Polish War with a greatly enhanced reputation. He had made mistakes but so, too, had others. To the people generally, he was still not well known. He was rarely in the public eye and, unlike Trotsky, he did not court publicity. Within the party, he was known as the quiet and incisive man of action, a leader of decision and authority. In the immense task facing the government, of reorganizing the country after the years of war and revolution, he was clearly a man who would bear special responsibilities. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The experience of the Civil War made a profound impact on Stalin. It broadened his knowledge of himself and his abilities. For the first time, he had responsibility on a vast scale, and he found that he could carry it and, indeed, was stimulated by it. But this self-knowledge came in conditions of complete brutalization. He had witnessed the bread war when villages and whole towns were wiped out in the struggle to ensure grain deliveries to the north. He had been schooled in the principle that the party's purposes must be pursued, no matter what the cost in human lives. Now he had seen people massacred in thousands in the struggle for the survival of the party and its government. The experience implanted more deeply in him that inhumanity which was to mark his exercise of power. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

C2S10. The 'Permanent Revolution', a Technique of Provoking an Imperialist Invasion / Trotskyite-Bukharinite Sabotage against Brest-Litovsk Peace / Bukharin's Terror Plot against Lenin and Sverdlov

For an invasion of the Soviet Union, the MI6 and other imperialist powers hostile to Soviet power, needed a pretext. The tactic to use for provoking such a pretext was to have the Trotskyite officers in the Soviet military command launch provocations against the USSR's neighbours, so that the imperialist encirclers of the USSR could obtain the excuse to invade the land of proletarian power. This technique of having rogue officers launch such provocations is an ancient technique and has never been limited to the Trotsky faction. However, Trotsky was the most prominent figure to give this ancient counter-revolutionary tactic of provoking invasions a 'communist' theoretical clothing.

A socialist state's refusal to outright invade capitalist or feudal countries, the Trotskyites claimed, was an abandonment of class struggle and hence a betrayal of the revolution. The establishment of socialism in one or few countries was impossible, they argued. The 'Permanent Revolution' this thesis of Trotsky's was called. As early as 1914, Lenin had condemned the vacillator Trotsky's 'Permanent Revolution' thesis as absurdly left-deviationist:

At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik, i.e., he deserted from the Iskristis to the Economists. He said that "between the old *Iskra* and the new lies a gulf". In 1904-05, he deserted the Mensheviks and occupied a vacillating position, now co-operating with Martynov (the Economist), now proclaiming his **absurdly Left "permanent revolution" theory**. (Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity, Lenin, 1914. MIA) (IMG)

As further corroboration of evidence, the MI6 report sheds light on the important truth about the clash between Lenin and Trotsky on this matter:

As regards international policy, Lenin holds the view that the best way to secure world revolution is to

compromise with the victorious Allies and to make concessions which would lead to the abandonment of intervention. It is for this reason, probably, that he authorised Litvinov to sound the Allies from Stockholm and to communicate with President Wilson. Litvinov has always belonged to the moderate wing, and is essentially one of Lenin's personal followers. Following Litvinov's proposals came the Prinkipo proposal. According to private information from Stockholm, which was probably an expression of Litvinov's views, the Prinkipo proposal would have the effect of strengthening the moderates represented by Lenin as against the extremists led by Trotski. No details are available about the debates that took place in Moscow before the answer to the Prinkipo proposal was telegraphed to the Allies, but Chicherin's answer would seem to be the expression of Lenin's views.

Lenin's disagreement with Trotski ... hinges ... on the question of tactics. The difference is now almost exactly the same as at the time of Brest-Litovsk. At that time Lenin favoured compromise and a "respite," while Trotski and others favoured violence, refusing to sign peace at all. Trotski now advocates world revolution by means of aggression, i.e., by means of the Red Army carrying the revolution into other countries. It is not that Lenin has changed his views. His desire for the world revolution and the class war is just as strong as Trotski's, but he thinks he can now succeed better by diplomacy and peaceful penetration than by open war. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 58) (IMG)

The MI6 report is in turn corroborated by an American intelligence document detailing the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

Leon Trotsky was sent to Brest-Litovsk in White Russia to negotiate with the representatives of the Central Powers for an Armistice. Trotsky was perhaps a poor choice. He was a devotee of permanent revolution. He believed that the revolution having been successful in Russia, revolt would follow in rather short order in the great industrial nations of the West. Therefore, Trotsky chose the occasion of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk to propagandise to the peoples of the West over the heads of their leaders. The Germans, and the Austro-Hungarian representatives listened to Trotsky for a while and then left in disgust. Trotsky left Brest-Litovsk with his famous statement, "Neither War nor Peace." Trotsky may have felt that there could be a situation where they could have "neither war nor peace," but the Germans did not agree with him and the forces of the Central Powers once more began to move to the East, thrusting on into the Ukraine, the Baltic States and West Russia. Lenin realized that peace immediately was absolutely essential to the preservation of his revolution. He therefore acted to persuade the party that Russia must sign [peace] at any cost. (HISTORY OF THE CPSU, CIA archives, p. 27) (IMG)

The attempts to sabotage the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was a Trotskyite tactic of having the German imperialists bogged down in the Soviet Union, so that on the one hand socialism would be damaged and on the other hand, the British Empire could splendidly 'stand outside' and watch as its Trotskyite agents used the Red Army forces as cannon-fodder against the German imperial rivals of Britain.

It is not difficult to imagine that had Trotsky's 'insane' argument of the military conquest of the world – among his many other insane or reactionary arguments – won out in intra-Party debates, the Soviet state had no chance for survival. And forget not: **that same Trotsky faction which sought to provoke an invasion of the USSR through such left-opportunism was the same Trotsky faction, which, when facing a British invasion, deliberately opened up the front to the British and Japanese invaders. It thus follows that the plan for 'invading' other countries was merely a provocation for actually providing the pretext for the invasion against the USSR much like how opening up the front was for the same purpose.** By contrast, it was precisely Lenin's common-sense call for diplomacy that made Soviet power a menace to imperialism. The MI6 agreed:

To the outsider, knowing Lenin's great intellectual powers, and remembering his skill in dealing with the Germans, it cannot but appear that Lenin's policy, if successful, would be far more dangerous to the stability of Europe than Trotski's. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), pp. 58-59) (IMG)

Precisely because Trotskyism helped counter the communist menace to imperialism, did the MI6 and the pro-British faction of the German intelligence as early as 1921, begin subsidizing Trotsky and his network. This is confirmed by an anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin oppositionist Grigori Tokaev who had infiltrated the Soviet state for quite some time and who later defected to Britain, providing his intelligence directly to the MI6. In 1956, when Khrushchev was rehabilitating numerous Trotskyites, Tokaev wrote in his memoirs:

Further, Trotsky, supposed originally to have inspired the formation of the 'bloc', had long since been linked with the Nazi secret service and the British intelligence service! On Trotsky's orders, Krestinsky, former Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, had been in the German service since 1921. Rozenholz, former People's Commissar of

Foreign Trade, joined the British service in 1926 and the German service in 1932. Rakovsky, one of the big figures of the Revolution, had served the British intelligence service since 1924, and the Japanese since 1934. And so on. All this Bukharin and Rykov had connived at, since they too were foreign agents. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 87) (IMG) Among those who have studied Soviet history, it is common knowledge that Krestinsky, Rozenholz, and Rakovsky were all close friends and associates of Trotsky, whereas Rykov was a close ally and associate of Bukharin. Bukharin and Trotsky and Co. had established a covert 'bloc' to conspire against Soviet power.

Since the establishment of the Soviet state, Bukharin too had joined forces with Trotsky in seeking to prevent the peace of Brest-Litovsk, going so far as to try to assassinate Lenin, Sverdlov, and Stalin. Regarding the attempts: in 1918 to upset the peace of Brest-Litovsk to overthrow the government and to assassinate Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov.. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG) the MI6 station in Moscow reported that Bukharin was the 'actual ringleader' in the scheme:

Bukharin was the actual ringleader though the scheme was first pronounced by Trotski, Pyatakov being designated by Bukharin to succeed learning as head of the proposed new Government of "Left Social Revolutionaries" and "Left Communists." (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG) Viscount Chilston was making such confessions (which were in favor of the USSR) from an anti-Soviet, anti-CPSU, and anti-Stalin perspective. Take the following quote as an example of the anti-Sovietism:

It would however be a mistake to assume that ... those who direct Soviet policy necessarily allow themselves to be influenced to any appreciable extent by purely logical considerations. With them the necessity of keeping up nervous tension inside the country, of providing with an excuse for past and probably also for future atrocities, carries far more weight than the importance of securing ... a certain standard of efficiency in the administrative and political body, the armed forces and the economic system. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 320) (IMG)

The MI6 agent Robert Conquest too confirmed:

But in the following year, Bukharin had led the "Left Communists" in opposition to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, in a struggle that at one time reached the point of tentative plans for Lenin's overthrow. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 16 -17) (IMG {Factional Conflict & Great Purge})

In 1917 Lenin had thought of Sverdlov as the natural successor.... (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 16) (IMG {Factional Conflict & Great Purge})

C2S11. Cooperatives in the Civil War / War Communism vs. Trotskyite Terror and Excesses

Once again, the MI6 document written by the General Staff of the War Office confirmed that Lenin was the moderating force in the Party unlike the terrorist extremist left-opportunist gang of Trotsky and Zinoviev. By promoting cooperatives in the Soviet economy, the Lenin faction was drawing the petit-bourgeois class towards an alliance with the proletariat, something which Trotsky and Zinoviev opposed:

Lenin's efforts to absorb the Co-operative Societies into Bolshevik institutions are of great importance. Evidence is carty on this point, but it appears that some form of working arrangement has been arrived at, which may well be important as the precedent for a "moderate Bolshevik" regime. This is generally accepted. This is generally accepted as being Lenin's present policy ("evolution of the revolution") in opposition to the continued militarist and terrorist policy of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and the Extraordinary Commissions. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), pp. 101-102) (IMG)

Again, recall that the petit-bourgeoisie are unwilling to risk their small businesses to combat finance capital. The cooperatives are a means of aggregating the petit-bourgeoisie's small businesses into collectively-owned big businesses. Big businesses can indeed afford to risk standing up against finance capital. Hence, aggregating the small businesses into collectively-owned big businesses was a means of engineering a radical change in the character of the urban shop-keepers, peasants, artisans, etc., not only elevating their material well-being, but also rendering them into a powerful class base for counteracting the agents of finance capital. The Trotsky- Zinoviev group, by contrast, missed no chance to block the road towards promoting cooperatives, for they were afraid of the threat posed by cooperatives to imperial interests.

While the policy of 'War Communism' was correct for the war, Trotskyite diversionary wedge-driving terror campaigns nonetheless were prevalent. Trotsky, as the head of the Red Army, interfered and pursued extremist measures in the war economy, some of which are outlined by MI6 operative Ian Grey below:

Faced with the stark problems of the economy and the survival of the Soviet regime, Lenin and his colleagues

at first thought the system of war communism would provide the answer. Trotsky was a fanatic exponent of this view. His plan, first presented in Pravda in December 1919, was approved initially by the Central Committee, but many party members argued strenuously against it. The plan provided for "the mobilization of the industrial proletariat, liability for labour service, militarization of economic life, and the use of military units for economic needs." He insisted that labor must be subject to the same strict discipline as the Red Army. Wholly authoritarian in outlook and without the least understanding of or feeling for human needs and emotions, he set about imposing this discipline. The immediate result was an angry storm of protest and rebellion. The Third Red Army was on his orders redesignated "The First Revolutionary Army of Labor" and assigned to labor duties in the Urals. The soldiers deserted. Peasants, infuriated by the takeover of their districts by labor armies, burned the crops as they were gathered.

Trotsky came into direct conflict with the trade unions. He had plunged into the task of restoring the railway system, and overruling the objections of the union, he had mobilized the railwaymen under army discipline. Then, again in the face of union opposition, he had set up his own transport authority, the Central Transport Committee, known as Tsektran. His overbearing treatment of this union and his threats that he would deal likewise with other unions infuriated unionist members of the party. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Again, the purpose of the MI6 agent Trotsky from such a campaign of terror was to drive a wedge between the working class and the peasantry on the one hand, and the workers' state on the other hand. It was a conspiracy aimed at provoking uprisings against the Soviet state.

C2S12. The Spread of the Revolution to Germany, France, Czechoslovakia / The Case of Hungary's 'Soviet' Republic
Revolutionary class warfare, Lockhart said, was popular in all countries. Communism in particular was a far greater danger to the imperialist powers of Europe:

In the article in the "New Europe" in May of this year, Professor Pares states that there are only two ideas in this war: one, the German idea of world-domination, and, two, the national idea of people's rights and people's frontiers. There is, however, a third idea, which is certainly not novel but which has gained considerable popularity in **all countries** since the war, namely the international idea of class warfare and anti-capitalism. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36. Bold added) (IMG)

Again:

It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Bolshevism is now a far greater danger to Europe than German militarism. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

After all, it was Bolshevism that was assisting or even instigating revolutionary proletarian uprisings in Europe, and bourgeois-democratic anti-imperialist uprisings in the colonized world. Hence:

the force of Bolshevism as an idea should not be under-estimated. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

A top US intelligence memorandum by American general Francis Joseph Kernan, referring to the influence of communism in Europe, stated:

Communitistic views are not a new thing. The terrific outburst in Russia and the more recent happenings in other parts of Central Europe signify an extraordinary condition of the masses brought about by generations of misgovernment and suddenly intensified beyond further endurance by nearly five years of war. In this view, the great cause of the apparent spread of Bolshevism in Europe is to be found in the despairing and wretched condition of its masses. It is not progressing in these days by force of arms but through propaganda falling upon ground prepared by long years of misery and culminating in the hardships of the great war. Therefore, if the normal life of the world can be restored, accompanied by such bettered living conditions as will enable the masses to have not merely enough bread to keep body and soul together, but some little share in the ordinary happiness of humankind, Bolshevism will be stopped. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace'. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April 11, 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", pp. 275-280. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

The October Revolution caused a strategic earthquake across the planet. Everywhere emerged communist or progressive anti-imperialist revolutions, covertly and/or overtly backed by the newborn Soviet state:

Whatever may be Lenin's policy as regards Russia herself, it is clear that he looks upon his mother country

merely as the most fertile ground for his experiments. A general European revolution on a class basis is, and always has been, his goal, and it is from this angle only that Bolshevism should be viewed. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918, p. 36) (IMG)

Regarding Germany, the MI6 reported:

[Lenin's] great hope is fixed on the German Socialist party, which is strong and well-disciplined and which might conceivably make a success of social revolution. While his foreign policy has been governed by playing off the Central Powers and the Allies against each other, he has never ceased to endeavour to strengthen his position with the German Socialist party. It was in order to strengthen his position with that party that he maintained such a bitter propaganda against the Allies, and his main task has been to exist until the German Socialists should follow his example. He has done much propaganda in Germany both before and since the revolution, and he has many friends amongst the German Socialist party. In this connection it is significant to note how the British press denounces Lenin as a traitor and in the same breath lauds Liebknecht to the skies as a genuine Socialist, and almost indeed as a hero. It should be recognised at once that Lenin and Liebknecht represent one and the same thing, and that the latter is as great a danger to Europe as the former. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

The US intelligence too reported:

Liebknecht, Franz Mehring and other ultra-radical socialist leaders in Germany are speaking everywhere denouncing Scheidemann and attempting to incite the German proletariat to immediate revolution. They have sent greetings to the Bolsheviks and Liebknecht has announced that the Soviet Government has promised him all possible assistance. (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

Communist influence was also increasing in France and Italy:

9. Dr. Herron reports that propaganda agents of the Bolsheviks with millions of dollars at their disposal have been sent to Italy and France.

10. The Milan Chamber of Labor has begun a movement to promote a general strike, which would be Bolshevik in character.

11. At the meeting of the Socialist Federation of the Seine on September 29, the former Minority of the French Socialist Party, which is led by Longuet and is semi-Bolshevik in character, became the Majority, obtaining 5,999 votes for its resolution, whereas the former Majority led by Renaudel obtained only 2,896 votes and the "40" led by Albert Thomas and Varenne obtained only 4 votes. (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 565-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

Communism was about to reach the industrial capitalist Czechoslovakia as well. A prominent 1918 US intelligence document written by the militant anti-communist US State Department representative William Christian Bullitt stated:

President Kramarz of the Czecho-Slovak National Council who is now in Berne reports that "there is grave danger of Bolshevism in Bohemia, not from Radical Socialism, but from famine." (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

As one may expect, through a combination of bribe-and-blackmail, the communist labour movements in all those countries were eventually defeated; the most famous case is of course that of the German revolution.

Some may argue that Hungary too experienced a communist revolution at the time. Not true. The MI6 agreed that communism was not really popular in Hungary, and that rather Bela Kun and his gang launched a coup:

Towards the end of March ... Bela Kun and other Bolshevik leaders were released from prison and assumed the control of affairs, and made attempts to establish communication with the Soviet leaders at Moscow.

Hungary, however, is a country even less propitious for the growth of Bolshevism than Germany. The population is mainly agrarian and anti-communistic, and all the evidence tends to show that the outbreak at Budapest was a *coup d'état* engineered from nationalistic motives under the pressure of the treatment of the country at the hands of the Allies. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 104) (IMG)

Corroborating the above observation, the US intelligence reported:

There have been serious riots in Budapest, but they have not yet become Bolshevist in character. Count Karolyi at present controls the situation,⁶ but the following excerpt from the [Berlin] Vossische Zeitung of October 31 will give some idea of the power of the Budapest mob:

“The Budapest eastern railway station was occupied by the crowd where two battalions leaving for the front joined the mob. Civilians were also arrested by the mob, which having pillaged the arms factory had enormous amounts of arms and munitions. Budapest infantry regiment number 32 mutinied and placed itself at the disposal of the Republic. The military prison was stormed and all political and military prisoners released. The Commandant of Budapest was put in prison by Hungarian soldiers.” (Subject: The Bolshevist Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

Chapter 3

C3S1. Bolshevism in Murmansk

Referring to “The Political Situation at Archangel and Murmansk,” an intelligence report by Britain’s General Staff of the War Office admitted:

There is no doubt that there is a certain amount of latent Bolshevist feeling among the inhabitants, which is only restrained by the presence of Allied troops. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: “PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS”, Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 108) (IMG)

The British intelligence report continued:

In the Murmansk area evidence of Bolshevist sympathy among the inhabitants has been somewhat stronger. On the 23rd March, the anniversary of the revolutionary massacres in Petrograd, risings on a considerable scale were to have taken place at Murmansk, Kandalashka, Kem, and Soroka, and these were only averted by timely information which enabled the authorities to take precautionary measures. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: “PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS”, Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 108) (IMG)

Hence with the backing of the people of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, Soviet power was established in those zones. Furthermore, referring to “Archangel and the region of Odessa”, a US intelligence memorandum by anti-Soviet American commander Francis J. Kernan states:

it must be remembered that the Soviet Government claims sovereignty over those areas and its military operations there can be accounted for on the ground of national defense and wholly apart from any schemes of forcible propaganda. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace’. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April, 11 1919. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, pp. 275-280. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

C3S2. The Progressive Bourgeois-Democratic State in Bulgaria

On the other hand, there arose a progressive bourgeois-democratic revolutionary government in Bulgaria:

A peasant socialist Republic has been established in Bulgaria under the leadership of Stambuliwsky, a peasant socialist leader who was in jail throughout the Radislavov regime. This new Government of Bulgaria may or may not become Bolshevist in character. (Subject: The Bolshevist Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

The new progressive Bulgarian government established friendly relations with the USSR. As confirmed by the infamous American spy Ruth Fischer of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC),

Stamboliyski maintained cordial relations with Soviet Russia. Following the line set in November 1922 by the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern, the Bulgarian party under Georgi Dimitrov cautiously avoided the sharpening of the conflict between the restless country and the government. (Stalin and German Communism, Ruth Fischer, 1948, p. 307) (IMG)

The communist faction of Dimitrov was not opposed to the Bulgarian government. However, the Trotskyites opposed it. Giving his usual junk analysis, Trotsky said that the Stamboliyski government was bad, that the communist forces in Bulgaria were the strongest and the bourgeois parties were thoroughly discredited, but that the communists lost anyways:

In the last few days we have had an example of the failure of a revolution for which the premises were favourable. I mean the revolution in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government, which came to power by a *coup d’etat*, is upheld by Wrangelite bayonets. The political parties which made the *coup d’etat* constitute a very small force. The Communists are strong. The majority of the country and the peasantry, almost 100 per cent, are against the Tsankov government. Given any degree of serious preparation, we could, in the opinion of comrades who know Bulgaria (I also have some knowledge of the country, from personal observation, but that was a long time ago: my last visit to Bulgaria was in 1913) – according to all the evidence, we could have been victorious in Bulgaria, but this has not happened. Why not? The social and political premises were present. The bourgeois parties had thoroughly discredited themselves. They were replaced by the Peasants’ Party. The leadership of this party, the Stambulisky Government, discredited themselves. All sympathies shifted Leftward and were transferred to the Communist Party. The enemy’s armed forces were infinitesimal. And yet we were beaten. (The Present Situation and Our Tasks in Building The Army: Report to the 3rd All-Union Conference of Political Workers in the Red Army and the Red Navy, Leon Trotsky, October 21, 1923. MIA) (IMG)

Thus:

On June 9, 1923, the Stamboliyski cabinet was overthrown by an army coup ... led by Professor Alexander Tsankov, who, discreetly encouraged by certain British advisors, had formed the Democratic Entente, comprising the intelligentsia, the Social Democratic Party, and the League of Active Officers (patronized by King Boris II, well known for his pro-German [pro-Nazi] and anti-Bolshevik sympathies. (Stalin and German Communism, Ruth Fischer, 1948, p. 307) (IMG)

That Trotsky would side with the MI6 coup installing a fascist regime is not surprising. Note also the role of the Bulgarian intelligentsia in collaborating with the pro-Nazi Tsar Boris II in overthrowing the Stamboliyski faction.

C3S3. The War in Poland / Trotskyite and Luxembourguite Sabotage / The so-called 'Communist Party of Poland'

The territory which the mainstream media refers to as 'Soviet-occupied' 'Eastern Poland' is more accurately to be described as 'Polish regime-occupied' 'Western USSR'. The facts from US intelligence confirm this. "On December 2, [1919,] with Mr. Polk present," the US intelligence reported, "the Supreme Council approved the following declaration":

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, recognizing that it is desirable as soon as possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of political uncertainty in which the Polish Nation is placed, and without pre-judging the provisions which must in the future define the eastern frontiers of Poland, hereby declare that they recognize the right of the Polish Government to proceed, according to the conditions previously provided by the Treaty with Poland of June 28, 1919, to organize a regular administration of the former Russian Empire situated to the West of the line described below:

From the point where the old frontier between Russia and Austria-Hungary meets the Bug River, down the Bug northwards to the point where it is met by the administrative boundary between the districts of Bielsk and Brest Litovsk; following that boundary northwards to the point where it forms an acute angle about 9 kilometers north-east of Mielnik; north-eastwards along a line to be determined on the ground, leaving to Poland the villages of Wierpole, Stolbce, Pleszczatka and Wolka, and cutting the Bielsk-Brest-Litovsk railway at the point where it crosses the road between Vysoko-Litovsk and Kleszczeli, reaching the Lesna-Prawa at the point where it is crossed by the north-south forest road passing about 2 kilometers to the west of Skupowo; northwards along a line to be determined on the ground along the above-mentioned forest road to the point where the Narew-Narewka road cuts the Hainowka-Swislocz railway; north-eastwards along a line to be determined on the ground to a point 4 kilometers north of Jalowka where the river passing through that city joins the Swislocz River; following the Swislocz downstream, then the Laszanka and the Likowka upstream to a point about one and one-half kilometers west of Baranowo; north-north-westwards to a point on the Grodno-Kuznitsa railway about 500 meters north-west of the junction of Kielbasin; north-west to a point on the course of the Lososna River about two and one-half kilometers south-west of its confluence with the Niemen; following the course of the Lososna downstream, then that of the Niemen downstream, then that of the Igorka upstream to its source, passing Warsawski; west-south-westwards to a point on the course of the Cheernohanya (Marycha) River near Sztudjanka, along a line on the left bank to be determined on the ground; the course of Chenhanya upstream to a point about two and one-half kilometers east of Zelwa; northwards along a line to be determined on the ground to a point on the Berzniki-Kopciowwa road situated two kilometers south-east of Berzniki; north-westwards along a line to be determined on the ground generally parallel to the line of small lakes situated between Berzniki and Zegary, about 2 kilometers to the east of these lakes; westwards to a point on Galadusya Lake about two kilometers north of Zergaary, crossing that lake to its extreme north-western point, leaving the city of Pusk to Poland, and reaching the northern boundary of the province of Suwalki at the southernmost point of the salient about 7 kilometers north-west of Pusk; northwards along the boundary of the province of Suwalki to the point where it meets the old frontier between Russia and East Prussia.

The rights which Poland may be able to prove over the territories situated to the east of the said line are expressly reserved. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, pp. 15 -16. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Though approved on December 2, the declaration was officially announced on December 8:

This declaration, dated December 8, 1919 and signed by Clemenceau, was communicated to the Polish Government.

The line of December 8, which later came to be known as the "Curzon Line", extended southward only as far as the northern border of Eastern Galicia. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 16. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

As confirmed by American intelligence, British Foreign Secretary George Curzon and British Prime Minister Lloyd George, the architects of the Curzon line, held that the "legitimate ethnographic frontiers" meant "extending no further east than the [Curzon] line":

While the line laid down by the Peace Conference, afterwards known as the Curzon line because the British note of July 11 was signed by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, was proposed only as an armistice line and not as a final frontier, the references to the withdrawal of Polish armies “from Russian Soil” (i.e., to the line of December 8) and to the defense of Poland “within its legitimate ethnographic frontiers” (i.e., extending no further east than the line of December 8) indicated that the British Government regarded that line as a proper basis for a final frontier settlement between Poland and Russia. Statements made at the time in Parliament by Lord Curzon and Lloyd George confirm that interpretation. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 19. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Therefore, even Britain agreed that the territory to the east of the Curzon Line did not belong to Poland. The Polish settler-colonial regime violated international law and refused to accept such a thing. The Polish settler-colonists, led by Pilsudski, envisioned the ‘Intermarium’, a greater Polish settler-colonial regime emerging out of the Polish conquest of Ukraine, the Baltics, and several Balkan nations. The settler-colonial proto-empire was to be called a ‘confederation’ in order to get a democratic guise and was to be used as a means of containing the Soviet Union and a Germany that could potentially be a rival to American, British and/or French interests. Although such a project as Intermarium eventually won the support of the Anglo-Americans, the French became most known for supporting it at that time. Indeed:

The French ... were persisting in their attempts to form a “defensive” anti-Bolshevik Alliance including Poland, Rumania and the Baltic nations.. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 18. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Like many fascists in Europe, the Pilsudski gang had their roots in the Kautskyite drift-away from Poland’s socialist labour movement:

Partly as a result of the Constitutional Manifesto of 1905, which caused a decline in popular support for the PPS and other socialist groups in Russian Poland, the PPS itself split in 1906 into two factions – the PPS “Revolutionary Faction” under the leadership of Jozef Pilsudski, and the “PPS-Left,” whose program became gradually more analogous to that of the SDKPiL. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 4) (IMG) the Pilsudski “Revolutionary” faction thus drifted away from socialism in its quest for national liberation.. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

the PPS "revolutionary faction" under Pilsudski became more and more absorbed with the struggle for national liberation, and used the factor of nationalism to gain the support of the majority of the Polish working class. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

To this end, Pilsudski and his gang advocated ‘Prometheism’, the Polish bourgeois-nationalist attempt to sow division among the nations that would later constitute the USSR. The Pilsudski regime thus embarked upon an aggressive adventure against Soviet power. As described by American intelligence:

Pilsudski planned to support an “independent” Ukrainian state (including former Russian territory but not Eastern Galicia), which was to be federated with Poland and to serve as a buffer against Russia. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 17. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Pilsudski had an important ally in Ukraine: the Ukrainian fascist bandits headed by Petlura. In the words of the CIA:

Petlura’s aim was to preserve the independence of the newly styled (Eastern) Ukrainian Republic against the Bolshevik government which, at that time, was fighting against the White armies. (Background, S- Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 1. In: “QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014”, CIA.) (IMG)

Like Pilsudski, Petlura too emerged from Kautskyite circles in Ukraine, bloody fascist assassins who adopted ‘democratic’ and ‘progressive’ policy lines in order to more easily infiltrate the socialist labour movement. However, Petlura and his gang ended up being far more blatant in their fascism and decided to give up their Kautskyite ‘socialist’ mask. Lacking much popular support among the Ukrainian people, their social base was limited to a hand full of fascist intellectuals and some Eastern Galician troops. Indeed, an intelligence report by the General Staff of the British War Office confirmed:

The Ukrainian Directorate formed by Vinnichenko and Petlura in December, 1918, represented the Left Social Revolutionaries and stood for a nationalistic, anti-Russia and anti-Bolshevist policy, has shown itself entirely incapable. Its national programme proved to be based on nothing but a few intellectuals and a few Eastern Galician troops. Its social programme resulted in a divergence of view between Vinnichenko, who inclined to a compromise with the Bolsheviks, and Petlura, who insisted on complete independence. In these circumstances the Directorate commanded little authority in the Ukraine. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: “PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS”, Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 102) (IMG)

By contrast, Ukraine was a favorable ground for communism:

As has already been indicated, the Ukraine in many respects provides a favourable ground for Bolshevism, and it should be borne in mind that there is at least a possibility of the Bolsheviks seeking in the south for support and fresh inspiration for their *regime*, and of their turning away from Central and Northern Russia, where the practical meaning of “Bolshevism” is now well realised. It is noteworthy that the same organised terrorism [of the Trotsky-Zinoviev group] is not applied to the *intelligentzia* and *bourgeoisie* in the Ukraine as was the case in Central and Northern Russia. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: “PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS”, Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 102) (IMG)

It is often said that the ethnic Ukrainians were ‘sympathetic’ to fascism and ‘antipathic’ to Bolshevism. The evidence demonstrates the contrary. A minority of Ukrainians residing in the mountainous regions, economically and societally underdeveloped, were staunchly sympathetic to fascism, and were removed from their residence by the Soviet intelligence service during the 1946-1947 Operation VISTULA. The majority of the Ukrainians remained sympathetic to Bolshevism, however. Ukraine, a fertile territory with great potential for the development of the productive forces, had some progressive classes advancing with the advancement of the productive forces. As such, it emerged as a zone favourable to communism. The above-cited document is one example of evidence of Ukraine’s pro-communist potential. As well, a prominent US intelligence document written by the militant anti-communist US State Department representative William Christian Bullitt, summed up reports in 1918 as follows:

Reports from the Baltic Provinces, Poland and Ukraine indicate that an outbreak of Bolshevism is expected when the German army of occupation is withdrawn. (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG) Information provided by an American intelligence agent were recorded in a US intelligence document, an excerpt of which is provided here. The US intelligence report confirmed that the Polish regime regarded the Galician Ukrainians as the ‘fifth column’ of the Soviets:

The Poles ... believed that the Galician Ukrainians represented a disloyal Soviet fifth column in their midst. (“Subject: Stephen BANDERA and the ZChouN (Foreign Section of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists).”, From: “SR/W2”, To: “SR/WC/[], SR/DC/[], EE/SSS/[]”, January 13, 1952, p. 4. In: “QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0011.pdf”, CIA) (IMG {Poland – 1939})

Thus, referring to the Ukrainians of ‘Eastern Poland’, another American intelligence document added:

Union with the Soviet Ukraine would seem to be a more natural association for them than a return to Polish rule, which has a long record of bitterness and failure. (POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER: ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARIES, US Intelligence (in CIA archives), March 26, 1943, p. 10) (IMG {Poland – 1939})

In 1940, the British intelligence station in Bucharest reported on the Ukrainians of Bessarabia:

Roumanian rule has been corrupt and unpopular, and the province has been more neglected by the Administration than almost any other [province]. The Russian and Ukrainian element have long wanted “our people” to come and take them over. The Jews, who form a large percentage of the total population of 2 million in the territories transferred, are hated by and hate the Roumanians, and have pronounced tendency to communism. Roumanian officials admit that a good many villages hunt out the red flag and . according to official communique, many thousands of people have tried to go back to Bessarabia since it was occupied [by the Red Army]. (N 6751/9/37, Sir R. Hoare to Viscount Halifax, Bucharest, July 2, 1940. Received: August 8, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 251. In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 275) (IMG {Nazi-Soviet Pact Era})

Back in 1919, the MI6 further predicted that the communists will continue to have the support of the Ukrainian people and the peasantry of the Russian Empire in general:

In the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks have undoubtedly derived large supplies from their newly-conquered territory, and for some time to come it is probable that they will receive considerable support from the lower masses of the peasantry who were deprived by the Germans and Skoropadsky of the lands they had seized. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: “PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS”, Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 102) (IMG)

The peasant however, must have land. He really requires it to live, and for years almost every party has encouraged him to expect it. The Bolsheviks gave him the land – not exactly as he desired, perhaps, and without any very great security of tenure, but still without any restriction or delay. Skillfully nursed by Bolshevik propaganda, and warned by the concrete example of the Skoropadsky regime in Ukraine, he believes that counter-revolution means the restoration of the land to the landowners, and as all other parties urge him to break the Brest treaty he prefers with his limited understanding a regime which gives him both land and peace to a regime

which he does not know, and which will send him back to the trenches. The result of the German occupation in the Ukraine is an example and a warning of what one may expect from a reactionary and purely military intervention in Russia. The peasant, it is true, objects strongly to the Bolshevik requisitions of grain and foodstuffs. This may lead to trouble in the future, but in his present disorganized state it is unwise to hope too much from the peasant as an anti-Bolshevik element. He might welcome a deliverer who would relieve his wants, but he will, and can do little on his own account. And certainly he does not want to do any more fighting either for himself or for anyone else. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918, p. 35) (IMG)

Lacking popular support in Ukraine, Petlura could only rely on foreign powers, in this case, the Polish regime backed by France's government:

Petlura ... therefore threw in his lot with the government of the newly emerging Polish republic, whose leaders were also ideologically opposed to the Soviet regime. (Background, S-Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 1. In: "QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014", CIA.) (IMG)

Petlura established an alliance with the Polish state. In December 1919, Andre LEVITSKY [another prominent Ukrainian fascist] renounced all claims of the Petlura government to the Western (Polish) Ukraine and was promised support by the Poles against Soviet Russia. Petlura, his government, and his army moved into Poland. In April 1920, shortly before the outbreak of the Polish-Bolshevik war, LEVITSKY signed the Petlura-Polish military alliance. Prof. Alexander SHULGIN was instrumental in bringing the alliance about. (Background, S-Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 2. In: "QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014", CIA.) (IMG)

A top US intelligence memorandum prepared for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, was written by the prominent anti-Soviet military commander Francis Joseph Kernan, who was based in Paris, France, the country that sponsored Petlura. The American general admitted that the Soviets were not the aggressors in the war, but rather the Polish were the invaders against the USSR:

Although the common report and the common talk in Poland constantly spoke of Bolshevik aggression against Poland, I could get no evidence to that effect whatever. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the desultory skirmishing along the Eastern frontiers of Poland represents an aggressive effort of the Poles to extend their military occupation as far as possible and as quickly as possible into Russia. The ease with which they have done this proves conclusively that no strong organized Soviet force has been opposing the Poles. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace'. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April 11, 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", pp. 278-280. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

With French blessing:

The Polish campaign in the spring of 1920 was at first successful, and the army of Pilsudski reached Kiev in May. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 18. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Along with their Polish allies:

Petlura's troops participated in the Ukrainian campaign against Russia (1920).. (Background, S -Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 1. In: "QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014", CIA.) (IMG)

However:

the Bolsheviks, having disposed of the "white" armies of Kolchak and Denikin, were able to turn the tide against the Poles and to drive them back rapidly toward Lwow and Warsaw. Poland then made an appeal to the western powers for assistance. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 18. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

And according to US intelligence:

Petlura's troops ... were defeated together with the Polish army. At this juncture, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Socialists and Social-Democrats who felt their concept of independence for both the Eastern and the Western Ukraine betrayed, broke with Petlura. The Social-Democrats MAZEPA replaced MK by Viecheslav PROKOPOVICH, and Petlura established his government in Warsaw. Andre Levitsky took PROKOPOVICH's post late in 1920, and moved up to Chief of State after Petlura had been assassinated in Paris (1926) by the Ukrainian Jew SCHWARZBARD who wanted to avenge the pogroms for which he held Petlura's army responsible. Petlura's government-in-exile was recognized only by Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. (Background, S-Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 1. In: "QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014", CIA.) (IMG)

The decision to expel the Polish aggressors was not controversial among the communist leaders, but the decision to launch a counter-offensive towards Warsaw, thus entering Polish soil, did spark controversy.

The problem was not so much with whether or not the Polish peasants were susceptible to communist ideological influence in general; assuming all else constant, the Polish peasants were immiserated to the point that they would accept communism. Nor was the problem the Polish hatred of Russians owing to the long history of Tsarist oppression, since, the Bolshevik movement embodied such mass resentment towards Tsarist Russia, and the Bolshevik revolutionary defeatism and fierce Bolshevik campaigns for secession from the Russian Empire had won over numerous oppressed minority masses over to the Bolshevik cause. Nor was Bolshevik Red Army penetration into the borders of Poland going to be – assuming all else constant – a problem because there were countless peoples in the territories of the former Russian Empire that were joyful towards the entry of the Red Army troops as liberators. As a matter of fact, there is evidence that the Polish people – the peasantry and the workers – were particularly susceptible to Bolshevik ideas, and that it would have enjoyed some popularity. A prominent US intelligence document written by the militant anti-communist US State Department representative William Christian Bullitt, summed up reports in 1918 as follows:

Reports from the Baltic Provinces, Poland and Ukraine indicate that an outbreak of Bolshevism is expected when the German army of occupation is withdrawn. (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

The American general Kernan made remarks about the spread of communist ideas to many of the peasants living in Poland. At first, the following quote may appear to state that the Bolsheviks were removing the populations of Poland, but upon a more careful look, it becomes clear that the quote was stating that Bolshevik ideas had spread into Poland, because of the great misery that was inflicted upon the peasant population there for several years when Poland was colonized by Russia. In the words of the American general Francis Kernan, for ‘several years’, during the time in which Poland was ‘Russian Poland’, the territories which the Russians colonized had ‘been a solitude’, and the ‘agricultural population’ living in Poland, during the ostensibly ‘best’ days of their lives, lived in utter misery – this fact of misery helped ‘explain the spread of Bolshevism’, Kernan said. Here is the excerpt from Kernan’s words:

When the Russians made their great retreat they drove the people out of a vast area of agricultural land which remains practically without population today and which for several years has been a solitude outside of the larger towns. No acre of ground has been plowed, no seed planted, no domestic animals are there, and practically no population. It is a vast area and it is nearly a desert today. Manifestly no crops can be sowed there this year, but the wretched inhabitants are straggling back slowly, many on foot, shoeless, clothed in rags, their whole worldly possessions carried on their backs. The agricultural villages show here and there a sign of life, and undoubtedly more of the former inhabitants will return as the summer goes on. Since they can raise no crops this year, manifestly they must be fed from outside. It is in this region that the greatest desolation and extremest want prevail. This was Russian Poland. In their best days the lives of this agricultural population must have approximated that of the animals which they worked. These squalid villages explain the spread of Bolshevism better than any other thing which has fallen under my observation. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace’. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April 11, 1919. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, pp. 275-280. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

It is highly unlikely that the traditional hatred towards Russia could be the factor behind the defeat in Poland.

Rather, the problems in the case of Poland were as follows. The most important factor was that the Pilsudski gang, Kautskyites as they were, had made many Kautskyite promises to the Polish people, and were thus bribing them into submission. The masses of proletarians are always very difficult to bribe, but the members of non-proletarian and non-kolkhoznik classes are easy to bribe by the Kautskyites. The Paris-based anti-Soviet American military General Francis Kernan noted that the Polish people were being provided extensive amounts of economic aid by the Americans, which certainly helped as Kautskyite bribes to prevent a revolt in Poland:

Want of the extremest character prevails in the large cities, in the industrial centers, and in the territory lying between Grodno and Brest Litovsk. There is, I believe, enough food in Poland to tide the population over until the next harvest, assuming the American food supplies to continue flowing into Poland at the present rate. The supply is not evenly distributed but an effort is being made by the Polish authorities in connection with our Food Mission to overcome this difficulty. If raw materials go into Poland and public works are started by the Government so that employment can be given to those not engaged in agriculture, much of the dire distress will be done away with. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace’. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April 11, 1919. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, pp. 275-280. From: University of Virginia,

Rotunda) (IMG)

On the other hand, there existed factors of secondary or tertiary importance. For example, the social-fascist ‘Polish Communist Party’ – the highly treasonous Party that was later duly and rightly dissolved by the Comintern – advocated the continued occupation of Poland by Tsarist Russia, thus intentionally fostering a high level of resentment towards the communists by the Polish peasantry; more details about the ‘Polish Communist Party’ will be explained in more depth later. All of these factors made Poland’s government stronger vis-a-vis the Soviets.

One side in the Soviet leadership was optimistic about a counter-offensive. Referring to “the Soviet leaders,” US intelligence stated:

Whatever generosity they showed toward Poland’s boundary claims was the result of their conviction that, simultaneously with the entry of the victorious Soviet army, Poland would experience a proletarian revolution, and that the frontier between Soviet Russia and a Soviet Poland would have no political significance. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 21. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

The British Empire’s Naval Intelligence officer Ian Grey remarked:

This vision was shared by many within the party and gave rise to a wave of enthusiasm, as members rallied to the cry “Onwards to Warsaw!” But there were realists, Stalin foremost among them, who saw the dangers of this policy. In June 1920, he wrote that “the rear of the Polish forces is homogeneous and nationally united. Its dominant mood is ‘the feeling for their native land.’. The class conflicts have not reached the strength needed to break through the sense of national unity.” It was a clear warning against accepting Lenin’s facile belief that the Polish proletariat was ready for revolution. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Indeed, the counter-offensive against Poland did not succeed because the rear of the Polish forces was strong, thanks to the promises that the Kautskyite Party, PPS – Revolutionary Faction, had given to the people of Poland. A 1958 CIA report stated:

the PPS “revolutionary faction” under Pilsudski became more and more absorbed with the struggle for national liberation, and used the factor of nationalism to gain the support of the majority of the Polish working class. A key factor in its popularity was the role of Pilsudski and the PPS in the defense of Poland against the Red Army invasion in 1920, when the Soviet forces were stopped by the “Miracle of the Vistula.” Here Pilsudski seized the leadership and rallied Polish nationalist feeling to his support. During and after the renaissance of the Polish nation, Pilsudski drifted further and further to the right, and had gradually less in common with the PPS. Nevertheless, the PPS retained its strong hold over the Polish working class during the inter-war period, not only by virtue of its role during the Polish-Soviet war, but because of its general identification with Polish nationalism. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

The Polish ‘Communist’ Party rallied many workers behind Pilsudski by refusing to support Polish right to secession from freedom Tsarist Russia. The US intelligence report continued:

Whereas a key factor in the popularity of the PPS was its role in the defense of Poland against the Red Army invasion in 1920, the role of the Polish Communists on the opposite side in this same invasion identified them in the popular mind as enemies of Poland. Another leading Polish Communist leader, Adolph Warszawski-Warski, a member of the right wing of the KPRP leadership, referred to this cardinal mistake during a KPRP congress in 1923. He said:

He who does not yet understand the causes of our mistake does not understand the reasons of our defeat in 1918-1919, as well as our defeat during the Polish-Soviet war of 1920, and consequently, would not comprehend why the Communist Party of Poland lost then the struggle with the PPS and the “Wyzwolenie” (peasant organization). The peasant masses and the masses of petty bourgeoisie (as well as a large part, even the majority, of the workers), did not follow the proletarian revolution, did not follow the Communist Party of Poland, because they saw in our party the opponent of the independence of Poland. They followed the PPS, the Wyzwolenie and the others, the parties which promised land to the peasants and fought under the banner of the Polish state... (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

This move by the Polish ‘Communist’ Party could not possibly be a mistake, but was rather a deliberate act of sabotage against the communist workers’ movement and a stab in the back of the Polish people. The malicious intents of the Polish ‘Communist’ Party leadership were evident by the fact that the Polish ‘Communist’ Party later supported Pilsudski’s MI6-backed coup, the coup that established a fascist regime favorable to Nazi and British interests, a regime that sponsored Trotskyite assassins in the USSR, and which pursued a chauvinist settler-colonial agenda for a greater Polish Empire, the so-called ‘Intermarium’. Anyways, well until World War II, the KPP remained unpopular:

As a result of its political outlook and its behavior during the Soviet invasion of 1920, the KPP in the inter-war period obtained little support among the workers and almost none among the peasants, and its attempts to work with other political groups were abysmal failures. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 6) (IMG)

In 1920, the Soviets launched a counter-offensive against the Polish regime aggression. While the Polish regime troops were strong due to the reasons mentioned above, there were also stabs in the back committed by the Trotskyites in the Soviet command: there was on the one hand the Trotskyite agent Kamenev, and then there was also Tukhachevsky. During the October Revolution, Trotsky recruited the Tsarist officer Tukhachevsky for the Soviet Red Army. A paper published by the Association of the United States Army stated:

Upon graduation from Alexandrovskii Military College, Tukhachevsky was commissioned into the Semenovskii Guards Regiment, part of the Tsar's Imperial Bodyguard (household troops) . . . By 12 October 1917, Tukhachevsky was back in Russia, as a function of either a sixth escape attempt or formal release. Due to the ensuing Revolution, there was no Tsarist military to which he could return; according to one author, he apparently "thought the thing through and just went home." (..) In 1918 he went to Moscow, met with Trotsky, who was heading the Military Department of the All-Russian Executive Committee, and offered his services to the Communist cause. On 5 April 1918, he became a Communist, and Trotsky appointed him as Military Commissioner at Headquarters Moscow Defense Area." (Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky (1893-1937): Practitioner and Theorist of War, The Land Warfare Papers, published in: Association of the United States Army, Christopher Paul McPadden, August 2006, p. 3) (IMG)

During the October Revolution, there were many lower-ranking Tsarist Russian army officers – often from peasant, working class, or revolutionary intellectual origins – who felt sympathetic to communism and as such provided tremendous assistance and skill in establishing and strengthening the Red Army. Andrei Zhdanov was a case in point. Tukhachevsky, however, was not one of these revolutionary-minded officers. The military doctrines of Tukhachevsky and Trotsky entailed launching global wars, and then once the countries invaded fight back, systematically open up the front for those enemy armies so that the Soviet territory will be occupied, and the Soviet Union would collapse. In Trotskyism, Tukhachevsky saw his own imperial ideas expressed in a 'communist' language. Much like Trotsky, Tukhachevsky argued for spreading the revolutionary military too thin by launching constant and aggressive wars on a global scale against capitalist states in order to spread 'socialism' worldwide. As noted by the prominent anti-Soviet Anglo-American military official John Erickson:

Tukhachevsky set out his main ideas which would dominate the 'strategy of civil war'; the 'universal dictatorship' of the proletariat would be its final aim, to which end the socialist state must create adequate military power, recruit its fighters from the ranks of the world proletariat independent of nationality, and postulate the permanent absence of a peaceful frontier with the bourgeois state. The role of the Komintern, in Tukhachevsky's eyes, would be to prepare the proletariat of the world for this coming civil war, for 'the moment of the world attack with all the armed forces of the proletariat on world armed capital'. A 'proletarian army' must be prepared for its first operations; the Komintern must find a place in its programme for the definition of the requisite military principles. Working on the assumption of 'a world-wide civil war in the very near future', Tukhachevsky wanted to see an international General Staff set up under the Komintern, which would occupy itself with studying the potential capitalist enemy, as well as working out a mobilisation plan for the working classes. This would avoid the difficulties which the Red Army itself encountered in fighting a civil war, the duration and intensity of which had come as a shock to the command. In addition, a number of military training centres and staff academies should be opened in Soviet Russia to train a revolutionary military officer corps 'of all nationalities in their languages'. (The Soviet High Command: A Military- Political History, 1918-1941, John Erickson, p. 108) (IMG)

The views held by Tukhachevsky were virtually the same as the theory of Permanent Revolution as advocated by Trotsky. Recall that Trotsky had arguments with Lenin regarding the pace of the revolution, with Trotsky overtly arguing that the USSR must launch a constant global war for the spread of 'socialism', while covertly pushing for the diversionary tactics of destroying the Soviet state. The MI6, as mentioned acknowledged that Trotsky's idea was, relatively speaking, a threat to the Soviet state. As late as 1931, Trotsky continued to argue:

The conquest of power by the proletariat does not complete the revolution, but only opens it. Socialist construction is conceivable only on the foundation of the class struggle, on a national and international scale. This struggle, under the conditions of an overwhelming predominance of capitalist relationships on the world arena, must inevitably lead to explosions, that is, internally to civil wars and externally to revolutionary wars. (The Permanent Revolution, Chapter 10, Leon Trotsky, 1931. MIA)

Furthermore, the aggressive stances taken by Tukhachevsky could lay the ideological basis for him to provoke border clashes with enemies of the Soviet state, so to thereby give the enemies of the USSR the excuse to invade it. Tukhachevsky's Trotskyite diversionism was useful for the sworn enemies of Soviet power. Tukhachevsky, a Tsarist infiltrator,

espoused the diversionary views of Trotsky; after all, it would have assisted his objective of destroying the Soviet state. And military sabotage Tukhachevsky did carry out. During the military campaign against the Pilsudski forces, Tukhachevsky and Kamenev carried out strategic and tactical sabotage causing the defeat of the Red Army. The MI6 official Grey wrote:

The Politburo had, however, decided on its policy of [counter-offending] Poland in spite of the opposition expressed by Stalin and others. Stalin had hurriedly rejoined the Southwest Front which covered the southern part of the Polish lines and was at the same time on guard against Wrangel in the south. The Politburo now decided to form a special front against Wrangel under Stalin's direction. A major part of the forces of the Southwest Front would be transferred to Tukhachevsky's Western Front for the advance on Warsaw, and the remaining forces would form Stalin's special front. Angered by these instructions from the Politburo, Stalin replied churlishly that the Politburo should not be concerning itself with such details. Lenin was taken aback and asked for an explanation of his opposition. In his reply, Stalin set out the organizational difficulties which the instructions entailed.

Lenin was impressed by his appreciation of the situation and allowed the Southwest Front to retain its previous commitments; only three of its armies were to be transferred to the Western Front.

The basic problem was that Tukhachevsky's Western Front was separated by more than 300 miles of the Pripet Marshes from the Southwest Front. Communications and the prompt transfer of forces over such distances were further complicated by the absence of a strong central command. Trotsky and the Supreme War Council were ignored. Kamenev, the commander in chief, issued directives but could not enforce them. The Politburo and, in particular, Lenin, acting independently, tried to resolve conflicts, but could not be sure that their instructions would be observed. Moreover, Lenin's instructions conflicted on occasions with plans of the commander in chief. Thus Kamenev confirmed that Tukhachevsky should outflank Warsaw from the north and west and take the city by August 12, 1920. This left the large Lublin gap unprotected between the Russian forces and the Pripet Marshes. At this time, Wrangel was moving with some success, posing a threat that alarmed Lenin. On August 11, he instructed Stalin to break off operations against the Poles at Lvov and to embark on an immediate offensive to destroy Wrangel's army and seize the Crimea. On the same day, Kamenev ordered the Southwest Front to send "as large a force as possible toward Lublin to assist Tukhachevsky's left flank."

At this time, it was believed that the Red Army had already won the battle for Warsaw. Stalin and Egorov were planning to send their cavalry not to Lublin, but to the Crimea, and they ignored Kamenev's instructions. On August 13, Kamenev sent orders that both the Twelfth and First Cavalry armies would be transferred to the command of the Western Front on the following day. Egorov felt he had to comply.

But Stalin refused to sign the order and sent a telegram angrily reproaching the commander in chief for trying to destroy the Southwest Front. At this time, it was believed that the Red Army had already won the battle for Warsaw. Stalin and Egorov were planning to send their cavalry not to Lublin, but to the Crimea, and they ignored Kamenev's instructions. On August 13, Kamenev sent orders that both the Twelfth and First Cavalry armies would be transferred to the command of the Western Front on the following day. Egorov felt he had to comply. But Stalin refused to sign the order and sent a telegram angrily reproaching the commander in chief for trying to destroy the Southwest Front.

Tukhachevsky's advance had been progressing slowly. But on August 16, the Poles counterattacked, concentrating on the Lublin gap, and within a few days, they had shattered the West Front. On August 19, the Politburo, including Stalin, met in Moscow, still unaware that the Poles were on the point of routing Tukhachevsky's armies. The Politburo, "having heard the military reports of Comrades Trotsky and Stalin," decided that the main concentration of forces should now be directed to the recovery of the Crimea.

Responsibility for the disaster was angrily debated then and later. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The anti-Stalin MI6 official Ian Grey further confirmed:

Kamenev and Tukhachevsky must bear the military responsibility since they neglected to ensure protection of their flanks before advancing. Moreover, even if Stalin and Egorov had responded promptly to orders to transfer troops from their front to fill the Lublin gap, it is doubtful whether such troops could have arrived in time and in fighting condition to have withstood the Polish onslaught.

Stalin's concern to maintain the strength of the Southwest Front was understandable. It was facing the Polish forces at Lvov, Wrangel's army to the south, and the possibility of Romanian intervention. All were serious threats, which were causing Lenin and the Politburo anxiety, and the wisdom of detaching any of its armies to reinforce the Western Front was questionable. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The formalities would have dictated that Stalin should have listened to such military saboteurs as Tukhachevsky and

Kamenev, causing countless Red Army troops to be exterminated. However, Stalin refused to yield to such sabotage and carried out the operations necessary, hence to save numerous lives.

When the Soviet Red Army reached Warsaw in 1920, the French rushed to assist the Pilsudski regime. Hence the French sent their well-known commander Weygand to assist Pilsudski's gang. Indeed, the American intelligence reported:

The French, who all along had been more favorable to the Polish cause than had the British, had taken no responsibility for the armistice proposals, and had not desired to invite Soviet Russia's participation in a general peace conference, saw their policy vindicated by the Polish victory at Warsaw, to which the French General Weygand contributed, and by Poland's success, after the victory, in securing a peace which satisfied its territorial claims. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 22. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

At this point, the Polish forces had advanced beyond the Curzon Line and occupied territories with Ukrainian and Byelorussian (White Russian) majorities. Given the critical situation which the Soviets faced, the latter agreed to the peace treaty of Riga imposed by Pilsudski's gang:

Receiving no consistent advice from the western powers, the Poles made peace on their own terms, to which the Bolsheviks, anxious for peace at any price, agreed. By the preliminary treaty of Riga; concluded on October 12, 1920, Poland secured a frontier over one hundred miles east of the Curzon line, running through regions which had clear White Russian and Ukrainian majorities. This frontier was confirmed by the final treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 22. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Backed by the imperialist forces, driving the tacit or active support of much of the population, and facing an army whose commanders were Trotskyite renegades, the Pilsudski forces were so obviously going to win. The anti-Soviet MI6 officer Ian Grey further remarked:

there was also an inevitability in the defeat of the Red Army. The troops were near exhaustion. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

In this situation though, Western USSR was occupied by the Polish regime and a policy of settler-colonialism and apartheid was pursued in those territories (see C9S5).

The absence of a high level of development of the productive forces in Poland had kept that country an agrarian society with a large petit-bourgeois population. The proletariat have nothing to lose in the struggle against finance capital and are thus willing to take great steps in the struggle against imperialism. The grand bourgeoisie have a large enough business that they can take the risk of competing with imperialism. The petit-bourgeoisie, on the other hand, unlike the proletariat, have a small business to lose and unlike the bourgeoisie, do not have a big business to use as a 'cushion' for taking big risks and competing against finance capital. This makes the areas that are predominantly populated by the petit-bourgeoisie easier to be taken over by finance capital or the comprador allies of finance capital. The material control of finance capital over these petit-bourgeois areas translates to a high level of soft power influence and propaganda dominance in these areas. As such, the petit-bourgeoisie are more susceptible to accepting imperialist propaganda. In a predominantly petit-bourgeois country, the agents and collaborators of fascism very quickly take over and extend their influence over the various institutions and bodies including at times the communist party that is supposed to resist such fascism. The influence of fascism in the communist party would take the forms of Trotskyism, Bukharinism, Kautskyism, Titoism, Maoism, etc. In order to fight imperialism in Poland, this key feature of the class conditions had to be taken into account.

The great positive intentions of Rosa Luxemburg are to be appreciated. However, she held a number of erroneous views that benefited the sworn enemies of socialism. The left-deviationist Rosa Luxemburg stood against the invincible scientific theses of Marx and Engels. In his letter to Kautsky in 1882, Engels was very clear in calling for decolonization. Every word of the letter serves as a sharp polemical blade against counter-revolutionary pro-imperialist ideas:

You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general: the same as what the bourgeois think. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies. In my opinion the colonies proper, i.e., the countries occupied by a European population, Canada, the Cape, Australia, will all become independent; on the other hand the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated, India, Algiers, the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish possessions, must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence. How this process will develop is difficult to say.

India will perhaps, indeed very probably, produce a revolution, and as the proletariat emancipating itself cannot conduct any colonial wars, this would have to be given full scope; it would not pass off without all sorts of destruction, of course, but that sort of thing is inseparable from all revolutions. The same might also take place

elsewhere, e.g., in Algiers and Egypt, and would certainly be the best thing for us.

We shall have enough to do at home. Once Europe is reorganised, and North America, that will furnish such colossal power and such an example that the semi-civilised countries will follow in their wake of their own accord. Economic needs alone will be responsible for this. But as to what social and political phases these countries will then have to pass through before they likewise arrive at socialist organisation, we to-day can only advance rather idle hypotheses, I think. One thing alone is certain: the victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing. Which of course by no means excludes defensive wars of various kinds. (Engels in London to Karl Kautsky in Vienna, September 12, 1882. In: Gesamtausgabe, International Publishers, 1942. In: MIA) (IMG)

According to Lenin, Kautsky for a while advanced Engels's correct theses against the left-deviationist unintentionally pro-imperialist line of Rosa Luxemburg (though, Kautsky later on proved to be an opportunist and adopted a line more pro-imperialist than that of Rosa Luxemburg, and hence Lenin began to support Rosa against Kautsky). Criticizing Rosa, Lenin said:

If, in our political agitation, we fail to advance and advocate the slogan of the right to secession, we shall play into the hands, not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the feudal landlords and the absolutism of the oppressor nation. Kautsky long ago used this argument against Rosa Luxemburg, and the argument is indisputable. When, in her anxiety not to "assist" the nationalist bourgeoisie of Poland, Rosa Luxemburg rejects the right to secession in the programme of the Marxists in Russia, she is in fact assisting the Great-Russian Black Hundreds. She is in fact assisting opportunist tolerance of the privileges (and worse than privileges) of the Great Russians. (The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Vladimir Lenin, Chapter 4. No screenshot.)

The CIA too reported on this dispute between Lenin and the left-deviationist stance promoted by Rosa Luxemburg: The chief theoretician of the SDKPiL was Rosa Luxemburg, a profoundly original thinker whose book on the industrial development of Poland became the bible of the Polish Marxist movement. She was soon to enter into a historic series of ideological arguments with Lenin which were to exert a profound effect on the Communist Party of Poland, especially upon its attitude toward Moscow. In this controversy, Luxemburg strongly disagreed with Lenin's ideas on party organization, especially with the theory of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", and she became involved in the complex ideological disputes between the Russian revolutionaries. But of greater consequence for the Polish Communists was her bitter attack against Lenin's theory on national self-determination. Lenin felt strongly that in the future social[ist] democracy, nations such as Poland which were oppressed by tsarism should have the right to free secession from Russia. Luxemburg, however, refused from the beginning to accept national self-determination as a principle, especially in the case of Poland. Lenin's theories, of course, eventually won out, and the theories of Rosa Luxemburg later became branded as a deviation termed "Luxemburgism," the legacy of which was carried by the KPP up to the time of its dissolution by the Comintern in 1938. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

And of course, it is well-known that at least for a while, if not till the end of her life, Rosa Luxemburg opposed Party work and held an anarchistic view of political activism:

Luxemburg disagreed with Lenin's ideas of a disciplined party elite as the vanguard of the working class.

She also rejected his ideas on the authority which should be accorded to the central committee. She referred to his conception as "His majesty, the central committee."

In opposition to Lenin's views, Luxemburg stressed the spontaneous development of the class struggle.

Her views were determinist. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

Rosa Luxemburg also supported the Trotskyite-Menshevik 'Permanent Revolution' theses, underestimating / denouncing the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, and thereby adopting a left-deviationist line favorable to Tsarist interests. Stalin mentioned how Rosa Luxemburg was the real inventor of the 'Permanent Revolution' thesis, even though Trotsky was one of its top proponents, and that Luxemburg struggled against Lenin's invincible scientific theses:

The article "The October Revolution" states that in 1905 it was not Rosa Luxemburg, but Parvus and Trotsky who *advanced* the theory of "permanent" revolution against Lenin. This fully corresponds to historical fact. It was Parvus who in 1905 came to Russia and edited a special newspaper in which he actively came out in favour of "permanent" revolution against Lenin's "conception," it was Parvus and then, after and together with him, Trotsky – it was this pair that at the time bombarded Lenin's plan of revolution, counterposing to it the theory of "permanent" revolution. As for Rosa Luxemburg, she kept behind the scenes in those days, abstained from active struggle against Lenin in this matter, evidently preferring not to become involved as yet in the struggle. (...). As for the "Letter to the Editorial Board of Proletarskaya Revolutsia," that treats of *another* aspect of the question, namely, the fact that the theory of "permanent" revolution was invented by Rosa Luxemburg and

Parvus. This, too, corresponds to historical fact. It was not Trotsky but Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus who *invented* the theory of "permanent" revolution. It was not Rosa Luxemburg but Parvus and Trotsky who in 1905 *advanced* the theory of "permanent" revolution and actively fought for it against Lenin.

Subsequently Rosa Luxemburg, too, began to fight actively against the Leninist plan of revolution. But that was after 1905. (Reply to Aristov, Stalin, January 25, 1932. In: *Bolshevik*, No. 16 August 30, 1932) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks were correct in outlining the core characteristics of Luxemburgism:

“Luxemburgism” was held by the Bolsheviks to consist essentially of the following:

- a) depreciation of the role of the party as the leader of the class-struggle;
- b) underestimation of the revolutionary role of the peasantry;
- c) misunderstanding of the potentialities of the national problem as a revolutionary factor.

While the first element was important in its later effect on relations between Polish Communists and the CPSU, the latter two attitudes, which were characteristic of many of the early leaders of the SDKPiL and the KPP, were the main reasons for the abject failure of Communism in Poland prior to World War II. As a result of these attitudes, the party failed to establish a popular base among the Polish peasantry and antagonized the strongly nationalist Polish populace. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

Although Rosa Luxemburg and her group were fundamentally erroneous in their line, Lenin supported Rosa Luxemburg – for the better. Firstly, her intentions were positive despite making important mistakes. Secondly, the left-deviation was to be temporarily allied with to counter the influence of the then-more-powerful Kautskyite right-deviation. Indeed, when Kautsky came out of the closet as a pro-imperialist right-deviationist, Lenin rightly allied with Rosa Luxemburg and her numerous petit-bourgeois left-deviationist followers so to undermine the imperialist-fascist agenda of the counter-revolutionary alliance of the Kautskyites and the White Guards.

Luxemburgite deviations had a higher influence on the “Communist Workers’ Party of Poland” than communism (‘Leninism’) because the petit-bourgeoisie predominated in Poland, and since the petit-bourgeoisie dare not risk their small businesses in the fight against the mighty finance capital, the petit-bourgeois areas are often materially – in terms of military, intelligence, or financial control – dominated by fascist finance capital, which pushes for increased intelligence penetration by the fascist spies and saboteurs into the organizations based in the agrarian petit-bourgeois areas. The “Communist Workers’ Party of Poland” bore no immunity against such fascist infiltration and the crypto-fascism was manifest in Trotskyism branded as Luxemburgism.

The Luxemburgite reactionary line was the line of the “Communist Workers’ Party of Poland.” The Polish Luxemburgites opposed the efforts to ally the proletariat with the peasantry and de facto sided with the Tsarists by denouncing Polish independence – and they did so in the noble name of ‘communism’. ‘Thanks’ to Luxemburgite errors/sabotage, it should come as no surprise that the patriotic anti-Tsarist peasantry of Poland would despise communism. The CIA stated:

the “PPS-Left” began to move closer and closer to the SDKPiL. Both groups were engaged in similar pacifist activity during World War I, and eventually merged, in December 1918, to form the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland (KPRP). At their “unification congress,” however, the ideological program of the SDKPiL was adopted as the basis of party policy, thus making the new Communist Workers’ Party of Poland the direct heir of the SDKPiL.

The new party program paralleled the Bolshevik program in many respects, and urged unity with the Bolsheviks in the struggle for world revolution. In certain important details, however, the new program of the KPRP was at variance with the Russian party. These differences had already been reflected in the disputes between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, one of the main subjects being the attitude toward the national question. The KPRP, like the SDKPiL before it, attacked national self-determination as a principle. This basic mistake of the Polish Communists, which was at the root of their failure to attract any serious support in Poland prior to World War II, was recognized later by leading Polish Communists. Thus Feliks Dzierzynski said later:

Our mistake (that of the SDKPiL) was in repudiating Poland's independence, for which Lenin always rebuked us. We believed that there could be no transitional period between capitalism and socialism and consequently that there was no need of independent states, since there could be no state organization under socialism. We did not understand that there would be a rather long transition period between capitalism and during which, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, classes as well as a proletarian state supported by the peasantry will exist side by side.... As a result of repudiating every independence, we lost our struggle for an independent Poland. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Regrettably, the so-called “Communist Workers’ Party of Poland,” was a social-fascist party promoting a pro-imperialist agenda, supported the coup d’etat of the Pilsudski gang, the very gang that had openly allied with Petlura’s Ukrainian

fascists to invade the USSR, the very gang that supported the Trotskyite opposition in the USSR, the very terror gang that had the blessing of Hitler. For this, the Party was condemned by the Comintern:

The party occasionally established cover political groups which managed over the years to elect one or two representatives to the Sejm. In 1926 the party incurred the displeasure of Moscow by supporting the Pilsudski coup d'etat. This move was later condemned by the Comintern as a serious tactical mistake, and became known in Communist history as the "May error. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

During the period of the Great Purge of the late 1930s, therefore, the social-fascist pseudo-communist 'Communist Workers' Party of Poland' was dissolved by the Comintern, exposed as the party of counter-revolutionary imperialist agents, thoroughly purged, and virtually wiped out. This party of renegades had some renegade survivors, however; one of them was Wladyslaw Gomulka. A Gestapo agent during the Great Patriotic War, Gomulka became a Yugoslav agent after the War, and was installed into power through the 1956 MI6 colour revolution in Poland. Subsequently, he began further serving the British and Israeli espionage services, carried out savage terror against the people of Poland so to provoke anti-state uprisings, and destroyed the economy of Poland so to pave the way for the colour revolution of the 1980s. These will be examined in more depth later in the book.

C3S4. Ukraine's Russian Population

Why did the Bolsheviks decide to keep some of the Russians in Ukraine? This was needed in part because in case Ukraine was to somehow separate from the USSR, the Soviet state would utilize its soft power influence among the Russians in Ukraine in order to agitate for a Russian sovereigntist uprising against the anti-Soviet regime in Ukraine, hence using local disturbances to destabilize the Ukrainian regime, and bring back Soviet influence there.

As indicated by the MI6, the Ukrainians were actually sympathetic towards Bolshevism, contrary to how the Nazi media portrayed the matter. No need to mention Carpatho-Ukraine, whose population as confirmed by the CIA and documented in C3S3, were pro-Soviet and pro-communist. Not as a matter of 'political correctness', but as a matter of fact, the UPA/OUN reactionaries did not represent the majority of the ethnic Ukrainians. It is nonetheless true that the UPA and OUN represented the majority of Ukrainians in specific geographic areas of Ukraine. Overall, these bad Ukrainians were a minority among the Ukrainians but they were a 'loud' minority, a very dangerous one. The Russian population, among whom the Bolsheviks would have had high soft power influence even if Ukraine separated from the rest of the USSR, could serve as a pro-Bolshevik contingent in Ukraine serving as a useful counter-weight against the bad Ukrainians who formed a loud minority.

C3S5. Tambov

It is alleged that the Bolsheviks carried out terrorist activity in Tambov during the rebellion in Tambov. Firstly, it is important to remind that Lenin emphatically condemned terrorism, mass-murder, and worked to minimize crimes committed by Red Army officers. Secondly, it is worth reminding that the Trotskyites were the ones responsible for terrorism during the Civil War (see C2S6). These are documented by the MI6. With regards to the specific case of Tambov, the Trotsky agent Tukhachevsky was in charge of the operation:

The driving sense of purpose which possessed the party leaders, and the distraction of such internecine disputes, caused them to minimize and even overlook the explosive mood of the people. Uprisings among the peasantry were too frequent to arouse special concern. But now the resourceful anarchist peasant leader Nestor Makhno had plunged the Ukraine into turmoil. Uprisings by peasants in western Siberia disrupted the Trans-Siberian Railways and further aggravated the food shortages in Moscow and other cities. Most serious of all was the rebellion of the peasants of the Tambov region, who were renowned for their turbulence. In April 1921, the Red Cavalry and special army units, commanded by Tukhachevsky, crushed the rebel forces, but it was not until autumn that order was restored in the region. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The fact that Tukhachevsky was a Trotsky agent and that Trotskyites supported terrorism, of course does not automatically make Tukhachevsky responsible for any alleged terrorist activity in Tambov; however, these facts do shed light on the usual suspects for such alleged terrorism.

C3S6. Spreading the Revolution to Latvia, Lithuania, and Byelorussia

A prominent US intelligence document written by the militant anti-communist US State Department representative William Christian Bullitt, summed up reports in 1918 as follows:

Reports from the Baltic Provinces, Poland and Ukraine indicate that an outbreak of Bolshevism is expected when the German army of occupation is withdrawn. (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr.

Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks definitely enjoyed a great level of influence in much of the Baltic zone. As the reader is probably aware, the Lettish language is an alternative term for the Latvian language; the Lettish people are ethnic Latvians forming the vast majority of the population of Latvia. British intelligence reports demonstrated that the Lettish, the vast majority of the Latvians, were overwhelmingly pro-communist. One report by the General Staff of the British War Office stated:

In Latvia a great part of the territory claimed by the Lettish Provisional Government, i.e., roughly, the old Russian Governments of Courland and (most of) Livonia, is controlled by the Bolsheviks, who have established their headquarters at Riga and Dvinsk and maintained themselves in occupation despite their expulsion from Esthonia and northern Livonia. The Bolsheviks have relied mainly on local Lettish and on imported Lettish Bolsheviks; they have passed the usual decrees nationalising the banks, setting up Soviets, and handing the land over to the peasants. The large industrial, unemployed population of Riga proved a suitable ground for Bolshevik ideas, while the peasantry have been given a free hand in venting their hatred of the German landowners. It should be noted that, according to British naval reports from Riga at the end of December, the few Lettish units that were raised to resist the Bolsheviks either mutinied or deserted. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918, p. 109) (IMG)

In a report to the British Foreign Office, Stephen George Tallents, the British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces during the British intervention in that region, admitted:

All their enemies and some of their friends say that the Letts tend naturally towards Bolshevism. (Note on the Present Position in the Baltic Provinces. – (Communicated to Foreign Office, August 8.), Doc.

64 [113472], S. G. Tallents, July 31, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 262) (IMG)

Referring to Latvians, Tallents continued:

they undoubtedly regard the Bolsheviks, at any rate those in their midst, with gentler eyes than the Esthonians. An Esthonian hospital nurse in Wenden one day in June spoke to me sarcastically of the way in which men, who to her knowledge had been leaders in the days of Bolshevik rule in the town, had now again been allowed to return and had been charitably received, though not prominent reinstated, by their fellow-townsmen. (Note on the Present Position in the Baltic Provinces. – (Communicated to Foreign Office, August 8.), Doc. 64 [113472], S. G. Tallents, July 31, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918, p. 262) (IMG)

The case of Lithuania was not much different than that of Latvia. The same British War Office intelligence report stated:

In *Lithuania*, as in Latvia, the Bolsheviks, with headquarters at Vilna, have been in control of a large portion of the territory claimed as Lithuanian, the unoccupied portion acknowledging the authority of the Provisional Lithuanian Government at Kovno. This Government was remodelled at the end of December and is anti-Bolshevik, but it exercises only very local authority and such prestige as it may have has been much damaged by the conduct of the various (and often rival) Lithuanian organisations abroad. The *Taryba* (Diet) itself (never a very representative body), owing to desertions to the Bolsheviks and enforced absences of various kinds, now numbers only 35 out of a total of 100 members.

The Government is also bitterly hostile to the Poles, who have made unsuccessful attempts to be called in as saviours of Lithuania against the Bolsheviks. In this case the Government is certainly supported by the peasants, who are determined to break up the big Polish estates. This economic hostility to the landlords has been the main cause of the easy conquests of the Bolsheviks in these areas. They are reported as having behaved with unusual mildness both at Vilna and Minsk (the White Russian capital), and to have made a good impression; they have trusted mainly to returning Lithuanians from Russia to propagate Bolshevik doctrines, and they have naturally adopted a strongly anti-Polish tone. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 110) (IMG)

The British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces corroborated the popularity of communism among the Lithuanian people by stating:

Big Lithuanian landlords complain to me that the Lithuanian people is Bolshevik at heart, and will soon so declare itself. (Note on the Present Position in the Baltic Provinces. – (Communicated to Foreign Office, August 8.), Doc. 64 [113472], S. G. Tallents, July 31, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 262) (IMG)

The peoples of Latvia and Lithuania were held as unwilling captives of their respective imperialist-backed puppet regimes.

The MI6 admitted that the best solution to the problems of the White Russians was to join Russia, which was of course a Soviet state:

The White Russians are extremely illiterate and backward and are without any nascent "national consciousness."

As they are so closely allied to the Great Russians, the best solution of their problem would be their reabsorption into Russia. It should be noticed that this is the policy apparently advocated by the Jews of both White Russia and Lithuania; the Jews have contributed largely to the *personnel* of the Soviets in Lithuanian and White Russia. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 110) (IMG)

C3S7. The Anarchist Colour Revolution in Kronstadt

Evidence on the real story behind the anarchist colour revolution in Kronstadt is provided by the anti-Soviet anarchist author Paul Avrich. "From internal evidence," Avrich remarks:

it is clear that the plan was drawn up in January or early February 1921 by an agent of the Center located either in Viborg or Helsingfors. (Kronstadt 1921: The Uprising of Sailors at the Kronstadt Naval Base is Examined in the Context of the Political Development of the New Soviet State, Paul Avrich, p. 239) (IMG)

The intelligence memorandum states the following:

Kronstadt had been fortified with anti-Bolshevik Russian troops, acting in concert with the French Command.. (MEMORANDUM ON THE QUESTION OF ORGANIZING AN UPRISING IN KRONSTADT, Top Secret, National Center in Paris, 1921. From: Columbia Russian Archive, translated by Paul Avrich. In: Kronstadt 1921: The Uprising of Sailors at the Kronstadt Naval Base is Examined in the Context of the Political Development of the New Soviet State, Paul Avrich, p. 239) (IMG)

The very title of the intelligence memorandum cited above clearly shows that the Kronstadt anarchist rebellion was indeed engineered by the Finnish intelligence service. Backed by the French Command, and organized by Finnish intelligence, the Kronstadt anarchists were launching a colour revolution against the Republic of Soviets which had elected the Bolsheviks. In their supposed fight against 'tyranny', Kronstadt sailors aimed at overthrowing the popular socialist system and targeted the communists of the Soviets even though the communists had the support of the workers and peasants:

Following a mass meeting of the garrison on March 1, 1921, Kronstadt rang with shouts of "Down with the Bolshevik tyranny!" and "For the Soviets – without the Communists!" The rebels proclaimed themselves to be the liberators of Russia from the new [alleged] Bolshevik autocracy. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The Kronstadt sailors were duly defeated by the Red Army, with the fighters taking refuge in Finland.

C3S8. Strengthening Democratic Governance / The Further Demotion of the Trotsky Faction Trotskyite influence fostered divisions in the Party:

Trotsky had provoked conflict with the unions, but there was also growing opposition to the high-handed practice of the central party organs of disregarding democratic elections and making appointments to high offices. Dispute over these fundamental issues threatened to split the party. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

To counter the Trotskyite influence:

Lenin, supported by ten of the nineteen Central Committee members, including Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, proposed some moderating of party rule. Immediate abolition of Trotsky's hated Tsektran was to be a first step. Trotsky violently opposed such "liberal" policies. He was supported by Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, and the three members then in charge of the party Secretariat. The rift within the Central Committee could not be bridged, and it was decided to put the matter to the party at large. Zinoviev, the party leader in Petrograd, led the attack on Trotsky, whom he had always detested, condemning him as a dictator. The debate raged between the factions as all prepared for the Tenth Party Congress, due to meet in March 1921, when these questions would be resolved. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

As was mentioned in C1S7, enemy infiltrators in the communist movement covertly collaborate but overtly may well pretend to oppose one another. At that time indeed, Trotskyite leaders Zinoviev and Kamenev pretended to oppose Trotsky so that they would not lose their position along with Trotsky. Anyways, Lenin and Stalin, as well as Kamenev and Zinoviev campaigned together against Trotsky's line and worked towards greater democratization, popular sovereignty, moderation, and greater freedoms:

Trotsky's proposals for rebuilding the economy by using the methods of war communism were heavily defeated. Lenin's resolutions on the trade unions and democratic centralism seemed to introduce a new spirit of reasonableness. One resolution declared that "it is above all necessary to put into practice ... on a wide scale the principle of election to all organs ... and to do away with the method of appointment from the top." Another resolution emphasized that members must be able to take "an active part in the life of the party" and that "the nature of workers' democracy excluded every form of appointment in place of election as a system." (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Suddenly on the last day of the congress, Lenin moved two new resolutions, one on "Party Unity" and the

other entitled "The Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party." The first denounced and outlawed all opposition groups as sources of weakness and danger, and demanded their immediate dissolution or the expulsion of their members from the party. The second resolution rejected the trade-union claims to control industry as "inconsistent with membership of the party." (Stalin: Man of History,

Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Trotsky suffered an ignominious defeat at the congress, and the campaign waged against him by Zinoviev, Stalin, and others seriously damaged his reputation. His plans for the militarization of labor, for the subordination of the trade unions, and for the greater centralization of power had been overwhelmingly rejected. The adoption of NEP had also been a rebuff to his economic policies. His public conflict with Lenin had lowered his standing with members among many of whom he was personally unpopular. In the election of the Central Committee, he nevertheless retained his place, but others who had supported his platform were not re-elected. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Stalin played an unobtrusive part in the disputes which dominated the Tenth Congress. He was one of the Platform of Ten supporting Lenin's proposals. He was evidently content to leave it to Zinoviev to launch the main attack on Trotsky in the pre-congress debate, but he was active in the campaign. In Pravda, on January 5, 1921, he published an article, entitled "Our Differences," which was his first polemical article against Trotsky. He argued that "democratism" and the use of persuasion among the proletariat were essential now that the war was over and the party had to deal with the complex threats of economic collapse. It was an effective polemic but moderate in tone and without the strident vigor of Zinoviev's attacks. Apparently, however, he was more active in the background. In the course of the congress, one delegate, who was a member of the Democratic Centralist group, referred to the campaign against Trotsky under the generalship of Zinoviev in Petrograd, and in Moscow led by "the military strategist and arch-democrat, Comrade Stalin." (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

C3S9. The Intelligentsia Temporarily 'Supported' the Soviet State

The intelligentsias as a stratum often arose out of the privileged family backgrounds, hence their ability to afford high-level education. Education is a virtue, but the feudal and bourgeois family backgrounds of the intellectuals has far more influence on their thinking than education itself; and the field of humanities itself is dominated by intellectuals from feudal and bourgeois family backgrounds, most of whom promote the reactionary anti-communist material.

In the face of the greater threat of British colonialism and Tsarist terror, however, the intelligentsia behaved like fellow-travellers and ostensibly 'sided' with the Party of the proletariat. While the so-called "intelligentsia" were predominantly liberals and romantics, they, for the time being, decided to 'support' the socialist state which stood as the antithesis to their fin-de-siecle beliefs. The MI6 report by the British General Staff of the War Office admitted:

there is evidence that a considerable number of intellectuals, previously anti-Bolshevist, have decided to throw in the lot, at least temporarily, with the Bolsheviks. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 101) (IMG)

The communist faction led by Lenin undertook measures to retain the scientists inside the Soviet Union so to advance the industry of the proletariat's state, while engaging in purge campaigns against the rest of the reactionary intelligentsia:

The overwhelming majority of scientists were hostile to the new regime, more hostile than they had been to the old regime, but neither side to the conflict could do without the other. With joy Lenin exiled religious philosophers and sociologists like Sorokin, but he repeatedly warned his comrades that natural scientists could not be treated the same way, however deviant their politics might be. (The Lysenko Affair, David Joravsky, 1970, p. 27) (IMG {Soviet Science})

Chapter 4

C4S1. The Establishment of Soviet Power in the Predominantly-Muslim Regions of the former Russian Empire

The peoples of the predominantly Muslim regions of the former Russian Empire were enthusiastic towards the establishment of Soviet power and sympathetic towards communism. A paper by the RAND Corporation stated:

Marxism-Leninism promised so much, if only by implication, to so many in 1918 that it could be portrayed without dissent as a conquering ideology. Many Russians welcomed it and fought under its banner for a better and new world, or at least for satisfaction of their grievances against the hated land owners and the exploitative bourgeoisie. National minorities in the Russian Empire, including Russia's Muslims, also found it convenient to side with the Bolsheviks who espoused this doctrine, for after all, part and parcel of Leninism is the promise of national self-determination. For Muslims, this meant the liberation of the Russian Muslim world. So powerful was the appeal of Bolshevism that converts blindly excused all the "unavoidable errors," tragedies, and brutalities that characterized the new movement from its first breaths. Stalin was later to denounce the perpetration of these "errors" as the work of "leftist deviationists," "Trotskyites," and "traitors," charges that carried the added advantage of allowing the Bolsheviks to eliminate forever some of their most formidable adversaries. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

There were many brave Muslims who fought for their own freedom alongside non-Muslims by fighting for the Bolsheviks. The following excerpt of the RAND Corporation document contains much of the usual anti-Soviet bias and propaganda but nonetheless admits much about the participation of Muslims in the Bolshevik revolution:

In 1920, approximately 40 percent of the soldiers and officers of Marshall Mikhail Frunze's VIth Red Army were Muslim, mainly Tatars and Bashkirs. The majority came from the "Muslim army" formed in 1917 by the Tatar nationalists of the Harbi Shura, which was disbanded by the Soviets in 1918. These Muslim officers were highly politicized, albeit more nationalist than Communist, having been trained between 1918 and 1920 in special political-military seminars created by Sultan Galiev under the aegis of the new People's Commissariat for Nationalities. Indifferent to socialist revolution and mainly interested in their own liberation from the reactionary rule of the Emir of Bukhara and from domination by the Russian colonists who had flooded into their native lands, the Muslim units of the VIth Red Army proved to be superb soldiers. Due largely to their presence in the force, the Russian recolonization of Central Asia appeared to be something else entirely; that is, it appeared to be more of a private Muslim affair.

By comparison, the XIth Red Army which invaded Daghestan and Chechnia was an all-Russian army, and its campaign became a typical colonial war for the Russians and a jihad for the fearsome Caucasian mountaineers who fought to the last man. Where the reconquest of Central Asia, on the whole, was a positive experience, the campaign in the Caucasus was a purely negative one. The Daghestani Communist historians who eventually wrote the history of this bloody period drew the necessary conclusions: A war against conservative Muslim insurgents must be conducted by revolutionary Muslim units or, at the very least, with the assistance of such units.

The early Bolshevik thrust has another important dimension that contributed to its success. In Central Asia, but not in the Caucasus, operations consisted primarily of conquering and organizing the territory; much less emphasis was placed on searching out and destroying the rebels. Even when the fighting in Central Asia was conducted by Russian units, pacification and organization of the conquered land was left to Muslim units. In the absence of a local proletariat, Muslim military cadre became the spearhead of the revolution. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 22-23) (IMG)

Unfortunately, the Trotskyites in the Bolshevik movement got the chance to savagely attack Muslim revolutionaries in order to drive a wedge between the communists and their Islamic revolutionary allies:

Objectively, the period of "War Communism," with its massacres and 'cavalry raids' – brutal attacks by armed bands of Bolsheviks against the Muslim religious establishment – was ... benign.... ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

It must be remembered that Lenin opposed terrorism, and that the savage terror launched throughout the territories of the former Russian empire by elements in the Bolshevik Party was indeed done by the Trotsky-Zinoviev group against the will of Lenin and his faction, as confirmed by the MI6 documents cited previously, and as stated by Stalin. Knowing that the atrocities of the earlier years of the revolution were not done by the real Bolsheviks, the Muslims of the former Russian Empire, as confirmed by the RAND Corporation, basically continued their acceptance and support of the communists.

Fortunately though, the Lenin-Stalin faction of the Bolshevik Party, which had the backing of the communist blue-collar workers in the Party, promoted the cultural liberality of the NEP in part to counter the Trotskyite left-deviations of the earlier period. As confirmed by the RAND Corporation document:

In Central Asia in the 1920s, the period of terror was followed by a brief but authentic detente promoted by native Communists. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

The temporary liberality surely allowed all kinds of revisionist eclectic 'Islamic Communist' tendencies to emerge in the Muslim parts of the USSR. The emergence of such right-deviation though was less a crisis and more an opportunity because it served as a useful weapon by which the communist faction of the Bolshevik movement could counter the Trotskyite left-deviation:

By a series of clever ideological innovations, Communists articulated what has become known as Muslim National Communism: a synthesis of Marxism, Islam, and nationalism. This loose doctrine inverted many tenets of orthodox Marxism. According to the Muslim National Communists, the cultural and religious bases of native society were to be left largely intact, free from the ... ideological attacks that characterized Russian applications of Marxism-Leninism to their own society. Class war in the Muslim borderlands was to be postponed indefinitely. (In fact, this restriction lasted only until 1928.) Reforms that might antagonize the native populations, such as land reform, destruction of traditional religious education, the confiscation of waqf properties (properties paid to Muslim authorities to support Islamic activities), and, above all, anti-religious campaigns, were put off for the foreseeable future. Local political and economic organs were gradually "nativized," leaving the mistaken impression in the minds of the natives that the Russians were embarked on something more benevolent than colonial reconquest. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

None of that is to imply that the 'Islamic communist' eclecticism was a tendency against which not to launch ideological and cultural campaigns. So-called 'Islamic communism' was eclectic and contrary to the principles of scientific socialism, even though temporarily for a few years, it benefited scientific socialist objectives by counteracting the Trotskyite left-deviation.

By the late 1920s, however, the struggle against the eclectic revisionist 'Islamic communist' right-deviation began, and class struggles in the field of the mode of production intensified. While local traditions were accepted, by the mid-to-late-1920s, cultural struggles against backward customs in Central Asia began. A paper by the US National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy launched the usual propaganda narrative that the processes of bringing change were in the form of 'diktats', but insofar as it pointed out that the mid-to-late- 1920s saw the beginning of the intensified cultural struggles, it is correct:

The Soviet era actually began with a nod towards local custom. It was not until the mid-1920s that various diktats were announced which folded local courts and juridical proceedings into the Soviet experience. By the 1930s, the Central Asia region was under Soviet control, although this continued to be a struggle for Soviet officials in the ensuing decades. (In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, National Defense University: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Washington DC, edited by; Dan Burghart & Theresa Sabonis-Helf, 204, p. 71) (IMG)

In addition, the cultural campaign against the totalitarian garment 'Burqa/'niqab' was launched:

Soviet publications and contemporary studies are replete with accounts of how the Soviet government tried to quickly institute their own legal norms in the region. From the initial "unveiling" campaign in the 1920s, which advocated that women should remove their traditional veils as a sign of modernity, to the legal restrictions placed on Islamic organizations, the Soviet leaders sought to radically transform the concept of law in Central Asia. (In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, National Defense University: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Washington DC, edited by; Dan Burghart & Theresa Sabonis-Helf, 204, p. 71) (IMG)

Turkey's Kemalists, who were funded in all ways by the Soviets, assisted the Bolsheviks in establishing Soviet power in the Caucasus:

In so doing, the Bolsheviks brought the Caucasus into their orbit with the approval and encouragement of Mustafa Kemal and thereby set the stage for an unsuccessful attempt to spread Bolshevism to other parts of the Muslim east. (Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey, External Research Program of the US Department of State, Lowell Bezanis, May 1992, p. 22) (IMG)

Then:

In December of the same year, agreement was reached between the nationalists and Soviet Armenia as to their

common boundary, an agreement which was confirmed in March 1921 by a treaty with the USSR signed at Moscow. In October 1921 the Turkish nationalists formally recognized the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. At the Conference of Lausanne in 1923, the status of the Straits was agreed upon among the powers concerned. The USSR, however, never ratified the treaty.

On 17 December 1925 Turkey and the Soviet Union signed a pact of friendship, which was extended and amplified exactly four years later. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 32) (IMG)

Too often, the Luxemburgites asserted that the Bolshevik support for self-determination and secession from the territory of the former Russian Empire would result in the future socialist state to have so little territory, and would help the bourgeois 'enemies' of the socialist state to rise in those territories. The case of Central Asian SSRs is one of the many cases in point to disprove this assertion. Communist support for the bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial struggles in the Russian Empire won many of the anti-Tsarist and anti-colonial freedom fighters onto the side of the Bolsheviks. Through absorbing the anti-colonial separatist movements into the Bolshevik cause, they were on the one hand able to annihilate the Anglo-Tsarist enemies of Soviet power; on the other hand, they were able to maintain the territorial integrity of the former Russian Empire.

This is why the key tribes in Kazakhstan joined the Bolshevik revolution, inviting them to establish Soviet rule, even though these tribes hardly had proletarian origins. The RAND Corporation document stated:

The paradoxical courting of the Muslim tribal aristocracy by Bolshevik representatives that took place during the Civil War in Kazakhstan had excellent results. When a Kazakh batyr, a sultan, or a khan sided with the Bolsheviks, his clan, tribe, or horde followed automatically.' Such was the case with the important Qypchaq tribe and the entire Bukey Horde, whose chieftains, Zhangildin and Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, joined the Russian Communist Party during the Civil War in return for promises of national self-determination.... In the same way and for the same reasons, Ahmed Zeki Validov, the aristocratic and undisputed Bashkir leader, went over to the Reds, taking his entire nation with him. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 9-10) (IMG)

In pre-revolutionary Kazakh society, a batyr was head of a clan, a sultan was chief of a tribe, and a khan - always a descendant of Genghis Khan--was the ruler of a horde. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N- 1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, p. 9) (IMG)

The general strategy of the Bolsheviks with regards to many of the progressive workers' or anti-imperialist movements was as follows: the Bolsheviks would absorb non-communist anti-colonial movements into their cause and then would begin a campaign to educate the ordinary members of the non-communist anti-colonial cause with regards to the theses of scientific socialism, historical materialism, and dialectics. Of course, every anti-colonial movement – communist or non-communist – is infiltrated by colonial agents and thus, the Bolsheviks would eventually purge off many of these colonial agents that had joined the Party during the process of the absorbing of such anti-colonial movements.

Many communists from the colonized parts of the world had their roots not as much in the working class communist movements but rather in anti-colonial national-bourgeois democratic movements. Ho Chi Minh is the most famous case in point, but there have been countless other cases. Such cases can be found in Central Asia and the Caucasus regions. Owing to their converging anti-colonial interests, many Islamists were interested in the Bolshevik cause, and invited Soviet rule even when such Islamists had not yet 'converted' to communism. Eventually, many of the Islamists genuinely interested in combatting the imperialists were convinced of the correctness of scientific socialism and thus 'converted', although such a process typically took quite a number of years since it required education in the field of historical materialism and dialectics.

Naturally, during the process of ideological re-education, and in part owing to the petit-bourgeois class forces at play in Central Asia and the Caucasus regions, there arose revisionist eclectic so-called 'Islamic communist' tendencies. Some leaned towards such ideas owing to a misunderstanding of the historical materialist and dialectical sciences. For these people, 'Islamic communism' was a good bridge towards eventually becoming a communist. On the other hand, there were others who leaned towards such ideas for the purpose of subversion and ideational sabotage aimed at leading people away from communism onto Islam – to be sure, Islam was a progressive force for its own historical time period but to move from communism to 'Islamic communism' is to move backwards.

The following excerpt of the RAND report sheds some light on this phenomena of the 'conversion' from being an Islamist to a communist, and the admission of numerous anti-colonial patriots into the Party:

In February 1917, there were a few Muslim Communists in Russia. Two years later, several thousand former radical Muslim nationalists were admitted to the Russian Communist Party. The new Communist cadre originated in various strictly nationalist parties such as the Young Bukharans, the Alash-Orda (Kazakh), Milli Firka

(Crimean Tatar), and Hummet (Azerbaijani). Because they needed these nationalists-turned-Communists to consolidate their revolution, Bolshevik leaders did not object to the non-proletarian origins of the new Muslim adherents. (In fact, nearly all belonged to the nobility or to the upper levels of the bourgeoisie in their respective societies.) Moreover, for a time at least, the Bolsheviks were prepared to suffer the Muslims' not inconsiderable ideological deviations. At the same time, however, the Bolsheviks submitted them to rigid discipline, much as they treated their Russian comrades. These Muslim Communists played prominent roles in local Communist Parties after 1920. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 19-20) (IMG)

Again, as a disproof of the left-deviationist views of team Rosa Luxembourg, the anti-colonial line of the Bolsheviks actually won the peoples of the predominantly Muslim regions on to the side of the communists. In fact, there were quite a number of Muslim religious leaders who regarded liberation from Tsarist oppression as a priority, and thus supported the Bolsheviks:

Another paradoxical Bolshevik success during the Civil War was the cooptation of important Muslim religious leaders. This success contributed immensely to the Bolsheviks' final victory over the Muslim guerrillas of Central Asia, the Basmachi. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

[D]uring this period local Soviet authorities, who often were Muslims themselves, appealed to "progressive" elements among the Muslim clerics. These clerics, who became known as "Red Mullahs," took the lead in attacking more conservative Muslim clerics who opposed the new Soviet regime. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

Facing the much more reactionary feudal or Tsarist elements, many progressive bourgeois-democratic intellectuals sympathized with the Bolsheviks for their anti-colonialism. As such, many of them began to study Bolshevik ideas, underwent genuine ideological changes, and joined the communist labour movement. Beside these waves of intellectuals who had really changed, were the counter-revolutionary intellectuals who did not undergo real changes, but who decided to opportunistically present themselves as the friends of the workers and as 'communists'. Thus, the RAND Corporation noted:

In the 1920s, the revolutionary Bolshevik leadership understood that the success of their political program in the borderlands depended to a large extent on their ability to swing the influence of the modern intellectual elite of Soviet Muslim regions to their side. In this they proved very successful and the revolution prospered. Exceptionally sophisticated native intellectuals such as the Kazan Tatars Mir- Said, Sultan Galiev, and Galimjan Ibragimov, the Kazakhs Turar Ryskulov and Ahmed Baytursun, the Uzbeks Abdurrauf Fitrat and Fjvzulla Kojayev, and many others went over to the Bolsheviks, either as full members of the Russian Communist Party or as temporary allies. This important group of intellectuals, most of whom were later liquidated by Stalin, played a major role in bridging the gap between the Russian revolutionaries and the Muslim masses. Through their efforts, the gap between traditional Islamic society and Russian socialism was made to appear much smaller than it eventually proved to be, and it was because of this that the Russian reconquest of Central Asia never assumed the character of a colonial enterprise. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920 - 1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 17-18) (IMG)

A paper by the US National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy stated:

Bukhara and Khiva, the two remaining protectorates, remained stagnant in their own personality-based systems. The frustration experienced by reform-minded individuals in these territories prompted some to find common cause with various revolutionary and reformist groups in Russia itself, including the radical Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic and Labor Party – the precursor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Thus, ironically, the Jadidist reformers came to the conclusion that external assistance would most likely be required to enact change in their countries – and they sought assistance from groups that would eventually result in their downfall. Naturally, there were critical debates within the reformist community and a significant number did not side with the Bolsheviks, either joining the local insurgencies against the Red Army or simply emigrating. (In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, National Defense University: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Washington DC, edited by; Dan Burghart & Theresa Sabonis-Helf, 204, p. 71) (IMG)

It is nonetheless worth reminding that a fair number of these Muslim leaders who joined the Bolsheviks, did so to infiltrate the movement and to undermine it. Fayzullah Khojayeve was an example. He was a right-deviationist eclectic and an agent of the British secret service, purged during the late 1930s. However, in the beginning, even the mere verbal support

of such fakes as Khojayeve in support of the Bolsheviks was useful for the cause. Furthermore, the right-deviation of such eclectics was useful for balancing off against the Trotskyite leftist measures aimed at driving a wedge between Muslims and Bolsheviks through terror against Muslims. All of this is in spite of the fact that the right-deviationist eclectic agents of the British secret service were covertly allied to the Trotskyite left-deviationists whom they pretended to oppose on the overt level.

Of course, there were also many people who chose not to become communists and to remain as non-communist progressives. These people did not belong to the Party in the longer run, but they surely could join the ranks of the Soviet government apparatus. Note that the Soviet government is not to be confused with the Party since the Party ruled over the government and strived to be an exclusive body of communists despite initially having right-deviationist and Trotskyite left-deviationist elements in it. On the other hand, the government, although subordinate to the Party, did not have to have communists in its ranks necessarily. This is why the Red Army, the intelligence service, the economic ministries, enterprise management, etc. all had many non-communists.

The Soviet Revolution was spread to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In the words of a document by the US-sponsored UNESCO:

In October 1917 the Bolshevik revolution triumphed in Petrograd, and that victory reverberated in the distant land of Turkistan. By 15 November Soviet power had been established in Tashkent, and by early December in Ashgabat. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 318) (IMG)

The communists proclaimed their support for the independence and decolonization of the Central Asian peoples:

In November 1917, ... Soviet power approved two important documents: the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia; and the Soviet Government's appeal 'To All Muslim Workers of Russia and the East'. These documents proclaimed the main principles of the Soviet policy on nationalities: equality and sovereignty for the large and small nations of Russia; their right to self-determination; free development for the national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting Russia; and the abolition of any and all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions. In the words of Lenin:

Arrange your own national life freely and without hindrance. You have the right to do this. Know that your rights, like the rights of all the peoples of Russia, are protected by the full force of the revolution and its agencies. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, pp. 318-319) (IMG)

“However,” the UNESCO document stated:

under the new conditions, the Turkmens encountered many difficulties and contradictions as they tried to establish a national life. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 319) (IMG)

After the July coup of 1918 when Junaid Khan seized power, there was a:

civil war that broke out in Transcaspian oblast'. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 319) (IMG)

Junaid Khan's regime was by no means popular let alone effective in resolving the issues. As such, a widespread rebellion broke out and the rebels called for the establishment of Soviet power and assistance of the Red Army:

During this period, the political and economic situation deteriorated sharply in the Khiva khanate, and inter-ethnic tensions increased. (...). One especially noteworthy individual at this time was Junaid Khan, a leader of the Turkmen tribes who seized power in the khanate, although at first he left the Khiva khan on the throne (1918-20). However, Junaid Khan was unable to ease Uzbek-Turkmen relations, which were founded exclusively on the issue of water use. Nor was he able to preserve unity among all the Turkmen tribes. As a result, the economic crisis worsened, and it was not long before upheavals and armed actions began in the khanate. The rebels, among whom Kochmamed Khan, Qulamali, Shamyrat Bagshy and other Turkmen clan leaders distinguished themselves, appealed to Soviet power in Turkistan for assistance. This was a pretext for Red Army units to enter the khanate. With their assistance, the rebels deposed Khiva's khan, Sayyid 'Abdullah Khan, and the actual ruler, Junaid Khan, who retreated with the remnants of his troops deep into the Kara Kum. Subsequently, for nearly 10 years, Junaid Khan waged a relentless struggle to restore his lost power. In 1928 he was defeated, left the republic and crossed into Afghanistan, where he died in 1937. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 319) (IMG)

As a result:

On 27-30 April 1920 the first All-Khwarazm Qurultay (Council) of People's Representatives proclaimed the creation of the Khwarazm People's Soviet Republic (Khwarazm NSR) and ratified its constitution.

On 13 September of that same year an agreement was reached in Moscow between the RSFSR and the Khwarazm NSR according to which the Government of the Russian Republic recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Khwarazm and annulled all agreements foisted on the Khiva khanate by tsarist Russia. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 320) (IMG)

Bokhara experienced a similar situation as in Khwarazm. An uprising began followed by an appeal to Soviet power and the Red Army, leading to the establishment of a Soviet republic in that region:

Events followed more or less the same scenario in the Bukhara emirate. In the summer of 1920, an armed uprising against the emir began in the emirate's Turkmen areas under the leadership of Abdulkhaim Kulmuhamedov and Byashim Sardar. The rebels appealed to the Red Army units standing at the ready in Kagan and on 2 September 1920, through joint efforts by the Red Army units, the First Eastern Muslim Regiment and the rebels, Bukhara's emir, Sayyid 'Alim Khan, was deposed. The commander of the Turkistan front, Mikhail Frunze, telegraphed Lenin: 'Bukhara has fallen. The Red Banner of world revolution is waving victoriously over the Registan.' On 6 October 1920, in Bukhara, the first All-Bukhara Qurultay proclaimed the formation of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (Bukhara NSR). (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 320) (IMG)

Adeeb Khalid, the American regime's distinguished scholar at the John W. Kluge Center at the US Library of Congress, admitted:

Even the harshest critics of Soviet nationalities policy cannot ascribe the separation of Tajikistan from Uzbekistan and its elevation to the status of a union republic to a divide-and-rule policy. It was the result of demands from the Tajik leadership and, if anything, central authorities tried their best to moderate Tajik demands. Rather, the separation had to do with the way in which Tajik and Uzbek elites had internalized the categories of ethnic nationhood and had come to see the historically intertwined sedentary Muslim population of Central Asia as composed of two distinct national and racial groups, each with its own political rights. These conceptions were of prerevolutionary vintage, but they found resonance with classificatory schemes used by the Soviet state. The ethnic disaggregation of the Muslim population of Central Asia was thus the culminating feature of the age of revolution on Central Asia. ("Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire and Revolution in the Early USSR," Cornell University, Adeeb Khalid, 2015 p. 369) (IMG)

C4S2. The Gilan SSR / Soviet Presence in Azerbaijan (Iran) / Baha'i-Trotskyite agents of the MI6

As with many of the other SSRs, the main local elements behind the establishment of the SSRs were former progressive bourgeois-democratic elements who had accepted communism. The progressive bourgeois democrats were not businessmen per se but were rather ideologically bourgeois-democrats and hence many of them moved away from bourgeois thinking and began to gradually train themselves with the scientific theses of communism. The establishment of the Gilan SSR was a case in point of this fact.

In 1905, along with the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Tsarist Russia, there came about a revolution to turn the monarchy in Iran into a constitutional one. One of the headquarters of the revolution was located in Iran's Azerbaijan region, which, centuries prior, had been also the region that spread Shia Islam to Persia. The revolt had some success but many of its gains were suppressed by the Anglo-Russian colonizers. Against the Anglo-Russian forces, there came about a constitutionalist-turned-republican resistance movements in Iran's 'Jangal-ha' (forests) in the Gilan province in the North. The Islamic Republic of Iran's Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies wrote:

With the victory of the Constitutional Revolution and in response to the unfulfilled promises of the constitutionalist revolutionaries in Tehran, movements took place around the lands of the forbidden countries of Iran, the most popular of which was the Jungle Movement. Although there is no consensus on the nature of this movement and the political goals of Mirza Kuchak Khan Jangali, Mirza Kuchak Khan can be considered one of the popular contemporary figures who is the legend of resistance against the colonialists. (The Reason Behind Mirza Kuchak Khan's and Ibrahim Heshmat's Popularity, Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies, Morteza Hafezi) (IMG)

Mirza was a Shia Muslim fighter against British imperialists and was a progressive republican. His movement, the Jangali movement, shared his ideology. He would later invite the Bolsheviks into Iran.

Parallel to the Jangali movement was the Baha'iyeh. In order to understand the character of the imperialist infiltration in Iran's communist movement, and especially with regards to Gilan, one must first understand this cult. Baha'ism (or Baha'iyeh) is an inherently pro-MI6 religion that presents itself as "progressive," "universalist," "internationalist," "pro-democracy," "friendly" towards peoples of other Abrahamic religions (including Islam), and "supportive" of women's rights. The progressive mask which this pro-MI6 religion takes is precisely a key factor for why it is dangerous. There indeed were and are many well-meaning individuals deceived by the propaganda narratives of this religion, but that does

not change the fact that the religion is a force for imperialist reaction. Abdul-Baha, the son of Baha'ollah, was one of the core leaders and co-founders of the Baha'iyeh, and openly befriended the British imperialist occupation forces in Palestine, promoted Britain's cause, all the while claiming to represent internationalism and women's rights. The following report published in the prominent American Baha'i magazine "The Star of the West" exposes the details of this matter:

While the league of nations is hailed or attacked here as a Wilsonian project, out in Palestine is a religious leader who claims it first saw the light in the writings of his father fifty years ago. He is Abdul-Baha, the son and successor of BAHÁ'O'LLAH, founder of the modern cult, Baháism.

Abdul-Baha, or Abbas Effendi, as he is widely known in the Near East, counts hundreds of followers in America. He made a tour here in 1912, preaching his doctrine of universal love in churches and halls from coast to coast. Born in Persia in 1844 he went to Acca as a young man. He was imprisoned by the Turks for his teachings, but was released in 1908, the year of the new Ottoman constitution.

Interested in World League.

I met Abdul-Baha lately in his home in Haifa. He has many friends among the British, including General Ronald Storrs, military governor of Jerusalem, and it was a British officer who took me

to him. His influence is considerable in the Holy Land, but it is almost impossible to reduce it to actual numbers. I went to him curious as to his views of the future of Palestine, but he seemed more eager to talk of a matter of world importance—the league of nations.

He spoke in Persian, a well trained secretary interpreting his low, soft words in good English. Through the open windows of the large sunny salon of his modern house came the trill of songbirds in the Effendi's lovely garden. In white galabieh and turban, he fitted into the summery scene, his voice falling on the silence like a woodland echo. An ancient, venerable patriarch he seemed, with his snowy beard, a kindly patriarch, but with little of the Biblical fire.

Tells of Father's Plan.

"Fifty years ago," he began, "BAHA'O'LLAH wrote that there must be a league of nations to establish universal peace. He worked his idea out on practical lines, too. He said every nation must choose representatives, approved by the senate, the cabinet and the ruler of the country. They were to meet to found a universal peace congress to be forever a world court of arbitration.

"BAHA'O'LLAH saw even then, half a century ago, that unless universal peace is established, the world of humanity will continue in a state of barbarism. For it is a world of struggle for existence, of sensualism, a world of nature. Only when universal peace comes to stay will it become a world of spirit.

"I went to America myself on a mission of universal peace. I proclaimed seven years ago that Europe was an arsenal that needed but a spark to turn it into a volcano. The world leaders, I urged, must prevent this catastrophe. But they did not heed me. Now that they themselves are working for universal peace and we are soon to have a league of nations, there is no need for me to go to America again.

Message to His Followers.

"Tell my followers," Abdul-Baha continued, "that I am always asking heavenly help for them, and that my deepest desire is that they shall be the source of the enlightenment of humanity and the unity of all the races of mankind. The point of distinction among men, let them remember, is their deeds, not their beliefs or words. I charge my disciples, too, at this time to show love even toward their 'enemies.' They have no 'enemies.' The enemy of man is himself."

His religion, this leader explained, includes the highest principles of its forerunners, with this addition — it fuses them all in the pursuit of one goal, the unity of mankind in universal love. Unlike its Mohammedan neighbor, it teaches the equality of man and woman. "The world of humanity has two wings," is Abdul-Baha's view, "man and woman. If one wing is weak then the bird cannot fly."

He looks to the rebirth of religion as a result of the war. The Bolshevik movement, he believes, will prove an admonition to the religious world and send mankind back to the fold, convinced that religion is the sole source of order and peace. Bolshevism was inevitable, because religion was on the daily decline in Europe, particularly in Russia.

Has Hope for Palestine.

For Palestine Abdul-Baha has the brightest hopes. "It will develop day by day now," he declared, "in industry, in commerce, in agriculture, under an enlightened government. Up to the present the people of this country were like lost sheep. Now they have found their shepherd.

"If the Zionists will mingle with the other races and live in unity with them, they will succeed. If not, they will meet certain resistance. **For the present I think a neutral government like the British administration would be best.** A Jewish government might come later.

"There is too much talk today of what the Zionists are going to do here. There is no need of it. Let them come and do more and say less.

"The Zionists should make it clear that their principle is to elevate all the people here and to develop the country for all its inhabitants. This land must be developed, according to the promises of the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah and Zachariah. If they come in such a spirit they will not fail.

Must Be Open to All.

"They must not work to separate the Jews from the other Palestinians. Schools should be open to all nationalities here, business companies, etc. The Turks went down because they attempted to rule over foreign races. The British are always in power because they keep fair and promote harmony. ('Declares Zionists Must Work with Other Races Leader of Bahá'ism believes Neutral Government Like British Is Best for Palestine at Present—Says His Father Advocated League Half Century Ago', From: The Globe and Commercial Advertiser, New York, July 17, 1919, author: Marion Weinstein. In: 'THE STAR OF THE WEST' (American Bahá'í publication), Vol. 10, Ezzat 1, 75 (September 8, 1919), No. 10, pp. 195-196. Bold added.) (IMG)

It is not difficult to understand why, considering the fact that this MI6-Zionist reactionary ideology took on a "progressive" cloak, it served and continues to serve to this day as a cult valuable to Anglo-American and Israeli intelligence networks. One Iranian Trotskyite nihilist trained in the Bahá'iyeh pro-MI6 network was Ehsanollah Khan Dustdar. Moojan Momen, a leading figure of the international Bahá'iyeh network, wrote:

The Bahá'í community in the town came to include prominent merchants such as Mirza Muhammad Isma'íl Amin al-Tujjar Isfahani, Mirza Muhammad 'Ali Mushir al-Tujjar Tabrizi (who was a son-in-law of Mirza 'Inayatullah 'Aliyabadi) and Hajji Muhsin Kashmiri. Also converted were Aqa Mahmud Sa'atsaz (1280/ 1863-1912), who was engaged in journalism and had been a darugha (police chief) in the town, and the bazaar trader Aqa Mirza Habib Kharazi-furush Isfahani. There were also two physicians who became Bahá'is, Aqa Lutf-'Ali Khan Majd al-Atibba', who became a Bahá'í in 1303/1885 and had extensive property in Arata Bur Khayl, and Mirza 'Ali Akbar Hafiz al-Sihha (d. c.1313/1895), who was in charge of public health and also had property in Arata. The latter's four sons later took the surname of Dustdar and the eldest of them Ihsanullah Khan (1884 - c.1944), studied at the Bahá'í-run Tarbiyat School and then at the St Louis School in Tehran and later taught French at the schools in Sari (hence the reference to him as "Monsieur" Ihsanullah Khan in the list below).²¹ Majd al-Atibba's interest in reform is demonstrated by his membership of the Mazandaran branch of the Jam'i-Adamiyyat (established c.1903), an organization that was inspired by Mirza Malkam Khan's writings on reform and that promoted the modernization of Iran. ('The Bahá'is and the Constitutional Revolution: The Case of Sari, Mazandaran, 1906-1913', Iranian Studies, Vol. 41, May 28, 2008, Issue 3, Moojan Momen, p. 348) (IMG)

Characteristic of British intelligence techniques is to self-describe as 'apolitical', even if one is so blatantly political. Bahá'ism, as an MI6 ideology, is no exception. Ehsanollah Khan Dustdar did precisely what every politically competent Bahá'í is religiously obliged to do: infiltrate revolutionary movements on behalf of MI6 intelligence networks. While Momen promoted the myth of Bahá'í apoliticism, and hence depicting Dustdar as deviating from Bahá'iyah, he did nonetheless mention the fact that the Bahá'í operative Dustdar joined an extremist (nihilist and proto-Trotskyite) fringe of the constitutionalist ("reform") movement, and then went on to join the Jangali movement:

Similarly, a few of the Bahá'is seem to have continued to play a part in the Bahá'í community but also to have continued some limited political involvement. Aqa Mahmud Sa'atsaz and Mirza Habibullah Kharazifurush, for example, are described as Bahá'is and also as having been members of the Democrat Party after 1909. At least one Bahá'í, however, Ihsanullah Khan (Dustdar), separated himself from the Bahá'í community and threw himself actively into the political process. He moved at first to Tehran where he was politically active after 1909 among the more extreme elements of the reform movement (Kumitih-yi Mujazat which had goals and activities that were radically opposed to Bahá'í principles) and then he moved to Gilan province where he became a leading figure in the Jangali Revolt, 1918-21. ('The Bahá'is and the Constitutional Revolution: The Case of Sari, Mazandaran, 1906-1913', Iranian Studies, Vol. 41, May 28, 2008, Issue 3, Moojan Momen, p. 354) (IMG)

As can be seen, while the Jangali movement was a revolutionary movement, it was infiltrated by the Bahá'iyah extremist elements. Mirza Kuchak Khan and the Shia Islamic and progressive republican leadership of Gilan saw in the establishment of Soviet power, the hopes for the liberation of Iran from the yoke of the White Guards, the British colonizers, and the central regime in Iran. As such, the progressive Muslim patriot Mirza invited the Soviet forces into Gilan and helped in the establishment of the Gilan SSR, a Soviet military intervention to which Western media wrongly referred as an "invasion." Prominent American intelligence official Ralph Cossa wrote:

the Soviets (even before the invasion) had been providing support to an Iranian revolutionary leader, Kuchik Khan, whose movement was dedicated to the overthrow of the central government and to radical social change. Although more a Muslim nationalist than a true Marxist believer, Khan realized that an alliance with Lenin's forces provided the best means of success for his movement. Within days of the Soviet invasion, therefore, Khan sent a telegram to "Comrade Lenin" in which he proclaimed the formation of the "Persian Socialist Soviet

Republic"--more commonly referred to as the Gilan Socialist Republic, since Khan at the time maintained considerable control over Gilan Province. From then until the time of their eventual pullout, Soviet forces were to fight side by side with Khan's followers. ('Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns', McNair Papers, No. 11, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC, author: Ralph A. Cossa, July 1990, p. 21) (IMG)

Along with Gilan, the other major hub of communism in Iran was the Azerbaijan region, which was most enthusiastic of all towards the October Revolution. As Richard Cottam, the CIA operative involved in the 1953 coup in Iran, admitted:

Nowhere in Iran was the Bolshevik revolution greeted with more enthusiasm than in Azerbaijan. (...). The Bolshevik Revolution meant that at last Azerbaijan would be free of the [Tsarist] Russian troops that had been in occupation since 1909. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 122) (IMG)

People in Azerbaijan (in Iran) sought to join the Azerbaijan SSR:

During one of these periods the notoriously antinationalist and pro-Tsarist Tabriz correspondent for the British journal *Near East and India*, Mirza Firuz Khan, wrote that separatist thinking was sweeping Azerbaijan. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 125. Citing: Russo-Persian Trade Relations, *The Near East and India*, Mirza Firuz Khan, July 29, 1927, p. 118) (IMG)

The Soviets thus entered Iran in order to undermine the presence of the British imperialists and the White Guards, and to help the people of Northern Iran reach their aim of freedom from imperialist yoke, through the establishment of the SSRs:

in May 1920 Soviet forces penetrated into Iranian territory, ostensibly in pursuit of the remnants of the White Russian Army. Fear of the British provided another justification for the invasion. As the commander of the Red Fleet, F. F. Raskolnikov, observed at the time, Soviet Russia "could not be sure that the British would not make a new attack on Baku from Enzeli" (a British outpost in Iranian territory on the Caspian Sea coast). The invasion was therefore aimed, in part, at "depriving the British [of] their mainstay on the Caspian Sea."

It soon became apparent that Moscow's aspirations exceeded merely neutralizing the White Russian and British threats. By the end of the year, Soviet forces had gained control over Iranian Azerbaijan and almost the entire Caspian Sea coast. (See map on p. 20.) ('Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns', McNair Papers, No. 11, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC, author: Ralph A. Cossa, July 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

While the liberation of Iran's north would have been a much-desired outcome, the fact remained that by 1921, the Soviets needed to establish peace agreements with all their neighbors in order to be able to build up their military- industrial capacity, before any further continuation of international class warfare. As such, it became a necessary evil to give up on Iran's north:

By 1921, the pragmatic Lenin came to grips with reality. Weakened by seven years of international and civil war, faced with serious economic challenges at home, and concerned over further confrontation with the British in Iran, the Bolsheviks elected to seek accommodation with Tehran and trade their newly acquired territory for secure borders and diplomatic recognition. In addition, the Gilan leadership by this time had become seriously factionalized.. ('Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns', McNair Papers, No. 11, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC, author: Ralph A. Cossa, July 1990, p. 21) (IMG)

In the meantime, as the Bolsheviks were further weakened in northern Iran, the position of Mirza became also less stable. This created greater leverage for a Trotskyite-Bahai saboteurial network in Gilan SSR. Then, in 1921, when the Bolsheviks were on the retreat, Dustdar and his Trotskyite-Baha'i clique launched their Trotskyite coup against Mirza and the Gilan SSR. Jamil Hasanli, a prominent Azeri government official serving in the CIA-funded Wilson Center since 2011, wrote:

Despite promises of support, on July 30, 1920, at a joint and secret meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Iran and representatives of the left forces in the government of the Soviet Republic of Gilan, it was decided to overthrow Mirza Kuchak Khan and suppress his supporters. As a result, a new government was established in Gilan on July 31, headed by Ehsanullah Khan at the suggestion of the [Trotskyite] [pseudo-]Bolsheviks in Iran. Mirza Kuchak Khan returned to the forests of Gilan and settled with his colleagues in his former headquarters, Fooman. The communist attempt to besiege and destroy him failed. A fierce battle ensued, resulting in the deaths of about 400 of Mirza's companions and hundreds of [Bolshevik] fighters sent from Azerbaijan and Russia. ('A Narrative of the Jangali Movement's Relationship with the Soviet Communist Government / The Promises Mirza Kuchak Khan Received from the Soviets', Jamil Hasanli, Professor of History, Baku State University, Translated to Farsi by: Abtin Golkar. In: *Tarikh Irani*, June 6, 2012) (IMG)

The Trotskyite-Rightist renegade Chicherin was very happy by the fact that the allegedly 'non-daring', 'non-revolutionary', non-Trotskyite Mirza was defeated by the Trotskyite faction:

on August 3, in the heat of the Gilan affair, Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin wrote to Kamenev: "There are rumors that Mirza Kuchak Khan is hiding and apparently escaped from the British, which does not matter. His commander-in-chief, who is much more left-wing than himself, has replaced him. The Soviet Republic of Iran will survive without him. Kuchak Khan is useful as a popular figure, but it is also detrimental in part because of his lack of full understanding of revolutionary and sedentary politics. He does not know how to dare, while this is exactly what is needed now ... Overall, our situation in the East is constantly improving. The revolutionary fervor has engulfed the masses of the army, and this means that the whole reactionary structures have been shaken ... a transformation has taken place in which the Iranian movement has been very influential. It is clear that the pace and intensity of our policy in the East depends on our policy towards Britain. It can be emphasized in the negotiations with the British that if they launch a military operation in Europe, they can only seriously injure us with a few pins in the fringes, whereas if we use all our facilities in the East, we can strike immediately. "Introduce the great and irreparable into the whole of Britain's world standing." ('A Narrative of the Jangali Movement's Relationship with the Soviet Communist Government / The Promises Mirza Kuchak Khan Received from the Soviets', Jamil Hasanli, Professor of History, Baku State University, Translated to Farsi by: Abtin Golkar. In: Tarikh Irani, June 6, 2012) (IMG)

Years later, Dustdar and his Trotskyite-Baha'i gang were purged on charges of being Trotskyite agents of British intelligence:

in Baku, the authorities opened fire on the first group of non-communist Iranian revolutionaries. Led by Ehsanollah Khan Dustdar, the group also included members of the Gilan Revolutionary Committee and later the Komiteh-e Enqelab-e Azadkonandeh-e Iran (Committee for the Revolution Liberating Iran): Ashuri, Ja'far Kangavari, Reza Pashazadeh and Ali Hoseynzadeh.

On 15 December 1937, Ehsanollah Khan was arrested in Baku. He was accused of being: "engaged in anti-Soviet activities, a British and later a German agent, a member of Trotsky-Zinoviev circle, an anti-Comintern and anti-Communist Party of Iran activist". During the early interrogation, ... he utterly rejected all charges. His interrogation in Baku lasted for almost five months. In April 1938, he was sent to Moscow for further interrogation. In Moscow, they repeated the same charges, and he again, as he had done in Baku rejected. (Iranian Revolutionaries in the Soviet Union, Touraj Atabaki, Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran, edited by Dr. Stephanie Cronin, 2013, p. 162) (IMG)

Interestingly, Iranian anti-communist propagandists denounce Dustdar as a traitor who destroyed the anti-imperialist movement, but praise him and his group as "great communists" "framed" and "murdered" "by Stalin."

Anyways, by the late 1930s, the Baha'iyah and its intelligence ties to Trotskyite spy networks was publicly exposed and thus the Baha'iyah was de facto banned in the USSR:

the Soviet Union ... confiscated the Baha'i temple in Ashgabat, deported about 1000 Baha'is back to Iran, and shipped most of the rest to prisons and gulags, where hundreds perished. Survivors were scattered across Siberia, where a few were found as late as the 1990s. In the 1930s Iran's government placed many new restrictions on the Baha'is there. (New Religious Movements and Violence, Catherine Wessinger. In: 'Introduction to New and Alternative Religions in America', edited by Eugene V. Gallaher, W. Michael Ashcroft, p. 199) (IMG)

C4S3. On the Russian Bourgeois-Nationalist Argument 'Bolsheviks surrendered Russian territory!'

Too often, Russian bourgeois-nationalists foolishly criticize the Bolsheviks for the latter's support for anti-colonial secessionist movements in the former Russian Empire. Are they correct in such 'criticism'? No, they are not correct. The non-existence of such a Bolshevik policy on secessionism would have led to the partition of the territory of the former Russian Empire, whereas the Bolshevik pursuit of the secessionist policy ensured the territorial integrity of that area in a new non-colonial fashion.

Note that in the territory of the former Russian Empire, in the aftermath of an October Revolution, only two options were possible: (1) the Bolsheviks taking over territory from the Tsarist Russians, or (2) the Bolsheviks accepting the continued rule of the Tsarist Russians. The second option was the surrender of the October Revolution to the Tsarist White Guards, and would have resulted in the territories outside of Soviet Russia to be dominated by reactionary states separate from Soviet Russia. Hence, the second option would have resulted in the partition of the territory of the former Russian Empire, precisely the kind of an outcome against which Russian bourgeois-nationalists whine.

Hence remained only the first option. And to pursue the first option was to pursue a revolt against the Tsarist Russians ruling and operating in the territories outside of Tsarist Russia. In some territories, the revolt against the Tsarist Russians could easily take the form of a proletarian revolution, devoid of any 'national' 'secessionist' colorations and strongly proletarian internationalist in rhetoric; in most territories of the Russian Empire, however, the conditions for a proletarian revolution had not yet come, and a Bolshevik revolt against the Tsarist White Guard rule could only take the form of an anti-colonial national-bourgeois revolution absorbed by the Bolshevik movement. Such an anti-colonial national-bourgeois revolution, due to its national-bourgeois rebel character, would have inherently taken on a secessionist rhetoric.

The Bolshevik proletarians, by adopting the language of such secessionist causes, were able to take leadership of the anti-colonial movements and to oust the Tsarist White Guards, the Mensheviks, etc. Since the same Bolshevik proletarians took leadership of the many 'centrifugal' secessionist movement, these secessionist movements were glued together; the Bolshevik proletarians constituted the glue that linked all these secessionist causes to each other. The Bolshevik absorption of these anti-colonial bourgeois movements allowed the Bolsheviks to overthrow the reactionary regimes encircling Soviet Russia and to establish Socialist Soviet Republics (SSRs) that then merged together to form the Union of the SSRs.

Imagine if the Bolsheviks would have, as the Russian bourgeois-nationalists desire, opposed the anti-colonial secessionist movements – what would have happened in that case? There were again two options: (A) accept the rule of the Tsarist White Guards over those non-Russian territories, as states separate from Soviet Russia, or (B) make peace with the Tsarist White Guards and come to an agreement with them wherein the remaining territories in which the Tsarist White Guards rule would be incorporated into Soviet Russia, with rights and privileges for the White Guards throughout the new 'Soviet' Russian state in exchange for those territories becoming a part of 'Soviet' Russia. Again, option A entails surrendering territory to the White Guards and letting them rule over their territories. Option B entails allowing the infiltration of massive hordes of MI6 agents, since the Tsarist White Guards were MI6 mercenaries, into the 'Soviet' Russian state apparatus; such a pervasive infiltration would have surely spelled either the restoration of the Tsarists to power throughout the 'Russian Empire', or partition of the territory of 'Soviet' Russia, depending on the worldwide geostrategic situation. Herein can be seen the direct link between the Bolsheviks revolting against the Tsarists and the Bolsheviks supporting proletarian-led secessionist causes throughout the Russian Empire. Ostensibly, proletarian-led secessionism would have resulted in the partition of that territory when in fact, in the context of after the October Revolution, it helped prevent the Tsarist White Guards from partitioning the territory of the Soviet Union.

Take for example the case of Bessarabia. Until the October Revolution, Bessarabia was controlled by the Russian Empire. By the time of the October Revolution, the local government leadership of Bessarabia, loyal to the ancien regime and vehemently anti-Bolshevik, invited the Kerensky regime's Russian army as well as the Romanian military to intervene in Bessarabia against the Bolshevik threat. Jonathan Wilkenfeld – the Principal Investigator in the 'Interstate Behavior Analysis Project' sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) during the years 1974-1977, the Principal Investigator in the 'Cross-National Crisis Analysis Project' sponsored by DARPA for the period 1977-1978, and the Program Consultant for the Pennsylvania Governor's School for International Studies in the early 1990s – confirmed that Bessarabia was taken over from the Soviet Union by the Romanian military in 1918:

Bessarabia had a long history of foreign occupation, from the time the Bulgars, a Turkic people, settled there in 679 A.D.: the Mongols (1241); Lithuania (1396); Russia (1812); Turkey (1856); and Russia once more (1878).

The breakdown of law and order at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution led the provincial government in Bessarabia in late December 1917 to request both the Romanian government and the Russian army's GHQ to dispatch troops to the area. Romania did so; and its forces occupied Kishinev, capital of Bessarabia, on 13 January 1918. Bessarabia proclaimed its independence on 24 January, but it was not recognized by the powers.

Russia responded to Romania's military intervention by severing diplomatic relations with Bucharest on 13 January and insisting that Romanian troops be withdrawn from Bessarabia. Romania refused; and its military presence was backed by a Note in early February from the senior representatives of France, Greece, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. to the Rumtcerod, or governing body in Odessa, as a measure designed to restore order; the question of sovereignty over Bessarabia was left open. Tension rose on 27 March and again on 9 April 1918, when the legislatures of Romania and Bessarabia passed an act of union. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, protested to Bucharest on 27 March. (The events from 13 January to 27 March 1918 constitute a separate (A Study of Crisis, University of Michigan Press, Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 1997, p. 576) (IMG{Nazi-Soviet Pact Era})

The Bolshevik program of promoting revolutionary defeatism undermined the reactionary provincial rulers of the Russian Empire, rulers who lifted the banner of Russia's territorial 'integrity' so to partition, and reduce the geographic size of, the Soviet Union. Such was also why the 'patriotic' Russian emigres closely collaborated with the Georgian separatists, with the same Anglo-American and Nazi German intelligence agencies, and with the MI6 Lavrenti Beria, for partitioning and reducing the geographic size of the Soviet Union.

C4S4. Soviet Involvement in Georgia / Lavrenti Beria, an Agent of the MI6

The US Information Agency confirmed that the Georgian Mensheviks established an alliance with the British Empire:

After the Bolshevik coup in October 1917, the Georgian Menshevik leaders still avowed their allegiance to the Russian Provisional Government. Only after the Bolsheviks' signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in which the Transcaucasian territories were ceded to the Axis powers did the Georgian leaders declare Georgia's independence, enter into a short-lived Transcaucasian Federation, and then establish a sovereign Georgian republic in May, 1918. The Georgian leaders entered into alliances with European powers (in turn, Germany and Great

Britain) and carried out a socialistic reform program. Independent Georgia was recognized by 22 countries. ('ATTITUDES OF MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES: Vol. III: THE TRANSCAUCASUS: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan' Center for International Studies at MIT, US Information Agency, June 1973, p. 'Georgia – History – 4') (IMG)

In Georgia, the Bolshevik agents were very active and posed a menace to the MI6-backed Georgian Menshevik regime. The MI6 reported:

It is a mistake to think that because Bolshevism is not seen in the Caucasus that it does not exist. Bolshevism in Tiflis is a very real danger, and their agents are working hard. Both Baku and Tiflis are teeming with them. The virulent form felt up in Russia cannot appear until the armed forces are affected. In Azerbaijan and Baku this is at present practically an impossibility, but in Tiflis it is a real danger. Hence one of the great dangers is a change of the present Government, which is able to hold the army together: the Georgians can mobilise about 30,000 men, and have some 700 Lewis guns sent to the Grand Duke's army in 1917. The Georgian outposts on the Georgian road are known to be fraternising with the Bolsheviks, and should be constantly changed or entirely replaced by foreign troops. (Report on the Georgian Government by Major McDonnell, Constantinople, Major McDonnell, January 27, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 57) (IMG)

As the following excerpts of an MI6 document prove, Georgian Foreign Affairs Minister Gegechkori, the close relative of Lavrenti Beria's wife Nina Gegechkori, was a staunch Menshevik anti-communist favorable to German interests, and favored by the British:

The actual establishment of the present Georgian Republic came about with the advent of the German troops. M. Gegechkori, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, states that he, as a representative of the then Tiflis Commissariate, applied to Colonel Pike, the representative of the British Mission in Tiflis, for British or Allied assistance in troops and finance, in order to keep the Turk out of Georgia and to establish Georgian independence. On being informed that this was impossible, the Tiflis Commissariate accepted Germany's offer on the 4th December, when news of armistice and the removal of the Turk and German from the Caucasus was confirmed. (...). The Prime Minister, M. Jordani, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Gegechkori] are undoubtedly the soundest elements in the Government. They are both former members of the old Russian Duma ... and more democratic than socialist. (Report on the Georgian Government by Major McDonnell, Constantinople, Major McDonnell, January 27, 1919. In: 188753, India Office to Foreign Office, from: J. E. Schuckburgh, November 14, 1918; received: November 15, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 54) (IMG)

As stated above, Evgeni Gegechkori, the foreign minister of the Georgian Menshevik government, made a deal with the British to fight against the Bolsheviks. He asked the British military chief in Tiflis, Colonel Pike, to deploy British imperial troops in order to assist the Georgian government. After the collapse of the Menshevik Regime in Georgia, the MI6 agent Gegechkori escaped to Paris to lead the fascist shadow war against the Soviet Union from there:

E. P. Gegechkori was a prominent leader of the Menshevik Georgian government-in-exile based in Paris. He was also father of Beria's wife, Nina Gegechkori. (Cold War in the Caucasus: Notes and Documents from a Conference, collected by Svetlana Savranskaya and Vladislav Zubok, Wilson Center, findings of Thom, p. 401) (IMG)

Evgeni Gegechkori was also the uncle to Beria's wife Nina Gegechkori, supporting her materially:

After my grandfather's death, my mother went, accordingly to Tbilisi to live with her uncle Sasha, a Bolshevik. It was another uncle, Evgeni, however, who supported her materially. He was a Menshevik. That may seem odd today but one has to remember that in those days betrayal was not commonplace. Sasha and Evgeni could meet, even during the period when Evgeni was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Menshevik government of Georgia while Sasha continued his underground activity. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 4) (IMG)

Nina Gegechkori was living with her uncle Sasha, a Menshevik agent among the Bolsheviks, and Nina was backed materially by Evgeni Gegechkori. Nina, with all her Menshevik connections, was to hook up with Lavrenti Beria, another MI6 agent. Lavrenti Beria was a counterintelligence operative of the MI6-backed and MI6-run Islamo-Kautskyite Azeri bourgeois-nationalist party, Musavat. With the assistance of Mir Ja'afar Bagirov, an anti-Soviet intelligence officer who had risen to the ranks of the Bolshevik Cheka, Lavrenti Beria was infiltrated on behalf of the Musavat into the Soviet intelligence service:

Beria joined the party after the tsar's abdication, served in the army, and graduated from high school with honors. He missed the revolution, and spent part of the civil war on the wrong side: the Musavat ("Equality") party of Azerbaijani nationalists had established an independent republic through the meddling of Ottoman and then British occupation forces, and after the British left, Beria joined Musavat counterintelligence. Following the Bolshevik reconquest, he was arrested. A meeting was called and Orjonikidze and others ruled that the party had likely assigned Beria to infiltrate the "bourgeois nationalists." Beria enrolled at the newly established Polytechnic University, on the premises of his old high school, with a state stipend, to fulfill his dream of becoming an engineer, but Mircafar Bagirov (b. 1896), the twenty-four-year-old head of the Azerbaijan Cheka, recruited Beria

and, after a few weeks, named him deputy secret police chief, at age twenty-one. ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 139) (IMG)

Regarding the death of Nariman Narimanov, the CIA states:

It was Bagirov who liquidated ... Narimanov. ('Bagirov, M D/Beria, L P', CIA, August 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG{Iran})

In the early days of the Bolshevik Revolution:

my father [Lavrenti Beria], who defended himself by appealing to the unity of the Social-Democratic movement, was unable to conceal his sympathy for ... Menshevik policy. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 5) (IMG)

Beria had an:

early sympathy for the Mensheviks. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 304) (IMG)

Beria and his wife were both Mensheviks with Georgian bourgeois-nationalist 'ideology' who considered the Bolshevik policy to be 'colonial':

my father showed himself sensitive to Georgian nationalism, if I can believe the testimony of my mother, who had always been a nationalist. Increasingly he realized that the Bolshevik policy was the same as that of the Tsars. It aimed solely at crushing the non-Russian populations and establishing Russian control. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 11) (IMG)

Like all bourgeois-nationalists, Beria savagely terrorized the very nation for which he privately claimed to stand for.

Lavrenti Beria utilized his position as an MI6-backed Musavat operative in the Cheka in order to further assist the MI6-backed Mensheviks. When the Georgian Mensheviks rebelled again in 1924:

my father [Beria] then proposed that he should meet a representative of theirs to whom he would prove that he knew where all their caches of arms were located. They sent the former commander of the Georgian Menshevik Guard, Dzhugeli, to him.

This man came to Tbilisi secretly with the aid of my father's agents. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 8) (IMG)

Sergo Beria recalled:

My father took three days to reach Tbilisi on horseback, accompanied by Shariko Tsereteli, prince and officer of the old regime. My mother followed in a car. They passed through the rebels' lines. The rebels did not harm them, though they knew their identity. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 9) (IMG)

Who was Shariko Tsereteli? In that famous excerpt of chapter 6 of Stalin's 'The Foundations of Leninism', Shariko Tsereteli was listed as alongside other Kautskyite agents of imperialism: 'the struggle waged by such "desperate" democrats and "Socialists," "revolutionaries" and republicans as, for example, Kerensky and Tsereteli, Renaudel and Scheidemann, Chernov and Dan, Henderson and Clynes, during the imperialist war was a reactionary struggle..' After the previous quote by Sergo Beria, Sergo B. states that Lavrenti negotiated with other Mensheviks on the order of Sergo Ordzhonikidze. However, the quote does not say that Lavrenti Beria negotiated with Tsereteli on Sergo Ordzhonikidze's order. The rebels were sympathetic to Beria.

The Red Army troops entered Georgia to fight against the Mensheviks that year. Sergo Ordzhonikidze is said to have: sent my father [Beria] and his comrade to . negotiate with Cholokashvili, the [Menshevik] rebels' leader. Again and even though they were unescorted, they were allowed to pass unscathed through the rebels' line. At that time there was still a sense of honour in Georgia. Though Cholokashvili refused to meet them, his representatives agreed to lay down their arms on condition that they were promised freedom from persecution. My father replied that he could give them no guarantee, as he was not in control.. Accordingly, he advised the Menshevik officers to flee – for which he [Beria] was blamed.. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 9) (IMG)

By telling the Menshevik leaders that Beria, a local head of the Cheka had information on all the weapons caches of the Menshevik military in Georgia, Beria may have sought to imply to the Mensheviks that the latter should change the location of its arms or else they may be hit by the Bolsheviks. Of course, Beria provided such information under the pretext of 'scaring' off the Mensheviks and encouraging them to surrender the territory in Georgia – except that Beria, rather than push for the surrender of the Mensheviks, sabotaged the attempts to establish an agreement for the lay-down of the arms by the Mensheviks and instead encouraged the Menshevik officers to escape. Later on, referring to 'the Georgian Menshevik emigres' based in Paris, Lavrenti Beria said:

It's thanks to me that they are still alive. Otherwise they would have been shot down like partridges. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 30) (IMG)

As such, with Beria's blessing, the escape of the Menshevik operatives of the British secret service was organized. Not all these Menshevik operatives escaped the USSR however. Some of them actually formed terrorist sleeper cells that revolted against the Soviet state later on, and Beria once again assisted these Menshevik terrorist sleeper cells. After the

flight of the Mensheviks from Georgia,:

In the months that followed my father's fate hung by a thread. The Party authorities looked into his case. Had he not warned the Mensheviks, allowed Dzhugeli to come to Tbilisi, negotiated with the rebels and allowed their leaders to escape? The Armenian Communists . were the most furious with my father, accusing him of double-dealing . and of showing complacency towards the Mensheviks on account, especially of his kinship with Evgeni Gegechkori, my mother's other uncle who had been [the pro-British] Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Georgian government. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 9) (IMG)

Beria did not plan to arrest Menshevik spies or agents:

my father already had his own idea of the policy to be pursued in intelligence matters, considering it more worthwhile to keep opponents under surveillance than to arrest them. 'A self-respecting intelligence service', [Lavrenti Beria] said, 'never arrests an actual spy. (...)' According to my mother [Nina Gegechkori], he [Beria] became extremely angry when the Menshevik leader Khomeriki, who ran an underground organization before and during the revolt, was captured [by the Bolsheviks] in Tbilisi. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 10) (IMG)

Even after the escape, Beria continued to have connections with Mensheviks in France. Nina Gegechkori's other uncle was Sasha Gegechkori, as stated before. Sergo Beria recalled:

One of Sasha's nephews was among his go-betweens with the Mensheviks. He always came to see us when he returned from his trips abroad. I remember hearing him pass on to my mother an invitation from Evgeni Gegechkori, who proposed that she come and stay with him Paris. This nephew perished later in the purges, on account of his visits to [Mensheviks in] Paris. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 30) (IMG)

The interviewer who helped Sergo Beria write his memoirs, cites a witness in the 1953 trial who claimed:

Sergo Ordzhonikidze related with indignation that Beria had destroyed the compromising archives of the Menshevik government of Georgia, and that when that government was finally breaking up, Beria, exhorted the Mensheviks to hold on and resist Bolshevik pressure. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 304. Citing: 'Voенно-istoricheskii Zhurnal 3 (1990) 83.) (IMG)

In other words, Ordzhonikidze found Beria to be increasingly suspicious. Sergo, based on his conversations with his mother Nina, said:

Ordzhonikidze, who saw my father as to some extent his disciple, had spoken about him to Stalin. The affair of the Menshevik revolt [however] had caused the first disagreements between them [i.e. Ordzhonikidze and Beria] and it was then that my father experienced his first disillusionments. When tensions became more and more acute between the two men, he asked for permission to appeal directly to Stalin. My mother was present during their conversation and she heard Ordzhonikidze reply: 'Do that and you'll see. You complain about me, but with him you'll know what pain is.' (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 10) (IMG)

Beria had intelligence connections with the Georgian Mensheviks based in Paris even during the Great Purge:

Early in 1937 a wave of arrests swept over the country. The central government by passed the local authorities in order to organise the repression more effectively, and these bodies looked on helplessly as events unfolded.

My friends' parents disappeared. My father's entourage, his family and my mother's family were decimated. Two of her cousins and two of her nephews disappeared at this time. One of them, who was a doctor, acted as an informer for my father through his contacts with the Mensheviks in France. He had confidence in my father and knew that he would never betray him. He was kidnapped, however, on French territory and nothing could be done for him.

I remembered, too, Golubishvili, an old Bolshevik who had been put at the head of the Georgian Government. He was tall and lean and dressed with distinction. He spoke English and German. My father had much respect for him appreciating his culture and erudition. This Georgian nationalist knew Russia well. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 26) (IMG)

Even until the 1950s:

The unfortunate Petr Sharia, the specialist in Hegelian dialectic ... had acted as my father's contact with the emigre Georgian Mensheviks.. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 271) (IMG)

Indeed, even until the 1950s:

Beria ran all contacts with the Menshevik exiles in Paris through his personal intelligence network. (Cold War in the Caucasus: Notes and Documents from a Conference, collected by Svetlana Savranskaya and Vladislav Zubok, Wilson Center, findings of Thom, p. 401) (IMG)

At the time, the interests of French imperialism converged with the interests of British imperialism, and hence France harbored these Menshevik exiles. There was, however, a reason why the Menshevik exiles settled mainly in France and not in Britain. France was far more susceptible to Soviet influence than Britain. The French were wary of British interest

in eventually reviving German Empire in order to combat the French. And since Britain was an enemy of the USSR, an Anglo-German alliance could draw France and the USSR closer together. Hence, in order to reduce the potential of a Franco-Soviet cooperation, the Mensheviks settled in France in order to (1) make France appear as permanently hostile to the USSR and not just for the while, thus driving a wedge between two potential allies and (2) to operate as MI6 agents in France so that they can strengthen the MI6 lobby in France, so that French imperialists would have to – against their will – yield to British interests; this would mean that if Britain wants Germany to get stronger, the MI6 lobby in France would push for pro-German capitulation by France even though it would be against the interests of French finance capital to capitulate to the Germans. This explains why numerous MI6 agents (and later on, also CIA agents) settled in France as opposed to in Britain. Referring to his father Lavrenti Beria, Sergo Beria said:

He liked France, which he knew well through his Georgian Menshevik networks. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 281) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria held:

France responsible for all our troubles. If there had not been the French Revolution there would not have been the revolution of 1917. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 281) (IMG)

Describing the later accusations against Beria, the CIA also implicitly acknowledged the fact of:

the espionage Beriya did for foreign intelligence organisations and his anti-Soviet subversive activity in the sphere of Socialist construction. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG {Titoist Coup})

The specific intelligence service which Beria served was the MI6. Since the 1920s, and well until long after then, the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria collaborated with the MI6-backed terrorist networks of Russian separatists, the Georgian separatists, the Georgian Mensheviks, the Russian Tsarists, etc.:

In the sphere of foreign policy my father very soon became interested in Turkey and France. It was in those countries that he formed networks of agents in the 1920s and 1930s. In Turkey he had agents among the Lazes, while in France he made use of the Georgian Menshevik emigres, whom he prided himself on controlling. 'It's thanks to me that they are still alive. Otherwise they would have been shot down like partridges,' he said. One of Sasha's nephews was among his go-betweens with the Mensheviks. He always came to see us when he returned from his trips abroad. I remember hearing him pass on to my mother an invitation from Evgeni Gegechkori, who proposed that she come and stay with him in Paris. This nephew perished later in the purges, on account of his visits to France. It was in this period, too, that my father concerned himself with Britain, which had been very active in Caucasia in the days when the Caucasian republics were independent. He had networks in France, in Britain and in America and recruited many agents among the Russian princes and princesses in emigration. These people collaborated willingly with him, not through fondness for Bolshevism or from greed but out of patriotism – for the Georgians, love of Georgia, for the Russians, love of Russia. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 30-31) (IMG)

C4S5. The Struggles of the Emir of Afghanistan

Upon the introduction of Soviet power in Central Asia, however, pseudo-Muslim bandits began waves of terrorist attacks against the state:

In the latter half of 1920 and early 1921, a wave of . uprisings rolled over the entire country, the so-called Basmachi movement of Central Asia (Muslim insurgents opposing the introduction of Soviet rule in Central Asia).. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 320) (IMG)

So discredited were the basmachis that even many of the violently anti-communist clerics who stood against the Bolsheviks did not dare to openly support basmachis:

In the balance, the Bolsheviks also managed to secure the [ostensible] neutrality of the prestigious and very conservative Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Ufa. In spite of his personal abhorrence of "godless Communism," the Mufti of Ufa, Rizaeddin Fahretdin-oglu, refused to give his blessing to the Basmachis. For this profoundly important abstention, the Bolsheviks eventually rewarded the spiritual leader with execution at the hands of the Cheka, but he had served his purpose. Musa Jarullah Bigi, the greatest of the Tatar jadid (modernist) theologians, also refrained from attacking the Bolshevik regime.

Bigi's logic, which was shared by many important Muslim leaders and which certainly was the product of some intense Soviet propaganda, was that in spite of all its errors and mistakes, Communism could coexist with Islam.

Perhaps because so many members of the traditional Muslim establishment felt this way, the Basmachi movement never acquired the character of a jihad (religious war). In addition, many Muslim soldiers were fighting with the Red Army against the Muslim rebellion. In fact, from time to time Basmachi leaders agreed to

negotiate with Soviet authorities and to cooperate with the Red Army, both unthinkable actions if the Basmachi movement had been a true jihad. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Ben-nigsen, August 1981, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

The Soviets engaged in a long period of struggle against such terror attacks:

This Soviet-Islamic alliance of mutual interest had a Central Asian flaw. In the aftermath of the revolution, Central Asian Moslems rose in revolt against the reestablishment of Russian rule. The Russian settlers and the Soviets called the rebels sent forces to suppress them. Turkish and Soviet aspirations clashed when Enver Pasha, leader of the Turkish triumvirate during the world war, was sent by the Soviets to Central Asia to organize Moslem forces against the British. Enver went over to the *basmachi* instead but was killed in April 1922 before he could mold an effective force against the Russians. The Red Army drove the *basmachi* out of their city bases at Bokhara and Khiva (sites of the khanates conquered by Russia in 1868 and 1873) and away from the valleys, then gradually suppressed rebellion in the hills. Mopping-up campaigns against the *basmachi* including Soviet forays against sanctuaries in Afghanistan continued until 1931. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 14) (IMG)

In their efforts against the Basmachis, the Soviets successfully managed to secure the friendship and cooperation of the Amir of Afghanistan, who regarded the USSR as an ally against the British imperialists and Islamic terror groups. "The struggle that the Emir of Afghanistan is waging for the independence of Afghanistan," Joseph Stalin so famously wrote in his 1924 book *The Foundation of Leninism*:

is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the monarchist views of the Emir and his associates, for it weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism; whereas the struggle waged by such "desperate" democrats and "Socialists," "revolutionaries" and republicans as, for example, Kerensky and Tsereteli, Renaudel and Scheidemann, Chernov and Dan, Henderson and Clynes, during the imperialist war was a *reactionary* struggle, for its results was the embellishment, the strengthening, the victory, of imperialism. (The Foundations of Leninism, Joseph Stalin, 1924, Chapter 6. Problems of Leninism, published in: Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947, pp. 62-63. Retrieved from: Soviet World Outlook: A Handbook of Communist Statements, United States Department of State Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intelligence Research, for the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence, U.S. Information Agency, April 30, 1954, first published: January 1950, p. 19)

Thus entered the Soviet Union into an alliance with the national-bourgeois Amir of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, while the Comintern propagated anti-colonial patriotism in Afghanistan against the British imperialists. According to a document by the US Department of the Air Force's Air University Review:

Soviet-Afghan contacts began when Amir Amanullah Khan expelled British control during the Third Afghan War, a minor affair lasting some three weeks in May 1919. Amanullah invited Soviet envoys to Kabul and hoped to rely on the new Soviet power as a counter to the British. From the Soviet side, cooperation with Afghanistan was part of the general effort to incite the Moslem world against the British, who were then supplying the White Russian armies in the Russian civil war. The keystone of Soviet policy was alliance with the Turkish nationalist movement of Kemal Pasha, later Ataturk, who, like the Soviets, wanted the British out of Constantinople, the Transcaucasus, Iran, Afghanistan, and even India. Amanullah of Afghanistan thus developed cordial relations with both Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia, promoted by the propaganda of the Comintern encouraging nationalism and liberation of the peoples of the East from British imperialism. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 13) (IMG)

The interests of the Amanullah Khan faction – representing the Afghan national bourgeoisie and the Afghan proletariat – and the Soviets were virtually the same, whereas the *basmachi* reaction in the USSR was on the same side as the British, also the enemies of Amanullah Khan. Hence, the Soviets and the Amanullah Khan faction deepened bonds:

Amanullah treated with the Central Asian leaders at Bokhara as well as with the Soviets, but the Soviets refused to respond with hostility. The Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty of February 1921 even recognized the independence of Bokhara and Khiva "in accordance with the wishes of the people" – wishes which turned out to be those of the Soviet troops. In return, Amanullah promised not to actively aid the *basmachi*. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 14) (IMG)

Not aiding the *basmachi* forces in the USSR was not the only thing that the Khan provided to the Soviets. The Emir of Afghanistan also extended the influence of the Soviet military in Afghanistan. And the USSR provided military, as well as extensive financial and technical assistance to the newly born Afghan state:

Taking Kemal's secular nationalist Turkey as his model, Amanullah attempted reform and modernization in the 1920s with Soviet aid. The 1921 treaty included a Soviet subsidy of a million rubles a year and provisions for technical assistance. The Soviets provided a small air force whose purpose was to put down rebellion by the tribesmen opposed to unveiling of women, secular education, and other reforms. A British official reported that "the so-called Afghan Air Force is to all intents and purposes a Russian service and may indeed be regarded as a Russian advanced base." (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 14) (IMG)

Nonetheless:

Amanullah was overthrown in 1928 by rebellion sparked by announcement of measures against corruption and the local authority of the mullahs and by the unveiling of the queen. The British were probably involved (Colonel T. E. Lawrence was then serving on the northwest frontier under the alias of "Airman Shaw"), and the Soviets did not intervene. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March- April 1981, p. 14) (IMG)

Nor did the Soviets have a legal responsibility to intervene against the British-backed terrorist rebellion. All in all, the following point summarizes the nature of the Soviet-Afghan relations:

Richard Newell wrote in 1972 that "Afghanistan has served as a showcase for Russia's good intentions in her dealings with Moslem nations." Further,

Probably most important to Russia have been the political profits gained by treating Afghanistan with generosity and careful respect. Friendly relations and assistance have demonstrated to the rest of the Muslim world, especially Turkey, Iran, and the Arab states, that the Russians are willing to help a Muslim people whom they could easily conquer or exploit.

Newell is not wrong; for the period 1919 to 1978, he is quite right. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 13) (IMG)

C4S6. Soviet Support for Kemalists in Turkey

The USSR began sponsoring Kemal Pasha Ataturk's revolution in Turkey:

The keystone of Soviet policy was alliance with the Turkish nationalist movement of Kemal Pasha, later Ataturk, who, like the Soviets, wanted the British out of Constantinople, the Transcaucasus, Iran, Afghanistan, and even India. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 13) (IMG)

While the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union are successors to regimes which frequently warred against each other, it was the USSR which provided support to the struggling Turkish nationalists in their efforts to drive the invading Greeks from their soil and to found their republic. In April 1920 the nationalists concluded a pact with the Soviets by which they were to receive military supplies. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 32) (IMG)

Details of Soviet military and financial assistance to Ataturk's revolution have been provided by a paper by the External Research Program of the US State Department:

Aside from the sympathy the Bolsheviks won in Turkish nationalist circles by their disclosure of the secret wartime agreements of the Entente and the repudiation of exorbitant Russian claims on Turkey, critical material aid to fight the Greeks and diplomatic support were in the offing. The importance of the Straits question to Moscow made Turkish friendship particularly attractive, as did communist ideological imperatives of the day.

After several rounds of secret and official negotiations, a mechanism for providing the aid required by the Turks was established. Via boats across the Black Sea and a corridor through the Caucasus the Turks received gold, weapons and ammunition supplied by Moscow. (Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey, External Research Program of the US Department of State, Lowell Bezanis, May 1992, p. 22) (IMG)

C4S7. Soviet Support for Democratic Anti-Colonial Movements in the Arab World (Egypt, Syria, and Hejaz)

Led by the revolutionary contingents of the bourgeois-democratic Wafd Party, patriotic uprisings against British colonial rule in Egypt emerged by the end of the Great War. A document produced by the US Department of the Army described in detail the situation as follows:

Egyptian nationalism was relatively quiescent in the early phases of the war, but by 1917, when the Allied victory began to be visible and after President Woodrow Wilson's pronouncement of the principle of national self-determination, demands for Egyptian independence and for representation at the peace conferences multiplied. By late 1918 a new, broadly based nationalist political organization, the Wafd- al-Misri (Egyptian Delegation), under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul, emerged as the most important Egyptian political party – a position it held for the next generation and a half. The initial purpose of the Wafd was to present the Egyptian case in

London. Agitation and unrest continued and heightened after failure to get a hearing at Paris. Finally, when police measures proved abortive, the British government responded by sending a special mission to Egypt under the leadership of Lord Alfred Milner in December 1919.

After its investigation the mission proposed the renunciation of the protectorate, a declaration of Egyptian independence, and a treaty of alliance—all subject to certain guarantees respecting British and foreign interests. Negotiations failed. Acting on the strong recommendation of Field Marshal Lord Edmund Allenby, the liberator of Jerusalem who had succeeded Wingate in 1919 as high commissioner in Egypt, the British unilaterally declared on February 28, 1922, their acceptance of Lord Milner's principal recommendations (except for the treaty of alliance) and set forth certain minimum conditions in terms of which an Egyptian cabinet could be formed. Pending an agreement between the 2 countries, there were reserved to absolute British control the following: imperial communication in Egypt, Egyptian defense, the interests of foreigners, and the Sudan. In tacit recognition of the declaration,

Prince Fund assumed the title of king on March 15, 1922. Egypt was thus independent, at least by formal pronouncement of the British government.

Egyptian constitution was promulgated on April 19, 1923. It made no claim to Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, and this issue was held over for subsequent adjustment between the British and Egyptian governments. In September 1923 the nationalist leader Saad Zaghlul returned from exile. His party, the Wafd, won a sweeping success in the elections of January 1924. Zaghlul went to London to negotiate with the British, but negotiations with the Labor government foundered over the issue of the Sudan, and Zaghlul returned to Egypt, having failed in his mission.

Sporadic rioting occurred in the months after Zaghlul's return. The British governor general of Sudan and commander in chief of the Anglo-Egyptian army, Sir Lee Stack, was assassinated in Cairo on November 19, 1924. The crime climaxed a series of murders of British subjects beginning in 1920. Through Lord Allenby, the British demanded and got compensation, concessions, and removal of all Egyptians from the Sudan. Allenby continued as high commissioner until 1925, after the trial and conviction of persons implicated in Sir Lee Stack's murder. He left the post in May of that year. Meanwhile, Zaghlul, who was under the pressure of bad relations with the palace, had resigned in 1924.

He had succeeded in initiating a modicum of parliamentary government in Egypt and in transforming the Wafd into the dominating political force in the country. Upon his death in 1927, Zaghlul was succeeded by Mustafa Nahas, who remained a dominant figure in Egyptian politics until ... 1952... (Area Handbook for the United Arab Republic (Egypt), United States Department of the Army, American University (Washington, D.C.), Foreign Area Studies, Harvey Henry Smith, pp. 49-50) (IMG)

Egypt's Wafdists had the support of the Soviets. In that famous excerpt of 'The Foundations of Leninism', Stalin wrote that the movement for Egyptian independence:

is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the bourgeois origin and bourgeois title of the leaders of Egyptian national movement, despite the fact that they are [at the intellectual level] opposed to socialism; whereas the struggle that the [Kautskyite agents of British finance capital in the] British "Labour" Government is waging to preserve Egypt's dependent position is for the same reason a *reactionary* struggle, despite the ... proletarian title of the members of the government, despite the fact that they are "for" socialism. (The Foundations of Leninism, Joseph Stalin, 1924, Chapter 6)

It is worth mentioning that the Labour Party was reactionary only insofar as it was under the influence of British finance capital and other parasitic classes allied to it. Insofar as the British Labour Party was under the influence of its proletarian electoral base, it was neither reactionary nor colonial, which was why Lenin in 'Left-Wing Communism' called on Britain's communists to use the Labour Party as a counter-weight against the Tories (see C1S2).

The USSR actively assisted the Wafd in the revolutionary anti-colonial struggle. The bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES), an international Middle East studies organization advising the British government's higher education funding bodies and authorities, quotes instructive documents regarding the Soviet relationship with the Egyptian uprising. According to a declassified MI6 document quoted in the BRISMES bulletin:

Further evidence has accumulated to the effect that cooperation has been established between the revolutionary activities of the Soviet Government on the one hand and Egyptian Extreme Nationalists on the other. It has been ascertained that the principal Agent on the Egyptian side is Abdel Rahman Bey Fahmi [a right-hand man of Sa'd Zaghlul]. He is in direct communication with the Soviet Agency at Jeddah, in connection with some subversive scheme, bearing on the political situation in Egypt and there are now definite indications that the Wafd-Bolshevik coalition is taking a special interest in the Sudan. (Secret Intelligence Report (SIR), No.5, July 31, 1926, in File No. Security 7/1/2, CRO, p. 6. In: "International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan," Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 27)

(IMG)

“Already we have received,” the MI6 reported:

warnings from Egypt of an alliance between Bolshevik agents and the Wafd party for the dissemination of anti-British propaganda in the Sudan. (Secret Intelligence Report (SIR), No. 1, 26 June 1926, in File No. Security 7/1/2, Central Records Office, Khartoum (CRO), p. 5. In: “International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan,” Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 27) (IMG)

As early as 1919, a prominent member of the Wafd admitted, the Soviets had approached the delegates in Paris:

Dr Hafiz Afifi (a member of the Wafd delegation to Paris) was put on record as having given a press conference in his private clinic in Cairo in October 1919, in which he explained how the delegates had been approached by the Russians in Paris and what their response to such approaches was. (“International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan,” Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 30) (IMG)

Afifi was quoted by an MI6 document as stating the following:

The Russian Bolsheviks promised the Sa'd Delegation simply to help it to drive the English out of Egypt, because every weakening of the English in any part of the globe is an advantage to Sovietism and a defeat for Capitalism. Consequently, they help us without asking anything of us except our assurance that a free and independent Egypt shall have a very radical and very wide labour policy. We naturally promised this, sure as we are that these aspects can be easily obtained by propaganda in favour of pure Islamic ideas, which are the truest and most radical principles of socialism. Consequently, the Bolsheviks are helping us in two ways: first, by means of the money they have given to Sa'd-a voice asked, 'How much?' and Afifi answered, 'A great deal'-and by the propaganda which they are making directly and without our interference in Cairo. It is thus that the Syndicalist movement, which did not exist when we left Europe, has been successfully organized without our help during our absence. We have merely promised to produce the same movement among the peasants and a committee of the Delegation in Cairo has a far-reaching programme for this purpose. (Letter No.506, dated 16 October 1919, to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, from the Residency, Ramleh in File No. PRO/FO 141/779 (File No.9065). In: “International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan,” Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 30) (IMG)

As the above MI6 document demonstrates, the Soviets provided ‘a great deal’ of financial aid to Sa'd Zaghlul's bourgeois-democratic revolutionary Wafd uprising, with the promise on Wafd's side that progressive anti-imperialist policies would be pursued by the Wafd. Undoubtedly, this would have assisted Comintern objectives as well since the spread of progressive bourgeois-democracy could provide the democratic freedoms for communist party activists as a first step, and as a second step, allowing the planting of communist party activists within the anti-imperialist Egyptian state apparatus.

Probably to prevent British justification of increased repression against the Wafd, the Soviet aid was covert rather than overt, as evidenced by the fact – thoroughly explained in the BRISMES paper – that neither the Wafd nor the Bolsheviks made much noise about their cooperation with the former sometimes pretending the opposite. The Wafd press reports stated that Egypt's anti-British-colonial ‘Al-Hizb el-Watani’ (Watani Party), another Egyptian anti-imperialist party with the urban national bourgeoisie as its social base, was financially sponsored by the USSR. In the words of one MI6 report:

Abd al-Hamid Sa'id, the Vice-President of the Watanist [patriotic] Party in Egypt is accused in the Wafdist press of having in 1919 and 1920 been subsidised by the Russian Communist Party.. Sufficient details are given to justify the conclusion that the accusation is founded on fact. Abd al-Hamid Bey Sa'id was at one time the President of a society in Europe for the protection of 'down-trodden Natives in the East', was expelled from Rome and Geneva and is now the life-President in Egypt of a new society, 'The Young Men's Mohammedan Association', the aim of which for the moment is mainly political. (Secret Intelligence Report (SIR), No. 22, 15 July 1928, in File No. Security 7/1/3, CRO, p. 12. In: “International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan,” Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 32) (IMG)

To conclude, the Soviet policy on Egypt was to support progressive bourgeois-democratic uprisings against British oppression in the colonized lands. An American intelligence document too confirmed that the situation in Egypt was boosting Bolshevik influence:

The disturbance is losing its character as a political demonstration and is rapidly developing into Bolshevism in which law and order are being overborne by the worst element of the population and the movement is showing indications of an animus against all foreigners and their property. (Enclosure,

Gary (American Diplomatic Agent in Cairo), March 18, 1919. In: ‘From Robert Lansing’, March 21 1919.

In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 56, March 17 – April 4, 1919, p. 154. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda) (IMG)

Again, as with other cases of the extension of Bolshevik influence, the expansion of such influence did not occur as much because the people joining the Bolshevik cause were necessarily well-versed in the studies of communism, but because the progressive bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial freedom forces saw in Bolshevik anti-colonialism the path for the freedom of their peoples.

America's ostensible 'denunciation' of colonialism was a means by which to lure the anti-colonial causes fighting against British imperialism onto the camp of American imperialism. And American imperialism, an ally of British imperialism, was going to hand those anti-colonial freedom movements back to the British. This is why Britain's Acting High Commissioner in Egypt called on the US to help in the restoration of order:

The Acting High Commissioner sent for me today. He outlined the situation and stated that at no time since the Araby rebellion in 18623 has the state of (omission) been so critical. He told me that he has fully informed London of all the facts but is unable to elicit instructions and he intimated that he desires me to report the serious conditions to my Government in the hope that it would exert promptly some influence upon his own Government and thus make them appreciate the gravity of the situation. He said that he might have to call upon me to assist in the restoration of order, undoubtedly realizing that on account of the warm relationship that all Egyptians feel for the United States an announcement by the American representative here would have great influence and perhaps prevent the destruction of life and property of foreigners. (Enclosure, Gary (American Diplomatic Agent in Cairo), March 18, 1919. In: 'From Robert Lansing', March 21 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 56, March 17 – April 4, 1919, p. 154. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda) (IMG)

The Soviet intelligence's assistance to Arab patriots was not limited to Egypt, however. Throughout Iraq, Levant, and the Hejaz, Soviet intelligence propagated against the Anglo-French imperialists and cooperated with Arab patriots, with Bolshevism winning the praise of Iraq's prominent Shia Iranian cleric Muhammad Taqi Shirazi:

Moscow spread anti-western leaflets and reading materials in Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Red Sea coast, known as "Hejaz." Persian pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala, as well as Persian students to these Shiite seminaries, brought with them Marxist ideology and literature. In these Shiite cities of Southern Iraq, one could find booklets entitled, *The Fundamentals of Bolshevism*, printed at a press in Aleppo, Syria.

So successful was Russian propaganda that Grand Ayatollah (Marja) and Mohammed Taqi Shirazi, who would be a key figure in the 1920 revolt, would, in 1919, call Bolshevism, "a friend of Islam." The first Bolshevik Society was established in Iraq in 1920, and as early as 1919, Marxist rhetoric began to appear in Iraq's newspapers. British security officials looked with concern as Arab and Turkish nationalists commingled with Bolshevik agents to plan challenges to England's control of Iraq. Among the news circulating was the 1920 communist eviction of British forces from the oil city of Baku and port towns in the Caspian. If the British show weakness in the face of Bolshevism, they show weakness if challenged through Arab nationalism. ("Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Iraq's Social, Political, and Military History," Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali Al-Wardi, Vol. 1, Part 1, US Navy Commander Youssef Aboul- Enein. In: 'Armor: The Professional Journal of the Armor Branch', Department of the Army, Headquarters, Vol. 118, November-December 2009, pp. 28-29) (IMG)

C4S8. USSR and the Faysal Faction of Saudi Arabia

In an interview with the Saudi regime's newspaper 'Asharq Al-Awsat', Prince Turki Al-Faysal – who had been the head of the Saudi Mukhaberat (intelligence service) for more than two decades and who was the son of former Prince Faysal bin Abdulaziz – revealed many aspects of the onset of Saudi-Soviet relations and his father's role in this matter. Contrary to the usual false narrative that the USSR blocked the Hajj, Muslims' pilgrimage to Mecca, the article reporting on the interview with Turki Al-Faysal reveals that the USSR did not interfere with this matter. The USSR supported Prince Faysal faction's struggle against the British Empire, and established fair commercial deals. The following is the text of the Saudi state article:

In the spring of 1932, King Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz, who was then a 26-year-old prince, led a Saudi delegation to Moscow on a historical visit to bring the two countries together and open a new page in the Kingdom's international relations, said Prince Turki Al-Faisal, former intelligence chief and former Saudi Ambassador to Washington, in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

The then Prince Faisal had previously successfully — at the behest of his illustrious father — negotiated with the British to gain recognition for sovereign Saudi rule in Hejaz and Najd.

At the age of 18, he led a military campaign in the southern province of Asir and was instrumental in uniting the region with the rest of the Kingdom. It was then that his father, King Abdul Aziz, appointed him as his deputy in the region.

Later, he was designated foreign minister to head the Foreign Relations Department, which later became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

His mission to Moscow, which was the capital of the then Soviet Union in 1932, was no less significant. Russia was the first foreign power to recognize the Kingdom's independence and establish full diplomatic relations.

Despite huge political and ideological differences between the two countries, Moscow supported King Abdul Aziz's efforts to establish a unified and stable state. On the other hand, the Russians would avoid interfering in the Kingdom's domestic matters, something that paved the way for better understanding between the two countries.

King Abdul Aziz, who wanted to strengthen international relations, was aware that strong Russian ties could help settle his differences with Britain, said Prince Turki.

Moreover, Russia was a good trade partner. The Kingdom admired the Soviet Union — unlike Great Britain — for its ability to forge relations on equal terms without trying to dictate terms.

It was planned that the then Prince Faisal would lead a mission to Moscow in 1927. However, the visit did not take place. By 1932, when the Soviet Union had become more established, the Kingdom viewed Moscow as a dependable trade partner.

Revolutions launched with Soviet support in several countries were also on the wane at the time. Although King Abdul Aziz was irked by Russia's hostile stance on religion, he was, nevertheless, confident that good relations with Russia would not have any negative impact on religious issues. He, therefore, decided to send the then Prince Faisal to Moscow in 1932 after visits to France, England, Poland and Turkey.

Prince Turki said the major issues the young Prince Faisal had to sort out during his Moscow visit included the one concerning Muslim endowments (awqaf) in Russia, which had been nationalized. Another issue was the facilitation of Haj for Russian Muslims. The Russian official stance on Haj, then, was that religion was a private affair and the state would not interfere.

The Russian commissioner in Hejaz, Nazir Taryaklov, used to insist that the economic agreements between the two countries should not be linked to the issues of endowment and pilgrimage, Prince Turki said.

On trade issues, Saudi Arabia made it clear that a trade agreement between the two countries should include conditions that Russia does not flood the Saudi market with its goods, Soviet trade activities should not lead to a fall in prices in the market and Soviet goods should be sold at a specified period through state channels.

The Kingdom also demanded that Russia sign a contract to provide commercial credits to the Kingdom. Though the Russian side did not accept the conditions, the two countries continued negotiations. Apparently, Russia hoped that eventually Saudi Arabia would grant more concessions.

These were the tough issues Faisal had to find solutions to during his visit to Moscow in 1932, Prince Turki said. Faisal, accompanied by Deputy Saudi Foreign Minister Foad Hamza and his aide Khaled Al-Ayyoubi, flew from Amsterdam to Berlin on May 18 and from there went on train to Poland and then to Moscow.

On May 29, the day of his arrival in Moscow, the official Russian newspaper Izvestia ran an article highlighting growing Saudi-Russian relations. The article said that Faisal's visit "sought to strengthen the young state's international relations."

It stressed the importance of the rise of Najdi tribes against the oppression of Ottoman rule in the Arab world. It also discussed British exploitation in the region and an European attempt to divide the region as French and British Mandates. It lauded the successes achieved by King Abdul Aziz in unifying the peninsula, describing it as a struggle for national liberation and noted that the Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the Kingdom's independence and establish normal diplomatic relations.

The Russian article pointed out that the Kingdom deserved the recognition by other big powers. It also commended King Abdul Aziz for his pragmatic domestic and foreign policies, and made indications toward the Kingdom's increasing prominence as a hub for unprecedented international trade.

The article signified the importance given by the Russian authorities to the visit. It also described King Abdul Aziz's fight against colonization and said that Russia was seeking to weaken British influence in the Middle East by strengthening relations with Saudi Arabia.

When the train carrying the then Prince Faisal steamed into the main station in Moscow, they were welcomed by the President of the People's Commission for Foreign Affairs Sergie Yastakhov and former Soviet Commissioner in Hejaz, Kareem Hakimov.

The railway station was decorated to mark the occasion with Saudi and Soviet flags flying at several places, with the words "Ahlan wa Sahlan" displayed on walls in Arabic. There were a large number of high-ranking Russian officials to welcome him at the station. The copy of the letter sent by the king to the Russian President Joseph Stalin and the photos of Faisal's visit have been published twice in a book.

King Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz, then foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, is seen at the Moscow railway station in Leningrad. He visited the Soviet Union at the head of a Saudi delegation on May 29, 1932. (Faisal Laid Foundation of Strong Saudi-Russian Ties, Arab News, Badr Alkhorayef, Publication Date: Wednesday, May 7, 2008, 03:00, Riyadh. Citing: 'Asharq Al-Awsat' interview with former Saudi Intelligence Chief Turki Al-Faisal) (IMG)

As the above article confirmed, Prince Faysal 'Laid [the] Foundation Of Strong Saudi-Russian Ties'. I will reveal more about Prince Faysal, later to be King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, in another book. However, for this context, let the following facts be known: Prince Faysal headed the rogue elements of the government of Saudi Arabia. He was nothing like the Wahhabi barbarians for which Saudi Arabia is notorious. Faysal, although a Muslim, was heavily influenced by progressive ideas and later on, aimed to render Saudi Arabia into a secular republic allied to the Abdel-Nasser faction and the United Arab Republic, as well as the Hafez Al-Assad faction in Syria. Faysal planted the Nasserist 'Free Princes' at the helm of the Saudi intelligence and security apparatus and promoted Nasserist Free Officers in the armed forces of country. He tried to advance women's rights, to crack-down on the Wahhabi laws of the Saudi regime, and to end the royalist regime. Although Faysal initially paid lip service to the condemnation of Abdel-Nasser, the transcripts of their meetings show that Faysal and Abdel-Nasser were good friends. Faysal was a staunch foe of the SAVAK re-

gime in Iran and the Saddam Hussein group in Iraq. Faysal, who stood up against Kissinger, was assassinated by the CIA in 1975. In Saudi Arabia, he remains the most popular of the Saudi monarchs. The Stalin-era USSR had the honour of establishing a strategic partnership with this martyr and freedom-fighter.

The social power base of the Faysal faction and the Faysalists who picked up Faysal's mantle after his death was the proletarianized areas of Saudi Arabia in the major cities as well as in the Qatif region along the Gulf. However, the Faysal faction was limited because most of Saudi Arabia was desert. The deserts led to the underdevelopment of the productive forces in many areas of Saudi Arabia which in turn led to the low advancement of the progressive class forces in those desert areas. The result was the continued existence of savage ultra-reactionary class forces in those desert areas, which helped undermine the progressive forces in the territory that is called Saudi Arabia. The savage Wahhabi tribes of the central areas of Saudi Arabia are the descendants of the Pagan barbarians who opposed the Mohammedan forces and



Voroshilov with Prince Faysal in Leningrad.



Right: Kalinin and Prince Faysa

later launched the Ridda rebellion against the Caliphate led by Abu Bakr. These ultra -reactionary class forces in the desert tribes are like the SS guards summoned by Anglo-American finance capital to suppress the proletariat in the Qatif region. The upper hand of these reactionary class forces in this predominantly desert country was what prevented King Faysal from getting his land out of the US orbit, and ultimately contributed to his assassination.

C4S9. The Mongolian Revolution

*** IMG-All- {Mongolia}

One of the people who has extensively researched the case of the Mongolian revolution and the establishment of the People's Democratic state in Mongolia, is Colonel Trevor Dupuy, who had served in the US Department of Defense's Operations Division during the late 1940s, and who had also served in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) under Eisenhower during the 1950s. Describing the background and popularity of Sukhe Bator, the Colonel remarked:

The leader of this group was a future hero of the 1921 revolution, Sukhe Bator. Jobless and in poverty, Sukhe Bator was among the first conscripts for the new army when he was called up in 1912 at the age of 19. His lack of wealth and position was more than compensated for by intelligence and vigor. Sukhe Bator's diligence was soon rewarded with a junior non-commissioned officer's warrant. During border clashes with the Chinese, he distinguished himself in combat and was promoted to senior NCO rank. As a member of the machine-gun company, a technical and prestigious assignment for that time, he was closely associated with the Russian instructors and learned some Russian. While nationalist and Communist mythology has magnified Sukhe Bator's attainments, he seems to have been a natural leader, liked and respected by his fellows, and an accomplished practical soldier. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, pp. 417-418) (IMG)

Sukhe Bator established closer contacts with the Mongolian communist revolutionary Choibalsan, who was closely associated to the Soviet Bolsheviks:

In November 1919 Sukhe Bator's group joined with a similar small group of revolutionaries led by Choibalsan, future MPR commander and Premier, which had formed under the aegis of Russian Bolshevik agents in Urga. In 1920, Sukhe Bator, Choibalsan, some of their followers, and a few revolutionary-minded political leaders escaped to Siberia. Some went on to Moscow and Leningrad for consultations, while Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan remained in Irkutsk for further military training. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 418) (IMG)

Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan grew in influence and formed the revolutionary national government of Mongolia, as well as the Mongolian People's Party:

In November 1920, Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan moved to the Siberia-Mongolia border town of Kyakhta, recruited followers, and harassed Chinese outposts with their new force of some 50 men. In February 1921, the Mongol delegates to Moscow and those in Siberia met in Irkutsk and then moved to Kyakhta in March, where they formed the Mongolian People's Party and a Provisional National Government. Sukhe Bator was named War Minister. By this time he had enlarged his force to 400 as the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (MPRA). (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, pp. 418-419) (IMG)

Commenting on the popularity of Choibalsan and Sukhe Bator as late as 1970, Colonel Dupuy said:

The Mongolians are extremely proud of the revolutionary feats of this small band led by Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 419) (IMG)

In the meantime:

As Bolshevik victories grew, some White Russian troops retreated into Outer Mongolia, where they were supported and encouraged by Japanese forces in Manchuria and eastern Siberia. The largest of these White Russian bands was some 5,000 strong and led by the psychotic Baron Ungern-Sternberg.

After an abortive attack on Urga in October 1920, the Baron attacked again in February 1921, drove off the Chinese troops, and declared an independent Mongolia. Mongol leaders in Urga appealed to China; meanwhile the Bolsheviks told Peking that if China sent no soldiers Red Russia would handle the Whites itself. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 418) (IMG)

Upon invitation of the Mongolian revolutionaries, the Red Army provided its direct military support:

In mid-March, Sukhe Bator drove the Chinese out of Kyakhta and established a provisional capital on Mongolian soil. Ungern-Sternberg's force struck north in May against the new Bolshevik-sponsored government. The provisional Mongolian government, however, had asked the Fifth Red Army for help, which quickly provided a

division-sized task force. The White offensive began on 22 May and Kyakhta was attacked on 5 June. The Red Army force divided to meet this two-pronged attack, with a Mongolian contingent in each Red column: one under Sukhe Bator at Kyakhta and the other under Choibalsan. The attacks were repulsed, and in the ensuing pursuit Ungern-Sternberg was captured and shot and his army exterminated. Urga was captured, and on 6 July the Provisional National Government was installed under close supervision of the Russian Bolsheviks. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 419) (IMG)

As such, Mongolia was liberated after so many years, and an independent people's democracy was established the Mongolian People's Party, and the army which Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan commanded became a patriotic symbol among the Mongolians:

While providing a convenient patriotic symbol to inspire Mongolians and to establish a military tradition, the MPRA of Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan furnished a more tangible heritage over the ensuing 30 years. Not only did it form the nucleus of the eventual MPA, which was to expand to a strength of 10 percent of the population by the late 1930's in answer to the Japanese challenge, but also the MPRA acted as a modernizing force and gave the nation a generation of leaders. Choibalsan led the nation militarily in the 1920's and 1930's, and was Premier from 1939 until his death in 1952. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 419) (IMG)

Thus:

On every public patriotic occasion, such as the anniversary of the founding of the MPRA on 18 March 1921, considered to be the day Sukhe Bator's force drove the Chinese out of Kyakhta, speeches of national leaders invariably refer glowingly to the events of 1921 and the virtues of the participants, as well as to the fraternal help of the Red Army. Sukhe Bator (whose name means Axe Hero) died suddenly, and some thought, mysteriously, in 1923, still a young man. This tragic fact assisted in his apotheosis as the great young hero of the revolution. A heroic size equestrian statue of him stands in the main square of Ulan Bator (Red Hero), as Urga was renamed after the revolution. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 419) (IMG)

There was much emphasis on the development of the military and the overlap of the people, the army and the Party. Dupuy wrote that at first:

the army received up to 60 percent of the governmental budget in these early years, and rose from 2,560 men in 1923 to 4,000 in 1924, and to 17,000 by 1927. Up to one third of its soldiers were members of the Party, which became the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) in 1922, while still others belonged to the Revsomol (Revolutionary Youth League). As early as August 1921, a Main Political Administration of the army was established to supervise the work of the political commissars and Party cells in all army units, and to act as a political link between the Party's Central Committee and the army. This politicization of the army served not only to insure its political reliability, but that of the government at large as well. The more leftist members of the government, who were also prominent in the Party, tended to be connected with the army as well. The army was definitely an important political force in the 1920's. With the close cooperation of the Red Army and Soviet and Mongolian secret police, purges of rightists and nationalists were conducted and the Buddhist theocracy severely curtailed. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 420) (IMG)

A significantly large part of Mongolia was a desert. Climates that are unfavorable to the development of civilization and the productive forces often result in the continued existence of backwards tribes in which the ultra-reactionary class forces predominate. In the territory of Saudi Arabia, the desert tribes outside of the urban areas constituted a major base for Pagan extremism during the early Islamic period and Wahhabism later on. In Mongolia, such a desert ultra-reactionary tribalism was manifested in the form of the Mongol barbarians many centuries prior. For the 20th century, such desert ultra-reaction formed the base for the subjugation of Mongolia by the Tsarist White Guards, and later on, constituted a major socio-economic base for Trotskyism, Mongolian bourgeois-nationalism, and espionage for fascist Japan in that country. The Mongolian communists waged a struggle against these forces. They, for example, struggled against Mongolian bourgeois-nationalism, not the least of which because of its ideological association to the legacy of Genghiz Khan's empire.

Dupuy wrote:

In the ensuing few years, the nationalists were either purged or became Communists. Choibalsan from an early age had been Russian-oriented by schooling and then Communist-influenced by Bolsheviks at the Russian consular compound and print shop in Urga. He cooperated closely with Comintern agents and the Soviet Union, and

survived to become Premier. Sukhe Bator was Minister of War and Commander in Chief of the army, and survived the purge of 16 of his Kyakhta comrades in 1922. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 421) (IMG)

Thanks to the reforms of Choibalsan and other Party members, popular participation in politics grew in People's Democratic Mongolia. The following excerpts the document by Colonel Dupuy shed light on the nature and legacy of the Choibalsan era upon Mongolia even when Mongolia went down the road of Titoization and counter-revolution since the mid-1950s:

The last quarter of a century has seen a major increase in the percentage of the population involved in political life in Mongolia and those more able by virtue of their education and other considerations to take part in their country's politics. A seemingly higher percentage of the population is represented within the power structure of the country than is the case in any other Communist land. This is partly a result of the sparse population of the country, but it also reflects the strides in education and other fields made since 1940. Before that time the emphasis was on the consolidation—indeed, protection—of Communist power. After Choibalsan had firmly established himself in authority, however, his real revolutionary character began to reveal itself in more meaningful deeds than the execution of monks and political rivals.

An important instrument in the popular consciousness of politics has been the army. It has been a key element in both the integration of a onetime largely politically formless society as well as the means for political indoctrination. Indeed, the army's political role is probably more important than its military contribution. It has played a major part in the spread of literacy and of the national language to minority groups. More importantly, it has striven to make convinced Communist cadresmen of the soldiers who return home after their service (see ch. 22, The Armed Forces).

The political awareness of the masses has also been stimulated by the growing availability of newspapers and magazines of various sorts, all, in varying degrees, vehicles of pro-Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda. About one in every ten persons sees a daily newspaper. This is a major accomplishment. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, pp. 238 -239) (IMG)

The case of counter-revolutionary events in Mongolia during the 1950s has been explored in C20S22.

Anyways, the Mongolian revolution thereby established a lasting relationship between the Soviet people and the Mongolian people. Well during the Great Patriotic War and even after, the Mongols supported the Soviets. As a strong indication of the popularity of the USSR, the Mongolian people raised money for military aid to USSR:

The MPR stayed mobilized, however, at the 80,000-man level to guard its frontiers and discourage the Japanese from a further adventure. Mongolia also devoted heavy efforts to its part of the 1936 Mutual Assistance pact by providing the Soviet armies with winter clothing, wool, hides, leather goods, meat, and almost half a million ponies and horses for draft and remount use from 1941 to 1945. The Mongolian people raised the money for a battalion of tanks, which was named "Revolutionary Mongolia," and a squadron of aircraft named "Mongolian Herdsmen," which were presented to the Red Army. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 428) (IMG)

*** IMG-All-{October Revolution & Civil War}

C4S10. Japanese Occupation of Sakhalin

During the Civil War:

Japan also occupied Sakhalin.. (JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN ASIA (1895-1930): JAPAN'S DREAM OF "HAKKO ICHUO" (EIGHT CORNERS OF THE WORLD UNDER JAPANESE RULE), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, by: John Yung Rhee, thesis advisor: S. Jurika, Jr. December 1980, p. 17) (IMG)

Recall from C2S7 that the Trotsky faction in the USSR directly invited the Japanese imperialists to invade the Soviet Union and occupy its territories. Later on, during the Great Patriotic War, the USSR was able to recover the Sakhalin and gain the Kuril Islands. The American imperialists, beginning since the Truman era, denied that the Yalta Agreement gave the right to control over the Kuril Islands and the Sakhalin to the USSR. However, the Center for Naval Studies (CNA) – which is a naval studies research and intelligence organization funded openly by US government and is subordinate to the US Navy and US Marine Corps – admitted that the “Yalta Agreement . stipulated that the Kuril Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union and that the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it should be returned to the Soviet Union”:

Since the early 1960s, the Japanese government has unwaveringly claimed all four islands to be Japanese territory. Japan's official views on the history of its claims to the Northern Territories are laid out in a pamphlet that

is readily accessible on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its key provisions are as follows: (.). The Yalta Agreement, which stipulated that the Kuril Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union and that the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it should be returned to the Soviet Union, did not determine the final settlement of the territorial problem. Furthermore, Japan is not bound by this document, as it was not a party to the agreement. (Japan's Territorial Disputes, CNA Maritime Asia Project: Workshop Three, CNA Analysis & Solutions, Michael A. McDevitt, Catherine K. Lea, June 2013, p. 62) (IMG)

C4S11. Soviet Assistance to China

The Soviet state needed to strengthen its East Asian rear in the face of Anglo-Japanese conspiracies by providing extensive amounts of aid to the freedom forces in China. In this affair, the Soviet state could count on the progressive bourgeois-democratic Kuomintang (KMT; sometimes written as Guomindung and abbreviated as GMD) headed by the well-known Chinese revolutionary Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. The Soviet state and the Comintern also helped establish the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a vehicle for increasing the influence of the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat into China. The Soviet state then got the CCP to form a popular front alliance with the KMT so to fight against the counter-revolutionary alliance of Japanese intelligence, the MI6, Chinese fascist warlords, and other criminals. Of course, the dialectical laws of history dictate that the reduction in the presence of the imperialist-fascist secret services in China would have meant greater progressive bourgeois-democratic development. And progressive bourgeois-democracy was indeed Dr. Sun's views. Years prior, Lenin had said:

Every line of Sun Yat-sen's platform breathes a spirit of militant and sincere democracy. It reveals a thorough understanding of the inadequacy of a "racial" revolution. There is not a trace in it of indifference to political issues, or even of underestimation of political liberty, or of the idea that Chinese "social reform", Chinese constitutional reforms, etc., could be compatible with Chinese autocracy. It stands for complete democracy and the demand for a republic. It squarely poses the question of the condition of the masses, of the mass struggle. It expresses warm sympathy for the toiling and exploited people, faith in their strength and in the justice of their cause.

Before us is the truly great ideology of a truly great people capable not only of lamenting its age-long slavery and dreaming of liberty and equality, but *offighting* the age-long oppressors of China.

One is naturally inclined to compare the provisional President of the Republic in benighted, inert, Asiatic China with the presidents of various republics in Europe and America, in countries of advanced culture.

The presidents in *those* republics are all businessmen, agents or puppets of a bourgeoisie rotten to the core and besmirched from head to foot with mud and blood—not the blood of padishahs and emperors, but the blood of striking workers shot down in the name of progress and civilisation. In those countries the presidents represent the bourgeoisie, which long ago renounced all the ideals of its youth, has thoroughly prostituted itself, sold itself body and soul to the millionaires and multimillionaires, to the feudal lords turned bourgeois, etc. (Democracy and Narodism in China, Lenin, 1912. MIA)

After the October Revolution, Lenin who admired the Chinese revolutionaries, supported an alliance with them. Regarding the CPP-KMT alliance, Bruce Elleman from the US Naval War College wrote:

The signing of the Sun-Joffe pact formally inaugurated the CCP-GMD United Front. This United Front was really an alliance between Guangzhou and Moscow. ('Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989', Bruce A. Elleman, 2005, p. 161) (IMG)

Bruce Elleman is an American scholar on the military and strategic affairs of China, teaching at the US Naval War college, and having received his educational degree there:

Bruce Allen Elleman received at UC Berkeley, the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1982, completed at Columbia University, the Master of Arts and Harriman Institute Certificate in 1984, the Master of Philosophy in 1987, the East Asian Certificate in 1988, and the Ph.D. in 1993. In addition, he completed the Master of Sciences at the London School of Economics in 1985, and the Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies (with Distinction) at the U.S. Naval War College in 2004. His dissertation research on Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations was conducted in Russia (1988-89), PRC (1990-91), Taiwan (1991-92), and Japan (1992-93). (US Naval War College, Est. 1884, Newport Rhode Island, Bruce A. Elleman, PhD) (IMG)

As Elleman points out, the Soviet Union provided military and financial support for the revolutionary Kuamintung: Sun ... readily admitted that what he wanted was Moscow's support in the form of military and political advisers, weapons and ammunition, and then also direct financial support. In mid-1923, the first Soviet military advisers to Guangzhou were sent by way of Beijing under the dubious disguise of "students." In addition to two million gold rubles in finding, the Soviet Union provided an estimated 8,000 rifles, fifteen machine-guns, four heavy guns, and even "two armored cars." ('Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795 -1989', Bruce A. Elleman, 2005, p. 161) (IMG)

A military research paper in the US Marine Corps Development Command at the US Command and Staff College confirms the Soviet military support for the progressive KMT:

As part of their larger Marxist concept of “world revolution,” the Soviets sought to reinforce Sun Yat-Sen’s Chinese revolution. In mid-1923, Soviet interests converged with Sun Yat-sen’s request for Soviet military training and assistance. As a result, Sun Yat-sen that same year sent Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow to study the Red Army’s training system and to plan for a Soviet advisory mission in China. From 1924 to 1927, the Russians deployed some 1,000 advisers to south and north China. About 30 to 60 key personnel worked alongside the KMT in Canton, Kwangtung Province. Most of those advisers participated in the Bolshevik Revolution and graduated from the Red Army’s Military Academy. Yet few were trained Sinologists or Chinese speakers. (‘Advising China, 1924-1948: The Role of Military Culture in Foreign Advisory Missions’, United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Development Command, Sean C. Ahern, March 2012, p. 13) (IMG)

It is worth reminding that funding freedom forces outside of the Soviet Union was both morally correct and a strategic need, and that such assistance to the freedom forces was an essential feature of the communist revolutionary mindset. Lenin and Stalin both believed in the thesis of world revolution, but their difference with Trotsky in this matter lied in the facts that (1) Trotsky wanted to quickly invade the entire world with his Red Army, whereas Lenin and Stalin advocated strategic patience, and (2) unlike Lenin and Stalin, Trotsky hated any alliance with peasants and progressive bourgeois-democrats.

Anyways:

To shore up KMT supplies, the Soviets in 1924 shipped 11,000 rifles to the KMT and later sent an additional 15,000 rifles, machine guns, and artillery pieces. (‘Advising China, 1924-1948: The Role of Military Culture in Foreign Advisory Missions’, United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Development Command, Sean C. Ahern, March 2012, p. 15) (IMG)

Unfortunately, China’s politics for most of the 20th century was under the influence of the agrarian petit-bourgeois class. This fact surely assisted in the struggle against feudal lords and the fascists, but it also allowed room for anarchist and petit-bourgeois left-deviationist tendencies on the one hand, and petit-bourgeois right-deviationist intellectualism on the other hand. Trotskyism was therefore common in that country.

The Trotskyites kept on denouncing the bourgeois leader Sun Yat-Sen because he was bourgeois, and through their anti-KMT activity, the Trotskyites weakened the Sun Yat-Sen faction, thus assisting the feudal elements in China. In the end, KMT General Chiang Kai-Shek (also written as Jiang Jieshi), an agent of all the reactionary class forces launched a coup inside the KMT and began to undermine Soviet intelligence presence in China. The conflict came to its climax in 1927. In the words of Bruce Porter of the US Senate Armed Services committee:

Dissension between the Communists and the Nationalists in the united front grew steadily, leading to a number of tense situations and incidents, to a split in the Kuomintang, and eventually, in April 1927, to a brutal massacre of Communists in Shanghai by their Nationalist allies. The Shanghai massacre led to a complete break in Soviet-Nationalist relations. (‘The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980’, Cambridge University Press, Bruce D. Porter, first published: 1984, reprint: 1988, pp. 10-11) (IMG)

As can be seen, contrary to the Maoist slanders against USSR, the USSR minimized its relations with the KMT from 1927 until the Japanese invasion.

Trotskyite and Maoist reactionaries argue that the USSR should have ceased support for the KMT as soon as Dr. Sun Yat-Sen died in 1925. Ending Soviet aid would have meant ending aid to the progressive faction inside the KMT, the faction that operated as obstacles against the Chiang Kai-Shek faction. Ending Soviet advisors’ presence in the KMT would have meant reduced Soviet intelligence presence in the KMT and hence greater strength for the Chiang Kai-Shek faction. By stating that the USSR should have put an immediate end to the aid, the Maoists and Trotskyites are indirectly siding with Chiang Kai-Shek, the butcher of Shanghai. Before the massacre at Shanghai, General Chiang had not been able to consolidate power in the KMT, and had not been able to fully yield the leap from quantity to quality to turn the KMT into an army of terror. Since he had not consolidated power and had not fully succeeded in the factional struggles, the Soviet Union should have continued aid to KMT as a means of weakening Chiang. It follows that precisely because the massacre took place in 1927, the Soviet state provided aid until then, and when the massacre occurred thereby consolidating power in the hands of Chiang’s gang and bringing the leap from quantity to quality, further friendly relations with the KMT became pointless and ceased.

C4S12. The Founding of the Comintern

The Bolsheviks founded the Comintern in order to spread communist revolutions worldwide, to train communist activists worldwide, to promote those tendencies in the labour movement that favored the interests of the Soviet state, and to spread the influence of the Soviet state as a dictatorship of the proletariat worldwide. The Comintern was funded by the

Soviet state and pursued the objectives of the Soviet state. The US intelligence reported at the time:

Moreover, it is within the knowledge of the Government of the United States that the Bolshevist Government is itself subject to the control of a political faction, with extensive international ramifications through the Third Internationale, and that this body, which is heavily subsidized by the Bolshevist Government from the public revenues of Russia, has for its openly avowed aim the promotion of Bolshevist revolutions throughout the world. The leaders of the Bolsheviki have boasted that their promises of non-interference with other nations would in no wise bind the agents of this body. There is no room for reasonable doubt that such agents would receive the support and protection of any diplomatic agencies the Bolsheviki might have in other countries. Inevitably, therefore, the diplomatic service of the Bolshevist Government would become a channel for intrigues and the propaganda of revolt against the institutions and laws of countries, with which it was at peace, which would be an abuse of friendship to which enlightened governments cannot subject themselves. (Washington August 10, 1920, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby. From: National Security Archives) (IMG)

Some would certainly have a problem with the USSR promoting those tendencies in the labour movement that favored the interests of the Soviet state, because they would think that this would serve as a vehicle for subjugating foreign communist parties, turning them into puppets, and preventing the independence of the labour movement. Such a concern would have been legitimate, had the USSR been a totalitarian state as the West portrayed it; but history showed that the USSR really embodied the dictatorship of the proletariat, and thus served as the manifestation of the working class riding upon a state apparatus as its vehicle. There existed a strong and total dialectical correlation of interests of the progressive bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial forces, the proletarian forces outside the USSR, and interests of the Soviet state. The interests of the Soviet state were also thoroughly and entirely antagonistic to the interests of the reactionary class forces that stood at odds with the interests of the progressive bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial movements and the working class forces operating outside the physical boundaries of the USSR. It follows that yes, serving the interests of the Soviet state was indeed service to the interests of the workers living outside the USSR or living inside countries whose states were antagonistic to the USSR.

On the other hand, there exists the incorrect view that the Soviet Union could use the Comintern as a means of ordering foreign communists to do certain things as though these communists were pawns. Such a view reflects an incorrect understanding of agency networks, because it fails to account for the fact that the Comintern, although technically an international agency that promoted the interests of the dictatorship of the Soviet proletariat and hence world proletariat, was not a military force in which its 'troops' would be commanded to do certain deeds, but was rather a coalition, a partnership network, made up of people who at least officially were 'like-minded' and who agreed to a friendship and alliance with the Bolshevik Party in the USSR. To achieve its objectives, the USSR could not order those parties to do things, but could only secure their cooperation as partners. Of course, the Soviet state, having vast amounts of historical-material forces at its disposal and morally recognized as the first socialist state, had the upper hand in this partnership, but again could not possibly 'order' the foreign communists do things, unless those foreign communists had taken refuge or lived in the USSR and thus had to abide by Soviet laws. Even then, the Soviet state never outright ordered entire foreign communist parties that had taken refuge in the USSR, to do certain things, but used the means of purging counter-revolutionary infiltrators in those parties as means of extending its influence in them.

C4S13. Soviet Aid to General Sandino's Campaign

The renowned Nicaraguan revolutionary General Sandino, after whom the Sandinistas were named, has long been hailed by progressive bourgeois-democrats and communists for leading the popular rebellion against American imperialists in Central America. Less known, however, is the Soviet financial support for Sandino's revolution via the All-American Anti-Imperialist League (AAAIL). In the words of a former fellow at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies:

The [US] State Department reported that the AAAIL sent \$48,000 to Sandino in April, through Mexico, with an additional \$15,000 from the Soviets directly to Mexico. (The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations, Oxford University Press, Alan McPherson, 2014, p. 222) (IMG)

During "the Comintern's Vith congress in 1928," the CIA reported:

a resolution praising the SANDINO revolt in Nicaragua was adopted.. (International Connections of Venezuelan Communism, CIA, January 22, 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

As such, as confirmed by the US State Department foreign service officer Cole Blasier:

The executive committee of the Communist International, attracted by the political turmoil in Central America, urged anti-imperialists everywhere to help Sandino in his fight against "American imperialism" and established the Hands Off Nicaragua committee to oppose U.S. policy. (The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, Cole Blasier, 1983, p. 136.)

Latin American communists affiliated to the Comintern communists formed the Anti-Imperialist League and the Hands

Off Nicaragua committee, sending another \$1000 through the latter to Sandino:

The Anti-Imperialist League was founded by the Anti-Imperialist Congress, which met in Brussels in February 1927... The Latin American delegates included Gustavo MACHADO, as well as Julio Antonio MELLA (Cuba) and Eudocio RAVINES (Peru). A Continental Committee of the League was set up in Mexico with MELLA as its prime mover and MACHADO as a member. (International Connections of Venezuelan Communism, CIA, January 22, 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

Latin American Communists associated with the League organized a “Hands Off Nicaragua” Committee (Manos Fuera de Nicaragua – Mafuenic), which undertook to raise funds for SANDINO. The \$1,000 that was raised was sent to SANDINO by means of MACHADO. (International Connections of Venezuelan Communism, CIA, January 22, 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

When elements in the Comintern and the North American communist movement began pursuing a Trotskyite, left-deviationist, and sectarian line, condemning General Sandino as a ‘petty bourgeois adventurer’, Joseph Stalin personally held a session with the heads of the Comintern, CPSU, and Latin American communists. According to a Sandinista journal, Stalin opined:

General Augusto Cesar Sandino was a patriot who defended his country from the invasion of foreign troops. (El dia que Stalin reivindico a Sandino, La Voz Del Sandinismo, March 20, 2013) (IMG)

However, Stalin said:

According to this resolution, he is a vulgar “petty bourgeois adventurer.” (El dia que Stalin reivindico a Sandino, La Voz Del Sandinismo, March 20, 2013)

He continued:

Comrades, I would like to know, on behalf of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who are guilty of such a serious mistake... (El dia que Stalin reivindico a Sandino, La Voz Del Sandinismo, March 20, 2013) (IMG)

Stalin finally declared:

as regards the Communist Party of the USSR and the Communist International, we will continue to consider General Sandino and his heroic companions as patriots who defend their country against foreign aggressors and that, in our opinion, the decision of the Colonial committee from the Communist Party of USA (CPUSA) is a gross mistake. (El dia que Stalin reivindico a Sandino, La Voz Del Sandinismo, March 20, 2013) (IMG)

Chapter 5

C5S1. The Onset of the NEP and Moves against the Trotskyite Left-Deviation / The End of the NEP and Onset of Campaign against Bukharinite Right-Deviation / Trotskyites and Bukharinites ally with MI6-backed Nazi Germany
*** IMG-All-{Factional Conflict & Great Purge}-{October Revolution & Civil War}

By 1922, the MI6's Menshevik agent Trotsky was plotting to establish slavery to the state, so to foster resentment towards the Party of the proletariat, drive a wedge between the masses and the state, and give the Kautskyites (including right-wing Mensheviks) the propaganda weapon they needed for denouncing the USSR as totalitarian. In a book fittingly and unironically titled 'Terrorism and Communism: Democracy versus Dictatorship: A Reply to Kautsky', Trotsky wrote:

The organization of labor is in its essence the organization of the new society: every historical form of society is in its foundation a form of organization of labor. While every previous form of society was an organization of labor in the interests of a minority, which organized its State apparatus for the oppression of the overwhelming majority of the workers, we are making the first attempt in world- history to organize labor in the interests of the laboring majority itself. This, however, does not exclude the element of compulsion in all its forms, both the most gentle and the extremely severe. The element of State compulsion not only does not disappear from the historical arena, but on the contrary will still play, for a considerable period, an extremely prominent part. (Terrorism and Communism: Democracy versus Dictatorship: A Reply to Kautsky, Leon Trotsky, 1922, Chapter 8) (IMG)

Yet labor-power is required – required more than at any time before. Not only the worker, but the peasant also, must give to the Soviet State his energy, in order to ensure that laboring Russia, and with it the laboring masses, should not be crushed. The only way to attract the labor power necessary for our economic problems is to introduce compulsory labor service.

The very principle of compulsory labor service is for the Communist quite unquestionable. (Terrorism and Communism: Democracy versus Dictatorship: A Reply to Kautsky, Leon Trotsky, 1922, Chapter 8) (IMG)

The economic policies of 'war communism' had already been a leap from feudalism to intensive nationalization and state control. This state of running the economy, while useful for managing the course of the war, was absolutely toxic for peacetime at the time since it marked a Trotskyite leap from feudalism to a left-deviationist pseudo- 'socialism'. To better transition the economy, a temporary period of capitalist production relations under the dictatorship of the proletariat were needed as a step forward towards the socialist mode of production. As the US intelligence put it,:

During the ensuing Civil War and the period of foreign intervention, a hastily organized system of communism was established. After the end of the Civil War, the withdrawal of Allied troops, and the termination of hostilities with Poland, Russia was virtually in ruins, and the economic life of the country had reached a primitive level. Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks, reversed the trend of War Communism in 1921 and introduced the New Economic Policy, which looked to private enterprise to set the economic wheels in motion again while retaining control in the hands of the [workers'] state. (JOINT ARMY NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDY EUROPEAN U S S R. PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT, Joint Army Navy Intelligence Group, (in CIA archives), p. X-3) (IMG)

Thus, in the words of an article published by the 'Problems of Communism' journal – which was the organ of the US government's Cold War propaganda agency, the 'US Information Agency' (USIA) – the communist faction of the Bolshevik Party promoted the New Economic Policy (NEP), and in doing so undermined the left-deviation:

The Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, however, marked a decisive downturn in the fortunes of Left communism. Divided between the anarchists and the authoritarians and embarrassed by the Kronstadt rebellion, the Leftists were powerless to stop Lenin's moves to ... the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the abolition of factional freedom within the party. Thenceforth any serious effort from the Left to protest against discrepancies between doctrine and practice was held to be a breach of the essence of Leninism [in particular the principle of democratic centralism] and subjected the critics to the irresistible power of the party Secretariat and Central Control Commission. ('The Left Communists', Robert V. Daniels. In: 'Problems of Communism', November, 1967 to December, 1967, Vol. 16, p. 64) (IMG)

The NEP was also an excellent means of dividing the left-deviationist tendency in the Party for it led the anti-Lenin assassin, Nikolai Bukharin, to deflect away from the left opposition:

Bukharin ... had worked with the "Left" tendency until 1921, when he had suddenly become the strongest supporter of the NEP, a line he was to maintain until his fall. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 16-17) (IMG)

In vain, the left-deviation waged the struggle against the communist line on NEP:

Nevertheless, the onset of Lenin's fatal illness in 1923 enabled the Left Communists to launch a new bid for power, both the purist and authoritarian wings joining forces on a platform of opposition to the NEP and the domination of the party secretariat. ('The Left Communists', Robert V. Daniels. In: 'Problems of Communism',

November, 1967 to December, 1967, Vol. 16, p. 64) (IMG)

In the meantime, the MI6 agent Trotsky – an advocate of state-owned slavery – continued his ferocious opposition to the scientific socialist line. The CIA Office Memorandum stated:

In the period from 1917 to 1924, while Lenin was in power, Trotsky was in frequent disagreement with official policies and had expressed himself as being in ideological opposition to the Russian approach to the development of international Marxism. Upon Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin assumed control. Trotsky remained in opposition and made a continuing struggle against what Stalin claimed to be the extension of Lenin's program. (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Then came the Trotskyite forgery of 'Lenin's Testament'. As confirmed by MI6 agent Robert Conquest:

It was ironically enough Trotsky who had publicly denied the existence of Lenin's Testament. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 115) (IMG)

Nonetheless, as a propaganda weapon of the imperialist media, the document was forged so to catapult Trotsky into power:

Max Eastman published Lenin's "last will" in the New York Times. Trotsky was blamed for giving the document to his capitalist friend, Eastman. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21 -22) (IMG)

There were indeed a series of documents that were attributed by the Trotskyite media to Lenin. With the exception of the first document that was hand-written, the rest of the series' documents attributed to Lenin were all typed:

Only typewritten versions of the document are preserved in the archive, with the exception of the first part dated December 23, 1922, which exists in a facsimile manuscript. ('Lenin, V.I., Letter to the Congress, between December 23, 1922 and January 4, 1923', 1000 Documents, Austrian State Archives / Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nurnberg / Bavarian State Library) (IMG)

Secondly, the document allegedly written by Lenin contains views that are diametrically opposed to what Lenin stood for. One of the key aspects of the document is the focus on the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, and the document disapproves of the conflict between those two. This is so unlike Lenin, because Lenin and Trotsky were documented by the MI6 to have been in conflict with each other – and of course, conflicts between those two individuals did increase the chances for a split. This is yet another of the many reasons why it is dubious if the document was written by Lenin in the first place. Stalin himself in his speech 'The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now', addressed the fact that Lenin was far less tolerant towards traitors.

However, regardless of whether the series of documents really were by Lenin, they were nonetheless documents that generally favored Stalin, which is why Stalin did not deny the authenticity of those documents at the time. Where the document speaks against Stalin, the document is actually self-defeating, but where it attacks Trotsky, the document remains consistent. Pay attention to the wording. Firstly, the document states:

Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands. (Letter to Congress, Lenin. MIA)

Obviously, the document's author (or authors) was exaggerating when stating that Stalin had 'unlimited authority', because even anti-communist historians state that Stalin did not have as much power until he purged the Trotskyites in the late 1920s. In fact, even the US National Security Council, the high command of the US intelligence, admitted that there was collective leadership:

Stalin ran through a series of collective leaderships:

(Stalin-Zinoviev-Kamenev vs. Trotsky 1924-25); (Stalin-Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky vs. Trotsky- Zinoviev-Kamenev 1925-27); (Stalin-Molotov-Voroshilov-Mikoyan vs. Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky 1927-29). ('NSC BRIEFING – 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

Furthermore, the document warns against a split inside of the Party:

I think that from this standpoint the prime factors in the question of stability are such members of the C.C. as Stalin and Trotsky. I think relations between them make up the greater part of the danger of a split... (Letter to Congress, Lenin. MIA)

Had Stalin had 'unlimited authority concentrated in his hands', he would have been able to prevent the split by immediately wiping out the Trotskyites. Hence, the document, by claiming that there was the risk of a split, defeats its own claim that Stalin had 'unlimited authority'. Furthermore, elsewhere, Lenin had made it absolutely clear that Trotsky was a key source of factionalism in the Party:

Trotsky behaves like a despicable careerist and factionalist of the Ryazanov-and-Co. [i.e. Russian Mensheviks] type. Either equality on the editorial board, subordination to the C.C. and no one's transfer to Paris except Trotsky's (the scoundrel, he wants to "fix up" the whole rascally crew of Pravda at our expense!) – or a break with this swindler and an exposure of him.. He pays lip-service to the Party and behaves worse than any other of the factionalists. (To G. Y. Zinoviev, Lenin, August 24, 1909. MIA) (IMG)

In 1911, Lenin had called on the communists to ruthlessly expose Trotsky rather than to argue with him:

It is impossible to argue with Trotsky ... because Trotsky holds no views whatever. We can and should argue with confirmed liquidators and otzovists; but it is no use arguing with a man whose game is to hide the errors of both these trends; in his case the thing to do is to expose him as a diplomat of the smallest calibre. (Trotsky's Diplomacy and a Certain Party Platform, Lenin, 1911. MIA) (IMG)

On the other hand, the supposed 'Lenin's Testament' document makes a reference to the counter-revolutionary espionage that Zinoviev and Kamenev carried out in the October Revolution, as well as to the non-Bolshevism of Trotsky:

I will not further characterize the other members of the Central Committee as to their personal qualities. I will only remind you that the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev was not, of course, accidental, but that it ought as little to be used against them as the non-Bolshevism of Trotsky. (The Testament of Lenin, MIA)

The document also states that the non-Bolshevik Trotsky had 'outstanding ability' but was also excessively self-assured:

Comrade Trotsky, on the other hand, as his struggle against the C.C. on the question of the People's Commissariat of Communications has already proved, is distinguished not only by outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present C.C., but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work. (Letter to Congress, Lenin. MIA)

With the above quotes in mind, it is definitely true that Trotsky was a very capable man in the Central Committee (CC), because he had an outstanding ability to organize a non-Bolshevik network in the Bolshevik Party in order to struggle against the Central Committee, thus leading to a split in the Party. And through the formation of the Joint Opposition, Trotsky did cause a split in the Party. The document calls Stalin 'rude', but Stalin himself acknowledged that he was rude to those rude individuals who were rudely engineering the partition of the Party:

It is said that in that "will" Comrade Lenin suggested to the congress that in view of Stalin's "rudeness" it should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin's place as General Secretary. That is quite true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the Party.

I have never concealed this and do not conceal it now. Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the Thirteenth Congress I asked the plenum of the Central Committee to release me from my duties as General Secretary. The congress itself discussed this question. It was discussed by each delegation separately, and all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain at his post.

What could I do? Desert my post? That is not in my nature; I have never deserted any post, and I have no right to do so, for that would be desertion. As I have already said before, I am not a free agent, and when the Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey. (The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now, Stalin, October 23, 1927, MIA)

During the meeting of the Central Committee, Stalin resigned from his position as the General Secretary of the CPSU and the Central Committee unanimously rejected the resignation:

When the Central Committee met to consider the documents ... [t]he Committee decided that the Testament should not be read to the Congress (nor be published), and it was merely read to closed meetings of the delegations from each province, with the comments of the Committee to the effect that Lenin had been ill [and hence may have been unable to correctly judge] and Stalin had proved satisfactory. Stalin submitted his resignation as General Secretary, which was unanimously rejected. ('Stalin: The Breaker of Nations', Robert Conquest, 1991, p. 111) (IMG)

Stalin could afford to resign. The Party had a large blue-collar percentage whereas the intelligentsia were a minority. The blue-collar elements promoted communism and thus elected a Central Committee dominated by people who on the overt level, endorsed the communist line, instead of the Trotskyite line. Hence, the Central Committee already supported Stalin. The General-Secretary's resignation would have raised the vigilance of the pro-Stalin members of the Party, putting them on alert, thus mobilizing their stronger support for the restoration of Stalin to the position of General-Secretary. The enemies of Stalin feared the mobilization of the pro-Stalin blue-collar majority in the Party. They therefore had every reason to oppose Stalin's resignation. Furthermore, Stalin even had the overt-level support of the Zinoviev-Kamenev group against Trotsky. Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev all were well-aware that the Lenin 'testament' spoke out against them as well. This was a supplementary reason for the disinterest of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev in publishing the document. Hence the document remained secret, was not published, and the Central Committee unanimously voted to reject Stalin's resignation.

As explained prior, the encirclement of the counter-revolutionary agents by revolutionary agents coopts and compels the counter-revolutionary agents to adopt revolutionary rhetoric and practices and to make moves against other counter-revolutionaries. This was clearly manifested in the case of the Zinoviev-Kamenev 'struggle' against Trotsky and in favor of the Stalin faction, even though covertly, the Zinoviev-Kamenev group were agents and allies of the Trotsky faction. The more the Zinoviev-Kamenev group were struggling against Trotsky's group, the weaker the Zinoviev-Kamenev

group became. The House on Un-American Activities (HUAC), the Congressional US intelligence body that tracked communist activity in the Americas, reported:

As Stalin went ruthlessly ahead., Zinoviev and Kamenev, the two junior members of the firm, had cause to wonder about their own future in the Party. They, therefore, launched a move of increased vituperation against Trotsky, and at the same time a sub-rosa move to depose Stalin from the office of General Secretary and make him Commissar of War. But their own offices were now swarming with Stalinite spies and their activities were easily discovered and crushed. Zinoviev tendered his resignation, which was rejected. Too late the two disgruntled members of the second triumvirate discovered with amazement and horror that while they were helping Stalin undermine the political power of Trotsky, he was doing precisely the same thing to them. (Seventh Report of the Fact-Finding Committee on Un- American Activities, California Legislature, Senate, 1953, p. 38) (IMG)

As late as 1929, Bukharin, who had pursued a secretive alliance with Kamenev and Zinoviev, told Kamenev:

Stalin is boasting that he has you and Zinovyev in his pocket. You can decide your own course, but I request that you do not help him destroy us. Stalin will likely seek contact with you, and I wanted you to know what is at stake. ('Politics, Murder, and Love in Stalin's Kremlin: the Story of Nikolai Bukharin and Anna Larina', The Hoover Institute, Paul Gregory, 2010, p. 34) (IMG)

Hence, although allied to the Trotskyites on the covert level, the Zinoviev-Kamenev group were coopted by the Stalin faction and thus launched an overt-level campaign against the Trotskyites:

In June, 1924, a Communist World Congress was held in Moscow under the direction of Zinoviev, and his agents diligently spread the anti-Trotsky propaganda among the Communist delegates from foreign countries. Thenceforth the tempo of the hate campaign was accelerated until its effect was felt in every country where a Communist organization had been planted. Throughout the Soviet Union anyone who expressed pro-Trotsky sentiments was immediately branded as a traitor, a counterrevolutionary and a Party outcast. Gradually the term "Trotskyite" came to carry all the evil significance of a political curse—and was freely applied to anyone who engaged in activities or expressed opinions displeasing to the new triumvirate—which actually meant Stalin. (Seventh Report of the Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, California Legislature, Senate, 1953, p. 37) (IMG)

Stalin's ability to put Zinoviev and Kamenev in his 'pocket' goes back to the early days of the October Revolution, when Lenin had called for a full-on purge of Zinoviev and Kamenev, thereby reducing the status of those two renegades in the Party. Thanks to Lenin's reduction of the status of those renegades Zinoviev and Kamenev, those renegades had gotten 'small' enough to 'fit' in Stalin's 'pocket'. In other words, so weakened was the Kamenev- Zinoviev gang that the Stalin faction was able to plant agents around them so to coopt them.

In this situation:

The "Declaration of the 46" and Trotsky's "New Course" articles touched off the first acrimonious contest for the succession, a fight in which the Left, however, was quickly beaten. ('The Left Communists', Robert V. Daniels. In: 'Problems of Communism', November, 1967 to December, 1967, Vol. 16, p. 64) (IMG)

Trotsky and his group were rebelling against the principles of democratic centralism in the Party. And Trotsky was defeated:

Trotsky ... counterattacked by calling Stalin the "gravedigger of the revolution." The net result was Trotsky's expulsion from the Politburo.

The Joint Opposition responded with more virulent underground activity. It prepared a political platform for publication. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

A few months afterwards:

By May 1925 Trotsky was out as the War Commissar. He became deputy to Dzerzhinski, an inferior post in the Council for State Economy. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

A Trotskyite Joint Opposition was re-formed in 1926 and was under constant surveillance by the hidden units of the Soviet counter-intelligence service:

The ultra-Left then went its own ineffective way again, while Trotsky teamed up with the . rivals of Stalin – Zinoviev and Kamenev – to mount a last desperate stand against the power of the party organization in 1926-27. ('The Left Communists', Robert V. Daniels. In: 'Problems of Communism', November, 1967 to December, 1967, Vol. 16, p. 64) (IMG)

The decisive contest with Stalin began in the summer of 1926 when a Joint Opposition was formed and started sending emissaries to the provinces. These steps were taken sub rosa, but Stalin knew every move ahead of time.. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

By this time the GPU had initiated constant surveillance over Trotsky and his leading followers. The Joint Opposition was forced underground, with meetings in workers' homes, suburban tenements, cemeteries, and forests. Its tenets called for a ... revolution not in one country but throughout the world. In the Politburo the opposition constituted a regular faction. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

One way to promote a specific cause is to organize terrorist attacks on that cause just enough to make that cause appear as 'victimized' but not so far as to strongly hinder that cause. The MI6 agent Trotsky's left-deviationist 'Joint Opposition' (or 'Unified Opposition') was sponsored by the right-opportunist contingent in the CPSU not through overt praises but rather through terrorist attacks by Trotsky's Menshevik supporters. The job was done by the Menshevik diversionary terrorists headed by Riutin, who later revealed himself as a supporter of Trotsky. The prominent Trotskyite historian Pierre Broue, who had studied the papers and memoranda written by Trotsky in Harvard University, wrote:

Riutin was an old Menshevik teacher, who joined the Bolshevik Party after October. He had been a pillar of the "Right" and had particularly distinguished himself in the struggle against the Unified Opposition in 1926-27 by organising "strong arm" squads, to terrorise everyone likely to sympathise with it. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

While superficially, it may appear as though Riutin and Trotsky were opposed to each other, in reality, they were on the same side. For start, Riutin and Trotsky both came from the Menshevik network, both infiltrated the Bolshevik movement, and both stood in opposition to the Soviet government. In 1928, the covert alliance between Riutin and Trotsky was semi-exposed. While having the blood of many real or alleged Trotskyites on his hands, Riutin himself declared:

"The Right wing has proved correct in the economic field, and Trotsky in his criticism of the regime in the Party." (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

The terror campaign that Riutin had launched 'against' the Trotskyites actually promoted the Trotskyite cause under the cover of 'fighting' it. It fostered around the Trotskyites a halo of victims and martyrs. In the meantime, the Trotskyites established a center for Trotskyite colour revolution against the Soviet state; colour revolutions launched by imperialist-fascist secret services require intensive media work in order to deceive the public – especially the students, the young intelligentsia – and to rally them into street action against the revolutionary state. An underground printing shop was thus established by the MI6-led Joint Opposition and involved the aid of a fascist White Guard officer from the army of Tsarist General Wrangel, the latter being an MI6 agent and a bloody assassin of the communist and progressive anti-colonial freedom fighters. The following are excerpts of session transcripts from America's pro-Trotsky John Dewey Commission, in which Trotsky points out the connection of this White Guard officer to the underground Trotskyite print shop:

GOLDMAN: What were the reasons, what were the pretexts which the Party gave for your expulsion?

TROTSKY: Many of them. There was a story about an officer of Wrangel. We published programmatic documents; they were written on a typewriter.

GOLDMAN: Who is "we"?

TROTSKY: We? The Opposition. The Party papers refused to publish our documents, absolutely loyal documents in which we criticized certain proceedings of the bureaucracy. We published them by mimeograph. It was done by young comrades.. But they then accused us of publishing the documents with the help of an officer of Wrangel. I was absolutely astonished. It was then established that the officer of Wrangel ... approached a young Oppositionist and proposed to get him a mimeograph and ink and service. The young man accepted. It was then the GPU declared that he was not an agent of the GPU, but an officer of Wrangel. (The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report of Dewey Commission, 1st Session) (IMG)

TROTSKY: The young comrades, they were more impatient. They secured a mimeograph machine.

They were discovered. That was the case when the GPU agent, the former Wrangel officer, proposed to get them connections for paper and so on. The GPU accused them of being in an alliance with a White Guard officer.

GOLDMAN: When was the first time that violence was used against the Left Opposition?

TROTSKY: In 1927 were the first arrests officially.

GOLDMAN: Who was arrested?

TROTSKY: I believe it was Mrachkovsky. It was a question of a "conspiracy." Another agent of the GPU, Tverskoi, was involved. I have all the documents, and I would be glad if the Commission would create a sub-commission to study them. They reveal the embryo of the present frame-up. There was a young man by the name of Shtsherbakov. He had in his room a "printshop," that is, a hectograph. Another was Stroilov ... the former officer of Wrangel. (...) There was the former officer of Wrangel ... who proposed to get paper for the young Oppositionist. This same former officer of Wrangel was connected with Tverskoi. (...). At the session of the Central Committee Menzhinsky, chief of the GPU, read some papers and documents on the "conspiracy." That was in 1927. The overwhelming majority of the Central Committee were absolutely perplexed. (The Case of

Leon Trotsky: Report of Dewey Commission, 9th Session) (IMG)

To save themselves against the charges of counter-revolutionary activity, the Trotskyite opposition started claiming that the White Guard officer was also a Soviet intelligence agent. No doubt, it is possible that the White Guard officer had infiltrated Soviet intelligence, since the Soviet intelligence had been shaken due to the rise of Yagoda's network. However, that would only go on to expose the extent of intelligence penetration by the Trotskyites and White Guard elements into Soviet intelligence and would serve to justify the need for the purges of the Soviet intelligence service. Stroilov himself, the White Guard officer, was purged in the Moscow Trials. Anyways, according to the CIA document,:

In November 1927, Stalin triumphed with the expulsion of Trotsky from the Russian government. (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

The sharp demotion of the Trotskyites by the Soviet state was correlated with the march-ahead of the USSR with the NEP. However, by 1928, the state capitalist policies of the NEP had done their job of centralizing the economy away from feudalism and partially away from private sector capitalism. The economic base for a greater centralization of the economy had been laid. It was high time that socialized industry would see a rapid expansion both in extent and in intensity, and that individual peasant holdings amalgamate into voluntarily-formed agricultural cooperatives. Agricultural collectivization would have gotten the petit-bourgeoisie into employee-owned big businesses capable of taking the risk of intensive class struggles against the kulaks, the comprador class allied to finance capital. The petit-bourgeoisie, with their small businesses, are not able to take the risk of standing up against kulaks, bureaucrats, and other comprador bourgeois forces. Collectivization could strengthen the peasants in this respect. Agricultural collectivization, by amalgamating such small holdings, would have also rendered economic coordination between peasants far more efficient, allowing them to cultivate bigger lands with much more resources, thus increasing economic efficiency. Concurrent with this development in the field of economic class struggles and the development of the productive forces, was the temporary halt to the overt campaign against the Trotskyite left-deviation – who after all agreed with speeding up the pace of economic class struggles – and the onset of the overt campaign against the Bukharinite right-deviation, who operated as the primary obstacle in the path of further economic centralization. Hence, with the halt in the overt campaign against Trotskyite left-deviation, the right-opportunists were no longer of use for cooptation by the communists. As such, there came the Stalin faction's turn against the right-deviation:

Zinoviev and Trotsky were no sooner defeated than Stalin turned against the Right. Its most influential leader was Nikolai Bukharin. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 16) (IMG)

The British agent Robert Conquest described the key parts of Bukharin's network and his efforts at alliance with the Trotskyite leader Kamenev as follows:

[Bukharin's] main associate was Alexei Rykov, Lenin's successor as Premier, who had worked in the underground top leadership since it first stabilized, but who had consistently tended to compromise with the Mensheviks. With Bukharin and Rykov stood the striking figure of Tomsy, leader of the trade unions, the only worker in the Politburo. He had led one of the earliest of all Soviets, that in Reval, in the 1905 revolution, and had been one of the three representatives of underground organizations at the conference of Bolshevik leaders in Paris in 1909.

Bukharin's Right won men like Uglanov, successor to Kamenev as leader of the Moscow Party; and around Bukharin in particular there grew up a group of younger men, mainly intellectuals, who were perhaps the best minds in the Party in the early 1930s. During the attack on the Left, Stalin strongly censured the idea of "fantastic plans for industry without reckoning up our reserves" and rebuked "people who look on the mass of laboring peasants as an object to be exploited for the benefit of industry." But he now began to take a different line, adopting the left-wing policy in its most rigorous form. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

It was time, high time, for the communist faction to coopt the Trotskyite left-opportunists against the Bukharinite right and to pursue the socialization and collectivization of the economy.

Trotsky himself, ever the outrageous renegade who opposed the NEP and had called for aggressive 'socialization', this time denounced the socialization of the economy just when the economy needed to be socialized. Nonetheless, he also did state that Stalin partially went on to incorporate some of the views of the 'Left Opposition' when the parasitic kulak class carried out its economic sabotage. In an interview with his own newspaper, Trotsky replied:

Simultaneously the Left Opposition in the course of several years carried on a struggle against the Stalinists in favor of collectivization. Only when the kulak refused to deliver grain to the State did Stalin, under the pressure of Left Opposition, accomplish a sharp turn. Being the empiricist that he is, he moved to the opposite extreme, and set as a task for two or three years the collectivization of all the peasantry, the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, and the compression of the Five-Year Plan into four years. The Left Opposition declared that the new

tempo of industrialization were above our forces and that the liquidation of the kulaks as a class in the course of three years was a fantastic task. If one wishes to say so, we find ourselves this time 'less radical' than the Stalinists. Revolutionary realism tries to draw the maximum advantage from every situation – that is what makes it revolutionary – but at the same time it does not permit us to set ourselves fantastic aims – that is what makes it realistic. (AN INTERVIEW WITH LEON TROTSKY, *The Militant: The Weekly Organ of the Communist League of America (Opposition)*, New York, April 15, 1933, p. 5. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

Though covertly allied to the Bukharinite right, the Trotskyite left-deviation had no choice but to overtly support the Party line against Bukharinite right-opportunism:

the real forces of the Left were beginning to be reconciled to the Party line, now that it evidently swung their way; Pyatakov capitulated as early as February 1928. By mid-1929, Krestinsky, Radek, and most of the other "Trotskyites" had petitioned for readmission to the Party. Of the leaders, Rakovsky alone held out (until 1934). An observer remarks that Communists who had become involved in the opposition and needed to redeem their past faults were "particularly ruthless." (*The Great Terror: A Reassessment*, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

The correctness of the Party line had the effect of disarming the Trotskyite left-deviation from the excuses with which to criticize the Soviet state, and compelled them to publicly oppose their own covertly allies, the Bukharinite right:

with the launching of the Party into the bitter adventure of sudden collectivization, the effect on any wavering section might be calculated to be a swing to more solidarity. The effect on the Leftists, already opposed to Bukharin's views, would be further to disarm their complaints against Stalin's policies and to make them start thinking of the old Party loyalty in the presence of the enemy. As for the just-defeated Rightists, how could they rock the boat during the crisis? (*The Great Terror: A Reassessment*, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 18) (IMG)

When criticized for their right-opportunist views, the Bukharinites saw fit to resign. At that point in time, when they were not fully exposed, their resignation would have stirred up unrest from elements in the Party and the populace, and thus would have had a colour revolutionary effect against Soviet power. To disarm the Bukharinites, Stalin began to compromise, stopped denouncing them by name, but kept up the pace of attacks on the Bukharinites in a covert way:

Towards the end of 1928, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky put in their resignations, in anger at Stalin's steady undermining of their positions. It was too soon for Stalin, and he immediately made his usual verbal concessions, passed a Politburo resolution compromising with the Right, and thus obtained "unanimity." Thereafter, the attack on the Rightist deviation went on as before but without any naming of the leaders. (*The Great Terror: A Reassessment*, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

Bukharin, isolated due to this secret service game by Stalin, grew impulsive, incapable of correct assessment of the situation, and prone to strategic error. Impaired in tactical judgement, he saw no choice but to launch blatant slanders on the Soviet state, so to stir up unrest from outside the Party, as means of pressuring the Soviet state. However, such action only antagonized him further in the Party:

In January 1929, Bukharin submitted a declaration to the Politburo protesting against plans to squeeze the [kulak] peasantry and strongly criticizing the absence of intra-Party democracy. It included the remarks "We are against one-man decisions of questions of Party leadership. We are against control by a collective being replaced by control by a person. even though an authoritative one." This, it was charged, was "direct slander of the Party, direct slander of Comrade Stalin, against whom they try to advance accusations of attempting the single-handed direction of our Party." (*The Great Terror: A Reassessment*, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 17-18) (IMG)

Isolated further and disgraced by the Party of the proletariat, the Bukharinites lost key positions, and the communist line of the Party was adopted:

Stalin's success in organizational detail now bore fruit. The Rightists were supported in the Central Committee by a mere handful of members. That body, meeting in April 1929, condemned the right wing's views, removed Bukharin from his editorship of *Pravda* and chairmanship of the Comintern, and dismissed Tomsky from the trade union leadership. (...). In April, too, the principles of crash industrialization and of collectivization were adopted at the XVIth Party Conference. After their views had been condemned, the Rightists submitted. On 26 November 1929 they published a very general recantation of their views on "a series of political and tactical questions." Bukharin now lost his Politburo post. (*The Great Terror: A Reassessment*, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 18) (IMG)

Correlated with these events is the fact that Riutin was demoted from the position he held:

However, in 1928, [Riutin] was relieved of his responsibilities in the Moscow Committee of the Party and as editor-in-chief of *Krasnaya Zvezda*. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

The Krasnaya Zvezda was the official media organ of the USSR Defense Ministry. The fact that he had been placed in the least materially significant part of the Defense Ministry – the media sector – was itself evidence that he was regarded by the Stalin faction as a terrorist adventurer to be demoted. The demotion of the terrorist adventurer from the Ministry of Defense at the time of the shift away from NEP meant a reduction in the influence of Bukharinite influence. Obviously, however, it did not put a halt on the terrorist conspiracies of the Riutin gang. Riutin spent his time developing contacts with various counter-revolutionary oppositionists. Key individuals among them were Uglanov, one of the closest associates and agents of Bukharin, as well as the revisionist intelligentsia in the Soviet universities:

It was then that he had formed a group, with P.A. Galkin, the conspiratorial character of which no one denies.

In this group were to be found elements from various currents, such as disciples of Bukharin, [supposedly] bright jewels of the Institute of Red Professors, such as Alexander Slepkov and Dimitri Faretzky, as well as little known former “Left Oppositionists” and especially, senior members of the apparatus, such, for example, as Nikolai A. Uglanov, and even prestigious Old Bolsheviks like the metalworker, Kayurov, who led the Vyborg district in Leningrad during the revolution. (The “Bloc” of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

Bukharin's Right won men like Uglanov, successor to Kamenev as leader of the Moscow Party; and around Bukharin in particular there grew up a group of younger men, mainly intellectuals. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

An alliance network of neo-Mensheviks, Trotskyites, terrorists, Bukharinites, and revisionist intelligentsia had formed long before 1928, since these categories of renegades all had ties to the MI6-sponsored Menshevik networks. Recall that at the instigation of the MI6 agent Trotsky, Bukharin and Pyatakov had formed an alliance to assassinate Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov, and to get Russia to continue the war with Germany. Recall what an intelligence document for the British Foreign Office had stated regarding the attempts:

in 1918 to upset the peace of Brest-Litovsk to overthrow the government and to assassinate Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

The Foreign Office stated that Trotsky was the instigator, Bukharin was the ‘actual ringleader’ and Pyatakov was the designated leader in the scheme:

Bukharin was the actual ringleader though the scheme was first pronounced by Trotski, Pyatakov being designated by Bukharin to succeed learning as head of the proposed new Government of “Left Social Revolutionaries” and “Left Communists.” (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

The MI6 document cited above mentioned that the conclusions it made were stated tentatively, rather than with full certainty, but the remarks of the British intelligence document are actually validated by the fact that Bukharin and Trotsky both engaged in terrorist action aimed at overthrowing the Soviet state and murdering the communist revolutionaries and aimed at getting Russia to wage war on Germany.

Recall the remarks of the MI6 operative Grigori Tokaev who admitted that Bukharin was a foreign agent and that he had connived at the fact that the Trotskyites were agents of the MI6, Japanese fascists, Kautskyite anti-Soviet elements in Germany, and Nazi Germans:

Further, Trotsky, supposed originally to have inspired the formation of the ‘bloc’, had long since been linked with the Nazi secret service and the British intelligence service! On Trotsky’s orders, Krestinsky, former Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, had been in the German service since 1921. Rozenholz, former People’s Commissar of Foreign Trade, joined the British service in 1926 and the German service in 1932. Rakovsky, one of the big figures of the Revolution, had served the British intelligence service since 1924, and the Japanese since 1934. And so on. All this Bukharin and Rykov had connived at, since they too were foreign agents. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 87) (IMG)

The dialectical logic of Bukharin being an MI6 agent goes both ways: on the one hand, Bukharin was an MI6 agent because he collaborated with the MI6 agent Trotsky, knowing that Trotsky was an MI6 agent; on the other hand, Bukharin collaborated with the MI6 agent Trotsky because Bukharin himself was an MI6 agent as well. Bukharin’s agency for the MI6 was therefore both a cause and a consequence of his knowingly collaborating with the MI6 agent Trotsky.

The tentative remarks of MI6 spy Chilston are also corroborated by the fact that the transcripts of the Moscow Trials made the same kinds of conclusions and that the confessions of the defendants were unlikely to be forced since the ban on physical torture at least, was genuinely enforced in the USSR and was not just on paper (see C5S6). As such, Bukharin, the MI6 agent Trotsky, and the Trotskyite agent Pyatakov had all almost certainly established a Trotskyite- Bukharinite alliance since at least the early days of the October Revolution, so to overthrow the Soviet state and murder its key communist revolutionaries. Thus the roots of the bloc can be traced to long before 1928. Lenin had already pointed out that the left-opportunist Trotsky had formed an alliance with the right-opportunists to undermine the communists as early

as February 1917. Nonetheless, the alliance was taking a stronger shape by then and was being further 'formalized'. In the USSR, the Riutin group was indeed correctly regarded as a key circle forming the link between the Bukharinites and the Trotskyites:

And now we come to a case crucial to the Terror – that of Ryutin. Throughout the ensuing years, this was named as the original conspiracy; all the main oppositionists in turn were accused of participating in the Ryutin "plot," on the basis of what came to be called the "Ryutin Platform." (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

With the development of the Riutin network, the Trotskyites and Bukharinites went one step further and sought to establish contacts for a more thorough coordination in their alliance. Robert Conquest remarked:

On 11 July 1928 Bukharin had a secret meeting with Kamenev, organized by Sokolnikov. Kamenev made a resume of the conversation which finally leaked and was published abroad. Bukharin had finally seen, as he said, that the political divergences between his own right-wing faction and the left-wing faction of Zinoviev and Kamenev were as nothing compared with the total divergence of principle which separated them all from Stalin. It was not a question of ideas, since Stalin did not have any: "He changes his theories according to the need he has of getting rid of somebody at such-and-such a moment." Stalin had concluded that the advance to socialism would meet more and more ... resistance. Bukharin commented, "That will mean a police state, but nothing will stop Stalin." (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

When Bukharin said that Stalin 'changes his theories according to the need he has of getting rid of somebody at such-and-such a moment', he was not speaking the truth, but his remark was certainly based on a fact: the purges were concurrent with the evolution in the policy line pursued by the Soviet state in the realm of political economy, in the realm of the economic class struggles and the development of productive forces.

At the same time, an international Trotskyite network had been developed in the Comintern, for the pursuit of counter-revolutionary ideas:

Upon Trotsky's expulsion from the Russian Communist Party his sympathizers within the various national Communist Parties at first gave no indication of an open break. However, as early as 1927 there was clandestine contact among the Trotsky disciples, and there began to appear factions within the national parties and the Comintern. This occasioned expulsion from the Communist Party proper, a fact which was resisted by the dissenters, who considered themselves as leftist opposition groups of parent body. For example, the Americans called themselves "The Communist League of America, Left Opposition of the Communist Party." (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

The USSR however also possessed the ability to turn such Trotskyite-induced crises into an opportunity. The left-opportunist tendencies in the Comintern were used to 'whip' the Bukharinite faction out of power. The prominent British Trotskyite activist Duncan Hallas had written about this matter. Hallas joined the Trotskyite movement in 1941, when he was 16 and when the so-called 'Socialist Workers Party' (SWP) was actively supporting strikes against a British Empire that had allied with the USSR against the Nazis. He was a prominent researcher for the notorious Trotskyite organization:

DUNCAN HALLAS, who died last week, was a lifelong fighter for revolutionary socialism. A whole generation of supporters of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) remembers him as an inspired speaker and teacher of Marxist ideas. Year after year he would fill halls with hundreds of people at the SWP's annual Marxism event as he spoke about a range of topics – historical materialism, the struggle of the working class in Britain, the revolutionary tradition, the origins of humanity.

Duncan was not just a theorist. He was an activist and a fighter. He was born into a working class family in Manchester – his mother started work in the cotton mills at the age of ten – and he went on to get a job in the local engineering industry.

By the age of 16 Duncan was a committed socialist. He joined the Trotskyist movement in the middle of the Second World War, at a time when it was the only political organisation prepared to break the law and support strikes. Conscripted into the army, he was sent to fight in Germany, and then to Egypt, where he was a non-commissioned officer at the end of the war.

('Duncan Hallas 1925 – 2002', The Socialist Worker (the media of the 'Socialist Workers Party'), September 28, 2002) (IMG)

Regarding the Third Period, Hallas wrote:

The swing to ultra-leftism owed something to the need to weaken the impact in the communist parties outside Russia of the opposition criticisms of the previous period's rightist policies, especially after their disastrous outcome in Britain and China. But more important was the need to remove Bukharin's supporters from positions of influence in various communist parties. 'The main danger is from the right,' it was proclaimed, and the by now well-established techniques of bureaucratically eliminating inconveniently independent party members, pioneered by Zinoviev and developed by Bukharin, were now used ruthlessly against the latter's supporters.

Genuine leftists purged during Bukharin's reign were not, however, reinstated. Instead 'leaders of a new type' were promoted and then made the objects of a personality cult mirroring that which now centred on Stalin himself in Russia. Prompt and unquestioning obedience and uncritical worship of Stalin and all his works: these were now the requirements. (The Comintern, Duncan Hallas, Chapter 6) (IMG)

Hallas continued:

The leftism of this period was not imposed by the Comintern consciously in order to isolate the communist parties. The leftist policies in fact developed from struggles inside the USSR, where the bureaucracy was now fighting against the right wing around Bukharin. (The Comintern, Duncan Hallas, Chapter 6) (IMG)

In this midst, Stalin began to launch an ideological campaign against Trotsky's theses on fascism. However, much more than undermining Trotsky, those Stalin theses undermined the right-opportunists in the Comintern. Stalin famously declared that 'social-democracy' was objectively the 'moderate wing of fascism'. Politically, this remark by Stalin was within a context of the attacks on the right-deviationist and liberalizer tendencies in the Party. However, in terms of the actual philosophical content behind the remark by Stalin, this remark of his has caused confusions amongst some. Therefore, the following points must be mentioned about it:

(1) In stating so, Stalin obviously did not use the term 'social-democracy' to refer to socialist or progressive bourgeois-democratic causes, but rather spoke of the Kautskyite agents of imperialist-fascist finance capital, who sponsored fascist mass-murderers abroad and at times at home. Fascist assassins like Petlura, Pilsudski, and Mussolini all had Kautskyite roots. The 'corporatist' model, the 'San- Sepolcro' model, etc. which the fascists used all deliberately imported ideas from scientific socialism obviously not in order to advance the communist cause, but to take leadership and hence mis-leadership of a backlash against finance capital, so that the imperialist-fascists secret services can pursue their agenda. They were also meant to create a 'progressive' covering for the fascists. West Germany was a Kautskyite state run directly by Nazi officials.

(2) That Stalin mentioned the Kautskyites does not mean that he meant to single them out, because there were (and are) conservative party or liberal party politicians who serve imperialist-fascist secret services as well, and provide the democratic cover. There are Trotskyites who superficially 'differ' with the Kautskyites, but who are no less agents of imperialist-fascist secret services.

(3) That Kautskyites served to further the interests of finance capital does not mean that when Anglo- American and French imperialists began to contradict the Nazi German finance capital, the Soviet Union should not have allied with the former group. On the contrary, Stalin was very clear in advocating such an alliance, even though that meant an alliance with some of the Kautskyite criminals who had formerly been sponsoring the Axis but who by then had turned against the Axis. Similarly, the popular front strategy of the Comintern meant that if necessary, the communists shall ally with the Kautskyite agents of Anglo-American intelligence services in order to combat the fascist occupation forces.

(4) State capitalism is simply a variant of the capitalist mode of production used by many – though not all – fascist regimes, and used also by the Kautskyites. That the Kautskyites and many fascists in Europe advocated a form of state capitalism does not mean that state capitalism is fascism. During the New Economic Policy (NEP) period, state capitalism was a major form of property relation.

The communist faction in the USSR sought to transition from the NEP to the process of socialized industrialization and agricultural collectivization. Bukharin's right deviationist group opposed the transition away from NEP, however. Hence, to undermine Bukharin's right-deviation, the communists were compelled to tolerate the left-deviationist elements in the Comintern. This, while a correct strategy, had its obvious side effect: the 'Third Period' line, which was a left-deviationist line denouncing alliances with any force from among the bourgeoisie against more dangerous elements among the bourgeoisie. The left-deviation of the Third Period of the Comintern, while needing to be denounced, was not a line promoted by communists but rather by the left-deviationist elements used by the communist faction against the power bases of the right-deviation. The case of some Latin American 'communists' pursuing a left-deviationist line, using the Comintern line, as their example is a case in point; General Sandino was stabbed in the back by them, although the Stalin faction of the USSR continued the aid. In the context of the USSR however, one must account for the fact that the left-deviation and the right-deviation were covertly allies against the socialist centrists, and that the rise of such a left-deviation against the right-deviation was useful for weakening the MI6 imperialist fifth column which the Nazis eventually recruited. The left-deviation in the Comintern, therefore, was 'ironically' useful in undermining the MI6-backed fascist intelligence network in the USSR, the network which the Nazis later began to support.

Back in the USSR, the campaigns were ongoing:

In 1929 [Trotsky] was exiled from the country. (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

There is no way that the Soviet leadership, if given the power to execute Trotsky, would have allowed the MI6 agent Trotsky to move freely out of the Soviet Union. However, at the time, the communists did not have sufficient power to

counter the Trotskyite lobby. At the time, through his intelligence network and through his vast network of operatives in the Red Army and to a lesser extent in the Soviet intelligence service GPU, the criminal Trotsky had enough lobbying power not to be jailed and silenced, let alone be fully interrogated and executed. This lobbying power gave Trotsky the ability to instead get exiled to Turkey, as opposed to being executed. The usefulness of the Trotskyites in the campaign against the Bukharinites supplemented the tendency to not execute him.

Upon landing in Prinkipo/Buyukada in Turkey, the MI6 agent Trotsky established his Trotskyite central command headquarters, an anti-Soviet base for intelligence and special operations, hence to weave his worldwide spy web: Summing up Trotsky's striving "to rally the under-world of Europe to the overthrow of Stalin," Winston Churchill described Trotsky's conspiratorial audacity and demoniac energy. The same characterization was drawn by [America's liberal journalist who denounced the Soviet Union,] John Gunther, who interviewed Trotsky at Prinkipo in Turkey. His description gave the essence of the movement's structure in 1932, which remained about the same until Trotsky's death:

A Trotsky movement has grown up throughout most of Europe. In each country there is a nucleus of Trotskyist agitators. They take orders from Prinkipo direct. There is a sort of communication between the various groups, through their publications and manifestos but mostly through private letters. The various central committees are linked to an international headquarters in Berlin (in Paris, after Hitler's take-over).

Its confidential communications with occasional uses of couriers, safe accommodation addresses, and code names for correspondents gave Trotsky's movement the semblance of an intelligence service. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, p. 18) (IMG)

One must also pay attention to where the Trotskyites overtly established their bases. Kemalist Turkey was militarily allied to the USSR but was coming increasingly under the influence of the British intelligence. Since Trotsky was hated in the USSR, the fact that he landed in Turkey of all places could serve as a means of associating Turkey with Trotskyism, hence to drive a wedge between Turkey and the USSR, precisely what Trotsky and the MI6 wanted. We know that Trotsky's network sought to drive such a wedge based on the fact that the Trotskyites in the Comintern denounced Kemal Pasha as a reactionary. On the other hand, Turkey did not have enough lobbying power to stand up against the will of the MI6, and so Trotsky was able to establish his base there.

Rapallo-era Germany had a common denominator with Turkey in this respect. For a period of time, the USSR militarily allied with Weimar-era Germany, and established military cooperation, as a means of containing Anglo-French imperialism. As stated in the CIA document above, the other overt base of the Trotskyites was Rapallo-era Germany. By establishing their base there, the much-hated Trotskyites were associating themselves to Germany, so to increase pressures on the USSR to cut military cooperation with Rapallo-era Germany. Rapallo-era Germany was too weak in the face of the British, to be able to expel Trotsky.

Once Hitler rose to power, the time had come for the USSR to lure France into an alliance against Nazi Germany; that the Trotskyites 'escaped' to France surely was a part of the plot to overtly 'dissociate' themselves from the Nazis, but it also helped them in driving a wedge between USSR and France. As many MI6 agents had settled in France since World War I, Britain had a large number of intelligence bases in France, and France was too MI6-influenced to undertake immediate action against the Trotskyites. Mexico was still under American influence but was emerging increasingly under the influence of the USSR through the communist-led popular front, and later on, Trotsky established his presence precisely in that country. Since Anglo-American influence in Mexico was high, Mexico did not have sufficient lobbying power against Trotsky. All such measures appear to have been intended, at least in part, to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and its allies.

The central command base of the Trotskyites in Turkey ran a network of Kautskyites and extremists throughout Europe. The Trotskyite movement established was the movement of the extremists, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and the Labour Party, albeit with a left-opportunist rhetoric:

Another vulnerability of Trotsky was inherent in the composition of his political movement. The Trotskyites of the 1930's were predominantly former CP members, Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, leftist laborites, Spartacus Youth groups, and similar extreme radicals. Their unifying slogans focused on the negation of Stalinism, while with regard to their positive ideal, world revolution, their varied ideological background divided them in all efforts. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, p. 19) (IMG)

The Labour Party, a branch of the Kautskyite Second International web and a mass organization controlled by the British espionage service, invited Trotsky to Britain:

On June 5, 1929, the Independent Labor Party, of which Ramsay MacDonald is a member, sent me an official invitation, on its own initiative, to come to England and deliver a lecture at the party school. The invitation, signed by the general secretary of the party, read: "With the formation of the Labor government here, we cannot believe that any difficulties are likely to arise in connection with your visit to England for this purpose."

Nevertheless difficulties did arise. I was [not] allowed to deliver a lecture before the supporters of MacDonald...

My application for a visa was flatly refused. (My Life, Trotsky, 1930, chapter 45. MIA) (IMG)

The reason why Trotsky was not allowed is obvious. While the Kautskyite Labour Party members would have liked their Menshevik MI6 agent physically harboured in Britain, the media hype about Trotsky's entry to Britain would have inflicted far too much of a cost on the public image and reputation of the Labour Party, for it would have portrayed them as in cahoots with international communism. Already, Western media, according to Trotsky, was publishing outlandish stories about Trotsky being an agent of Stalin for a Soviet conquest of the Middle East and the loss of Anglo-French colonies in that region:

Newspapers like The Times or Le Temps speak the truth on all unimportant and inconsequential occasions, so that they can deceive the public with all the requisite authority when necessary.

The Times later published reports that I had come to Constantinople by arrangement with Stalin, to prepare for a military conquest of the countries of the Near East. (My Life, Trotsky, 1930, chapter 45. MIA) (IMG)

In the meantime, when Trotsky was in Turkey, it once again became convenient to launch another wave of political attacks against the Bukharin group so to speed up the pace of economic centralization. Hence came the arrest of Riutin on charges of terrorist activity, a blow to the right-opportunists:

Ryutin was expelled from the Party in September 1930, and arrested six weeks later. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

However, by 1930, some Trotskyite left-deviations had been committed in the realm of agricultural collectivization, and many peasants had been quickly forced into 'collectives'. It was necessary to prevent forced 'collectivization' and to ensure that collectivization would be voluntary, within pace, and concurrent with the development of the productive forces. The Trotskyites, the advocates of rushing and forcing, must have been counteracted. To this end, by early 1931, it was necessary for communists to slightly elevate the Bukharin group again so to counteract the Trotskyite influence. Such was why:

on 17 January 1931 the OGPU Collegium acquitted [Ryutin] of criminal intent, and he was released and later restored to Party membership, with a warning. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

Upon restoration to Party membership, Riutin's position was overall much weaker than before his arrest, and thus he was coopted by, compelled to cooperate with, the communists in order to 'ensure' his political survival. He was readmitted because the communists aimed to coopt Bukharinite trumpeting against Trotskyite phrasemongering. Of course, the fact of the Trotskyite left-deviations compelled the communists into an overt-level 'alliance' with the Bukharinites again, and hence the Trotskyite left-opportunists created the lobbying force behind Riutin's temporary release from prison. Nonetheless, overall, the trend was in favor of the communist faction, which successfully exploited the overt-level hostilities of the covertly-allied left- and right-deviationists, for the purpose of adjusting the speed of class struggles and the development of the productive forces.

With this new policy line of preventing forced 'collectivization' and slowing down pace,:

The peasants left the kolkhozes. (...). Bukharin, Tomsy, and Rykov ... went out of their way to say that to come out against "the Party," especially with the support of peasants, was unthinkable. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

Therefore, through the pursuit of such correct policy, once again the Bukharinite right was coopted and pitted against the Trotskyite leftist advocates of the speed-up in pace. This was in spite of the covert alliance between the Trotskyites and the Bukharinites. Overtly and outwardly, the covert allies had to denounce each other ferociously, thanks to the vigorous correctness of the Party line. However, the weakening of the Trotskyites and the correctness of the Party line also meant that the Bukharinites could no longer have excuses with which to criticize the Soviet state. This meant that they could not have as much of a popular base with which to catapult themselves politically upwards. Instead, the correct line pursued by the Party disarmed them further, leading to their key chess pieces being demoted. Thus:

Tomsy was removed from the Politburo in July 1930, and Rykov in December. Henceforth, [the Politburo] was ... Stalinist. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

Their demotion only increased the severe pressure upon them to adapt to the Party line:

The Rightist leaders privately regarded Stalin's leadership as catastrophic and hoped for his fall, but advised their closest adherents to wait in patience for a change in the Party mood. Bukharin favored working up a general support of the idea of a change without any direct organized struggle for the time being. He is described as having counseled the younger oppositionists to rely on the masses, who must sooner or later realize the fatal consequences of the Stalin line. Patience would be necessary. So he accepted defeat in the vague hope of some improvement later on.

The Trotskyists voiced a similar hope for a change. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University

Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

By pursuing forced 'collectivization', the Bukharinite-Trotskyite alliance fomented discontent among the ordinary peasants. The Bukharinites and the Trotskyites also launched kulak rebellions, thus causing the condition of a civil war inside the USSR's agricultural territories, leading to famines in the early 1930s. In so doing, they caused the deaths of the hidden soldiers of Soviet power, the numerous officers who sought to protect the Soviet people from kulak terror. Through the famine, the MI6 gang of Bukharin committed a democide, if not a genocide, against the Soviet people, and committed crimes against humanity, murdering approximately 1.4 million people (see C5S3). The economy of the USSR was damaged although it was able to recover fairly quickly.

In addition to kulak sabotage though, there was industrial sabotage. The hope of the Trotskyites lied in several of their agents throughout the USSR, one of which was the Trotskyite group of Pyatakov, Radek, and Sokolnikov. The ties of Bukharin to Pyatakov reportedly goes back to as early as 1918. It is, furthermore, a well-known fact that Pyatakov was a Trotskyite.

As early as 1931, the MI6-backed Trotskyite group of Pyatakov was engaged in economic sabotage against the Soviet state. The memoirs of John 'Jack' Littlepage are very valuable for understanding the scale of the industrial sabotage occurring throughout the USSR. This American engineer was employed by the Soviet government to work in the development of the mining sector. After the termination of his employment period, Littlepage returned to the United States and wrote his memoirs 'In Search of Soviet Gold'. In it, he detailed the industrial wreckage carried out by a Trotskyite gang led by Radek and Pyatakov:

[In] the spring of 1931,.. I decided to take a quick vacation in Europe.. I requested permission from Serebrovsky, and the latter told me a large purchasing commission was headed for Berlin, under the direction of Yuri Piatakoff, who, ... was then the Vice-Commissar of Heavy Industry. The proposed purchases to be made included some expensive mining equipment, and he suggested that I might advise the commission on such purchases.

I agreed to do this, and arrived in Berlin at about the same time as the commission. I found it consisted of about fifty persons, headed by a few prominent Communist politicians of whom Piatakoff was the chief, together with Secretaries, clerks, and technical advisers. There were also two other American engineers, who had come along to give technical advice on other purchases than mining.

The Russian members of the commission didn't seem any too well pleased to have me around at this time; their attitude made me recall the rumors I had heard about ill-feeling between Piatakoff and Serebrovsky, and I decided I was unwelcome because I was regarded as Serebrovsky's man. But I told them Serebrovsky had asked me to approve every purchase of mining equipment, and they agreed to consult me.

Among other things, the commission had put out bids for several dozen mine hoists, ranging from one hundred to one thousand horse-power. Ordinarily these hoists consist of drums, shafting, bearing, gears, etc., placed on a foundation of I- or H-beams.

The commission had asked for quotations on the basis of pfennigs per kilogram. Several concerns put in bids, but there was a considerable difference – about five or six pfennigs per kilogram – between most of the bids and those made by two concerns which bid lowest. This difference made me examine the specifications closely, and I discovered that the firms which had made the lowest bids had substituted cast-iron bases for the light steel required in the original specifications, so that if their bids had been accepted, the Russians would have actually paid more, because the cast-iron base would be so much heavier than the lighter steel one, but on the basis of pfennigs per kilogram, they would appear to pay less.

This seemed to be nothing less than a trick, and I was naturally pleased to make such a discovery. I reported my findings to the Russian members of the commission with considerable self-satisfaction. To my astonishment, the Russians were not at all pleased. They even brought considerable pressure upon me to approve the deal, telling me I had misunderstood what was wanted.

I knew I hadn't misunderstood, and wasn't able to figure out their attitude. I finally told them that if they bought these hoists, they would have to act on their own responsibility, and that I would see to it that my contrary advice got on to the record. Only after I had made this statement did they drop the proposal.

The incident left a bad taste in my mouth. Either these Russians were too proud to admit that they had overlooked this obvious substitution in the specifications, or there was some kind of personal reason involved. It might very well be graft, I thought. If I had not discovered the substitution of cast-iron in the specifications, the commission could have gone back to Moscow and showed how successful they had been in beating down prices for the mine hoists.

At the same time, they would have paid out money for a lot of worthless cast-iron, and it would have been possible for the German concerns to pay over substantial sums privately in graft.

But I had done my duty, and the purchase had not gone through. The commission had purchased the right kind of hoists in the end, and no harm was done. I decided to say nothing about the matter to anybody.

The incident left my mind, and did not come back to me until after I had gone home on sick leave in the spring of 1932. Soon after my return to Moscow, I was informed that the copper mines at Kalata were in very bad condition; production had fallen even lower than it was before I had reorganized the mines in the previous year. This report dumbfounded me; I couldn't understand how matters could have become so bad in this short time, when they had seemed to be going so well before I left.

Serebrovsky asked me to go back to Kalata to see what could be done. When I reached there, I found a depressing scene. The Americans had all finished their two-year contracts, which had not been renewed, so they had gone home. A few months before I arrived, the Communist manager, who had learned something of mining under my direction, had been removed by a commission which had been sent in from Sverdlovsk, Communist headquarters in the Urals. The commission had reported that he was ignorant and inefficient, although there was nothing in his record to show it, and had appointed the chairman of the investigating commission to succeed him – a funny sort of procedure.

During my previous stay at the mines we had speeded up capacity of the blast furnaces to seventy-eight metric tons per square meter per day; they had now been permitted to drop back to their old output of forty to forty-five tons. Worst of all, thousands of tons of high-grade ore had been irretrievably lost by the introduction into two mines of methods which I had specifically warned against during my previous visit.

We American engineers had evolved for some of the mines at Kalata a more productive system of working the stopes, and had managed to introduce it in spite of the persistent opposition of Russian engineers. We knew, however, that this method could not safely be applied to the remaining mines, and I had explained why this was true, carefully and at great length, both to the former Communist manager and to the engineers. To make completely certain that the situation was understood, I left instructions in writing when I left, warning against extension of this method.

But I now learned that almost immediately after the American engineers were sent home, the same Russian engineers whom I had warned about the danger, had applied this method in the remaining mines, with the result that the mines caved in and much ore was lost beyond recovery.

Much discouraged, I set to work to try to recover some of the lost ground. The atmosphere around the place impressed me as unpleasant and unwholesome. The new manager and his engineers were sullen, and made it plain that they wanted little to do with me. The food shortage was at its height in the Urals at this time, and the workmen were in a more ugly mood than I had ever seen them.

Living conditions had been permitted to decline along with production.

I worked as well as I could to get things moving again; but I didn't have seven American engineers and a friendly Communist manager to help me out, as I had before. Then one day I discovered that the new manager was secretly countermanding almost every order I gave. I saw there was no need to stay any longer, and caught the first train I could get back to Moscow. I was so disheartened at that time that I was prepared to resign and leave Russia for good.

When I reached Moscow, I reported exactly what I had discovered at Kalata to Serebrovsky. He brushed aside my resignation and told me I was needed more than ever now, and shouldn't think of leaving. I told him it was no use for me to try to work in Russia, when I could get no co-operation from the men in the mines. "You needn't worry about those men," he said. "They will be attended to."

He started an investigation right away, and in a short time the mine manager and some of the engineers were put on trial for sabotage. The manager got ten years, the maximum prison sentence in Russia, and the engineers lesser terms. The evidence indicated that they had deliberately removed the former manager in order to wreck the mines.

I was satisfied at the time that there was something bigger in all this than the little group of men at Kalata; but I naturally couldn't warn Serebrovsky against prominent members of his own Communist party. It has never been my policy to get mixed up in politics. But I was so sure that something was wrong high up in the political administration of the Ural Mountains that I agreed to stay on in Russia only after Serebrovsky had promised me that I would not be sent back to work in the copper mines of the Urals.

There was another good reason why I had no desire to go back to the Urals. I had gone out one day, during my first visit to Kalata, walking with another American engineer from one mine to another. We stood for a few minutes on a dump of ore near one of the mines, silhouetted against the sky. Suddenly bullets began to whizz past me, and I wasted no time in taking shelter. That was a turbulent period, and it was not uncommon for Soviet officials to be shot at, or even killed, and I didn't suspect that those bullets were intended for me. But as I got to thinking over subsequent events, I began to wonder.

I studied all the information I could get hold of about the trial of the manager and engineers at Kalata. It seemed clear to me at the time that the selection of this commission and their conduct at Kalata traced straight back to the Communist high command in Sverdlovsk, whose members must be charged either with criminal

negligence or actual participation in the events which had occurred in these mines. However, the chief secretary of the Communist Party in the Urals, a man named Kabakoff, had occupied this post since 1922, all through the period of great activity in developing the mines and industries of the Urals. For some reason which was never clear to me, he had always commanded the complete confidence of the Kremlin, and was considered so powerful that he was privately described as the "Bolshevik Viceroy of the Urals."

If this man's record was examined, there was nothing to justify the reputation he appeared to have. Under his long rule, the Ural area, which is one of the richest mineral regions in Russia and which was given almost unlimited capital for exploitation, never did produce anything like what it should have done.

This commission at Kalata, whose members later admitted they had come there with wrecking intentions, had been sent directly from this man's headquarters, and yet when this evidence came out at the trial, there was no reflection against Kabakoff. I told some of my Russian acquaintances at the time that it seemed to me there was a lot more going on in the Urals than had yet been revealed, and that it came from somewhere high up.

All these incidents became clearer, so far as I was concerned, after the conspiracy trial in January, 1937, when Piatakoff, together with several of his associates, confessed in open court that they had engaged in organized sabotage of mines, railways, and other industrial enterprises since the beginning of 1931. A few weeks after this trial had ended and Piatakoff had been sentenced to be shot, the chief Party Secretary in the Urals, Kabakoff, who had been a close associate of Piatakoff's, was arrested on charges of complicity in this same conspiracy.

I was particularly interested in that part of Piatakoff's confession which concerned his actions at Berlin in 1931, when he headed the purchasing commission to which I was assigned as technical adviser. It then became clear to me why the Russians around Piatakoff had not been pleased when I discovered that German concerns had substituted cast-iron for light steel in specifications for mine hoists. Piatakoff testified that anti-Stalin conspirators, headed by Leon Trotsky, the exiled former Commissar of War, needed foreign currency to build up a fund for their work abroad. Inside Russia, with so many conspirators occupying important positions, he said it was easy to get funds, but Soviet paper money was no good abroad. Trotsky's son, Sedoff, according to Piatakoff, therefore worked out a scheme to get foreign currency without arousing suspicion.

At his trial, Piatakoff testified that he met Sedoff in Berlin in 1931 by previous arrangement in a restaurant near the Zoo. He added; "Sedoff said that only one thing was required of me, namely, that I should place as many orders as possible with two German firms, and that he, Sedoff, would arrange to receive the necessary sums from them, bearing in mind that I would not be particularly exacting as to prices."

Questioned by the prosecutor, Piatakoff added that he was not required to steal or divert Soviet money, but only to place as many orders as possible with the firms mentioned. He said that he made no personal contacts of any kind with these firms, but that the matter was arranged by others without any further action on his part than throwing business to them.

Piatakoff testified: "It was done very simply, particularly since I had very many opportunities, and a fairly large number of orders went to those firms." He added that it was easy to act without arousing suspicion in the case of one firm because the firm itself had a fine reputation, and it was simply a question of paying slightly higher prices than were necessary.

The following testimony then was given at the trial:

Piatakoff: But as regards the other firm, it was necessary to persuade and exercise pressure in order to have purchases placed with this firm.

Prosecutor: Consequently, you also paid this firm excessively at the expense of the Soviet Government?

Piatakoff: Yes.

Piatakoff then went on to say that Sedoff did not tell him exactly what the conditions were, what the technique was for this transfer of money, but assured him that if Piatakoff placed orders with these firms, Sedoff would receive money for the special fund.

This passage in Piatakoff's confession is a plausible explanation, in my opinion, of what was going on in Berlin in 1931, when my suspicions were aroused because the Russians working with Piatakoff tried to induce me to approve the purchase of mine hoists which were not only too expensive, but would have been useless in the mines for which they were intended. I had found it hard to believe that these men were ordinary grafters, as they did not seem to be the kind interested in feathering their own nests. But they had been seasoned political conspirators before the Revolution, and had taken risks of the same degree for the sake of their so-called cause.

Of course, I have no way of knowing whether the political conspiracy mentioned in all confessions at this trial was organized as the prisoners said it was. I never attempted to follow the ins and outs of political disputes in Russia, and wouldn't have known what anti-Government conspirators were talking about if they had tried to drag me into their affairs, which none of them ever did.

But I am absolutely sure that something queer was taking place at Berlin in 1931, during the period

mentioned by Piatakoff at his trial. I have already said that my experiences at that time puzzled me for years, and that I couldn't figure out any sensible explanation until I read Piatakoff's testimony in the Moscow newspapers at the time of his trial.

Another part of this testimony that some Moscow journalists found it hard to believe was that German firms should give commissions to Sedoff. But I have already mentioned in an earlier chapter that Russian emigres were in the habit of collecting commissions from German firms for using their alleged influence to throw Soviet business in their direction. The managers of these German firms might consider that Sedoff was simply another Russian emigre, and would make the same kind of a deal with him that I know they had been making for years with other emigres.

In such cases, it was the usual procedure for German firms merely to figure the promised commissions into their prices, and if the Russians accepted the prices nothing more was necessary. But in the case of these mine hoists, the commission must have been put so high that the firm had to juggle the specifications in order to clear its profit. When they did this, my attention was attracted and the deal was blocked. Piatakoff testified that he had to exert pressure to have some orders passed, and I have told how pressure was put on me.

The testimony at this trial aroused a great deal of skepticism abroad and among foreign diplomats at Moscow. I talked with some Americans there who believed it was a frame-up from beginning to end. Well, I didn't attend the trial, but I did follow the testimony very closely, and it was printed verbatim in several languages. A great deal of the testimony about industrial sabotage sounded more probable to me than it did to some of the Moscow diplomats and correspondents. I know from my own experiences that a good deal of industrial sabotage was going on all the time in Soviet mines, and that some of it could hardly have occurred without the complicity of highly placed Communist managers.

My story is valuable, so far as this trial is concerned, only as regards the incident at Berlin. I have described what that was, and how, to me, Piatakoff's confession cleared up what had happened.

(In *Search of Soviet Gold*, John D. Littlepage, pp. 94-104) (IMG)

The Pyatakoff-Radek group, which had the backing of the MI6 agent Trotsky, carried out the industrial sabotage in the USSR, and for this they were later tried and purged in the late 1930s. In a formerly classified letter to Washington, George Kennan – the well-known Cold War hawk and US diplomat to the USSR – referred to the purge:

of Pyatakoff, former Assistant Commissar for Heavy Industry; Karl Radek, famous journalist and publicist; Sokolnikov, formerly Ambassador in England and subsequently Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and Commissar for the Timber Industry; and L. P. Serebryakov, a prominent Party official who had held important posts in the Government apparatus, including at one time that of Assistant People's Commissar for Ways of Communication. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 362) (IMG)

The activities of the Pyatakoff-Radek group went on, with the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany. The Nazi Germans had the backing of the MI6 and thus many Trotskyite agents of the MI6 also began working for Nazi Germany's secret service. The claim that the Pyatakoff-Radek group were intelligence agents of Nazi Germany was, according to Kennan, very 'plausible':

Let us start first with the small fry among the defendants, who were accused of espionage, sabotage, et cetera. Some of these were quite probably guilty of a great deal. While the wrecking acts to which they confessed in open court did not all seem very convincing, the espionage connections are plausible enough. It is probable that they had on their consciences certain espionage activities in connection with military industries, which were the real cause of the death sentences. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 364) (IMG)

In the footnote of that document, Kennan stated that the connections of the accused to the intelligence service of the Third Reich was 'almost inevitable':

A number of the plants in which these men were employed were chemical plants, said to have been built largely by German engineers. Under these circumstances, espionage – in the Soviet sense – is almost inevitable. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 364) (IMG)

Kennan seems to have used the term 'in the Soviet sense' in order to ridicule the Soviet judicial procedures. Kennan was likely implying that the employees were providing information to the German technicians for the purpose of the construction or operation of chemical plants, not for other purposes. To respond to his point, the following needs to be said: first of all, yes, the German intelligence officers could penetrate Soviet territory under the cover of 'technicians' and

sensitive intelligence material could be provided to them by citizens of the USSR under the cover of ‘cooperating’ with the ‘technicians’. Secondly, Kennan himself acknowledged previously that the defendants likely truly had an intention to carry out espionage for Nazi Germany.

Also, during the trial, Kennan noted, along with the accused:

on the defendants' benches, there was a somewhat motley company of other accused persons. These included four other fairly well-known Trotskiists: Muralov, Drobnis, Boguslavski and Livshits, and nine lesser lights. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 384) (IMG)

Although he did not fully agree with the verdict of the Moscow trials, Kennan nevertheless acknowledged that at least ‘some of the above four Trotskyite defendants – Muralov, Drobnis, Boguslavski, and Livshits – were ‘evidently spies and stool pigeons’:

The fact that some of these lesser defendants — evidently spies and stool pigeons — were people whom Radek and the other leading defendants had obviously never seen before in their lives, caused little surprise among the public. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 362) (IMG)

The British intelligence agent Grigori Tokaev suggested that firstly, Pyatakov indeed was a criminal and that the Prosecution’s statements about him – that he was a saboteur and foreign agent – were factual; secondly, that, by the time of his trials, Pyatakov was no longer a believer in Trotsky’s theories; and thirdly that the only reason why he confessed was that he felt shame for his Trotskyite past – he did not confess because of supposed ‘torture’ (in the USSR, the interrogators were strictly banned from any physical harm on the prisoners. See chapter). Tokaev wrote:

Piatakov ... said, ‘I have waived my right to a speech in my defence because the Prosecution is right in its statement of the facts, and in its estimation of my crime. But I cannot reconcile myself to one assertion made by the State Prosecutor, namely, that even now I am a Trotskyite. Yes, I was a Trotskyite for many years; but my only motive for the statements I have made at this trial, was the desire, even now, even when it is too late, to get rid of my loath-some Trotskyite past.’

Nobody acquainted with Piatakov’s work could seriously doubt that he was speaking the truth. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, p. 66) (IMG)

As stated previously, the Trotskyites in the USSR came into the service of Nazi German intelligence, and not just the MI6. The Trotskyites outside the USSR too established intelligence ties to Nazi Germany, promoting Hitler’s cause against the USSR. This makes sense since the MI6 at the time was supporting the growth of Nazi Germany against the USSR. The pro-Nazi sentiment was even reflected in Trotsky’s writings. During the Dewey Commission hearings, Trotsky claimed that he wrote articles in 1933 denouncing Hitler’s real plans and stating that it would not be correct to believe that good relations with Hitler are possible:

TROTSKY: I didn’t try to provoke a war. But I showed in my writings how the Soviet bureaucracy in their hopes to remain in good relations with Hitler were absolutely wrong. Then I wrote in the French press in 1933 or 1934 – I wrote a series of articles in the bourgeois press denouncing the genuine plans of Hitler. (The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report of Dewey Commission, 9th Session) (IMG)

Yet again, Trotsky was blatantly lying, for it was he who promoted the British policy of support for Hitler, the warmonger whom Trotsky boldly hailed as a ‘pacifist’. In line with the British intelligence service, which supported Hitler’s war to contain Soviet power, Trotsky portrayed Hitler as a force for good. In a 1933 article titled ‘Hitler the Pacifist’, Trotsky really had the audacity to write:

Hitler wants peace. (Hitler the Pacifist, Leon Trotsky, November 23, 1933. MIA) (IMG)

Unless otherwise stated, all the British intelligence service sources thus far have been anti-communists. However, there was a British secret service officer named James Klugmann, who probably was an anti-communist at heart, but at the time, at least pretended to be a supporter of the USSR. As a ‘pro-Soviet’ MI6 operative, he also had suspicious ties to the anti-Soviet MI6 spy Tito. Hence Klugmann’s testimony against Trotsky would be somewhat biased, but certainly not useless. Klugmann recalled:

In Mussolini’s Italy of the 1930s, when it meant long terms of imprisonment, and perhaps torture or even death, to be in any way connected with the Communist Party, and when not only all the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but the works of all Italian and foreign democrats and progressives were strictly banned from Italian libraries and bookshops, the works of Trotsky, on the ‘new kind of Communism’, were ‘freely’ and widely translated and distributed. I remember vividly how in 1938, passing through Italy on the way to meet the anti-fascist and Communist students of Belgrade University, and spending a few hours in Mussolini’s Milan, the

word 'Communism' caught my eye on a number of books prominently displayed in a bookshop window. They were newly-translated works of Trotsky. (From Trotsky to Tito, Chapter 4, Marxist Internet Archive, James Klugman, 1951) (IMG)

The ties of the MI6 agent Trotsky to Mussolini was not surprising since Mussolini too was an MI6 spy. The British newspaper 'The Guardian' reported:

Documents reveal Italian dictator got start in politics in 1917 with help of £100 weekly wage from MI5. ('Recruited by MI5: the name's Mussolini. Benito Mussolini', The Guardian, Tom Kington, October 13, 2009) (IMG)

Archived documents have revealed that Mussolini got his start in politics in 1917 with the help of a £100 weekly wage from [MI5](#).

For the British intelligence agency, it must have seemed like a good investment. Mussolini, then a 34-year-old journalist, was not just willing to ensure [Italy](#) continued to fight alongside the allies in the first world war by publishing propaganda in his paper. He was also willing to send in the boys to "persuade" peace protesters to stay at home.

Mussolini's payments were authorised by Sir Samuel Hoare, an MP and MI5's man in Rome, who ran a staff of 100 British intelligence officers in Italy at the time. ('Recruited by MI5: the name's Mussolini. Benito Mussolini', The Guardian, Tom Kington, October 13, 2009) (IMG)

It remains irrefutable though that Trotsky was an agent of fascism. To get a glimpse into Trotsky's pro-fascist views, here is a case: in a 1939 article for the 'Socialist Appeal' magazine, Trotsky wrote:

Being an irreconcilable opponent not only of fascism but also of the present-day Comintern, I am at the same time decidedly against the suppression of either of them. (Why I Agreed to Appear Before the Dies Committee, Leon Trotsky, March 11, 1939. MIA) (IMG)

Trotsky also claimed that the 'German soldiers ... will in the majority of cases have far more sympathy for the vanquished peoples than for their own ruling caste':

The armies of occupation must live side by side with the conquered peoples; (...). The German soldiers, that is, the workers and peasants, will in the majority of cases have far more sympathy for the vanquished peoples than for their own ruling caste. The necessity to act at every step in the capacity of "pacifiers" and oppressors will swiftly disintegrate the armies of occupation, infecting them with a revolutionary spirit. (On the Future of Hitler's Armies, Marxist Internet Archive, Leon Trotsky, August 1940) (IMG)

It is true that agitation among those German soldiers who came from proletarian backgrounds against the Nazi regime would have been relatively easier. Furthermore, it is true that the class struggles of the fascist-minded workers against the fascist bourgeoisie is objectively an anti-fascist struggle despite the fascistic mindset of the workers involved; such class struggles sow division in the camp of the fascists and hence undermine the fascists, despite the genuinely pro-fascist intentions of those workers. Hence, even if some of Nazi Germany's proletarians loved Hitler, that does not mean that those Nazi German workers could not unintentionally become an anti-Nazi fifth column through their class struggles against the Nazi bourgeoisie, even if such class struggles are for some relatively minor economic rights and some additional welfare benefits. This fact has to be taken into account for it is of tremendous value from a strategic perspective; it is helpful in fomenting discontent and sowing division in the fascist camp, undermining the fascist army from the rear through agitation for such class struggles. However, Trotsky was not arguing such; rather he was saying that the German soldiers would as a matter of supposed 'fact', have sympathy for the people whom they helped conquer – this remark by Trotsky was obviously not true and served as blatant attempt by Trotsky to whitewash the Nazi German occupation forces. One needs not mention the fact that actually, the German peasants, in vast contrast to the German proletarians, were vehemently pro-Nazi and Hitlerian.

When communists or progressive bourgeois-democrats were suppressed under the Fascist regime of Mussolini, the MI6 fascist agent Trotsky roamed freely in the streets of Italy. In his 1960 memoirs, Max Shachtman – Trotsky's 'commissar of foreign affairs', close friend, and co-traveller – recalled his and Trotsky's journey to Fascist Italy, in which the Fascist police welcomed 'Signor Trotsky as a great military commander'. Shachtman wrote:

By the time we got to Naples [Italy] where the ship docked briefly the secret was out. All the newspapers of Europe carried the stories, most of them garbled. The fascist police came aboard, and I must say they, too, were the height of correctness and propriety. Their commander was a young fascist dressed in the standard black fascist uniform, and he assured me, as commissar of foreign affairs for Trotsky, that there would be no incidents whatsoever, that Signor Trotsky and his lady would be perfectly guarded and accorded all the honors of a statesman. I remember he told me "we in Italy honor Signor Trotsky as a great military commander."

And there were no incidents in Naples, you may be sure. (The Trotsky I knew, Workers' Liberty Website (Trotskyist), Max Shachtman, early 1960s. MIA) (IMG)

Shachtman's remarks have been corroborated extensively. Indeed, Trotsky's visit to Italy became a subject of Western reportage, from The Stanford Daily to the New York Times to the Life Magazine. Trotsky temporarily moved out of his central intelligence base in Prinkipo/Buyukada and traveled to Fascist Italy, remaining under Fascist blackshirt police protection there.

THE STANFORD DAILY
MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA. MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1932

ROOSEVELT MAPS LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM	PHI BETES PICK 15 NEW HONOR STUDENTS HERE	LEON TROTSKY IN ITALY
	<p>Twelve Men, Three Women Receive Distinction In Fall Membership</p> <p>With 15 new members having been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, national honorary scholastic fraternity, last Wednesday, the official list is now published. The number accepted this fall is about average, the incoming membership usually ranging from 12 to 18, said John P. Mitchell, secretary of the local chapter.</p> <p>Fifteen Named New Phi Betes are John F. Carson, Alfred E. Cronkite, Anthony J. Franich, Agnes T. Galbraith, Frederic O. Glover, Richard A. Hattrup, Robert W. Lippman, Stanley L. Rea, Henry L. Reich, Mary</p>	
<p>President-elect Roosevelt, resting at his hill-top cottage in Warm Springs, Georgia, went over the legislative program for the present short session of Congress with Senators Joseph Robinson (right) and John J. Akhead. Robinson said, following the conference, that he hoped for some Republican support for the democratic program.</p>		<p>Exiled by the government he helped form when he, with Lenin, led the Russian revolution, Leon Trotsky is shown in this recent picture as he visited the Roman ruins near Naples, Italy. The famous Communist is now almost a social outcast, finding himself an unwelcome visitor in almost any country to which he goes.</p>
<p>RISE TO VOTE <i>Carnival Nets</i> SENIORITY LEADS</p>		

(Leon Trotsky in Italy, The Stanford Daily, December 5, 1932)

TROTSKY GOES TO ITALY.

France Permits Him to Leave on Train as Wife Is Ill.

MARSEILLES, France, Dec. 7 (AP).—Leon Trotsky, his wife, and members of the party that accompanied him on a brief visit to Copenhagen, left today by train for the Franco-Italian border on the way back to Turkey.

This morning the former Bolshevist leader refused to make the trip from here by sea, asserting that Mme. Trotsky was too ill to stand the fourteen-day voyage to Istanbul. The Ministry of the Interior granted permission for him to go by rail.

The New York Times

Published: December 8, 1932

(TROTSKY GOES TO ITALY, New York Times, December 8, 1932, retrieved from the archives) ('Trotsky, in Naples, Denies Making Up With Stalin', The Associated Press, July 22) (IMG)

Trotsky, in Naples, Denies Making Up With Stalin

By The Associated Press.

NAPLES, July 22.—Leon Trotsky denied reports of a possible reconciliation with Joseph Stalin as he arrived here today aboard the steamer Bulgaria.

Mr. Trotsky said he would proceed with his five aides to Genoa tonight en route to Marseilles or Corsica in order to take a health cure for his ailing heart. He declined the privilege of debarking here, but Mrs. Trotsky enjoyed a shopping tour.

The former Russian leader's secretary was described to port authorities as a Pole traveling on an American passport.

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9 (right) and Trotsky Lenin's death in 1924. t for slow, sly Stalin.



9 Trotsky (arrow), still War Commissar, reviews Red Army in 1924 from Lenin's wooden tomb. Decline begins soon.



10 His exile begins in Grand Vizier's house near Constantinople in 1929. Suspicious fire destroyed it and Trotsky's manuscripts.



11 He stops briefly at Naples, Italy, to see Roman ruins on his first parole from exile in Turkey.

(Blood Murder Ends Great Revolutionary Career of Leon Trotsky, LIFE Magazine, September 2, 1940, p. 20)

There has also been an archival video published online by the Critical Past, a media center which archives old videos. Some screenshots of this video are provided as follows, marked by me using red texts and arrows so to assist the reader in identifying Trotsky and the Fascist Police. Worthy of note is that the man without a hat walking to the right of Trotsky in these images is none other than Max Shachtman. Trotsky is accompanied by the black-coated Italian Fascist police officer.





‘Former Soviet leader Leon Trotsky, in exile visits ruins of ancient Roman sites with other dignitaries in Naples, Italy’, HD Stock Footage, Critical Past, March 31, 2014) (IMG)

To make Trotsky’s roaming in Italy appear as normal, some critics would raise the objection that Maxim Gorki too went to Fascist Italy and did not get arrested. What these critics fail to account for, however, is that Gorki had the strict diplomatic protection of the USSR, meaning that if any harm was inflicted upon him, an entire state – the USSR – could rush in to confront the Italians; much like how Dimitrov was released from Nazi jails thanks to Soviet diplomatic pressure. Trotsky – while covertly having Britain, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany behind him – did not officially have any state behind him. When this fact is taken into account, Trotsky’s free roaming in Italy, not to mention the praise of the Fascist police for him, are all indications of collusion with the Italian Fascist authorities. Had Trotsky been arrested by the Italian Fascists though, that would not have made him any less of a traitor either, since secret services sometimes protect their agents under the cover of arresting them, get them to pass off intelligence to the secret service under the cover of ‘interrogating’ them, present them as ‘heroic’ ‘victims’ of and ‘resistors’ against the secret service through covertly leaking the false information of having ‘brutally’ ‘tortured’ them, and get them to infiltrate back to their movement under the pretense that they ‘escaped’ from prison. None of that is to make the utterly baseless argument that all cases of torture, prison breaks, arrests, etc. have been and are fake; however, it is to say that when highly suspicious elements or known agents of imperialism, such as Trotsky himself, would get ‘arrested’ by imperialist intelligence services, there is a good chance that the ‘arrest’ is just a secret service game being played.

While Trotsky was developing his networks outside the Soviet Union, he was also further strengthening his network of alliance with the right-opportunist conspirators inside the USSR, the Bukharin network. Outwardly, they continued to denounce each other, since they belonged to the opposite poles of the political spectrum; behind the scenes, more than ever before, they collaborated for undermining the communist faction and the blue-collar contingent which had promoted Stalin to the post of the General Secretary. Evidence to this fact is in the secret letter sent by Leon Trotsky to his son Leon Sedov. In the words of the prominent Trotskyite author with extensive access to the archives of Trotsky’s writings in Harvard University, there was:

an undated letter in German from Trotsky to Sedov, the content of which enables it to be dated towards the end of 1932, in the October or November. (The “Bloc” of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Pierre Broue, January 1980. Marxists Internet Archive.) (IMG)

In that letter, Trotsky stated:

The proposal for a bloc seems to me to be perfectly acceptable. I stress that we are dealing with a bloc and not a fusion. (Document No. 2: The Letter from Trotsky to Leon Sedov, Library of Harvard College 13905c and 1010.

In: 'The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932', Pierre Broue, Marxists Internet Archive, January 1980) (IMG)

Trotsky added:

One fights repression by means of anonymity and conspiracy, not by silence. (Document No. 2: The Letter from Trotsky to Leon Sedov, Library of Harvard College 13905c and 1010. In: 'The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932', Pierre Broue, Marxists Internet Archive, January 1980) (IMG)

In the letter, Trotsky also made it clear that the bloc of the right-opportunists and the Trotskyite left would outwardly appear as 'mercilessly' resisting and critical towards one another, despite the behind-the-scene collaboration. Indeed, Trotsky wrote:

The bloc does not exclude mutual criticism. Any propaganda by the allies on behalf of the capitulators (Grunstein, etc.) will be inexorably, mercilessly resisted by us. (Document No. 2: The Letter from Trotsky to Leon Sedov, Library of Harvard College 13905c and 1010. In: 'The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932', Pierre Broue, Marxists Internet Archive, January 1980) (IMG)

Despite criticizing one another though, the main target was the moderate faction of the CPSU, the faction devoid of left- and right-deviations, the faction supporting Stalin's line. Trotskyite extremists accused this moderate faction of being too 'liberal' and 'right-wing' whereas the Bukharinite liberalizers accused this faction of being too extreme and 'left-deviationist'. Soviet power faced a pincer assault.

Trotsky's son Leon Sedov said:

Before everything else we have to drive out the present leadership and get rid of Stalin [because] nothing but their liquidation can bring victory. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

Trotsky himself admitted that Leon Sedov was actively seeking to 'hunt' tourists and Soviet students and to get them (i.e. bribe-and-blackmail them) to join the Trotskyite intelligence service fighting against the Soviet Union:

During the first years of emigration he engaged in a vast correspondence with Oppositionists in the USSR. But by 1932 ... [it] became necessary to seek fresh information through devious channels. Leon was always on the lookout, avidly searching for connecting threads with Russia, hunting up returning tourists, Soviet students assigned abroad, or sympathetic functionaries in the foreign representations. To avoid compromising his informant, he chased for hours through the streets of Berlin and later of Paris to evade the GPU spies who trailed him. ('LEON SEDOV: Son, Friend, Fighter', Leon Trotsky, 1938. MIA) (IMG)

Trotsky approved of eliminating Stalin, but opposed using it as a slogan, because the 'internal Thermidoreans' – the right-wing concentrated around Bukharin – were sometimes going to attack the Stalin faction, and the Trotskyite left-deviation, while covertly allied to the Bukharinite right-deviation, nonetheless had to attack the 'Thermidorean' right on the overt level and to side with the Stalin faction:

Trotsky opened the discussion about whether the slogan, "Get Rid of Stalin", was appropriate on 17 October. "Get Rid of Stalin", he wrote, "is correct in a well-defined, concrete sense", but contrary to the "allies" and the "right-wingers", he did not think it an appropriate one. In fact, he wrote that this slogan would not be dangerous "if we were strong". But did it not risk being supported by the emigres, by the Mensheviks and by the "internal Thermidoreans"? He went on: "It is always possible that in a few months Stalin will be obliged to defend himself against the Thermidorean pressure, and that we shall be obliged to support him momentarily". Indeed, "this stage is not yet past and, consequently, this slogan does not correspond to the needs of the movement". (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

Bukharin's group agreed. As already stated several times, Bukharin sought to overthrow the Soviet state and sought to make common cause Kamenev as early as 1928. Before then, he had established covert links to Trotsky's group. Furthermore, according to a book published by the CIA's 'Hoover Institute':

There is even evidence that Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy had, in desperation, decided they had no choice but to kill Stalin, whom they had come to consider the next Genghis Khan. ('The Lost Politburo Transcripts: From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship', The Hoover Institute, Paul Gregory, Norman Naimark, p. 103) (IMG)

For instance:

the Swiss Communist Jules Humbert-Droz, who supported the "Rightists," recalled Bukharin telling him that "they had decided to use individual terror to get rid of Stalin." (The Lost Politburo Transcripts: From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship. The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace. p. 103) (IMG)

Tomsy, a Bukharinite leader of the labour unions, tried to intimidate the Soviet leader by mentioning that the workers will murder him:

Tomsy, for example, told Stalin to his face that workers wanted to murder him. At a party barbecue in Sochi in 1928, Stalin and Tomsy's wife were grilling shashlik together when a "completely loaded" Tomsy walked up

and whispered into Stalin's ear, "Soon our workers will start shooting at you, they will." (The Lost Politburo Transcripts: From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship. The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace. p. 103)

Trotsky was forming a Trotskyite bloc with two major left-opportunist figures Zinoviev and Kamenev who: were expelled in October 1932 at the very moment when the discussions with the Trotskyists were developing. Officially, they were criticized [by the Soviet leadership] for having failed to denounce certain oppositional activities, which the so-called Riutin-Slepkov Group had been carrying on over several months.. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

On July 11, 1928 Bukharin had a secret meeting with Kamenev, organized by Sokolnikov. In that meeting, Bukharin said:

I, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov – the *pitertsy* ["Petersburgers," i.e. the Leningraders] are in general with us, but they got scared when talk turned to possibly replacing Stalin, so Komarov disavowed Stetsky's speech, but that night Ugarov came running to me to apologize for Komarov. Andreev is with us. They're removing him from the Urals. Stalin has bought off the Ukrainians by removing Kaganovich from [his post] there. We have great potential strength but (1) the average Central Committee member still doesn't understand the depth of our disagreements; (2) there is great fear of a schism, which is why Stalin's retreat on extraordinary measures has made our attack on him more difficult. We don't want to act as schismatics, because then they'll smash us. But Tomsky in his last speech at the plenum demonstrated clearly that Stalin is the schismatic. Yagoda and Trilisser are with us. There are 150 cases of such small uprisings. (.). Our task is to gradually clarify the catastrophic role of Stalin and bring the average Central Committee member to support his removal. (The Kirov Murder and Soviet History, Yale University Press, Matthew Lenoe) (IMG)

And as mentioned before, Bukharin had intelligence ties to the Riutin group; one of the key liaison agents linking Bukharin to Riutin was Uglanov, who was a member of both Bukharin's entourage and the Riutin death squad.

In his letter to Leon Sedov, Trotsky also approved of intelligence cooperation with the other members of the terrorist Trotskyite-Bukharinite bloc against the Soviet state:

How is the bloc going to express itself? For the moment, principally by the exchange of information. The allies keep us informed about what concerns the Soviet Union, as we do for them about what concerns the Communist International. We should agree on very precise arrangements for correspondence.

The allies must send us correspondence for the Bulletin. The editors of the Bulletin undertake to publish the documents of the allies. But it reserves the right to comment freely upon them. (The letter from Trotsky to Leon Sedov, Document No. 2. In: "The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin (Appendix), Pierre Broue. MIA) (IMG)

Hence, the terrorist bloc members inside the USSR were to spy for the MI6 agent Trotsky and Trotsky was to in turn feed them with information with anti-Soviet opposition outside USSR in order to assist in the coordination of efforts against the Soviet state. Embarrassing information from inside the USSR was to be fed to Trotsky's media so to depict the USSR in a negative light.

In order to confront the Stalin faction in the Central Committee more easily, the Bukharinites saw fit to pretend to have 'differences' with Riutin as well. In a manner comparable to the 'humanitarian interventionist' agents of the American secret service who 'criticize' American imperialists for the latter's inability to directly involve in imperialist wars, the Riutin group 'criticized' Bukharin for not being able to combat the Stalin faction of the Party. The point of such criticism was to radicalize the younger Bukharinite intellectuals into a more militant action against the Soviet state, without waiting for Bukharin to cause reforms from the top; through such incitement of radical action, Bukharin's leverage in his political confrontations with the Stalin faction would have been strengthened. Hence the criticism of Bukharin benefited Bukharin in this context. Indeed, the Riutin platform, which criticized the Bukharin group for not standing up to the Stalin faction as strongly, was to strengthen both Trotsky's and Bukharin's influence over the Party. The Riutin platform also called for reduced investments into heavy industry, thereby unofficially advocating the weakening of the USSR's military-industrial backbone, and an opposition to the collectivization of agriculture:

Ryutin, with the help of Slepkov and other young Bukharinites, produced a long theoretical and political document. (...). It censured Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky for their capitulation. It proposed an economic retreat, the reduction of investment in industry, and the liberation of the peasants by freedom to quit the kolkhozes. As a first step in the restoration of democracy in the Party, it urged the immediate readmission of all those expelled, including Trotsky. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

The Riutin platform also called for:

the elimination of Stalin.. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet

Archive, Pierre Broue citing Serge and Bukharin, January 1980) (IMG)

The MI6 agent Conquest wrote:

It was even more notable for its severe condemnation of Stalin personally. Its fifty pages devoted to this theme called forcefully for his removal from the leadership. It described Stalin as "the evil genius of the Russian Revolution, who, motivated by a personal desire for power and revenge, brought the Revolution to the verge of ruin." Ryutin saw, far more clearly than his seniors in the opposition, that there was no possibility of controlling Stalin. It was a question either of submission or of revolt. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

On the other hand:

Zinoviev and Kamenev were expelled in October 1932 at the very moment when the discussions with the Trotskyists were developing. Officially, they were criticized [by the Soviet leadership] for having failed to denounce certain oppositional activities, which the so-called Riutin-Slepkov Group had been carrying on over several months.. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

It was for failing to denounce the existence or the circulation of this manifesto – which did circulate, according to our evidence, in the factories in Moscow and elsewhere – that Zinoviev and Kamenev were officially excluded from the Party again in 1932. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue citing Serge and Bukharin, January 1980) (IMG)

In a telegraph to the US Secretary of State, Loy Henderson, the US diplomatic official in Moscow, acknowledged:

Zinoviev and Kamenev and other prominent defendants have had conversations regarding the advisability of assassinating Stalin and regarding their course of action in case of his death. (The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, August 27, 1936 – noon [Received 2 PM]) (IMG)

For the conquest of power, the Trotskyite-Bukharinite network, as the agents of the comprador classes in the USSR, needed command over the means of violence, the military and the intelligence services. The Trotskyite-Bukharinite imperialist-fascist fifth column exercised *some* influence over the intelligence service and the military through Yagoda and Tukhachevsky respectively. Referring to the conspiracy of the Trotskyite-Bukharinite bloc against the Soviet state, the prominent MI6 operative Fitzroy McLean reasoned:

if, in fact, there had been a conspiracy, what more natural than that the thinkers, the ideologists, should have made common cause with the men of action, Tukachevski, Yagoda? What more natural, too, than that to the Tukachevskis and the Yagodas, finding themselves in positions of great power, should come the idea of using that power for their own ends. Tukachevski was known to admire Napoleon. As a soldier? Or as a man? An officer of the Imperial Army, he had shifted his allegiance quickly enough, when his interests demanded it. Might he not do so again? And Yagoda. In the service of the State he had shown himself utterly ruthless and utterly unscrupulous. Might he not, with the vast power at his disposal, be tempted to pursue a personal policy? And if he did? Was he not the man who held Stalin's own personal security in his hands? It was an alarming thought.

What more natural, too, than that any potential opponents of the regime should seek, and receive, outside support, among the enemies of the Soviet Union? Some of them had, in the course of their normal duties, had contact with foreigners. Tukachevski, in the old days, had had many dealings with the German General Staff; had been to Paris. Krestinski had been to Berlin, Rakovski to London and Tokio. Rosengolts had lunched and dined at the British Embassy. Had these contacts really been innocent?

And the 'wrecking'? Inefficiency? Or stubbornness? Or malice? Or a combination of all three? In any case a phenomenon which the enemies of the regime, if they knew their job, would be bound to exploit. Something which called for the most ruthless countermeasures.

Looking at it like that, it was possible to see how, in the minds of those concerned, if not in reality, the idea of a conspiracy might have grown up. (Eastern Approaches, Fitzroy McLean, 1949, pp. 115-116) (IMG)

Owing to his leadership of the Red Army during the Civil War, Trotsky had influence over the military. In particular, his key man in the military was his protege Mikhail Tukhachevsky. During the October Revolution, Trotsky recruited the Tsarist officer Tukhachevsky for the Soviet Red Army as shown in C3S3. On the other hand, the agent of the imperialist-fascist secret services inside the Soviet intelligence service was Yagoda, a Bukharin agent.

Regarding Rakovski, the data about his betrayals is as follows. The MI6 spy Tokaev confirmed in his memoirs:

Rakovsky, one of the big figures of the Revolution, had served the British intelligence service since 1924, and the Japanese since 1934. And so on. All this Bukharin and Rykov had connived at, since they too were foreign agents. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 87) (IMG)

The British Foreign Office reported that Rakovski definitely became a Japanese spy:

when Rakovski visited Tokyo in the following year he was definitely enrolled in the Japanese intelligence service.. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March

8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

MI6 operative Fitzroy McLean, the real-life James Bond, reasoned:

Krestinski had been to Berlin, Rakovski to London and Tokio. Rosengolts had lunched and dined at the British Embassy. Had these contacts really been innocent? (Eastern Approaches, Fitzroy McLean, 1949, p. 116) (IMG)

Correlated with and affected by the fight for the material bases upon which the intelligence agents of different class forces relied was the struggle for dominance over the intelligence service itself. Conquer the secret service, the counter-intelligence in particular, and the state will be unable to hunt down infiltrators. The MI6 agent Trotsky had thus planted numerous agents within the Soviet secret service:

Trotsky ... never expressed antagonism to the Cheka's successor services. In fact, when an allegedly disenchanted agent, Yacov Blumkin, visited him in Turkey, Trotsky urged him to remain in his OGPU service for the good of the "workers' state." His references to the Soviet secret services and the security of revolutionary movements proved that Trotsky strongly believed in and supported the Cheka's successor services (although not the extent to which they were under Stalin's personal control). ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, p. 17) (IMG)

Trotsky had plenty of influence in the Cheka since the early days of the revolution:

In many ways Trotsky set the pattern for the early practices of the Soviet secret services. He prescribed the role of the Cheka area leaders attached to the Revolutionary War Councils at the front and gave and carried out recommendations on purges and summary courts. He stipulated the requirements in recruiting Cheka leaders and teams for intelligence assignments against counterrevolutionaries and for Bolshevik propaganda. His field messages to the Politburo dealt with the uses of codes, security of communications, methods of suppressing hostile rumors, and the role of the press in misleading foreign governments and organizations. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 16-17) (IMG)

Furthermore, as the reader may recall from C2S9, Trotsky also was the founder of the Red Army counter-intelligence service, meaning that the body that was supposed to filter out the enemy agents that sought to infiltrate the Red Army was already partially compromised. The communist agents of the proletariat dominated the command of the Red Army, which was why the Soviet Union was a dictatorship of the proletariat in the first place, but the Red Army was nevertheless penetrated by fascist agents in its high command.

The picture is not as gloomy in the intelligence service either. At the time, since the Cheka and its successor agencies were headed by Dzerzhinsky and Menzhinsky, the communists had enough influence in the organization to not only weaken the imperialist-fascist fifth column in the Cheka, GPU, NKVD, etc. but to also purge the Red Army itself. Popular support for the socialist state allowed for the socialist state to recruit numerous high-quality intelligence officers who would serve as the soldiers of the intelligence war against the fifth column. The planting of communist or pro-communist intelligence officers in the NKVD allowed it to hunt down even the treasonous chiefs of the NKVD who rose to power after the death of Menzhinsky. The sufficient communist and pro-communist influence in the organization also allowed for the thorough political encirclement of numerous traitors in the NKVD and forced those traitors to support the purges and pursue correct policy lines. Most importantly, the dominance of the Party of the proletariat over the military and the Party's hierarchical supervision of the intelligence service decisively turned the balance of power in the favour of the proletariat at the expense of anti-proletarian agents throughout the Soviet security apparatus.

Though officially having strict command structures, intelligence services do not always function as rigidly enforced command structures in practice. Their command structures are always inherently looser than they appear. Intelligence services function more like networks of agents who work together and who, if finding one another suspicious, spy on each other and try to purge each other. This means that subordinate officers can have the power to purge their superordinates. This is why the NKVD purged its own traitorous chiefs, and in these purges, it obviously had the support of the General Secretary of the Party who bore pressure from above on the NKVD chief to help in the purges of the NKVD chiefs. Indeed Lavrenti Beria confirmed to his son that Beria was under Stalin's intense pressure from above to perform properly:

Stalin had always taken care to have the police apparatus under his personal control. My father had had experience of that in 1938-43. 'I couldn't take a step without being watched by him. I tried to get round that by vigilance but rarely did I succeed, and then at great risk.' (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 242) (IMG) (See Titoist Coup Process – Images 1)

For important historical reasons, Stalin did not succeed in eventually purging Beria; nonetheless, he maintained an intensive level of pressure on the traitorous intelligence chiefs such as Yezhov and to some extent also Yagoda, which was why he was able to assist the other NKVD agents in eventually purging them. The Party of the proletariat, through supervision of the NKVD, was the key factor allowing the Stalin faction to purge the counter-revolutionary agents in that intelligence body.

Anyways, through subverting and neutralizing the counter-intelligence service, the imperialist-fascist fifth column would have rendered the Soviet state defenseless against enemy infiltration. Through control over the intelligence service, the imperialist-fascist fifth column could more easily assassinate the revolutionary elements in the ranks of Red Army and replace these elements with imperialist-fascist moles. The military is a more material factor than the secret service, however. Thus, the ultimate prize to win was not the NKVD but the Red Army – yet, the Trotskyites and Bukharinites lost the battle for control over the Red Army, the ultimate means of violence, and then lost the battle for the NKVD as well.

Bukharin was most fit for conquering the intelligence service on behalf of the comprador classes, the fifth column allied to Anglo-German finance capital. Outwardly, Bukharin had denounced Trotsky and Trotskyism. Under the guise of combatting Trotskyite fifth column, Bukharin could access the NKVD and extend his influence there. Hence he could extend the Bukharinite-Trotskyite network's dominance over the intelligence service, under the guise of combatting Trotskyism. Bukharin's key agent in the NKVD was Yagoda. Indeed, according to the British intelligence official Robert Conquest, who had served in the Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office,

In Kamenev's memorandum of his conversation with Bukharin on 11 July 1928 Bukharin is represented as saying 'Yagoda and Trilisser [Head of the OGPU Foreign Administration] are with us. (.)' (The Great Terror: Stalin's purge of the thirties, Robert Conquest, 1968, p. 545. square brackets by Robert Conquest)

Quite importantly, Trotsky ordered his agent Krestinsky in the USSR to be an agent of German intelligence. Trotsky's agents in the USSR were agents of Anglo-German secret services. Anti-Soviet British intelligence agent Tokaev recalled:

Further, Trotsky, supposed originally to have inspired the formation of the 'bloc', had long since been linked with the Nazi secret service and – the British intelligence service! On Trotsky's orders, Krestinsky, former Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, had been in the German service since 1921. Rozenholz, former People's Commissar of Foreign Trade, joined the British service in 1926 and the German service in 1932. Rakovsky, one of the big figures of the Revolution, had served the British intelligence service since 1924, and the Japanese since 1934. And so on. All this Bukharin and Rykov had connived at, since they too were foreign agents. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 87) (IMG)

As such, Bukharin, in collaboration with the other enemies of Soviet power, became the head of the pyramid of the comprador agents allied to the imperialist secret services. At the helm of the comprador network in the USSR lied Bukharin, who had laid the complete contingent plan for the overthrow of the Soviet state.

The overthrow of a socialist state, the drive to conquer the means of violence in the dictatorship of the proletariat, requires the elimination or demotion of the agents of the proletariat in the command of the military and intelligence bodies. Through the annihilation of hundreds of agents of the proletariat at the commanding positions, a leap from quantity to quality can occur, whenby the fascist reaction will be able to plant its agents in key positions, as a major step to transform the class character and strategic orientation of a state. Thus, the plan for the overthrow of the USSR included the murder of Stalin as a step, but also had, as part of the conspiracy, the plots to murder other leading communists in the USSR.

Menzhinsky, the head of the Soviet intelligence service OGPU, was loyal to Soviet power, unlike his subordinate Yagoda. Through the murder of the Soviet intelligence chief, Yagoda was able to rise to the official leadership of the Soviet intelligence service. Tadeusz "Thaddeus" Wittlin – an official of the British-led 'Anders Army' and a CIA operative and spy-'journalist' affiliated with the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe since the 1950s – wrote that the 'inner circle', the most powerful in the heights of the Soviet state apparatus, knew that Yagoda had murdered Menzhinsky:

Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, who organized OGPU into an independent state within a state, was a highly educated man and a hardworking official. But, as the inner circle knew, Menzhinsky was poisoned by his Deputy, the little pharmacist Yagoda, who took his place. (Commissar: The Life and death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Tadeusz 'Thaddeus' Wittlin, 1972, p. 175) (IMG)

In using the phrase 'inner circle', Wittlin was also alluding to the MI6 agent Beria:

Although Beria knew Dzerzhinsky had died of a stroke during a quarrel with Stalin, it was generally understood that Menzhinsky had had a heart condition for several years and was under the constant care of the best physicians attached to the Kremlin.

However, Lavrenty, as a well-informed man, was aware that Menzhinsky's Deputy Yagoda was very ambitious and only too happy to take his boss' place. Yagoda was a pharmacist by profession and, thanks to his knowledge of various drugs and poisons, would have been able to accelerate the failure of his superior's heart. (Commissar: The Life and death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Tadeusz 'Thaddeus' Wittlin, 1972, pp. 146-147) (IMG)

In May 1934, Menzhinsky, the head of the Soviet intelligence service, was murdered. As the Soviet security came increasingly under the influence of the Anglo-German agent Bukharin's henchman Yagoda, it was by then easier to reduce

the security of people like Kirov. Yagoda, as Trotsky admitted and as will be shown shortly later, aimed to deliberately reduce the personal security of Kirov. This was why, by a few weeks after the murder of Menzhinsky and the conquest of the position of NKVD leadership by Yagoda, the plan for the murder of Kirov was hatched: During the Zinoviev Trial, the planning of the Kirov murder was said to have taken place in the summer of 1934. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 37) (IMG)

According to the British intelligence agent and veteran anti-Stalinist oppositionist Grigori Tokaev, the assassination of Kirov had long been planned by the anti-Soviet opposition within the Soviet state and Party apparatus:

That a 'Demokratov' existed, I knew. This was one of the undercover names used in my particular underground opposition movement, always reserved for a comrade who had proved his worth in an operation involving great personal risk, and who was therefore entrusted with further hazardous tasks. (...). Demokratov too had been arrested the previous autumn. He was a highly-educated young officer with wide and important connections. These and his hatred of tyranny had set his course in life. Thus a man who in Great Britain could have counted on a brilliant professional and social career, became an unswerving member of an opposition group which long before Kirov's assassination had been forced to contemplate acts of political terror against both Kirov and Kalinin. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

For what it is worth, the CIA also stated:

Thus, on 1 December 1934, Kirov was killed by one Nikolayev, who was, as the official press stated, one of the members of an active anti-Soviet terrorist organization. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG {Titoist Coup})

It is not completely clear if by 'as the official press stated', the CIA meant 'as rightly stated' by the official press or 'according to' the official press.

Historically, the security of the Soviet officials fell under the control of the Soviet intelligence service. It is not surprising therefore, that Kirov did not have any guards and Nikolayev, the assassin, was easily allowed into Kirov's office. The British agent Robert Conquest wrote:

Late in the afternoon of 1 December 1934, the young assassin Leonid Nikolayev entered the Smolny, headquarters of the Communist Party in Leningrad. The few hours of the city's thin winter daylight were over, and it was quite dark. The lights of the former aristocratic girls' school, from which Lenin had organized the "ten days that shook the world," shone out over its colonnade and gardens, and eastward up the icy Neva. The outer guard examined Nikolayev's pass, which was in order, and let him in without trouble. In the interior, the guard posts were unmanned, and Nikolayev wandered down the ornate passages until he found the third-floor corridor on to which Sergei Kirov's office opened. He waited patiently outside.

Kirov was at home preparing a report on the November plenum of the Central Committee, from which he had just returned. He was to deliver it to the aktiv of the Leningrad Party in the Tavride Palace that evening, and was not expected at the Smolny. However, he arrived there at about 4:00 P.M., and after speaking to his trusted aide, Leningrad's Second Secretary Mikhail Chudov, and others, he walked on towards his own office just after 4:30. Nikolayev moved from a corner, shot him in the back with a Nagan revolver, and then collapsed beside him.

At the sound of the shot, Party officials came running along the corridor. They were astonished at the absence of guards. Even Kirov's chief bodyguard, Borisov, who according to standing instructions should have been with him, was nowhere to be seen, though he had accompanied Kirov as far as the Smolny's front door. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 37) (IMG)

That Kirov was murdered by Yagoda's network in the Soviet intelligence service is acknowledged by the MI6 agent Leon Trotsky. In his memoirs, Trotsky admitted that the murder of Kirov, so-called "Stalin's viceroy in Leningrad," "was committed under the auspice of the agents of the GPU by direct order of Yagoda" and that it was a "**fact** that the chief of the GPU, Yagoda, ordered" agents not to prevent the murder:

On 1" December, 1934 Stalin's viceroy in Leningrad, Kirov, was murdered. It was **acknowledged** in later trials that the assassination was committed under the auspice of the agents of the GPU by direct order of Yagoda. In the tops of the bureaucracy there were whisperings to the effect that the 'boss' had begun to play with the heads of his closest collaborators. At first I did not suppose that the GPU had actually killed Kirov. (...). At the session of the [Third Moscow Trial on] 9th March 1938, Yagoda confessed that he gave his subordinates in Leningrad an order ... "Not to interfere with the terrorist acts against Kirov." Coming from Yagoda, the head of the GPU, such a directive was equivalent to an order for the assassination of Kirov. The **fact** that the chief of the GPU, Yagoda, ordered them not to interfere with the attempt on Kirov's life can only be explained by the fact that Stalin found it necessary at any price to establish his alibi. ('Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence', Leon Trotsky. Well Red Publications, Editor & Translator: Alan Woods, 2016, p. 622. Bold added.) (IMG)

Again, Trotsky too, seeking to slander Stalin as the culprit of the Kirov assassination, had claimed falsely that Yagoda

was affiliated with the Stalin faction, when in fact the then NKVD chief was an agent of Trotsky's ally, the imperialist-fascist agent Bukharin. Regarding the circumstances of Sergei Kirov's death, the British Foreign Office preliminarily concluded:

The murder of Kirov was accomplished by the Trotskyist-Zinovievite group "on a decision by the Right- Trotskyist bloc." Yagoda, informed by Yenukidze of the arrangements made for this murder, undertook to see that no obstacle was placed in the way of it, and instructed his subordinate, Zaporozhets, at Leningrad accordingly. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

Another target was Gorky. In contrast to the widespread accusation that Gorky had grown hostile to Stalin, Trotsky himself admitted that Gorky was an "unshakable supporter" of the Stalin faction:

Gorky was an unshakable supporter of Stalin's leadership. Bukharin in his testimony called Gorky a Stalinist, a supporter of the Stalinist policy in the Party. Social gatherings in the evening at Gorky's house were the only place where Stalin would come off his pedestal to some extent. ('Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence', Leon Trotsky. Well Red Publications, Editor & Translator: Alan Woods, 2016, p. 633) (IMG)

The British Embassy in Moscow preliminarily reported that the counter-revolutionary opposition carried out medical sabotage as means of gradually murdering Gorky and his son Peshkov:

Rykov gave orders to a terrorist group under one Artemenko to "watch the cars of the heads of the Government and party." (.). After attempting without success, through the intermediary of Tomski and Kamenev, to seduce Gorki from his allegiance to Stalin, the *bloc* resolved at the beginning of 1935 to "liquidate" him, this decision being taken on instructions from Trotski himself. Yagoda arranged the details of the murder, employing two of the Kremlin doctors, Levin and Pletnyov, his own secretary, Bulanov, and Gorki's secretary, Kryuchkov. As Gorki suffered from a trouble of lungs, it was arranged that he should catch cold and that the two doctors give him the wrong sort of treatment. Kuibyshev was also done away with, on Yagoda's instructions, by Levin, Pletnyov and his own secretary, Maximov, similar methods being employed. (.). Peshkov, the son of Gorki, was also eliminated by Yagoda and the Kremlin doctors Levin, Pletnyov and Vinogradov by means of an intentionally wrong treatment for pneumonia. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

Many researchers, including the vehement Russian anti-Soviet investigative journalist and lawyer Arkady Vaksberg, have concluded that Gorky was murdered by Yagoda. Many such researchers implausibly claim that the order for the murder came from Stalin, that Stalin and Gorky had grown hostile to each other, a claim debunked by Trotsky's above-cited confession. Furthermore, Yagoda, not a true comrade of Stalin, was a henchman of Bukharin and was affiliated with the hostile anti-Soviet intelligence network in the NKVD. The MI6 agent Tokaev recalled:

On the same day the first step was taken to bring about the downfall of Yagoda. He was removed from the NKVD, and we lost a strong link in our opposition intelligence service. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 63) (IMG)

Recall that in the secret meeting with Kamenev in the late 1920s, Bukharin had confirmed that in the fight against the Stalin faction:

Yagoda and Trilisser are with us. There are 150 cases of such small uprisings. (.). Our task is to gradually clarify the catastrophic role of Stalin and bring the average Central Committee member to support his removal. (The Kirov Murder and Soviet History, Yale University Press, Matthew Lenoe) (IMG)

Wittlin – the CIA operative affiliated with the Anders Army, VOA, and Radio Free Europe – also clearly implied that Gorky had been murdered by Yagoda:

[T]hanks to his former position as a pharmacist, Yagoda had been named Head of the Toxicological Laboratory at the Kremlin. This enabled him to speed up the death of Lenin, who suffered a lot anyway after three strokes. His knowledge of drugs and poisons continued to help Yagoda in his career and got him the then vacant post of Chief of the OGPU, when his superior, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, had died suddenly. His knowledge of drugs also proved useful in stopping forever Maxim Gorky's painful tubercular coughing. (Commissar: The Life and death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Tadeusz 'Thaddeus' Wittlin, 1972, pp. 181-182) (IMG)

Also especially notable in the above paragraph is that Yagoda, the hangman and assassin for Bukharin, had also murdered General-Secretary Vladimir Lenin. Sooner or later, the late General-Secretary would have died anyways. Yet, for years, medical scholars, Trotskyites, as well as the supporters of Soviet power, had all expressed suspicion that Lenin's death may have been deliberately expedited by a band of anti-Soviet assassins. The above-cited quote confirms the suspicion as a fact.

It is worth reminding that the murders of Menzhinsky and Kirov occurred in 1934 whereas the murder of Gorki occurred in 1936. The period 1933-1935 was a period of the consolidation of the hold of the Hitler faction over the German state and the end of what remained of the Rapallo era. The pro-Soviet tendency in Germany was being vigorously

rolled back during that period and the fascist agents of German finance capital, backed by British finance capital, were consolidating control over the German military and intelligence bodies, swiftly expanding Germany's might. 1934 was also the year in which the Night of the Long Knives, a Nazi terror campaign against pro-Soviet agents in Germany, occurred. During this period, the Soviet state's security bodies were also bogged down in conditions of war against the kulaks. All of these factors together sharply increased the pressure on the Soviet military and intelligence bodies, forcing them to reallocate resources to confronting the Nazi Germans. Such a reallocation made some of the fronts in the intelligence war, such as the security of key personnel, weaker, making it easier for the fascist agents to conquer commanding positions in the Soviet intelligence and paving the way for the elimination of some of major personnel. In spite of this strategic setback, the Soviet state quickly recovered by 1936. The fight against the kulaks saw the triumph of Soviet power, the military-industrial backbone was expanding, the productive forces were developing and flourishing, and thus the leverage of the Stalin faction was increasing in the intelligence war. More on this will be mentioned later.

While engaging in such suppressive terror operations against Soviet officials affiliated with the communist faction, Yagoda also aimed to launch a provocative terror operation "against" Leon Trotsky. According to this plan, in collaboration with the MI6-backed and Gestapo-backed White Guards, and against the will of Stalin, Yagoda and his band of fascist assassins would make a deliberately-failed assassination attempt against Trotsky which would then make a living "martyr" out of Trotsky while painting the Soviet state as a "terrorist" organization. To sabotage this conspiracy by Yagoda, Stalin contacted his comrades in the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and leaked the White Guard plot to the press. Trotsky, while continuing to employ his usual anti-Stalin propaganda rhetoric, nonetheless admitted the mentioned facts amidst his lies:

On October 31, 1931, the German newspaper Rote Fahne [Red Flag], the central organ of the late Communist Party, unexpectedly published a report that the White Guard General Turkul, at that time operating in the Balkans, was preparing a terrorist attempt on Trotsky, Gorky, and Litvinov. By the contents of this report, by its tone, and finally by its anonymity, it was completely evident that the information came from the very depths of the GPU. The Soviet press did not breathe a word about this warning, and this still more underlined the highly official source of the information in the German Comintern newspaper. L. D. Trotsky was at that time in exile in Constantinople; Blumkin had already been shot for connections with Trotsky. The question naturally arose: what goal was the GPU pursuing in making this printed warning? Gorky and Litvinov were under the protection of the GPU and did not need any printed warning. That their names had been added only as a cover was obvious to any thinking person even then.

The French and German Bolshevik-Leninists contacted the USSR embassies in France and Germany with written declarations something like this: "If you are reporting a planned attempt on Trotsky, that means you know who is planning it, and where and how it is being planned. We demand from you a united front against White Guard terrorists. We suggest collaboration to work out means of defense."

There was no answer. Nor did our French and German comrades expect one. They only needed confirmation of the fact that in making its warning the GPU only wanted to ensure its alibi in advance, and not at all to prevent a terrorist act. The French and German comrades then took their own measures: the guard at Prinkipo was considerably reinforced.

Not long ago, during the Plevitskaya trial, this whole episode floated to the surface again. Commissioner of judicial police Roche, according to the newspaper accounts, testified as follows: "Turkul was once a brave general. ... In documents there are indications that at one time he was planning an attempt on Trotsky. General Turkul was displeased not only with Leon Trotsky. He was also dissatisfied with General Miller." Gorky and Litvinov were not mentioned by Roche. Commissioner of judicial police Pigue testified: "Larionov was entrusted with making an attempt on Trotsky. But General Turkul blabbed. And there wasn't any money. They abandoned the project. (Sounds of amazement.)" Not a word about Gorky and Litvinov. Both the commissioners — **freemasons** and "friends of the USSR" — are giving testimony in the interests of the GPU. They are trying to draw attention away from the Kremlin. Hence Roche's far-fetched remark that Turkul was dissatisfied with Miller (that is, Turkul could have kidnapped him). Hence also the remark of Pigue, thrown out as it were in passing, that Turkul's conspiracy failed because of his free talking (that is, Skoblin didn't take part), and for lack of money (that is, Moscow was not financing him). It must also be added that the French police, informed in time about the conspiracy, did not warn Trotsky at all; they preferred to preserve a benevolent neutrality toward the GPU and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the "brave general" Turkul.

Now, however, the real nature of these "internal affairs" have inconveniently leaked out into the open. Skoblin was carrying out secret work inside the White Guard military organization. In this work he was connected with Turkul, in his capacity as a White terrorist. Skoblin was carrying out secret work in the service of the GPU. In this work he was connected through Yagoda with the Kremlin. Stalin knew about the attempt being planned because he prepared it himself, through Skoblin. It was a ticklish business. **At that time Stalin did not yet have the fully finished reputation of Cain, which now absolves him from the necessity of taking**

precautionary measures. He still had traces of revolutionary "prejudices." He understood that the murder of Trotsky would inevitably be ascribed to him. And so, in Rote Fahne it was said straight out that it was Turkul's intention not only to carry out the assassination but also to "lay the blame for the murder on the Soviet government." That is why, at the same time as supporting the "brave general" Turkul through Skoblin, Stalin prepared an alibi for himself. That was the purpose of the warning (which in fact did not warn about anything). The mechanics of the whole business was clear to us even then. In No. 27 of the Biulleten (March 1932) was printed the declaration from all the sections of the International Left Opposition saying, among other things: "Stalin is in an actual united front with General Turkul, the organizer of a terrorist act against Trotsky. No alibi in the form of disclosures printed in a German newspaper, but concealed from the people of the USSR . will refute or weaken our accusation. " Why did Turkul's attempt not take place? Most probably the White Guards did not want to fall under the Mausers of the Bolshevik- Leninists. ('Stalin, Skoblin, and Company', Leon Trotsky, January 30, 1939. In: 'Writings of Leon Trotsky', Vol 11, 1938-1938, New York 1974, p. 179-181. Bold added.)

There is no reason to believe the dialectically invalid narrative that Yagoda was seriously aiming to kill Trotsky. Firstly, may it be born in mind that Yagoda, a foe of the Soviet state, was a hangman for Bukharin and that Bukharin and Trotsky were allied in the struggle against the communist faction led by Stalin. Furthermore, Trotsky, the patron of the White Guard Tukhachevsky, was an MI6 agent, the same intelligence agency that, in collaboration with the Gestapo, sponsored the White Guard terrorists with whom Yagoda was collaborating. Their affiliations with the same international intelligence networks, and their covert alliance via Bukharin, renders implausible the claim that Yagoda was plotting to actually murder Trotsky. Yagoda and his Anglo-German intelligence allies would have plotted the killing of their top ally, Trotsky, mainly in the unlikely event of a defection by Trotsky to the anti-imperialist camp or in the (more likely) event of Trotsky being arrested by the Stalin faction of the Soviet intelligence service or the latter's allies.

Nor were any assassination plots directed against 'against' Trotsky committed by the Stalin faction. We know, as shown in C9S4, that the assassination of Sedov was by the Gestapo, as confirmed by Trotsky. We know furthermore, based on a declassified FBI document presented in C9S4, that Trotsky was killed by the MI6, just when he appeared on the verge of an arrest by the progressive elements of Mexican intelligence. We also know that the second last assassination attempt on Trotsky in Mexico was definitely fake, involving his own cooperation.

For this specific case, as Trotsky admitted, the French secret police refused to disclose to Trotsky the terror plot; this makes sense, because the French imperialists were allied to the USSR against Nazi Germany and thus by then hostile to the White Guards. They could expect that Trotsky, upon receipt of such information from the French secret police, would then transfer the intelligence either to the MI6 or directly to the White Guards, thereby expediting the White Guard terror plot so that the Stalin faction would not have the time to sabotage Yagoda's terror plot. Such a leak to Trotsky would have therefore undermined the Soviet state, the ally of French imperialism in the fight against Nazi Germany.

There are reasons to suspect that, prior to the October Revolution, Yagoda was an agent of the Okhrana, the Tsarist secret police. Justifying such a suspicion is that not only Yagoda collaborated with the White Guards after the Revolution but also had faked his pre-Revolution past. The CIA agent Wittlin confirmed:

One year later Mikhail Trilisser, Yagoda's deputy who, for his own purposes, was carrying on an investigation of his boss' past, found out that Yagoda had given false information about himself, entering in the records that he had been an active Communist long before the Revolution. (Commissar: The Life and death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Tadeusz 'Thaddeus' Wittlin, 1972, p. 175) (IMG)

Trilisser, as stated previously, was another hangman for Bukharin and Yagoda.

In Abkhazia and Georgia, similar anti-Soviet activities were being committed by the Trotskyite agents of Anglo-German secret services. There:

The leader of the band of counter-revolutionaries seems to have been the late M. Nestor Lakoba, formerly President of the Republic of Abkhazia, who died in December 1936. (N 5720/250/38, No. 536, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, November 13, 1937; Received November 19, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 231) (IMG)

In his memoirs, Sergo Beria, the son of Lavrenti Beria, remarked:

People still don't know that Lakoba detested the Soviet regime, in which he saw the vehicle of Russian penetration. He 'worked on' my father to get him to slow down and restrict so far as possible the expansion of Russia into Georgia and Abkhazia. Consequently, he was opposed to the building of a railway along the Black Sea coast because for him this meant 'opening the gates to Russia.' He was also against the building of roads over the passes of the Caucasus and he did not want there to be a tunnel linking North Ossetia with South Ossetia, fearing that Abkhazia and Georgia might become a 'holiday resort for Russians.' And he did whatever he could to scupper these projects. (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 22) (IMG)

Lakoba told Nina Gegechkori, Beria's wife:

‘Nina, you don’t know the Russians. You’ve never lived in Russia, but I had that experience before the revolution. They feel at home everywhere and invade everything like locusts.’ (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, pp. 22-23) (IMG)

Lakoba was promoting separatist activity. According to Sergo Beria, what:

mattered for [Lakoba] was the independence of Georgia and Abkhazia from Moscow. (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 23) (IMG)

Lakoba was pro-German, and had contacts with Turkey, which was a British satellite; the Central Committee of the CPSU was aware of this. As Sergo Beria confirms:

The ... functionaries in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the USSR who agitated behind the scenes, intriguing against Lakoba and my father alike, were convinced that Lakoba ... cherished sympathies with Turkey. He had indeed formed a number of links with that country, and he also felt a certain fondness for Germany. (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 23) (IMG)

The MI6 supported Nazi Germany against the USSR. This fact was manifested in the collaboration of German and British agents in the USSR. The British intelligence agent Beria and the pro-German Lakoba entered an alliance against the Soviet state:

Lakoba had decided to obtain the support of my mother, being convinced that she had great influence on her spouse. As she herself told me, he confided in her when he saw the opportunity during our annual holiday in Abkhazia. (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 22) (IMG)

‘But how can one resist, in conditions such as ours?’ my mother asked. ‘By all and every means. It is useless to try for an open confrontation. Things have to be dragged out as long as possible and one must obey only when the knife is at one’s throat.’ (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 23) (IMG)

My father did not remain deaf to the advice of this older man [Lakoba], even if it seemed to him impossible for the time being, to stand up against Russia.. (.). The two men decided that thenceforth they would co-ordinate their actions and keep each other informed of Stalin’s intrigues. Even though my father did not share all of Lakoba’s views, he did not betray him. (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, pp. 22-23) (IMG)

As confirmed by an MI6 document (not to be confused with the other MI6 document whose conclusions were tentative):

In 1933 M. Lakoba, whose ultimate aim was the annihilation of M. Stalin and the return to power of M. Trotski organized his first attempt on the former’s life. The attempt was arranged by the chief and deputy-chief of the Abkhazian G.P.U. who, acting under orders from M. Lakoba, instructed a G.P.U. coastguard to shoot at M. Stalin while he was cruising along the shores of the Black Sea in the neighbourhood of Gagri, where he was spending his holidays. M. Stalin’s launch, however, kept well out to sea, and the coastguard missed his mark. M. Lakoba seems to have taken advantage of M. Stalin’s annual visit to the Black Sea Riviera to organise at least one more attempt on his life, but this also came to nothing. (N 5720/250/38, No. 536, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, November 13, 1937; Received November 19, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 231) (IMG)

In 1933, there was a failed assassination attempt on Stalin by the Beria’s ally Lakoba. Apparently, he plotted at least one other assassination attempt as early as 1934. Both assassination plots failed.

Another person to die was Sergo Ordzhonikidze, undoubtedly among the best of the Bolshevik activists. Sergo Ordzhonikidze, as documented in C4S4, had had profound problems with Lavrenti Beria. He supposedly committed ‘suicide’ in 1935. However, the CIA stated:

Ordzhonikidze may well have died an unnatural death. (Purge of L. P. Beria, CAESAR-10, CIA, August 17, 1954, p. 14) (IMG)

In her memoirs, Svetlana Alliluyeva, the daughter of Joseph Stalin, stated:

Olga Shatunovskaya told me that the Party people in Georgia were appalled and Ordzhonikidze stubbornly opposed it, but that my father wouldn’t give an inch. Once he was First Secretary in Georgia, it didn’t take Beria long to reach Moscow, where he began his long reign in 1938. (.). Olga Shatunovskaya has told me that Beria’s role in the Civil War in the Caucasus was highly ambiguous.

He was a born spy and provocateur. He worked first for the Dashnakists (the Armenian nationalists) and then for the Reds as power swung back and forth. Once the Reds caught him in the act of treason and had him arrested. He was in prison awaiting sentence when a telegram arrived from Kirov, who was chief of all operations in the Caucasus, demanding that he be shot as a traitor. Just then, however, the fighting started up again, and he was such small fry that nobody got around to dealing with him. But all the Old Bolsheviks in the Caucasus knew of the telegram’s existence — and Beria himself knew of it.

Isn’t it perhaps here that one should seek an explanation of Kirov’s murder many years later? It was right after Kirov’s murder in 1934, after all, that Beria began his climb to prominence and power. It’s at least a strange coincidence—the death of the one and the rise of the other. I can’t imagine, moreover, that Kirov would ever

have allowed Beria's election to the Central Committee.

Sergei Kirov was a great friend of the family from way back, probably from their early days in the Caucasus. He knew the Alliluyevs exceedingly well and was very fond of my mother. I have a photograph of Kirov and Yenukidze at my mother's grave. Grief is written all over their faces—the stern faces of two strong men not given to showing their feelings. After my mother died Kirov would come to see my father at Sochi and they used to take me on outings. I have a pile of photographs taken at about that time, simple family photos with nothing posed about them. (.) Kirov looks relaxed in a long, loose shirt, and my father is wearing a white summer suit. I remember these trips myself. Other people would sometimes come with us, too, perhaps even Beria — I don't remember. But Kirov used to live in our house. He was one of us, an old colleague and a friend. My father liked him and was attached to him.

Kirov spent his last summer, that of 1934, with us as in previous years. Then, in December, Nicolayev shot him. Wouldn't it be more logical to link his killing with the name of Beria rather than with that of my father, as is done by transparent hints today?

I'll never believe my father was involved in this particular death. Kirov was closer to him than the Svanidzes, the Redenses, his other relatives, or most of his other colleagues. Kirov was close to my father and my father needed him. I remember when we got the awful news that Kirov was dead, and how shaken everybody was.

Sergo Ordzhonikidze, another of our old friends, died in 1936. I suspect that this, too, was a result of Beria's machinations. (Twenty Letters to a Friend: A Memoir, Svetlana Alliluyeva, 1967, p. 107) (IMG)

After the death of Stalin, the communist faction of the MVD and the Red Army posed a strong pressure causing Beria to be purged. During Beria's trials, he was accused of plotting against Ordzhonikidze:

Another new charge was that Beria had intrigued against various "honest" party workers such as Ordzhonikidze who had stood in his way. Ordzhonikidze was thus being held up to those who might be tinged with "bourgeois nationalism" in Georgia, as an example of a good Bolshevik. (...). Kravchenko claimed, "That he died by violence, that his end was not natural, my sources have not the slightest doubt." (Purge of L. P. Beria, CAESAR-10, CIA, August 17, 1954, pp. 14-15) (IMG)

Sergo Beria described Anastas Mikoyan as a:

friend of my father's and ... undertook to protect my father. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 36) (IMG)

That same Mikoyan stated in his memoirs that he believed:

[Lavrenti] Beria was the indirect culprit in the death of Sergo [Ordzhonikidze]. (Memoirs, Anastas Mikoyan, Chapter 47: Power Struggle after Stalin's Death) (IMG)

In the conspiracies for murder, one person who reportedly played an important role was Yenukidze. As was shown previously, the tentatively-conclusive document by Chilston had presented Yenukidze as one of the people who assisted Yagoda in the murder of Kirov. As confirmed by Tokaev, Yenukidze and Sheboldayev were plotting for 'destroying Stalinism' 'root and branch' and for partitioning the USSR. Tokaev remarked:

I myself was never a supporter of Yenukidze's programme, nor was I in his conspiracy. Yet his proposals are of considerable interest, as representing the conception of reformed U.S.S.R.... The plan was outlined to me by one of Yenukidze's closest associates, Sheboldayev, who said that they aimed at destroying Stalinism 'root and branch' and replacing Stalin's 'reactionary USSR.'.... The country was to be divided at once into ten natural regions:

1. The United Transcaucasian States: Armenia, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia; capital, Tbilisi:
2. The North Caucasian United States: the republics and regions of the Don, Kuban, Lower Volga, Kalmykia, Karachai, Adygei, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Checheno-Ingushetia, Daghestan, and Kizliarai Kalmykia; capital, Rostov-on-Don:
3. The Ukraine Democratic Republic: including the Crimea and Moldavia; capital, Kiev:
4. The Belorussian Democratic Socialist Republic; capital, Minsk:
5. The United States of the Middle Volga: the republics of Tataria, Bashkiria, Chuvashia, Mordva, Mar and other regions:
6. The Turkestan Association of Peoples (the present republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizia):
7. The Northern Democratic Republic: the provinces of Leningrad, Novgorod, Pskov, Vologda, Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, and the Komi republic; capital, Leningrad:
8. The Moscow Democratic Republic; the provinces of Veliki Luki, Smolensk, Kalinin, Kaluga, Briansk, Orlov, Riazan, Voronezh, Tambov, Vladimir, Ivanov and some other territories; capital, Moscow:
9. The Urals Democratic Republic; capital, Sverdlovsk:
10. The Siberian Democratic Republic; capital, Novosibirsk.

(Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

Tokaev named Yenukidze, alongside Beria, Yagoda, and Sheboldayev, and General Osepyan as ‘not ... servants’ but rather as ‘enemies of the [Soviet] regime’:

By them, moreover, we knew the power of men like . or Army General Osepyan, or Yenukidze, or even NKVD bosses Yagoda or Beria, or Regional Secretary Sheboldayev, in their roles not of servants, but of enemies of the regime. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

To the dismay of the Beria family, the Georgian counter-revolutionaries were ruthlessly purged in the 1930s. **The MI6 agent Beria actually belonged to the vast network of Trotskyites and Bukharinites.** He especially belonged to the Trotskyites and had allied with Lakoba. Well until the 1950s, the MI6 agent Beria continued to promote the narrative that Trotsky, Bukharin, and their active supporters were not agents of the foreign intelligence services. **Indeed, as Sergo Beria said, well until 1953 after Stalin’s death, Lavrenti Beria:**

wanted, also, to publish the writings of Bukharin and Trotsky, so that people should realize that they presented genuine political tendencies and were not agents recruited by foreign intelligence services. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 254) (IMG)

Years later, when Stalin died, Beria tried to set up a rehabilitations commission to convince people that Trotskyism should be treated as just a political ideology rather than an imperialist-fascist secret service strategy and tendency: Some time later my father drew up the instructions for the committee charged with rehabilitations. He recommended that all the trials be reviewed, including the pre-war ones, and that Trotskyism be treated as a political tendency and not as spying. Malenkov, Saburov and Pervukhin sided with him [on this].. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 259) (IMG)

Furthermore, the MI6 agent Beria opposed the purge of the Nazi agent Tukhachevsky as well. When the Nazi agent was purged:

My father explained to me that Tukhachevsky had nothing against Stalin or the Party, or at least, nothing that would justify his arrest. He could hardly be charged with anti-communism. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 39) (IMG)

Beria also vehemently opposed the existence of the Comintern:

My father could not stand the Comintern, ‘that nest of intriguers and informers,’ he called it. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 89) (IMG)

Beria also stated that the USSR was not a real socialist state but was rather ‘state capitalist’:

In our country, he [i.e. Beria] explained, what we had was not socialism but a form of state capitalism. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 293) (IMG)

Later in this chapter, the evidence will be presented as to Tukhachevsky’s agency for Nazi Germany. Beria could not have missed the irrefutable fact of Tukhachevsky’s treason, much as how he could not have been mistaken about Trotsky, who was the recruiter of Tukhachevsky. And yet, he defended Tukhachevsky.

The MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria also staunchly opposed agricultural collectivization. According to Sergo Beria, Lavrenti:

several times tried, in vain, to convince Stalin and his Politburo colleagues that the collective-farm system was the worst possible system for regions like the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine and Caucasia.” (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 293) (IMG)

In the letters he sent to Ordzhonikidze, Kirov and Stalin, my father explained that it would be unreasonable to practise this policy in mountainous regions like Caucasia. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 11) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria carried out economic sabotage against the Soviet agriculture by, as much as possible, pushing the peasants to plant tobacco – which by the way, was a relatively useless crop – and by forcefully trying to prevent the centralization of agricultural holdings into collectives:

the plan for subtropical crops furnished my father with a pretext for defending the existence of private plots of land. He pointed out that such crops required a high degree of technical skill which could not be acquired otherwise than by work on private plots. Unfortunately, the peasants did not understand this policy. They did not appreciate that, by making them plant tobacco and orange trees in their gardens, my father was trying to protect their farms, and they resisted as hard as they could. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 11-12) (IMG)

Sergo Beria further recalled:

Collectivization gave rise to riots, especially in eastern Georgia, in the vine-growing region. The organizers of these movements of revolt, who were usually survivors of the 1924 insurrection, were arrested afresh, and once more, my father took steps to save them from execution by facilitating their flight abroad, as I was told later by Shariko Tsereteli, who himself organised their escape. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 12) (IMG)

Who was Shariko Tsereteli? In that famous excerpt of chapter 6 of Stalin's 'The Foundations of Leninism', Shariko Tsereteli was listed as alongside other Kautskyite agents of imperialism: 'the struggle waged by such "desperate" democrats and "Socialists," "revolutionaries" and republicans as, for example, Kerensky and Tsereteli, Renaudel and Scheidemann, Chernov and Dan, Henderson and Clynes, during the imperialist war was a reactionary struggle..' Furthermore, as was stated in C4S4, Tsereteli had been the Tsarist regime official with whom Beria travelled to the Menshevik rebel territory in order to tell them to escape Georgia: 'My father took three days to reach Tbilisi on horseback, accompanied by Shariko Tsereteli, prince and officer of the old regime. My mother followed in a car. They passed through the rebels' lines. The rebels did not harm them, though they knew their identity.' And in those negotiations with the Menshevik-Tsarist commanders, Beria recommended to them that they flee: 'My father . advised the Menshevik officers to flee.'. Years later, these Menshevik rebels had been 'arrested afresh' as Sergo Beria stated above, 'and once more, my father took steps to save them from execution by facilitating their flight abroad, as I was told later by Shariko Tsereteli, who himself organised their escape.' Once again, Lavrenti Beria was retaining his collaboration with the anti-Soviet Menshevik terrorists who were working for the British intelligence. The MI6-backed Menshevik kulak sleeper cells thus received the support of Beria.

The Bukharin-Trotsky network had been responsible for agitating for anti-collectivization uprisings. The MI6 agent Beria, a member of this Bukharin-Trotsky network, also assisted the anti-collectivization Ukrainian fascist and Georgian Menshevik rebels by getting several of them to form terrorist sleeper cells that would launch rebellions against the Soviet state later on when the strategically opportune time comes about. Referring to the rebels that the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria helped flee, Sergo Beria recalled:

My father gave them [kulak rebels] clearly to understand that the moment had not come to stir up trouble and that it was necessary to save the Georgian nation from destruction. He let them keep their lives but, in return, they had to cease agitation. Implicitly, however, his address to the Georgian nationalists conveyed the following message: preserve yourselves for a more favourable occasion. He was to say the same thing later to the Ukrainian nationalists. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 12) (IMG)

To undermine the Great Purge, the MI6 agent Beria launched a pincer assault on the purges, by on the one hand deliberately going extreme with the purges in order to discredit them and to drive a wedge between the masses and the Party, and on the other hand by preventing the purges of some of the Trotskyites and Bukharinites with whom he sympathized. The following excerpts are instructive:

My mother [Nina Gegechkori] accused my father: 'You are the First Secretary, aren't you? How can you allow these men to be attacked? Aren't you the master here? Are you just Russia's tool?' Replying to these reproaches, my father pointed out that he tried to resist by invoking the official slogans put forward by the regime, particularly stressing that the economy would suffer as a result of the extermination of cadres. He defended himself by saying that he had managed to save several people. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 27) (IMG)

The above excerpt hints that Nina Gegechkori regarded Beria as responsible for the extremities in the purges; the above excerpt also confirms that Beria tried to prevent some of the purges. Both claims are true. The same Beria who opposed the purges of the Trotskyites and Bukharinites, promoting them as 'innocent', was the same Beria who launched savage terror campaigns during the Great Purge. The MI6 operative Ian Grey remarked:

Lavrenty Beria, an NKVD officer, was then serving as first secretary of the party in Transcaucasia. An evil man who managed to insinuate himself into Stalin's confidence, he was one of the principal architects of the terror. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Where Ian Grey is incorrect is when implying that Stalin trusted Beria; such a claim was not correct. Stalin deliberately promoted Beria for the same reason as why at some point he promoted Yezhov; the reason for the promotion of such elements was to coopt Beria against the Yezhov group, even though Beria was covertly an ally of Yezhov.

The imperialist agents who had risen to the ranks of the Soviet state also fomented separatist tendencies. The Polish intelligence service apparently had a role in this. The MI6 tentatively reported:

The particular agents of the Polish intelligence service in the *bloc* were Grinko, for the Ukraine, and Sharangovich, for White Russia. (.). In Central Asia the agents were Ikramov and Khojajev, but they do not appear to have got beyond the stage of hoping to establish contacts with the British intelligence service and to win support at the price of cession of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

The Polish secret service was a comprador secret service and a front for MI6. Being an agent of the Polish secret service meant being an agent of the British secret service. Therefore, being agents of Poland does make them agents of the MI6. The only question is whether they established direct contacts with the MI6 or not, and the MI6 document cited above confirms that Ikramov and Khojajev hoped to establish such direct contacts even if not going very far in so doing.

To drive a wedge between the peoples of the USSR, the bourgeois-nationalists of different nationalities banded

together to promote chauvinist rhetoric against each others' nationalities so to foster inter-ethnic hatred, thereby fomenting ethnic separatist uprisings. The central command uniting these bourgeois-nationalists that unitedly promoted hate against each others' nationalities to foment inter-ethnic conflict, was the Nazi German intelligence. The Nazi German minister Goebbels confirmed in his diaries that as late as June 1941, the Nazis were working with the Russian bourgeois-nationalists, so to drive a wedge between the Russian SSR and the other SSRs, and as a complementary policy in supporting Russian bourgeois-nationalism, the Nazis were also working with those who sought separatism from the USSR. And thirdly, the Nazis were working with the Trotskyites to overthrow the Soviet state. Goebbels wrote in his diaries:

We are working with three secret stations in Russia. They are: the Trotskyites, the Separatists, and the Chauvinist Russians. All are operating against Stalin's Regime. (June 30, 1941, Goebbels. In: 'Tagebucher 1924 -1945 Vol. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5', The Internet Archive, Joseph Goebbels, p. 1614) (IMG) Russian chauvinism foments anti-Russian chauvinism and separatism, thus dialectically rendering Russian chauvinism and anti-Russian chauvinist separatism allies. The same Chilston report also stated:

Chernov ... used his official position for agricultural wrecking on a vast scale.. Similarly Grinko and Zelenski worked systematically to undermine respectively the financial positions of the Soviet Union and the planning of such staple products as butter and sugar. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

The MI6 operative Grigori Tokaev confirmed that Zelenski was involved in anti-Soviet conspiracies with Yagoda: The Little Politburo had penetrated the Yenukidze-Sheboldayev and the Yagoda-Zelinsky conspiracies, and broken through the opposition's links within the central institutions of the political police. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 63) (IMG)

In addition to the infiltrators in the Party, there were Christian fundamentalist terrorist organizations engaged in sabotage on behalf of German and Japanese intelligence services. The British Foreign Office remarked:

In Siberia a band of Orthodox priests engaged in sabotage in the mines and espionage on behalf of the Japanese Intelligence Service, and a group of Evangelists and Adventists acting on behalf of both the German and Japanese Intelligence Services, have been brought to book. (.). Details of these and other "counter-revolutionary organisations" show them as having engaged in anti-Soviet activities on a most impressive scale and as having disposed of considerable material resources. (N 2481/1310/38, Mr. Vereker to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, May 16, 1938; Received May 20, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 355) (IMG)

In that famous March 1937 speech, Stalin declared:

Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principles and without ideals, a gang of wreckers, diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, assassins, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.

Such is the incontrovertible result of the evolution of Trotskyism in the last seven or eight years.

Such is the difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time.

The mistake our Party comrades made is that they failed to notice this profound difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time. They failed to notice that the Trotskyites have long ceased to be people devoted to an ideal, that the Trotskyites long ago became highway robbers, capable of any foulness, capable of all that is disgusting, to the point of espionage and the downright betrayal of their country, if only they can harm the Soviet government and Soviet power. They failed to notice this and therefore were unable to adapt themselves in time to fight the Trotskyites in a new way, more determinedly. ('Defects in Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyite and Other Double-Dealers: Report and Speech in Reply to Debate at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.', Stalin, March 3-5, 1937, Revolutionary Democracy)

Where I disagree with Stalin is when he implies that there was a time period in which Trotskyism was not a fascist secret service tendency, and that there was a time period in which Trotskyism could be treated as an ideological belief. It may have been politically good for Stalin to say that, for he may not have had proof of Trotsky's treasons in the early 1910s; but regardless, the content of that remark is not true, for it is too generous a remark about Trotskyism. No, Trotskyism was never at any point in time a real ideology; it was always an imperialist-fascist secret service tendency, and a set of strategies and tactics of striking the revolution from an ultra-'revolutionary' perspective. Since the birth of finance capital and long before the word 'fascism' was coined, Trotskyism served as a tool and a tendency of the imperialist-fascist secret services camouflaged with revolutionary phraseology. Well before officially 'abandoning' the Mensheviks, Trotsky had the audacity to openly argue that imperialism industrialized the colonized countries whereas anti-imperialism was reactionary and kept countries backwards (see C1S2).

Trotskyism was a sub-trend within the Menshevik movement, and the Menshevik movement was the Russian Imperial branch of what was later referred to as the 'Kautskyite' network. Even if the Mensheviks were not spies and mercenaries on the payroll of the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, the Mensheviks behaved very much as though they were Okhrana agents. When it suited the Russian secret police, the Mensheviks chanted for liberalism and right- deviation,

called for capitulation under the cover of 'pragmatism', and supported outright collaboration with the imperialists in order to 'grow' industry and 'enlarge' the proletariat; on the other hand, when it suited the Tsarist secret police, the Mensheviks were as dogmatic and left-sectarian as they could possibly be, and tried to sow division in the revolutionary movement by refusing to ally the proletariat with the kolkhoz peasantry, and promoted anti- kolkhoznik anti-peasant hate. The fact that the Mensheviks were simultaneously right-opportunist and left- opportunist in favor of the Tsarist regime is what brings from them the smell of the Okhrana. Trotsky, a left-wing Menshevik, was allied to the right-wing, as Lenin pointed out (see C2S9). I dare speculate that the arrest of Trotsky by the Okhrana in the Tsarist years may well have been a means of espionage under the cover of 'being interrogated'. Get only two slaps in the face and then call it 'brutal torture', and thereupon provide all the intelligence material needed as 'confessions' during 'brutal' 'interrogations'. Imperialist secret services sometimes utilize jailing as an espionage tactic. Jailing one's own intelligence assets can ensure asset protection against rival intelligence organizations. Jailing one's own spies can be a means of receiving intelligence from one's spies under the guise of 'interrogation' and supposed 'torture' of one's own spies. Speculating that imprisonment is a cover for espionage for ordinary activists who have been arrested can be an act of toxic slander-mongering, but in the case of Trotsky, since his intelligence activities for the fascists has been voluminously documented, I dare give myself the right to speculate such about his 'arrest' by the Tsarist regime. I also refuse to believe that his 'escapes' from jail in the 1900s were really 'escapes'.

It is said that the difference between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks was that the latter called for a bourgeois-democratic revolution prior to the socialist revolution 'unlike' the Bolsheviks who allegedly called for a 'leap' into socialism. This narrative is a Trotskyite myth. Lenin clearly supported (1) the replacement of tyranny with bourgeois-democracy as a channel for paving the way towards a proletarian revolution, and (2) the bourgeois transformation of feudal society as a predecessor to socialism. Rather, Lenin believed that the bourgeois replacement of the feudal mode of production can occur under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as he supported the NEP. On the other hand, the Mensheviks opposed the partnership of the kolkhoz peasantry with the proletariat, supported participation in imperialist wars of desertification under the banner of 'improving' productive forces, aimed to disarm the proletariat by seeking reformist agendas, and waged bloody wars against the proletariat by inviting the British colonizers into the Soviet Union. All of such major differences between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks have been swept under the rug by the Trotskyite myth that the Bolshevik-Menshevik clash was over whether or not to leap to 'socialism'.

C5S2. Sabotage in and Purges of the Red Army

The MI6 agent Trotsky had his infamous agent Tukhachevsky in the Red Army as well. Tukhachevsky was also an agent of Nazi Germany. As will be recalled from C3S3, Tukhachevsky shared Trotsky's views for anti-Soviet diversionary and provocative military strategy – launch wars against every country in the world, and then once those states are provoked to fight back, open up the front so that they can enter the Soviet territory and duly conquer it. Tukhachevsky was one of the commanders responsible for the defeat of the Soviet Red Army in Poland in 1920 (C3S3). To spread cultural corruption, Tukhachevsky sponsored a musician who composed decadent 'music' (C6S7). In the 1930s, Tukhachevsky was serving as an agent of Nazi Germany, seeking to help that state take over the USSR. Pierre Fervacque was the biographer of Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who had met him for several times. According to Neil Harvey (PhD) of the University of Glasgow:

Fervacque's memoirs in *Le Chef de L'Armee Rouge* provide arguably the most illuminating insights on Tukhachevsky.. (Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Russian Civil War, University of Glasgow, Neil Harvey, p. 42) (IMG)

Tukhachevsky's goal was to defeat socialism. Tukhachevsky's biographer:

Fervacque recalled asking Tukhachevsky if he was a socialist. (Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Russian Civil War, University of Glasgow, Neil Harvey, p. 43) (IMG)

Tukhachevsky responded:

Socialist? Certainly not! What a need for classification you have! Besides, the great socialists are Jews and the socialist doctrine is a branch of universal Christianity. I laugh at money, and whether the land is divided up or not is all one to me. The barbarians, my ancestors, lived in common, but they had chiefs. No, I detest socialists, Jews and Christians. (Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Russian Civil War, University of Glasgow, Neil Harvey, p. 44; citing Fervacque's *Le Chef de L'Armee Rouge*, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

Prior to that, Tukhachevsky had made his virulent anti-Semitism very explicit in his conversation with Fervacque:

The Jews brought us Christianity. That is enough to make us hate them. And then they are a low race. I do not speak of the dangers which they have brought to my country. You French cannot understand that; for you equality is a dogma. The Jew is a dog, a son of a bitch, who sheds his fleas in every country. It is he who has contributed most to infecting us with the plague of civilisation and who would like to give us his morality, the morality of money and capital. (Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Russian Civil War, University of Glasgow, Neil Harvey, p. 44; citing Fervacque's *Le Chef de L'Armee Rouge*, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

Alexander Bregman was the:

chief editorial writer for the London emigre daily *Dziennik Polski* [and] the author of several books, [who] contributes regularly to leading American and British periodicals. (East Europe: A Monthly Review of East European Affairs, Vol. 12, January 1963, p. 15) (IMG)

Bregman mentioned that Tukhachevsky passionately aimed to continue to collaborate with the hostile anti-Soviet military of the Third Reich:

As for Tukhachevsky himself, we know from German diplomatic documents how enthusiastic he had always been about the Red Army's cooperation with the German Army and how much he regretted that it came to an end after Hitler's accession to power. There is little doubt that he wanted a resumption of this cooperation. (The Tukhachevsky Affair (Review). In: 'East Europe: A Monthly Review of East European Affairs', Vol. 14, Alexander Bregman, January 1965, p. 54) (IMG)

Another important source of information on Tukhachevsky is John Erickson. Erickson was a prominent British military scholar with extensive intelligence contacts with anti-Soviet treasonous elements and British spies in the Red Army. Under the guise of scholarship, he accessed the Red Army archives and, as confirmed by the Washington Post, aimed to collect sensitive military intelligence from the Red Army generals. He founded the Centre for Defense Studies which received funding from the British government. According to John Erickson, in 1935, amidst the high tensions caused by Hitler's open talk of war against the Bolshevik East, Tukhachevsky told the commander of the French army Maurice Gamelin that he continued to sustain:

relations avec des personalites de l'armee allemande. (The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, Author and Editor: John Erickson, p. 412) (IMG)

The phrase in French means 'relations with personalities within the Germany army'.

In the late 1930s, Romania's economy was becoming colonially dependent on the Third Reich, as the treasonous monarchical leadership of Romania was selling the economy to the Third Reich for cheap. In this context, when meeting with the Romanian foreign minister, Tukhachevsky advised the foreign minister to look to Romania's colonizers 'for rescue' – i.e. become more dependent on the Germans:

To the Rumanian Foreign Minister Titulescu he [i.e. Tukachevsky] advised the need to look to Germany for rescue. (The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, Author and Editor: John Erickson, p. 413) (IMG)

It is very clear that Tukhachevsky had pro-Nazi sympathies.

Moreover, Erickson referred to reports that:

Admiral Canaris, head of the German Abwehr [intelligence service], had proof of even greater indiscretions by Tukhachevsky, namely that he had entered into contact with emissaries of General Miller, the head of the organisation of Tsarist veterans in exile. This Tukhachevsky was supposed to have done while executing his commission abroad at the funeral of King George V. (The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, Author and Editor: John Erickson, p. 413) (IMG)

Tokaev confirmed that Bukharin:

had certainly considered supporting Yenukidze and Tukhachevsky. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 96) (IMG)

Bukharin, as will be remembered from C2S10, had allied with the Trotskyites knowing that the latter had been agents of the Anglo-German secret services.

Tukhachevsky was by no means alone in this. Many others in the Red Army shared his pro-Nazi sympathies. Erickson wrote:

There is at least one significant item which confirms that contact of a tenuous but deliberate nature was sustained between German and Soviet officers. Although the collaboration had lapsed, [German Chief of Staff, General Hans von] Seeckt's disciples in the German Army remained interested in possible re-insurances in the east; General Kostring, before taking up his appointment as Military Attache in Moscow, was instructed by Fritsch and Beck to work – along purely personal lines – for an improvement in relations between the Red and German Armies. That reservoir of good will towards the German generals had certainly not evaporated in the Red Army by the end of 1935. Personal contacts would presumably be subject to personal arrangement. (The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, Author and Editor: John Erickson, p. 411) (IMG)

Well into 1937, the executed Red Army commanders had maintained very close and friendly relations with the Nazi General Ernst Kostring:

The execution of the eight Red army leaders might have been supposed likely to affect adversely the position of General Kostring (see Lord Chilston's despatch under reference), who is believed to have been defended by the Red army against party intrigues, and who was certainly on excellent terms with most of the executed leaders as well as with [some of] the surviving marshals. (N 3648/250/38, No. 319, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden,

Moscow, July 3, 1937; Received July 16, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 145) (IMG)

Lyman Kirkpatrick – the inspector general and executive director of the CIA, as well as a co-founder of several other US intelligence agencies – admitted in his book:

The Abwehr [i.e. German intelligence] had some agents on senior staffs of the Red Army. (Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II, Routledge, Lyman B Kirkpatrick Jr, 1987) (IMG)

Referring to Tukhachevsky, a classified report by the British Embassy in Moscow stated: the foreign press . have often described him as the Napoleon of Russia.

(Colonel Firebrace to Mr. MacKillop, No. 15, Secret, Moscow, June 14, 1937. Inclosure in Doc. 101 – N 3177/461/38. Foreign Office (1937-1938). p. 135) (IMG)

Napoleon, though himself a progressive military general who overthrew the counter-revolutionary Directory, was described in the mainstream media, and seen by many, as a perpetrator of a coup against a civilian government. The comparison of Tukhachevsky with Napoleon was more so along the lines of Tukhachevsky's coup plots and not of him sharing the views of a progressive freedom-fighter general. The classified British documents reported that there already were:

rumours current ... of the possibility of the Soviet Government being overthrown and replaced by a military national Government under some military leader. (N 1397/46/38, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden – (Received March 12), No. 106. Moscow, March 9, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938). p. 57) (IMG)

Recall as well that the MI6 operative Fitzroy McLean, the real-life James Bond, reasoned:

if, in fact, there had been a conspiracy, what more natural than that the thinkers, the ideologists, should have made common cause with the men of action, Tukachevski, Yagoda? What more natural, too, than that to the Tukachevskis and the Yagodas, finding themselves in positions of great power, should come the idea of using that power for their own ends. Tukachevski was known to admire Napoleon. As a soldier? Or as a man? An officer of the Imperial Army, he had shifted his allegiance quickly enough, when his interests demanded it. Might he not do so again? (.). What more natural, too, than that any potential opponents of the regime should seek, and receive, outside support, among the enemies of the Soviet Union? Some of them had, in the course of their normal duties, had contact with foreigners. Tukachevski, in the old days, had had many dealings with the German General Staff; had been to Paris. (...). Had these contacts really been innocent?

And the 'wrecking'? Inefficiency? Or stubbornness? Or malice? Or a combination of all three? In any case a phenomenon which the enemies of the regime, if they knew their job, would be bound to exploit. Something which called for the most ruthless countermeasures.

Looking at it like that, it was possible to see how, in the minds of those concerned, if not in reality, the idea of a conspiracy might have grown up. (Eastern Approaches, Fitzroy McLean, 1949, pp. 115-116) (IMG)

In a letter to the US Secretary of State, Loy Henderson pointed out that he was:

in possession of no information regarding the nature of the evidence advanced during the investigations and the trial. (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 383) (IMG)

Nevertheless, Henderson wrote, there had been contacts between the Red Army and the US Embassy, based on which the US Embassy was able to make judgements on the purges. As Henderson stated:

The [American] Embassy's opinions ... are based ... upon its observations of the events which have unrolled here during the last 6 months, its own estimation of the officers in question, some of whom were personally known to members of the staff, the reputation of these officers, the foreign observers and Soviet citizens for whose views it has respect. (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 383) (IMG)

Regarding the pro-German sympathies of the Tukhachevsky group, Henderson noted:

Most if not all of the accused would have liked to have seen better relations established between Germany and the Soviet Union under conditions which necessarily would have included certain alterations in Hitler's own policies. They have been known to express their feelings of friendliness for Germany in public. At a farewell party given at the German Embassy 2 years ago for the departing German Counsellor, Tukhachevski in the presence of other guests frankly stated that it was too bad that "the politicians were disturbing German-Soviet relations". (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 384) (IMG)

There is some truth in the reports which have circulated for years to the effect that the feelings toward Germany of many of the higher officers of the Red Army are friendlier than those held by those responsible for

the present Soviet foreign policy. (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 383) (IMG)

Regarding the putschist tendencies of Tukhachevsky's gang, the American charge d'affaires commented:

There is reason to believe that Tukhachevski and at least most of the other condemned had acquired while in Germany a tendency to regard an army as a professional organization standing above politics and untouched by all but the most profound political changes, that they had therefore systematically endeavored to resist the penetration into the army of the agents and provocateurs of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs.. (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 383) (IMG)

Some would attempt to advance the argument that Tukhachevsky aimed to increase Soviet ties with Germany, not as a way of increasing German fascist influence in the USSR but on the contrary as a channel for the intelligence penetration of the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat into Germany. Such an argument, however, is entirely implausible, in light of Tukhachevsky's alliance with the MI6 agent Trotsky, the renegade anti-communist and anti-Semitic general's tactical and strategic sabotage of the Soviet armed forces during the war with Poland (C3S3), and his excellent relations with the network of reactionary generals headed by Seeckt. Had Tukhachevsky been sincere in using such friendly contacts with the German armed forces for the purpose of Soviet penetration into Germany, he would have pursued increased ties not to Seeckt but to Schleicher, the prominent pro-Soviet commander in the German armed forces (C10S7). Whereas no evidence exists to suggest close ties to Schleicher, there is plenty of evidence of close ties to Seeckt. Last but not least, as shall be shown, the American spy Orlov has confessed that Tukhachevsky and his gang aimed to launch a military coup against the Soviet government and to murder Stalin, acts which clearly would have benefited Tukhachevsky's Nazi German allies. Clearly, Soviet relations with Nazi Germany could not be simultaneously equally beneficial to both Nazi anti-communism and communist anti-Nazism; it could only be either of the two. In this light, it is clear that the good relations with Germany were pursued by the Tukhachevsky gang not as a channel for Soviet influence over Germany but as a channel for German fascist influence over the USSR.

On the assassination and coup plots of the Tukhachevsky network, the American spy Alexander Orlov had access to plenty of intelligence materials, content which he was able to provide to his spymasters in the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Orlov, a long-time anti-communist and an infiltrator into the ranks of the NKVD and Red Army, had defected to the United States, wherein he provided intelligence to the American imperialists on the Soviet security personnel. The National Counter-Intelligence Center of the FAS, the body linked to the US Congress, provided a background on Orlov:

In 1936 Orlov was sent to Spain as Soviet liaison representative to the Republican Government for matters of intelligence, counterintelligence, and guerrilla warfare. Throughout Orlov's stay in Spain, tales mounted of secret trials, summary executions, and widespread terror in the Soviet Union.

In July 1938, Orlov was abruptly ordered to Paris. While in transit, he stopped to see his family, which was living in France not far from the Spanish border. Orlov discussed with his wife his growing suspicions and his moral revulsion, and then decided to break with Stalin and the Soviet Union. After first enlisting the aid of the Canadians, the Orlovs entered the United States on 13 August 1938. Eighteen years later they were granted permanent residence.

After Orlov's defection, he provided much information to US intelligence on pre-World War II personnel and operations of the Soviet State Security Service. With the publication of his book, *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* in 1953, the true history of the Soviet Union from 1934 to 1938 was revealed for the first time. In 1955 and again in 1957, Orlov appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. His second book, *The Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare*, was published in 1963.

In April 1973 Orlov died in the United States. (CI Reader, Vol. 1, Chapter 4, National Counter-Intelligence Center. In: Federation of American Scientists (FAS)) (IMG)

By 1956, when the MI6 agent Khrushchev had 'confessed' that Trotsky's protege Tukhachevsky and the latter's band of fascist assassins were 'innocent' and 'communist' 'loyalists', the prominent American spy Orlov was able to disclose much about the truth of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy. Tukhachevsky, a 'former' Tsarist White Guard officer and Trotsky's hangman, and his band of collaborators aimed to compromise the communist faction by defaming its leader Stalin as a 'spy' of the Tsarist secret service, the Okhrana. Kossior, Balitsky, Zinovy and others, according to Orlov's intelligence network, contended that Stalin shall first be compromised and defamed using the fabricated evidence, so to be demoted and purged by the Central Committee, whereas Tukhachevsky and his group of generals in the Red Army, more realistic and aware of the overwhelming support enjoyed by Stalin among the blue-collar majority of the CPSU, aimed

to launch a military coup, directly murder Stalin, overthrow the Party, install a military dictatorship, and to subsequently accuse Stalin of having been an 'Okhrana agent'. Orlov, himself a long -time imperialist spy within the Soviet security, in fact encouraged such a putsch against the Stalin faction. Below is a part of Orlov's article for the LIFE magazine:

In September 1936 the Politburo sent me to Spain to advise the Republican government of that country on counterintelligence operations and the organization of guerrilla warfare behind Franco's lines. On one of my trips my car went over an embankment and I suffered two broken vertebrae. After some time in a Spanish hospital I was taken to Paris in the middle of January 1937 and placed in a clinic. There I lay flat on my back for over a month.

One day—it was on the afternoon of Feb. 15 or 16, 1937—my bedside telephone rang. It was the NKVD resident in France, Smirnov, and he sounded gay. "Just listen," he said. "I'll give you the surprise of your life." And immediately I heard over the phone another voice which did indeed make me happy.

It was my cousin, Zinovy Borisovich Katsnelson. He had just arrived in Paris and was coming right over to see me.

Zinovy was much more to me than a relative. He had been my childhood friend and our mutual affection had grown deeper with the years. When I enrolled at Moscow University I shared a room with him in his mother's small apartment. During the civil war we served together in the 12th Red army and shared the dangers of the front. Thereafter both of us rose rapidly in the service of the new regime.

Friends among the mightiest men

By 1937 Zinovy was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and acting deputy chief of the NKVD in the Ukraine. He had the title of army commander, second rank, and he had close friends among the mightiest men in the land. One of them was a member of the Politburo, Stanislav Kossior.

And, as a weekend guest of his chiefs in the secret police, Zinovy had often met Stalin.

(...). ZINOVY went on to tell me, there in the Paris hospital room, that he and Balitsky had promptly revealed the facts to two close friends who were also among the most powerful men in the Ukraine.

They were General I. E. Yakir, commander of all military forces in the Ukraine, and Stanislav Kossior, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU and virtual dictator of the Ukraine. (Kossior had also been the boss of a fast-rising man in the Communist hierarchy named Nikita Khrushchev. Liquidated in 1938, Kossior had his name "cleared" at the 20th Party Congress.)

The circle of horrified initiates widened. General Yakir flew to Moscow and conferred with his friend Tukhachevsky, supreme commander of the Red army, whose personal dislike of Stalin was well known. Tukhachevsky took into his confidence the deputy commissar of defense, Gamarnik, a man revered by his intimates for his moral integrity. General Kork was also briefed. These were the men Zinovy named to me. Other army men were apparently told later.

Out of this there developed a conspiracy headed by Marshal Tukhachevsky to end the reign of Stalin.

The nightmare of the blood purges then in progress created a climate of distress, moral disgust and soul-searching conducive to conspiracy against Stalin. The sudden realization that the tyrant and murderer responsible for the piled-up horror was not even a genuine revolutionary but an impostor, a creature of the hated Okhrana, galvanized the conspirators into plans for action. Together they decided to stake their lives to save their country by ridding it of the enthroned agent provocateur.

In February 1937 the Red army generals were still in the process of "gathering forces," as Zinovy phrased it. They had not yet reached agreement on a firm plan for the coup d'etat. But Tukhachevsky

was inclined to the following scheme: some plausible pretext he would persuade Defense Commissar Voroshilov (now the president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) to ask Stalin to summon a top-level conference on military problems concerning the Ukraine, the Moscow military district and certain other areas whose commanders were privy to the conspiracy. Tukhachevsky and other conspirators would come with their trusted aides. At a certain hour, or signal, two elite regiments of the Red army would bar the main avenues to the Kremlin in order to block the approach to NKVD troops. At the same moment the conspirators would announce to Stalin that he was under arrest. Tukhachevsky was convinced that the coup could be carried out within the Kremlin without disturbance.

There were two views, Zinovy explained to me, as to how to deal with Stalin thereafter. Tukhachevsky and other generals were of the opinion that Stalin should be killed outright, after which a plenary session of the party's Central Committee should be convened and the police file laid before it. Kossior, Balitsky, Zinovy and others (the nonarmy group, apparently) wanted to arrest Stalin and bring him before the Central Committee plenary session to be confronted with the charges about his police past.

Before leaving, Zinovy told me, in a shy sort of way, "In case of failure, if Elena and I are shot, I want you and Maria to take care of my little girl." Elena was his wife, Maria is my wife. His daughter was then only 3

years old and he loved her with fanatical devotion. His eyes became damp for a moment. It was for his child's sake, I realized, that he had been ready to travel all the way from the Ukraine to Spain, if necessary, to prepare me for the best—or the worst.

"But how can there be any failure?" I encouraged Zinovy. "Tukhachevsky is the respected boss of the army. The Moscow garrison is in his hands. He and his generals have passes to the Kremlin. Tukhachevsky reports to Stalin regularly and is not suspected. He will arrange the conference, alert the two regiments, and that's that."

I went on to say that the usual risk inherent in any plot—the possibility that one of the participants might betray the whole conspiracy—was absent here. Nobody in his right mind would go to Stalin and tell him about the police file, since immediate liquidation would be the reward for such a disclosure.

We embraced, kissed each other on both cheeks, and Zinovy left. I never saw him again.

A FEW days later I returned to Spain. Week after week, then for month after month, I watched the daily papers and used every free moment to tune in my short-wave radio set. It was enough for anyone to ask me, "Have you heard the news?" to give me a start as if I had been stung. I was expecting my news.

On June 11, 1937 I was riding in my car from the French-Spanish border to Barcelona. The weather was beautiful. I was looking at the rolling hills and listening to soft music from a French radio station. Suddenly the music was interrupted and a news bulletin was read in French: "Radio Toulouse! Special announcement! Soviet Marshal Tukhachevsky and a number of other generals of the Red army have been arrested on charges of treason. They will be court-martialed."

The very next morning an official Soviet announcement informed the stunned world that the court-martial had already taken place and that eight ranking military men—Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Kork, Uborevich, Putna, Eideman, Feldman and Primakov—had been put to death. It became known later that Stein, the NKVD officer who had discovered Stalin's Okhrana file, shot himself. Kossior, despite his rank in the Politburo, was executed. Gamarnik committed suicide before the generals were liquidated. Balitsky was shot.

About the middle of July 1937 I received information that my cousin, Zinovy Katsnelson, had been shot. To this day I have heard nothing of the fate of his wife and little daughter. (THE SENSATIONAL SECRET BEHIND DAMNATION OF STALIN: EX-NKVD GENERAL IS FINALLY FREE TO DISCLOSE DEEDS SO SHOCKING REDS MUST DISOWN OLD IDOL, Life Magazine, Alexander Orlov, April 23, 1956, pp. 35-38) (IMG)

In the magazine article, an image of Tukhachevsky and his collaborators was shown. Underneath the image of Tukhachevsky, the following was stated:

MARSHAL TUKHACHEVSKY led six men shown at top of page in the 1937 conspiracy on Stalin's life. (THE SENSATIONAL SECRET BEHIND DAMNATION OF STALIN: EX-NKVD GENERAL IS FINALLY FREE TO DISCLOSE DEEDS SO SHOCKING REDS MUST DISOWN OLD IDOL, Life Magazine, Alexander Orlov, April 23, 1956, p. 37) (IMG)

The 'six men shown at top of page' were described as follows:

CONSPIRATORS banded together in 1937 ... when they learned Stalin had worked for the czar. Politburo member Stanislav Kossior, Ukrainian NKVD boss V. Balitsky, Deputy Defense Commissar Yan Camarnik, plotted with Red army generals I. E. Yakir, A. I. Kork and V. K. Putna under the leadership of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (far right of page) When plot discovered, Gamarnik allegedly committed suicide [read: was eliminated by pro-Tukhachevsky elements so that he could not testify]. Others were accused of collaborating with Nazi Germany, tried and executed. At 20th Congress last month Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, Kossior were rehabilitated" as loyal Communists. (THE SENSATIONAL SECRET BEHIND DAMNATION OF STALIN: EX-NKVD GENERAL IS FINALLY FREE TO DISCLOSE DEEDS SO SHOCKING REDS MUST DISOWN OLD IDOL, Life Magazine, Alexander Orlov, April, 23, 1956, pp. 36-37) (IMG)

Henderson added that the French ambassador Robert Coulondre to Moscow as well as the Lithuanian ambassador Jurgis Baltrusaitis agreed, based on their secret sources in the Soviet Union, that Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and Uborevich had 'engaged in conversations' 'regarding the desirability of executing some kind of coup d'etat for the purpose of . getting rid of Stalin':

Practically all diplomatic missions and foreign observers believe, however, that one or more of the possibilities listed below is responsible for the destruction of these officers.

(a) The officers had shown a tendency not wholeheartedly to approve certain of Stalin's recent actions and particularly to object to Ins attitude that the welfare of the State was identical with the continued success of his own political career.

(b) The officers had become alarmed at the havoc which the growing disposition of Stalin to distrust and destroy those about him was creating in all spheres of Soviet life and had made remarks to each their showing their disapproval thereof.

(c) In some instances these remarks had develop into conversations regarding the desirability of executing some kind of coup d'etat for the purpose of either getting rid of Stalin or curbing his power.

(.).

3. The French Ambassador has told me in confidence that he has been given formally to understand from certain Soviet sources that certain military leaders including Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uborevitch had engaged in conversations along the lines indicated in 2 (c) above and that these discussions were known to but not reported by at least some of the other executed officers. He added that he was convinced that no formal conspiracy had evolved and that he did not believe that the executed officers had formed treasonous contacts with Germany or any other foreign power.

4. The Lithuanian Minister states that some of his Russian acquaintances have given him to understand that several of the executed officers had actually discussed ways and means of seizing power and of converting Stalin into a tool of the Red Army. (861.20/406, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 23, 1937 – 5 PM; received June 23 – 2:40 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, pp. 384-385) (IMG)

And of course, the Czech military attaché agreed as well – at least according to the Cold War hawk and diplomat George Kennan of the Division of European Affairs, who:

In an attached memorandum of March 12, 1938 . noted: “The remarks of the Czech Military Attache have a special significance. not brought out in the accompanying despatch. Certain professors in this country, aided by Foreign Affairs (New York; quarterly periodical), have given wide currency to the rumor that the Red Army generals were really guilty of plotting with the Germans... Footnote to: 861.20/439, No. 996. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 18, 1938; received March 9. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, p. 384) (IMG)

Joseph Davies, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union during the purge of Tukhachevsky, stated that Tukhachevsky and elements in the Red Army:

had entered into a conspiracy among themselves, and into an agreement with Germany and Japan to aid these governments in a military attack upon the Soviet Union. They agreed to and actually did co-operate in plans to assassinate Stalin and Molotov, and to project a military uprising against the Kremlin which was to be led by General Tukhachevsky, the second in command of the Red Army. In preparation for war they agreed to and actually did plan and direct the sabotaging of industries, the blowing up of chemical plants, the destruction of coal mines, the wrecking of transportation facilities, and other subversive activities. They agreed to perform and did perform all those things which the German General Staff required should be done by them pursuant to instructions which they received from such General Staff. They agreed to and in fact did conspire and co-operate with the German and Japanese Military Intelligence Services. They agreed to and in fact did cooperate with German diplomatic consular representatives in connection with espionage and sabotage. They agreed to and actually did transmit to Germany and Japan Information vital to the defence of the Soviet Union. They agreed among themselves and with the German and Japanese governments to cooperate with them in war upon the Soviet government and to form an independent smaller Soviet state which would yield up large sections of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and White Russia in the west to Germany and the Maritime Provinces in the east to Japan.

They agreed after the German conquest of Russia that German firms were to have concessions and receive favours in connection with the development of iron ore, manganese, oil, coal, timber, and the Other great resources of the Soviet Union. (FIFTH COLUMNISTS IN RUSSIA: A STUDY IN HINDSIGHT, Joseph E. Davies, 1941. In: ‘Mission to Moscow’, pp. 181-182) (IMG)

Davies, though said to be affiliated with the pro-Soviet Roosevelt faction, had his remarks corroborated by other officials, as stated previously and as shall be further shown. In spite of Churchill’s open anti-Stalinism after World War II, he nevertheless confirmed in his post-War memoirs that pro-German elements existed within the Red Army, to be targeted by the Soviet state during the purges of the military. According to Churchill, once Stalin was informed of the plot of German agents in the Red Army:

there followed the merciless, but perhaps not needless, military and political purge in Soviet Russia, and the series of trials in January, 1937, in which Vyshinsky, the Public Prosecutor, played so masterful a part. (The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, Winston Churchill, 1948, pp. 288-289, underline added) (IMG)

The Russian Army was purged of its pro-German elements at a heavy cost to its military efficiency.

(The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, Winston Churchill, 1948, p. 289) (IMG)

Churchill continued by saying that this purge of the German agents:

was, of course, thoroughly understood by Hitler; but I am not aware that the British and French Governments

were equally enlightened. To Mr. Chamberlain and the British and French General Staffs the purge of 1937 presented itself mainly as a tearing to pieces internally of the Russian Army, and a picture of the Soviet Union as riven asunder by ferocious hatreds and vengeance. (The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, Winston Churchill, 1948, p. 289) (IMG)

The MI6, somewhat tentatively, reported:

The work of the *bloc* for the foreign employers included not only espionage and economic aid to Germany and Japan at the expense of the Soviet Union, but also sabotage, diversion, planning to open the front to the enemy on the outbreak of war, undermining the material basis of the Red army, wrecking, particularly on the railways, and the fomenting of discontent among the Soviet population by various methods. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

The above document by MI6 agent Chilston presents its conclusions as ‘tentative’ in nature. However, the fact remains that Chilston’s remarks are corroborated by the other sources which are definitive in concluding such.

C5S3. Agricultural Collectivization / Ukraine and Kazakhstan Famine / Death Toll *** IMG-All-{Soviet Collectivization and Ukraine/Kazakhstan Famine}- {Mortality Statistics}

A Joint US Army-Navy intelligence study published in the post-war years described the USSR’s state of agriculture prior to collectivization as follows:

Prior to the 1930’s, when agriculture was collectivized, the USSR was characterized by peasant farming of small individual tracts of land. Even before the revolution of 1917 the peasants owned 70% of all land in European Russia, and they leased a considerable portion of the remaining 30% which consisted of large estates. After the revolution, the estate land, with insignificant exceptions, was divided among the peasants who continued to till it on an individual basis but the state kept title to all land, and private ownership of land was legally abolished.

Most of the peasants lived in villages and not on separate farmsteads as in the United States. Cultivated areas were divided into a number of rather narrow strips, and the holding of each peasant family consisted of strips in each field, which were usually intermingled with strips of other families. The strip system in Russia, as in other European countries, was a result of the attempt to equalize holdings with respect to soil, topography, and distance from the village. Over a large part of Russia, such equalization was associated with the communal, repartitional type of land tenure, under which the land commune (mir) allotted holdings to its members on some uniform basis with general or partial repartitions of land at regular or irregular intervals. Under an hereditary system of land tenure, which prevailed in the western provinces of Russia, the strips resulted from successive division of holdings among heirs in the process of inheritance.

This scattered strip system of farming, although conducted on an individualistic basis, was usually associated with a common crop rotation, since it was difficult to plant different strips of the same field with crops of varying growing seasons and maturities, especially since the stubble frequently was used as pasture. Such a system of farming precluded the use of modern power machinery, involved considerable waste of land in boundaries between strips (providing a fertile breeding ground for weeds and pests), and wasted time in traveling from one field to another. During the decade preceding World

War I, a strong effort was made by the government to promote consolidation of the scattered strip holdings into a single tract but such consolidated holdings were divided again during the revolution. Another consolidation of scattered holdings, on a much larger scale, occurred in the early thirties when Russian agriculture was collectivized, following a bitter struggle of the Kremlin with the [kulak] peasants. (“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, pp. IX-2 to IX-3) (IMG)

The remedy to this situation of the scattered agricultural holdings was collectivization, which would have:

transformed the narrow strips into large fields, suitable for modern power machinery, especially in the level steppe country. (“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

Collectivization was necessary for the improvement of agriculture because:

the kolkhoz ... represents the pooling of the holdings of formerly independent peasant farmers.. (“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

Thus, the USSR initiated a process of collectivization, which centralized the agricultural sector into cooperatives and contained the kulaks. The kulaks were a class of richer peasants who used their finances in order to act as rural quasi - bankers, exploiting the poorer peasants by, for example, entering them into debt traps. The strengthening of the poorer peasants through the amalgamation of their lands into cooperatives would have rendered the peasantry into a strong force capable of resisting the comprador and parasitic classes, including the kulaks. The petit-bourgeoisie on their own have businesses so small that they cannot take the risk of standing up to the powerful parasitic classes. Yet, when the petit-

bourgeoisie amalgamate their small businesses into bigger businesses through the formation of cooperatives, they, like the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, gain the economic strength and cushion that allows them to take the risk of standing up against the comprador and anti-productive classes. The Soviet state policy therefore was on the one hand economically centralizing and mechanizing agriculture so to render it more efficient, transforming the petit-bourgeoisie into cooperativists, and systematically containing the kulaks.

However, every correct policy always is faced with the pincer assault of liberalizers/capitulationists from the right and the extremists/adventurists from the left. The correct policy of centralizing agricultural sector into cooperatives met on the one hand the resistance of the Bukharinites who favored the kulaks, supported rural uprisings, and blatantly denounced collectivization, and the Trotskyite adventurers who, in the name of the Soviet Union, deliberately carried out forced collectivization so to discredit collectivization and thereby discredit the Soviet state itself. Naturally, the Trotskyites and the Bukharinites – representing the left and right flanks of the pincer assault on collectivization – were covertly allied despite being ‘hostile’ to each other on the overt level, as documented previously. Furthermore, in a July 11, 1928 conversation with Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin had remarked:

Stalin has bought off the Ukrainians by removing Kaganovich from [his post] there. We have great potential strength but . . . Stalin's retreat on extraordinary measures has made our attack on him more difficult. (‘The Kirov Murder and Soviet History’, Yale University Press, Matthew Lenoe. Presenting: memorandum of conversation between Kamenev and Bukharin as organized by Sokolnikov.) (IMG)

While the document belongs to the year 1928, it actually reveals Bukharin’s thinking. The MI6 agent Bukharin was launching the classic imperialist-fascist secret service strategy of pincer assault on collectivization: on the one hand, he wanted excess ‘collectivization’ and on the other hand he wanted no collectivization. Covertly, he wanted the pace of the ‘collectivization’ to be too fast, so that farmers would be forced and terrorized into it, so that collectivization would be discredited and thereby abandoned. He therefore both supported excesses in ‘collectivization’ and de-collectivization. This is also a reflection of his alliance as a right-deviationist with the Trotskyite left-deviation. On the overt level, however, he simply always presented himself as a supporter of de-collectivization or of a dramatic slow-down in its pace.

Stalin slowed down the pace of revolutionary change, a measure which set him at odds with the Trotskyites who sought to speed things up, and a measure that compelled the Bukharinites yet again to support Stalin on the overt level. In the July 11, 1928 secret meeting with Kamenev, Bukharin said:

Stalin's retreat on extraordinary measures has made our attack on him more difficult. We don't want to act as schismatics, because then they'll smash us. (The Kirov Murder and Soviet History, Yale University Press, Matthew Lenoe) (IMG)

Regarding Stalin’s ‘retreats’, the CIA too stated:

It should be noted, however, that Stalin has manifested caution in making his recommendations, and that in the past he has shown no compunction to retreat in the face of strong opposition. (STALIN’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY, Staff Memorandum No. 313, Office of National Estimates, CIA, January 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

Stalin, it must be noted, was not really retreating as much per se; rather he was slowing down pace in order to contain the Trotskyite attempts which sought to speed up the pace too much in order to provoke rural counter-revolutionary uprisings. And this compelled the Bukharinites to publicly support him, even though the Bukharinites continued their anti-Stalin conspiracies behind the scenes.

Stalin on the other hand, exploited the overt-level hostilities of the Bukharinites and the Trotskyites in order to adjust the pace of collectivization. When collectivization was too slow, he would appeal to the Trotskyites to speed it up, and when collectivization was too fast, he would tacitly ‘support’ the Bukharinites to slow it down. In so doing, the Stalin faction of the Party was able to adjust the pace of collectivization, carry forward with its politico-economic agenda, while also exploiting the overt ‘hostilities’ of the Bukharin-Trotsky groups, so to undermine the covert network of alliance of the Bukharinites and Trotskyites. When Bukharin said that Stalin ‘changes his theories according to the need he has of getting rid of somebody at such-and-such a moment’, he was pointing to this fact albeit in a manner that actually was aimed at distorting the truth. These facts are mentioned in greater detail in C5S1. With the campaign for agricultural collectivization and industrialization being in full swing, the MI6 agent Nikolai Bukharin emerged as the mastermind of the conspiracy to sabotage the Soviet state’s projects every single step of the way. He engineered waves of kulak rebellions throughout the USSR. The Britain-based MI6 spy and former Soviet military official Grigori Tokaev confirmed in his memoirs that the MI6 agent Bukharin:

had organised peasant uprisings, particularly in the North Caucasus, where Slepkov, Eismont, Pivovarov, Beloborodov, Petrovsky, Zaitsev and others had acted in the name of Buryto. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 96) (IMG)

‘Buryto’ abbreviated:

the Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky group. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 34) (IMG)

The comprador agents in the Soviet state organized death squads that would combat the Soviet government. This is

important, for many wrongly assume that officials in the Soviet government were physically 'incapable' of organizing, training and funding fascist death squads that would rise up against the Soviet state. Referring to the activities of the bloc of the Right and Trotskyites, the British Embassy in Moscow reported:

Another form of activity carried out on behalf of the Fascist employers was the organisation of cadres of bandits and malcontents with a view to risings behind the Red army lines in the event of war. This activity was particularly pronounced in Uzbekistan, where the basmachis, the remnants of the kulaks and clergy and common criminals in concentration camps, were enrolled. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

The above document by Chilston was stated by Chilston himself to be tentative in its conclusions, though the remarks are already well-corroborated by the other sources that are definitive, rather than tentative, in concluding that organizing anti-Soviet armed revolts was done by the Soviet state officials in the bloc of the Right and Trotskyites. Documenting the Great Purge of the officials who engaged in the economic sabotage in Georgia, an intelligence report by the British diplomatic corps in the USSR reported:

the trial took place in Tiflis from the 24th to the 26th August before the Supreme Court of the Georgian S.S.R. of eleven members of a Right Wing counter-revolutionary, terrorist organisation with its headquarters at Sinakhi. The trial ended by sentence of death being passed on seven of the defendants, the remainder being condemned to long terms of imprisonment. (...). The defendants ... were minor party and administrative officials in the Signakhi area and almost all ... seem to have been Georgians by race. (N 4549/250/38, No. 431, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, September 6, 1937; received September 10, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 187-188) (IMG)

The right-wing terrorists, noted the intelligence document, were engaged in:

wrecking and terrorism designed to undermine the economic and military strength of the Soviet Union and also to hasten the defeat of the Soviet Union at the hands of foreign aggressors. One of their principal lines of attack was through the collective farm organisation. Here they did everything to create chaos in the working of the farms and discontent amongst the workers, deliberately injuring the crops and livestock and showing undue severity in imposing and collecting taxes. (.). In all this they had the support of the local People's Judge. (N 4549/250/38, No. 431, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, September 6, 1937; received September 10, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 188) (IMG)

The document above written by Britain's most prominent spy in the USSR at the time, Viscount Chilston, is not to be confused with another document also written by Chilston and cited elsewhere in the book; the latter document presented its conclusions as tentative in character, whereas the remarks in the above document are cited definitively and can be regarded as definitive conclusions by the MI6.

Trotskyite sabotage, and with it the purges of its perpetrators, swept the entire Soviet Union. For instance, in Kirghizstan, Esenomanov, the Commissar for Agriculture:

entrusted the working of the commissariat of Agriculture to wreckers and White Guardsists. In spite of warnings no action was taken against M. Esenomanov, who enjoyed the support of M. Isakeev, the president of the Council of People's Commissars, who had in his time also taken part in the Nationalist movement. M. Isakeev, although his political tendencies were well known in the party circles, was never called upon to give an explanation of his activities and continued to afford material support to wreckers and Nationalists, going so far as to obtain M. Ailchinov, formerly an active Nationalist, the post of secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Kirghiz S.S.R. (N 4547/250/38, No. 428, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, September 4, 1937; received September 10, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 185) (IMG)

There was plenty of agricultural sabotage throughout the USSR. In Byelorussia, for instance, a gang of wreckers in the CPSU were, according to the British Foreign Office:

guilty of such severity towards the collective farmers that the latter have felt discouraged and the proper working of the farms has been interfered with. Yet others have given themselves up to riotous farming. (N 4124/3649/38, No. 374 E., Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, August 3, 1937; Received August 13, 1937, p. 155) (IMG)

Later on, in the late 1930s, such officials were purged. There was a serious effort to demote incompetent officials to maximize efficiency. For instance:

by a decision of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M. A. S. Bubnov has been removed from his post of People's Commissar of Education for the R.S.F.S.R.... (...). As Commissar for Education he was probably a failure; (N 5231/771/38, No. 492, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, October 15, 1937; Received October 22, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 212) (IMG)

The collective farmers sent letters to the central government of the USSR, thanking the state for the ruthless punishment of the saboteurs. As the British Embassy reported:

the collective farms welcome the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central

Committee of the Communist party (1) to liquidate 138 State farms which were “organized for the purpose of wrecking” and to transfer their lands to the collective farms; (2) to supply all collective farms with homesteads according to a fixed norm; (3) to transfer to the collective farms in perpetuity 480,000 hectares of forests; (4) to lower the rate for milk deliveries by half; and (5) to grant additional privileges to individual farmers joining the collective farms. (N 4124/3649/38, No. 374 E., Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, August 3, 1937; Received August 13, 1937, p. 155) (IMG)

Again, the four quotes above are from MI6 documents not marked as ‘tentative’ in conclusion by their authors. Since the start, the Stalin faction sought to neutralize such conspiracies aimed at systematically sabotaging agricultural collectivization. Regarding the excess speed in the pace of collectivization and the forceful implementation of collectivization in some areas by the early 1930s, the prominent US military official Kenneth Whiting wrote:

The Party began its campaign for collectivization by attacking the kulaks, or richer peasants, as early as the fall of 1928. The program was accelerated in 1929-30.... So rapid was the tempo that by March 1930 some 55 percent of all peasant households had been forced into collectives. At this point Stalin intervened and in his letter "Dizzy With Success" called for a slow-down and leniency. (Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Alabama, United States Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1970, p. 32) (IMG)

Countless hostile anti-Soviet propagandists, Whiting himself included, have claimed that Stalin supported hasty and forced collectivization, and that his remarks in “Dizzy with Success” merely served as a veil of hypocrisy. Indeed, the author goes on to comment that Stalin’s warning against unduly hasty collectivization:

was monstrous hypocrisy. (Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Alabama, United States Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1970, p. 32) (IMG)

Many such propagandists have refused to acknowledge that Stalin seriously meant to stop hasty and forceful collectivization. However, in the words of a US intelligence memorandum from the CIA Office of National Estimates (ONE),

There are, I believe, strong reasons for taking Stalin’s remarks on Soviet agriculture seriously. (...) Stalin cautioned against undue haste and emphasized the gradual introduction of the new policy. (STALIN’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY, Staff Memorandum No. 313, Office of National Estimates, CIA, January 19, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

Referring to Stalin, the memorandum continued:

in his report to the XVth Party Congress in 1927 he stressed the need to collectivize “by example and persuasion.” In that earlier period the lower echelons in bureaucracy pushed collectivization allegedly at a faster pace than the regime desired. (STALIN’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY, Staff Memorandum No. 313, Office of National Estimates, CIA, January 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

In his “Dizzy with Success,” Stalin – whose remarks on agriculture were serious (as admitted by US intelligence) – argued:

The successes of our collective-farm policy are due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on the voluntary character of the collective-farm movement and on taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry. Examples of the formation of collective farms in the developed areas must not be mechanically transplanted to underdeveloped areas. That would be foolish and reactionary. Such a “policy” would discredit the collectivisation idea at one stroke. In determining the speed and methods of collective-farm development, careful consideration must be given to the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. (Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement, First Published: Pravda, No. 60, Joseph Stalin, March 2, 1930, Source: J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 12, pp. 197-205, Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1955. Transcribed/HTML: Kenneth Higham and Mike B. retrieved from: Marxists Internet Archive. NS.)

As a result of Stalin’s article which aimed to prevent forced collectivization:

some 9 million out of the 14 million households dropped out of the collective farms in the first two months of the new policy. The carrot [i.e. persuasion] was now given more prominence than the stick [i.e. force]. (Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Alabama, United States Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1970, p. 32) (IMG)

At this point, the Bukharinite enemies of the Stalin faction, felt compelled to support the Stalin faction since the Bukharinites officially favored the slow-down of the pace of collectivization.

One of the means of persuading the peasants to join the collectives was by the provision of the mechanization services through the machine-tractor stations (MTS), in exchange for a part of the peasants’ agricultural produce. This again is in line with the historical materialist thesis that class struggles in the realm of property relations must occur strictly in

conjunction with the development of the productive forces. The post-WWII American intelligence document by the US Army and Navy stated:

Tractors, combines, and other important farm implements are not owned by the kolkhozy, but by state machine-tractor stations, which supply the necessary power machinery and operators to the kolkhozy on the basis of annual agreements. For their services the machine-tractor stations are paid in kind by the kolkhozy at specified rates per hectare (2.471 acres). These rates vary with the officially determined crop yields in a district.

The machine-tractor stations usually have repair shops for tractors and combines, and also staffs of mechanics, agronomists, and officials to provide technical assistance and direction of the kolkhozy. Tractor drivers are paid by the kolkhozy on the basis of "labor days" earned, as are other collective farmers, except that minimum amounts of grain and cash per "labor day" are prescribed by law. Combine operators are paid by the machine-tractor stations.

("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-4) (IMG)

The kolkhoz must also pay the state for the field work (plowing, seeding, harvesting) performed by state-owned tractors. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

In addition:

When their earnings from the kolkhozy were small, the peasants often found it advantageous to work on their little plots and tend their few animals rather than to work in the collective fields, especially if they had the opportunity to sell their produce at good prices on the limited private market in a neighboring town. Kolkhozy members have a legal right to carry on such trade provided they do not use the services of a middleman. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

"The state continues to own the land," the document continued:

but each collective farm holds the land it occupies for an unlimited period, "in perpetuity," according to Article VIII of the Soviet Constitution. The title of the kolkhoz to the land is secured by a title deed issued after an official land survey is made. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army- Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

In exchange for the use of Soviet state-owned land, the peasants paid in kind through their produce:

The state is a partner in collective farming and has the first claim on production. A kolkhoz must deliver to the government, at low fixed prices, a specified quantity of crops and livestock products per unit of land. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3)

Soviet policy also ensured that agricultural collectivization would not violate peasants' personal property. As confirmed by a post-WWII American intelligence report:

Only the land [use], horses, and other livestock ... and the farm machinery are collectivized. (...). In addition to their dwellings, each peasant family is entitled, if land is available, to a small plot for a kitchen garden and a small number of personally-owned cattle, hogs, sheep, and goats. But horses, except in nomadic regions, are collective property. A member of a kolkhoz who needs a horse for his own use must borrow it from the kolkhoz. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army- Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

Thus:

By assuring the peasants of private ownership of their homes, garden plots, livestock, and small tools, giving them preferential treatment in taxes, and setting up machine-tractor stations for the distribution of agricultural machinery, the government succeeded in enticing peasant households into the collective farms. By the end of 1932 some 14 million households were collectivized. (Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Alabama, United States Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1970, p. 32) (IMG)

However, Anglo-American media has argued since the 1930s, collectivization was a means to launch a genocide. Upon Stalin's 'orders', the imperialist press has famously asserted, the Soviet state launched a genocidal campaign of deliberately starving its own population, particularly the peasants of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Millions of pages have been printed to 'prove' that 'Stalin' – as if the policies of the USSR were all dictated by one man only – deliberately created famine and subsequently covered up 'his crimes' .

By contrast, the explanation of the Soviet government regarding the famines in this period has been that in part they were caused by natural cycles of famine and partly due to sabotage operations by the kulaks, the rich peasants who made up the ruling class of the agrarian zones. The Soviet claims have been implicitly – though clearly – rejected as Soviet propaganda by such professional anti-Soviet propagandists as Robert Conquest, Anne Applebaum, and Norman Naimark:

However, reports of the famine were hard to suppress entirely. The next line of defence is two-fold: that there was indeed malnutrition, and even an increase in the death rate, and that the responsibility for this was the recalcitrance of the peasants who had refused to sow or reap properly. The Soviet Government's need for grain was attributed to the requirements of the Army, a war with Japan being supposedly expected.

The admission of an increase in the death rate was permitted to journalists running a pro-Soviet line, who were, as we have seen, even able to say that there was no famine – only an excess of some two million deaths! This too confused the issue by its implication that such figures did not amount to much.

The recalcitrance of the peasantry was, of course, in accord with the official line that kulaks were sabotaging the crop in various ways: it too was made good use of in the West.

Between them, these amounted to an admission that there was indeed something most people would call a famine, but that it was not the Soviet's fault, and was not as serious as malignant propaganda had reported. (The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine, Robert Conquest, 2002. No Images)

Whereas, in 1921, the Soviet leadership had spoken of starving peasants as victims, in 1933, Stalin switched the vocabulary. Those who were starving were not victims; they were perpetrators. They were not sufferers; they were responsible for their terrible fate. They had caused the famine, and therefore they deserved to die. From this assessment came the logical conclusion: the state was justified in refusing to help them stay alive.

This was the argument that Stalin would advocate for the rest of his life. He never denied, to Sholokhov or to anyone else, that peasants had died from a famine caused by state policy in 1933, and he certainly never apologized. He clearly read Sholokhov's missives, and took them seriously enough to respond.

But he never admitted that any important element of his policy – not collectivization, not grain expropriation, not the searches and shakedowns that had intensified the famine in Ukraine — was wrong. Instead, he placed all responsibility for food shortages and mass deaths firmly onto the shoulders of those who were dying.

This is certainly what he told his party. During the Congress of Victors at the beginning of 1934, where Stalin had denounced nationalism, he also predicted further violence. “We have defeated the kulaks,” he declared, but the liquidation was not yet complete. Agents of the old regime – “former people,” as he called them – could still do a good deal of harm. More to the point, the party should expect more resistance from these “moribund classes”: “It is precisely because they are dying and their days are numbered that they will go on from one form of attack to another, sharper form, appealing to the backward sections of the population and mobilizing them against the Soviet regime.” (Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine, Anne Applebaum, 2017. No Images.)

By contrast, as the crisis worsened in the course of 1933, Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others in charge of dealing with requisitioning and punishing resistance increasingly tended to blame the Ukrainians for the famine (a shift from blaming the kulaks!). (Stalin's Genocides, Norman Naimark, p. 74. No Images.)

Though none of the above excerpts explicitly claim that the Soviet charges against the kulaks were falsified, it was quite clear that the Soviet narrative on the Ukraine famine was being rejected by the authors.

On the deliberate starvation of the peasant population allegedly committed by the Soviet state, the argument made is that the Soviet state forcibly collected the agricultural produce of the peasants, thereby starving them to death. This is a profound historiographic distortion of Soviet policy. Actually as stated previously, the peasants were to deliver part of their produce to the government **in exchange for** the state provisions of mechanization and tractor services as well as land use rights. This policy was not the cause of the famine.

In contrast to the claims of numerous CIA-funded anti-Soviet publications, the US intelligence itself reported as early as December 1946 – only nine months after Churchill's ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech, the official Anglo-Americans declaration of the Cold War – that the Soviet government was aiming to prevent famines from occurring, whereas the kulaks were the main human factor for the famine.

In May 2003, the CIA publicly released an intelligence document labelled as “Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study” on the “European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation.” Having remained classified for years, its distribution to unauthorized persons was prohibited by the Espionage Act.

The following is an excerpt of the intelligence document:

The food situation has always been a very serious matter in the USSR. Famines occurred about once in every 10 years, and serious crop failures once in 5 years. In the nineteenth century alone, famines occurred in the years 1822, 1833, 1840, 1873, 1880, 1883, 1891, 1892, 1898. and 1899. The disturbance created by civil war, foreign intervention, and boycott, after the Russian Revolution, resulted in the disastrous famine of 1920 to 1922 which cost the country numberless human lives and endless suffering. The famine caused mass migration in a search for food and contributed to the spreading of epidemics.

The Soviet Government decided to solve the problem of food and famine by collectivization and mechanization of agriculture. This proved to be a failure at the end of the first Five-year Plan, and in 1932 the U.S.S.R.

experienced a disastrous famine again. The failure was caused by lack of cooperation on the part of the “kulaks” (rich peasants), who openly sabotaged the government’s plan. However, in 1933 all forces were mobilized to remedy the kulak situation, and since then the U.S.S.R. has been having record crops and no major problems except those resulting from war and drought. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, pp. XI-5-6) (IMG)

In case the above paragraphs do not make sense to the reader, the following is a break-down.

Referring to the territory of the former Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, the US intelligence file stated that cyclical:

Famines occurred about once in every 10 years. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-5) (IMG)

The previous famine as the document suggests was in:

1922.. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

Therefore, the next natural famine was expected to be in $1922 + 10 = 1932$. 1932 indeed was the year of the famine. However, the intelligence document pointed out:

The Soviet Government decided to solve the problem of food and famine. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

The above quote absolutely clarifies that the intention of the Soviet Government was to ‘solve the problem of food and famine’ and thereby prevent those deaths from happening. The US intelligence report, therefore, practically rejects the narrative that the Soviet Government carried out a genocide because intending to deliberately exterminate an ethnic group is a key component of genocides. The attempt to ‘solve the problem of food and famine’ was through the:

collectivization and mechanization of agriculture. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

However, this attempt:

proved to be a failure at the end of the first Five-year Plan. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

not because the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture were supposedly bad ideas, but rather because of the:

lack of cooperation on the part of the “kulaks” (rich peasants), who openly sabotaged the government’s plan [for ending the famine]. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European USSR, p. XI-6)

The Anglo-German intelligence agent Bukharin and his gang were responsible for this crime against humanity, because they were the ones who fomented a kulak rebellion against the Soviet state, causing agricultural sabotage. The Britain-based MI6 spy and former Soviet military official Grigori Tokaev confirmed in his memoirs that the MI6 agent Bukharin:

had organised peasant uprisings, particularly in the North Caucasus, where Slepkov, Eismont, Pivovarov, Beloborodov, Petrovsky, Zaitsev and others had acted in the name of Buryto. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 96) (IMG)

‘Buryto’ abbreviated:

the Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky group. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 34) (IMG)

Consequently:

in 1932 the U.S.S.R. experienced a disastrous famine again. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

In short, while a cyclical famine was expected to occur in 1932, kulak sabotage was the main human factor for the Ukraine Famine that year. To put an end to the sabotage:

in 1933 all forces were mobilized to remedy the kulak situation. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

and:

since [the time of the crackdown on kulaks] the U.S.S.R. has been having record crops and no major problems except those resulting from war and drought. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

Collectivization of agriculture enlarged the lands and thereby allowed room for mechanization. The consolidation of the lands into cooperatives was a major step that centralized agriculture, in conjunction with Soviet state’s industrial assistance (MTS) in order to yield the development of the productive forces. In the words of US Army-Navy intelligence:

The elimination of boundaries transformed the narrow strips into large fields, suitable for modern power machinery, especially in the level steppe country. The peasant families, having thus pooled their holdings, continue to live in their own dwellings in villages. (“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

To summarize: (1) A cyclical, natural famine was to occur 1932. (2) The Soviet government aimed to end the cycles of

famine through collectivization and mechanization of agriculture. (3) The central government of the USSR aimed to prevent collectivization from being forced upon the peasantry. (4) Throughout the Soviet Union – especially Kazakhstan and Ukraine – these plans temporarily failed due to the sabotage by the financier peasants also known as the kulaks. (5) Once the kulak situation was remedied and the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture occurred, never again did the Soviet people face a famine except during and briefly after World War II which had temporarily damaged Soviet agriculture.

Another aspect of the hostile anti-Soviet propaganda is the exaggeration of the mortality statistics regarding the famine. To be sure, the exaggeration of the mortality statistics is superficially ‘beneficial’ to the Stalin faction and the Soviet state since it exposes the statistical extent of the crimes against humanity committed by the kulak rebels and the Bukharin intelligence network. Needless to say is that the purpose here is to expose the truth instead of moulding and torturing the facts into a ‘Soviet apologist’ narrative. The Party’s resistance against the Bukharinite- kulak crimes against humanity prevented the death toll from rising to such an exaggerated level. Statistics provided by the CIA’s Office of Research and Reports (ORR) can help debunk the myths regarding the death toll. Of course, in this process, as with any other statistical estimate, there will inherently be some assumptions that are flawed, but which are overall useful. Therefore, it is hoped that the reader, in judging the statistical procedures used here, would take this fact into account.

The territory controlled by Tsarist Russia between 1897 and 1913, though not the same, was similar to the territory controlled by the USSR. The main difference was that Finland and the Baltics were a part of Tsarist Russia at that period as well. Overall, Tsarist Russia’s geography stayed stable. Therefore, it is logical to say that the population and its growth rates would be relatively stable.

In nature, population growth occurs exponentially. Generally, populations do not grow such that 1000 people are added to it every year, but rather grow by being multiplied yearly by an average of, for instance, 2 percent. Hence, the first thing to take into account for the death toll of the famine is the population exponential growth coefficient. Where ‘y2’ is ‘year 2’, ‘y1’ is ‘year 1’, ‘p2’ is population for y2, and ‘p1’ is population for y1, the Population Growth Coefficient ‘r’ would be as follows:

$$\text{Growth Coefficient} = r = \left(\frac{p2}{p1}\right)^{\frac{1}{(y2-y1)}}$$

Example: Growth Coefficient for the period 1897-1900 can be calculated as follows:

$$r = \left(\frac{131.7}{125.6}\right)^{\frac{1}{(1900-1897)}} = 1.01619386$$

The table below shows the population of the territory of the Soviet Union and its Tsarist Russian predecessor (middle column). The statistics for the population is provided by an economic intelligence report of the CIA’s Office of Research and Reports, whereas the column on the right represents the population growth coefficient as calculated according to the method shown above.

Year = y	Population (Millions) = p	Growth Coefficient = r
1897	125.6	1.015933728
1900	131.7	1.01619386
1902	136	1.015859713
1913	161.7	0.992695258
1926	147	1.011473219
1939	170.5	

My calculation of population Growth Coefficient (r) based on CIA data.

Note: the 1954 CIA document, upon the statistics of which the estimates are being made here, presents data both for the pre-1954 period and the projected populations statistics for the USSR for all the way to 1975. The document states that the projected population data is calculated by the US Census Bureau. For the pre-1954 period, however, the CIA does not state that that it obtained the data from any other source than the CIA. See the following for the CIA statistics: (LONG-RUN SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH, Economic Intelligence Report, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, December 23, 1954, p. 72) (IMG)

The next step would be to use the Growth Coefficient r so to estimate the populations for the years 1932 and 1933, the years of the famine in the USSR. As bolded in the above table, the growth coefficient for the year 1926 is 1.011473219; on the other hand, the CIA did not provide any data for the years in between 1926 and 1939, which is why the populations

for the years 1932 and 1933 have to be estimated based on the CIA data. The procedure for doing that is not difficult. Step 1: find the difference in the number of years between 1932 and 1926, and between 1933 and 1926, which would obviously be 6 and 7 respectively. Step 2: have the Population Growth Coefficient 'r' to the power of 6, and also to power of 7, to get r^6 and r^7 . Step 3: multiply r^6 by the population for the year 1926, and multiply r^7 by the population for the year 1926 as well. The point of such a multiplication is obvious enough – by multiplying those 'powered' growth rates by the 1926 population, one is basically multiplying the 1926 population by its corresponding growth coefficient 6 and 7 times in order to find the populations of 1932 and 1933 respectively. The mathematical procedure is shown below. Where 'py' is the population for the specific year 'y', we have:

$$p_y = (p_{1926})(r^{n-1926})$$

$$p_{1932} = (147)(1.011473219^{1932-1926}) = (147)(1.011473219^6) = 157.4141124$$

$$p_{1933} = (147)(1.011473219^{1933-1926}) = (147)(1.011473219^7) = 159.2201589$$

The same kind of procedure was repeated for all the years between 1926 and 1939, and has been shown in the table below.

Year	Estimated Population (in millions not rounded)
1926	147
1927	148.6865632
1928	150.3924767
1929	152.1179625
1930	153.8632452
1931	155.6285519
1932	157.4141124
1933	159.220159
1934	161.0469267
1935	162.8946534
1936	164.7635794
1937	166.6539481
1938	168.5660053
1939	170.5

From here, it is necessary to find one yearly natural population growth coefficient in the territory of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union. The point of finding this one yearly natural population growth coefficient is to find its difference with the growth coefficient corresponding to the 1926-1939 period, which, as bolded previously, is 1.011473219. Such a difference would in turn reflect the amount of decline in the growth coefficient, which can then be multiplied by the population for each of the years 1932 and 1933 so to find the sum {mortality plus the decline in births resultant from the mortality}, for each of those years respectively; then, the last step would be to add the products of multiplication, so to calculate the total amount of {mortality plus the resultant birth decline} for the years 1932 to 1933. It is worth emphasizing that the figure that would be obtained would not be the mortality but would be mortality in addition to the birth decline, the birth decline in this case reflecting the loss in births caused in the first place by the mortality of adults who would have given birth had they been alive. In other words, imagine if the people who actually died as a result of the famine continued to live on; how many children would these people have given birth to? That represents the birth decline resultant from the mortality.

Again, for all of this, the first step is to find the one yearly natural population growth coefficient. In order for the growth coefficient to be natural (or natural enough), the growth coefficient has to somehow exclude the factors of (1) wars occurring, which would cause an artificial decline in population, (2) Soviet or Tsarist-Russian territory shrinking, which would cause an artificial decline in population, and (3) Soviet or Tsarist-Russian territory expanding, which would cause an artificial rise in population.

Obviously, during the time of the Soviet years prior to the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet territory neither shrank much nor expanded, after the Civil War. And the Civil War itself was a war and hence an artificial factor for the decline of the population; the Civil War also involved the net shrinkage of the territory of the former Russian Empire, such as in Finland and the Baltics, and hence an artificial population decrease. The original CIA data provided the year 1926 as the first datapoint after the October Revolution and Civil War, and the year 1939 as the first datapoint for after 1926. Hence,

the CIA data does not provide as much insight on the natural population growth coefficient. For this reason, the Soviet years are excluded. Instead, one has to look at the years of the Russian Empire in the recent centuries.

The period 1897-1913 would be optimum for the calculations here. The year 1913 was the year before World War I, and, compared to the other periods in the Russian Imperial history, the years between 1897 and 1913 saw a relatively high degree of stability in the territorial reach of Tsarist Russia. Russia briefly occupied Manchuria in 1900, but could not absorb that territory into its Empire and was quickly forced into retreat. The fact that the territory of Russia neither expanded much nor shrank could help minimize the factor of territorial change as a cause for population change. The population growth therefore can be regarded as natural enough. Still, it is worth reminding that the slight expansion of the Russian Empire probably would have artificially expanded the population, and that the treatment of such an artificial expansion of population as ‘natural enough’ would lead to exaggerated figures on mortality during the Soviet years. As will be seen later in this section, this period 1897-1913 would actually surprisingly prove to be far more optimum for being used for estimations, than may at first appear.

The next step is to calculate the yearly growth coefficient for the years 1897 to 1913. The data available by the CIA document for period 1897-1913 is only with regards to the years 1897, 1900, 1902, and 1913. This means that the number for each year does not increase in an interval; in other words, it is not the case that the data is presented, for example, for every four years: 1897, 1901, 1905, 1909, 1913. Since such an interval does not exist, there are two main ways to find the population growth coefficient for the years 1897-1913. Method 2 is preferable over Method 1.

Method 1

The first method is to find the ‘weighted average’. This involves the following steps:

Step 1 – Find the growth coefficients for the years 1897-1900, 1900-1902, and 1902-1913. This step has already been taken and the figures have been presented in the table before the above.

Step 2 – Find the difference between each of those years. This is easy; 1900 – 1897 = 3; 1902 – 1900 = 2; and 1913 – 1902 = 11.

Step 3 – Multiply the year differences found in step 2 by the growth coefficients that correspond to those periods found in step 1.

Step 4 – Add the product of those multiplications, and then divide the sum of those products by the number of years between 1897 and 1913 (which is 1913 – 1897 = 16).

The result, which would be the weighted average, can be regarded as the one yearly natural population growth coefficient looked for. As explained previously, this natural population growth coefficient has to be subtracted with the growth coefficient for 1926, the $r_{1926} = 1.011440208$, in order to then be multiplied by the sum of the estimated populations of 1932 and 1933, so to calculate the total population loss for those years. The result would be as follows:

$$\text{Average Growth Coefficient} = \frac{\sum_{1897}^{1913}[(y_2 - y_1)r]}{1913 - 1897} = \frac{(1900 - 1897)(1.015933728) + (1902 - 1900)(1.01619386) + (1913 - 1902)(1.015859713)}{1913 - 1897} = 1.015915359$$

$$(\text{Estimated Population for 1932} + \text{Estimated Population for 1933}) (\text{Average Growth Coefficient} - r_{1926}) = (157.414112 + 159.220159)(1.015915359 - 1.011473219) = 1.406533762$$

The calculations based on method 1 and relying on CIA data show that the sum of the mortality and birth decline resultant from the 1932-1933 famine in the USSR (including Ukraine **and** Kazakhstan SSRs) was 1.406534 million, or 1,406,534. Note that the inclusion of the birth decline in the figure indicates that the **mortality figure throughout the Soviet Union was significantly**, though in unknown amounts due to the absence of available CIA statistics on the birth rates, **smaller than 1,406,534**.

Method 2

Method 1 has its obvious merits; it finds the average and ensures that the average is weighted. It therefore helps adjust for the fact that the data from the CIA is not provided in intervals. However, since finding averages inherently deals with summation, average growth coefficient and average growth rate is useful for finding the growth rate for things that grow almost arithmetically; however, in the context of the exponential growth of the population, while certainly the weighted average would still be useful, there is another way to find the one yearly natural population growth coefficient looked for. Thus, the second way, would be to calculate the exponential growth coefficient for the years 1897-1913, without involving the arithmetic methods such as average. To find one yearly natural population growth coefficient while excluding the arithmetic methods, find the growth coefficient for the years 1897-1913 such that the data for the years during this period – that is, the data for the years 1900 and 1902 – is excluded, because it is that data which creates the

requirement for finding the weighted average and hence the incorporation of the arithmetic methods in the first place. Hence, for $y_2 = 1913$ and $y_1 = 1897$, we have:

$$\text{Growth Coefficient} = r = \left(\frac{p_2}{p_1}\right)^{\frac{1}{(y_2 - y_1)}}$$

$$r = \left(\frac{161.7}{125.6}\right)^{\frac{1}{(1913 - 1897)}} = 1.015915353$$

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{Estimated Population for 1932} + \text{Estimated Population for 1933}) (\text{Average Growth Coefficient} - r_{1926}) = \\ & (157.414112 + 159.220159)(1.015915353 - 1.011473219) \\ & = 1.406532 \end{aligned}$$

Comparing the results of the two methods, we find that the one natural coefficient for growth is 1.015915359 for method 1 and 1.015915353 for method two, thus having a difference of only 0.000000006. This shows that both methods result in extremely close answers. The fact of the high level of similarity between the answers of the two methods strengthens the view that the years 1897-1913 chosen for finding the natural growth coefficient are the best years to examine, because had there been dramatic fluctuations in the population growth during those years, the answers for methods 1 and 2 could be radically different.

On the other hand, the sum of mortality and the resultant birth decline as calculated above using method 2 is 1,406,532, whereas for method 1 it was 1,406,534. That marks a difference of 2 persons. Again, note that the figure represents not the mortality from the famine, but rather the {mortality plus the resultant birth decline}. If one is to assume that those who died would have remained alive and as couples would have given birth to two children per couple, that would have meant that the birth decline was half of the 1,406,534 figure, meaning that the other half, the mortality, would have been 703,267. Therefore, the total mortality as a result of the 1932-1933 famine was somewhere in between 703,267 and 1,406,534. This means that the number of people murdered through starvation to death by the British intelligence agent Bukharin, his network within the Soviet Party and state apparatuses, and his kulak rebels, was less than 1,406,534 and most likely above 703,267.

Whereas the Stalin faction of the Soviet government was not at all responsible for a genocide, the Bukharinite agents of the MI6 within the Soviet state and their kulak allies carried out a mass-slaughter – if not a genocide – against the Soviet people. During the time in which they were busy carrying out such an intelligence war of extermination, the Bukharinites had the MI6 agent Trotsky and the Trotskyites as their accomplices. On the other hand, the Soviet state and the Stalin faction, which arose out of the blue-collar workers' faction of the CPSU, resisted such crimes. Eventually, the Bukharinites and Trotskyites were prosecuted for their crimes against humanity.

Another myth is that collectivization was a means by which the Soviet state 're-enslaved' the peasants. Not true. Agricultural collectives, by the nature of their property relations were not socialized public property but rather cooperativist/collective property. Firstly, unlike in state enterprises in which large factories were run under the principles of one-man management, the kolkhoz peasantry elected their officers. "[T]he kolkhoz," the US intelligence reported:

elects its officers by majority vote, and manages its own affair within limits set by government plans and regulations. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

Regulated, rather than controlled by, the Soviet state, the cooperatives therefore would engage in market competition and thereby help drive down the price of food for the consumer masses. The cooperative market sales would help provide wages according to the amount of work done by each kolkhoz peasant. The US intelligence reported:

After the obligations to the state are met, seed supplies assembled for the next year's sowing, and other required reserves set up, the remainder is available for distribution by the kolkhoz to its members. The kolkhoz may sell some of its produce to the government at somewhat higher prices than those fixed for compulsory deliveries, and thereby also secure the privilege of purchasing some manufactured products in short supply. It may sell some of its produce on the free private market in the neighboring town at uncontrolled prices, which are usually higher than the prices paid by the state. As no middleman can be legally employed in this process, such trade is limited in scope.

The remainder of the kolkhoz output is distributed in kind among the members, as is the cash income after the necessary expenses of production are met and required appropriations to capital are made. Distribution in kind and in cash is made on a sort of piece-work basis, according to the quantity, skill, and quality of work performed. Work is measured in special units called "labor days." The greater the skill required in a particular task, and the greater the quantity of work done, the larger the payment assessed in terms of "labor days." Bonuses for better quality of work, resulting in higher yields of crops or livestock products, have also been provided in

terms of additional "labor days." Inferior quality of work is punishable by reduction in the number of "labor days" assessed. The total number of "labor days" credited to all members of the collective farms are added up at the end of the year, and the income to be distributed, in cash and in kind, is divided by the total number of "labor days."

Each "labor day," therefore, entitles a member of the collective farm to a certain quantity of the product and cash, and, since the number of "labor days" credited to different members of the kolkhoz varies, their earnings also differ. The earnings of individuals and families show considerable variation in the same kolkhoz. There are even greater variations as between different kolkhozy, since the quantities distributed per "labor day" vary from kolkhoz to kolkhoz, depending upon such factors as efficiency of management, fertility of the soil, type of equipment, distance to town markets, and weather conditions, which vary from region to region. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

"The government," the US intelligence document continued:

concerns itself directly with problems of seed and forage supply, timely and efficient sowing and harvesting, proper care of livestock, crop rotation, internal organization of the farm unit, and many others. Crop acreages and even yields per acre, and numbers of livestock, are directed by national plans, establishing the goals for republics and provinces. Local goals are set up by republic and province authorities. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

The kolkhoz peasants, as was mentioned previously, had the right to engage in some personal farming as well, within the regulations set by the government. The US intelligence reported:

In 1937 this personal farming by members of the kolkhozy was estimated to yield over one-fifth of total agricultural production. In 1939 the government decided to limit this type of farming, which competed with collective farming, by fixing a minimum required time for each member to devote to collective work. Members of collective farms, both men and women, who consistently fall below the minimum are liable to expulsion [from the kolkhoz] and loss of their plots of land. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

C5S4. The Truth about the Corrective Labour Camps ('Gulag')

*** IMG-All-{Corrective Labour Camps}

The CIA-funded media presents the Soviet state as having enslaved individuals, sending them to the corrective labour camps, the Gulags. The prisoners were not enslaved, firstly because they had given up their liberty on their own by committing crimes, and secondly because they were materially rewarded for their work in the form of payments or in kind.

A September 1952 US State Department document stated:

The utilization of food, as an incentive to work, to be diminished or increased with the work or performance of the prisoner, is perhaps a unique feature of the Soviet corrective labor system. This principle receives official sanction in the regulation governing corrective labor camps. The Regulations for the Supply of the Ukhta-Pechora NKDV Corrective-Labor Camp, issued in May 1937, states in section 1, paragraph 2, that "in distributing the food supplies a system must be followed whereby the quantity of products issued to the prisoners rises in proportion to the rate of fulfillment (or overfulfillment) of the norm." (Forced Labor in the Soviet Union, US State Department, Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State Publication 4716, European and British Commonwealth Series No. 37, September 1952, p. 50) (IMG)

The September 1952 US State Department document, referring to the prisoner workers in the Soviet corrective labour camps, stated:

Practically all workers, even those engaged in labor where piece-rate determination is difficult, such as snow removal, are judged on a piece-rate basis. Specialists and persons such as electricians, engineers, and doctors are considered as fulfilling 100 percent of the norm. (Forced Labor in the Soviet Union, US State Department, Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State Publication 4716, European and British Commonwealth Series No. 37, September 1952, p. 50) (IMG)

Hence, the US State Department document was confirming that by 1952 the piece-rate wage system was the system of rewards given to all the prisoner workers in the Soviet Union; before then, the prisoners were materially rewarded by the amount of food they received.

The above-cited US State Department document was concerning all of the corrective labour camps, the gulag system in general, in the USSR. However, the CIA provided details of specific labour camps. That the prisoners were paid is also confirmed by the CIA's Office of Research and Report, which is one of the bodies responsible for collecting the different reports by individual CIA operatives, dissecting the corroborated/validated points among them and placing them together into a single report. This fact is important because it means that the remarks by the CIA's Office of Research

and Report are based on not just one source, but several sources. In this document, the CIA's Office of Research and Report stated:

Beginning in 1950-51, prisoners in some camps began to, receive wages for their work, and by the end of 1953 this practice had been extended to all camps. Prisoners were paid for their work on the basis of wage rates and norms applicable to free workers, except that forced laborers were not paid the special bonuses for work in areas and for length of service. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 14) (IMG)

The report by the Office of Research and Reports continued:

In 1950-51 the system of *zachet* under which the prisoner was able to reduce his term of imprisonment by over-fulfilling his work norm, was introduced in a few camps and was liberalized and extended throughout the camp system during 1953-1954. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 15) (IMG)

Other US intelligence reports pretty consistently corroborate the fact that the Gulag inmates/prisoners were paid for their work. Some of these other US intelligence documents focus on specific camps that were of prime importance. There was one CIA report about the different types of corrective labor camps in the USSR and explains some of the aspects of these camps:

1. The following report mentions several different **types** of forced labor camps in the USSR, viz.:
 - a. Minlag: A camp maintained by the MGB for political prisoners. Minlag is an abbreviation of minis-tralnaya lagernaya chast MGB. The meaning of ministralnaya is said to be that the camp is central one with certain responsibilities for dependent camps.
 - b. Gorlag: A camp maintained by the MGB for political prisoners, at which special precautions against escape are taken. Gorlag is an abbreviation of gosudarstvennyy osoborezhimnyy lager (State special regime camp).
 - c. OLI: A small camp in a severe climate, maintained by the MGB and believed to be a subdivision of a minlag. OLP is an abbreviation of otdeleniye lagernogo puncta chrezvychaynorezhimnogo lagerya (subsec-tion of a sub-camp of an extreme regime camp).
 - d. Ozerlag: A camp maintained by the MVD for both political and criminal prisoners with long sen-tences, at which special restrictive measures apply. Ozerlag is an abbreviation for osobozakrytnyy rezhimnyy lager (special closed regime camp).
 - e. Steplag: An MVD camp in the steppe zone, believed to be identical in function with an Ozerlag.
 - f. ITL: A corrective labor camp maintained by the MVD. The initials stand for ispravitelnyy trudovoy lager (corrective labor camp).
 - g. KTR: A penal labor camp maintained by the Ministry of Justice. The "K" stands for katorzynyy (penal), the "T" probably stands for trudovoy (labor), and the "R" may stand for rezhim (regime).
 - h. Peresyilka: A transit camp (peresylnyy lager)
(FORCED LABOR CAMPS, CIA, December 1, 1954, p. 1. Bold added. Underline original.) (IMG)

Note that the list of the terms above is not referring to individual camp settlements but rather the different types and series of camps throughout the USSR. For, example, the Ozerlag was a chain of camps that stretches from near Moscow all the way to near Vladivostok. Hence, the list above is referring to the chains of camps throughout the USSR, and the different types of camps thereof. While aspects of all the series of Gulag camps will be examined in this section, three in particular will be given special attention because they are the most important ones: Ozerlag, Vyatlag, and Angarlag. They are important because all of them were among the largest and most extensive of the corrective labour camps in the USSR, and hence provide excellent cases to examine. Describing the history of the Gulag camps in Siberia, Igor Naumov, who was anti-communist collaborator of the Soros agent Jonathan Brent (see the 'Titoist Coup' images section for C19S3.1), listed Ozerlag as being one of the top five:

largest and most horrendous GULAG structures. (The History of Siberia, Igor Naumov, 2006, p. 202) (IMG)

On the other hand, according to 'Open Democracy' – an Atlanticist publication that as early as 2012, received funding from Soros's Open Society Foundation as well as the CIA's Ford Foundation – the Vyatlag was one of the biggest concentration camps in the Gulag system:

In 1938 a special order from the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs established Vyatlag, one of the biggest concentrations of forced labour camps in the Gulag system, in the north of the Kirov Oblast, 1000 km north east of Moscow. Its 75th anniversary falls in 2013. During the period 1938-56 more than 100,000 prisoners from 20 countries and of 80 different nationalities were sent here to serve their sentence. 18,000 of them were destined never to see their homes again. (Vyatlag: the Gulag then and now, Open Democracy, Eka-terina Lushnikova, November 9, 2012) (IMG)

One CIA document was particularly concerned with Vyatlag and more important the Ozerlag labour camp because it was

the one that was maintained by the Soviet intelligence service for political criminals and ordinary criminals. A CIA document explored the organization of labor camps:

This six-page report provides detailed information on the organization of labor camps.. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. Main) (IMG)

In this CIA document:

The bulk of this information concerns [the] Ozerlag. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR. 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. Main) (IMG)

The Ozerlag was not just one camp settlement but was a large chain of camps stretching across Soviet territory, and was maintained by the MVD for both political and criminal prisoners with long sentences. (FORCED LABOR CAMPS, CIA, December 1, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Note again that 'the camp' referred to a long series of camp settlements across the USSR. The CIA provided the data on the per settlement number of prisoners in Ozerlag and other camp types:

The number of prisoners in each labor camp settlement was different, and in Ozerlag ranged from 600 to 2,000.

The size of settlements in other labor camps was different; for example, in Vyatlag in 1946-47 there were 1,500 to 3,500 prisoners per settlement, and in Minlag in 1948-49 there were 5,000 to 8,000 prisoners per settlement. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

Another confusion that may arise out of reading the 1957 CIA document is that since the title of a subsection of it is 'Ozerlag, 1951-1955', all the points made in it are solely regarding the period 1951-1955. Although the subsection focuses predominantly on the 1950s, it would be a misconception to assume that the remarks made under it are solely with regards to the 1950s, since the above-cited paragraph, which explains the camps well prior to 1949, is also under that subsection.

Anyways, until 1952, the prisoners were rewarded with food, as opposed to money, according to the CIA. More work, more food. The CIA document reported:

Until 1952 the "guaranteed ration" was distributed to each prisoner, regardless of whether or not he had fulfilled the norm. It consisted of 122 grams of groats, 10 grams of flour, 20 grams of sugar, 75 grams of fish, 10 grams of something made of flour, such as macaroni, 500 grams of potatoes and vegetables, 15 grams of fat, 17 grams of coffee substitute, 1.3 grams of tomato sauce, 45 grams of meat, and 650 grams of bread. From this the following meals were delivered: breakfast – 700 grams of soup and 200 cc of kasha; dinner – 700 cc of soup and 200 grams of bread; supper 700 cc of soup and 200 cc of kasha. In the evening a portion of fish and 200 grams of bread were handed out. All these food products were of extremely low quality. In addition, it was permitted to substitute some products for others; for example, fish could be substituted for meat, cabbage for potatoes, etc. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

An individual who worked more received more food:

The prisoners who fulfilled over 100% of the norm were given a supplementary ration. There were several grades, each including 100 grams of bread, 200 cc of kasha, and 5 grams of sugar more than the next lowest one. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

From March 1952 onwards however, the prisoners were paid/rewarded with money for their work:

Beginning with March 1952 the camp was put on a basis of economic accountability (khozrasset), i.e. the prisoners were paid for their work on the basis of a reduced rate of output (po vyrabotke po ponizhennoy tarifnoy setke). The quantity of food was increased: everyone was given daily an additional 800 grams of bread, 130 grams of groats, 10 grams of flour products, 30 grams of fat, 27 grams of sugar, 3 grams of tomato puree, 350 grams of potatoes, 500 grams of vegetables, 45 grams of meat, and up to 90 grams of fish. The food improved, but the practice of substituting some products for others remained. Moreover, there always was an inadequate amount of green vegetables and the prisoners all suffered from scurvy. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF

1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

The prisoners could utilize their money for purchasing the goods at the store:

Stores (lar'ki) where food and tobacco could be bought were opened at the settlements. One could always buy bread at these stores, but the supply of other products was poor. There were expensive products, too expensive for the prisoners to buy, but rarely cheap products. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

There was a wage differentiation:

The amount of earnings depended on the profession and on the degree of fulfillment of the norms, if there were norms for that particular type of work. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

The CIA provided further details by stating:

Each enterprise where the prisoners worked paid the money earned by the prisoners to the camp. The camp deducted 60% of each prisoner's earnings for the upkeep of the camp. More was deducted from the remaining 40% as the upkeep of the prisoner himself, i.e. for lodging, food, clothing, and services such as light, heating, bath, barber, etc. The remaining money was given to the prisoner. For example: a locksmith in a motor vehicle repair shop earned 1,000 rubles a month. The camp reduced 600 rubles for the upkeep of the camp. About 100 rubles of the remaining 400 rubles was deducted for food, 75 rubles for clothing, about 50 rubles for everything else, such as lodging, bath, barber, etc. He was given the remaining money. This was typical of worker who was a specialist. The other workers received an average of 30-40 rubles a month. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

In addition:

Those who were employed in economic services, such as shoemakers, barbers, etc., and also prisoners who worked in the administration, were given a salary of 35 to 100 rubles a month. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

For the physically disabled people ('invalids'), there was a lower deduction from the earnings:

Invalids [i.e. the physically-disabled people] who did production work were paid according to their output. However, only 50% was deducted from their earnings. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

In other words, the physically disabled had the equivalent of a tax break.

The per day working hours for the inmates was 10 hours, i.e. 2 hours more than the Soviet workers' working hours.

The CIA stated:

The production norms were in accordance with the All-Union scale and were the same as for free workers. The free workers' norms were calculated for eight working hours. The daily norms for the prisoners, who worked ten hours, were raised proportionately. In 1954 an eight hour working day was introduced for the prisoners also. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

The prisoners were rewarded for their 'over-fulfilment' of the production targets. However, too often, the 'over-fulfilment' was not real:

Ordinarily the norms were overfulfilled, but mainly on paper. Each brigade leader would record for his brigade more output than had actually been produced. All, from the authorities to the prisoners, were anxious to overfill the plan, and consequent authorities paid little heed to the accuracy of output records. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

That is, many prisoners got paid for work that they did not do. The brigade leaders in the camps carried an act of sabotage

by reporting the production as higher than it was, and the authorities apparently neglected such economic sabotage. Perhaps a reason for such economic sabotage is that the staff of the units of the labour camps were themselves made up of inmates:

The staff of all the units of a labor camp settlement, with the exception of their heads is chosen from the prisoners. An exception is the planning-production unit, the head of which is often [though not always] a prisoner, since apparently there were not enough civilian economists. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

Now to be sure, having the units of a labour camp staffed by inmates benefited the camp by bridging the inmates with the heads of the units, and helped employ the skills of the inmates for productive purposes. However, the obvious downside was the economic sabotage mentioned above. Overall, however, the policy of employing staff from among the inmates certainly was useful in boosting production.

The over-fulfillment of the norms also reduced the sentence of the prisoners:

In addition, for overfulfillment of the norm there were the so-called "zachety" (payments). For overfulfilling the norm by 105%, one day of the sentence was counted as two. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

On other hand:

Those, such as cooks, trailors, etc., who performed work for which there were no norms, were given the type of compensation in accordance with the evaluation of their work: if the evaluation was good, one day of their sentence counted for two; if the evaluation was excellent, one day counted for 2 or 3, depending on their duties. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

The CIA also plausibly claimed that some of the guards abused the laws and murdered prisoners. Such an abuse was put an end to during Stalin's time period:

Until 1952 if a guard prevented a prisoner's escape, he received a month's leave and 300 rubles. As a result it frequently happened that a guard would kill a prisoner for taking one step beyond the boundary of the zapretnaya zone, at work, for example, and then receive 300 rubles and leave. In 1952 this policy of giving leave and money was abolished, and immediately "escape attempts" ceased. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 3) (IMG)

An indication as to whether the inmates had the mentality of actual criminals or not lies in the fact that, upon the rise to power of the Titoist bloc in the Kremlin, numerous criminals were released from jail, and upon release, the majority of these criminals swiftly committed new crimes. Indeed, the US intelligence reported:

The 1953 amnesty was for ordinary criminals. Approximately one-half per cent of the prisoners in Ozerlag were released. Up to 70% of the prisoners in Angarlag were released. They were released in one grand sweep, in approximately one week. Within the next three months the majority of them were rearrested for crimes which they had newly committed and returned to Angarlag. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

The Angarlag was a very extensive corrective labour camp. According to the Taishet History website, the vastness of the Angarlag camp columns was follows:

Due to production needs, the camp columns of Angarlag were located on the territory along the railway from Taishet to Ust-Kut and even further. (Angarsk Forced Labor Camp, Taishet History) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document deals more specifically with how the prisoners of war captured during the Great Patriotic War were treated. A prisoner of war captured during the Soviet war against the Nazis eventually got released from the Gulag and was able to provide valuable information to the US intelligence regarding the camp conditions. The prisoner testified:

In July 1944, I was captured a second time by the Soviet Army and sent to the prisoner of war camp in Marshansk. (.). The Marshansk camp was a large camp with a capacity for from between 20,000 and 25,000 prisoners. (...). At Marshansk, treatment of the prisoners was generally fair and we were able to walk around inside

the camp after returning from working parties. At 5:30 each morning, the roll call was handled by a major and two surgeons who counted prisoners in each barracks and asked each prisoner if he was sick or all right. (.). The treatment of the prisoners inside the camp was not particularly brutal because there were so many prisoners that the Soviets were not able to get mad at any one in particular. On those days that I stayed in the camp, having been excused from work details because of illness, I and other prisoners in the same position had routine duties such as policing the camp and digging what we called "brown coal" from the ground for heating the barracks. ('POW CAMPS: GENERAL CONDITIONS / SECURITY MEASURES/ TREATMENT OF PRISONERS / POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION / INTERROGATION / MEDICAL TREATMENT / WORK ASSIGNMENTS', CIA, January 12, 1954, p. 5) (IMG)

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the anti-Soviet fiction writer whose idol was General Franco, claimed that the notorious Nazi-collaborationist Vlasov Army, not the Red Army, was the military force liberating Prague from Nazi German occupation. West Germany's *Die Welt* reported:

Solzhenitsyn writes in "The Gulag Archipelago" that the credit for having driven the Germans from the city belongs to the Vlasov units, i.e. units composed of Russian prisoners of war who were placed under the command of the German Wehrmacht. ('VLASOV SIDED WITH THE CZECHS: Who Took Part in the Prague Rebellion of May 1945?', *Die Welt*, February 26, 1974, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

In the fiction novel "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the infamous fanboy of General Franco and the Vlasov Army, naturally spread slanders against the USSR's corrective labour camps system. Yet, even this Vlasovite apologist, so beloved by the CIA, could not hide the fact that in the corrective labour camps, more work brought more material rewards in the form of more food. In the novel 'One Day', the 'protagonist' is Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, the corrective labour inmate 'oppressed' by the 'Stalinist' 'regime', whereas Tyurin is a 'foreman' in the camp. Importantly, the camp prisoners received "rates for the job" upon which "their ration ... depended.." and they could receive "good rates for their work." In the novel, it is stated that "better rates" "meant . good bread rations.." The following are excerpts of the novel:

now he must have been figuring out how to get them good rates for the job. And their ration for the next five days depended on this. (One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 47)

Shukhov heard Tyurin say in Pavlo's ear : "You stay here and keep 'em at it. I've got to go and fix the work rates."

More depends on the work rates than on the work itself. A clever boss who knows his business really sweets over these work rates. That's where the ration comes from. If a job hadn't been done, make it look like it had. If the rates were low on a job, try to hike 'em up. You had to have brains for this and a lot of pull with the fellows who kept the work sheets. And they didn't do it for nothing.

(One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 63)

Tyurin got "better rates," which meant they'd have good bread rations.. (One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 89)

Shukhov went to sleep, and he was very happy. He'd had a lot of luck today. They hadn't put him in the cooler. The gang hadn't been chased out to work in the Socialist Community Development. He'd finagled an extra bowl of much at noon. The boss had gotten them good rates for their work. (One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 187)

Obviously, the novel was a fiction work and cannot be cited as concrete historical evidence. However, it is remarkable that Solzhenitsyn novels are cited as 'realistic' fiction depicting the Soviet corrective labour camps, and yet even in such an anti-Soviet fiction novel, this fact about the Soviet system is mentioned. It is the consensus of the mainstream anti-Soviet media that Ivan Denisovich Shukhov was one fiction character representing the actual lives of real people who lived in the corrective labour camps. And yet, here came Solzhenitsyn basically admitting in his novel that the camp inmates were receiving rates. The picture that emerges from the US State Department and CIA documents and from the Solzhenitsyn fiction, which is a kind of a fiction considered by anti-Soviet media as reflective of historical truth, is that the corrective labour camps were not slavery but practically a form of mandatory capitalistic-spirited exploitation inflicted upon criminals in the USSR. The prisoners of the corrective labour camps were punished and made to suffer not from slavery but from a kind of a workplace that inherited the capitalistic spirit – the key difference being that the workplace was owned by a workers' state, rather than privately owned.

Another important issue regarding the Gulags is with regards to the size of its population. Firstly, it is important to note that the CIA too agrees that the huge figures given for the population of prisoners in the Gulags are unrealistic and implausible:

the number of prisoners in the prewar period (about 1941) at 10 million, plus or minus 20 percent, and at 12 million, plus or minus 10 percent, in the postwar period (about 1950). These magnitudes were obtained for each period by assembling all available reports from ex-prisoners who had given the number of prisoners at various

forced labor sites, computing an estimate of the average number of prisoners per place and multiplying this average by the estimated total number of places associated with forced labor camps. Because of the nature of the data (observation reports from ex-prisoners) and the methodology used, and in light of information received since 1953, the estimate of 12 million prisoners as of about 1950 appears much too high. As at least 4 out of every 5 prisoners were males in the productive age group (15 to 59), moreover, a prisoner population of such a magnitude would mean that nearly one-fifth of all adult males were imprisoned. So disastrous would be the demographic and economic consequences of such a situation that its existence seems highly implausible. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 20) (IMG)

A document published by the America's 'National Park Service' – a US government agency that not only deals with matters concerning ecology and the parks, but also with museums, historical sites, military history, and preservation of historic materials – fiercely denounced the USSR. It did, however, acknowledge that the maximum number of inmates that the USSR's corrective labour camps had was around 2.5 million:

The camp population grew from 179,000 in 1929 to 2,468,524 in 1953 (reaching its height in 1950 with 2,525,146 inmates). (GULAG FACT SHEET, National Park Service, United States Government, 2017, p. 1) (IMG)

Regarding the death toll in the Gulag, the document admitted that the bulk of the deaths in the Gulags were during the war years, when food, medicine, and other facilities grew scarce for the entire Soviet population, not just the prisoners:

perhaps 1.5 million perished. It is important to remember, however, that in most years more people were amnesiated from the Gulag than died in it. Excepting the brutal war years, the most common experience of the Gulag was surviving it. (GULAG FACT SHEET, National Park Service, United States Government, 2017, p. 1) (IMG)

Another CIA document further reported:

Mortality was fairly high at all camps until 1948, in which year conditions became more humane at most camps. From May Day 1952, each prisoner was paid a daily wage though deductions were made for food and clothing, with the result that the only prisoners who ever held any cash in their hands were the few who were able occasionally to exceed their norm. Even these, at that time, were not allowed to have more than 100 rubles in the pockets. (FORCED LABOR CAMPS, CIA, December 1, 1954, p. 6) (IMG)

Obviously, the high mortality rate was owing to the severe damage caused by the Axis invasion, as a result of which the mortality rates were high whether inside or outside the camps. After 1948 when some success was seen in the reconstruction efforts, the conditions became better. More importantly though, the CIA document has admitted that the Gulag prisoners were paid for their work starting from mid-1952, which was during the Stalin era, and that the prisoners were paid more for more work. The CIA document also confirmed:

In all camps, women had exactly the same conditions as men. (FORCED LABOR CAMPS, CIA, December 1, 1954, p. 6) (IMG)

The persecution of juveniles in the Soviet Union was banned. As confirmed by the British Foreign Office, the USSR had: the Law of April 1935, forbidding the prosecution of small children on political charges. (N 1294/233/38, No. 85, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, March 7, 1939; received March 10, 1939, Foreign Office (1939), p. 67) (IMG) {Factional Conflict & Great Purge}

There was at least one case in which children were tried as 'fascist' 'agents' by a Yezhovite intelligence official. However, as mentioned in C9S1, that Yezhovite official was purged for his abuse of children.

C5S5. Wage Differentiation in the Soviet Union *** IMG-All-{Wage Differentiation}

In 'The Critique of the Gotha Programme', written by Marx and Engels, and in 'The State and Revolution', written by Lenin, it is very clearly and explicitly stated that under the socialist system, there would be wage differentiation according to the amount of labour performed by each individual. Wage-egalitarianism is a reactionary Trotskyite left-opportunist deviation fought against by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The wage differentiation system existed in the Soviet Union. Referring to the wage system from 1931 to 1956, the CIA reported:

Generally speaking, the basic characteristics of the present Soviet wage and salary system were established in 1931 and 1932 as a result of the major wage reform undertaken in response to directives laid down by Stalin in a speech of 23 June 1931. In this speech he severely criticized the "equalitarian" nature of the then-existing wage system, holding it largely responsible for widespread and excessively high labor turnover, and called for the "destruction" of the old system. During the next several years the entire wage structure was revised, new wage scales were established to provide greater wage differentials between skilled and unskilled jobs, wage and salary rates were changed, and formal job classification manuals were prepared for all industries. (THE CURRENT WAGE REFORM IN THE USSR: Economic Intelligence Report, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), August 9, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

Progressive piece-rate wages were established, according to which the enterprise profits would be augmented to finance bonuses for the worker overfulfillment of production targets. Europa Archiv, a prominent West German Frankfurt-based media outlet on economics, was founded by the Wehrmacht Sergeant Wilhelm Cornides. Europa Archiv reported:

Contrary to simple piece wages, which provide the same rate of pay for each finished product or phase of work regardless of the number produced, progressive piece wages provide differing rates which increase relative to the amount of output, the progression starting when a certain predetermined phase in the fulfillment of the quota has been reached. (MEANS AND WAYS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION: Appealing to Materialistic Drives by Various Types of Remuneration: Piece Wages and Increase of Productivity: Part 2. In: 'METHODS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION', Europa Archiv No. 17, Frankfurt A.M., September 5, 1952, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

The provision of bonuses was divided into 'steps', defined by the amount of overfulfillment of the production targets. Providing an example of the progressive piece rates, bonuses and their corresponding 'steps', the Europa Archiv stated:

The bonus for exceeding the quota is not everywhere as high as in these illustrations. Other scales of progression prescribe the following percentages as bonus payments:

From one to 10 percent overfulfillment	30% bonus
From 10% to 25 percent overfulfillment	50% bonus
From 25% to 40 percent overfulfillment	75% bonus
From 40% to more percent overfulfillment	100% bonus

(MEANS AND WAYS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION: Appealing to Materialistic Drives by Various Types of Remuneration: Piece Wages and Increase of Productivity: Part 2. In: 'METHODS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION', Europa Archiv No. 17, Frankfurt A.M., September 5, 1952, p. 2. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

The Europa Archiv added:

It is the contention of Soviet leaders that a scale providing only one pay increase will not offer sufficient incentives to the worker to exceed the quota further. Nor will too many step increases serve this purpose because in that case, the intervals between the individual steps diminish as the number of steps increases, thus likewise reducing the incentive to the worker to progress from one round of exceeding quota to the next. (MEANS AND WAYS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION: Appealing to Materialistic Drives by Various Types of Remuneration: Piece Wages and Increase of Productivity: Part 2. In: 'METHODS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION', Europa Archiv No. 17, Frankfurt A.M., September 5, 1952, pp. 2-3. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

When quantifying the contributions to the production was more difficult, emphasis was laid on qualitative changes, creative ideas that reduce the amount of labour necessary per output produced:

Bonuses are paid in situations where it is not possible to measure real output. A repair gang, for instance, receives a bonus its time wages if the men succeed in lowering the estimated loss of output by painstaking maintenance of the machines; a lubrication team will receive a bonus for thrifty and efficient of the lubricants, etc. In connection with bonus wages, the use of increasing output is likewise specifically stressed, the necessity emphasis being on reducing the number of time wage earners, which reduction is in itself a reason for granting a bonus. (MEANS AND WAYS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION: Appealing to Materialistic Drives by Various Types of Remuneration: Piece Wages and Increase of Productivity: Part 2. In: 'METHODS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION', Europa Archiv No. 17, Frankfurt A.M., September 5, 1952, p. 4. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

C5S6. CIA: Virtually No Physical Torture in USSR / Soviet Interrogation Techniques

*** IMG-AII- {Soviet Interrogation}

American intelligence documents, one after another, corroborate the virtual absence of torture in the USSR. One US intelligence document titled 'Soviet Interrogation Methods' was about the Soviet military intelligence as well as the MGB and the MVD. The document stated:

If captured by the MGB or MVD a prisoner is always turned over to the Intelligence Section of the Military District. From there the information would be reported to the Main Intelligence Directorate in Moscow. The prisoner would go to a distribution point located either in the district or nearest to the district where capture has been made. (SOVIET INTERROGATION METHODS, CIA, October 9, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

Describing the intelligence section of the Soviet Red Army, and in response to the question 'Can a military translator ever strike prisoner?', a leading CIA officer reported that physical torture was strictly prohibited. The following excerpt of the US intelligence document reveals this fact:

Can a military translator ever strike prisoner?

The Chief of the Intelligence Section of an Army Group, normally prohibits any physical contact between and interrogators and interrogatees. Threats, on the other hand, may be used if practicable. (SOVIET INTERROGATION METHODS, CIA, October 9, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The document went on to describe:

one instance, however, when violence was used during World War II. A German fighter pilot, who was believed to have military information of vital importance, resisted Soviet interrogators for fifteen days. After torture methods had succeeded in breaking his resistance, he was not mistreated any further. [T]his was an exceptional case and ... as a rule physical violence would be avoided. (SOVIET INTERROGATION METHODS, CIA, October 9, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

In the words of another CIA document, not only was the use of physical force by the MGB, the main Soviet intelligence organization, officially prohibited, the beating of the prisoners was also banned:

The use of physical force in the organs of the MGB was officially prohibited, and the beating of prisoners was not permitted. Numerous orders and directives on this subject were sent out by the central organs of the MGB. (SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION, CIA, May 14, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

In cases where interrogators were responsible for torture, they were punished for doing so, which is why so often, the MGB officers did not dare to strike the prisoners:

Not all interrogators, however, adhered to these restrictions, especially case officers of MGB organs located at the "periphery" (in the provinces), where prisoners sometimes were beaten in order to obtain testimony. This type of activity was considered in the MGB in 1948 and 1949 to be illegal, and operational personnel guilty of the use of force were punished through administrative channels. (SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION, CIA, May 14, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

In very important cases where it was absolutely known that a prisoner was giving false information, especially in espionage cases, the chief of the section (otdel), with the verbal sanction of the chief of the directorate (upravleniye), assumed responsibility and force was used on the prisoner, i.e., he was unmercifully beaten. This application of force was repeated no more than once with each prisoner, since the MGB was afraid to leave traces of the beatings on the prisoner. Actually, such beatings were rare, since everyone in the MGB knew that these "measures" might result in unpleasantness. For example, **if the prisoner brought out in court that he had been beaten and forced to give false evidence wittingly, the chairman of the military tribunal would return the case to the MGB for further investigation.** The decision of the military tribunal would include the statements of the prisoner on the beatings. The return of a case for further investigation was considered a to be a serious reflection on the work of the MGB, and the Third Chief Directorate of the MGB might **punish those guilty of administering beatings to prisoners.** (SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION, CIA, May 14, 1954, p. 3. Bold added.) (IMG)

According to the same CIA document, the Soviet intelligence had solitary confinement, but only for a maximum of 5 days, with the food and water being provided:

The MGB ... employed ... confinement in small detention cells. In every MGB prison there was a cell of very small dimensions, 1 x 1.5 meters [i.e. larger than a closet], without windows. If, in the opinion of the interrogator, a prisoner was giving false testimony or withholding certain information from the interrogator, the interrogator would write a report to the chief of the directorate saying: "I request the confinement of such-and-such prisoner to the small detention cell. The prisoner has conducted himself in a provocative manner during his interrogation and has given false testimony." The chief would endorse the report as follows: "I sanction a term of 5 days" "According to law", the chief could not confine the prisoner to this cell for more than five days. The chief of the prison, on the basis of the endorsed report, would transfer the prisoner to the detention cell, where he would only have room to stand [Saed's comment: actually, in a room larger than a closet, one can sleep (though uncomfortably) as well; not just stand], and would **receive only bread and water.**

The stratagem in this case centered around the fact that the prisoner did not know for how long a period he was to be confined to this small cell. Prior to incarceration the interrogator would threaten him, saying that he would remain there until he confessed his guilt. "You will rot there," the interrogator would say, "and if you think it over and decide to tell the truth then let me know through the jailer." The prisoner would remain the cell without hope, not knowing that his **confinement there was strictly limited to five days** since his death in the detention cell would render the chief of the prison responsible.

The prisoner, of course, would be unable to endure such conditions and therefore would beg to be reinterviewed. If the prisoner were to repeat his original testimony, or give false testimony, he would be returned immediately to the cell to serve the full five-day confinement. (SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION, CIA, May 14, 1954, p. 4. Bold added.) (IMG)

Five days of solitary confinement however is not torture. This is a well-known fact. According to the Office of the High

Commissioner for the United Nations Human Rights, the:

standard of UN rules ... defines solitary confinement as "the confinement of prisoners for 22 hours or more a day without meaningful human contact." Solitary confinement may only be imposed in exceptional circumstances, and "prolonged" solitary confinement of more than 15 consecutive days is regarded as a form of torture. ("United States: prolonged solitary confinement amounts to psychological torture, says UN expert", United Nations Human Rights – Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), February 28, 2020) (IMG)

In Western countries, by contrast, not only is there solitary confinement, the period of such confinement is several years. In Canada for instance, even as late as 2018, solitary confinements were up to at least two and a half years:

Five years after [the Canadian province of] Ontario vowed to curtail its use of solitary confinement, average inmate stays in segregation cells have grown longer, with one prisoner in Ottawa remaining in isolation for at least 835 days, according to newly released provincial data.

(...). The most glaring figure comes from the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre, where government spreadsheets indicate a Muslim man with mental-health issues, between the ages of 35 and 39, was housed in solitary for at least 835 days. Little more is known about him. United Nations guidelines recommend 15 days as a limit for segregation placements to prevent lasting mental and physical harm. ("Length of solitary stays increasing in Ontario prisons, including 835 days for one inmate", Boston Globe, November 5, 2018) (IMG)

It is a well-known fact that West Germany imposed solitary confinement on many dissident elements. There is no need to mention the Americans who are most notorious in the West for this. These facts are widely known and shed light upon the great contrast between a state controlled by the proletariat and the anti-proletarian states.

C5S7.1 Democratization: The Cleansing of the Party and State Apparatuses

*** IMG-All-{Democratization}

Finance capital, the primary class base of modern imperialist reaction, seeks dictatorship. Yet, imperialism derives its strength from a military-industrial backbone that generates a massive population of proletarians. The numerical strength of the proletariat imposes upon the dictatorship of finance capital the incorporation of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such an incorporation yields the imperialist bourgeois-democracy of the kind seen in Britain and USA. In Germany, in which occurred only a partial industrialization, German finance capital emerged, financing fascism. Yet, the medium level of industrialization, thus of proletarianization of the society, yielded a relatively smaller percentage of proletarians in Germany's general population. The relative numerical weakness of the proletariat allowed the dictatorship of German finance capital to overthrow democracy and prevent the influence of the proletariat over the state. A dictatorship of the bourgeoisie grows democratic when it comes under the influence of the proletariat. The less under proletarian influence, the more easily finance capital crushes democracy, the proletariat's avenue for wielding influence over the state. The more the proletariat's influence, the less finance capital can undermine democracy. In the Soviet Union was established the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therein, finance capital was crushed. Inherently, the highest amount of the influence of the proletariat over the state meant the highest quantity of the factor giving rise to democracy. In that respect, the USSR was more democratic than other countries, for it was a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Secondly, there have been rare cases in which the bulk of the population is not proletarian, the state continues to remain under the influence primarily of finance capital, and yet the state remains a bourgeois-democracy. In its initial years, Israel – a comprador bourgeois state that invited the Anglo-American finance capital to colonize the Hebrew, Yiddish and Arab nations – lacked a numerically large proletariat, for it was not yet so industrialized. However, unlike the vast majority of the comprador bourgeois states allied to the Anglo-American finance capital, Israel was a pro-fascist pro-imperialist bourgeois-democracy, rather than a fascist 'autocracy', even in the initial years of its existence. Why? Why did most Anglo-American-backed comprador bourgeois states operate as 'autocratic' fascist 'juntas', but Israel did not? Israel had kibbutzim. Though structured in a generally idealistic fashion, the kibbutzim were a form of cooperatives. Beside the proletariat, the cooperativists constitute another major class that plays a role similar to the proletariat, 'stands up to' finance capital, and imposes democratic governance on the dictatorship of finance capital or of the comprador bourgeoisie. The petit-bourgeoisie have too small of businesses and are unwilling to take risks to stand up to finance capital. Unlike the proletariat, who have nothing to lose but their 'chains' in the struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie have much to lose, including their vitally important small businesses. The cooperatives, on the other hand, amalgamate these small businesses into big businesses capable of taking the risk of competing with finance capital. Owing to their employee-owned character, it is as though they are 'proletarian-owned big businesses' even though cooperative employees, owning cooperative stocks, are not proletarians per se. Due to such factors, the cooperativists acquire characteristics similar to the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie who also have big businesses with which to stand up to finance capital; however, unlike in the case of the national bourgeoisie, the cooperatives are big businesses run by their own cooperativist employees and thus bear a socialistic character. Israel did not become a bourgeois-democracy for colonial self-advertisement purposes, nor did the 'liberal' migration policy towards the 'world Jewry' create the 'openness' that would result in democracy. The agents of Israel's parasitic classes have always resorted to solving the issue of their public

image through propaganda and psychological pressure tactics. No, Israel emerged democratic, for despite all the fascistic behaviours emanating from its comprador character, it had a kibbutzim that significantly resisted such finance capital, a kibbutzim whose political influence was elevated because of the damages which the anti-imperialist Arab armies inflicted upon the Zionist army of Anglo-American finance capital. In the USSR, not only did the enemies of finance capital have the upper hand, the agriculture was collectivized into kolkhozy. The kolkhoz peasants had much influence over the state.

The cases of Israel, United States, Britain, and Germany show that the proletariat and the cooperativists are the two most important classes behind democratization. It follows that through the alliance of the proletariat and the kolkhoz peasants, as well as through the crushing of finance capital and the comprador (e.g. kulak, comprador mercantile bourgeoisie, feudal landlords) allies of finance capital, the USSR maximized the quantity of those class factors that impose democratic governance and minimized the influence of those classes that operated as factors against democratization.

What exists in the form of imperialist bourgeois-democracy in the 'Western' countries is really a quasi-compromise condition in which the state is ultimately the dictatorship of finance capital but has been forced to accept the influence of the proletariat over the state via the avenue of democratization. Whenever finance capital sees no powerful proletarian or cooperativist rivals standing up to it, it imposes the authoritarian/autocratic dictatorship of the comprador allies of finance capital; whenever, the proletariat and the cooperativists gain control over a state with minimal presence of finance capital and its reactionary class allies, the proletariat and the cooperativists impose the dictatorship of the proletariat and cripple most of the means of agitation and propaganda of the enemies of the proletariat. Whether we like it or not, the 'absolute freedom of speech', the freedom of both the pro-fascists and anti-fascists to agitate, is fragile. The 'absolute freedom of speech' exists in the West merely as a 'quasi-compromise' principle emanating from the 'quasi-compromise' condition in which the regime of finance capital has been forced to accept a degree of state power exercised by the proletariat. Once the proletariat takes decisive control over a state, 'absolute freedom of speech' will vanish, and pro-fascist propaganda will inevitably be cracked down upon, even if the communist leaders of the proletariat have 'good will' and are true believers in the principle of 'absolute freedom of speech'. 'Absolute freedom of speech' will be the order of the day again only in the late-stage communist phase of humanity, when almost the entire world population has chosen to promote speech that promotes the proletariat rather than to promote anti-proletarian speech. After the rise of the global dictatorship of the proletariat, only in the late-stage communist phase will 'absolute free speech' be revived.

By 1936, the class struggles in the Soviet Union had reached a stage in which the private bourgeois classes had mostly diminished and had begun to vanish. The dictatorship of the proletariat controlled most of the economy. The obliteration of the material bases of the parasitic classes in the private sectors of the economy thus weakened the parasitic classes allied to the corrupt bureaucrats, hence the corrupt bureaucrats themselves. The centralization of the state-owned sector further shrank the influence of the corrupt bureaucrats. Far more difficult than monitoring the activities of one large central bureau is the monitoring of the activities of several small local bureaus lacking coordination with one another. This weakening of monitoring would render it easier for the bureaucrats' corrupt activities to go unnoticed. The centralization of the state-owned sector would cut the number of localized bureaus, thus facilitating the anti-corruption monitoring process. A decentralized state-owned sector also reduces coordination between the several individual bureaus; this absence of coordination creates the discrepancies in planning, which result in chaos and mismanagement, a fertile ground for abuses by corrupt bureaucrats. The gradual centralization of the economy resolves that problem. Thus, the centralization of the economy weakens the material base of the corrupt bureaucrats hostile to the proletariat and democracy.

A republic of soviets run by a democratic centralist Party compositionally proletarianized in its membership ensured a high level of control of the proletarian class over the state apparatus, leading not only to the gradual abating of the comprador classes, including the bureaucrats, but also to maximum proletarian control, a 'democratic dictatorship' of the working class.

The Party of the proletariat, a Party compositionally proletarianized and democratic centralist in structure, needs not split into two or more parties. Such a split not only erodes the hold of the proletariat over the state, it also allows for the rise of unnecessary parallel bureaucracies, since each party would function like a bureau. The existence of several bureaus renders more difficult the monitoring of such parties by anti-corruption institutions, while reducing policy coordination. This would strengthen bureaucrats. What surprise is there that the Trotskyite bureaucrats, in the Party of the proletariat in the USSR, called for an end to democratic centralism and a freedom to form sub-parties, 'blocs', all in the name of combatting bureaucracy?

The scientific socialist system, the 'democratic dictatorship' of the proletariat, is inherently anti-bureaucratic. By 1936, most of the private-sector socio-economic base upon which the Bukharinites and Trotskyites could rely so to hold the Soviet economy captive was centralized under the dominance of the proletariat and kolkhozniks. The year 1936 was the year in which the communists could pursue their agenda of a full-scale pincer assault on the bureaucracy inside the Soviet state. The pincer assault came in the form of a simultaneous effort at (1) democratizing the Soviet state and Party apparatus, and (2) centralizing the Soviet state and Party apparatus. Many with a liberal mentality regard centralism and

democracy as two diverging, contradictory, and antagonistic tendencies. In reality, centralism and democracy cannot exist without each other because they are both tendencies emanating from the proletariat and antagonistic to finance capital, bureaucracy, and other parasitic class allies. Democracy is opposed to bureaucracy for reasons obvious even for liberals, whereas centralism is opposed to bureaucracy for reasons explained previously. Hence, in 1936, the plans were hatched for a new communist assault against bureaucracy. The 1937 war on bureaucracy intensified in the form of a Great Purge strongly correlated with, and somewhat causally linked to, the democratization program.

In 1937, Party leaders Stalin and Zhdanov made important speeches in which they engaged in a critique of the Soviet government apparatus itself and the Party. The speeches are already available in the internet and can be duly viewed by the reader; however, this section will examine the speech as reported and analyzed by the MI6.

Western media presents the Soviet self-criticism process as dishonest and farcical. However, in reference to Zhdanov's self-criticism session, the British Embassy in Moscow, which was the MI6 station there, also acknowledged that:

Soviet "self-criticism" is not always wholly farcical and dishonest. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 67) (IMG)

The report added:

the practice may often be genuine enough.. Those at the top may well be honestly perturbed at the extent to which the party mechanism has become corrupted.. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 67) (IMG)

As the document rightly stated,:

The main interest of M. Zhdanov's speeches lies of course in their detailed revelation of the extent to which the party's own statutes and constitution have for years past been systematically ignored. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

Afterwards:

M. Zhdanov goes on to examine the question of internal party democracy, about which an immense amount has been written of late, and enumerates the principal "constitutional" abuses which have crept into the party during recent years. In the first place there has been a very widespread disregard of the rule that elections to the primary organisations and town and district committees should take place once a year and those to the higher organisations once every eighteen months. All the higher organisations, with the exception of five created incidentally as a result of administrative changes, have outlived their allotted span, and many even of the primary organisations date back to the seventeenth party congress, i.e. to the spring of 1934. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 65) (IMG)

In his speech, Zhdanov condemned the undemocratic and non-electoral appointment of Party officials, and named numerous cases of such practices, with:

some of the worst being from M. Zhdanov's own Leningrad district and city. As regards the actual mechanics of the party pseudo-elections under present conditions, M. Zhdanov gives some equally revelatory facts. He states frankly that the general practice is to avoid uncomfortable criticism on the part of the rank and file of the party by a complicated system of lists of likely candidates, drawn up in the first instance by the secretary of the committee and hustled through a series of preliminary closed conferences "at which the question is settled in a 'family' atmosphere without too much 'trouble'." Thus "everything revolves itself into a narrow organisational technique, the sole object of which is to shut out the criticism of the party masses." (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

Additionally, Zhdanov condemned the unrati ed appointment of local party leaders and secretaries of party committees.

In fact, he stated:

that he could name dozens of such secretaries, who were merely appointed by the committee of the immediately superior organisation without even being actually elected by the organisation to which they were thus attached. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

He also condemned the fake 'self-criticism' that many Party members engaged in:

M. Zhdanov has some scathing remarks to make on the degeneration of the system of "self-reports" – a practice akin to ordinary "self-criticism." These reports, he says, are far too largely the result of prying investigations into the private affairs of those concerned, and far too little connected with their activities as party men. He quotes the actual texts of a resolution by a local party committee on one of these "self-reports" by an ex-wife beater. It runs as follows: –

"To permit no more family nonsense.

“To regulate the family relations without delay.”

(N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

Zhdanov’s speech echoed Stalin’s opinion. According to report by the US Embassy, Zhdanov was:

from all indications ... Stalin’s personal favorite.. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 511) (IMG)

On the other hand, Stalin had provided in-depth criticisms of the bureaucracy that existed in the Party and state apparatus. Excerpts of reports by US and British embassies in Moscow are as follows:

On March 5, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, Stalin’s epochal speech was addressed to this situation. He berated the party for having given too much attention to economic development and too little to the welfare of the party machinery. He required that each party member become a vigilant soldier, for the protection of their ideals from capitalistic states, foreign spies, et cetera. He made a definite bid for the support of the agricultural workers and for the workers as against the factory managers and party leaders. All during the months of March and April, and even up to the present time, every vehicle of propaganda press, radio, and popular exhortation has been addressed to the reorganization, cleansing, and revivifying of the party organization. (WHY THEY SHOT TUKHACHEVSKY No. 457 Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SHOOTING OF THE RED ARMY GENERALS ON JUNE 12, 1937, AND GENERAL CRISIS WHICH FOLLOWED, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, p. 134) (IMG)

On the question of keeping a proper check on the work of individual members of the party, [Stalin] explains that promises and declarations, and even office statistics, are of less importance than the results of actual work achieved. Moreover, checking from above is not enough in itself; checking from below – i.e., the control exercised by the masses over their leaders by means of congresses and elections – is also essential, and the problem is to combine the two types of control.

M. Stalin goes on to discuss the need for an atmosphere of genuine self-criticism and for the public avowal of mistakes committed. He quotes as examples the mistakes made by the party in the early years of the drive to collectivize peasants. The year 1930 was, he says, one of the most dangerous in the whole history of the party’ many party members had forgotten that “the peasants could not be converted to collectivization by administrative pressure,” and wished to rush matters through. despite strong resistance, the Central Committee held those hot-heads in check, and the attitude of the committee has been justified by the final result. The splendid cadres of collective farm workers could never have been created if the party not realised its mistake and correct it in time. Similarly, during the Schachty period of industrial wrecking there was a disastrous tendency to believe that Socialist industrial construction could be achieved by the employment of hostile bourgeois specialists controlled by party “commissars,” who themselves lacked technical qualifications. The campaign for the widespread mastery of such technical qualifications encountered stubborn resistance at first, but subsequent history demonstrated its correctness. It is sheer nonsense to pretend that the frank admission of mistakes might strengthen the hands of the enemies of the regime. On the contrary, it is only much honesty that the party can maintain and enhance its authority in the eyes of the owing masses. It is equally incorrect to suppress public criticism out of regard for the feelings and pride of the cadres; such an attitude is not only fundamentally incorrect, but dangerous to the cadres themselves, and is, indeed, a sure way of ruining them.

M. Stalin then proceeds to speak at length on the dangers of a conceited and bureaucratic attitude in the party leaders, and on their need to keep in intimate touch with the masses, listening to their suggestions and criticisms. (N 1910/250/38, No. 155, Mr. MacKillop to Mr. Eden, Moscow, April 3, 1937; Received: April 9, 1937. In Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 77-78) (IMG)

Akin to the problems listed by Zhdanov and Stalin was the duplication of the Soviet state apparatus; local Party leaders had set up their own bureaucracies parallel to the government machinery. The Central Committee of the Party criticized this practice. In his report to Washington, Charles Bohlen – an American anti-Soviet diplomat, and later, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union – wrote:

Local Party committees have been severely criticized in the press and by decisions of the Central Committee of the Party for exercising governmental and administrative functions in their own name. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 513) (IMG)

To remedy this problem:

the Kremlin [aimed to] do away with this duplication of functions and to return to the system of control by the Communist Party which prevailed in the early days of the Soviet Union, whereby the control was exercised not by the Communist Party in its own name but through its members placed in key positions in the governmental machinery. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 513) (IMG)

And a press campaign against such duplication was launched:

There have been numerous indications in the Soviet press that the Kremlin has been opposed to the growth of the purely Party organs as a separate administrative apparatus. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 513) (IMG)

There were:

A large number of other serious abuses . enumerated by M. Zhdanov.. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

in his late February 1937 speech. Of these:

one [was] the so-called "triangle" composed of the secretary of the local party committee, the works manager and the chairman of the local trade union organisation. These "triangles," he says frankly, have come to be a law unto themselves, and their administrative and merely repressive power is such that no ordinary party member can stand up to them. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

Furthermore:

Zhdanov denounced dictatorial behaviour in the management of soviet institutions and state enterprises. ('Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896-1948', Kees Boterbloem, p. 151)

While retaining the scientific Taylorist system of one-man management as advocated by Lenin, the Party advocated for greater democratic accountability within the factories as well as the in the entire trade union structure. The system of 'one-man management in our conditions', Zhdanov said:

sharply differs from the administration of enterprises by capitalists, where there is no party organization, where often there are no trade unions, where there is no public opinion (*obshchestvennost'*) and where the director individually is in complete command. ('Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power, and Terror in Inter-War Russia', Oxford University Press, David Priestland, p. 321)

By the time Zhdanov made that statement, considerable progress had already occurred in the field of democratic trade unionism:

With the abolition of the People's Commissariat of Labor in 1933 and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in 1934 the functions of the local offices of these bodies were transferred to trade union organizations. These functions consist primarily of checking on managerial observances of those provisions of the Labor Code which deal with the well-being of workers, sanitary conditions, and safety techniques. This control is performed by special "public inspectors" who are elected by trade union organizations. (The Structure of Factory Control in the Soviet Union, American Sociological Association, American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, Alexander Vucinich, April 1950, p. 182) (IMG)

However, the campaign launched by Zhdanov and Stalin brought greater democracy to Soviet trade unionism as well. One month after Zhdanov's speech, there was:

the sixth plenum of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [which] opened in Moscow on the 28th April and closed on the 15th May. (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

In that plenum of the trade unions, two representatives from the Party were present; they were Kaganovich and Andreyev who, on behalf of the Central Committee:

opened ... by announcing that "the Central Committee of the party were of the opinion that trade union democracy should be realised starting at the top, with the plenum; and that, if the plenum should see fit to raise the question of recasting the leadership of the council, the Central Committee would in no way hinder the members of the plenum from doing so." (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

Thus, the campaign for the further democratization of the trade unions had begun. Throughout the plenum, the corrupt

elements among the trade union officials were encouraged to self-criticize:

The result of this remarkable invitation was ... "self-criticism" and recrimination. The trade union officials evidently did their best, repeatedly accusing themselves and one another of having completely lost touch with the masses, of reactionary bureaucracy and many other serious offences. (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

Naturally, some trade union leaders would have self-criticized out of humility, and others did so because they saw in self-criticism a chance for 'disarming' their critics and not losing too much ground, so that they can later continue their corrupt practices. On the other hand, the creation of an atmosphere of criticism and self-criticism increased room for purging the corrupt bureaucrats – linked to Bukharin's group formerly through Tomsky – who had risen to power in the trade unions. As such:

the speeches of the factory workers attending the plenum were characterised by a much greater severity and "real Bolshevik criticism" than those of the officials. They could afford to be, since the speakers were not criticizing themselves. Each of the members and candidates of the whole presidium, and each of the secretaries of the council, were individually discussed by the whole plenum.. (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

After the criticism of the individual officials, re-elections occurred with some of the top officials being demoted, and replaced by new democratically elected trade union leaders. Thus, at that time:

it was decided to hold by secret ballot an election both to the presidium and to the secretariat. The upshot was the election to both organs of an almost completely fresh personnel – though M. Shvernik [who officially agreed with the need for changes] remains the head.. Two members and two candidate members of the presidium were expelled ... and another member was expelled for the dissolute character of his personal life. In addition, the chief administrative official and the principal financial inspector of the council were dismissed after consideration by the plenum of the findings of a commission, set up during the course of the congress, to investigate what the Pravda describes as the scandalous extravagances of the council in financial matters. (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

At the end of the plenum, a resolution was passed condemning numerous abuses and calling for the democratization of the trade unions. The following democratizations plans were established by the end of the trade union plenum:

"Co-optation," [in this case referring to appointments without intra-Party electoral processes] and other illegal practices, such as election by voting list, are to cease. All trade union officials are to be re-elected or replaced during the present year, and the elections, like those to the soviets and to the party, are to be by secret ballot. Factory committees and institutions are to hold their elections from the 1st June to the 15th July, district and individual trade unions for the whole Union from the 15th July to the 1st October, and the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions is to be convened on the 20th October. The regional trade union councils of the various grades, from the "rayon" to the Union Republic, are to be abolished as too unwieldy. Various measures are prescribed for increasing trade union activity in caring for the material, cultural and political well-being of the workers (the discussions of the congress showed up very clearly the entire failure of the trade union organisations to ensure adequate protection of the workers against avoidable industrial traumatism..). The practice of concluding collective agreements between the trade unions and the employing organisations is to be reintroduced; as also the practice of holding regular conferences on production, to which the broad masses of the workers, employees, engineers and technicians are to be invited. Trade union officials are to be put through various training courses in political ideology. Strict financial discipline and responsibility to be enforced, and it thought necessary to lay down specifically that "embezzlers are to be handed over to the courts." (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 106-107) (IMG)

According to a study published by the Oxford University Press:

THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER OF 1937, the unions held multi-candidate, secret-ballot elections at every level from the factory to the central committees. The workers took up the campaign for union democracy and swept out the old apparat in one election after another. (Stalinist Terror and Democracy: The 1937 Union Campaign, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, The American Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 5, Wendy Goldman, December 2005, p. 1444) (IMG)

In elections for the highest level of union leadership, the central committees, union members also returned strong votes of no confidence. (Stalinist Terror and Democracy: The 1937 Union Campaign, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, The American Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 5, Wendy Goldman, December 2005, p. 1446) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that the trade union elections, from then on, were multi-candidate. As a result of these democratic changes,

the Oxford Press University article stated, the entire apparatus of the trade unions was shaken up, with new democratically elected leaders in charge:

Electoral returns from 116 union central committees showed that more than 96 percent of 5,054 plenum members, 87 percent of presidium members, 92 percent of secretaries, and 68 percent of chairmen had been replaced. Here, too, officials at the apex of the hierarchy retained a greater share of posts than those immediately below them: 96 percent of central committee members were replaced, but only 68 percent of chairmen. Moreover, the new chairmen and secretaries often transferred from other important Party, managerial, or union posts. In about one-third of the central committees, they were former heads of factory committees. The new electoral shake-up provided the greatest benefits to this group, catapulting them from leadership of the factories into positions of national prominence. (Stalinist Terror and Democracy: The 1937 Union Campaign, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, The American Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 5, Wendy Goldman, December 2005, p. 1446) (IMG)

The proletarian battle for democracy is an indication of the marriage between the purges and Party unification campaigns and the democratization campaign. They went hand in hand, combatting corruption and elitism while increasing accountability to the working masses.

These practices lasted well into the 1950s. For instance, according to Vucinich, the workers still had 'production conferences' up until in 1950:

The trade union members are entitled to hold "production conferences" at which they are informed about the current plans and are called upon to state mistakes and unwarranted acts perpetrated by management. (The Structure of Factory Control in the Soviet Union, American Sociological Association, American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, Alexander Vucinich, April 1950, p. 182) (IMG)

These practices lasted well beyond Stalin's death as well. The CIA confirmed this active role of trade unions. The CIA stated:

As a more positive means of creating – and preserving an atmosphere suitable to promote maximum output, the internal enterprise managements attempt to maintain communications systems designed not only to get their point of view to the workers but also to get the point of view to management. Communications channels are inherent in the established chain of command and in the role played by the factory trade union committee (zavkom). In addition, widespread use is made of the production conference, which may be called at the initiative of management, the trade union, or the Party group in the plant. These conferences are held regularly or intermittently to consider reports by management concerning production and workers' welfare matters and to discuss production problems, operational changes proposed by management, and workers' suggestions and criticisms. Though some of these arrangements have been subject to criticism, they seem, by and large, to have functioned fairly satisfactorily and to have provided an element of strength in the operation of Soviet industry.

Since it is obvious that wherever employees have to perform work under the direction of superiors, the will of one man is subordinated to that of another, and friction cannot be avoided, irrespective of the prevailing economic, social, and political system, the same conflicts or grievances arise in the day-to-day working relations of Soviet-plant managements and workers as arise between Western employers and their personnel, and similar methods or grievance procedures used to adjust them. The standard method provides for the submission of complaints to successively higher levels until they are adjusted or referred to final decision by a neutral agency. In the USSR the grievance is first presented to the plant trade union organizer, who may take it up with the plant trade union committee or discuss it directly with management. If the matter cannot be adjusted in this stage, it may be submitted in a more formal manner to the plant appraisal and conflicts commission (RKK). This bipartite body is composed of representatives of the union and of management in equal-numbers and may be invoked not only by labor but also by management to obtain, for example, punishment of workers, for violating rules of employment or for damaging enterprise property. Decisions of the RKK, which must be unanimous, are binding. If a unanimous decision cannot be reached or if the complainant is not satisfied with the award, the issue may be referred for final decision to higher levels of the trade union or to the people's court.

The commission, in addition to settling grievances, has the power to decide whether a worker may be discharged for lack of qualification or reasons of health. Without its affirmative decision, such a discharge is not legally valid.

The general practice of attempting to settle issues outside of prescribed channels, already noted in connection with production and supply matters, is also present in the field of labor-management disputes. Workers have complained directly to the Kremlin, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and the ministry, not only in matters over which the RKK and the courts have no jurisdiction, but also concerning issues which should have been settled through the grievance procedure. Officials on high administrative levels have accepted such complaints and have channeled them back for investigation. By and large, however, extensive use is apparently made

of the grievance machinery.

Some sources state that workers have been fairly successful in grievance proceedings, though other observers declare the system to be unsatisfactory. On balance, the operation of the machinery for settlement of disputes probably affects worker morale favorably and thereby contributes to labor productivity. (Management of the Soviet Industrial Enterprise, CIA, August 7, 1956, pp. 58-59) (IMG)

To maximize the tactical efficiency of running the state enterprises, the USSR embraced the one-person management instead of collective management – one main manager for each enterprise. However, to ensure that the factory managers are held accountable, the democratic rights of the trade unions were to be expanded so to ensure that the workers could criticize the managers for potential errors, shortcoming, or even sabotage. This system would have allowed wreckers, saboteurs, and corrupt elements in the management to be called out more easily. In November 1937, the British Foreign Office reported that managers:

during the past months,... there are few industrial enterprises of which the managing staff has not changed several times during the last twelve months as a result of arrests and executions. (N 5458/42/38, No. 520, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, November 2, 1937; Received: November 5, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 225) (IMG)

In addition to the democratization of the Party, of course it was necessary to also democratize the state apparatus as well, as part of the general strategy of pincer assault on bureaucracy. Hence the Party of the proletariat tried to democratize the Soviet government as a whole. In every sphere of the USSR, there came efforts to simultaneously increase democratic accountability – without causing anarchy or disorder – while purging those officials who abused their power. Davies remarked:

It is vital to the [Soviet] government that they should make a strong showing of popular support. The result has been an enormous party activity from the top down, extending into every branch of activity over the entire country. The whole party organization is being shaken up. (THE RUSSIAN BEAR WADDLES THROUGH, NO. 455, Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALLEGED BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PLAN, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 125-126) (IMG)

A new constitution further democratizing the Soviet system was written. The strength of the workers' state by then was so high as to be able to promote greater democratization. Regarding these democratization efforts, Bohlen's report to Washington is instructive. Although filled with anti-Soviet rhetoric, Bohlen's report contains significant remarks about the status of the separation of powers in the USSR. Bohlen pointed to the:

aspects of the proceedings afforded interesting indications of the manner in which the Soviet Government would function under the new Constitution. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 512) (IMG)

The Kremlin, Bohlen noted, aimed 'to prevent the concentration' of 'too much power' in 'any governmental body'. Indeed, Bohlen made note of:

the desire of the Kremlin to increase the efficiency and simplify the machinery of government, as well as to prevent the concentration in any governmental body of too much power. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 512) (IMG)

In fact, according to Bohlen:

As the proceedings developed it became obvious that there was a real intention of separating and defining much more closely than in the past the powers and duties of the principal governmental bodies and of the individual officials. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 512) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that Loy Henderson – the anti-Soviet US charge d'affaires in Moscow – agreed with virtually all of Bohlen's assessments in that document. The following was written as the footnote of Bohlen's report as declassified by the US State Department:

Transmitted by the Charge in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 913, February 2, 1938; received February 19. Mr. Henderson wrote: "I may state that the personal impressions set forth by Mr. Bohlen are similar to those obtained by me and that I agree with the observations set forth in his memorandum." (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938.

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 509) (IMG)

Such division of power as described by Bohlen (and Henderson) is also backed by evidence from a 1953 CIA document which stated:

The powers the USSR Supreme Soviet [they] are as follows:

- (a) Proclaims the laws of the USSR;
- (b) Elects the of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is the collegiate (collective) president of the country;
- (c) Forms the USSR Government, the USSR Council of Ministers;
- (d) Elects the USSR Supreme Court;
- (e) Appoints the USSR Prosecutor-General;
- (f) Exercises control over the organs of power, which consist of the right of the deputies to address questions to the Government, to appoint committees of investigation and audit, and to remove all officials of the Government;
- (g) Exercises all other functions of the highest State power, i.e., ratifies the most important treaties with foreign powers, declares a state of war. etc.;
- (h) Introduces amendments to Constitution of the USSR by a two-thirds majority vote in each Chamber.
- (i) Each Chamber establishes the conduct of its business, elects its organs, etc.

(Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Note that for the CIA documents, there are two dates: the date of distribution and preceded by it, the date of information. Although the CIA document was distributed among CIA staff in December of 1953, the date of information – though not declassified – was undoubtedly much earlier. Regardless, the information by the CIA document encompassed the structure of the Soviet state up until then.

Also, nowhere in that document did the CIA ever claim that its remarks are tentative in character; nor did it claim that the above descriptions are merely based on the formal laws of the USSR, that the descriptions may be incorrect. In short, the above claims by the CIA were made definitively and not in a probabilistic manner.

The claims of the CIA are also confirmed by 1937 report and analysis from the British Foreign Office stating that the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet ‘enjoy ... the right of legislative initiative’ and that the laws of the USSR were ‘passed by a simple majority of each House’:

The sole legislative body of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a whole is the Supreme Council (“Soviet”) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is composed of two Houses, each of about 500 -600 members, the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities, which enjoy equal status and the right of legislative initiative. Laws are passed by a simple majority of each House. (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, P. S. Falla, September 7, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 176) (IMG)

The Supreme Council has the power to ratify or cancel decrees made by its own Presidium and decisions taken by the Council of People’s Commissars or by individual commissars.. (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, P. S. Falla, September 7, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 176-177) (IMG)

Once again, the British Foreign Office document did not use a probabilistic language, nor did it describe the formal laws of the USSR; this suggests that the author of the Foreign Office document really meant what was written in the above excerpt. Clearly, the Supreme Soviet played a significant, well-defined role in policy making:

The USSR Supreme Soviet is a legislative organ which forms and controls all organs of administration and justice, and carries out supervision over adherence to the law. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Thanks to the democratization efforts, after the elections, the new deputies to the Supreme Soviet were more lively and intelligent individuals actively engaged in policy-making. In reference to:

the entire proceedings in the sessions of the Supreme Soviet.. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 510) (IMG)

the American diplomat Bohlen admitted:

I received the impression that many of the deputies themselves, . felt that they were taking an active and responsible part in the government of the Soviet Union. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 510) (IMG)

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR was made up of the Soviet of the Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union. In reference to Soviet of the Union, Bohlen reported that, resultant from the 1936 democratic reforms, there were 'more intelligent' deputies to the Soviet of the Union:

In appearance the deputies to the Soviet of the Union were more intelligent and in general seemed to be of a noticeably higher type than the members of the previous Soviet bodies, for instance, the All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1935, which I attended. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 509)

(IMG)

Also noteworthy is that given their hard work, the deputies earned approximately four times the average Soviet citizen:

In view of the fact that the average wage in the Soviet Union is apparently between 230 and 250 rubles a month, it is of some interest to note that the deputies were granted salaries of 1,000 rubles a month, a daily allowance of 150 rubles while the Soviet is in session, and a free pass on all railroads. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 514)

(IMG)

Similar remarks can be made about the Soviet of Nationalities. There, again contrary to the Western depictions, the deputies were not forcibly 'Russified' by the Soviet state; rather, they were able to express their culture freely, and in fact, seemed genuinely engaged in the politics. Bohlen reported:

The deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities, representing thirty-two different races, were of a noticeably more primitive type. The majority of the deputies from the republics of the minor nationalities appeared in their national costumes, giving to the assembly a colorful and varied appearance which was totally lacking in the Soviet of the Union. The body as a whole was considerably more lively, and the deputies appeared to derive considerable simple enjoyment from the proceedings. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 509) (IMG)

Such active engagement by the deputies can be explained by the increase in the democratic spontaneity resultant from the campaign for democratization. The CIA itself confirmed that the governing bodies of the USSR were 'elected ... from among citizens' or 'elected by all the voters':

The highest governing body in the USSR is the USSR Supreme Soviet, elected for four-year terms from among citizens with a minimum age of 23 and a right to vote. The USSR Supreme Soviet consists of two Chambers.

(a) Soviet of Union which is elected by all the voters in election okrugs, with one delegate chosen for every 300,000 population.

(Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

According to the 1937 British Foreign Office report:

The Council of the Union is elected directly on the basis of one Deputy to 300,000 inhabitants. The Council of Nationalities, which numbers about 150 members, is also elected directly.. (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, P. S. Falla, September 7,

1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 176) (IMG)

A 1957 CIA document analyzed elections in that country up to 1957. The report makes references both to the Stalin era and to the Khrushchev era. The US intelligence document, having noted the mass-based spontaneous nature of the nomination of candidates for the Supreme Soviet, presented a narrative vastly in contrast to the Western media claims that 'Stalin' – or any other 'despotic' Party 'elite', for that matter – was responsible for 'handpicking' the individual candidates for the 'farical' Soviet elections.

Moreover, the document pointed to the USSR's 'honest conduct of elections' protected by the 'Soviet laws' which aimed to prevent 'the usual threats' that may occur against voters during elections. In order to prevent abuses during the elections, electoral committees were set up throughout the Soviet Union, with the membership of these committees being chosen through, in the CIA's words, 'spontaneous nominations' from trade unions, collective farms, etc. The CIA added that the same criteria applied to the candidates to the Supreme Soviet; they too were spontaneously nominated by mass

organizations. The following is a paragraph from the document:

Soviet laws condemn the usual threats to the orderly and honest conduct of elections. The administration of elections and the prevention of abuses are in the hands of a hierarchy of election committees, reaching from the voting precinct to the union republic. The administration of elections and the prevention of abuses are in the hands of a hierarchy of election committees, reaching from the voting precinct to the union republic. These committees are composed of representatives of the organizations which nominate candidates – the Communist Party, trade unions, youth groups, collective farms and so on. The members are selected by the same kind of spontaneous nomination as are candidates for the supreme soviets. (Electoral and Parliamentary Practices in the USSR and Poland, CIA, August 9, 1957, pp. 10-11) (IMG)

The study further confirmed:

There is no evidence to indicate that Soviet elections are not technically honest. (Electoral and Parliamentary Practices in the USSR and Poland, CIA, August 9, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

As the CIA document correctly stated, the Communist Party participated in the electoral committees, and sometimes choosing the candidates for the elections; it would be a mistake, however, to assume that this means the elections were a farce.

Firstly, thanks to the Lenin Enrolment program, as the reader may recall from C2S4, the Party was overwhelmingly composed of politically educated industrial, blue-collar working class, and not just white-collar intellectuals and bureaucrats. Ambassador Davies reported:

The party heretofore has been dominated by the industrial working class, constituting about 20% of the entire electorate. (THE RUSSIAN BEAR WADDLES THROUGH, NO. 455, Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALLEGED BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PLAN, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 125-126) (IMG)

Secondly, while it was absolutely essential to spread the influence of the Communist Party to every sector of the society as far as possible, it was also important to keep the individual officials within the Communist Party in check by preventing them from becoming a ‘favored aristocracy’ during the elections. Anti-Soviet hawk Henderson wrote: During the elections no distinction was made between the candidates in or out of the Communist Party.

In other words, many observers believed that the leveling off of the political barriers between the Party and the non-Party masses, which has been going on for many months, was accelerated during the election campaign and that actual steps were taken to eliminate the Communist Party as a favored aristocracy. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/1, No. 829, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, December 22, 1937; Received: January 10, 1938, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939, Office of the Historian, Document 356) (IMG)

The wording of the above quote implies that the communists may have been trying to weaken the influence of the CPSU, when in fact, they actually sought to expand it. Instead, the effort was to keep the individual CPSU officials in check.

Although the communists in the USSR were successful in most of their campaigns for democratization, there was one area in which they decided to retreat. Initially, the communists in the USSR campaigned for multi-candidate elections. Loy Henderson of the US Embassy reported:

there can be little doubt that it was originally intended to have more than one candidate for each constituency, as was the case on December 12. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/1, No. 829, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, December 22, 1937; Received: January 10, 1938, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933 -1939, Office of the Historian, Document 356) (IMG)

Let it be clarified once more that multi-candidate elections should not allow for even an inch of deviation away from the dictatorship of the proletariat. Again, the multi-candidate multi-partisan pro-‘absolute freedom of speech’ bourgeois-democratic system existing in the West is a temporary ‘compromise-state’ system resultant from the compromise of the dictatorship of the imperial bourgeoisie with the dictatorship of the proletariat. The imperialist bourgeois-democracies, fundamentally the dictatorships of finance capital, would have imposed fascist dictatorships on their imperial heartlands had they faced no numerically strong proletariat in their countries, but were forced to incorporate elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat through electoral democratization. When faced with no strong proletarian or cooperativist opposition, finance capital has consistently imposed a fascist dictatorship. Likewise, when faced with no strong opposition from the anti-proletarian classes, the proletariat have imposed a dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, when the ‘compromise-state’ system has ceased to exist, when the tug-of-war has been won by one of the two sides, the triumphant side has allowed no room for the kinds of democratic freedoms that allow the potential resurgence of the defeated. As finance capital has no longer-term future, as the proletariat is destined to conquer the world (assuming the continued life of humanity), there is no future for this ‘compromise- state’ system, the Western-style bourgeois-democracy. Absolutely regardless of whether Western-style bourgeois- democracy is good or bad, the fight for it is a lost cause in the longer

term, a futile mission. A multi-candidate election of a kind allowing for the candidacy of anti-proletarian agents thus has no place in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Rather, the type of multi-candidate election strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat is one that expands the accountability of officials to the proletarian and kolkhoznik electorate, without allowing for an inch of deviation away from the class interests of the proletariat. In this context, the debate would not be between socialist vs. anti-socialist candidates, nor between socialist vs. crypto-anti-socialist voices. Assuming the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the context, the questions of the grand strategies and macro-level policies of class struggle have already been resolved, and thereupon the electoral contest would be not over the grand strategies and macro-level policies but over such issues as (1) the credentials, leadership skills, technicality, and personality traits of the candidates, and (2) the ability of the candidates to ensure that the material needs of the local proletarians, kolkhozniks, and revolutionary intellectuals are properly accounted for by the scientific central plan. This type of a multi-candidate election in the context of a dictatorship of the proletariat would be endorsed by every communist revolutionary and class-conscious proletarian. It is a type of multi-candidate elections that would not put to question socialism in the slightest, but would maximize the accountability of individual officials to the proletariat and its class allies, thus expanding the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In a famous March 1936 interview with American newspaperman Roy Howard, Stalin spoke of 'election contests' through which 'millions of electors will measure the fitness of candidates, reject the unsuitable, expunge their names from candidates' lists, and promote and nominate the best':

You are puzzled by the fact that only one party will come forward at elections. You cannot see how election contests can take place under these conditions. Evidently candidates will be put forward not only by the Communist Party, but by all sorts of public, non-Party organisations. And we have hundreds of these. We have no contending parties any more than we have a capitalist class contending against a working class which is exploited by the capitalists.

(...). But there will be, and I foresee very lively election campaigns. There are not a few institutions in our country which work badly. Cases occur when this or that local government body fails to satisfy certain of the multifarious and growing requirements of the toilers of town and country. Have you built a good school or not? Have you improved housing conditions?

Are you a bureaucrat? Have you helped to make our labour more effective and our lives more cultured?

Such will be the criteria with which millions of electors will measure the fitness of candidates, reject the unsuitable, expunge their names from candidates' lists, and promote and nominate the best.

Yes, election campaigns will be very lively, they will be conducted around numerous, very acute problems, principally of a practical nature, of first class importance for the people. Our new electoral system will tighten up all institutions and organisations and compel them to improve their work. Universal, direct and secret suffrage in the U.S.S.R. will be a whip in the hands of the population against the organs of government which work badly. (Interview Between J. Stalin and Roy Howard, On March 1, 1936, Scripps-Howard Newspaper. Source: Works, Vol. 14. Publisher: Red Star Press Ltd., London, 1978, Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

In his speech in February 1937, Zhdanov pointed to the need for the local CPSU candidates to step up their efforts in order to challenge and defeat their rivals during the elections to the Supreme Soviet:

M. Zhdanov goes on to explain that under the new system Deputies and candidates must be prepared for much wider publicity ... and the party organisations must take the lead in criticizing and challenging unsuitable candidates "without waiting for these to be defeated by the secret ballot." (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilton to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 65) (IMG)

However, soon there emerged reports by local Party leaders stating that multi-candidate elections are allowing room for infiltration by the counter-revolutionaries. According to a study published by the Cornell University Press:

Once election preparations were underway, local Party and security police officials began to warn that former kulaks and priests were organizing for the elections, and ... that Communists would be voted out in favor of religious leaders. One Party official in March 1937 stated, "The facts in our possession show that counterrevolutionary clergymen and sectarians are very actively preparing to submit their candidacies for the secret ballot." (Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939, Cornell University Press, David Hoffmann, 2011, pp. 286-287) (IMG)

In this context, in the fall of 1937:

the Central Committee cancelled plans for multicandidate elections in favor of single-candidate elections. (Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939, Cornell University Press, David Hoffmann, 2011, pp. 286-287) (IMG)

It is worth reminding that multi-candidacy in socialist elections is merely a means of increasing the accountability of elected officials, and not a matter of communism vs. anti-communism. At the time, the Party did not have a strong

mechanism for ensuring that the multi-candidate elections would be solely between communism vs. communism rather than communism vs. crypto-anti-communism. As such, the Party cancelled the plan for multi-candidate elections, for the while.

Not that multi-candidacy in the election was too important an issue. Scientific socialism does not see electoral competition as the alpha and the omega. From a liberal perspective, 'competition' is the logocentric panacea that resolves all problems – competition between ideas, candidates, parties, businesses, etc. To the liberal, competition is almost everything. To the socialist, the Party of the proletariat, not competition, is the vortex from which arises good governance. The logocentric panacea is the exercise of state control by a socialist-educated democratic centralist Party whose largest membership percentage, if not the overwhelming majority of its membership, is that of industrial workers who own no private property and have solely their labour to sell. As long as a socialistic democratic centralist Party is controlled by its proletariat, and so long as this proletarian-controlled Party decisively controls the state, all of the other macro and strategic issues would be on the path of resolution, which in turn would pave the way for the resolution of the micro, technical, and tactical detail issues. In a socialist state, there could be hundreds of institutions by which to reinforce the accountability of the elected officials, of which multi-candidate elections was only one among many. The absence of multi-candidate elections, the absence of a mechanism by which to reinforce the accountability of officials, certainly had a negative effect, but to a magnitude a thousandth of what the liberal would portray it as. As there were numerous other avenues of boosting accountability, the negative effect of the absence of multi-candidacy was nowhere near a game changer.

Inevitably, the Party of the proletariat had to promote multi-candidate elections, by the time of its further entrenchment, by the time that it could ensure that the electoral contest would not be between revolutionary candidates vs. anti-revolutionary candidates but between skilled revolutionary candidates vs. more skilled revolutionary candidates. Hence, during this time, the ideological seeds of multi-candidate elections were sown:

It is possible that in future elections, . there may be more than one candidate for each constituency. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/1, No. 829, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, December 22, 1937; Received: January 10, 1938, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939, Office of the Historian, Document 356) (IMG)

Soviet elections did not become multi-candidate later on, as the Great Patriotic War severely decimated the membership composition of the Party, and allowed for the rise of a corrupt tendency that seriously damaged the level of influence of the proletariat over the state, rendering nearly impossible any potential promotion of multi-candidate elections under the conditions of dictatorship of the proletariat. However, in spite of the non-implementation of such a program, a state controlled by the proletariat, upon further entrenching itself, would have, as a matter of class interests, inevitably promoted the accountability of its officials, one reinforcing institution for which was and is the multi-candidate elections.

Anyways, the single candidate nominated for each district, though unopposed, was spontaneously nominated by such mass organizations as the trade unions – which had multi-candidate elections – and collective farms – which were inherently run in a democratic fashion (see C5S3). Democratically-run mass organizations were the force behind the nominations of the single candidates.

Historical experience shows that the degree of the 'openness' of electoral contests, and how many candidates are involved, etc. are not in themselves the main factors that determine the participation rate. The main factor, rather, is the level of class struggle. The more the class struggle against the bourgeoisie and the liberal strata of society, the more the participation of the workers and peasants will be in the elections. The more liberal and bourgeois the policies pursued, the more indifferent would the working and peasant masses be to elections and the less they will participate, and the more the intelligentsia and privileged classes will participate in the elections. More importantly, the proletarians and kolkhozniks in the USSR saw the elections as a referendum of whether their class should continue to rule over the state. Almost all of them voted positive in such referendums by voting for the candidates supported by proletarian-kolkhoznik organizations. Thus the election turnout was high. For instance:

In the 1950 election for the Supreme Soviet, 99.98% of the electorate voted and 99.73% cast ballots for the official candidates. The vote for the candidates of the Soviet Nationalities was 99.72% of the total.

In 1951 in elections to supreme soviets of the Union Republics similar unanimity was achieved. (Electoral and Parliamentary Practices in the USSR and Poland, CIA, August 9, 1957, p. 9) (IMG)

That the candidates were spontaneously nominated by the democratic organizations of the proletariat and peasantry explains the coherence of Soviet society and politics. Socialist construction in the USSR resulted in the defeat of the capitalist and feudal modes of production and the virtual end of the capitalist and feudal classes as socio-economic entities. Leaving aside the minority corrupt bureaucrats and black marketeers, the rest of the Soviet population, the overwhelming majority, was composed of proletarians and kolkhozniks. As Stalin said during the Extraordinary Eight Congress of the Soviets on November 25, 1936:

in the USSR there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the USSR there

are only two [legal] classes, workers and peasants, whose interests – far from being mutually hostile – are, on the contrary friendly. (Electoral and Parliamentary Practices in the USSR and Poland, CIA, August 9, 1957, p. 7) (IMG)

This reality was reflected also in the business-like process of the meetings in the Supreme Soviet. Unlike the bourgeois parliaments in which extremely long debates and filibusters were and are held, there was no need for such processes within the USSR. The deputies to the Supreme Soviet generally tended to agree with each other, because all of the deputies were nominated by proletarian and peasant organizations, and unless in cases of treason or criminal offenses, represented proletarian and peasant interests. Many of the bureaucrats and corrupt Trotskyite-Bukharinite agents had been purged as well, thus reducing such intense political conflicts between the agents of the bureaucratic oligarchic class, finance capital, and the kulaks vs. the enemies of such reactionary parasitic classes. The conflicts reduced, for the revolutionary class forces already won most of it during the Great Purge. Also, the speeches, although shorter, contained more substance. As Bohlen pointed out:

It was noted, however, that in comparison with meetings of previous Soviet bodies which the Embassy has observed, the sessions of the Supreme Soviet were conducted in a much more businesslike manner. The speeches were shorter and, while containing the usual eulogies to the achievements of the Soviet Union “under the leadership of Stalin”, had considerably more substance than the average Soviet orations. The Soviet press has emphasized the businesslike manner in which affairs of state were disposed of by the Supreme Soviet, in contrast to the long-drawn-out debates and intrigues of bourgeois parliaments. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, pp. 511-512) (IMG)

But in case disagreements would occur between – for instance – the Soviet of the Union and Soviet of the Nationalities, which together made up the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, there were procedures to resolve such differences. In this regard, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was instrumental. ‘The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR’, the CIA stated, was a governmental body that consisted:

of people’s representatives, members of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, with a provision ensuring the representation of all Union Republics, large Autonomous Republics, krais, and oblasts. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The Presidium:

Is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and carries full responsibility for the legality and expediency of its activities. Every member of the Presidium is at all times subject to dismissal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Elected by and accountable to the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was the body acting on behalf of the former when the former was not in session. This characteristic feature of the Presidium was aimed at maximizing the efficiency of the government. For instance, during the times of war the Presidium had the right to – when the Supreme Soviet was not in session – declare martial law in the specific parts of the USSR affected by war:

Of the amendments to the Constitution, only one was of any importance, i.e., the addition of a clause to Article 49 giving the Praesidium the right, when the Supreme Soviet is not in session, to declare martial law in a part or the whole of the Soviet Union in the interests of national defense or internal security. The present amendment is obviously to provide a legal basis for the use of any measures to put down possible internal disorders or revolt, especially in the outlying regions of the Soviet Union. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 514) (IMG)

As stated, the Presidium played a key role in helping the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet to resolve their potential differences. According to the 1953 CIA document and the 1937 British Foreign Office document:

In the event of a disagreement between the Chambers, the question is referred for settlement to a Conciliation Commission composed of both Chambers in equal numbers. In the event that the Conciliation Commission fails to arrive at an agreement, or if its decision fails to satisfy one of the Chambers, the question is again examined by both Chambers. In the event the two Chambers again cannot agree on a decision, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dissolves the USSR Supreme Soviet and orders new elections. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Provision is made, in case of disagreement between the two Houses, for reference to a conciliation commission, and in the last resort for the dissolution of the Supreme Council and the holding of fresh elections. (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, P. S. Falla, September 7, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 176) (IMG)

The Presidium had:

no veto power over decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and has no authority to dissolve the Supreme Soviet of the USSR except in the single instance described in the foregoing section on the functions of the Conciliation Commission. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Alongside the Presidium was the 'Soviet of the People's Commissars', which after World War II was renamed as the 'Council of Ministers of the USSR' – at times also officially referred to as the 'Government of the USSR'. The Soviet of the People's Commissars was the highest executive body of the Soviet state. As the CIA correctly stated:

The highest executive and administrative organ of State power in the USSR is the Government of the USSR, [also known as] the Council of Ministers of the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

That too was elected by and accountable to the Supreme Soviet:

The Council of Ministers of the USSR is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at its first session after elections. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR assigns to one of its members who is being considered for the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the task of submitting to the Supreme Soviet his suggestions on the composition of the Government. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR must confirm the appointment of each member of the Government individually, beginning with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Members of the Government do not necessarily have to be deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; they may also be non-deputies. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA,

Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

The Government of the USSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and reports to them. Specifically, the Government as a whole or a separate member of the Government is obligated to give an answer within three days to the question of a deputy. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 5)

(IMG)

Decrees and regulations of the Government of the USSR are issued in accordance with and in execution of the laws, and can be revoked by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

For example, for the Soviet treaties with Nazi Germany,:

SOVIET German Pact was ratified to-night by Supreme Council after speech by Molotov. (C 12591/15/18, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, No. 240, Moscow, August 31, 1939, In: Foreign Office (1939), p. 141) (No Image)

The right to initiate legislation belonged to all the individual members of the above-mentioned bodies:

The right to initiate legislation belongs to both Chambers in the persona of deputies, to the Committees of both Chambers, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

There were strict laws advocated by the communists and set up to prevent the overlap between Presidium and the Soviet of the People's Commissars. In fact, in the Soviet legal system:

it was expressly stated that there shall be no interlocking memberships between the Presidium and the Soviet of People's Commissars. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, pp. 512-513) (IMG)

Bohlen points to:

the announcement by Kossior that members of the Soviet of People's Commissars would not be eligible for election to the Praesidium, and furthermore the statement by Molotov that Vice Presidents of the Soviet of People's Commissars were not to act at the same time as the heads of any Commissariat. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 512) (IMG)

Thus, the Presidium and the Soviet of the People's Commissars were kept separate, so to promote the system of checks and balances.

Recall that the Politburo was the council appointed by the Central Committee of the CPSU, and that it was a body distinct from the Presidium and the Soviet of People's Commissars (later on, the Politburo would be temporarily renamed 'Presidium' as well). In 1948, referring to his 1945 meeting with the Soviet leader, Truman publicly remarked:

Joe [Stalin] is a prisoner of the politburo. He can't do what[ever] he wants to. (Madera Tribune, Volume LVI,

Number 89, June 12, 1948. From: Center for Bibliographical Studies and Research) (IMG)

Even fascist dictators cannot rule without having the consent of their peers in government. In order to be a fascist dictator, one has to have enough agents throughout one's government so to be able to bulldoze one's way through. Without the consent of one's peers in government, and without having planted one's agents throughout the state apparatus, one cannot rule as a fascist dictator, even if the law officially gives one dictatorial powers. Without fascist enforcement agents, a fascist dictator will be a mere puppet, an 'absolute' 'ruler' only on paper. One-man totalitarianism has always been but an idealist myth, for the 'one man' needs to rely on other men in order to enforce his totalitarianism. This is why Hitler was able to bulldoze his way through when the MI6 supported but him, but once the MI6 turned against him, he was not able to fully pursue his agenda even within his Reich, because the MI6 agent Canaris who was in charge of Abwehr created obstacles in front of him. And that was the case with the Nazi dictatorship! It is worth noting the difference in how the Soviet media referred to the Nazis and how the Americans did; the American media would promote the idealist myth of one-man totalitarianism by using phrases like 'the German dictator', 'Nazi dictator', 'dictator Hitler', etc. whereas the Soviets promoted the historical materialist view using phrases like 'Hitler gang', 'Hitler clique', 'the Hitlerians' which shows that the latter recognized that Hitler, although undoubtedly a dictator, could not rule without a clique behind him.

The narrative that the USSR was a 'one-man' totalitarian regime is baseless, as one-man totalitarianism cannot possibly exist anywhere even in the most tyrannical of regimes; it cannot exist, for class forces antagonistic to the 'one man' will inevitably catapult their agents up into the ranks of the state, thus limiting the one man.

As with all other leading figures in the USSR, Stalin ran for elections in a district in Moscow, and was thereby directly elected by the people in the district he represented. Furthermore, the Soviet leader's style of governance was democratic in spirit. Even in his personal behaviour with his coworkers and colleagues within the Soviet government, Stalin was far from autocratic or dictatorial. Among the American diplomatic circles in Moscow, it was:

generally considered that Stalin is . what we might term the type of "easy boss," who permits it to appear that his associates make their own decisions. (WHY THEY SHOT TUKHACHEVSKY No. 457 Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SHOOTING OF THE RED ARMY GENERALS ON JUNE 12, 1937, AND GENERAL CRISIS WHICH FOLLOWED, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 131) (IMG)

One thing is for certain: the Soviet leader led, rather than dictate. The archives show that he spoke as though he was the teacher of many of his comrades, but that is because he indeed was a teacher of scientific socialism.

In spite of these realities about the Soviet leader, the overwhelming majority of the policies advocated by him were implemented, back when the blue-collar workers formed the majority of the CPSU. When the blue-collar workers became a minority as a result of the casualties of the Great Patriotic War, and when the intelligentsia and bureaucrats became the majority in the CPSU 'thanks' to the Great Patriotic War, Stalin lost the majority in the Party, lost his seat as the General Secretary in late 1952, lost the intelligence war against the imperialist-fascist secret services, and lost his life.

Referring to the December 1937 elections, the MI6 official Ian Grey reported that the Soviet people supported the Party's General-Secretary and that, even if (hypothetically) the election figures were falsified, the broad fact of a vote of confidence by the overwhelming majority of the electorate was true:

In the elections, 96.6 percent of the electors cast their votes for the party candidates. The press proclaimed this as a massive vote of confidence in Stalin and the Soviet government. The election figures may have been falsified, but there could be no doubt the nation supported Stalin. Somehow he stood above the purges and betrayals; he was the leader to whom all looked. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

In the 1950s, the CIA investigated the level of Stalin's popularity in the Soviet Union; numerous documents on this topic have been declassified since then. For one example, the Soviet students, almost all from proletarian or kolkhoznik family backgrounds, were asked what their opinion on Stalin and his portraits was. The following is an excerpt of the document:

[Question:] What is their true thinking either pro or con the Party line on. Stalin?

[Answer:] Stalin was a hero to them. They say that they loved him and that the reason there are so many pictures of him is that the people demanded them even against Stalin's wishes. ('Student Attitudes toward Current Issues/Observations on 'Komsomolskaya Pravda'/Soviet Shops and Stores', CIA, date of distribution: March 5, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document states:

most Soviet workers support the Communist regime. (...). The average worker automatically accepts statements of Stalin as the unquestionable truth. Furthermore, the average Soviet considers his economic position to be greatly improved; he credits his government for this improvement. [T]he workers' lot has [indeed] improved

considerably since the Revolution of 1912. (...). The Soviet citizen firmly believes in the sincerity of the Soviet peace campaign and is convinced that in signing the Stockholm Appeal and similar petitions, he is furthering the cause of peace. It is also my impression, that all but a small percentage of the population believes in the anti-American propaganda campaign. All the Soviets believed that America started the Korean war. There appeared to be a decrease in tension and interest in the war after China's intervention. The Soviets [population] felt that China could take care of matters and there was therefore little chance of war spreading. They considered Chinese intervention as a normal state action, not an action carried out by volunteers; the Soviets seemed to be proud of it. Politically, the average Soviet [citizen] is much more conversant with world affairs than the average German. (LABOR CONDITIONS AND SOCIOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS IN THE USSR, CIA, April 21, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

CIA reports frequently point to the overwhelming popularity of Stalin among the ordinary people:

[T]he majority of the Soviet working class supported the Soviet government.. Their very real dissatisfaction with housing conditions, high prices, and shortages of consumer goods [caused by the Nazi invasion largely] was not directed against the government itself. They rationalized, for example, that present [post-war] conditions did not permit a substantial improvement in living conditions. Stalin was considered a demigod by the average worker, as a man who could make no mistake. (Political Conditions in the USSR, CIA, October 30, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

[T]he average Soviet citizen was a dye-in-the-wool supporter of the Soviet government. This was particularly true of the younger generation. They certainly appeared to be active supporters of the regime, to judge by their participation in political activities.. (1. Political Attitudes in the USSR 2. Foreign Radio Broadcasts in the USSR, CIA, July 16, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

[T]he average Soviet citizen greatly respected Stalin.. (...). [T]he average Soviet worker was convinced of the likelihood of achieving communism. (1. Political Attitudes in the USSR 2. Foreign Radio Broadcasts in the USSR, CIA, July 16, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Also, the Red Army was:

a branch of government known to be popular with the Soviet people.. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 4) (IMG {Titoist Coup})

The cheering for Stalin was, according to the anti-Soviet US State Department official Charles Bohlen, 'genuinely spontaneous':

The appearance of Stalin was greeted with ovations which gave all the indications of being genuinely spontaneous. Each delegation felt called upon to lead a cheer in its native language for Stalin, and, with possibly an Asiatic sense of realism, wasted very little time in cheering the other members of the Politburo or the Government, most of whom were present. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 509) (IMG)

The cult of personality fostered around Stalin was very reactionary and had persisted. However, the above excerpt provides evidence to show that much (if not all) of the cheering for Stalin by Soviet state officials was genuinely spontaneous, not engineered by Stalin to satisfy himself.

An example of how Stalin was not alone in his policies was the purges. One may assume that the Party was opposed to 'Stalin's purges' and that the Soviet leader had to impose the cleansing upon the Party. This could not be farther from the truth. The foreign – including American – diplomats in Moscow agreed that the cleansing of the Soviet state was not particularly Stalin's idea only, and that rather, it was an idea for which the Party as a whole advocated:

Moreover, generally speaking, in diplomatic circles here responsibility for these executions, in a strictly personal sense, is not attributed to Stalin. (...). The responsibility is generally attributed to the "action of the party". (WHY THEY SHOT TUKHACHEVSKY No. 457 Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SHOOTING OF THE RED ARMY GENERALS ON JUNE 12, 1937, AND GENERAL CRISIS WHICH FOLLOWED, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 131) (IMG)

The same can be said about many of the great construction projects in the Soviet Union; while having contributed much to those construction projects, the Soviet leader nevertheless rightly admitted that he was not the sole planner, supporter, or designer of those ideas. Davies recalled:

Meeting Mr. Stalin, I then said, was a great surprise, and that I was very much gratified to have this opportunity. I then went on to say that I had personally inspected typical plants of practically all of the heavy industries of the Soviet Union, as well as the great hydraulic developments of the country; that these extraordinary achievements, which had been conceived and projected in the short period of ten years, had commanded my great admiration; that I had heard it said that history would record Stalin as the man who was responsible for this

achievement and that he would be recorded as a greater builder than Peter the Great or Catherine; that I was honoured by meeting the man who had built for the practical benefit of common men.

To this, Stalin demurred and stated that the credit was not his; that the plan had been conceived and projected by Lenin, who had projected the original Dnieperstrogos Dam project; that the ten year plan was not his work; that it was due to the three thousand able men who had planned this work and those others of his associates; and above all that it was the "Russian people" who were responsible, and that he disclaimed any personal credit therefor. He gave me the impression of being sincerely modest. (Memorandum of Conference Had This Fifth Day of June, 1938, by Joseph E. Davies with Mr. Stalin, President Kalinin, and Premier Molotov, in the Kremlin at Moscow. In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, p. 222) (IMG)

In brief, the policy line for which the democratic Soviet leader advocated were usually implemented, not because they were imposed, but rather because those policy ideas matched the will of the working class as a whole. Similar democratization measures were launched and established in the individual Republics of the USSR. According to the CIA:

The organs of power and administration of the Union and Autonomous Republics are established in absolute conformity with the principles of the establishment of the organs of power in the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

All the citizens of the USSR, 21 years of age or over, having a right to vote, may be deputies to the Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic or an Autonomous Republic. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

The key difference was that the Supreme Soviets of these Republics were unicameral, meaning they were not composed of two chambers:

A unicameral Supreme Soviet, elected by the entire population of a Republic, is the highest organ of the State power in each Republic. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

In addition, the Autonomous Republics were represented in the Presidia of the Supreme Soviets in each Republic:

The Supreme Soviet of a Republic elects a Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. In those Union Republics which contain Autonomous Republics, the latter have representation in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republics in capacity of Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

Those Republics were of course divided into various districts as well. For each particular district the rule of law was democratically enforced through the popularly elected 'People's Courts':

The People's Courts are elected directly by the citizens of the district for a term of three years. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

People's courts are elected, by direct, equal and secret voting of the whole electorate of each region for terms of three years. (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, Memorandum. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 178) (IMG)

An MI6 report written by the Frank Roberts, one of the most trusted advisors to Churchill and a prominent British intelligence and diplomatic official, stated:

Instead of wasting time discussing whether the elections were really "democratic," it seems more fitting to examine what the party and the Government have gained from them. Firstly, they have won a striking vote of confidence which is none the less remarkable for being largely a foregone conclusion. This vote of confidence indicates that the authorities have lost none of their skill in leading, inspiring, persuading, cajoling, deceiving and driving the public. It also indicates either that the masses really like the present system or, even at the lowest, that they can see no possible alternative to it. Secondly, the party and the Government have used the elections to celebrate victory and the virtues of the Soviet system, to test the pulse of the ordinary people, to find out something of what they are thinking and saying, to answer their criticism and complaints, and to explain and justify their own policies and measures. This process naturally goes on the whole time. But the elections provided the opportunity for a really thorough and intimate shock taking from which both the public and the Government feel that they have greatly benefited. Thirdly, the party and the Government were able to turn the elections into a vast campaign for preparing and mobilising the masses for the new Five-Year Plan. If left to themselves the Soviet people might well have succumbed to war weariness and let their efforts flag. But the election campaign gave them a great stimulus to gird themselves for the tasks ahead, and it is significant that its progress was marked by new labour achievements in the factories and fields, especially after Stalin's speech. (N 3300/24/38, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, by: Frank Kenyon Roberts February 25, 1946. Received: March 12, 1946, p. 86. p. 92 of British Foreign Office (1946)) (IMG)

C5S7.2. Criticism and Media Freedom in the USSR

Liberal and anarchist models of analyzing the concept of media freedom emphasize the role of structure in promoting

media freedom. Create proper structures and there will be more willingness on the side of the media to combat corruption. Liberal and anarchist models therefore propose decentralization of the media and the fostering of competition among media outlets as to which outlet would be more critical and better at tackling corrupt practices and officials' errors.

Undoubtedly, there is truth to these points of theirs. Creating proper structures matter and fostering competition among media outlets does help. The problem is not so much with this point that liberals and anarchists make in-itself; the problem rather is with the fact that they blow the importance of this point out of proportion.

In America, there are numerous media outlets and in theory, they should be engaged in a tough competition as to who is more critical of officials and corrupt practices – they are not. They are all owned by American finance capital's mafia and its intelligence arm, the CIA gangsters. Daring to deviate from the CIA-approved line has severe consequences and so the journalists of these prominent media outlets dare not deviate if they would at all be willing to deviate. The situation is not so different in any of the other Western bloc countries. In anti-imperialist bourgeois- democracies that have a large private sector, there are many corrupt oligarchs and bureaucrats that bully journalists into not exposing their corrupt or saboterial practices.

The common denominator behind these events is that there are parasitic class forces that block the path for a critical media, even though there are multiple (private sector) media outlets competing with one another.

Contrast that with the Soviet system. In the USSR, the private sector was abolished and the industrial sector was strongly centralized. There was only one Party and the Party was democratic centralist, with the formation of blocs and fractions in the Party being banned. All of these reduced bureaucracy and assisted in the purge of bureaucrats – how and why the centralization of the economy and democratic centralism cut bureaucracy has been explained in depth in C1S6, C1S8, and C2S8. The purge of bureaucrats and weakening of bureaucracy helped in strongly weakening the corrupt bureaucrats, the last major violent parasitic class force in the USSR which would have terrorized journalists. This allowed for a more critical media.

Therefore, as counterintuitive though it may seem, democratic centralism and economic centralization, by fighting bureaucracy, actually helped promote media freedom. Furthermore, the purges against enemy agents and corrupt bureaucrats also cleared the way for the media to be more critical since again there were fewer enemy agents, torturers and assassins that would seek to terrorize journalists into submission. The critical media in turn became the ally of the counter-intelligence officers in their struggle against sabotage and corruption.

All of these allowed the media to ruthlessly criticize and expose poor performance, sabotage, and corruption in the spheres of culture, politics, and economics. The articles on the intelligence and military sector were of course censored, as they involved state secrets. Only the intelligence cases exposed by the state or authorized by the state to be exposed, were exposed in Soviet media; and rightly so. However, everything else was to be ruthlessly criticized.

Western media claims that Stalin forced his media to depict the USSR fully positively and that the supposedly 'totalitarian' features of the USSR – democratic centralism, central planning, and the purges – forever muted the Soviet media criticism. Such Western media assertions are very far from the truth.

The dictatorship of the proletariat, in its historic drive to consolidate the hold of the proletariat at the expense of corrupt bureaucratic class, bears a natural tendency to systematically, ruthlessly, suppress media activities that question the proletariat's exercise of state power, but also to systematically promote media activities that ruthlessly expose and 'rip apart' the influence of the anti-proletarian classes – such as corrupt bureaucrats and black-marketeers – within the proletariat's state. To this end, the socialist state's media, so long as continuously under the influence of the agents of the proletarian class, will naturally promote an ever greater campaign of exposing corruption in the various holes and nests of the socialist state, so to pave the way for the downfall of the corrupt bureaucrats that have penetrated the socialist state. Rather than attempt to regress society by questioning and criticizing the proletariat's right of state power, the proletarian-owned media unapologetically represses such foolish 'critiques' and rather engages in the kind of media criticism useful and necessary, the one that improves society by challenging the position of the class enemies standing in the way of the expansion of the proletariat's state power.

I have spent much time reading Soviet articles translated into English by the CIA's Foreign Documents Division (FDD). Presenting the Soviet media's cases of criticisms would take far too many pages of this work to be effective in showing the data. Instead, I will show below excerpts of a CIA document, also from the Foreign Documents Division (FDD), summarizing the Soviet media criticisms and demonstrating the extent of the ruthlessness. The CIA FDD document, which looks at the criticisms of economic matters in the Soviet media in early February of 1953 (i.e. during the Stalin era), is as follows:

There is some criticism of the operations of the light and consumer industries where mismanagement, corruption, theft and embezzlement are said to be still rampant. Plan-fulfillment figures in these industries are said to be particularly misleading since the totals do not reflect satisfactory performance of every aspect of the plan. A ZYAZDA editorial broadcast from Minsk on 3 February says that last year a “considerable number of enterprises and even entire industries” of Belorussian SSR failed to complete their annual plan. The Republic's fishing

industry, for example, has been lagging for years and shows no signs of improvement now:

The question arises: when will the leaders of the fishing industry administration finally overcome their lagging and fulfill the State Plan?

Similar production failures are attributed to the Belorussian Electric Power Administration and the Industrial Cooperatives Council which cater exclusively to the consumers. We must not be deceived by the glowing reports of the Ministries which have fulfilled and even overfulfilled their gross production plans. The paper reports that a number of them failed to complete the plan "according to specified items." Among them are the Ministries of light, building materials, food and local industries. Similar failures not reflected in the gross-production reports are said to have been registered in the production of tractors and automobiles, bricks and tiles, lime and woolen textiles.

The Kherson Oblast consumer industry is honeycombed with "swindlers and shapers" according to NADDNEPRIANSKA PRAVDA of 4 February. Socialist property is being stolen in such large enterprises as the "Main Textile Distribution Administration" . the "Eighth of March" plant and the river port. The damages sustained through thievery by the Oblast Consumer Cooperative Administration last year alone amounted to over 1.2 million rubles. The oblast Party and Soviet officials, says the paper, "should have drawn suitable conclusions" from that and looked into the personnel problem. This, however, has not been done, and "incompetent and untrustworthy" officials, instead of being dismissed, are shifted from one responsible post to another. An interesting sidelight on the official attitude toward the consumer is provided by a STALINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA editorial of 6 February. Listing the activities of several officials of the oblast consumer industry who have been fleecing the consumers for a long time, the paper inveighs against their "dishonesty to the State" without even mentioning the consumers. Thus the director of the Kamyshin Meat Combine for example, had "tried to transform that State enterprise into his own property" and systematically deceived the State and the Party by faking the combines performance reports and otherwise engaging in "shady machinations." The head of the oblast "Gastronome" Bureau, Safonov, having surrounded himself with yes-men and "people of unclean conscience" . has been violating the retail trade regulations himself and protecting the violations of his subordinates by transferring them from the executive position to another. He, too, is referred to as a bad Communist [Party official] who is "dishonest to the State and the Party."

In a long TRUD article published on 6 February, the acting chief of the Central Trade Union Housing Administration Bertasov unwittingly testifies to the extent of corruption in the retail trade industry by admitting that licensed "public inspectors" . are frequently refused admission to the places they are to inspect. It is quite clear, he says, that these inspectors, whose duty it is to see that the customers are well treated, are "a thorn in the flesh" . of unscrupulous officials who brook no interference in their favorite pastime of "cheating customers" .. It has also been discovered, according to Berrbasov, that where public inspectors cannot easily be kept out of stores and other retail trade enterprises, they are "reported" to their superiors in "anonymous slanderous letters" . as taking bribes and committing a variety of other crimes in the hope of having them dismissed or "bringing them to terms" with the unscrupulous store managers and other officials.

Misleading total production figures are also the object of an editorial discussion by KOMMUNA broadcast from Voronezh on 5 February. Good industrial production indexes often "conceal straggling enterprises," says the paper, and Voronezh oblast is no exception: "Several plants of the oblast remain heavily indebted to the country." The building-materials industry failed to complete its 1952 plan, is "far behind" in its current program, and the plants of the butter industry trust . are not producing the prescribed quantities of butter and other food-stuffs. "Solicitude" for the consumer is expressed in a broadcast from industrial Kemerovo of 3 February where the "acute shortage" . of living space has been the target of criticism for a long time.

Many building organizations are failing to fulfill the house-building plans every year. . Some enterprises of the oblast have slackened their attention toward improving the working and living conditions of the workers.

The communal enterprises such as public baths, laundry transportation and electric supply in the workers' settlements are said to be functioning very unsatisfactorily. Interruptions in the water supply are frequent in Prokofyevsk, Kiselavsk, Lenin-Kuznetsky and other towns. The network of repair shops is far too inadequate to serve the people, the assortment of consumer goods produced by the local industry is limited and the quality "remains low" .. The oblast Party organizations, the report concludes, must put an end to the "harmful practice of under-estimating the importance of the workers' material welfare" and devote more time to the daily cultural and other requirements of the people. It is revealed that most of those officials seldom if ever visit workers' dormitories and other communal dwellings and are not even familiar with the conditions obtaining there: "you cannot learn much by sitting in an office." PRAVDA refers editorially (7 February) to a collective letter from the workers of the Zarubino fishing trust, the largest in the Far East, to call attention to the "vicious methods" ... of administration employed by the USSR Fishing Industry. The letter, which was not broadcast, points out that structural defects are frequently found on the fishing vessels delivered by the Ministry, and repair materials for

the fishing fleet are usually shipped by the Ministry when it is too late; that is, in the height of the fishing season. Serious shortcomings have been noted also in the oil industry, PRAVDA continues. The Ministry of that industry and its subordinate organizations “are insufficiently familiar with the situation on the spot”.. This is particularly evident in the Tatar ASSR where drilling operations are frequently and unaccountably delayed, and in Bashkir ASSR where “little interest is shown” . in improving the technical skill of the industry personnel. At the . Ukrainian Waterway Construction . where valuable materials are poorly guarded, a group of squanderers and thieves have been operating and causing great losses. Tens of tons of petrol . have thus disappeared from one sector of that project, the Vasilievsky construction and assembly division. Another gang of swindlers . is said to have built a nest at the Krasno-Perekopsk sector and engage in squandering . socialist property. INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES, CIA, Information from: Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts, Date of Information: February 3, 1953 to February 9, 1953. Date Distributed: March 16, 1953, pp. 6-8) (IMG)

Imperialist media claims that Stalin sought to present the USSR as a completely happy place devoid of problems, that even the slightest media criticism of the state was banned, that Stalin sought to brainwash the Soviet people into thinking that everything was fine with regards to the economy and state affairs, that the workers got no voice in the media, etc. As the above CIA document’s excerpts demonstrate, this was not the case.

Other excerpts of the document show how the critical media was an ally of the anti-corruption and anti-sabotage purge processes and how the critical media called for greater vigilance in order to hunt down saboteurs and corrupt politicians:

A broadcast from Dnepropetrovsk (4 February) cited ... the case of the Sinelnikovsky Rayon Party Committee which approved a certain Rudenko for the post of collective farm pyramid without realizing that he had been “wanted for investigation” by the same Committee for a long period of time in connection with his questionable behavior. Many swindlers and criminals are still at large, according to the paper, because their friends holding influential positions in the oblast trade union and other organisations “rescue and protect them” by providing suitable jobs for them. G. Alexandrov, State Counsellor for the Justice Department . writing in LITERARY GAZETTE on 3 February also identifies the swindlers and thieves with such political criminals as spies and diversionists since both of them are “just what the enemy is looking for.” (.). That thieves, rascals and people alien to the Soviet system had been appointed to “materially responsible” jobs was disclosed by SOTSIALISTICHESKIY DONBAS on 5 February. The paper does not mention whether or not such undesirables have already been weeded out but admits that they have already “inflicted great damage” . to the Socialist economy.

The Kurakovka mine of Krasnoarmeisky Coal Trust is said to be one of the casualties but no details are offered. “We must constantly bear in mind” that as long as capitalist encirclement exists the Soviet Union will be the hunting ground for foreign spies, terrorists, saboteurs and diversionists.

Lagging silk production may not in itself be of any political significance but, as indicated in a summarized ZARYA VOSTOKA editorial broadcast from Tbilisi on 6 February, political vigilance is one of the suggested cures for it. Averting that the backwardness of Georgian silk production is “the direct result of liberalism” toward violations of the State plans manifested by Party and Soviet officials, the paper quotes a reference to the subject made by Georgia Party leader Mgeladze. (INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES, CIA, Information from: Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts, Date of Information: February 3, 1953 to February 9, 1953. Date Distributed: March 16, 1953, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

Liberal 'journalists' are scared of the term 'purge' and denounce the call for purges, when in fact it is precisely the moral duty of the media to challenge corrupt politicians and call for their purges.

True, journalists must keep in mind the potential need for occasional tactical retreats and strategic expediency- discernments when facing far more powerful corrupt oligarchs and saboteurs that threaten them. They need to play strategic in their targets for anti-corruption purges. However, to completely denounce purges in general is what corrupt media – not critical media – would do.

On the other hand, it is important to note that imperialist agents and saboteurs seek to use the cover of 'criticism' as a means of launching colour revolutions and spreading lies. The Soviet legal system did not tolerate such a counter - revolutionary agenda.

Akin to the issue of media freedom is the issue of criticism and self-criticism in the CPSU. Regarding this matter, there was another CIA FDD document summarizing the large extent of criticism and self-criticism provided by the Party leaders of the republics and zones of the USSR. The following are excerpts of the CIA document:

Listed below are some of the economic and ideological shortcomings recited on the floor of the Congress by the regional Party bosses. one of the most articulate critics of the Republican as well as all-Union agricultural organizations is Shayakhmetov of Kazakh SSR. The Kazakh livestock industry, he says, is still far behind the planned tempo of development because some of the other branches of agriculture on which it depends are not doing their share. Fodder procurement is far too inadequate, there are not enough cattle sheds and all the work

involved in hay processing and stockpiling is still largely unmechanized. The USSR. Ministry of Agriculture has not only lost interest in the Republic's cattle industry and other agricultural organizations but also appears to "restrain their initiative in the mechanization of the stock-breeding industry and the establishment of a stable fodder base" . . . The [food] situation is indeed so bad, according to Shayakhmetov, that in a number of places the indispensable "emergency reserves" . of fodder have not been made available. The machine-tractor stations and the motor pools of the cattle industry, he concludes, will henceforth require the Party's concentrated attention before a higher level of agricultural development can be attained.

Brezhnev of Moldavian SSR complains of the great disproportion . between the capital investments in the food industry and then in the construction organizations for house-building purposes. These industries, he says, have been unable to cope with the mentioned problem, which should therefore be solved by the appropriate All-Union bodies: "We are therefore badly in need of the help of the USSR (Food) Ministry and the State Planning Commission.. We are still lagging far behind . in the utilization of the available machine-tractor stations, Brezhnev concludes.

Muratov of Tatar ASSR speaks of the serious shortcomings in the work of the Republic's oil industry. Accidents and idle drilling equipment . are referred to as common features of the industry's activities, while the production of building materials and housing construction are said to be beset by great difficulties..

(. . .). Efimov of Khabarovsk Krai is bitter about the irrational and lopsided administration of the Far Eastern Lumber Industry. The enormous timber resources, he says, are neither processed nor distributed the way they should be. This is particularly evident in the case of Primorye, where the "management" of the lumber industry actually defies common sense. That krai, it is stated, has increased its lumber imports eightfold since 1935 despite the abundant local resources of that raw material, which are more than adequate to meet its requirements. Much of the long haulage of Khabarovsk lumber to the Okhotsk coast, Lower Amur, Kamchatka and Sakhalin, it is claimed, could be similarly dispensed with and should therefore be discontinued.

(.). Razzakov, [from the] Kirghiz SSR, says that the exploitation of the Uzgen Coal Basin, scheduled to begin in the first post war Five Year Plan, is still in the blueprint stage. The coal reserve there, estimated at hundreds of millions of tons, remains in the ground intact because the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry has for some reason neglected that area. Turning to agriculture, he said that we must not blind ourselves to the "very grave shortcomings" . in that branch of the Republican economy, particularly in stock-breeding:

Losses through death and squandering of cattle are still permitted in the collective and State farms of the Republic. (INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES, 19th All-Union Communist Party Congress in Moscow / References to Shortcomings, CIA, Foreign Documents Division (FDD), November 13, 1952, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

In case there is any suspicion that the genuineness of self-criticism started appearing only in late 1952, it is worth reminding the reader that at least in reference to Zhdanov's self-criticism session, the MI6 station in Moscow acknowledged that:

Soviet "self-criticism" is not always wholly farcical and dishonest. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937 -1938), p. 67) (IMG)

The report added:

the practice may often be genuine enough.. Those at the top may well be honestly perturbed at the extent to which the party mechanism has become corrupted.. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937 -1938), p. 67) (IMG)

C5S7.3 The Anti-Soviet Agitation Law

Imperialist-fascist secret services use the media as a means of agitating the public into a colour revolution against the state. It was therefore necessary to promote freedom of speech, but not to allow as much freedom of speech as to help the imperialist-fascist secret services in agitating for colour revolutions. Hence, the Soviet criminal code stated:

58.10. Propaganda or agitation containing a call for the overthrow, undermining or weakening of Soviet power or for the commission of certain counter-revolutionary crimes (Articles 582-589 of this Code), as well as the distribution or production or storage of literature of the same content entail – deprivation freedom for a period not less than six months. (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE, RSFSR, Official text as amended on July 1, 1950, STATE PUBLISHING, LEGAL LITERATURE, MOSCOW, 1950, p. 42)

The above law was implemented in the USSR in the 1920s, but only slightly changed during the Stalin-era in the 1930s. As with all legal systems, the important factor to take into account was the intention of the authors of the propaganda/agitation piece. A person promoting anti-Soviet propaganda was to be punished only if such a person intended to use the material distributed as a means of overthrowing or undermining Soviet power. This would mean that, so long as the Soviet laws were actually enforced, one who had been misled into genuinely believing that 'Stalin carried out a genocide

in Ukraine' and who spread this lie not for the purpose of a deliberate slander of the Soviet state, but for the purpose of improving the situation, was not going to be punished. This is why:

On December 16, 1930, the plenum of the Supreme Court issued a decree stressing the absolute inadmissibility of the broad application of article 58.10. The decree warned that the only activities warranting qualification under this article were those "containing the direct signs stipulated in this article, and bearing a counter-revolutionary character." Despite the admonition of the Supreme Court, the excesses continued, particularly on the part of the OGPU, and a "comradely letter" was sent to procurators responsible for overseeing the OGPU activity. This letter referred to an unacceptably wide application of certain articles concerning state crimes, including 58.10. It recommended that 58.10 should not be applied groundlessly, for example, to cases of critical comments alone. (The crime of "anti-Soviet agitation" in the Soviet Union in the 1930's, Sarah Davis. In: 'Cahiers du monde russe', Vol. 39, no. 1-2, January 1998 to June 1998, p. 151. In: Persee) (IMG)

During the 1920s and before the Great Purge, the Soviet intelligence was obviously heavily infiltrated by Trotskyite left-deviationists who engaged in diversionary terror aimed at driving a wedge between the people and the state, which means that in certain cases, even mere criticism of the state was going to cause some to be arrested. The Soviet judicial system, however, boosted efforts to prevent such provocative terror campaigns of arresting individuals for mere criticism:

From mid-1933, as part of its general policy of internal and external detente, the Soviet regime began to pursue a more "liberal" penal policy. 14 An instruction of May 8, 1933 from the TsK VKP(b) and SNK called for the end to mass repression, and its substitution by mass organizational work.15 On June 20, 1933, the Procurator of the USSR was established with the aim of strengthening legality. These measures had some effect. In 1934 the number of criminals convicted by the courts fell by 23% to 1,096,358 in the RSFSR. The reduction in numbers convicted for counterrevolutionary crime by the courts was even greater: in 1933, there were 7,303 convictions, in 1934, 3,049. 16 Arrests for counter-revolutionary crime in OGPU/NKVD cases in the USSR also fell from 283,029 in 1933 to 90,417 in 1934. Of these, in 1933, 32,370 were for anti-Soviet agitation and in 1934, 16,788.

By July 1934, the procurator of the Western Siberian krai was able to report to USSR Procurator, Akulov, that mass repression by the OGPU had been extirpated in his region. (The crime of "anti-Soviet agitation" in the Soviet Union in the 1930's, Sarah Davis. In: 'Cahiers du monde russe', Vol. 39, no. 1-2, January 1998 to June 1998, p. 151. In: Persee) (IMG)

However, note that the ending of the terroristic mass-arrest of people for criticism did not stop the counter-revolutionary conspirators in the Soviet intelligence. This time, the policy of relative liberality was sabotaged by the right-deviationist counter-revolutionary elements in the Soviet counter-intelligence, through showing leniency towards those who spread anti-Soviet agitation! No matter what correct policy gets chosen, excesses are always committed by the saboteurs. If liberality is shown, right-deviationists carry out sabotage and if illiberality is shown, left-deviationists carry out sabotage. The difference though was that through such a process of constantly shifting from liberality to de-liberalization and vice versa, each time the Soviet system was able to weaken more and more of left-deviationist and right-deviationist elements, so that by the end of the Great Purge, the misuse of the anti-Soviet agitation law was dramatically minimized. Hence, the constant shift in the degree of liberality actually helped gradually minimize the misuse of the law, by balancing off the right- and left-deviations and pitting them against each other.

C5S7.4. Condemnation of Discrimination based on Class Origin

According to the OSS, on December 15, 1936,;

Soviet Union: Announcement of a campaign to insure observance of new rights granted under Constitution; action taken against officials who continued to discriminate against persons because of class origin. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 66) (IMG)

C5S7.5. Structure of the Party

It is also worth mentioning the structure of the Party with respect to the relationship between general membership of the Party, the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the General-Secretary. The core idea that caused the distinction between those decision-making levels was with regards to the issue of efficiency and quickness in decision-making. The massive membership of the Party could obviously not meet for making all the decisions. Hence, the Central Committee arose out of the Party membership for making the grand strategic decisions, policy decisions, and tactical decisions on behalf of the Party. The Politburo arose out of the Central Committee for cases in which the decisions – especially tactical decisions and decisions regarding policy details – had to be made relatively more quickly and when the Central Committee could not afford to meet for such a quick decision about the details. The General-Secretary of the Party in turn made the tactical decisions that were to be made even more quickly than the Politburo. Naturally, the General Secretary also was supposed to inform the rest of the Party about policy questions, to promote education about socialism, etc. However, the main

feature that distinguished those levels of decision-making was efficiency in making quick decisions.

C5S8. On the Cults of Personality

*** IMG-All- {Personality Cult}

The cult of personality was something that unfortunately existed in the USSR, and even more unfortunately continues to exist among many who (wrongly) self-describe as communists. The culture of the cult of personality was a vestige of the culture of agrarian Russia, inherited by the USSR. The peasants with small lands had a natural tendency to not take risks and thus expected a god-like superhero to solve their problems. Collectivization in the USSR made the businesses of the peasants bigger (in a collectivist way) thus causing the kolkhoz peasants to be more willing to take risks and advance in a socialist environment. In spite of the material change, however, the reactionary culture of the cult of personality in that country persisted and its elimination was to take a longer time.

Since the beginning, even before the full success of the collectivization drive, Stalin campaigned against the cult of personality that others sought to form around him. As early as 1926, he gave a long speech in which he stated that such heaping of praise upon him was for the martyrs and not him, and that he was more of a student:

Comrades, permit me first of all to tender my comradely thanks for the greetings conveyed to me here by the representatives of the workers.

I must say in all conscience, comrades, that I do not deserve a good half of the flattering things that have been said here about me. I am, it appears, a hero of the October Revolution, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leader of the Communist International, a legendary warrior-knight and all the rest of it. That is absurd, comrades, and quite unnecessary exaggeration. It is the sort of thing that is usually said at the graveside of a departed revolutionary. But I have no intention of dying yet.

I must therefore give a true picture of what I was formerly, and to whom I owe my present position in our Party.

Comrade Arakel* said here that in the old days he regarded himself as one of my teachers, and myself as his pupil. That is perfectly true, comrades. I really was, and still am, one of the pupils of the advanced workers of the Tiflis railway workshops,

Let me turn back to the past.

I recall the year 1898, when I was first put in charge of a study circle of workers from the railway workshops. That was some twenty-eight years ago. I recall the days when in the home of Comrade Sturua, and in the presence of Djibladze (he was also one of my teachers at that time), Chodrishvili, Chkheidze, Bochorishvili, Ninua and other advanced workers of Tiflis, I received my first lessons in practical work. Compared with these comrades, I was then quite a young man. I may have been a little better-read than many of them were, but as a practical worker I was unquestionably a novice in those days. It was here, among these comrades, that I received my first baptism in the revolutionary struggle.

It was here, among these comrades, that I became an apprentice in the art of revolution. As you see, my first teachers were Tiflis workers.

Permit me to tender them my sincere comradely thanks. (Applause.)

I recall, further, the years 1907-09, when, by the will of the Party, I was transferred to work in Baku. Three years of revolutionary activity among the workers in the oil industry steeled me as a practical fighter and as one of the local practical leaders. Association with such advanced workers in Baku as Vatssek, Saratovets, Fioletov and others, on the one hand, and the storm of acute conflicts between the workers and the oil owners, on the other, first taught me what it means to lead large masses of workers.

It was there, in Baku, that I thus received my second baptism in the revolutionary struggle. There I became a journeyman in the art of revolution.

Permit me to tender my sincere comradely thanks to my Baku teachers. (Applause.)

Lastly, I recall the year 1917, when, by the will of the Party, after my wanderings from one prison and place of exile to another, I was transferred to Leningrad. There, in the society of Russian workers, and in direct contact with Comrade Lenin, the great teacher of the proletarians of all countries, in the storm of mighty clashes between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, in the conditions of the imperialist war, I first learnt what it means to be one of the leaders of the great Party of the working class. There, in the society of Russian workers — the liberators of oppressed peoples and the pioneers of the proletarian struggle of all countries and all peoples — I received my third baptism in the revolutionary struggle. There, in Russia, under Lenin's guidance, I became a master workman in the art of revolution.

Permit me to tender my sincere comradely thanks to my Russian teachers and to bow my head in homage to the memory of my great teacher — Lenin. (Applause.)

From the rank of apprentice (Tiflis), to the rank of journeyman (Baku), and then to the rank of a master workman of our revolution (Leningrad) — such, comrades, was the school in which I passed my revolutionary

apprenticeship.

Such, comrades, is the true picture of what I was and what I have become, if one is to speak without exaggeration and in all conscience. (Applause rising to a stormy ovation.)

(Reply to the Greetings of the Workers of the Chief Railway Workshops in Tiflis, Iosif. V. Stalin, June 8, 1926. In: "Works", Vol. 8, January-November, 1926, pp. 182-184. Publisher: Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954. First Published: Zarya Vostoka (Tiflis), No. 1197, June 10, 1926. Retrieved online from: Marxists Internet Archive (MIA). Note: MIA is an openly Trotskyist website) (IMG)


Seven years later, when the 'Society of Old Bolsheviks' tried to organize a mere exhibition to honor the activities of Stalin during the October Revolution and the Civil War, Stalin, in a letter to his secretary Poskrebshev, expressed his strong disagreement with this move and said:

I am against it, as such undertakings lead to the strengthening of the 'cult of individuals', which is harmful and incompatible with the spirit of our party.

(Letter to Poskrebshev, Stalin, July 2, 1933, p. 1) (IMG)

Charles Bohlen, the US State Department and American intelligence official who was a diplomat to the USSR in the 1930s, was one of the most virulently anti-Soviet American officials at the time. Yet, even he admitted that Stalin was uninterested in the proceedings honoring him and cut short the proceedings. In a 1938 intelligence report to Washington, Bohlen wrote:

Stalin had visibly aged in appearance during the past two years. His face was more deeply lined and his hair had turned gray. He gave an appearance of general weariness and at times even of strain which was not noticeable in 1935. He not only exhibited little interest in the proceedings, but on one occasion, with an impatient gesture of his hand, signalled to the presiding officer to cut short the demonstration in his honor. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 511) (IMG)



Stalin's message to Poskrebshev