



The History of the USSR & the Peoples' Democracies

Part 3, Chapters 11-16

by
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C11S1. Submerging Below the River Saleph?: The Nazis Establish an Underground State

*** IMG-All-{Nazi Underground}

The tactical and strategic victories of the Soviet Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad in late December 1942 turned the tide. Thus shifted the balance of power in favour of the Soviets against the Nazi regime.

With the death of Operation BARBAROSSA in late December of 1942, the Nazi Germans had already begun plans for another Crusade against the Soviet Union, a Third World War. Curt Riess, an American intelligence officer who researched extensively on such Nazi plans, wrote in a May 1944 book:

In a way this is one and the same thing, since the ultimate goal of the Nazis who continue after the defeat will be another war. World War III is by no means a product of the overheated imagination of diehards among the Nazis. Even the most realistic among the German generals have begun to think and talk seriously about it. General Otto von Stuelpnagel has already prepared a memorandum on the next war which the Algerian weekly Combat (November 28, 1943) printed. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. VIII) (IMG)

The Nazi Reich even set the ground for the German army to go underground. This was revealed by the very German commander responsible for rendering the Reich army underground. Indeed:

it has been established that it was Field Marshal von Kluge himself who arranged for this intelligence to leak out. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 58) (IMG)

The German:

generals desired ... to work out their long-range plan of an army underground which was to start many years after the armistice. Field Marshals von Kluge and von Mannstein put their foot down in no uncertain way. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 57) (IMG)

One of the key architects of this Underground Fourth Reich was Reinhard Gehlen:

the former chief of the German Army's intelligence branch dealing with the Eastern Front and Soviet forces.. (CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 1-10, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0010, Chapter 9: America's Seeing-Eye Dog on a Long Leash, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

The British intelligence officer Hugh Trevor-Roper noted that the head of German intelligence service:

[Walter] Schellenberg has told us how, in these darkening days [of the Third Reich], a certain Major-General Gehlen, who had long been busy studying the Polish underground movement, drew up a careful plan for German resistance on similar lines; (The Last Days of Hitler: The Classic Account of Hitler's Fall from Power, 7th Edition, Hugh Trevor Roper) (IMG)

Major-General Gehlen, the top architect and planner of the establishment of such a Nazi Underground, would later become the leader of the Anglo-American-backed Nazi shadow war against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies.

Gehlen knew that the Anglo-Americans wanted to ally with the Nazi Underground:

Like most Germans, Gehlen preferred surrender to the Western Allies as opposed to an uncertain fate at Russian hands. (...). Gehlen believed that the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, while wartime allies, would soon become peacetime rivals. With his knowledge about the Russians, combined with the FHO's collective resources, Gehlen felt he could influence relations between East and West and Germany's role in postwar Europe. (CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 1-10, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0010, Chapter 9: America's Seeing-Eye Dog on a Long Leash, CIA, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

Germany, Gehlen believed, could count on Anglo-American assistance. The Nazis expected that the Anglo-American-installed regime in Germany would provide pensions for the Reich commanders. These pensions in turn would serve as funds for the underground Reich army:

This again presents a parallel with 1918. After the last war the German Republic decided to pay pensions to all imperial officials and the officers of the army and the navy. In the minds of German Socialists and Democrats the officers had done their duty; they could not be blamed for the war, and that was that. It never occurred to them that they were thus feeding their worst enemies.

If Germany does not go Communist, there is an overwhelming likelihood that this time pensions will again be paid. Indeed, the Nazis are counting on it. It is undoubtedly because of these pensions that the officer corps of the German Army and the Navy have become so unbelievably large. There are today about 700 admirals in Germany, almost twice as many as there are in the United States Navy, although the German fleet hardly exists any longer. The amusing and revealing feature about this situation is that, while the German fleet has steadily grown smaller and smaller, the number of admirals has just as steadily grown larger and larger. As for the army, it may have between 4,000 and 5,000 marshals and generals. Including colonels, there will be about 20,000 commissioned German officers who will get pensions large enough for them to live on. With their incomes assured, the recipients will be able to devote their time and energies to something else. And to what better activity

could they devote their time and energy, so they must think, than to make Germany once more a strong and feared nation? That is what the Nazis count on. It is why the Nazis have promoted these officers – so that they can live without worrying about their daily bread and butter. The Nazi underground will take full advantage of them. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 177) (IMG)

The information leaked by Marshal von Kluge:

appeared in Czechoslovakian underground newspapers and in Swiss periodicals. They even found their way via Stockholm papers to the London dailies. These reports said that Heinrich Himmler “had been instructed to establish cadres immediately for the underground cells of an illegal Nazi party to exist fully ramified and equipped....” It was also said that “plans had been completed for violence and terror... to start as soon as the war was over.” In particular it was rumored that “two to three secret divisions of SS men had been established and were being trained in guerrilla tactics.... Factories, power plants, waterworks would be destroyed... communications would be smashed, food depots be blown up.” Other accounts spoke of “secret radio stations, a clandestine press, and secret arsenals of arms and ammunitions. New Free Corps were quoted with names such as “Goetz von Berlichingen” and “Georg von Frundsberg.” (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, pp. 57-58) (IMG)

‘Toward the end of October 1943, for instance,’ added the US intelligence officer:

the Swedish daily, Nydag, reported that a vast organization all over Germany was preparing to go underground when Germany is defeated; that the “General Staff” of this “illegal Nazi party” had been established in Munich; that secret radio stations, a clandestine press, and secret arsenals of arms, ammunition, explosives, and sabotage material were being prepared; that wholesale sabotage was to start in Germany in case of ... defeat; that SS men were being selected and trained as guerrillas. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. VII) (IMG)

The US intelligence officer even predicted:

The Nazi guerrillas and partisans who hold out in Germany until the zero hour will have a great nuisance value. (...). And also certain organizations of the early twenties which featured political assassinations may spring up again in order to prevent ... Germans ... from betraying the guerrillas. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 176) (IMG)

Terror operations by the stay-behind Nazi underground were to soon haunt not just Germany, but the whole of Europe. The beginning of the end for the Third Reich had come – and the Nazis knew it. That did not mean, however, that the Reich leaders would accept defeat. No, the ‘National-Socialist’ dream shall and will prevail, the Nazis argued. Himmler said:

It is possible that Germany will be defeated on the military front. It is even possible that she may have to capitulate. But never must the National Socialist German Workers’ party capitulate. That is what we have to work for from now on. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 4) (IMG)

Thus, the German Reich began preparing to go underground, in some cases, literally, beneath the surface of the Earth. ‘[T]here had been’, said Curt Riess:

many weeks of preliminary and preparatory work – work done mainly inside the so-called Gestapo building in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse, Berlin, where Himmler had his headquarters on the second floor.

But on May 16 the real work began. On that day those who were in charge of it moved to a spacious house, almost a little chateau, at II Koenigsallee in Berlin Grunewald. The whole estate, which had once belonged to a Jewish banker and had been taken over by the Nazis before the outbreak of the war, comprised more than a square mile. The rebuilt house contained large rooms on the first floor and a number of small offices on the second floor. The left wing of the main building was occupied by General Werner Heissmeyer of the SS and his staff, the right wing by General Fritz Kaltenbrunner of the SS. In the large, well-kept garden that surrounded the house some of the old trees had been cut off to make room for small office bungalows. The archives were stored in a bombproof cellar.

I quote from a report: “It was the Intelligence Department of the Gestapo which moved to II Koenigsallee on May 15 and 16. From May 16 on the Intelligence Department of the Gestapo was split into two parts. About half of the officials went on as usual in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse. The rest worked in Koenigsallee under Heissmeyer and Kaltenbrunner.” (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 1) (IMG)

Thus, for the first time in their history as a state:

THE NAZIS went underground on May 16, 1943. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 1) (IMG)

Notice that the date was in the first half of 1943, which shows that the preparations for going underground must have been in early 1943. This shows that the Nazi decision originated from the December 1942 defeat of the Nazis in the Battle of Stalingrad. The rendering of the Nazi state apparatus into an underground was also important concerning the Anglo-

American alliance with the Nazis, for this underground constituted the roots of the Gehlen Organization, HIAG, Schnez Truppe, and other Nazi military and intelligence networks backed by the CIA and MI6 in the years to come.

In another case, there was an underground Nazi city built. According to Gregory Pallucci, a specialist cited in a documentary by the British Channel 4, the Monte Soratte bunker:

was a city, an underground city. (Exploring the Haunting ‘Underground City’ Built by Nazis, Treasure Hunters, Channel 4 Documentary, November 1, 2018) (IMG)

Calling the massive bunker ‘a city’ was by no means an exaggeration. The Channel 4 documentary stated that in this underground Nazi city:

there was once a fully operational cinema, a bakery, a beer hall. (Exploring the Haunting ‘Underground City’ Built by Nazis, Treasure Hunters, Channel 4 Documentary, November 1, 2018) (IMG)

Of course, only a portion – and not the whole – of the Reich went underground on that important date. However, more was soon to come.

C11S2. Anglo-American Imperialists form an Alliance with Nazi Germany

*** IMG-All-{Nazi Underground}

Between 1941 and 1943, Germany had a higher amount of power, a higher amount of productive forces, under its disposal, a factor which led Anglo-American imperialists to regard Germany as a threat against which to stand with the Soviet Union. From late December of 1942 and early January of 1943, when Soviet power was overwhelming the Nazi Germans, the Soviet Red Army was paving the way for a mighty bloc of socialist states with plenty of productive forces under their control, capable of fighting against the Anglo-American imperialists. Expecting this, the Anglo-American imperialists assessed that this potential socialist bloc would have high amounts of productive forces, hence a high amount of power, thus being a greater threat than the Nazi German Empire. As such, the Anglo-American imperialists decided to ally with the Nazi Germans against the Soviets. Undoubtedly, the Reich leaders themselves were enthusiastic about an alliance with the Anglo-American imperialists against the Soviet Union. For one, Hitler’s Chief of Staff, Heinz Guderian:

had a conversation with RIBBENTROPPE in which he pointed out that a two-front war was too much to cope with, and asked him to make peace either in the WEST or in the EAST. (Observations on Armored Tactics, OSS, May 25, 1945. in: Miscellaneous 1945 Seventh Army reports on Germany, CIA, September 22, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

Eichmann recalled in his memoirs:

for almost to the end Himmler was optimistic about making separate peace terms. “We’ll get a better treaty than the ones at Hubertusburg,” he said to me, slapping his thighs. We’ll lose a few feathers, but it will be a better one.” It was then mid-April 1945. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 14-15. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG{Israel})

The Moshe Dayan henchman Shlomo Aronson wrote of:

the very connection thereby created between Himmler and the West ... for his genuine political purpose, separate peace, ... mainly due to the German defeat at Stalingrad, as argued by several parties involved such as Pomeranz in his postwar memoir and by some scholars ex post facto. (‘Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews’, Shlomo Aronson, 2004, pp. 172-173) (IMG{Israel})

Indeed, the Anglo-American agents and mercenaries throughout the world began to fight against the Red Army starting from early 1943, and the Nazi German negotiations with the Anglo-American imperialists, as shown in C16S1, were instructed by Hitler himself to start on December 1942. Therefore, the dating of the turn-about of the Anglo-American stance on the Nazi-Soviet War shows that it was directly correlated with the Soviet victories on the Stalingrad front. All the other Anglo-American-Axis negotiations that came about after the Battle of Stalingrad were mere continuations, extensions, and expansions of the series of negotiations that began on December 1942.

The MI6-backed fascist ‘resistance’ sleeper cells in Soviet Central Asia were reactivated to fight against the Red Army, to bog down the Soviets in Central Asia as a means of aiding the Nazi Germans. In this regard, the CIA referred to a report by the military intelligence of the Third Reich. According to the CIA:

There exists a long report by the (German) Chief of Security Police and Secret Service on the resistance movements in the USSR in 1943 and 1944. (...). In general, the report noted a considerable increase of opposition in the Soviet interior since the beginning of 1942. (Soviet Defections to the Germans in World War II, CIA, November 19, 1952, p. 30) (IMG{The Georgia Purge})

The German intelligence report cited in the CIA document specified that Britain was utilizing Afghanistan as a base for active sponsorship of anti-Soviet bands in Central Asia:

In Turkmenistan ... where the [anti-Soviet] resistance movement was strongest, there was a strong nationalistic movement, – which ... the report attributed to British support from Afghanistan. (Soviet Defections to the Germans in World War II, CIA, November 19, 1952, p. 31) (IMG{The Georgia Purge})

During the 1930s, Britain was keen on containing Soviet Central Asia through the occupation of Afghanistan, fascist subversion in Xinjiang, Central Asian Trotskyite-separatist infiltration in the Party, and the sponsorship of reactionary bandits in Turkmenistan. However, once Germany began outrivalling the British, Britain was compelled into a two-year alliance with the Soviet Union against the Third Reich. Between 1941 and late 1942, Britain ceased its support for separatism in Central Asia, as a partitioned USSR would have only helped Britain's imperial rival, the Third Reich. However, with the death of Operation Barbarossa in late 1942, Britain fully returned to its policy of supporting and siding with the Axis.

A CIA paper stated that the Nazi agenda was to compel:

the Americans and the British [to] join forces with the Germans to fight the Soviets. (The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 3. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

The American spymaster Allen Dulles was enthusiastic towards an alliance with Nazi Germany. Allen Dulles, the high-ranking American spymaster was also a lawyer representing the interests of American finance capital in Fascist Italy. This has been confirmed by Kerstin von Lingen, a historian for the Stuttgart Attorney General in preliminary proceedings on Nazi war crimes in Italy and a Fellow at the Royal Historical Society and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Kerstin von Lingen wrote:

In northern Italy and in Switzerland, American companies had financial stakes in firms and banks, so it is no surprise that there was an economic interest in protecting these resources by reaching a surrender settlement quickly. As a lawyer, Allen Dulles represented clients from U.S. high finance in northern Italy. Should Italy fall, he considered it a top priority for economic reasons to protect Trieste and Austria from a Russian invasion. This economic motivation was strengthened ideologically by a strong anti-communist current found particularly among the East Coast upper classes, and the two Dulles brothers had certainly never made any secret about their lifelong aversion to communism.' (Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution, Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 254) (IMG)

Documenting the history of the American intelligence collaboration with the SS, the CIA reported:

By late 1944, various SS officials in Italy and in Germany decided to contact the Allies. (The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 4. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

When the Americans came to the aid of the Axis forces, the fascist armies began to rebrand themselves with 'democratic' coloration, 'democratic'-sounding names, 'democratic' slogans, etc. in order to provide the excuse for US intelligence support. In 1943, Mussolini established his 'Italian Social Republic' with the 'National Republican Army', thus returning to some of the Kautskyite San-Sepolcrist rhetoric that he used to promote during the post-WWI period when communist ideas were popular amongst the Italian proletarians. The San-Sepolcro program was a program that gave 'democratic' and 'socialist' slogans to Italian Fascism in the 1910s, so that MI6 agent Mussolini could demagogically nullify worker discontent. Via intermediaries, the Dulles network and the SS engaged in negotiations behind the back of the Roosevelt faction and of the Soviets:

In December 1944, Dulles's agent, Gero von Schulze Gaevernitz, told Dulles that Alexander von Neurath, the German consul in Lugano, was in close contact with senior German military and SS officers searching for an American contact to discuss surrender terms. Dulles was forced to reject this feeler because President Roosevelt ... had expressed concern about the reaction of the Soviet allies to any negotiations by the Western Allies with the Germans. (The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 3. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

In spite of the US President's efforts to prevent any such negotiations with Nazi Germany:

Over the next several months [after December 1944], Dulles continued to receive feelers in Switzerland from senior SS officers, including such notable Nazis as Heinrich Himmler, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, and Walter Schellenberg. (The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 3. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

Thus:

By mid-February 1945, SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Karl Wolff, the commander of all SS troops in Italy, told Walther Rauff, a subordinate SS officer, that he wanted to establish contact with the Allies in neutral Switzerland. Rauff mentioned this to another SS officer, Guido Zimmer, who suggested Baron Luigi Parilli as an intermediary.

Parilli, the prewar European representative of a prominent American company, was closely tied to Zimmer and may have been one of his agents. The Italian claimed that Zimmer's love for Italy and his concern that the Germans would unleash a "scorched earth" policy motivated both men to seek the Allies. Through Professor Max Husmann, a Swiss schoolmaster, Parilli received a visa to visit Switzerland and present the German proposal to Maj. Max Waibel, a Swiss intelligence officer and a contact of Allen Dulles, the OSS station chief in Bern. This led to the first meeting between Gero von Gaevernitz and Parilli in Lucerne and the beginning of

Operation SUNRISE. (The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 4. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

Hitler is documented to have given the order for selling the wealthy among the Ashkenazi captives in exchange for the Anglo-American provisions of arms to Nazi Germany since December 1942. In addition, Hitler hinted at the process of negotiations with the United States for a general alliance. On February 24, 1945, Hitler gave his last speech to the Nazi Party members in the Reich Chancellery. Mainstream newspapers presented incorrect information about the nature of Hitler's speech. According to US intelligence:

No authentic reports of this session [were] published in the Press or announced over the Radio [at the time]. Reports which [were] released did not contain the true facts [about the speech]. (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in: Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 1. Cited in: Miscellaneous 1945 Seventh Army reports on Germany, CIA, September 22, 1950) (IMG)

The following is the authentic information about Hitler's speech, based on declassified US intelligence files. Having: stated that the Russian onslaught was of paramount concern to the people.. (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. CIA, May 24, 1945. p. 2. Cited in: Miscellaneous 1945 Seventh Army reports on Germany, CIA, September 22, 1950) (IMG)

Hitler:

predicted that, if Germany held firm during the crisis, a day would come when serious conflicts would arise between Russia and the US. (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 2. Cited in: Miscellaneous 1945 Seventh Army reports on Germany, CIA, September 22, 1950) (IMG)

The Nazis concentrated their military power on fighting their formidable foes in the East rather than their secret Allies in the West. In his final speech to the Reich Chancellery on February, Hitler had also explained that:

A large-scale counter-attack [against the Red Army] was planned.. (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 1) (IMG)

so:

that the [Red Army] attack could be stopped. (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 1) (IMG)

Hitler further explained

- i) Germany must remain on the defensive in the WEST. (...).
- ii) In the EAST a powerful [anti-Soviet] counter-offensive would be prepared.
(Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, Seventh Army Interrogation Center, Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 2) (IMG)

Clearly, the Nazis had biased their units towards fighting on the Eastern Front as opposed to the Western Front. This was obviously because a covert alliance between the Anglo-Americans and the Third Reich had taken shape. Both the Anglo-Americans and the Third Reich wanted the Axis forces to surrender Northern Italy, so that the Axis forces could be deployed to the Eastern Front. 'The military advantages', von Lingen wrote:

derive from the relief provided to the Allied forces by the early surrender. The peaceful cessation of hostilities in Italy meant that two Allied armies could be redeployed to southern Germany. In this way, the surrender of the southern front affected troop strength and combat capacity within Germany as a whole because it enabled the Western Allies to make further territorial gains in the heart of Germany before the Soviet Union could expand its advance into the country. Therefore, from a military standpoint, territorial gains over the Red Army and its allies were the immediate benefit of the surrender in northern Italy.

The surrender was also crucial to the political reorientation of Europe. As the Red Army advanced across Eastern Europe, liberating countries from German occupation, it planted communist governments (such as in Poland) or concluded partial surrenders, thereby determining the postwar order and prompting the Western Allies to make the containment of the Soviet sphere of influence their highest priority as long as the military possibility to do so existed. A race ensued between the Anglo-American Allies and the Soviet troops to reach certain points in central Europe that were attributed strategic importance both militarily and politically. Northern Italy held such a key position. (Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution, Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 255) (IMG)

In the end, Northern Italy was surrendered to the Anglo-Americans, the Soviets were betrayed, and German troops moved eastward. As von Lingen confirmed, these:

negotiations between the U.S. intelligence service and the SS general violated existing Allied agreements.. ('Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution', Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 6) (IMG)

Meanwhile, Gehlen hid his files in Bavaria, the agrarian petit-bourgeois territory in which Nazism was most entrenched,

and eventually surrendered to the Americans:

As the Soviets drew closer to Berlin, Gehlen dispersed his staff and transferred the FHO's intelligence files from the capital to secret locations in Bavaria. There, Gehlen and his handpicked officers waited to surrender to American forces. (CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 1-10, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0010, Chapter 9: America's Seeing-Eye Dog on a Long Leash, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

The British Prime Minister and the staff of the British military were devising contingency plans for a war against the USSR in alliance with the forces of the Third Reich. The British could not afford to launch a war against the USSR, but they nonetheless did need to contingency-plan for such an 'unthinkable' scenario. 'Operation UNTHINKABLE' the plan was called. Churchill's intentions were clarified to Truman, the newly-installed pro-Nazi American President, on May 12, 1945, just three days after the official 'surrender' of the Third Reich. 'I am profoundly concerned about the European situation' said Churchill in a Telegram to Truman, adding:

what is to happen about Russia? I have always worked for friendship with Russia but, like you, I feel deep anxiety because of their ... overwhelming influence in the Balkans excepting Greece, ... and above all their power to maintain very large Armies in the field for a long time. (Telegram from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to US President Truman, May 12th 1945, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill) (IMG)

'What will be the position in a year or two', Churchill added:

when the British and American Armies have melted and the French has not yet been formed on any major scale, when we may have a handful of divisions mostly French, and when Russia may choose to keep two or three hundred on active service? (Telegram from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to US President Truman, May 12th 1945, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill) (IMG)

Nevertheless, in late April when the Red Army was increasingly closer to the heart of Berlin, the British staff under Churchill were busy devising contingent plans for wars of elimination against the USSR which could: only be achieved as a result of:

- (a) The occupation of such areas of metropolitan Russia that the war making capacity of the country would be reduced to a point at which further resistance became impossible.
- (b) Such a decisive defeat of the Russian forces in the field as to render it impossible for the U.S.S.R. to continue the war.

(Operation UNTHINKABLE, Final Report by the Joint Planning Staff, May 22, 1945, p. 1. in: National Archives of the United Kingdom) (IMG)

This was:

Apart from the chances of revolution in the U.S.S.R. and the political collapse of the present regime.. (Operation UNTHINKABLE, Final Report by the Joint Planning Staff, May 22, 1945, p. 2. in: National Archives of the United Kingdom) (IMG)

The British war Planning Staff assumed the:

full assistance from the Polish armed force [i.e. the Nazi-collaborationist Home Army] and .of German [Nazi] manpower.. (Operation UNTHINKABLE, Final Report by the Joint Planning Staff, May 22, 1945, p. 1. in: National Archives of the United Kingdom) (iMG)

as well as the:

readiness of German industrial capacity. (Operation UNTHINKABLE, Final Report by the Joint Planning Staff, May 22, 1945, p. 1. in: National Archives of the United Kingdom) (iMG)

The Nazi military, party, and government – which by then had gone underground – were to engage in the conflict in support of the British forces. On the one hand, the British would use them for a frontal assault against the Soviets; on the other hand, the Nazi Underground, the Fourth Reich would utilize British aid to strengthen itself. This scenario had been predicted a year earlier by the US intelligence officer Curt Riess:

But it is not the [Nazi] guerrillas or their aides who will make up the dangerous part of the Nazi underground. It is, rather, those who will not make trouble openly; those who will seem to co-operate with the AMG [Allied Military Government in Occupied Territories]; those who, in order to demonstrate their good will, may quite conceivably ... become stool pigeons for the AMG..

This peaceful Nazi underground will have various ways and means of establishing an aura of confidence. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 176) (IMG)

Riess did not specify which countries among the 'Allied' he was speaking of – the British, the Americans, or the Soviets. However, history proved that it was the Americans and even more so the British with whom the Nazis would collaborate. According to von Lingens – historian for the Stuttgart Attorney General in preliminary proceedings on Nazi war crimes in Italy and a Fellow at the Royal Historical Society and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum – the German archives show that under Operation Unthinkable, the German troops were to remain armed 'in the interests of the West':

Still, the Soviet Union posed a considerable threat to the Western Allies in the spring of 1945. Therefore,

contingency plans involving the support of German military units were drawn up and circulated at Allied headquarters under the codename Operation Unthinkable. (...). In a speech he gave on November 23, 1954, the aging Churchill himself had casually mentioned such plans from 1945 and thereby sparked one final major debate in British parliament and in the daily newspapers on his change of policy toward the end of the war. Although the possibility of a last-minute betrayal of the alliance had long been discussed in research, it had been considered merely a hypothesis and was always repudiated by other participants. With the help of German sources, it can now be shown that Operation Unthinkable was not merely a war game of the British military but of the vanquished German commanders to possibly keep their troops armed to continue the fight for Trieste, this time in the interest of the West. ('Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution', Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, pp. 255-256) (IMG)

Churchill himself, von Lingen noted, had admitted this in a 1954 speech:

In a 1954 speech, Churchill unleashed the last major controversy of his political career in parliament and in the daily newspapers when he acknowledged in passing that the idea to rely on the support of German troops to achieve local war aims against the Soviet Union had been considered at the time and circulated under the codename of Operation Unthinkable. The possibility of such a last-minute treasonous breach of the alliance fueled by East-West antagonism had been discussed in research but considered hypothetical. When the Cabinet files from the final days of the war were released as a routine measure in 1998 by the National Archive (PRO) in London, public debate was again rekindled. With the help of German sources, it is now possible to confirm that Operation Unthinkable was not just a British military war-game scenario, but that the defeated German commanders had indeed kept their troops under arms with the expressed permission of the Western Allies.

Certain individual decision makers thus garnered sufficient leeway to undermine high-level political agreements by bringing about the critically important separate peace in northern Italy in exchange for the protection of alleged war criminals, as is evident in the case of Wolff. It must have been clear to the negotiators that any deal with the Germans went against the Casablanca agreements on the unconditional surrender of the German Reich. Hence, secrecy was the highest priority. (Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution, Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 6) (IMG)

In the 1954 speech, Churchill openly confessed:

Even before the war had ended and while the Germans were surrendering by hundreds of thousands, and our streets were crowded with cheering people, I telegraphed to Lord Montgomery directing him to be careful in collecting the German arms, to stack them so that they could easily be issued again to the German soldiers whom we should have to work with if the Soviet advance continued. (The Unity of the free Nations, Winston Churchill, November 23, 1954. In: Speeches of Winston Churchill, London 1974, Vol. 8, Robert James. Cited in: Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution, Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 6) (IMG)

In 1945, just as the Anglo-American forces and the Red Army were marching towards Germany's heartland, Himmler ordered Eichmann's gang not to shoot at the Anglo-Americans:

In the middle of our move an orderly arrived from Kaltenbrunner with a directive from Reichsführer Himmler ordering us not to shoot at Americans or Englishmen. I countersigned it and ... I conveyed this order to the men. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 24 -25. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG{Israel})

Meanwhile, the Nazi Underground, which Reinhard Gehlen had established (see C11S1), was of special value for the Anglo-American imperialists. As such, the American intelligence service assisted the Gehlen group in entrenching the already-existing Nazi German intelligence network. This was regarded in foreign media as the 'reconstituting' and the 'reviving' of the Nazi German intelligence network that, in the first place, never 'died' for it to revive. In Bavaria, the agrarian petit-bourgeois zone in which the Nazis were so well-entrenched socially, the new capital of the Nazi German intelligence was established – particularly in the city of Pullach. From that time onwards, CIA documents frequently referred to Pullach, not to Bonn, as the capital of the Nazi German intelligence network. After his phony 'suicide' and fake 'death' in 1945, Hitler may well have escaped to Pullach, Bavaria.

The official declaration of the establishment of the 'Gehlen Organization' was in June 1946. According to Gehlen's own conservative estimates, 28% of the Gehlen Organization's members had a history of membership in the Nazi Party. Some time in the early 1950s:

Gehlen had told Critchfield (who served as the CIA's contact with the Germans and as chief of CIA's base at Pullach from 1948 through 1956) that 28 percent of his officers had been Nazi Party members. (CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 1-10, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0010, Chapter 9: America's Seeing-Eye Dog on a Long Leash, CIA, p. 36) (IMG)

Such estimates do not mention the Nazi Germans existing outside of the Nazi Party, nor does it speak of the many Slovak,

Italian, etc. fascists that were not 'Nazis'. Nazi Germany's intelligence service ran the deep state of the West German government. West Germany contained much of the agrarian zones of Germany whereas East Germany contained the industrial zones. Hence, West Germany had a smaller proletariat. It was therefore harder for West Germany to transition to democracy, and easier for the Nazis to run that country. A failing democracy was established in West Germany, a terror state that banned the communist party but at the same time had some facade of democratic governance.

The entire regime apparatus of the Third Reich, the German army had gone underground. The state went underground but that does not mean the West German government was no longer ruling Germany; rather, in this context, it means that the West German government would serve as a mere facade of this 'underground' state. It means that the Nazi institutions had a powerful lobby which allowed them to control the West German state. No, the underground Nazi state cannot be regarded as a state separate from the West German state. Under the auspices of the Christian Democrats and the Kautskyites, the underground Nazi army began to resurface. Known as the Schnez Truppe, it:

was an organization of former German professional soldiers who were ... doing staff work now on how former professional soldiers could aid in the [supposed] defense of the Fatherland.. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

KIBITZ-15 was the code for Nazi German official Walter Kopp (IMG).

The leaders of Schnez Truppe were:

former Lt. Col. Albert Paul Schnez of Stuttgart-Gaisburg [after whom the group was obviously named],

Ferher Strasse 12, manager or frontman; former General of Infantry Rudolf von Buenau of Stuttgart, Gaensheide Strasse 62, responsible head of organization. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The Schnez Army had:

plans drawn up for the organization now of former soldiers into dormant groups or military formations.

In time of hostilities, ... these soldiers would join Allied forces for the defense of the Fatherland. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Agilolf Kesselring – a Lieutenant Colonel of the Federal Republic of Germany's military, and one of the foremost scholars on the history of the Schnez Truppe – noted that in the event of war, the Schnez Truppe would comprise a: military force of about 40,000 men in their war.. (The Gehlen Organization and the Re-Formation of the Military in the Federal Republic, Agilolf Kesselring, 2017, p. 255) (IMG)

The following was the plan of the Schnez Army as outlined in the declassified CIA file:

1) The first will be the defense of the land East of the Donau and then withdrawal over the Donau. All former soldiers living East of the Donau would form groups now; activate in time of invasion and join the Allies in defense of that area and withdraw with them over

2) The second line of defense, a line running approximately north and south through Stuttgart. Same action as above, to;

3) The third line of defense, the Rhine, with same action by groups as above. Then in the worst military situation;

4) The withdrawal of Allied troops, the Selbsthilfe organized German groups included, down the Rhine valley into Spain.

(Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

The plan also calls for the evacuation (upon hostilities) of 100-200 former German officers who would be given the task of: a) organizing combat-qualified German males from the streams of refugee into military units to soldier with Allied forces; and, b) other logistical responsibilities in regard to the organization of such divisions. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

As mentioned in the US intelligence document, the Schnez Truppe would fight alongside the Anglo-American allies against the Soviet and Popular-Democratic forces.

The 'Gehlen Organization' (codenamed ZIPPER) (IMG) maintained close friendly ties with the head of the Schnez Truppe:

Schnez has evidently maintained contact ... with ZIPPER. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

In fact, according to Der Spiegel which examined the declassified German intelligence documents, the Gehlen Organization provided intelligence for the Schnez Army and vice versa:

Gehlen and Schnez also reached an agreement to share intelligence derived from spying efforts. Schnez boasted of having a "particularly well-organized" intelligence apparatus. (Nazi Veterans Created Illegal Army, Spiegel Online, Klaus Wiegrefe, May 15, 2014) (IMG)

Furthermore, Schnez successfully persuaded the Gehlen Organization to provide the former's army with financial support:

These contacts were made with the idea of having ZIPPER sponsor the [Schnez Army's] plan ... for providing the Western military forces with four German divisions four weeks after the outbreak of hostilities. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

In the original approach to ZIPPER [Gehlen Organization], the [Schnez Army] and [its leader] Schnez evidently sold ZIPPER with the idea for ZIPPER [desired] to furnish about 9,000 DM a month for the maintenance of a small Selbsthilfe planning staff. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ- 15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Selbsthilfe was a subgroup within the Schnez Army. The subgroup's:

full title is "Soldatenselbsthilfe in Sueddeutschland". It is also known as the South Wurttemberg Officers Group. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

It was an officers' organization. As was mentioned previously in this section, the Nazi Underground was predicted by Curt Riess to be using 'pension' funds as a cover for financial assistance for up-keeping this Nazi Underground. The establishment of veterans' organizations created the cover of 'insurance' providing and 'pension' funds which were all really financial assistance.

Der Spiegel suggested that 'apparently', well until the 1950s, the networks of SS organizations retained influence on West German politics:

According to another BND document seen by SPIEGEL, a division head raised the question of whether it was possible for the organization to take an aggressive stance against Skorzeny. The Gehlen Organization man suggested consulting "the SS", adding, the SS "is a factor and we should sound out opinions in detail there before making a decision." Apparently networks of old and former Nazis still exercised considerable influence during the 1950s. (Nazi Veterans Created Illegal Army, Spiegel Online, Klaus Wiegrefe, May 15, 2014) (IMG)

There is no need for the word 'apparently'. As with the Nazi Schnez Army, the SS as an organization had gone underground; its networks remained almost intact; it also had a very strong influence in German politics through a powerful lobby and intelligence organization known as 'Hilfsgemeinschaft auf Gegenseitigkeit der Angehörigen der ehemaligen Waffen-SS' (HIAG).

The Schnez Truppe marked the resurfacing of the Nazi army, the Wehrmacht, which had gone underground during the Great Patriotic War. Other underground Nazi organizations resurfaced as well. The Waffen-SS, the Nazi German intelligence service (SD), and the Reich Main Security Office (RHSA), which together formed the bulk of the underground Nazi state and party apparatus, resurfaced in 1951 as the 'HIAG'. The HIAG was a powerful group with its own propaganda apparatus as well as its own intelligence service called the 'Kameradschafts-ND', with extensive influence in West Germany and probably much of Western Europe, and a membership size that by the 1970s reached 120,000. Two documents from the CIA shed light on this matter. Having referred to the unnamed chief of Kameradschafts-ND as 'SUBJ[ECT]' and 'Identity 2', the CIA – codenamed as BKTRUST – noted that the unnamed chief had been the founder of the HIAG's intelligence organization; once the West German authorities found out about the existence of this intelligence service, 'Identity 2' founded the Kameradschafts-ND serving as the unofficial intelligence service of the HIAG. The following are excerpts of the two CIA documents:

SUBJ STATED [that] HE [was an] EARLY MEMBER [ofthe] SS AND [a] PROTEGE [of] HEIDRICH WHO ASSIGNED HIM TO RSHA WHERE [he] HELD [the] RANK STURMBANNFUEHRER (MAJOR) AT [the] END [of the] WAR. CA 48 SUBJ [was] INSTRUMENTAL IN ORGANIZING [the] HILFSGEMEINSCHAFT AUF GEGENSEITIGKEIT (HIAG) WHICH [is a] VETERANS ORGANIZATION OF FORMER SS MEMBERS WITH CURRENT MEMBERSHIP [of] 120,000.

SUBJ CLAIMS HIS JOB IS CHIEF OF "KAMERADSCHAFTS-ND" WHICH INFORMAL INTEL SECTION OF HIAG. ('SYRUP, GUENTHER_0022', CIA, March 1972, p. 1)

SUBJ CLAIMS HIS ORGANIZATION HAS RELIABLE CONTACTS IN GERMAN INDUSTRY, BUNDESWEHR, BANKING, GRENZSCHULTZ, POLICE ALL OF WHOM SUPPLY HIAG WITH CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ON REQUEST. ALSO CLAIMS ROMANIAN CONTACTS THROUGH FORMER IRON GUARD MEMBERS. TWO UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES EAST BERLIN, SOURCE IN CZECH ELBE RIVER SHIPPING COMPANY, SON-IN-LAW WHO IN SWISS MILITARY. ('SYRUP, GUENTHER_0022', CIA, MARCH 1972, P. 1) (IMG)

According to Identity 2, his father – a conservative – occupied the post of Minister of Labor in the pre - HITLER German cabinet, and was imprisoned for a while after the takeover by the Nazis. Identity 2, who describes himself as "a national and a Nazi for reasons of ideology", joined the Waffen-SS at an early age. After

short tour of duty with the "Sicherheitspolizei" in Prussia, Identity 2 was transferred to the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" (RSHA) in Berlin where he worked in the section "Economic Espionage", and where he became a protege of HEIDRICH. During World War II, he saw action in the Balkans and in Soviet Union, his last rank being that of "Sturmbannfuehrer" (Major). A lawyer by profession, Identity 2 was no longer permitted to practice law ... in 1948, and retired to his family's farm near Hamburg. A fanatical anti-Communist, he became one of the first organizers of the HIAG (Hilfegemeinschaft auf Gegenseitigkeit), the association of former Waffen-SS members with current strength of ca 120,000 which publishes a monthly magazine called the "Freiwilliger" (The Volunteer). Identity 2 then proceeded to organize an intelligence branch of the HIAG – the "Sicherheits-Referat" – but resigned from HIAG when it became evident that the authorities were watching this organization closely, and built his own informal intelligence network, the so-called "Kameradschafts-ND". This network is former members of the Waffen-SS (HIAG), RSHA, and SD, and allegedly possesses contacts in all walks of life, including political parties, police, Bundeswehr, industry, trade organizations, etc. According to Identity 2, the goal of his network is to continue fighting against Communism and left-wing Socialism in the ERG by means of providing the opposition parties CDU/CSU with precise individuals who cooperate with the East. Identity 2, who showed several of his reports to [prominent German commander] STRAUSS, BARZEL, and other outstanding members of the opposition, and the thank-you letters he has received in return, stated that he is willing to furnish BKTRUST with similar or better information. ('GEHRICH, INGE MARIE_0040', CIA, July 1971, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

The existence of HIAG and its powerful intelligence and propaganda services is a testament to the continued existence of the underground Nazi Reich, which was designed by Reinhard Gehlen during the Great Patriotic War (see C11S1). It is also a demonstration of the tremendous covert intelligence and overt propaganda influence of this Nazi underground as explained by US intelligence officer Curt Riess in 1944. And indeed, Riess correctly predicted back then:

The picture in Germany immediately after the war would be somewhat as follows: at the top a few "decent, neutral" statesmen who, at first sight, seem to have no connection with the Nazis. Behind and around them a great number of men who seem willing, even eager, to collaborate with the AMG and the occupying authorities in order to retain their positions. Behind them innumerable front organizations and Nazi cells biding their time, waiting, lying low. And finally, at least during the first period of occupation, the relatively small group or groups of those who wage active resistance, the guerrillas and partisans. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, pp. 184-185) (IMG)

With Heusinger as a top-ranking official of the West German government, the Nazi underground was able to entrench its influence in the West German regime. Heusinger and Speidel both were closely tied to Schnez:

Until July 1951, more and more reports were received in Pullach about Schnez. It was thus well known to the godfather [Gehlen] that [Schnez] not only had Graser's support but, in addition to the trust of Speidel, obviously also enjoyed that of Adenauer's other adviser in matters of security – Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger's staff member. (The Gehlen Organization and the Re-Formation of the Military in the Federal Republic, Agilolf Kesselring, 2017, p. 255) (IMG)

The next step was a European military integration, which Adenauer advocated:

Adenauer ... pushed for West Germany to integrate more deeply with the West and for the establishment of the Bundeswehr. (Nazi Veterans Created Illegal Army, Spiegel Online, Klaus Wiegrefe, May 15, (IMG)

The agents of American finance capital were concerned by the communist 'spectre' that would have swept Western Europe. In the words of the CIA and State Department advisor Melvyn Leffler, the Americans were concerned by the force of 'revolutionary upheaval':

In April, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy visited Germany and Western Europe. When he returned, he talked to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and President Truman. "He gave me a powerful picture of the tough situation that exists in Germany," wrote Stimson, "-something that is worse than anything probably that ever happened in the world. I had anticipated the chaos, but the details of it were appalling." During the following weeks, Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew as well as Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton, and Byrnes became alarmed by portentous signs of revolutionary upheaval. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 203. Citing: For Stimson's comment, see diary entry, April 19, 1945 Stimson Diaries. For McCloy's report to the president, see Memorandum, April 26, 1945, HST, PSF, box 178. For State Department apprehensions, see, for example, FRUS, Potsdam, Vol. 1, pp. 524-525, 623.) (IMG)

The Nazi Germans and the Anglo-American imperialists needed each other's assistance to suppress such 'revolutionary upheavals'.

It remains an irrefutable fact that the Axis and the Anglo-American imperialists held common interests against the USSR since 1943, or rather late December 1942, when the productive forces of the USSR made that country a greater

rival to Anglo-American interests than the much-destroyed Nazi German productive forces. The dialectical laws of history dictated that since Anglo-American imperialists had common interests with the Nazi German imperialists by late 1942, they were inevitably going to establish bonds and contacts for a general and comprehensive alliance in all fields, in all directions, in all sectors, on every corner of planet Earth, beneath the ground and 'even' in the space race.

C11S3. A More Aggressive Approach by the United States

The Truman Administration expected that fulfilling America's promises to the USSR would result in what the CIA and State Department advisor Melvyn Leffler called 'revolutionary upheaval' in Western Europe:

On June 24, Truman wrote Churchill, "From all the reports that reach me, I believe that without immediate concentration on the production of German coal we will have turmoil and unrest in the very areas of Western Europe on which the whole stability of the continent depends." A few days later it was decided that the president would issue a directive to ensure the export of 25 million tons of coal from Germany by April 1946. This objective was to take priority over all other considerations except the health and safety of occupation troops and the redeployment of Allied forces to the Pacific. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 203. Citing: For Truman's letter to Churchill, see *ibid.*, p. 612. For the directive to Eisenhower, see *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 1028-1030) (IMG)

The American imperialists' concern was that the communist-led 'revolutionary forces in Western Europe' would rise: Apprehension that revolutionary forces in Western Europe might bring Soviet influence to the Atlantic and Mediterranean impelled American officials to repudiate the Yalta agreements on Germany. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 205) (IMG)

Such fears:

decisively shaped American attitudes at Potsdam and impelled American officials to distance themselves from the position taken by Roosevelt at Yalta. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 204) (IMG)

Thus:

In the months between Yalta and Potsdam, ... American priorities changed significantly. In February, Roosevelt still sought Soviet cooperation to guarantee Germany's defeat and to perpetuate the wartime coalition into the postwar era. By July, Truman sought to revive Germany's coal production as a means to resurrect Western Europe and to contain the forces of revolution, even if it meant jeopardizing Soviet- American relations. Between February and July, the war in Europe ended and American officials became fully aware of the prospects for chaos, famine, and upheaval. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 203) (IMG)

Without the Americans' will to resist, Stalin would have taken over Europe. He said that if Roosevelt had still been alive, we would have succeeded. America would ... not have moved against us. Stalin was convinced, moreover, that Roosevelt had been assassinated and he blamed my father for having nothing to tell him about that matter. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 113) (IMG)

To honour its covert alliance with Nazi Germany, the United States blatantly violated its own official international agreements with the USSR:

Byrnes sidestepped proposals for four-power control of the Ruhr industries, rejected the \$20 billion reparation figure [promised by the United States], argued that the Soviets should take reparations from their own zone in Germany, and proposed a settlement that safeguarded the potential resources of the Ruhr, Saar, and Rhine for Western European recovery. Molotov and Vyshinsky went to see Joseph Davies, whom Truman had invited to Potsdam as one of his closest advisers, and expressed disbelief at the overt violation of the meaning and spirit of the Yalta compromises. Neither Davies nor Byrnes nor Clayton really disputed Soviet claims. From the perspective of the State Department, however, new circumstances dictated new priorities and a reinterpretation of Yalta. It was now evident that Germany could not pay \$20 billion without risking economic chaos and revolution throughout Western Europe and without imposing a permanent drain on American financial resources. Nor could the Soviets be allowed to use their claim for reparations as a means to gain leverage over economic developments in Germany's industrial heartland. So a new formula had to be devised that entitled the Kremlin to reparations primarily from their own zone in eastern Germany rather than "from the national wealth of Germany," as stipulated in the Yalta accord. Transfers from the western zones to the Soviet Union were made contingent on a number of variables that the Kremlin had little means of controlling. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 204. Citing: For developments at Potsdam regarding Germany, see FRUS, Potsdam, Vol. 1, pp. 440-443, 491-492, 520-523, 587-588, 596; *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 141-142, 183-184, 297-298, 428-431, 472-475, 481-483, 486-493, 512-522; diary entry, July 28, 1945, Davies Papers, box 19; Frederick J. Dobney, ed., Selected Papers of Will Clayton

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 136-139.) (IMG)

American imperialism was keen to promote West Germany, in turn dominated by the Nazi Underground, as the dominant economic power of Western Europe. To honour its alliance with the West Germans, the United States government continued to break the Yalta commitments. 'By the summer of 1946', the CIA and State Department consultant Melvyn Leffler noted:

the United States had determined that the reconstruction needs of Germany and Western Europe meant that no reparations from current production could go to the Soviet Union. Since Potsdam did not explicitly mandate such transfers, State Department officials argued that the Kremlin was not entitled to them (even though they had been explicitly mentioned in the Yalta agreements). (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 212) (IMG)

Hence, the American imperialists, wary of Roosevelt faction attempts to fund Soviet power against US imperialism, suspended the delivery of reparations to the USSR from West Germany:

in May 1946 ... General Lucius Clay formally and unilaterally suspended delivery of reparations from the American occupation zone in Germany. The Soviets protested but to no avail. Clay's action was in response to the failure of the four occupation powers to agree on the economic unification and administration of Germany, as provided for in the Potsdam agreement. Indeed, a few months after Clay's decision, Clifford and Elsey cited the Soviet Union's actions in Germany as one of the litany of items demonstrating Soviet perfidy and untrustworthiness. Yet Clay himself did not blame the Soviet Union for the impasse in Germany. Nor did his superiors in Washington. In June 1946, Secretary of War Patterson and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Petersen, the officials responsible for the implementation of occupation policy, wrote the president that however much the Soviets might benefit from economic unrest and chaos in the Western zones of Germany and in Western Europe, it was the French, not the Soviets, who were the source of the problem and who were most egregiously disregarding the Potsdam accords. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 212. Citing: For background on the suspension of reparations, see John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 53 - 140; and John H. Backer, *Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983), pp. 121—124. For the emphasis on France as the most flagrant violator of the Potsdam agreement, see Jean Edward Smith, ed., *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany 1945—1949*, 2 vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), Vol. 1, pp. 243-244; and Patterson to Truman, June 11, 1946, HSTP, PSF, box 157. Also see FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, pp. 486-488. Although the French had not been invited to Berlin and had not signed the Potsdam accords, American officials expected the French to comply with the terms of the agreements.) (IMG)

The United States violated the Potsdam Agreement with the USSR:

The "first charge" principle meant that reparations should not be paid until German exports were sufficient to finance German imports (thereby reducing U.S. occupation costs and abetting economic reconstruction in Western Europe). Yet the "first charge" principle was of little importance to the Kremlin, whose representatives continually insisted that the Western powers should comply with the reparations obligations spelled out at Yalta and Potsdam. Their argument was well founded because section 19 of the Potsdam agreement on economic principles explicitly exempted the transfer of equipment and products from the western zones to the Soviet Union from the application of the "first charge" principle. Notwithstanding the legitimacy of their position, Soviet leaders' contempt for the "first charge" principle and their tacit support of French opposition to the economic unification of Germany provoked Byrnes in mid-1946 to threaten a reconsideration of Poland's western border. Since the boundary had been the key Soviet achievement at Potsdam and the trade-off for Soviet acceptance of Byrnes's reparation formula, the American threat must have prompted Soviet officials to wonder who indeed was adhering to agreements. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 213) (IMG)

In response to repeated violations of the Potsdam Agreement, the Soviets launched the Berlin Blockade to cripple the Anglo-American imperialist presence in West Berlin and to pave the way for the liberation of West Berlin. In this operation, the USSR prevented the Americans from providing aid to West Berlin. One objective was to pressure the Americans onto the negotiations so to force them to commit to their agreements at Potsdam and Yalta, by providing the reparations from Ruhr. The CIA analyzed the events as such:

The blockade of Berlin is designed, in the first instance, to compel the Western Powers to reopen quadripartite negotiations with respect to Germany as a whole and to render them acquiescent to Soviet terms. At no more cost than the relaxation of this pressure for the time being and perhaps minor concessions on such matters as reparations, the USSR would hope to gain an effective voice in the control of Western Germany and especially of the Ruhr. By this means it could prevent the consolidation of a West German state aligned with the

West and could gain an opportunity to bring about an eventual eastward orientation of Germany as a whole. The corresponding broader consequences would be to reduce the contribution of the Ruhr to the recovery of Western Europe, to gain a share in Ruhr production for the USSR and its satellites, and to prevent or retard the consolidation of a Western European community antagonistic toward the USSR.

If the Western Powers refuse to negotiate, however, or to accept in negotiation the USSR's terms, the current blockade of Berlin will have so weakened the Western position there as to hasten the day when the USSR would expect it to become untenable. Denied quadripartite agreement on Germany as a whole, in all probability the USSR would intensify its presently coercive blockade into a decisive effort, by all means short of armed force, to compel the Western Powers to withdraw from Berlin, would establish there a "national" German government, and would employ every means of political warfare and subversion to prevent the consolidation of a West German state and to bring about an eventual unification of Germany by accession of the West to the Soviet-controlled East. (Review of the World Situation, CIA 7-48, CIA July 14, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

C11S4. The Roosevelt Faction

*** IMG-All-{The Roosevelt Faction}

By 1944, Britain was no longer the greatest imperial power in the world. The United States was a rapidly emerging economic and military powerhouse, followed by the gradual decline of the British Empire. For Britain, fostering a strategic balance of power between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union required the MI6 to involve Washington in European affairs on London's side. Without America on its side, the British Empire would have surely been doomed. The American imperialists fully sided with the British imperialists on all fronts, every step of the way, for the class interests of American and British finance capital was virtually the same at the time. Much to the dismay of the British, however, the Roosevelt faction in the United States, the agents of the proletariat disguised as 'American imperialist' 'liberals', sympathized with the Soviet Union, and stood as an obstacle, not a friend, to the newly re-shaped Anglo-American-Axis bloc. Stephen Ambrose – the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College – et al. noted:

Documents show that Roosevelt ... and his advisors believed that "Britain epitomized much of what was wrong with the world." Indeed, the White House argued that British colonial policies were chiefly responsible for the international rivalries that brought on both world wars. During the interwar period, the British had encouraged the outbreak of economic depression and war through a closed economic system conducive to commercial and political rivalries. The Roosevelt administration wanted to replace the British system of imperial preference with a Wilsonian program of world interdependence based on a liberal commercial network resting on the principle of reciprocity. In this manner, the President could satisfy Wilsonian idealists while realistically involving the United States in international affairs. The White House wanted to redesign the postwar global economy into one based on the end of colonialism and the institution of free trade that, the writer correctly argues, meant "equal commercial opportunity" and "the elimination of discriminatory trade practices." (War Comes Again: Comparative Vistas on the Civil War and World War II, Oxford University Press, Stephen Ambrose, Michael Adams, Ira Berlin, 1995, p. 192) (IMG)

Therefore, the Anglo-American imperialists hatched plots to install a new Administration in the United States, one friendly to Anglo-American and Nazi German imperialist interests.

Roosevelt himself as US President was sympathetic to the USSR and antipathic towards the British, but the agents that surrounded Roosevelt were all loyal to American imperialism and hence loyal to an alliance with British imperialism. The centuries-old British intelligence service was to lead the way in establishing US intelligence. The founder of the US central intelligence, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was William Donovan. The most important figure who in the post-WWII years proposed the founding of the 'Central Intelligence Agency' – and he was one of the first to use that phrase before the phrase became the official name of the agency – was William Donovan. And William Donovan was more loyal to British intelligence than to American intelligence. He was an MI6 agent. That is confirmed by Auriol Weigold, who is the:

Professor at the School of Government and Politics, Faculty of Business, Government and Law at the University of Canberra. She has been a Fellow and Honorary Fellow at the Australian Prime Ministers Centre at Old Parliament House. (Auriol Weigold, Senior Visiting Fellows, Future Directions International) (IMG)

According to Weigold, throughout World War II:

Donovan also had an MI-6 code number and was a member of Churchill's Special Operations Executive (SOE). ('Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda During World War II'. Auriol Weigold, p. 13) (IMG)

Hence the MI6 operative Donovan founded the US central intelligence, the OSS:

On his return from Europe in mid-1941, Donovan was appointed Coordinator of Information (COI), which later became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), directed by Donovan from June 1942. ('Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda During World War II'. Auriol Weigold, p. 13) (IMG)

The OSS was of course the parent to the CIA. The founding of the OSS was with the partial instigation of the MI6: Churchill's intelligence chief in the United States, William Stephenson, promoted the creation of the COI and OSS. ('Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda During World War II'. Auriol Weigold, p. 13) (IMG)

It is a well-known fact that Donovan founded the OSS after a meeting with Stephenson and the British monarchs in Britain. At the time, since Britain was lobbying for US involvement in Europe against the Axis, the MI6 agent Donovan was cautiously welcomed by US President Roosevelt, for Donovan could convince the Congress to sell arms to Britain.

In 1940, the MI6 expanded its intelligence ties with the FBI chief Hoover. In his book, Keith Jeffrey, whom the British intelligence service selected as its official historian, wrote that the MI6 spymaster William:

Stephenson visited [FBI head Edgar] Hoover on 16 April and (as the American record dryly put it) 'discussed arrangements for cooperation between the British Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation'. (MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, Keith Jeffery, p. 439) (IMG)

London reminded ... Stephenson 'that any liaison resulting from this must be entirely unofficial'.. (MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, Keith Jeffery, p. 439) (IMG)

General Edwin Watson, who was in charge of the White House approved of and tacitly supported the MI6's relationship with the FBI:

Hoover took very good care to clear the arrangement with President Roosevelt's secretary, General Edwin M. Watson, and ensure that [he] had no objection to the proposed relationship ... between the FBI and SIS. (MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, Keith Jeffery, p. 439) (IMG)

The strategic partnership of the American imperialists with the Nazi Germans was manifest in the struggles in the White House, the struggles for power and life. A hybrid coup d'états against the pro-Soviet elements in the White House, centered around Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, and Henry Wallace took place. Stalin had correctly assessed that Roosevelt had been assassinated and that had Roosevelt been alive, the Soviet-backed communist-led popular fronts would have taken over continental Europe:

Without the Americans' will to resist, Stalin would have taken over Europe. He said that if Roosevelt had still been alive, we would have succeeded. America would ... not have moved against us. Stalin was convinced, moreover, that Roosevelt had been assassinated and he blamed my father for having nothing to tell him about that matter. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 113) (IMG)

The anti-Soviet MI6 operative Richard West wrote in his book:

President Roosevelt wanted to rid the world of empires, whether that of the British in India or of the French in Indo-China.. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 177) (IMG)

By attempting to rid the world of empires, Roosevelt was obviously paving the way for the establishment of Popular-Democratic governance throughout the world. An examination of the conditions in the countries of Western Europe – from France to West Germany to Italy, from Sweden to Denmark – leaves no doubt that Western Europe, possibly minus Spain, would have been ruled by the Peoples' Democracies had the Roosevelt faction in the United States not been decimated. The installation of Harry Truman undoubtedly prevented Roosevelt's project to hand Europe and East Asia over to the Peoples' Democracies:

In the months between Yalta and Potsdam, ... American priorities changed significantly. In February, Roosevelt still sought Soviet cooperation to guarantee Germany's defeat and to perpetuate the wartime coalition into the postwar era. By July, Truman sought to revive Germany's coal production as a means to resurrect Western Europe and to contain the forces of revolution, even if it meant jeopardizing Soviet- American relations. Between February and July, the war in Europe ended and American officials became fully aware of the prospects for chaos, famine, and upheaval. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 203) (IMG)

The USSR's access to many of the industrial zones of Germany was facilitated by team Roosevelt's stab in the back of the American imperialists. The Truman Administration, upon rising to prominence, attempted to undo as many of Roosevelt's projects as possible, as a part of the Cold War against the USSR. Harry Hopkins, one of the closest comrades of Roosevelt, was yet another traitor to American imperialism. Harry Hopkins went to Moscow and reaffirmed to Stalin the fact of the hostility of the Truman group towards the USSR:

When Hopkins was sent to Moscow by Truman on 26 May 1945, he reported to Stalin that Roosevelt had been very disappointed by Stalin's conduct during the last days of his life, and warned him that the change in American policy had already begun. Hopkins said that Truman, knowing that the Soviets had confidence in him, wanted to make use of him, and added that he refused to play that game and misinform Stalin.³⁴ Had he passed that message at his government's request or had he done it unknown to them? I favour the second hypothesis. At this time the worsening of relations between the USSR and the Western Powers was still covered up. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 114) (IMG)

By whatever means necessary, Washington's pro-Axis elites aimed to oust Hopkins. Plots were hatched to prevent him

from living longer. In fact, this was the stated aim of Admiral Ross McIntire, the White House's chief physician:

"Our biggest job is to keep Harry [Hopkins] from ever feeling completely well," said the White House physician, Admiral Ross T. McIntire. (Pearl Harbor: FDR Leads the Nation into War, Steven M. Gilon) (IMG)

Yet despite his illness, his zest for life endeared him to Roosevelt. The president's physician, however, was less pleased [with Hopkins], once declaring, "Our biggest job is to keep Harry from ever feeling completely well. (...)." (The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World, Oona A. Hathway, Scott J. Shapiro, p. 190) (IMG)

The President's physician, Admiral Ross T. McIntire once said: "Our biggest job is to keep Harry [Hopkins] from ever feeling completely well.(...)." (Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, Robert Emmet Sherwood) (IMG)

Hopkins was already ill during the War. However, had adequate medical care been provided for him, he could, against the will of the pro-Axis elites, live longer. When McIntire, the physician of the White House, sided with the pro-Axis elites in America, there was little chance for Hopkins. Over time, the advisor's health deteriorated until he became too weak to be involved in politics. In 1946, seven months after the Great Patriotic War, he died at the age of 55.

It is true that the American imperialists had turned in favour of the Nazis against the USSR by 1943; yet, so is it also true that the ostensible 'alliance' of the United States with the USSR provided Soviet spies in the United States the cover and the excuse they needed for assisting America's 'ally' by providing it top secret military-nuclear intelligence materials. Indeed, that is how the Soviet spies in the Manhattan Project operated – they helped America's 'ally' in the war against the Nazis by assisting the USSR's nuclear program. In so doing, these Soviet spies obviously stabbed the American imperialists. These Soviet spies were protected by their superiors from the Roosevelt faction. The ouster of the Roosevelt faction paved the way for a purge of these pro-Soviet elements in the US nuclear program. Later on, when Kennedy rose to leadership of the White House, Kennedy restored many of these agents linked to the Soviet espionage network back to prominence. The Kennedy faction used its network to spy on Israel's nuclear program and then provided the intelligence materials to the Nasserist Egyptians. The elimination of the Roosevelt faction back then undermined the Soviet intelligence influence in the US government.

Besides Hopkins, another close agent of Roosevelt was Henry A. Wallace, a pro-Soviet politician from the Democratic Party, attacked by Allen Dulles's intelligence network and backed by the Soviet intelligence network. Throughout 1944, Dulles had worked tirelessly to get Washington on board for an alliance with the Third Reich. On behalf of Dulles, the pro-Nazi elements in Washington were working tirelessly to oust the Soviet-friendly officials, Wallace among them. A large contingent of the Democratic Party absolutely despised Roosevelt and Wallace. Henry A. Wallace was regarded by the reactionary Kautskyite 'Democrats' as too:

pro-Soviet.. (Oral History Interview with Edwin W. Pauley, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, March 1, 1971) (IMG)

Pro-Soviet he was. The Democrats, in their drive to oust Wallace, were in conflict with President Roosevelt himself because:

Roosevelt continued to say publicly and privately that he admired Wallace and that he was the obvious vice-presidential candidate. (Vice Presidents: A Biographical Dictionary, Edward Purcell, p. 326) (IMG)

The voting Democrats supported Wallace, but the agents of finance capital in the Democratic Party, the foes of the Roosevelt faction as they were, organized a soft putsch to oust Wallace:

The Gallup Poll said 65 per cent of the voting Democrats wanted Wallace and that 2 per cent wanted Senator Truman.

But the party bosses could not boss Wallace. They made a coalition with the Roosevelt-haters and skillfully but cynically mowed down the unorganized Wallace forces. (St. Petersburg Times, July 22, 1944) (IMG)

A key official leading the Democrats in the front against Wallace was Edwin Pauley, a prominent businessman in the petroleum sector who had financial ties to the Axis powers. Importantly, he was an intelligence agent for Allen Dulles in the Roosevelt Administration. Former high-level US government prosecutor and CIA agent John Joseph Loftus claimed:

One of Allen Dulles's secret spies inside the Democratic party later became George Bush's partner in the Mexican oil business. Edwin Pauley, a California oil man, was, like James Forrestal, one of Dulles's covert agents in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Like Forrestal, Pauley was a "big business" Democrat. The parallels didn't end there.

During Roosevelt's presidency, Pauley was a major Democrat fundraiser and held a series of top posts, including treasurer of the Democratic party's National Committee. He was also director of the Democratic convention in 1944 and had an unrivaled reputation as a man who could shake a great deal of money out of the oil companies, which were notoriously right-wing.. (...). The truth is that Pauley was committed to profit and, like the Dulles brothers, could not distinguish between his own interests and his public duties. During World War II he was in the perfect position to assist the Dulles clique in their Nazi oil deals. (The Secret War Against

Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People, John Joseph Loftus, Mark Aarons) (IMG)

For replacing Wallace, Harry Truman was Dulles agent Pauley's choice. As early as June 24, 1941 – only two days after the Third Reich's invasion of the USSR – Truman had openly said:

If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible. (The New York Times, June 24, 1941) (IMG)

By 1944, the USSR was winning, and so the US intelligence believed that Truman's philosophy would need to be implemented. Pauley launched a campaign to overthrow Wallace and install Truman in his place. In his own words:

I organized a campaign to prevent Henry Wallace from becoming the Vice President and used all the influence that I had in the Democratic Party to bring this about. This came about by my recruiting all of the Democratic friends of great influence that I had within the party and particularly those that had influence with President Roosevelt.. (Oral History Interview with Edwin W. Pauley, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, March 1, 1971) (IMG)

Pauley was instrumental:

in getting [Truman] the delegate numbers to replace Henry Wallace as vice president in 1944.. (The Secret War Against Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People, John Joseph Loftus, Mark Aarons) (IMG)

In collaboration with General Edwin M. Watson, Edwin Pauley launched a soft coup against Wallace:

A cabal consisting of party treasurer Edwin W. Pauley, party secretary George B. Allen, the president's appointments secretary Major General Edwin M. Watson, together with national chairman Robert E. Hannegan and preceding chairman and then Postmaster General Frank C. Walker, thereupon determined to destroy Wallace. General Watson kept Wallace admirers out of the president's office and brought in Wallace antagonists. Gradually, the group [pressured] the president ... to their point of view. (Vice Presidents: A Biographical Dictionary, Edward Purcell, p. 326) (IMG)

Wallace was ousted and Harry Truman was installed as the Vice President.

On April 12, 1945, Roosevelt died at the age of 63. Photos of him prior to his death indicate that he was becoming increasingly weaker as time went by. Undoubtedly, the US President was old by then – but not so old as to die naturally, unless due to a disease. The official line was that he died of cerebral hemorrhage. However, data to prove or reject this thesis on the circumstances of Roosevelt's death is highly insufficient. As mentioned previously, his medical file has not been disclosed to the public, to date. Furthermore, Roosevelt's body did not even undergo any autopsy:

It is unlikely we will ever know with absolute certainty what killed the thirty-second president of the United States. No autopsy was performed.. (FDR's Deadly Secret, Eric Fettmann, Steven Lomazow, p. 8) (IMG)

There was no autopsy, and the rumor circulated ... that he was assassinated by his own bodyguards. (Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom, Conrad Black, p. 366) (IMG) save for a few slips that turned up in 1957, the whereabouts of Roosevelt's medical file, maintained by Ross McIntire, has been unknown since his death. (FDR's Deadly Secret, Eric Fettmann, Steven Lomazow, p. 8) (IMG)

Again, McIntire was directly responsible for the lack of autopsy and most likely the sudden disappearance of the President's medical records as well. In an article for The Boston Globe, Dr. Steinberg remarked:

Much of the continued speculation concerning Roosevelt's health can be blamed on the actions of McIntire, Roosevelt's physician. After Roosevelt's death, no autopsy was performed because, as McIntire would later write in his book, White House Physician, there was "no useful purpose to be served by it." Had one been performed, many of the persistent controversies would be moot. Soon after Roosevelt died, his medical records, which were kept in the safe at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, disappeared. Only three individuals – one of them McIntire – had access to them. It is generally believed that McIntire removed and destroyed those records, fueling the speculation there was a well-hidden secret about Roosevelt's health. (Dr. Lahey's dilemma; Why the founder of the Lahey Clinic chose to conceal his report on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's medical exam – and how it was finally revealed six decades later, The Boston Globe, Dr David Steinberg, May 29, 2011) (IMG)

Stalin agreed with the claim that Roosevelt was murdered. Sergo Beria, son of Lavrenti Beria, remarked:

Stalin was convinced, moreover, that Roosevelt had been assassinated and he blamed my father [who was an MI6 agent] for having nothing to tell him about that matter. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 113) (IMG)

If Roosevelt was murdered, McIntire was most likely involved in the assassination plot. And if so, certain questions would be raised: did McIntire act independently or did he belong to a terrorist bloc or intelligence service?

Stalin believed that the MI6 was responsible for the assassination. Elliott Roosevelt, son of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, recalled that in a 1946 interview with Stalin, the Soviet leader told him that the British government poisoned the US president:

In an article in Parade magazine, Elliott Roosevelt also said that Stalin told him in a post-war interview that he believed the president had been poisoned by members of the British prime minister's "gang." ('Stalin Admitted

Knowledge Of English, Roosevelt's Son Says'. AP News, Rick Hampson, February 6, 1986) (IMG)

The Soviet leader's claims must be taken very seriously as he (1) had much to lose from the death of his friend and ally in Washington and (2) may have had access to high-level intelligence sources indicating that the MI6 was behind the murder. The MI6, after all, was in control of the OSS and Donovan probably had enough power centralized around himself to launch a coup against the US President. The MI6 was planning to further involve the United States in forging an alliance with the Anglo-Axis bloc. Doing so required the MI6 to oust Soviet-friendly elements in Washington, and to install a new cabinet more rigidly in line with US imperial regime objectives, hostile to Soviet power, and friendly to Nazism. It made sense for the MI6 to plan to eliminate Roosevelt, along with Wallace and Hopkins.

Pages 35 to 70 of the book 'A Conspiracy of Silence: The Health and Death of Franklin D. Roosevelt' (2007) by Dr. Harry S. Goldsmith provide a very extensive research on the suspicious circumstances of the death of Roosevelt. The book provides evidence that the death of Roosevelt was likely a case of medical sabotage by a band of American killer-doctors. My personal tentative impression, based on that book and research from other areas, has been that McIntire was responsible for the medical sabotage against Roosevelt, whereas Bruenn was probably not guilty. Note that it was McIntire who explicitly stated: 'Our biggest job is to keep Harry [Hopkins] from ever feeling completely well'.

In early March of 1944, Vice Admiral McIntire appointed Lieutenant Howard Bruenn as a cardiologist doctor for the President. The official website of the US Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery stated:

Early in March 1944, the president's primary physician Vice Adm. Ross McIntire recruited Lt. Cmdr. Howard Bruenn (1905-1995), a talented Navy cardiologist at Naval Hospital Bethesda, Maryland, to conduct a complete heart and lung examination on the president. (The President's Vital Signs: A Look Back at FDR's Heart Health, Navy Medicine Live: The Official Blog of the US Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Andre B. Sobocinski (Bureau of Medicine Historian)) (IMG)

One factor leading me towards tentatively believing that Bruenn may have been innocent in this affair is Bruenn's rivalry with McIntire. A long article by the US Navy, defending McIntire, nonetheless admitted that Bruenn had a negative impression of McIntire:

In his later years, Bruenn was frequently sought out to discuss his experiences treating President Roosevelt, including a detailed interview by Navy Medicine in 1990/75; To all Bruenn spoke with, he left a distinctly negative impression of his mentor, VADM McIntire. (NAVY MEDICINE, Vol. 99, No. 4, U.S. Navy, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Steven Lomazow July-August 2008, p. 23) (IMG)

Bruenn apparently believed that McIntire did not provide the necessary medical care for Roosevelt.

Stalin believed that the British were responsible for aggressively promoting the American imperialist anti-Soviet tendency in the US government. The anti-Soviet forces in the United States inevitably held the upper hand in the US government, but the British undoubtedly contributed immensely to their promotion. The US ambassador to Moscow in 1946 recalled the following conversation with Stalin:

I then asked directly why the Generalissimo [Stalin] thought that any power or powers seemed a threat to the USSR. To this he replied: "Churchill – He tried to instigate war against Russia, and persuaded the US to join him in armed occupation of part of our territory in 1919, and lately he has been at it again." "Russia," he said, "as the events of the past few years have proved, is not stupid, and we can recognize our friends from our potential enemies."

I replied that we ourselves must plead stupidity since it was impossible for us to imagine a threat to Russia, particularly in the direction of the Baku oil fields, or any serious attempt at aggression without the support of the United States, which would never be given to aggression.

I then asked him categorically if he really believed that the US and Great Britain were united in an alliance to thwart Russia. He replied that he did so believe.

(711.61/4-546: Telegram, top secret, priority, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 5, 1946, 6 PM; Received 6:38 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1946, EASTERN EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION, VOLUME VI, p. 735) (IMG)

If Britain was the perpetrator of the probable murder of Roosevelt, then there must have been a connection between British intelligence and McIntire. McIntire was a Vice Admiral of the US imperial Army, and thus an agent of American imperialism. Since American imperialism was allied to British imperialism, all American agents were inevitably serving British intelligence as well. However, of the existence of a more direct or special connection between McIntire and the MI6 or the latter's agent William Donovan, I am unaware. Nonetheless, what can be stated for certain is that there should be no surprise if Britain utilized a gang of killer-doctors for eliminating its obstacles in Washington. The use of killer-doctors for murdering prominent officials has been a classic tradition of the British intelligence service, along with any other imperialist-fascist secret service.

After having ousted Wallace, having seen the extremely suspicious death of Harry Hopkins, and having possibly

murdered Roosevelt, the Allen Dulles network, through the Truman team, slowly began a purge of some of the Roosevelt faction Democrats.

The crypto-communist and pro-Soviet forces made yet another effort to resurge the Roosevelt faction back to dominance of the White House. There were two main choices. One was for the remnants of the Roosevelt faction to directly compete against Truman in the 1948 election. The other option was to support Truman in exchange for concessions on the part of Truman to the pro-Soviet Roosevelt-Wallace faction. The membership base and electoral base of the Democratic Party was the American working class, a factor that catapulted upwards the Roosevelt faction in the Democratic Party. Truman, although a militantly anti-Soviet reactionary, was nonetheless under a greater pressure by the proletarian-backed Roosevelt faction than the Republican/GOP candidates were. Hence, Truman was partially coopted by the Roosevelt faction into pursuing a less anti-Soviet policy than the GOP candidates who were not so under proletarian pressure and not so coopted by the pro-Soviet progressives. Therefore, Truman was objectively preferred over the GOP candidates. In this midst, should the Roosevelt faction have turned against Truman during the 1948 election, even at the risk of a split amongst the Democrats, a split to be exploited by the more anti-proletarian and anti-Soviet GOP? Back then, the American public opinion was in the favour of the Democratic Party and a Democratic politician was going to win anyways. Therefore, the remnants of the Roosevelt faction decided to compete against Truman during the election, correctly calculating that they would not lose to the more anti-Soviet GOP candidate. Henry A. Wallace formed the Progressive Party and ran against Harry Truman. Wallace was backed by the Communist Party of USA (CPUSA). Wallace was also backed by the Soviet intelligence network in the Zionist movement. Moshe Sneh – the former Haganah commander, the leader of the Soviet spy front party Mapam, and a Soviet spy himself – went to the United States to back Wallace in the Presidential elections via a ‘progressive Zionist’ group:

I saw Sneh at his request. He is one of the leaders of the United Mapam Workers' Party, having previously been in command of the Hagana. In conversation Sneh told me that he was leaving in a few days' time for the US as his party's delegate in order to establish closer relations with a certain progressive Zionist group in the US. This group has recently been linked to Wallace's Party and supports his candidacy in the presidential elections. Sneh's task is to organize propaganda in the US, aiming to make the group work more actively in support of Wallace. Sneh, being a foreigner, cannot speak publicly for Wallace, but he will support him through the Zionist group. He thinks he will stay in the US until the presidential elections and may stop off in Paris on his way back. (DIARY: AVP RF. F.089, OP.1, P.1. D3, LL.5-6, Secret, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – M. Sneh, Tel Aviv, October 9, 1948. In: “Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2”, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry,

Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 379) (IMG{Israel})

The ‘Progressive Zionist’ organization to which Sneh was referring was likely the organization ‘Progressive Zionist League’ (PZL), which had roots in the Hashomer Hatzair. The PZL had a major role in the establishment of ‘Americans for Progressive Israel’ (API) and ‘Partners for Progressive Israel’ (PPI). The PZL supported Wallace in the 1948 elections:

Organizationally, Partners for Progressive Israel has roots in the Hashomer Hatzair youth movement, founded in 1913 in Galicia, Austria-Hungary. In 1947, a number of adult former members of Hashomer Hatzair felt the need to maintain social and political cohesion even if not making Aliyah (moving to Israel); many were involved in the Progressive Party campaign of Henry Wallace. They created an organization called the Progressive Zionist League (PZL). (PPI'S ROOTS AND HISTORY, Partners for Progressive Israel, Arie Lebowitz & Ralph Seliger) (IMG{Israel})

C11S5. Soviet Campaign against American Imperialist Hawks

*** IMG-All-{Cultural Cold War}

The Soviet program was to promote the ‘peace’ campaign in order to prevent the remilitarization of Germany, to prevent the strengthening of the Nazis and NATO. The Soviets also aimed to strengthen the pro-Soviet dovish capitulationist tendency in the United States, the tendency that had the support of the American proletariat and was concentrated in strength in the Democratic Party, so that the USSR would develop its military against a weak level of resistance from the American imperialists. The dovish tendency, which had the backing of the American proletarians, was undoubtedly going to render the US imperialist military much weaker.

Meanwhile, inspired by the Soviet Union:

A world-wide collection of signatures “for peace” was directed against the “remilitarization of Germany” and against the “aggressive” Atlantic Pact. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

And:

A series of Soviet-sponsored cultural conferences beginning in September 1948 called for world peace and denounced the policies of the Truman administration. (‘Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50’, CIA, Michael Warner, p. 90) (IMG)

Referring to the West during the 1940s and early 1950s, the CIA pointed to:

Communism's appeal to artists and intellectuals.. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 89) (IMG)

It was not just the intellectuals; the anti-imperialist movement in the United States, said Raymond Murphy of the US State Department's Office of European Affairs, 'actually embrace[d] far more than intellectuals', with a larger population of Americans supporting the communist aims of 'pacifism' and 'isolationism':

Now the theme is that the United States and the Western democracies are the war-mongers and Fascists and the Kremlin and its stooges the peace-loving democracies. And there is a better than even chance that by constant repetition the Commies can persuade innocents to follow this line. Perhaps not immediately but in the course of the next few years because there is a tremendous residue of pacificism [sic], isolationism and big business [sic] to be exploited. For example, a recession in the United States might cause people to lose interest in bolstering Europe I think you will agree that this phony peace movement actually embraces far more than intellectuals and that ... [we] should emphasize also that the threat to world peace comes from the Kremlin and its allies. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 91. Square brackets original.) (IMG)

In his 1952 book, Stalin explained the character of the communist-inspired peace offensive against the imperialists, a move which in spite of not directly struggling for socialist revolution, would have had tremendous benefits for the proletariat. Stalin wrote:

The object of the present-day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war. Consequently, the aim of this movement is not to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism – it confines itself to the democratic aim of preserving peace. In this respect, the present-day peace movement differs from the movement of the time of the First World War for the conversion of the imperialist war into civil war, since the latter movement went farther and pursued socialist aims.

It is possible that in a definite conjuncture of circumstances the fight for peace will develop here or there into a fight for socialism. But then it will no longer be the present-day peace movement; it will be a movement for the overthrow of capitalism.

What is most likely is that the present-day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing a particular war, in its temporary postponement, in the temporary preservation of a particular peace, in the resignation of a bellicose government and its supersession by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be good.

Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough, because, for all the successes of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force – and, consequently, the inevitability of wars will also continue in force.

To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.

(The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Marxists Internet Archive, Joseph Stalin, 1952, Chapter 6).

In mid-1949, the intellectuals and artists gathered in New York to condemn US imperialism and support the Soviet Union:

In March 1949, New York's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel played host to one of the strangest gatherings in American history. Less than four years after Allied troops had liberated Hitler's concentration camps, 800 prominent literary and artistic figures congregated in the Waldorf to call for peace at any price with Stalin.. Americans, including Lillian Heliman, Aaron Copland, Arthur Miller, and a young Norman Mailer, joined with European and Soviet delegates to repudiate US warmongering. Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich told the delegates that a small clique of hatemongers was preparing a global conflagration; he urged progressive artists to struggle against the new Fascists who were seeking world domination. American panelists echoed the Russian composer's fear of a new conflict. Playwright Clifford Odets denounced the enemies of Man and claimed the United States had been agitated into a state of holy terror by fraudulent reports of Soviet aggression; composer Copland declared the present policies of the American Government will lead inevitably into a third world war. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 90) (IMG)

Of 'the conference's sponsors,' the New York Magazine reported, were:

Albert Einstein and Eleanor Roosevelt. (New York Magazine, December 30, 1974 – January 6, 1975, p. 36) (IMG)

With some of the most prominent Americans on the side of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, the imperialist camp led by the United States was struck a blow:

The Waldorf conference another step in the Communist Information Bureau's (Cominform) campaign to shape

Western opinion. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 90) (IMG)
Regarding the efforts to nullify the effects of the Waldorf Conference, Ruth Fischer, the CIA's German Trotskyist- Titoist spy and a notorious anti-Semite, said to a US intelligence friend of hers:

I think we talked about this plan already during my last stay in Paris, but I have now a much more concrete approach to it. I mean, of course, the idea of organizing a big Anti-Waldorf-Astoria Congress in Berlin itself. It should be a gathering of all ex-Communists, plus a good representative group of anti -Stalinist American, English, and European intellectuals, declaring its sympathy for Tito and Yugoslavia and the silent opposition in Russia and the satellite states, and giving the Politburo hell right at the gate of their own hell. All my friends agree that it would be of enormous effect and radiate to Moscow, if properly organized. It would create great possibilities for better co-ordination afterwards and would also lift the spirits of Berlin anti-Stalinists, which are somewhat fallen at present. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 92) (IMG)

C11S6. Francoist Spain

*** IMG-All-{The Roosevelt Faction}

The last major openly fascist regime in Europe was that of Franco. On July 19, 1945, Stalin, Truman, and Churchill had their Third Sitting in the Potsdam Conference.

In the end:

the United States president, Harry S. Truman, and the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, successfully resisted Stalin's proposals at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 for Allied intervention against Franco.. (Foreign Policy Under Franco, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, in: Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, editors. *Spain: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988, p. 51) (IMG)

In the end, according to the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress:

The United States government took steps to normalize its political and economic relations with Spain in the years 1948-50. In September 1950, President Truman signed a bill that appropriated US\$62.5 million for aid to Spain. In the same year, the United States supported a UN resolution lifting the boycott on Franco's regime and resumed full diplomatic relations with Spain in 1951. As Spain became an increasingly important link in the overall defense system of the United States against the Soviet Union, the period of isolation came to an end. (Foreign Policy Under Franco, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, in: Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, editors. *Spain: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988, pp. 51-52) (IMG)

C11S7. Fascist Italy

A similar process occurred in Italy by the way. Mussolini resigned, but the Italian Fascists remained in power. A Fascist Italy devoid of Mussolini allied with the Anglo-American imperialists. A democracy with large waves terrorist bombings was the new 'democratic' Italy. US intelligence officer Curt Riess recalled:

In vain did six anti-Fascist parties, liberals as well as Socialists and Communists, demand that the King abdicate. It did not matter that Badoglio and his men had no intention of abandoning the Fascist spirit after they had, in name only, dropped Fascism. Lord Rennell of Rodd, the head of the Allied control machinery, a prominent financier and former friend of Schacht and of Pirelli and other Fascist industrialists, did everything he could to see to it that the regime was kept in power.

Anti-Fascists who had formed armed units to combat Fascism were forced by Badoglio to wear the King's insignia. In disgust they tore off their uniforms and went home. Workers in north Italy who had organized numerous uprisings and who had taken to guerrilla fighting decided that it was no use. Prominent liberals in Bari were arrested because they demanded the abdication of the King. Mass meetings in the University of Naples which were called for the same purpose were dissolved. Liberal papers were suppressed. Count Sforza received a severe warning for holding a meeting for which he had neglected to obtain a permit.

In short, we did everything possible to keep in power those who had fought us. Count Sforza said about the generals who did the dirty work there? "They despise the Allies in their hearts, but probably will be given congressional medals." The knowledge of what was going on in Italy must have pleased the leaders of the Nazi underground enormously. Here was the perfect setup in which to plant their men.

They planted them. Perhaps they did not need to plant any around the King or Badoglio because there were enough Fascists or former Fascists close to them to assure any degree of collaboration with the Nazi underground in the years to come. Theoretically, that idea contradicted the original Nazi plan of not working in close contact with known Fascists. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 65) (IMG{Nazi Underground})

C11S8. The Cold War in Music

*** IMG-All-{Cultural Cold War}

In West Germany, the United States was working actively to resurface the Nazi underground under the guise of democratizing Germany. Goebbels's ideas regarding 'modernist' music was to be re-implemented on a wide scale. 'Modernist music' is ironically termed such, for the allegation of it being 'music' was dubious right from the start, and, far from being a modernizing cultural force, promoted backwards-ness. So-called 'modernist music' was particularly toxic due to its extremely irrational, ugly, and insane nature. The 'modernist' trend utilizes music in order to destroy music, and to corrupt the cultures of Europe. American propaganda, however, depicted 'modernist' music as emancipatory, anti-fascist, and pro-democratic given the 'modernist' music's 'revolt' against the 'tyrannical' 'totalitarian' rationality seen in non-'modernist' music. Suddenly, the fascists of yesterday were portrayed as the new 'anti-fascists'. Washington's cultural warfare against the kind of music that makes sense was a part of its general drive to yield masses of 'rootless cosmopolitans', brainwashed 'globalist' liberals passively absorbing imperialist propaganda. The Nazis supported rootless cosmopolitan mentality as means of pacifying the occupied peoples into accepting the New Order for a New Europe, the project for a Nazi European Union (see C8S2). In its alliance with the Nazi underground, the United States continued the fascist project to foster the rootless cosmopolitan mindset.

It would be an exaggeration to say that, merely because Western Europe was America's 'front yard', America totally succeeded in turning Europeans into rootless cosmopolitans. The existence of class forces antagonistic to American imperialist interests prevented such a process. In Western Europe, French finance capital was a class force that stood in the way of US finance capital, and thus sought to sabotage the rootless cosmopolitan campaign. This is of course in addition to the Western European proletarian class forces that stood in the way of the US plots. The USSR and the Peoples' Democracies used their instruments of influence to sabotage US plans. As such, the project for turning people into fully brainwashed liberals devoid of culture saw only mixed results. True, American propaganda bombardment of the masses was intense. However, the class forces that stood in the way of American finance capital designs were not weak either, and thus the rootless cosmopolitan campaign was not as successful. The masses of Europe did not lose their cultures, certainly not to the extent that the Americans would have desired.

The fin de siècle and rootless cosmopolitan tendencies fostered by the CIA and MI6 did however succeed in getting the intelligentsia of Western Europe fully on the side of the US and the so-called 'globalists'; but that is not surprising since the liberal intelligentsia were – long before the CIA was established – a stratum made up mostly of liberals or fin de siècle degenerates from feudal or bourgeois classes anyways. Never true friends, they presented themselves as 'allies' to the USSR against the Nazis, but in practice sided with fascist reaction against Soviet power. The CIA's Congress for Cultural Freedom programs only succeeded in expediting the inevitable.

In 1946, a major musical organization was founded in the US-occupied German city of Darmstadt. The name of the organization was:

Kranichsteiner Ferienkurse für Neue Musik (later renamed Internationale Ferienkurse für Neue Musik, hereafter IFNM or Ferienkurse). ('New Music, New Allies, American Experimental Music in West Germany from the Zero Hour to Reunification', University of California Press, Amy C. Beal, pp. 37 -38) (IMG)

The IFNM, also known as the Darmstadt School, was widely acknowledged as:

quintessentially modernist.. (Darmstadt as Other: British and American Responses to Musical Modernism, Cambridge University Press, Bjorn Heile, p. 161) (IMG)

This 'modernist' musical organization had been founded with the active support – in the form of 'money, performance space, bedding and food' – of the US military administration in Germany, represented by the Office of Military Government, US (OMGUS):

The *Ferienkurse* had been founded in 1946 with support from the Allied military government, with aims that mirror those of political alliances such as the Council of Europe, launched soon after – namely, re-establishment of inter-government relations and the tempering of destructive nationalist forces after six years of war. In Germany, Darmstadt reopened cultural borders closed to the outside world after 1933 by National Socialist censorship of the arts. Quite self-consciously and publicly, the aim was to help a younger generation of artists catch up after a period devoid of contact with musical developments outside Germany. US funding of the early *Ferienkurse*, as a 1947 State Department publication put it, sought to "overcome the spiritual isolation imposed by National Socialism." (British Musical Modernism: The Manchester Group and their Contemporaries, Cambridge University Press, Philip Rupprecht, p. 69) (IMG)

Early IFNM programs were stamped with OMGUS publishing licenses, and Ferienkurse participants had to receive a clearance issued by the Music and Theater Branch. Music Officers stationed nearby, like Everett Helm in Wiesbaden, quickly came into the orbit of contemporary music activities in Darmstadt. Requests by Steinecke and others to the Military Government for money, performance space, bedding, and food were frequent, and frequently granted." A piano that had been confiscated from the Nazis by the Allies during the war was supposedly donated in 1946 by American soldiers, who transported the Steinway grand to Jagdschloss Kranichstein – the location of the first three Ferienkurse – on the back of a military jeep. ('New Music, New

Allies, American Experimental Music in West Germany from the Zero Hour to Reunification', University of California Press, Amy C. Beal, p. 38) (IMG)

Indeed, the US-sponsored IFNM was very famous for being a hub for 'modernist' music as early as 1946.

The Soviets were well aware of the imperialist-fascist assault on the culture of European Enlightenment and the Renaissance, which the Soviet socialist realists had championed. In the USSR, the terms 'modernist' and 'formalist' music were utilized interchangeably to describe the same insane chaotic 'music'. In a 1946 speech to the Soviet intellectuals, Stalin condemned formalist/modernist music and declared: music can also fight.

In 1944 I had the opportunity to read instructions written by an officer of British intelligence, with the title: *"How to use formalist music for corrupting the enemy army."*

While talking about the future development of Soviet art, literature and music, it must be taken into consideration that it is developing in a condition of unprecedented secret war, a war that has been unleashed upon us and our art, literature and music by the world's imperialist circles. The job of our own foreign agents in our country is to penetrate Soviet organizations dealing with culture, to capture the editorships of major newspapers and journals, to influence decisively the repertoire of theatres and movies and in the publication stop or hamper by any means possible the publication of revolutionary works that awaken patriotism and lead the Soviet people towards creating communism. They support and publish works where some failures of socialist ideals and communism are preached. (...). Their aim is to support and propagate the capitalist method of capitalist production and the bourgeois life style.

At the same time these agents are asked to popularize in art and literature the feelings of pessimism, decadence and demoralization.

(Stalin on Art and Culture, Revolutionary Democracy, retrieved from: North Star Compass) (IMG)

During the 1930s, the Nazi agent Tukhachevsky had actively promoted the expressionist-formalist-'modernist' music of Shostakovich, so to corrupt and sabotage Soviet music. Shostakovich's formalist 'music' was to music what sodomy is to sex. The 'music' was condemned in Pravda as 'Chaos, not Music'. The CIA picked up on the Nazi agent's project and sponsored such fascist reactionary 'music'. The agency responsible for sponsoring the formalist music was the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), an office shared as a sub-department of the CIA and the US State Department and responsible for the many extra-territorial power projections and special operations that later became the CIA's tasks. The OPC in turn pursued such a CIA music project via the infamous 'Congress for Cultural Freedom'. The first conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom officially took place in Berlin on June 1950, with the CIA's OPC sponsoring the event in collaboration with the US State Department, and prominent philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, John Dewey (Trotsky's lawyer), and Karl Jaspers officially heading it:

The congress in Berlin rolled ahead that spring gathering sponsors and patrons. World-renowned philosophers John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Benedetto Croce, Karl Jaspers, and Jacques Maritain agreed to lend gravitas to the event as its honorary chairmen. OPC bought tickets for the American delegation, using [several intermediary organizations] as its travel agents. Hook and another NYU philosophy professor named James Burnham took charge of the details for the American delegation.

The Department of State proved an enthusiastic partner in the enterprise, arranging travel, expenses, and publicity for the delegates. (...). The Congress for Cultural Freedom convened in Berlin's Titania Palace on 26 June 1950. American delegates Hook, James Burnham, James T. Farrell, playwright Tennessee Williams, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., actor Robert Montgomery, and chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission David Lilienthal had been greeted on their arrival the previous day with the news that troops of North Korea had launched a massive invasion of the South. This pointed reminder of the vulnerability of Berlin itself heightened the sense of apprehension in the hail. The Congress's opening caught and reflected this mood. Lord Mayor Reuter asked the almost 200 delegates and the 4,000 other attendees to stand for a moment of silence in memory of those who had died fighting for freedom or who still languished in concentration camps. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50',

CIA, Michael Warner, p. 94. Square brackets original.) (IMG)

Washington's leaders found the Congress for Cultural Freedom very useful for combatting the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and communism:

Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Jesse MacKnight was so impressed with the American delegation that he urged CIA to sponsor the congress on a continuing basis even before the conclave in Berlin had taken place. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 94) (IMG)

And the CIA did continue to sponsor the Congress for Cultural Freedom throughout the Cold War:

The Congress for Cultural Freedom despite the embarrassing exposure of its CIA sponsorship in 1967 ... ultimately helped to negate Communism's appeal to artists undermining at the same time the Communist pose of moral superiority. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 89)

(IMG)

From then on, the:

CIA sponsorship of the Congress has long been publicly known.. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 89) (IMG)

The Congress for Cultural Freedom:

helped to solidify CIA's ... [global] strategy of promoting the non-Communist left – the strategy that would soon become the theoretical foundation of the Agency's political operations against Communism over the next two decades. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 89) (IMG)

America's cultural offensive in support of formalist/'modernist' arts and the rootless cosmopolitan mentality of course accompanied the attempt to revive Hitler's New Order for a New Europe. Rootless cosmopolitanism served as propaganda for a Pan-European economic, military, and political integration. The mentality for a European citizen accepting CIA efforts to revive the New Order for a New Europe was the mentality of a brainwashed liberal devoid of national-cultural roots. As was mentioned, the CIA promoted the corrupt reactionary 'music' of Shostakovich in order to undermine Soviet music. A book published by the Cambridge University Press stated that between 1950 and 1952:

The Congress [for Cultural Freedom] extracted a good deal of propaganda value out of featuring works by composers who were thought to have laboured under Soviet censure. These included two by Serge Prokofiev (*The Prodigal Son and Scythian Suite*) and Dmitri Shostakovich's *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District*, the orchestral score of which was performed as a concert suite.. Soviet sensibilities were no doubt further affronted by these works being performed by the orchestra of the West Berlin Radio in the American Sector (RIAS). The difficulties experienced by Shostakovich in the wake of *Lady Macbeth* were highlighted in an article by Nabokov published in the special issue of *Preuves* [which was the magazine for the Congress for Cultural Freedom] given over to L'Oeuvre du XXe siecle. (Music and Ideology in Cold War Europe, Cambridge University Press, Mark Carroll, p. 21. Citing: This is Our Culture, Counterpoint, Nicolas Nabokov, May 1952, p. 15. 'Elegie funebre sur quatre notes', *Preuves*, Nicolas Nabokov, May 1952, p. 15) (IMG)

The United States also backed formalism (or 'modernism') in art and literature. Dr. Duncan White, the Harvard University's Assistant Director of Studies in History and Literature, wrote:

late modernism's insistence on the aesthetic autonomy was the fundamental reason for it being deployed as a weapon in the cultural Cold War. 'Modernist' art and literature ... became a powerful symbol of the freedom of expression of the West. (Nabokov and His Books: Between Late Modernism and the Literary Marketplace, Duncan White, p. 39) (IMG)

Jan Goldman – professor of intelligence and security studies at The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina, as well as an experience employee of US intelligence – wrote:

The Congress for Cultural Freedom, officially known as Operation CONGRESS, also gave the CIA the ideal front for promoting its covert interest in Abstract Expressionism. The Congress for Cultural Freedom would be the official sponsor of touring exhibitions. Its magazines would provide useful platforms for critics favorable to the new American painting style, and no one – the artists included – would be any the wiser.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom put together several exhibitions of Abstract Expressionism during the 1950s. One of the most significant exhibitions, *The New American Painting*, visited every big European city in 1958-1959. Other influential shows included *Modern Art in the United States* (1955) and *Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century* (1952).

Because Abstract Expressionism was expensive to move around and exhibit, millionaires and museums were called into play. Preeminent among these was Nelson Rockefeller, whose mother had cofounded the Museum of Modern Art in New York. As president of what he called "Mummy's museum," Rockefeller was one of the biggest backers of Abstract Expressionism (which he called "free enterprise painting"). His museum was contracted to the Congress for Cultural Freedom to organize and curate most of its important art shows.

('CONGRESS, Operation (1950-1979)', Jan Goldman. In: 'The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies', Jan Goldman, p. 82) (IMG)

It is however important to not exaggerate the level of the success of this cultural program of the imperialist-fascist secret services. While expressionist/formalist music did emerge popular among the decadent intelligentsia around the world, it never succeeded in becoming widespread among the general populace anywhere; the average person simply would be and indeed was unwilling to listen to such nonsensical junk. Hence, this program did not succeed beyond just some decadent circles of intellectuals. The kinds of CIA music programs that did succeed however are the musical works that were rational but had unethical content, such as highly corrupt ideas and feelings promoted in many kinds of rap music.

The Soviets resisted. American efforts to promote formalist/'modernist' music and hence rootless cosmopolitanism began to fail in the USSR:

The change in Composers' Union leadership was reaffirmed and solidified at the First All-USSR Congress of

Soviet Composers, and the attacks on the so-called "formalists," particularly Shostakovich, intensified.. ('Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953', Cornell University Press, Kiril Tomoff, p. 123) (IMG)



An example of expressionism in the field of paintings. Jackson Pollock, the 'artist' who painted the above was sponsored by the CIA. Pollock, No. 1A, 1948.

A paper by the Cornell University Press stated that in the Soviet Union, in 1948:

On the morning of 25 April, representatives from each delegation gathered to discuss candidates for the newly organized governing board and auditing committee of the Composers' Union. The meeting was conducted by a few party members who led the delegations. They drew up a large list of candidates, and the assembled representatives objected to only four suggestions: the composers Ivan Dzerzhinskii, Anatolii Novikov, and Karl Rautio and the musicologist Tamara Livanova. Livanova was removed from the list because she concentrated on the prerevolutionary greats and not Soviet music. Novikov was replaced by another song composer, Boris Mokrousov, after allegations of unethical behavior sullied Novikov's candidacy. Despite significant support for another representative from the Karelo-Finnish Republic (Ruvim Pergament), Rautio remained on the list, as did Dzerzhinskii, without explanation.

In the final session of the congress, this list was presented to the assembled delegates, who sought to add Shostakovich, Khachaturian, Kabalevskii, Gol'denveizer, the stricken Novikov, and the unsuccessful Pergament. In the stormy discussion that followed, Shostakovich's candidacy was particularly vigorously championed by those in the room who "were satisfied" with his self-critical presentations in earlier days. Finally, a military band composer took the floor to ask how it would look "to the people" if, after all the discussion of the resolution, they reelected a "formalist composer." The question was called, Shostakovich was defeated, and Kabalevskii and Khachaturian withdrew their names.

When the secret voting finally took place, Shostakovich still garnered thirteen write-in votes, and Pergament, who also failed to make the list, gathered forty-four. The absent Miaskovskii got six write-in votes, and Kabalevskii and Khachaturian each received two. Though these tallies pale in comparison to the 333 votes needed to be elected to the new governing board, they indicate that a significant group continued stubbornly to protest long after the whispers died down and the writing was on the wall.

('Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953', Cornell University Press, Kiril Tomoff, p. 149) (IMG)

C11S9. Rejection of Marshall Plan 'Aid'

*** IMG-All- {Pan-Europe – Cold War} {Titoist Coup}

The Marshall Plan was part of the American drive to revive the New Order for a New Europe. The New Order called for the integration of the European states into one Union led by Germany against the USSR. In its alliance with the Nazi underground, the United States utilized the Marshall Plan in part to unite Europe. An Intelligence Memorandum by the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) confirmed:

American interest in Western European integration is based largely on a desire to see the area strengthened against Soviet aggression. Starting in 1948 with the Marshall Plan, in the economic field, and the Brussels Pact, in the military, a number of organizations furthering integration have been established or projected.. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

The Marshall Plan was against the Soviet Union. The US offered the Marshall Plan to the USSR as well, so long as the USSR gave the 'necessary' concessions, such as military 'transparency'. It was clear enough that the imperialist power that formed an alliance with Nazi Germany offered the 'aid' not for the reconstruction of its top enemy USSR, but to obtain a channel for sending its front companies and spies under the cover of 'technicians' to carry out espionage and sabotage, in a manner disguised as 'rebuilding' the Soviet Union. Naturally, Beria, Malenkov, and Mikoyan supported American designs. Led by MI6 agent Beria, Titoists in the Soviet Union argued in support of the Marshall Plan. Among them:

Mikoyan ... viewed the Marshall Plan proposals favorably.. (The Balance of Power August 1948 to October 1950, HR70-14, CIA, August 5, 1953, p. 7) (IMG)

Another person supporting the Marshall Plan was Voznesensky – the head of the Gosplan or the State Central Planning Commission – who was a major ally of Beria:

My father never saw Voznesensky as a rival; on the contrary, they were always allies. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

As the head of the Soviet State Central Planning Commission, Nikolai Voznesensky:

shared my father's views on the economy.. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 186) (IMG)

and:

disagreed with Stalin's opinions on some of the economic and political problems of the Soviet Government. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3)

Thus, in addition to Mikoyan, three other individuals Malenkov, Beria, and Voznesensky supported the receipt of Marshall Plan 'aid' as well:

Voznesensky and my father, for example, and those who administered German reparations [i.e. Malenkov], favoured acceptance of American aid and [encouraged] the peoples' democracies to do the same. Like my father, they thought that we should have been able to manoeuvre and were not at all in favour of a categorical refusal. (...). Some of our leading personnel even thought that we might allow the Americans in to supervise certain sectors. I remember that the Minister of Transport, Kovalev, and his deputy Beshchev, argued in that sense. The Americans were offering special equipment which enabled railways to be built more quickly. (...). The leaders of agriculture were also attracted by the American offers, especially of fertiliser factories and technologies to improve yields. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 205) (IMG)

However:

Stalin stated that it had become evident, upon receipt of information from Paris, that the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to aid the formation of a Western bloc and to isolate the Soviet Union. (The Balance of Power August 1948 to October 1950, HR70-14, CIA, August 5, 1953, p. 7, underline original) (IMG)

The constant flow of intelligence materials confirming Washington's plans to use the Marshall Plan against the Soviet Union built a strong case against the Marshall Plan and gave sufficient leverage to the communists to compel the Beria-Malenkov faction of the Politburo to stop their campaign for the Marshall Plan and to join the communists in voting against it. A senior fellow of the CIA front think tank Council on Foreign Relations wrote:

On the night of June 29 [1947], a brown-jacketed Feldjager special messenger raced through the streets of Moscow. Arriving at the Kremlin gates, he handed the guard an envelope marked "Very Urgent." A few minutes later, Stalin, sitting in his dimly lit office, opened it and removed the intelligence report, growing increasingly "indignant" as he read. He quickly wrote out text, and directed his secretary, Alexander Poskrebyshev, to call Politburo members and request their approval. Once the last "yes" vote was secured in the early hours of June 30, Poskrebyshev told Vyshinsky to encipher the cable and send it to Paris.

The message directed Molotov to obstruct Marshall's plan from being implemented.. (The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War, Benn Steil, 2018, pp. 127-128) (IMG)

Via the Cominform, Andrei Zhdanov promoted the communist efforts at sabotaging the Marshall Plan in Western Europe. Zhdanov:

believed that it was possible to make striking advances internationally through foreign Communist Parties, particularly in France and Italy. Specifically, he is said to have been responsible for organization of the Cominform in September 1947, a foreign policy move which at the minimum was intended to sabotage the Marshall Plan but which was also intended to launch French and Italian Parties into revolutionary action to seize power. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

In his speech to the Cominform, Zhdanov declared:

One of the directions of the ideological “campaign” that accompanies the plans to enslave Europe is the attack on the principle of national sovereignty, calling for the abandonment of the sovereign rights of peoples and imposing the ideas of a “world government” to them. The meaning of this campaign is to embellish the rampant expansion of American imperialism, unceremoniously violating the sovereign rights of peoples, to expose the United States as a champion of universal laws, and to present those who resist American penetration as outdated "selfish" nationalism. Accepted by bourgeois intellectuals from among dreamers and pacifists, the idea of a “world government” is used not only as a means of pressure for the ideological disarmament of peoples who defend their independence from the attacks of American imperialism, but also as a slogan specifically opposed to the Soviet Union, which consistently defends the principle of real equality and fencing of the sovereign rights of all peoples, large and small. Under current conditions, the imperialist countries, like the United States, Britain and the countries close to them, become dangerous enemies of national independence and self-determination of peoples, and the Soviet Union and the countries of new democracy are a reliable pillar in the defense of equality and national self-determination of peoples. (The Zhdanov Report to the Cominform, September 22, 1947, p. 10. retrieved from: Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE)) (IMG)

The USSR unleashed a massive media campaign against the Marshall Plan, pan-Europeanism, and rootless cosmopolitanism. An article from the Soviet media stated:

American ideologists use every possible way to propagate the idea cosmopolitanism, the theory of the 'united' peoples of Europe under the aegis of the United States of America. They are trying to weaken the West European intelligentsia morally. American reactionaries spare no expense to introduce the ideas of cosmopolitanism into the consciousness of the intellectuals of Western Europe. In every possible way the reactionaries are enrolling spokesmen for their ideas. They bribe and buy renegades who sell themselves openly and cynically to their bosses across the Atlantic. They employ wavering intellectuals who, by their petty-bourgeois social nature, are unstable. They deafen people with their propaganda, press their ideology on artists who only yesterday were progressive, but who, not being sufficiently consistent, do not understand that if you offer a reactionary one finger you lose your hand. (...). What does cosmopolitanism mean in our days? Yesterday this reactionary cosmopolitan idea of a world state meant the Hitlerite 'new order in Europe', trampling on the national sovereignty and independence of the European peoples. Today it is one of imperialism's disguises in its struggle for world mastery. ('Kosmopolity iz literaturnogo Gollivuda' [Cosmopolitanism of the Literary Hollywood], R. Miller-Budnitskaya, Novy mir, 1948, No. 6, pp. 282-284, p. 293. Document 65 in: The Soviet Government and the Jews 1948-1967, Benjamin Pinkus, 1987. pp. 182-183) (IMG)

The intelligentsia of Western Europe were going to side with the CIA eventually no matter what. Since the intelligentsia come from feudal or bourgeois family backgrounds, the bulk of them side with reaction. The intelligentsia were going to condemn the USSR at some point. It was only a matter of time and smoothness in transition. The creation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the spread of rootless cosmopolitanism and counter-revolutionary ideas by the CIA were merely a means of more smoothly and quickly ‘transitioning’ the intelligentsia towards condemning the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies and towards siding with the pan- European entity. Rootless cosmopolitanism was a part of the CIA agenda for bring about Germany-led ‘pan- Europeanism’. The Maoists and other ‘culture warriors’ and so-called ‘cultural revolutionaries’ are continuing the path of the CIA in spreading rootless cosmopolitanism.

C11S10.1. The Strategic Importance of France

*** IMG-All- {France Post-War}

Should France have been conquered by the French proletariat, it was likely that all of continental Europe would be swept with proletarian revolutions, along with anti-imperialist revolutions in the Maghreb (Northwest Africa) and other areas ostensibly colonized by France. The CIA reported:

France is of greater strategic importance than any other continental European country except the USSR.

It is important because of its geographic location, its military potential, its cultural and intellectual leadership of Western Europe, its key position in the European Economic Recovery Program, and its control of French North Africa and other outlying areas which, in the hands of a hostile power, would provide bases for military

action against the US.

Access to France's airfields, Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Channel ports, and transportation net are essential to the successful prosecution of a war in Western Europe. Their control by a power hostile to the US would provide that power with bases for mounting amphibious attacks against the US or US-held bases in the Atlantic, would permit naval and aircraft to operate against US shipping in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and would make US counteraction extremely difficult. The cost in manpower and materiel of forcing such a hostile power out of France was demonstrated in World War II.

(...). An unfriendly government in France would, at the outset of war at least, control French North Africa with obvious implications for US security (see ORE 63: The Current Situation in French North Africa). Other French possessions of varying degrees of importance to US security are located in other parts of Africa, the West Indies, the Far East, and the Indian Ocean. The most vital of these could be neutralized or occupied rapidly by the US but would, if controlled even temporarily by any enemy, cause diversion of force and effort. (ORE 64 – The Current Situation in France, CIA, December 31, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

C11S10.2. Communist, influence in France since 'de-Nazification'

*** IMG-All-{France Post-War}

The proletarians of the 'West' in general were strongly sympathetic to the USSR. Michael Smith – the militant anti-Stalinist member of the British Army's Intelligence Corps and a prominent defense correspondent for the British mainstream media – confirmed that as late as March 1946:

As a result of the propaganda of the war years, 'Uncle Joe' Stalin was still regarded with affection in the West. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith, 1996, p. 113) (IMG{Hungary})

In Britain, for example, the sympathies went back to the 1930s, in fact. Roger Moorhouse of the BBC and British Royal Historical Society wrote:

It remains an open question how the prospect of blatant aggression against the Soviet Union might have been received by the wider British public, which persistently viewed the USSR in general and Stalin in particular much more positively than did the political and military elite. In the summer of 1939, for instance, shortly before the outbreak of the war, a questionnaire circulated by Mass Observation – an official network established to keep the government informed of public opinion – asked contributors to rank the world leaders for whom they had the greatest respect and the nations that they would "prefer the British nation to collaborate with and associate with." The results would have surprised many among the ruling class, with the Soviet Union ranking fourth among the nation's potential allies, close behind France and above Poland; Stalin even ranked second as a "respected" leader, behind President Roosevelt. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

However, nowhere were pro-Soviet sympathies more strongly manifest than in France. In fact, a 1948 CIA report stated::

According to the Turkish diplomats in France, the internal situation in France in case of war between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union will be very dangerous because of the "great Russophile current" prevailing among the French people. ('Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos, Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas', CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Well until the 1950s, the overwhelming majority of the Parisians were staunchly sympathetic to the USSR. One CIA document confirmed that in this time period:

Parisians who cared about world affairs were often Stalinists; novelist Arthur Koestler quipped that from Paris the French Communist Party could take over all of France with a single phone call. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 92) (IMG)

At the time, the French Communist Party (PCF) had an overwhelming representation in the French parliament:

The French Communist Party has the largest representation in the National Assembly — roughly 27%, exclusive of the minor parties which follow the Communist line. (ORE 64 – The Current Situation in France, CIA, December 31, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Over the years, the PCF had gained a strong influence over the French government. In a conversation with Thorez, Stalin remarked:

This is why the Party must have allies, even if they are weak at first. If the leader of the Socialist Party says in his report that the Socialist Party is for unity with the Communist Party, then one must answer him: 'Please do it!' One must attract other political groups into the bloc created. One must have allies in the trade unions, one must create something like a bloc. (...). Com. Stalin explains that ... it seems to him that the Communists have not yet understood that the situation in France has changed. The Communists are acting brashly and are continuing to follow the former line at a time when the situation has changed. They would like to send all the Socialist scoundrels to hell at a time when one must try to create a bloc and find allies among the Socialists. The Communists are trying to retain the militia. This will not happen. There is a government that is recognized by

Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and other powers, but the Communists continue to act by inertia. Meanwhile, the situation is new, different, it provides an opportunity for de Gaulle. The situation has changed and it is necessary to make a turn. The Communist Party is not strong enough to hit the government on its head. It must accumulate forces and search for allies. It must take measures so that, in the case of an offensive of reaction, the Communists can have a solid defence and can say that reaction is attacking not only the Communists but the people. If the situation changes for the better, then the forces united around the Party will be useful for the offensive. (Notes of a Talk of Com. J.V. Stalin with the General Secretary of the C.C. of the French Communist Party Com. Thorez, November 19, 1944. In: Revolutionary Democracy, George Gruenthal) (IMG)

The Trotskyites and Maoists like to denounce the French Communist Party (PCF) for its participation in coalition governments in imperialist France. This criticism of the PCF is a sneaky way to promote reactionary left-deviationist views under the guise of 'anti-revisionism'. True, participation in bourgeois parliaments and imperialist governments for the purpose of collaborating with imperialist reaction is a betrayal of the proletariat. However, and by contrast, participation in the imperialist state apparatus for the purpose of infiltration and planting of communists at the top ranks of the imperialist state as a means of sabotaging imperialist designs and stabbing the imperialist troops from the back and from the top is a correct strategy. And subsequently, when the right time comes, the communist party members at the top ranks of the imperialist or reactionary state can destabilize the bourgeois state apparatus, disarm the anti-worker troops and thus, in coordination with the rest of the party, pave the way for a bloodless violent proletarian revolution. This kind of a model is applicable not just to imperialist states but also pro-imperialist states. The communist revolution in Czechoslovakia occurred precisely through such a process. A comparable though not the same model was applied in People's Democratic Poland and Romania. The model implemented in Czechoslovakia was that adopted by the French Communists and was referred to by some as the 'Thorez Road'.

This strategy is not collaboration with the enemy but is rather infiltration into the imperialist state apparatus. Those who criticize the 'Thorez road' or the 'Czechoslovak model' do so either out of naivete or out of an intense desire to sabotage the plans to infiltrate the imperialist state apparatus. Indeed this latter category, in which one will predominantly find the Trotskyite fascist agents and the Maoist reactionaries, has shown burning passion for yielding the global victory of the imperialist-fascist secret services. They oppose infiltration-disguised-as-'participation' into imperialist and comprador states not because they oppose collaboration with imperialists but precisely because they themselves are the collaborators with imperialism, just like Mao and Trotsky. The PCF infiltration into the French government, which was disguised as 'participation', was a natural product of the Soviet recommendation to the PCF that the latter forms a popular front alliance with communist-friendly elements in the Kautskyite 'Socialist' Party in France.

The PCF therefore embarked upon a path of recruiting French military generals and planting its agents in the positions of the French state. It did however face a number of major problems. At the time, France was ruled by:

The Schuman Cabinet, a centrist coalition government... (ORE 64 – The Current Situation in France, CIA, December 31, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

As mentioned in C9S8, Robert Schumann was an ethnic German who fought for the German Imperial Army during World War I, but who lived in France after WWI. A staunch German bourgeois-nationalist and a minister of the government prior to and during the Nazi invasion, he had unapologetically voted for the establishment of a Vichy Regime during WWII, and even served in the Petain government for a while. After the Great Patriotic War, this German fascist became the ruler of France 'thanks' to Anglo-American backing. The fact that a German fascist was the ruler of 'de-Nazified' France goes on to show the depth of Anglo-American imperialist and West German influence over the French state during those years.

French finance capital did seek to ally with the USSR against the Anglo-American and West German rivals, but French finance capital after the Great Patriotic War was rather weak. It hardly had an army; its army was created by the Anglo-Americans, and the Anglo-Americans preferred West German finance capital over French finance capital. Added to this was the military occupation of France by the Anglo-American armies, and the fact that many Anglo-American spies have historically defected from anti-imperialist countries and have landed in France in particular. These defectors, by living in France, continue to serve as Anglo-American intelligence services' unofficial occupation troops. The gang of the German fascist Robert Schumann pursued the suppression of the French imperialist tendency in the French government and promoted a comprador alliance with the Anglo-Americans against the USSR. However, pro-Soviet sympathies were common amongst the French proletarians and amongst a minority of French intellectuals.

When the moment was ripe, the French Communist Party (PCF) launched:

a wave of strikes that seriously threatened the nation's economy.. (ORE 64 – The Current Situation in France, CIA, December 31, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

A US intelligence document reported, with regards to the PCF-led waves of strikes:

the impetus for this was attributed to Zhdanov. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2)

(IMG{Greece})

Andrei Zhdanov did encourage militant action by the PCF via the Cominform, although obviously the PCF had the social base and the great capabilities for launching this series of strikes, without Soviet instigation. Finally, according to the CIA:

The French Communist Party undertook ... action in November of 1947 and, until broken by the French army, almost succeeded in paralyzing the government and the economy. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

The Schuman faction suppressed the proletarian uprisings. However, a few months later:

The 48-hour “warning strike” by French coal miners is the first in a series which the Communists hope will prepare the ground for an all-out attempt to wreck French economy during April or May, or before the European recovery program becomes effective. As a result of lessons learned during the unsuccessful strikes of November 1947, the Communists will employ disguised tactics, including scattered “non -political” strikes, and exploitation of existing local grievances. (BOOK IV – WEEKLY SUMMARY COMPLETE – 9 JAN 1948 (#80) THRU 14 MAY 1948 (#98), CIA, p. IV. p. 131 of the PDF) (IMG)

Inspired by the French:

The Italian [Communist] Party undertook similar action, but with much less success. (The Zhdanov- Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

Historically, in Italy, the communist movement somewhat consistently succeeded only half-way. This is rooted in the large population of both proletarians and the petit-bourgeoisie in Italy, the former being a major anti-fascist resistance force and the latter being submissive tacit enablers of fascism. Again:

the impetus for this was attributed to Zhdanov. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

The French and Italian communists were provided with priority armaments to form sleeper cells for an eventual armed uprising against the pro-fascist anti-Soviet factions in the French and Italian governments. The arms were provided by People’s Democratic Czechoslovakia. A CIA document confirmed with reference to Czechoslovak socialist arms:

European Parties which need arms much more urgently, namely Italy, France and Spain to a lesser extent, are being supplied with arms and ammunition via contraband shipments. (Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

This was in line with Stalin’s recommendation to Thorez that the French communists hide their arms rather than disarm:

Com. Stalin asks whether the resistance organizations have any armed forces.

Com. Thorez answers that there are armed detachments of the patriotic militia, which were the main forces of the resistance during the occupation of France. Presently these militia detachments retain their arms.

Com. Stalin says that one must take account of the fact that presently in France there is a government recognized by the allied powers. Under these conditions it is difficult for the Communists to have parallel armed forces, since there is a regular army. It can be asked of the Communists for what purpose they need parallel armed detachments. As long as there was no provisional government, as long as there was no rear area under its command, then the existence of these detachments had a definite sense. For what purpose do these detachments exist now when there is a government with its own army? Such could be the arguments of the enemies of the Communists. These arguments could convince the average French person. That is why the position of the Communist Party of retaining its own armed forces appears weak and will be weak. It is difficult to defend this position. This is why it is necessary to transform these armed detachments into another organization, into a political organization, but the arms should be hidden (‘a oruzhiye nuzhno spryatat’).

(Notes of a Talk of Com. J.V. Stalin with the General Secretary of the C.C. of the French Communist Party Com. Thorez, November 19, 1944. In: Revolutionary Democracy, George Gruenthal) (IMG)

C11S10.3. French Imperialism, the Ally of the Socialist Forces / The Subjugation of France by the West German Imperialists

*** IMG-All- {France Post-War}

It is necessary to have some discussion of the following quote from Stalin’s ‘The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’ (1952). Stalin stated that in the Atlantic bloc, the emergence of the US as the dominant power would eventually – turn America’s own imperial allies against the United States:

Some comrades hold that, owing to the development of new international conditions since the Second World War, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable. They consider that the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are more acute than the contradictions among the capitalist countries; that the U.S.A. has brought the other capitalist countries sufficiently under its sway to be able to prevent them going to war among themselves and weakening one another; that the fore-most capitalist minds

have been sufficiently taught by the two world wars and the severe damage they caused to the whole capitalist world not to venture to involve the capitalist countries in war with one another again – and that, because of all this, wars between capitalist countries are no longer inevitable.

These comrades are mistaken. They see the outward phenomena that come and go on the surface, but they do not see those profound forces which, although they are so far operating imperceptibly, will nevertheless determine the course of developments.

Outwardly, everything would seem to be "going well": the U.S.A. has put Western Europe, Japan and other capitalist countries on rations; Germany (Western), Britain, France, Italy and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the U.S.A. and are meekly obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to "go well" for "all eternity," that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavour to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development.

(The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Marxists Internet Archive, Joseph Stalin, 1952, Chapter

6)

Many have misinterpreted the above remarks by Stalin as meaning that the imperialist camp was in the condition of a secret civil war, that the imperialist powers' alliance with one another was fake, and that the USSR was advancing freely forward in deepening the wedge between all these imperialist powers. This misinterpretation of Stalin's quote is of course profoundly left-deviationist, not to mention foolish. Stalin, by making the above remark, was basically stating that any alliance between imperialist powers against the USSR was going to be temporary. After all, imagine if the US would be almost taking over the entire world; would the German, Japanese, British, etc. imperialists all stand by and watch as the US takes over the entire planet, leaving nothing for the German, Japanese, British imperialists? Of course not. The imperialist allies of the United States would have had to, for the sake of remaining as imperial powers, to eventually stand up against the United States. Their alliance with the US was and to this day remains temporary: an alliance against the USSR and Co. back then, and now against modern Russia and Co. Since the USSR was strong and bore a high level of development of the productive forces, the US – the imperialist power with the highest level of productive forces power – turned against it. In this Cold War against the USSR, the US had West Germany and Britain as its top imperialist allies in the Atlantic. Despite the outwardly pretensions of 'differences' (such as on Israel-Palestine; see C16S3), the imperial interests of Britain, the United States, and Germany strongly converged with one another and they were covertly allied with each other in all directions in all parts of the world.

The US, in order to contain the USSR, supported the expansion and restoration of the German empire not only in the form of reviving the Nazi networks but also in rendering France a satellite of West Germany as well. France was militarily occupied by the US troops, the CIA controlled French intelligence, and French leaders – such as the Nazi German Robert Schuman – were sellouts to the CIA and to the West Germans. As such, the US was able to use France as a satellite so to force the French imperialists into accepting West Germany as the senior partner. France did not become a colony of Anglo-Americans and Germans because those countries' finance capital was not able to fully dominate France and so France remained its own imperialist power; however, France's politics was so heavily infiltrated and under the lobbying pressure of those imperialist powers that France became a satellite of the Anglo-American and German imperialists.

As early as 1942, the German intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg had set up plans for a Franco-German economic union, of course with Germany dominating France:

I am thinking of a solution which aims at the economic integration of German and French interests. France's own political physiognomy must be restored, but inevitably Germany and France will be drawn together, and France, with her colonial possessions, will bring Germany tremendous advantages. Therefore, one must not limit one's actions by doctrinaire preconceptions or political resentment. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 309) (IMG)

This was already the case with the Nazi German occupation of France. Since the Anglo-Americans entered France in order to save the Nazi Germans, the Anglo-Americans saw it fit to keep the situation that way and to have France continue to operate as a satellite. For this purpose, the Anglo-Americans could count on Robert Schuman. The reader may recall that Robert Schuman was a German who had fought for Germany during World War I against France, and who, after the Nazi German invasion, supported the establishment of the Vichy regime. After the Great Patriotic War, 'thanks' to Anglo-American backing, the Nazi German Robert Schuman became the French Prime Minister and the French foreign minister.

In addition, the Americans had officially occupied France militarily until the late 1960s and forced France to contribute to NATO. As such, there was a massive American military pressure on French finance capital, coercing French imperialists to cooperate – against their will – with their American imperialist rivals. In this situation, Paris became an epicenter of those aiming to render France subjugated by West German imperialism. The Nazi German agent Robert Schuman, who was not even a French national but managed to be the leader of post-war France, declared that France and

Germany should cooperate in the 'development' (colonization) of French-controlled West Africa: With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent. In this way, there will be realised simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions.

By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.

To promote the realization of the objectives defined, the French Government is ready to open negotiations on the following bases.

The task with which this common High Authority will be charged will be that of securing in the shortest possible time the modernization of production and the improvement of its quality; the supply of coal and steel on identical terms to the French and German markets, as well as to the markets of other member countries; the development in common of exports to other countries; the equalization and improvement of the living conditions of workers in these industries.

(The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950. In: europa.eu) (IMG)

In other words, France was unofficially handing over its own colonies in West Africa to the West Germans. In case there is any doubt as to whether or not this remark in the Schuman Declaration was for having France and its colonies be dominated by the Germans, take note of the following quotes. As confirmed by prominent US State Department official on African affairs, Vernon McKay, Schuman sought to give French colonies in West Africa as a 'dowry to Europe':

Monnet evidently shared the motivation of those who desired to help France first, Europe second, and Africa last. It was he who reportedly coined the myopic phrase that France could bring Africa as a "dowry to Europe," which Foreign Minister Robert Schuman used in announcing his plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. (Africa in World Politics, Vernon McKay, 1963, pp. 138-139) (IMG)

And of course, Germany was to dominate the pan-Europe, as had been the case during the Great Patriotic War and before then. This was a part of the general conspiracy for rootless cosmopolitanism, for reviving the Hitlerian 'New Order' for a 'New Europe'. Furthermore, as confirmed by a top 'French' economic planner who helped establish the European Union, the purpose of the clause about Africa in the Schuman declaration was for 'seducing the Germans':

This closed, I admit that I have made some changes to the text of the [Schuman] Declaration. It seems that it has counted seventeen successive versions. The changes were minor after the writing I had helped to finalize. It was Rene Mayer who had added Africa, thinking of seducing the Germans, and the Quai d'Orsay which introduced the mention of the obligations imposed on Germany, as long as they remained. (Penser pour L'Action: Un Fondateur de L'Europe, Pierre Uri, 1991, p. 80) (IMG)

Clearly, the purpose of the French leaders was to have France hand over its colonies to West Germany as a means of strengthening West German-dominated pan-Europe against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Jean Monnet, who was very well-known as a CIA agent, was joyfully enthusiastic about handing French colonies to American finance capital America, as well as to some extent the Anglo-German finance capital :

In these early postwar years, another person interested in the idea of Eurafrica was Volney Hurd, Chief of the Paris News Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor. Hurd has related how he approached Jean Monnet, then in charge of French economic planning, to discuss the idea. They considered the possibility of an African development corporation in which Europe would hold the ownership through bonds and half-interest in the stock, while the United States would be given the other half of the stock in return for Marshall Plan aid and any other sums invested in Africa. With Monnet's encouragement, Hurd put this suggestion into the form of a report which he sent to European foreign ministers and to Marshal Jan

Christian Smuts in South Africa. According to Hurd, he received personal replies from many foreign ministers, including Bevin in England and Count Carlo Sforza in Italy, as well as from Marshal Smuts.

They all approved the idea in principle but most of them indicated that the Marshall Plan was about all they could handle at the moment. Smuts "sent a particularly warm letter, saying the idea paralleled much of his own thinking and sincerely hoping it would come about. He questioned whether the minds of Europe were advanced enough in their thinking at the moment, however, and so it would probably have to be left to the future."

Soon afterward, following a Marshall Plan meeting, Hurd again met Monnet, who told him: "A wonderful idea, Mr. Hurd! But my French colleagues are finding it difficult to think even about uniting Europe, let alone thinking about Africa! But what a shame, for it is still a very great idea – and I'm terribly sorry!" Hurd does not mention, however, a basic weakness in Monnet's concept of Eurafrica. Monnet evidently shared the motivation of those who desired to help France first, Europe second, and Africa last. It was he who reportedly coined the myopic phrase that France could bring Africa as a "dowry to Europe," which Foreign Minister Robert Schuman

used in announcing his plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. It is also said that while Monnet was enthusiastic about Eurafrika ideas in the abstract, he failed to give the necessary support to specific economic cooperation projects advocated by certain other French officials.

(Africa in World Politics, Vernon McKay, 1963, pp. 138-139) (IMG)

The quote ‘A wonderful idea, Mr. Hurd! But my French colleagues are finding it difficult to think even about uniting Europe, let alone thinking about Africa!’ belonged to the immediate post-war years. The ‘French colleagues’ were indeed very opposed to German imperialist dominance over France. Whereas in Britain, there was a great sentiment (as opposed to strong action) against German rearmament, the French pursued their opposition to West German rearmament eagerly, doing everything to this end:

There is a strong sentiment in Great Britain and France against German rearmament, and the French in particular are eager to do everything possible to relieve international [anti-Soviet] tension. (Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist ‘Unity’ Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

All imperialist powers, be they French, Britain, Germany, Japan, etc. were going to revolt against American imperialism at some point even if they would not have succeeded. At the time, France, which was being dominated by a West Germany backed by the Anglo-Americans, was at the forefront of the imperialist revolt against American imperialism. To this end, France needed – not out of some kind of moral or ideological necessity, but out of material benefits and French finance capital profits – to strategically align with the freedom forces of the world, the camp of the USSR, the Peoples’ Democracies, and other anti-imperialist countries. Where the French military engaged in wars against these freedom forces, it did so not on behalf of French finance capital, for French finance capital had nothing to gain from such confrontation against the freedom forces, but it did so rather on behalf of American finance capital. Much as how ‘Vichy French’ colonialism was German colonialism rather than French colonialism, the colonialism of ‘France’ after 1945 and before the rise of the Gaullists in the 1960s, was Anglo-American colonialism rather than French colonialism.

During the Cold War, French imperialism therefore had a natural tendency to ally with the USSR, the Peoples’ Democracies, and other anti-imperialist countries. The anti-imperialist countries in turn regarded French imperialism as a tool with which to sow division in the Atlantic alliance and to hamper Anglo-American and German efforts. The Anglo-American-German alliance in turn played its own intelligence game: Anglo-American-German imperialists pursued their agenda by disguising themselves as ‘French imperialists’. Hence, the CIA-MI6-BND alliance utilized its vast network of agents dominating French intelligence for the purpose of infiltrating the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. French companies like ‘Total’ are actually spy fronts for the CIA. American agents disguise themselves in Arab countries by utilizing their French politicians, agents of the CIA, as their cover. What if the anti-imperialist states’ counter-intelligence services publicly announce the uncovering of the subversive and espionage activities of these French agencies and institutions? The CIA-MI6-BND needed not to worry because it would be French imperialism that would be blamed, not the West Germans and the Anglo-Americans. This in turn would assist CIA- MI6-BND agents in the anti-imperialist countries to increase pressure and to lobby for further widening the wedge between anti-imperialist states and French imperialism, thus rendering the anti-imperialist secret service use of French imperialism more covert and hence costlier. Often times, CIA-MI6 spies who defected from anti-imperialist countries to the North Atlantic zone settled in France so that French imperialism – the rival of Anglo-American and West German imperialists – would be blamed instead of CIA, MI6, BND, etc. being blamed. Defectors have at times overtly settled in America, Britain, West Germany, Yugoslavia, or Israel, but nowhere nearly as much as in France. By fighting in Vietnam, the French troops were ostensibly protecting ‘French’ colonies when in fact they were protecting American imperialism, because after all, French imperialism’s interests converged with those of the Vietnamese freedom-fighters despite appearances to the contrary; the US troops were in Vietnam to monitor the French troops so that they do not deviate from the pro-US line, and then to help the French troops in fighting not for

French imperialism but for American imperialism. The French military, the military of the US satellite France, fought against Egypt in 1956 and against Algerian revolutionaries as a means of protecting Anglo-American imperialist interests in the Arab world. Yet, if one pays closer attention to the activities of the French imperialists, one will see that even in the case of the colonial war against the Algerians, French imperialism actually was very helpful for the decolonization of Algeria. Charles de Gaulle’s group, who represented French imperialism, began negotiations with the FLN in the early 1960s to bring the independence of Algeria, and for this reason, Charles de Gaulle and his team faced a CIA military coup in 1961. The coup was plot was by pro-American military generals in the French Army, who opposed de Gaulle’s and his team’s plans to decolonize Algeria. French finance capital would have benefited from a stronger FLN, because the FLN was targeting more so the pro-American elements in the French military, hence undermining the American imperialist rivals of French imperialism. Since the Nazi German occupation of France, onwards, the ‘French’ colonial occupation of Algeria was ‘French’ in the appearance only; the faces were French, the names were French, the flag was French, but the finance capital was not French. The French imperialists morally supported the UAR and imposed

sanctions on Israel during the 1967 War. The French imperialists also supplied arms to Libya in the 1970s. One of Hafez Al-Assad's objectives in the 1990s was to promote the French presence in the Middle East, and France sold arms to Syria for quite some time. France promoted the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the international scene, and, under the cover of supporting the anti-Qadhafist rebels in Libya, supported the Qadhafi agents in the Libyan fascist rebel opposition.

There have been times in which German imperial revival was beneficial to anti-imperialist camp interests such as in the 1920s when the USSR and Weimar Germany engaged in economic and military cooperation against the Anglo-French alliance. After the rise to power of the Nazis and them becoming the top threat to the USSR and anti-imperialist forces, French imperialism once again became a progressive force in its contradiction with the German imperialists. And while in the Cold War and beyond, French imperialism played and plays a progressive role, none of this is to imply that French imperialism is somehow inherently more 'humane', 'good', etc., nor is to imply that French imperialism would be compatible with anti-imperialist interests in the longer-run. In the longer-term too, French imperialism, just like any finance capital, is an enemy of the proletariat and all the freedom forces. In his famous 'Letter to American Workers', Lenin wrote:

When in February 1918 the German imperialist vultures hurled their forces against unarmed, demobilised Russia, who had relied on the international solidarity of the proletariat before the world revolution had fully matured, I did not hesitate for a moment to enter into an "agreement" with the French monarchists. Captain Sadoul, a French army officer who, in words, sympathised with the Bolsheviki, but was in deeds a loyal and faithful servant of French imperialism, brought the French officer de Lubersac to see me. "I am a monarchist. My only aim is to secure the defeat of Germany," de Lubersac declared to me. "That goes without saying (cela va sans dire)," I replied. But this did not in the least prevent me from entering into an "agreement" with de Lubersac concerning certain services that French army officers, experts in explosives, were ready to render us by blowing up railway lines in order to hinder the German invasion. This is an example of an "agreement" of which every class-conscious worker will approve, an agreement in the interests of socialism. The French monarchist and I shook hands, although we knew that each of us would willingly hang his "partner". But for a time our interests coincided. Against the advancing rapacious Germans, we, in the interests of the Russian and the world socialist revolution, utilised the equally rapacious counter-interests of other imperialists. In this way we served the interests of the working class of Russia and of other countries, we strengthened the proletariat and weakened the bourgeoisie of the whole world, we resorted to the methods, most legitimate and essential in every war, of manoeuvre, stratagem, retreat, in anticipation of the moment when the rapidly maturing proletarian revolution in a number of advanced countries completely matured. (Letter to American Workers, Lenin, August 20, 1918)

Note that Lenin made the above remark regarding a Germany that had not even been taken over by the Nazis. Even for fighting a non-fascist Germany, Lenin allied with the French monarchists to combat the German imperialists, even though he regarded the French finance capital as an eventual enemy of the USSR as well. In the period of the Cold War, the strategic situation was not so incomparable to that of 1918, because at the time, a revanchist West German imperialism, backed by the Anglo-Americans and covertly headed by the Nazi state apparatus, posed a greater menace to the freedom forces than the French imperialists. And a revival of French imperial power would have undermined West German imperialism, and hence Anglo-American imperialism. The problem though was that at the time imperialist France was too war-torn and too much of a satellite of the Anglo-Americans and West Germans to be able to stand up against them and openly ally with the freedom forces. It is interesting how Stalin once implied that the de Gaulle faction did not necessarily wish to take action against the PCF but was definitely going to do so anyways at the instigation of the Anglo-Americans. In a conversation with Maurice Thorez, Stalin said:

Com. Stalin says that the Communists should keep in mind the fact that de Gaulle will take measures against the Communists, even if he does not want to do so himself, he will be incited by the English and the Americans, who want to create a reactionary government in France, as everywhere else that this might be possible. (Notes of a Talk of Com. J.V. Stalin with the General Secretary of the C.C. of the

French Communist Party Com. Thorez, November 19, 1944. In: Revolutionary Democracy, George Gruenthal) (IMG)

Sergo Beria recalled:

it was Soviet policy to push to the forefront the Gaullists, who might facilitate infiltration of Communists into positions of authority. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 101) (IMG0)

Although Stalin initially was unsure as to whether the Anglo-Americans preferred French imperialism or German imperialism, the Soviets eventually sided with the French imperialists. Recall that as previously shown, the French imperialists and the Soviets ended up on the same side in their struggle against the expansion of West Germany's military-industrial complex:

The "first charge" principle meant that reparations should not be paid until German exports were sufficient to finance German imports (thereby reducing U.S. occupation costs and abetting economic reconstruction in

Western Europe). Yet the "first charge" principle was of little importance to the Kremlin, whose representatives continually insisted that the Western powers should comply with the reparations obligations spelled out at Yalta and Potsdam. Their argument was well founded because section 19 of the Potsdam agreement on economic principles explicitly exempted the transfer of equipment and products from the western zones to the Soviet Union from the application of the "first charge" principle. Notwithstanding the legitimacy of their position, Soviet leaders' contempt for the "first charge" principle and their tacit support of French opposition to the economic unification of Germany provoked Byrnes in mid-1946 to threaten a reconsideration of Poland's western border. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 213) (IMG)

Of course, in this midst, Lenin, who advocated the alliance with French imperialism against German imperialism, would be privately denounced as a 'revisionist' and a 'right-opportunist' by the Maoists.

C11S11. USA for a New Order in a New Europe

*** IMG-All- {Pan-Europe – Cold War}

As was explained in C8S2, the idea of a German-dominated Pan-European 'federation' had been pursued by Nazi German officials Hitler, Himmler, Schellenberg, Goebbels, and Funk. The Hitler faction referred to the project as the 'New Order' for a 'New Europe'. Geostrategically, the idea made sense from a Nazi perspective – Germany would dominate and 'unite' Europe onto a struggle against Soviet power. When the American imperialists joined Germany's side of the Great Patriotic War, they began to pursue the same idea of a German-dominated Pan-European integration. 'I am coming to believe' wrote US President Eisenhower on June 11, 1951 in his memoirs:

that Europe's security problem is never going to be solved satisfactorily until there exists a United States of Europe, to include all countries now in NATO: West Germany and (I think) Sweden, Spain, Yugoslavia, with Greece definitely in if Yugoslavia is (if necessary, the United Kingdom could be omitted). (The Eisenhower Diaries, Dwight Eisenhower, Edited by: Robert Ferrel, 1981, p. 194) (IMG)

Note that Yugoslavia, led by the CIA's fascist agent Tito (see C12S1, C12S2, and C12S3), was included in the list of countries which Eisenhower envisioned in 1951 to be a part of the anti-Soviet European Union. Beria, a Titoist agent of the MI6, shared the pan-European and pan-Balkan ideas. West Germany was to take over East Germany, and through the mechanism of a Pan-Europe, to conquer most of Eastern Europe after Yugoslavia had devoured the Peoples' Democracies. Then, through such a German-dominated Pan-Europe, Eurasia would be more easily contained. This is why:

My father wanted an economic union of the Balkan countries, led by Yugoslavia, which would later join up with a unified Germany and a free Austria. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 209 -210) (IMG)

The pan-European entity was the next stage of Tito's project for a fascist settler-colonial entity in the Balkan zone. Such an idea of a 'Balkan Federation' that would then become a part of a 'federation' led by a 'unified Germany' was almost identical to the views of Himmler and Schellenberg. Midway through Operation BARBAROSSA, the German intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg pondered of ways to establish a Pan-European alliance that would encompass Eastern Europe in order to maintain the German Empire. Referring to this 'New Europe' in late 1942, Schellenberg said to Himmler:

"(...). Czechia and Slovakia will each be governed by their autonomous governments, but economically integrated with the Reich. I believe this ought to apply also to all southeastern Europe, including Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania."

At first Himmler did not agree, but after a discussion he admitted these areas could hardly be integrated into the framework of a new Europe in any other way.

(Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 310) (IMG)

Schellenberg's and Himmler's vision of a federation of Europe led by Germany would come true more than seven decades later when the European Union that Hitler and he envisioned expanded its reach to the Balkans. Yet, it was the vision of Lavrenti Beria and Dwight Eisenhower as well.

The idea was quite unpopular in Europe. In spite of the mass opposition to a Pan-European alliance, Washington continued to pursue Hitler's New Order for a New Europe. The refusal of many Western Europeans towards American imperialist subjugation of their populations, along with the refusal of antagonizing the USSR all:

limited progress toward integration along these [Pan-Europeanist] lines.. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA,

April 2, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The CIA further reported:

Longstanding mutual distrusts, reluctance to give up sovereign powers or make other national sacrifices, and

fear of antagonizing the Soviet Union have all been powerful deterrents. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Quite simply, in Europe, there were two currents – the current for pan-European integration, which adopted the same ideological justification, and the current against pan-European integration. The latter current, which was backed by the USSR and did not get defeated until the 1991 collapse of Eurasia, incarnated in different ideological appearances nation by nation. Each European nation's anti-pan-Europeanist movement justified its opposition differently than the anti-pan-Europeanist movement in the other European nations. That is why 'different' arguments were made specific to each European nation against such a pan-European integration:

Great Britain contends that its Commonwealth and Atlantic ties preclude joining any European federation; the Scandinavian countries do not like the absence of Britain, and Sweden additionally refuses to compromise its alliance-free foreign policy; Switzerland maintains its traditional neutrality; the Spanish and Portuguese governments distrust European integration, and the former is politically unpalatable to most other European countries (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In reality, despite the differences in their methods of justification, all the forces against pan-European integration fed from the same center – the communist faction in the territory of the former Soviet Union. That is why, although the establishment of the European Union was meant for containing the Soviet Union, not until the 1991 collapse did the European Union come to be established. The CIA reaffirmed with dismay:

little active interest has developed among the populations concerned and there are no indications of effective European union being accomplished soon. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

In March 1948, a military alliance pact was signed:

Earlier, the Brussels Pact, signed by Britain, France, and the Benelux countries in March 1948, had established a military alliance known as Western Union, which helped pave the way for the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

Then, on April 1948, the OEEC was founded:

The program for European economic cooperation was intended initially to help overcome the dislocations caused by the war, then to make Europe more self-supporting, and later, also to provide a solid economic base for rearmament. The first major step was the formation, in April 1948, of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which embraces all the Western European countries except Spain. Besides helping to allocate American aid under the Marshall Plan and establishing the European Payments Union, the OEEC has tried to strengthen the area's economy by such other measures as the elimination of import quotas, reduction of tariffs, and increases in investments. It has also served, in some ways, as a first step toward a loose confederation of the whole of Western Europe. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Although later in 1948, Robert Schuman officially became the French foreign minister, that German fascist leader of France nevertheless maintained the power and influence that he had as Prime Minister of France a while earlier. In May 1950, Schuman continued the Hitlerian project, the New Order for a New Europe. Known as the 'Schuman Declaration' it paved the way for the European Union to resurface:

The Schuman Declaration was presented by French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950.

It proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community, whose members would pool coal and steel production.

The ECSC (founding members: France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) was the first of a series of supranational European institutions that would ultimately become today's "European Union".

(The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950, europa.eu) (IMG)

As the Schuman Plan was being implemented, the Pleven Plan, the project for the Pan-European military integration of Western Europe towards the establishment of a single 'European Army', was simultaneously pursued:

In the summer of 1950, Jean Monnet, General Commissioner of the French National Planning Board ... sought to organise European defence on a supranational basis comparable to that laid down in the Schuman proposal. At the same time, the USA asked their allies to plan for the rearmament of West Germany. But Monnet was also trying to ensure that Germany, aware that its role was becoming increasingly indispensable, did not lose sight of the plan for a coal and steel pool or harden its position in negotiations on this matter. He put his proposal to Rene Pleven, French Premier and former Defence Minister, who in turn submitted it to the Council

of Ministers before putting it to the French National Assembly on 24 October 1950.

Keen that the establishment of a German army should be undertaken within the confines of a European structure, the French Premier, Rene Pleven, put forward to his European partners a plan proposing the constitution of a European army of 100 000 men. The Pleven Plan was to combine battalions from various European countries, including Germany. The European army, though run by a European Minister for Defence and endowed with a common budget, would be placed under the supreme command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Negotiations began on 15 February 1951. With American support, the members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) signed the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) on 27 May 1952 in Paris. It differed from the initial French plan in several respects. The planned European army would consist of 40 national divisions of 13 000 soldiers wearing a common uniform, much more than originally proposed by France. The Treaty also provided for the creation of a Commissariat of nine members, having less extensive powers than those of the High Authority of the ECSC, a Council of Ministers, and an EDC Assembly with the task of drafting a plan for a European political authority. As those in federalist circles had wished, Article 38 of the Treaty provided for the development of a plan for a federal structure to oversee and democratically control the planned European army. The EDC Treaty, signed for a period of 50 years, could not, however, come into force until it had been ratified by the parliaments of all the signatory states.

(The plan for an EDC – The organization of post-war defence in Europe (1948-1954), cvce.eu) (IMG)

The Pleven Plan ... proposed an integrated European army under a supranational authority similar to that proposed in the Schuman Plan.

The treaty, as it emerged from the protracted negotiations which began in February 1951, would set up for 50 years a Defense Community with common institutions, an integrated army with a common uniform, and a common budget. The basic unit consists of 15,000 men of a single nationality – a figure more than twice as large as that originally proposed by the French but finally accepted by them as small enough to prevent re-creation of a German general staff. A mutual assistance agreement with NATO is provided for, and Britain has extended its Brussels Pact guarantees to include West Germany, which is to remain subject to certain indirect restrictions on its armament production and total military contribution.

A “Commissariat,” ... [as a supranational] High Authority answerable to an Assembly and Council of Ministers, is to head the proposed community and handle relations with other international organizations.

(The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

The United States planned more and more steps towards a Pan-European integration. However, these plans progressed far too slowly:

Obstacles to a united Europe are, however, still very serious, as is illustrated by the current difficulties in obtaining ratification of the European Defense Community treaty. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2,

1953, p. 1) (IMG)

The CIA predicted:

The West, in 1952, will continue its efforts toward a unified Europe and toward strengthening the defense potential, thereby provoking the East into employing all tricks of diplomacy and cold-war in order to doom these efforts to failure. According to all available evidence, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union will be prepared, as early as 1952, to look upon the growing military defense of the West and West Germany's participation in the European Army as a casus belli. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 4) (IMG)

C11S12. German Proletarian Resistance against Pan-Europeanism and for German Reunion / The Soviet-SED Peace Offensive

*** IMG-All- {Communist-led Resistance in West Germany}

The Anglo-American plan for integrating their occupied zones of Germany into a US-led Atlantic alliance and to arm West Germany made the division of Germany inevitable. And in fact, this was precisely what the leaders of the Nazi Underground, described by US intelligence officer Curt Riess in 1944, wanted. ‘Undoubtedly’, remarked Riess, much of the Nazi underground:

will even support separatist movements or Allied plans to create such movements. Nothing would be more favorable for a Nazi underground than a split-up of the unified German administration into many state administrations. In the first place, such a solution would create fierce resentment among the Germans – and it is on this resentment that the Nazi underground must live and grow for years to come.

But even more important than the resentment such a change would arouse is the fact that while it will be difficult for the Allies to survey and control a central administration of Germany, it would be next to

impossible for them to watch a number of administrations. They would supply the Nazis with literally thousands of chances to place their people in unobtrusive key positions. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 176) (IMG{Nazi Underground})

The Anglo-Americans could not afford to split the Western zone of Germany while the Eastern zone was going to be unified. This was to be ruled out. However, the split of Germany into the two zones did assist Nazi propaganda. As a matter of fact, as early as 1945, the leadership of the Nazi underground had articulated this in their instructions. Titled 'Secret German Underground Instructions', it declared:

'They [i.e. Anglo-American] consciously set about breaking Germany into small bits, but by this very action they force it to reunite and become great. It is a stunning blow for Germany, but the national Idea is not extinguished. The disaster welds the true German national community together.' ('Secret German Underground Instructions'. Cited in: German Underground Movement, CIA, Hilary Pawel Januszewski's letter, September 3, 1945, p. 2) (IMG{Nazi Underground})

The Anglo-Americans did however 'split' the Western zone of Germany in the economic sense – namely that they established a decentralized economy that benefited the bureaucrats and thus promoted the interests of the Nazi intelligence network.

The Soviets launched a campaign against the program of the Anglo-American imperialists and the Nazi Germans for the partition of Germany into two countries, the rearmament of West Germany, and the closer alignment of West Germany with the US-led camp. A 1951 CIA document stated:

as the result of consistent propaganda, the Soviets have succeeded in creating a sympathetic reaction, among large circles of West Germans, to the thesis that there are only two alternatives for Germany, namely rearmament and the subsequent threat of a civil war, or reunification. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 3) (IMG{Israel})

Indeed, largely for this reason:

West German opinion is by no means strongly in favor of rearmament or closer relations with the West.. (Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist 'Unity' Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

It was not just the West German Nazis that smuggled their agents for agitating colour revolutions against the Soviets. The Soviets and the SED smuggled communist agents across the border for agitating communist uprisings against the West German Nazis. The German communists led several strikes in West Germany. In late April of 1948, the CIA pointed:

to Communist-inspired strikes and demonstrations in Berlin and the penetration of Soviet-controlled labor unions in that city.. (BOOK IV – WEEKLY SUMMARY COMPLETE – 9 JAN 1948 (#80) THRU 14 MAY 1948 (#98), CIA, p. II. p. 54 of the PDF) (IMG)

Another report shortly after stated:

Communist-inspired wildcat strikes in Essen, Hamburg and Frankfurt may occur during the next few months and will probably follow the general pattern of the successful wildcat test strike of dock workers in Hamburg last January. The Central Committee of the Communist Socialist Unity Party in Berlin is reported to have organized strike committees in these German cities and to have sent leaders to organize and control strikes in the areas. The local Communist headquarters in each city has been instructed to show sympathy for strikers but not to participate openly in strike action. Discontent and idleness among workers in Essen and Hamburg made those cities especially vulnerable to this type of penetration. Frankfurt, as the seat' of the Bizonal Economic Council, also makes an excellent target for such Communist activity. (BOOK IV – WEEKLY SUMMARY COMPLETE – 9 JAN 1948 (#80) THRU 14 MAY 1948 (#98), CIA, p. III. p. 39 of the PDF) (IMG)

The German proletarian strikes did take place. Anti-government protests of the German proletariat swept West Germany. In mid-May 1948, the CIA reported:

German food strikes, labor demonstrations, and general unrest may be expected to continue in the US- UK Zones until the food situation and general economic conditions have improved substantially. The present wave of strikes may be regarded, in large part, as spontaneous protests resulting from: (1) the unsatisfactory food situation; (2) the slowness of economic recovery; (3) the preferential treatment of workers in favored industries; and (4) dissatisfaction with the [low level of] efficiency of the German local administrations. Meanwhile union members still at work have been instructed by trade union officials to slow down production until ration demands are met. (BOOK IV – WEEKLY SUMMARY COMPLETE – 9 JAN 1948 (#80) THRU 14 MAY 1948 (#98), CIA, pp. II-III. pp. 4-5 of the PDF) (IMG)

West German proletarian public opinion forced Konrad Adenauer to demand sovereignty for Germany:

Negotiations between the Occupation Powers on the one hand and the Federal Republic on the other with regard both to the replacement of the Occupation Statute and a German contribution to Western European defense are currently at a critical stage. The West German Chancellor is reported to be bitterly disappointed at the failure of the Washington Conference to accord the Federal Republic full sovereignty, and there is a strong feeling in Germany, whipped up by political factions hostile to the Chancellor and the veterans groups, to resist Allied offers until all German terms are met.

There are indications that the Chancellor, aware of these pressures has increased his demands in the last few days lest his control of the situation be weakened by appearing too subservient to Allied wishes. (Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist 'Unity' Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Against Anglo-American plans, the East German communist-led 'Socialist Unity Party' (SED) called once again for the reunification of Germany:

The projected rearming of Germany was countered by the East with the demand for a reunified Germany. This demand, as expressed in Grotewohl's letter of 30 November 1950, has been given unremitting propaganda support. The East German regime tried to create the impression that it was seriously concerned with reunifying Germany on a democratic basis. It maintained that the arming of West Germany would make reunification impossible and that it contained the threat of a fratricidal war. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

In support of the SED and the West European people's hostility to the rearmament of West Germany, the USSR intensified its campaign for German unity:

The USSR cognizant of the present crisis in the relationship between the Allies and the Germans, has timed the ... Germany "unity" campaign to produce a maximum influence on those forces in West Germany opposed to the Chancellor's proposals. (Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist 'Unity' Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

There were two series of unity campaigns that the USSR launched:

In the first of these notes, the Kremlin called for a peace treaty with a united, neutralized, and rearmed Germany. In the second note, the Kremlin asked for immediate four-power discussion of the terms upon which all-German elections should take place. (The Soviet Notes on German Unity as a Possible Indication of a More "Conciliatory" Soviet Policy, Office of National Estimates, CIA, April 17, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The [Soviet] proposal is cleverly baited to carry the maximum appeal to those West Germans – a considerable number – who are still undecided between the merits of integration with the West and another try at German unification. A united Germany is promised its own national land, sea and air forces as well as "democratic rights" and membership in the United Nations but not in NATO. No restrictions of any kind are to be placed upon the development of the German economy, and Germany will even be allowed to manufacture some war materials for its own armed forces. Most important perhaps is the offer to let the united Germans participate in writing their own peace treaty. (The Soviet Proposal for a German Peace Treaty, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 17, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

In a conversation with the East German SED leader, Stalin made it clear that he had no delusions that the Anglo-Americans will consistently reject the proposals for a German reunification campaign. Rather, the purpose of the diplomatic offensive for the reunification of Germany into a democratic and 'neutral' Germany was to expose the hostility of the Anglo-Americans to the German nation and the friendship of the USSR to the German nation: Comrade Stalin says that in their last conversation W. Pieck raised the issue of the prospects for German development in connection with the Soviet proposals on peace treaty and the policy of the Americans and the British in Germany. Comrade Stalin believes that regardless of what proposals we make on the German issue, the Western powers will not agree with them, and will not leave West Germany anyway.

To think that we would be able to achieve a compromise or that the Americans would accept the draft of peace treaty would be a mistake. The Americans need an army in West Germany, so that they would be able to have all of Europe in their hands. They are saying that they keep the army there against us. In reality however, the mission of their army there is to control Europe. The Americans will pull West Germany into the Atlantic pact. They will create West German troops. Adenauer is in the Americans' pocket. All the former fascists and generals are there as well. In reality, an independent state is being created in Germany. And you too need to organize an independent state. The demarcation line between East and West Germany should be considered a border--and not just any border, but a dangerous one.

We need to strengthen the defense of this border. The Germans will guard the first line of defense, and we

will put Russian troops on the second line. Agents of Western countries are moving around the German Democratic Republic all too freely. They can decide to use some extreme measures and kill you or Comrade [Vasilii] Chuikov. This has to be taken into account. Therefore, we need strong border defenses. (...). Comrade Grotewohl says that they completely agree with Comrade Stalin's opinion in his evaluation of the situation in West Germany, and the policy of the United States. He, Grotewohl, would like to ask whether Comrade Stalin believes that at the present time we should introduce changes in our arguments to the official position of the GDR government on the issue of revival of German unity. Comrade Stalin answers negatively. You should continue propaganda of German unity in the future. It has a great importance for the education of the people in Western Germany. Now it is a weapon in your hands and you should always hold it in your hands. We should also continue to make proposals regarding German unity in order to expose the Americans. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, pp. 2-9. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG{GDR})

As a result of communist efforts, Washington's:

Attempts to unite western Europe have not progressed beyond the experimental stage. Partial economic integration, such as the Schuman Plan (coal and steel), and the achievements in connection with setting up a European Army, with a view to bringing about a political merger as well, have developed very slowly.

Thus far it has been impossible either to eliminate the political differences (formation of political bodies for the control of the Army of Europe) or to create a substantial financial basis for unification.

(The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 3) (IMG{Israel})

Led by Kurt Schumacher, West Germany's Social-Democrats (SPD) joined the Nazis, the Anglo-Americans, and the Schuman gang in opposing the communist plans for a united sovereign Germany. A 1952 CIA document confirmed: Schumacher is hostile to Communist schemes for a united Germany.. (Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist 'Unity' Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

Hence:

the SPD ... has unfortunately let itself be dragged into a deadly hostility to the Communists and the Soviet Union, and will have to pay a high price for this unreasonable attitude. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG{GDR})

Chapter 12

C12S1. Tito's Gang, Agents of the Nazis

*** IMG-All-{Gestapo agent Tito}

In Yugoslavia, a small level of capitalist development of the productive forces had occurred but the bulk of Yugoslavia throughout the entire 20th century was agrarian. The population of Yugoslavia was therefore primarily petit-bourgeoisie and since the petit-bourgeoisie are unwilling to risk losing their businesses in the fight against finance capital – unlike the proletarians who have nothing to lose in the fight against finance capital, and unlike the national bourgeoisie who can afford to take the risk of standing up against finance capital – the areas in which the petit-bourgeoisie live are materially dominated by fascist finance capital. Historically, this took the form of dominance by the Tsarist ultra-reactionaries, then the Nazis and the Ustase, then Trotskyism and Titoism, and then direct NATO rule. All of these reactionary forces were closely correlated with one another. The story of Tito's gang is the story of the Trotskyite agents of Nazism, Ustase, and Italian Fascism, a Trotskyite gang that would then begin its alliance with the CIA and MI6, all in the struggle against the proletariat and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. Pay very careful attention to the following excerpts from a 1950 article in the Soviet press:

The Tito fascist clique is an abominable product of the darkest forces of international reaction. The imperialists rightly regard Tito as Hitler's successor. It is no accident that when the fascists captured power in Germany the Tito-Rankovic clique was in the service of the Hitlerite Gestapo which later turned over the Yugoslav traitors to the secret services of other imperialist powers.

Irrefutable facts revealed at the trials of Koche Dzodze [i.e. Koci Xoxe], Laszlo Rajk, and Traicho Kostov showed that while thousands of Yugoslav patriots were brutally put to death in the torture chambers of the Gestapo, the ringleaders of the Titoite gang, including Rankovic, were at liberty because they were already at the time agents of the imperialist secret services. This is also confirmed by other voluminous data.

(...). While serving Gestapo, Tito clique betrayed many Communists and patriots. Thus Vukmanovic (Tempo) betrayed the Communist Party and Young Communist League organization in Sarajevo in 1941. Hundreds of young patriots were then cast into prison and concentration camps, many of them were killed. In the same year Tito's colleague Velebit denounced members of the Central Committee of the Croatian Communist party who met at his villa.

Thus the Belgrade hirelings of imperialist reaction, even before coming to power, destroyed by various means the finest sons of the Yugoslav people.

Seeking to behead the Communist and labor movement in the country, the Titoites have pursued a policy of the mass annihilation of the finest proletarian forces. Thousands of Yugoslav patriots have fallen victim to treacherous directives and orders. The treachery of Tito, Rankovic and Djilas in valley of the Pivo, Tire, and Suteski [Sutjeska] rivers alone in March 1943, claimed the lives of thousands of patriots. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol'stvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

The above is an article published by the USSR Information Bulletin, which was a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry.

A 1952 Soviet book titled 'The Secret Weapon of the Doomed' was written by the Soviet intelligence scholar Vladislav Minayev and was widely published and supported by the Soviet press throughout 1952 and 1953. The Komsomolskaya Pravda, the CIA noted, emphatically recommended to the young Soviet communists in the Komsomol on the need:

to read all available literature dealing with foreign intelligence and espionage so that [they] may learn to "recognize the enemy and his subversive methods." Highly recommended in this connection is a recently-published book by V. Minayev, "The Secret Weapon of the Doomed" (Taynoye Oruzhie Obrechenntkh), referred to later in this report, which "exposes" American hostile activities against the USSR in the past several decades. "It is necessary to read it. It is absolutely essential for each one of us to do so!" (Indications of Psychological Vulnerabilities, CIA, March 16, 1953, p. 5)

In this book, which had a circulation of 50,000 copies, Minayev noted:

These trials completely ripped off the mask from Tito and finally exposed the fascist Gestapo gang headed by him.. (The Secret Weapon of the Doomed, Vladislav Minayev. From: aliba.ru) (IMG)

On January 30, 1953, the Soviet press published an article, condemning Tito as a 'Gestapo agent':

American imperialism bought the Gestapo agent Tito and his clique for a low price. ('Spies, Saboteurs, Embezzlers and Swindlers', L. Smirnov, Material for Talks: Untiringly Raise the Political Vigilance of Soviet People. January 1953, Published in: Soviet History, Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An Online Archive of Primary Sources, Original Source: Bloknot agitatora, No. 3, 30 January 1953, pp. 10-22.) (IMG)


That Tito's clique were a gang of fascists was also officially stated as the position of the communist parties of the Cominform, including the CPSU. The Cominform resolution started with the following:

The Information Bureau, consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Rumanian Workers' Party, Working People's Party of Hungary, United Workers' Party of Poland, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, and the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist Parties, having considered the question: "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the power of murders and spies", unanimously reached the following conclusions.. (COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE POWER OF MURDERERS & SPIES, Cominform, 1949, p. 1. Retrieved from: Revolutionary Democracy.) (IMG)

One of the main themes explicitly emphasized in the Cominform resolution was:

the fascist terror of the Tito gangs.. (COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE POWER OF MURDERERS & SPIES, Cominform, 1949, p. 3. Retrieved from: Revolutionary Democracy.) (IMG)

In this section are presented a series of documents providing incontrovertible evidence of the correctness of the claims made by the Soviet and Popular-Democratic state press. First, the suspicious case of Mustafa Golubic's death will be briefly examined; then, the course of the Trotskyite policy lines adopted by Tito's gang harming the Yugoslav People's Liberation War will be examined; and lastly, the extensive collaboration and full-scale alliance of Tito's group with the Nazi Germans will be documented.



In a long and well-sourced report to the US Congress, Joseph Martin – the official leader of the Republicans in the US Congress and thus the House Minority Leader – said:

when Hitler attacked Russia, Tito was killing Serbs – our allies – not Nazis. **Tito was the best friend Hitler had.** (Joseph Martin's Report, May 24, 1945. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 79th Congress, First Session, Volume 91, Part 4, May 7 1945 to June 1945. p. 4993. Bold added) (IMG)

The GOP/Republicans was more anti-Soviet and pro-Titoist than the 'Democratic Party' back then. Thus, as confirmed by the GOP's leader in the Congress, **Tito was ally of the Nazis in Yugoslavia as early as 1941**, 'when Hitler attacked' the Soviet Union.

Before delving further into the case of Tito's intelligence connections to the Gestapo, however, it is worth examining

the case of Mustafa Golubic, which should raise suspicion. One of the most important figures in the fight against the Nazi occupation in Yugoslavia was a man named Mustafa Golubic. Golubic was a very good friend of the Soviet leaders and had personally met several times with Joseph Stalin. Borivoj Neskovic, a Yugoslav intelligence Major who worked under Tito and Rankovic in the post-war years, recalled:

At the end of 1932, when they met on the street, Mustafa summoned [Rocko] Colakovic, who at the time lived in Moscow as an emigrant and stayed at the Lux Hotel, which was reserved for foreigners and executives, to come to Red Square in the evening. Once they were in, Mustafa and Colakovic headed to ... the room of Stalin's wife, Aliluyeva, for a cup of tea, where an elected society of Soviet executives and their families met at that time. Near the end of this tea, Stalin entered the Aliluyeva's room as well, and after greeting with the attendees, he approached Mustafa, who presented him with Rocko. After a brief conversation, in which Stalin was interested in 'Yugoslav' matters and the situation in the YCP, they greeted each other and parted. Comrade Rocko also told me that this was the first and only time that he had met with Stalin, unlike Mustafa, which sufficiently shows the level of reputation that Mustafa enjoyed with Soviet leaders. ('Mustafa Golubic', Belgrade, Borivoj Neskovic, 1985, p. 18) (IMG)

Moscow had been fully aware of the Trotskyite deviations of Tito's gang. The roots of the rift between Tito's clique and the USSR can be traced to as early as mid-1930s. Tito, back then codenamed as 'Walter', had engaged in suspicious romantic relationships:

Ivan Srebrnjak (Antonov), an agent of the Soviet military intelligence, ... called the attention of the IKKI to the romance Walter had in Moscow with a certain Elsa, a member of the German Communist Party, who was suspected of working for the Gestapo. He also affirmed that the young woman who brought party correspondence from Yugoslavia to Paris and back (obviously Herta Haas) was also a Gestapo spy. For all these reasons, Srebrnjak felt that Walter needed to explain himself, underscoring his resemblance to Gorkic and inviting the IKKI to disband the CPY. (Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pirjevec, 2015, p. 38) (IMG)

This was why as early as 1939, Stalin and cadres of the Soviet intelligence had asked Mustafa Golubic to travel to Yugoslavia, as means of targeting the Trotskyite group of Tito which held the dominant position in the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. A communist loyalist and an agent of the Soviet intelligence, Mustafa Golubic had traveled to Yugoslavia in 1939 in order to purge Tito's ring of Trotskyite saboteurs dominating the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In his memoirs, Milovan Djilas admits that he and Rankovic, the two main members of Tito's inner circle, maintained strict surveillance over Golubic with the goal of eventually assassinating him. Djilas and Rankovic encouraged their friend Cile Kovacevic to maintain contact with Golubic, as means of maintaining surveillance over Golubic. Djilas wrote:

We didn't even maintain contact with the Soviet Intelligence agent who had come to Belgrade long before the diplomatic staff – in fact, some time in 1939. He was hostile to our Central Committee and said that it was composed of Trotskyites. The Regional Committee, particularly Rankovic, kept an eye on him.. (...).

Cile Kovacevic maintained contact with him by doing him various favors, which we encouraged [so that Kovacevic could spy on him]. Moreover, we were prepared to kill him if he indeed proved to be a Trotskyite. So we followed him carefully, and took photographs of him. Rankovic showed them to Tito, who recognized the man.. He was in Yugoslavia on a "special assignment,"..

The man's name was Mustafa Golubic. He ... after the [First World] war, joined the Communist movement, and soon became an agent of the Soviet Secret Police. Among us Communists there were many tales about his great exploits in distant lands. Exactly how high he was in the Soviet hierarchy of the Soviet secret service, I don't know. But judging by Tito's reaction, he must have been fairly important.

(Memoir of a Revolutionary, Milovan Djilas, 1973, pp. 375-376) (IMG)

In highly suspicious circumstances, Golubic was captured by the Germans once they invaded, hence preventing the Soviet intelligence investigation into Tito's case. Referring to Golubic, Djilas concluded:

shortly after the occupation, the Germans took him away. (Memoir of a Revolutionary, Milovan Djilas, 1973, p. 376) (IMG)

Former UDB Colonel Zivorad Silija (UDB was Yugoslav intelligence during Tito's era) pointed out that there is 'some basis' for believing that 'Mustafa Golubic was arrested on the report of someone from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia':

According to an unverified version, Mustafa Golubic was arrested on the report of someone from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in order to protect Tito, because Mustafa Golubic came to Belgrade to liquidate him and appoint Draza Mihailovic as the leader of the movement.

This assumption has some basis on which it could be correct. Namely, Tito was not to Stalin's taste. Tito wanted an independent Party, and Tito's action at the beginning of the Second World War to free the CPY from Moscow's subsidies provoked resentment from Stalin, of course expressed through the KI [Comintern].

Even the very beginning of the uprising, the formation of the First Proletarian Brigade was against the will of Stalin, although its founding was on the very birthday of Big Brother, Stalin!

(‘Dossier: Use and Abuse’ [Dosije: Upotreba i Zlopotreba], Zivorad Mihajlovic-Silja, 1989, p. 84) (IMG)

By the time of the Nazis’ official withdrawal from Yugoslavia, however, the files of Mustafa Golubic were no longer available, so that the conspiracy could be covered up:

when Mustafa Golubic's file was found, someone picked up all the documents that would reveal how Mustafa Golubic was caught, what charged him and who was his informant. (‘Dossier: Use and Abuse’ [Dosije: Upotreba i Zlopotreba], Zivorad Mihajlovic-Silja, 1989, p. 84) (IMG)

Tito’s group, as confirmed by the leader of the GOP in the US Congress, was allied to the Nazis as early as 1941. It follows that the surveillance over, and assassination plot against, Golubic by Tito’s group was surveillance and assassination plots by the allies of the Nazis. As allies of Nazi Germany as early as 1941, Tito and his group inevitably had on their hands the blood of Golubic, even if they were not the ones to directly inform the Gestapo about Golubic’s positions and activities. Their desire of eventually murdering him was fulfilled by the Tito group’s allies, the Nazis.

By the time of the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, the time was ripe for the Yugoslav Communist Party to plan a popular resistance cause against the Axis occupation. However, Tito and his Trotskyite-fascist clique, positioned at the helm of the Yugoslav Communist Party, had ulterior motives. The gang of Tito was planning the implementation of the Permanent Revolution thesis of Trotsky, leaping from slavery under fascism straight to Trotskyite ‘socialism’. This would involve ‘skipping’ the bourgeois-democratic phase of development, and the refusal to engage in popular fronts of communists and progressive bourgeois-democrats against fascism. This viewpoint of Tito was likely influenced by his studies of the situation in China. Klaus Schmider – a scholar with extensive access to the German archives, and a senior lecturer at Britain’s Royal Military Academy Sandhurst – wrote:

The example of China, where a Communist party succeeded in initiating a revolution without an upstream “bourgeois” or “democratic” revolution, seemed to point the way to a possible “shortcut.” That Tito attentively studied the book of the American journalist Edgar Snow during the month of May, by which the events in China became known only to a larger public in the west, is in this respect certainly a not insignificant indication. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 54. Edgar Snow’s book, as referred to by Schmider, was ‘The Red Storm over China’ (1938).) (IMG)

The material conditions in China were significantly different than those of Yugoslavia, however. Although Yugoslavia was not yet a developed capitalist-imperialist state, it nevertheless had a considerable capitalist class – unlike in China which had a very insignificant bourgeois class. Therefore, in China, the progressive democratic revolution could take place through the proletariat’s recruitment of the peasantry as lower rank soldiers, as well as the proletariat’s alliance with the very insignificant national-bourgeois class. By contrast, in Yugoslavia, the progressive anti-fascist revolution necessitated an alliance between the proletariat and the anti-fascist national- bourgeoisie. Tito would ignore these profound differences between China and Yugoslavia, and would therefore seek to implement a leap from slavery under fascism to a Trotskyite ‘strand’ of ‘socialism’.

While the forces of the fascist occupation were stationed in Yugoslavia, Tito’s anti-fascist activity was quite delayed. The anti-Soviet MI6 operative Richard West confirmed:

Tito remained in Zagreb until early in May 1941 but did not try to mount a resistance to the Ustasha regime. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 103) (IMG)

Rather than fight the Nazis, Tito’s gang collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces against the anti-fascist resistance movement. In a long and well-sourced report to the US Congress, Joseph Martin – the official leader of the Republicans in the US Congress and thus the House Minority Leader – said:

when Hitler attacked Russia, Tito was killing Serbs – our allies – not Nazis. **Tito was the best friend Hitler had.** (Joseph Martin’s Report, May 24, 1945. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 79th Congress, First Session, Volume 91, Part 4, May 7 1945 to June 1945. p. 4993. Bold added) (IMG)

Franjo Tudjman would later become the fascist head of ‘independent’ Croatia in the 1990s, leading the separatist efforts against Yugoslavia. As confirmed by the Oxford University Press’s ‘Oxford Reference’, Franjo Tudjman indeed was a: soldier in the army of the Fascist Independent State of Croatia in 1941. (Overview: Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999), Oxford Reference) (IMG)

However, later in the War, Tudjman:

joined Tito’s partisans army.. (Overview: Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999), Oxford Reference) (IMG)

And:

Tudjman ... ended the war as a major and also as political commissar in the 32nd Division. Later he went to the Yugoslav High Military Academy. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 300) (IMG)

During 1941, there was extensive collaboration between the Trotskyite clique in the Croatian Communist Party’s top

leadership and the Ustase. Citing Italian intelligence archives, Smilja Avramov – the well-known pro-Milosevic politician, legal and history scholar with a background in the study of the Italian archives – noted:

there were direct links and cooperation between the Croatian communist Partisans and the Ustasas, even in the course of the war. These liasons were reported to the High Command of the Italian troops on November 28, 1941, with the note that contacts between the Croatian communist top leadership and Ustasas were maintained through the area between Sinj and Knin. (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Smilja Avramov, p. 232. Citing: AUSSME, Rac. 5, Telescrivente 28/11/1941, Superescrito a Comando Supremo.) (IMG)

Avramov does not name a specific individual in the Croatian Communist Party. However, until early 1942, the head of the Party in Croatia was Vladimir Popovic, who shortly after:

the invasion of Yugoslavia by the German army in World War II, ... became a leader of the Partisan forces in Croatia. ('Vladimir Popovic Is Dead at 58; Yugoslavia's Envoy to 3 Powers', New York Times, April 3, 1972) (IMG)

And Vladimir Popovic was a:

Close Associate of Tito.. ('Vladimir Popovic Is Dead at 58; Yugoslavia's Envoy to 3 Powers', New York Times, April 3, 1972) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that Andrija Hebrang, the Yugoslav communist leader of the Communist Party of Croatia, did not become the Secretary until late 1942 when Soviet victories in the Battle of Stalingrad destabilized the Nazi Empire. Ivo Goldstein, a historian and Croatia's ambassador to France and UNESCO during 2012, confirmed:

After 1942 Andrija Hebrang was secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, and thus the most influential person in the Croatian Partisan movement. (Croatia: A History, McGill- Queen's Press, Ivo Goldstein, p. 150) (IMG)

Therefore, most likely, a member of Tito's gang was responsible for such covert contacts with the Ustase during 1941.

While such collaboration between the fascist fifth column of the Croatian Communist Party was occurring, Tito himself and the supreme staff of the Yugoslav partisan movement were busy conquering the Serbian-populated towns and implementing their Trotskyite policies there. The Uzice 'Soviet' Republic became the two-months-old capital of Tito's gang:

It was in Uzice, a town of some 12,000 inhabitants, that Tito proclaimed a symbolic 'Red Republic' boasting its own hotel, bank, factories, newspaper and prison. All the future leaders of Yugoslavia held their positions in embryo, with Tito as President, Rankovic in charge of the secret police, Kardelj dealing with policy, and Djilas producing the newspaper *Borba*.

Tito worked and slept in the bank, whose coffers provided the Partisan treasury. On top of the bank building Tito erected a Partisan star, which glowed red at night and attracted German bombers. Factories turned out rifles, ammunition, matches, and uniforms, in which Tito took a particular interest. He had a Soviet pilot's cap made for himself; this kind of cap, a *pilotka*, was later renamed the *Titovka* and became a standard issue to Yugoslav troops. While every other Partisan had a red star of cloth in his cap, Tito wore an enamel Soviet star with a hammer and sickle. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 113) (IMG)

Like Khrushchev and other Trotskyite enemies of Stalin, Tito tried to flatter the Soviet commander-in-chief, establishing the 'Proletarian Brigade' during the latter's birthday:

On Stalin's birthday, 21 December 1941, Tito established the 'Proletarian Brigades' which, as Djilas remarked, 'were proletarian not in a literal but in an ideological sense'. Although these brigades later included genuine proletarians such as miners, shipyard workers and almost the whole of Split's 'Hajduk' football team, most of the troops were Party activists from the urban middle class. The Marxist sound of the 'Proletarian Brigades' was to be a disadvantage ... in the National Liberation Movement. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 116) (IMG)

However, Yugoslavia did not need such 'socialist' slogans, phrase-mongering, and symbolism. Yugoslavia did not need a 'socialist' revolution at the time; what the Axis-occupied country needed more than ever was a progressive bourgeois-democratic revolution, much the better if communist-led, against the Axis occupation. The establishment of a 'free' 'Red Republic' with 'socialist' slogans and symbolism were measures hostile to the force of communism, the proletariat, and democracy, for such measures were Trotskyite left-sectarian. The communist line under the condition of fascist occupation was to downplay communist symbols and slogans and to emphasize the national- liberationist character of the struggle. Tito's gang disagreed with such anti-fascist policy promoted by the Comintern. Nor did Stalin ever need or desire the creation of a cult around him; he was opposed to such left-opportunist attempts by his fake 'friends' to etherealize him. In C5S8, it was mentioned that Stalin was opposed to the cult of personality fostered around him. While Tito's gang was implementing Trotskyite policies in Serbia, Stalin – without directly naming Tito's gang – condemned such left-opportunist attempts at imposing a 'Soviet' 'regime' on 'the Slavonic or other enslaved nations of Europe':

We have not, and cannot have, any such war aims at that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic

or other enslaved nations of Europe, who are expecting our help. Our aim is to help these nations in the struggle for liberation they are waging against Hitler's tyranny and then to leave it to them quite freely to arrange their lives on their lands as they think fit. There must be no interference whatever in the internal affairs of other nations! ('Speech on the Twenty-Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution, to the Moscow Soviet and Representatives of Moscow party and Public Organizations', Joseph Stalin, November 6, 1941. Cited in: A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse, 3rd Edition, University Press of New England, Robert V. Daniels, pp. 88 -89. Cited in: The Cold War: Interpreting Conflict through Primary Documents [2 volumes], edited by Priscilla Roberts, p. 105) (IMG)

Stalin's opposition to Tito's Trotskyite measures is confirmed by Franklin Lindsay, an OSS operative who landed in Yugoslavia to support Tito and later emerged as the head of the American Military Mission to Tito's group. He later served as a founding official of the CIA, with a focus on widening the gap between Tito regime and the USSR. In his memoirs, Lindsay wrote:

The Comintern instructions, significantly, also directed the Yugoslav party to "take into consideration that at this stage your task is the liberation from Fascist oppression and not Socialist revolution" In March 1942 the Comintern repeated their guidance in a further message to Tito:

Study of all information you send gives the impression that the adherents of Great Britain and the Yugoslav Government have some [justification] in suspecting the Partisan movement of acquiring a Communist character, and aiming at the Sovietization of Yugoslavia. Why, for example, did you need to form a special Proletarian Brigade? We earnestly request you to give serious thought to your tactics in general and to your actions, and to make sure that you on your side have really done all you can to achieve a united national front.

The Comintern also advised Tito to play down the conflict with the Chetniks: "It is not opportune to emphasize that the struggle is mainly against the Chetniks. World opinion must first and foremost be mobilized against the invaders; mentioning or unmasking the Chetniks is secondary." In spite of Moscow's directives, Tito continued to concentrate on the defeat of the Chetniks and to prepare the ground» step by step, for the creation of a postwar Communist government.

Throughout the war Moscow continued to advise Tito to avoid anything that smacked of a provisional government, to play down the role of the party, to emphasize the role of the National Liberation Front, and to emphasize that the Front had representatives of all parties and groups resisting the German occupation. Yet Tito ignored Stalin's advice. Instead he created a provisional government in liberated territory in 1943 .. Stalin was furious when he learned of the former; (Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia, Franklin Lindsay, p. 334) (IMG)

Djilas too, in his memoirs, corroborated the suspicion of the Soviets that Tito's group were essentially Trotskyites:

Though in May 1942 we scoffed at Mihailovic's claim that the Yugoslav Communists were Trotskyites because they didn't listen to Moscow, the suspicion was born in us that not only was this diabolical brew concocted by the British Secret Service, but that Moscow knew of it and chose to ignore it. All this was in time relegated to oblivion, only to be resurrected when Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union parted ways, and particularly when they crossed each other. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 144) (IMG)

It is no wonder then that Stalin for long refused to enthusiastically endorse the Trotskyite regime of Tito's clique – the very regime that sought to flatter him by founding its 'Proletarian Brigades' on his birthday – and instead supported the Chetniks led by Dragoslav 'Draza' Mihailovic:

Stalin and Churchill supported Draza Mihailovic because he was popular with the Serbs and therefore the man most dangerous to the Germans. They thought that the Partisans, with their Communist slogans and red star camps, were alienating the Serbs and therefore splitting the opposition to Germany. And at that time Stalin and Churchill were right. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p.

116) (IMG)

Tito and his group should have supported the common-sense line of Stalin by allying with the bourgeois forces against the fascist invaders. However, far from agreeing with the Soviet leader whom they had flattered to heavens, Tito's gang obstructed all attempts for an alliance with the Soviet-backed Chetniks. A US intelligence document – undated but from the looks of it, most likely written between late June 1950 and early March 1953 – confirmed that Tito was responsible for the failure to reconcile the two forces against the Axis invaders:

All attempts on the part of the allies to reconcile the two armed factions of resistance [i.e. Chetniks and Partisans] so that they may cooperate with one another as was the case in other occupied countries, failed as a result of the obstructions of Tito ... who on top of it shamelessly threw the blame for these very facts on Mihailovic. (Economic Situation in FNR Yugoslavia, CIA, p. 5) (IMG)

Richard West also confirmed:

Tito ... wanted to conquer the Chetniks more than he wanted to drive the foreigners out of the country.

(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 143) (IMG)

By warring against the Soviet-backed Chetnik forces, Tito's gang was fighting the Nazis' proxy war against the USSR. All of this was a part of Tito's general activity on behalf of his Nazi German spymasters. Again, recall that in a long and well-sourced report to the US Congress, Joseph Martin – the official leader of the Republicans in the US Congress and thus the House Minority Leader – had said:

when Hitler attacked Russia, Tito was killing Serbs – our allies – not Nazis. Tito was the best friend Hitler had. (Joseph Martin's Report, May 24, 1945. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 79th Congress, First Session, Volume 91, Part 4, May 7 1945 to June 1945. p. 4993. Bold added) (IMG)

The Trotskyite measures of Tito's gang in the Uzice Republic were all done in the names of 'socialism' and 'communism'. Through their left-reactionary policies, the Trotskyites successfully tarnished the reputation of communism among the inhabitants of Uzice. The situation in Montenegro, if not worse, was no better. There, a popular anti-fascist uprising had taken place; but the Axis occupation forces were able to successfully crush the uprising. However, as time went by, the Trotskyite-led YCP partisans were able to take over some of the Axis-occupied territories, and thereby implemented Trotskyite policies in those Montenegrin territories. Elizabeth Roberts – member of the Australian Diplomatic Service serving in Paris and researcher in the House of Commons for the Liberal Party spokesman on Foreign Affairs – wrote:

as the Partisans began to retake some of the terrain lost after the crushing of the uprising, their return was accompanied by a spate of executions of their fellow Montenegrins. Many of those executed were denounced as spies or collaborators but others were in reality simply prominent citizens judged to be 'class enemies', a category that included former members of parliament, judges and larger landowners. Caught between the Partisans' excesses and fear of Italian reprisals, many villagers turned instead to the nationalist bands as offering some degree of protection. So counterproductive was this upsurge of extremism that the Communists themselves later denounced it as an example of 'left deviation', a fundamental error for which Djilas was blamed. But it was in his absence from Montenegro, from November till the following March, that some of the worst atrocities were perpetrated including the macabre events that took place outside Kolasin over Orthodox Christmas of 1941-2. Here fanatical young Partisans carried out a particularly gruesome series of executions of prominent townspeople in a field where the bodies were then dumped together with that of a tortured dog at a site they dubbed the 'Graveyard'. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 361) (IMG)

The Trotskyite leader responsible for implementing such extreme-left measures in Montenegro was Milovan Djilas: Djilas ... was by his own admission involved in the executions of some civilians and prisoners. His account of the period, Wartime, published in the United States and Britain in 1977 at a time when publication was impossible in Yugoslavia, is a work that must stand as one of the great memoirs of warfare of modern history. In it Djilas admits to ordering or acquiescing in both the burning of villages and the execution individuals who were in no way collaborators but were deemed by virtue of their occupation or social position to be 'reactionaries' and class enemies.. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, pp. 361-362) (IMG)

More details will be provided later, concerning Djilas's confessions on the burning of villages.

In his memoirs, Djilas recalls:

It became increasingly clear to me that our imprudent, hasty executions, along with hunger and war weariness, were helping to strengthen the Chetniks. Even more horrible and inconceivable was the killing of kinsmen and hurling of their bodies into ravines – less for convenience than to avoid the funeral processions and the inconsolable and fearless mourners. In Hercegovina it was still more horrible and ugly: Communist sons confirmed their devotion by killing their own fathers, and there was dancing and singing around the bodies. How many were executed in Montenegro and Sandzak at that time? I don't know, but several hundred doesn't seem exaggerated. All too lightly the Communists destroyed the inherited, primeval customs – as if they had new and immutable ones to replace them with. By retrieving the bodies from the ravines and giving them solemn burial, the Chetniks made impressive gains, while pinning on the Communists the horrible nickname of "pitmen." (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 149) (IMG)

In a research book published by the Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, a prominent Croatian-American historian at Yale University, described the events as follows:

The burning of "enemy" villages and the confiscation of "enemy" property were commonplace during the Left Errors. Partisan units were given quotas of "fifth columnists" to be shot. Perhaps as many as 500 were executed in Hercegovina alone. (...) Plans were laid for the building of soviets and kolkhozes. Churches were desecrated and such anti-Western jingles as "Partisans, prepare your machine guns to greet the king and Englishmen" were quite popular. In addition to the Partisan slogan, "Death to fascism – liberty to the people," a new slogan was

gaining currency: "The Red Army is with us – victory is ours." Idleness in the villages was treated as military desertion, and peasants were fined or sentenced to forced labor if their houses were untidy or if they were infested by lice. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 82) (IMG)

Moshe Pijade, said the MI6 operative Richard West, even went on to create his own pseudo-‘sovkhoz’:

In their isolation and hopelessness, some of the Partisans in Montenegro seem to have taken refuge in fantasy. The avant garde Mosa Pijade, or ‘Uncle Janko’, started a sovkhoz, or Soviet state farm, on Mount Durmitor, stocked with animals stolen from Chetnik peasants. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, pp. 119-120) (IMG)

This is confirmed based on Djilas’s memoirs. Djilas wrote:

Alongside the heroic and tragic undertakings, there were also the grotesque and the preposterous. Pijade concocted the idea of establishing on Mount Durmitor animal farms that would be modeled on the sovkhozes or Soviet state farms described by our Soviet-trained "Muscovites," and stocked with cattle seized from Chetnik peasants. With his lively imagination, Pijade threw himself into a detailed inventory and disposition of sheep, cows, bulls, sheds, pens, shepherds, milkmaids, herders, monthly and yearly yields of wool, milk, and meat. There was a fair supply of those animals – some twelve thousand sheep alone, with hopes for their increase along with improvement in planning and organization. For a beginning Pijade engaged Mitra, happy that he would at last have an intelligent and resourceful helper who, on top of everything, could take shorthand. True, neither of them knew much about farm animals.

Mitra was from a small town where the well-to-do kept animals, so she might conceivably have known how many teats a cow had, but in the case of Mosa Pijade even this was unlikely. However, that seemed unimportant for the job at hand. Who can expect herders to manage farms? Mosa and Mitra zealously organized shepherd brigades, administrators, and inspectors. Provision was also made, to be sure, for competition between camps. Mosa established strict economy and discipline, yet the animals kept disappearing, and the yields fell short. Mitra made fun of the whole venture with a merriment no more restrained than her diligence and devotion to the job. Even so, this project might have survived until the end of the war, had not the Chetniks and Italians swept down upon us, and the Partisan units and the peasants appropriated the animals. Overnight, everything disappeared except Mosa's and Mitra's saddlebags crammed with regulations, inventories, decrees, and orders. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 175) (IMG)

Moshe Pijade, a sworn Nazi-collaborationist traitor to the Yiddish people and one of the closest henchmen of the Gestapo agent Tito, put to torch the entire village of Zabljak.

The Chetniks had broken through in considerable force. We had only two small battalions left with which to confront them. But we did secure the withdrawal of our wounded, around six hundred of them. That evening the clouds grew red over Durmitor's peaks, as Pijade and Pekic set Zabljak on fire to keep it from serving as a Chetnik stronghold. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 177) (IMG)

Djilas comments:

the Chetniks were also a guerrilla army, so for them every village could be a stronghold. On the other hand, it was justified not to accept the Chetnik takeover of a town which had been ours for so long and with such devotion. Though there were regrets over the burning of Zabljak, there was no criticism. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 177) (IMG)

Again and again, entire villages were burnt down by the Trotskyite gang of Tito:

On their way to Bihac in the mainly Muslim north-west of Bosnia, the partisans put to the torch the Chetnik villages in the plain of Grahovo, and almost burnt to the ground the birthplace of Gavrilio Princip, the Sarajevo assassin of 1914. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 124) (IMG)

Such Trotskyite policy lines were:

completely out of tune with the Soviet position.. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 82) (IMG)

Note that the interests of Tito’s group were inversely correlated with the interests of the Yugoslav communist movement. The weaker the Yugoslav Communist Party, the more the casualties inflicted upon the Yugoslav communists and patriots, the stronger became the hand of Tito’s clique. As such, the Trotskyite left-opportunism of Tito’s group:

weakened the base of the Politburo's control to the point of virtual collapse. Terrorized peasants who were anything but kulaks or collaborators swelled the Chetnik ranks in Montenegro and eastern Hercegovina. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 82) (IMG)

Indeed:

Partisan excesses were ... why the winter of 1941 saw ordinary villagers deserting the Partisans and turning for

support to local nationalists. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 363) (IMG)

Precisely as the Gestapo agent Tito's gang of Trotskyite wreckers intended, communism grew unpopular amongst the masses of the Yugoslav people. By the end of 1941, the Trotskyite regime became very unstable; it was unpopular internally, while susceptible to swift German assaults externally.

The Gestapo wreckers leading the Party ensured that as much casualties would be inflicted on the lower echelons of the Yugoslav Communist Party which were indeed predominantly made up of Soviet-friendly, non-Trotskyite communists. The German military itself would directly do the job for Tito's gang. On November 25, 1941, the German 342nd Infantry Division (ID) launched their operation against the Uzice Republic:

The 342nd ID was still in use in the Valjevo area until 23rd November, repeating the "cleansing" of the surrounding area twice earlier during the previous month. From there, on 25 November, they pushed south to the capital of the partisans. The 113th ID started out from its Jagodina-Krusevac landing area, where it had arrived in full on the 24th of November, heading west the following day. Flanking were also four battalions of the occupying divisions and – as far as in the West, a novelty associations of the Serbian gendarmerie in use. According to German estimates, these forces faced about 10,000 partisans in the Cacak / Uzice area. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 78. Citing: 'Ebd., S. 73-78 u. BA/MA, RW 40/14 10-Tage-Meldung der 342. ID an den Bev. Kdr. Gen. (10.12.1941).') (IMG)

Of course, it would have been strategically unsound for the Nazis to kill their own agents at the helm of the Yugoslav Communist Party during the fighting. And indeed, the Nazis, when given the chance to shoot the Gestapo agent Tito and his gang, refused to fire at their own agents:

Although the enclosure was again not complete enough to allow a complete annihilation of the enemy, Tito and his supreme staff managed to escape only by German leadership mistakes in the Boehme entry. Thus, the partisan leadership had ... to flee head over heels south towards the Italian-occupied Sandzak. In doing so, they benefited from the fact that such an escape route had either been overlooked or rejected as unlikely in the German Einsatz Order. Even more serious, however, was that the 342nd Infantry Division's peaks on pursuit of the Sandzak border, at the express command of the divisional commander, halted the persecution. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 78. Citing: Wartime, Milovan Djilas, pp. 103-115. BA/MA, RH 26 -342/16 Einsatzbefehl zum Unternehmen Uzice (18.11.1941)) (IMG)

December 1: A comparison of German and Yugoslav battle reports shows that at this time the group led by Tito and the Supreme Staff was only a few minutes ahead of their German pursuers, and, with a push of the 342nd ID into the Italian occupation zone, would have been with high probability killed in battle or captured. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 80. Citing: Wartime, Milovan Djilas, pp. 109-113. BA/MA, RW 40/14 342. ID/Ia 10-Tage-Meldung vom 30.11. bis 10.12.41 (10.12.1941)) (IMG)

Again, the interests of the 'Yugoslav Communist Party' were inversely correlated with the interests of Tito's terrorist organization which led the YCP. The Third Reich did not inflict any harm upon its spy ring in the Party leadership, but vigorously moved to exterminate thousands of lower-ranking YCP members, capturing thousands of rifles as spoils of war:

Nevertheless, the extent of the seized prey and especially the numerical relationship between it and the number of fatalities was a sure indication that the insurgency movement had been dealt a blow this time:

2,0 killed, 2,723 captured rifles. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 80. Citing his sources, Schmider says: 'In a first report of December 5, the spoils are numbered 18 MG and 1,537 rifles; see. BA/MA, RH 20-12/121 Der Bev. Kdr. General an den Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Sudost (5.12.1941). The 10-day announcement of the 342nd ID on 10 December speaks of 28 MG and 2,723 rifles; see. RW 40/14.') (IMG)

With minimal casualties on the German side, the Third Reich triumphantly destroyed the lower-ranking members of the Yugoslav Party, while allowing the Trotskyite fascist agents on the upper echelons of the Party to escape. A remarkably similar incident would occur a few months later, this time as a result of direct collusion between Tito and the Italian Fascist command.

On Tito's behalf, Milutinovic and Djilas, two 'former' Trotskyite associates of the notorious terrorist Petko Miletic, had been slaughtering the Slavs of Montenegro in the name of 'socialism'. After his escape from Uzice, the Gestapo agent Tito called on Ivan Milutinovic to divert more Yugoslav revolutionary fighters into fighting the heavily fortified Italian Fascist positions in Pljevlja:

In early December the Partisans' prestige had been deeply damaged by a failed attack on the Italian garrison at Pljevlja which left them with over 300 dead and two to three times that number wounded. Milutinovic believed that in order to send the Montenegrin Partisans into Serbia in compliance with Tito's orders he had first to drive the Italian forces out of Pljevlja, a key point in their battle to control the Sandzak. As he was to discover, his plan to reduce the garrison and capture the town was over-ambitious. Pljevlja was heavily fortified and defended by the highly capable Alpine Pusteria Division. Tito, who had been initially consulted by Milutinovic, had already expressed grave doubts over the viability of the plan.. Hoping for both glory and booty, Milutinovic went ahead with catastrophic consequences. Although some Partisan units fought bravely, others had melted away even before battle was engaged, thereby providing the nationalists with a demonstration of Partisan military ineptitude, if not actual cowardice, which they were quick to exploit. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 363) (IMG)



Red represents the YCP partisans. Photoshopped screenshot from a video. Video source: (Yugoslav Partisans during World War II, YouTube, Balkan History May 27, 2017)

A look at the map of the Yugoslav war renders it clear that conquering Pljevlja was not strategically necessary for the survival of Tito and his staff who were migrating from Uzice. A much more powerful imperialist occupation force can be vanquished not by striking it where it is strongest, but by attacking it wheresoever it is weakest. To win, persistently attack the enemy from where it is weakest so that via that avenue, the enemy would be deprived of the resources with which it could even upkeep its strength. By contrast, to sabotage a military force, have that military force keep on attacking where the enemy is the strongest. The Gestapo agent Tito and the notorious Trotskyite Milutinovic knowingly sabotaged the military operations against the Nazis. They struck the enemy force wherever it was strongest. Naturally were yielded heavy casualties – approximately one thousand Yugoslav communists and progressives, the sons and daughters of Yugoslavia who laid their lives for freedom only to be stabbed in the back by the Trotskyite-Nazi wreckers leading them. This entire battle launched by Tito and Milutinovic was nothing short of military sabotage.

As always, Tito refused to accept blame for the catastrophic defeat he caused. He highly doubted that the YCP would triumph over the Nazis in that battle – and that was the point. The point was that the YCP would not triumph, which was the YCP leadership, Tito's gang, did nothing to stop Milutinovic and his group from launching the doomed-to-fail military operation. Under great pressure, to deflect criticism away from himself, Tito was forced to rightly blame Milutinovic, but did not take any responsibility himself. In the post-war years, when the Yugoslav communist freedom-fighter and patriot Arso Jovanovic proved to be too anti-Trotskyite for Tito to tolerate, after the Tito group assassinated Jovanovic while he was on his escape route to the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, Tito decided to blame him for the Pljevlja battle as well:

On hearing the news Tito blamed both Arso Jovanovic, the commander, and Milutinovic for the defeat, although

it was not until Arso Jovanovic broke with Tito over the split with Stalin in 1948 that his role in the debacle at Pljevlja resurfaced to set the seal on his disgrace. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 363) (IMG)

Afterwards, the YCP (abbreviated in Yugoslavia as KPJ) was attacked by Chetniks, who were aiming for self-defense against Titoist betrayals:

Buoyed by the self-inflicted propaganda defeat of the KPJ, the Chetniks and the occupiers inflicted several military defeats on the Partisans in the spring of 1942. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 82) (IMG)

As confirmed by Djilas, the Trotskyite policies of Tito's gang in Montenegro were precisely the key set of factors leading to the rise of the Chetnik movement in Montenegro:

And though I didn't have sufficient maturity to express it, I sensed that the Chetniks also profited from the Communists' excessive stress on Montenegrin, as distinct from Serbian, nationality. I thought then, and I believe to this day, that this explains in part why the Chetniks gained their most vital and broadest support from the Vasojevici, a region and clan which from ancient times has looked to Serbia for leadership. Serbianism was the most vociferous and emphatic sentiment of the Montenegrin Chetniks – all the more so in that the Montenegrins are, despite provincial and historical differences, quintessential Serbs, and Montenegro the cradle of Serbian myths and of aspirations for the unification of Serbs. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 149) (IMG)

The Trotskyite group of Tito had overwhelmingly lost support among the Montenegrins. Thus, a while after Djilas's return from Montenegro, the Gestapo agent Tito, the systematic exterminator of the Montenegrin people, ordered Djilas to go back and restore 'order' by doing 'whatever was necessary, including the burning of whole villages':

Ostrog monastery on 8 and 9 February 1942 failed in its attempt to harness popular support by setting up a National Liberation Council intended to lay the foundations for a future Government of Montenegro. Meanwhile increasing hunger among the population was encouraging yet more defections among the Partisans' peasant supporters.. So concerned was Tito at the prospect of losing Montenegro that in March 1942 he ordered Djilas to return to Montenegro to replace the now out of favour Milutinovic. Not only was Montenegro a traditional bastion of Communist support, but its loss would rule out the prospect of the Partisans in Serbia receiving help by sea, as well as forfeiting large tracts of country best suited to guerrilla warfare. Tito therefore authorized Djilas to do whatever was necessary, including the burning of whole villages to discourage their inhabitants from going over to the Chetniks. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 366) (IMG)

Djilas in his memoirs wrote:

The danger loomed of losing Montenegro, our most important base, and of its final separation from Serbia. An analysis was made of the situation and, naturally, of "errors." All along we were troubled by the peasants' excuse that they were going over to the Chetniks for fear of having their houses burned down and other reprisals. This issue came up at the meeting with Tito, and the following argument developed: If the peasants realize that if they go over to the invader we will also burn their houses, they will change their minds. This argument seemed logical to me, too, though I did not support it resolutely. Finally Tito made up his mind, though hesitantly: "Well, all right, we can burn a house or a village here and there." Later Tito issued orders to that effect – orders that were fairly bold, by virtue of being explicit. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 146) (IMG)

The prominent American anti-Soviet diplomatic official Walter Roberts wrote that the Trotskyite gang of the Gestapo agent Tito:

On February 8 ... even proclaimed such territory of Montenegro as they held to be an integral part of the USSR. ('Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945', Walter R. Roberts, p. 55) (IMG)

Although Stalin had emphatically condemned any attempts to impose the Soviet system on the Slavic countries, this did not stop the Yugoslav Trotskyites leading the YCP to call on Montenegro to be annexed by the USSR. The Titoists were effectively supporting the Nazi and Trotskyite propaganda depictions of the USSR as a 'chauvinist' 'aggressive' expansionist power.

By March of 1942, Tito's Trotskyite group had overwhelmingly sabotaged the image of the Yugoslav Communist Party. As such, Tito's group was pressured by public opinion to officially denounce its own Trotskyite policies:

The Politburo then repudiated the Left Errors, "ignoring the fact that the [wrong line] in fact was formulated by the KPJ CC." The principal exponents of the Left Errors (Milovan Djilas and Ivan Milutinovic in Montenegro and Boris Kidric in Slovenia) were not punished, but some local leaders were (Miro Popara and Petar Drapoin in Hercegovina and several members of the party leadership in Montenegro). (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, pp. 82-83) (IMG)

In practice, however, the Trotskyite policies did not stop. As Elizabeth Roberts pointed out:

The killings ... did not stop, and nor did burning of villages and settlements. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A

History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 366) (IMG)

Nor did the left-sectarian phrase-mongering of Tito's group stop:

in rejecting the excesses of the Left Errors, the KPJ leadership did not reject the leftist goals of class revolution and Communist control; (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 83) (IMG)

In early April of 1942 for instance:

thirty members of the Karadzici clan were deemed guilty of conspiracy and executed in Savnik. Many of them, as Djilas himself observes, were condemned solely on the basis of clan affiliation, although the Partisans themselves would have argued that while such a penalty was extreme, it was a reaction to the clan's known nationalistic and anti-Communist fanaticism. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 366) (IMG)

Boio Ljumovic, a YCP official who harbored a line to the right of the left-deviationists, would have served to reduce the leftist deviations of Tito's gang. Thus, as the saboteur-in-chief Tito removed Ljumovic from his positions in Montenegro, thereupon tilting the balance further in the favour of the Trotskyite exterminators of the Montenegrin nation:

Curiously, Boio Ljumovic, political secretary of the KPJ regional committee for Montenegro and a future Cominformist, whom Djilas considered an opportunist and a rightist, was also removed from the Montenegrin party leadership, at least for the time being. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 83) (IMG)

By the middle of 1942, the communist faction in the Yugoslav Communist Party had been seriously weakened, as patriotic men and women of the Party had collapsed in the battlefield in the thousands. Other patriots were demoted. The Trotskyite-fascist wing of the Party, therefore, gained the upper hand in some regions. This allowed Tito's group to further pursue its Nazi agenda and to plant fascist agents in strategic command positions.

Having been interned in France after the collapse of the Spanish Republic, Ivan Gosnjak was 'freed' as a result of the establishment of the Vichy Regime and therefore was allowed to travel to Germany and be employed by Hitler's regime. In 1942, the Nazi employee Ivan Gosnjak went on to join Tito's gang:

After the defeat of the republican forces in Spain, Gosnjak was detained in France in February 1939. Only after the capitulation of France in 1940 did Gosnjak succeed in escaping from the camp, going in 1941 to Germany as a worker. (IVAN GOSNJAK – TITO'S GENERAL – DIES, RFE-RL, Research, RAD BR/36, Slobodan Stankovic, February 12, 1980, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

This employee for the Nazis was:

one of Tito's closest comrades.. (IVAN GOSNJAK – TITO'S GENERAL – DIES, RFE-RL, Research, RAD BR/36, Slobodan Stankovic, February 12, 1980, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Then in July of 1942, he travelled to Yugoslavia to join the band of the Gestapo agent Tito:

In Germany he used a fake passport, and in July 1942 ... returned to his native Croatia and immediately joined Tito's partisan units. (IVAN GOSNJAK – TITO'S GENERAL – DIES, RFE-RL, Research, RAD BR/36, Slobodan Stankovic, February 12, 1980, p. 2) (IMG)

Nazi Germany, which strictly obstructed attempts to join resistance movements, somehow managed to 'miss' the fact that one of its 'employees', freed from prison 'thanks' to the Nazi German invasion and occupation of France, was able to join Germany's secret ally, Tito. Ivan Gosnjak joined Tito and was promoted to the rank of the commander of the partisan forces in Croatia:

Gosnjak returned to Yugoslavia (via Germany) and immediately joined Tito's partisan units. (IVAN GOSNJAK – TITO'S GENERAL – DIES, RFE-RL, Research, RAD BR/36, Slobodan Stankovic, February 12, 1980, p. 1) (IMG)

Gosnjak's return to Yugoslavia approximately coincided with the strategic alliances of the Party's Trotskyite leadership with the Ustase, which occurred a month prior. By late April of 1942, General Francetic – the Ustase commissioner for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the head of the Black Legion, and a likely successor to Ante Pavelic – had made alliances with the 1st and 2nd 'Proletarian Brigades':

Politically, the Trio's greatest surprise [move] had undoubtedly been the success of the Francetic group and its temporary alliance with the 1st and 2nd Proletarian Brigades. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 132. Citing: BA/MA, RL 21/218 10-Tage-Meldung des Kdr. Generals, 21. (30.4.1942).) (IMG)

During April and May 1942, the Ustase regime made pacts with the Italian Fascist occupation forces regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. These pacts nominally targeted both the Chetniks and Tito's units. In practice, they rarely struck Tito's units:

Beginning with the first talks which the Croatian civilian commissary Vjekoslav Vrancic led in March in the Italian occupation zone, these negotiations resulted in two standstill agreements, of which the first (27 April),

concerned the West Bosnian, and the second (28 May) concerned the majority of the East Bosnian Cetniks. In practice, these agreements resulted in the establishment of more or less well-defined protection zones for the Bosnian Serb population; Parts of the agreements, which also provided for joint action against the partisans, were only occasionally put into practice. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 133. Citing: 'The Cetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945', Stanford University Press, Jozo Tomasevich, 1975, pp. 226-231. The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav resistance, Matteo J. Milazzo, 1975, pp.

78-81) (IMG)

The Italian General Roatta assured the German command that he would cooperate in the fight against the partisans: Interestingly, however, [German General Walter] Kuntze had already reconciled himself with the idea of continuing the operations even before the release of Rogatica. Roatta's assurance of 21 April seems to have played a decisive role here, and the command of the troops deployed would definitely remain in German hands even after the demarcation line had been crossed. Unlike his subordinate Bader, Kuntze was able to gain something from the idea of commanding Italian troops south of the demarcation line. Not least of all, he promised himself the chance of being able to persuade the Italians within their own sphere of influence "to engage in more active warfare." In any case, there was cause for hope that the cooperation agreed upon in Abbazia might yet lead to a presentable result. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 128) (IMG)

Therefore, on:

May 2, an armed force of one German and three Italian divisions could be targeted against an area roughly bordered by the Sarajevo-Gorazde-Foca-Kalinovik line. While the 718th ID [i.e. Infantry Division] had to advance from the northeast, the 1st Italian Mountain Division "Taurinense" from northwestern Germany, which meanwhile had arrived in Sarajevo, and the 22nd ID "Cacciatori delle Alpi", deployed in Nevesinje in Herzegovina, came from the south. Towards the east, the securing of the Drina section between Gorazde and Foca had been entrusted to the 5th Mountain Division "Pusteria". That, unlike the attack on Rogatica, the "Bader Task Force" finally arrived on the eve of the pincer operation against the capital of the partisan movement. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129. Citing: BA/MA, RW 40/26 Kampfgruppe General Bader, Befehl zur Bildung der Einschließungsfront (30.4.1942).) (IMG)

'However, the company "Trio II" ... was not even a day old', said Schmider, 'when':

Contrary to the assurance given by Roatta Bader on April 21, Colonel-General Ugo Cavallero decreed on May 3 that the three Italian divisions should withdraw from the combat group and the Italian VI responsible for this area. Army Corps (General Renzo Dalmazzo) are to be subordinated. It was only thanks to the protest of Rintelens that at least the "Pusteria", which at no time belonged to the VI. AK, under Bader's command remained.

The further course of the operation, despite all efforts to the contrary, showed striking parallels to the previous operation against Rogatica. On the one hand, because again no major enemy forces were put to the fight, on the other hand, because due to the delayed opening up of the "Cacciatori" once again no timely south barrier could be established. It was also this gap that made it possible for Tito and his staff to detach themselves via Zabljak to Pluzine in the Herzegovinian-Montenegrin border region. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129. Citing: KTB OKW, II. 1, S. 334 (Eintrag vom 3.5.1942); BA/MA, RH 20-12/145,

Der Deutsche General beim Hauptquartier der italienischen Wehrmacht an den Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Sudost (3.5.1942). BA/MA, RW 40/26 AbschlusBericht »Unternehmen Foca« (20.5.1942).) (IMG)

Luciano Viazzi, a head of Italy's 'Historical Society for the Study of the Second World War', argued that:

the "Cacciatori" Division approaching from the south only by the order issued on 15.5. [i.e. June 15th] prevented the setting of the "trio" operation. This laid the way [for escape] for Tito and his staff. ('L'inutile vittoria: La tragica esperienza delle truppe italiane in Montenegro', Giacomo Scotti, Luciano Viazzi, Milan, 1989, p. 331. Cited in: PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129) (IMG)

In other words, the Italian forces allowed Tito and his supreme staff to escape the battlefield. Indeed, Dedijer and Djilas: agree that the group around Tito during the retreat from Foca at not time was in immediate danger of being cut off.. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129. Citing: Wartime, Milovan Djilas, pp. 173-175. War Diaries, Vladimir Dedijer, pp. 156-175 (entries from 9.5.-20.5.1942).) (IMG)

The British intelligence agent Richard West wrote:

the Italian soldiers were loath to get involved in fighting the Partisans, and in July 1942 they began to withdraw

from the NDH to their territory on the coast. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 136) (IMG)

Schmider adds:

The temporary evacuation of Konjic by the Italian garrison on the route of the "long march" at least suggests this conclusion; (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 190. Citing: BA / MA, RH 26-118 / 28 Annex 7 to 718. ID, Ia, No. 2554/42 go.) (IMG)

Thus:

the Italians started to leave places like Bihac, Drvar, Kalinovica, Karlovac and Petrova Gor.. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 136) (IMG)

Elsewhere Richard West writes:

Although the Partisans captured and briefly held small highland towns such as Uzice, Foca, Bihac and later Drvar and Jaice, they seldom descended into the cities or the rich lowland plains which held most of the country's wealth and population. Until the end of 1942, their presence did not much bother the Axis occupation force. When the Italians moved into the NDH in the summer and autumn of 1941, this was not to suppress the Partisans.. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 126) (IMG)

A German intelligence officer named Wilhelm Hottl reported in his memoirs that a courier of Tito:

had traveled the road between Tito and Roatta several times. (Use for the Rich: In the Foreign Secret Service of the Third Reich, Koblenz, Wilhelm Hottl, 1997, p. 223. Cited in: PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 190) (IMG)

The Nazi officials themselves stated that the Italian Fascist commander Roatta and Tito had colluded. Indeed, there were remarks:

by some German authorities in 1942, that the "long march" was even based on a collusion between Roatta and Tito.. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 190) (IMG)

For the second and third times in a row, the Trotskyite agents of the Gestapo were able to escape the battlefield, as their subordinates, Yugoslav patriots, were being martyred by the Axis assassins. One may allow the Tito apologists to argue, for as much as they desire, that divine providence was at work, but for the non-superstitious, it is clear that the Nazi Germans and Fascist Italians, not the heavens, were on Tito's side. As documented previously, the Nazi German authorities, entirely correctly, remarked that the 'long march', Tito's escape from the hands of the Nazis, was a case of collusion between the Italian Fascists and Tito.

Having annihilated more and more of the communist and progressive children of Yugoslavia rivalling Tito's group, the latter gained even further leverage. A leap from quantity to quality, the annihilation of many Yugoslav communists and progressives, allowed Tito's clique to consolidate its influence on more sections of the Party. More than ever before, the hold of fascist faction over that Party was growing. In this midst, Tito's group confidently went ahead and treated the Nazi German military and intelligence officials loyally and royally, expressing to them a desire for consolidating the strategic partnership between Tito's group and the Nazis. In 'a comprehensive report compiled for Heinrich Himmler', said Schmider, the 'German police attache in Zagreb' stated the following in September 21, 1942:

"The loyal treatment in the headquarters even went so far that the Germans were invited for lunch on Sunday. The table was laid white and it was served like a first class hotel. The food order was accordingly. Noteworthy are political statements by the Partisan Commander-in-Chief Tito. On the occasion of a conversation with a German, he expressed the view that, in spite of the present terrible bloodbath on the eastern front, it was necessary to bring about an understanding between Germany and Russia. Otherwise there would be the danger that England and America would eventually emerge victorious again, and the victory of these regimes would mean the downfall and subjugation of the working peoples." (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 159. Citing: PA/AA, Inland II g 99, 1956 Der Polizeiatteache in Zagreb an den Reichsfuhrer SS (21.9.1942).) (IMG)

Another report shortly after by the German police attache made the same remarks

In another report, written three days later, ... the [German] police attache once again referred to the negotiating readiness of the partisans.. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 159. Citing: PA/AA, Inland II g 99, 1956 Der Polizeiatteache in Zagreb an den Reichsfuhrer SS (24.9.1942).) (IMG)

In October 1942, the Nazi high command reported that Tito was willing to serve as an economic 'partner' of the Third Reich:

Thus, above all, the question of the undisturbed exploitation of the resources of the country by the occupying power, which had already been discussed three months earlier, seems to have been the subject of extensive discussions. On October 30, the commander-in-chief of the Commanding General noted the following

impressions: "Tito believes that economic cooperation between the partisans as equal partners with Germany, even in the Yugoslav area, is quite possible." (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 171. Citing: 'BA/MA, RH 26-114/14 Die kommunistische Aufstandsbewegung im Raum des ehemaligen Jugoslawien (30.10.1942)'.) (IMG)

It was for this reason that:

In November 1942, the Partisans were not even a serious threat to the Ustasha government of the Independent State of Croatia. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 127) (IMG)

By late 1942, a strategic alliance had indeed been consolidated between the Ustase and certain elements of the partisan movement, involving joint plunder raids:

Thus, the 718th ID and the IC Department [note: IC refers to Abwehr, the German intelligence service] of the Commanding General reported in late October 1942 that in the area of Rogatica, the Ustasha and Partisans a deliberate alliance was formed, which among other things also served to carry out joint plunder raids. The fact that a few weeks later (beginning of December 1942) an attempt to contact the partisan leadership in Bihac by a senior Ustasha leader was taken very seriously by the latter can be seen from the fact that a member of the Politburo (Milovan Djilas) was sent out as negotiator; the establishment of a connection failed only at the outbreak of hostilities that forced Djilas and his companion Velebit to turn back. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 400. Citing: BA/MA, RH 26-118/12 KTB-Eintrag vom 20.10.1942; RH 26-118/41 718.ID. Ic-Lagebericht für die Zeit vom 17.10.-26.10.1942 (26.10.1942); RH 26-114/13 Kdr. Gen. u. BfHls. in Serbien, Ic-Lagebericht für die Zeit vom 19.10.-29.10.1942 (29.10.1942). Survey of Dr. Vladimir Velebit in Zagreb (9. u. 10.5.1998).) (IMG)

Nor did the Axis occupation forces attempt to combat Tito's army. Referring to the presence of Tito's group in some Yugoslav cities, the MI6 operative Richard West wrote:

Until the end of 1942, their [i.e. Titoist-led Partisans'] presence did not much bother the Axis occupation force. When the Italians moved into the NDH in the summer and autumn of 1941, this was not to suppress the Partisans..

The Germans also intervened to restrain and sometimes to hang the Ustasha in Slavonia and the Srem, but did not ... take the Partisans seriously. Hitler's vital interests in the former Yugoslavia were first to protect the railway line down the Sava and Morava valleys, and secondly to ensure the supply of strategic ores such as copper and chrome from the mines, which were mostly in Bosnia. Since the Partisans wanted to win power in Yugoslavia rather than damage the Axis war effort, they seldom threatened either of these two German interests. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 127) (IMG)

In late January 1943, Tito was maintaining secret talks with the heads of the Ustase. This fact is backed up by the Italian intelligence archives cited by Avramov:

Josip Broz himself, according to these [Italian intelligence] sources, maintained communications with certain members of Pavelic's cabinet. At a time when the Italian command from Sibenik informed the superiors about the meeting between Broz and Ustasa minister Rustinovic in 1943, the latter had already ceased to be the Independent State of Croatia's permanent emissary to the Holy See, but he continued to carry out various assignments in his old role. In this connection, a whole series of new questions arises, which call for comprehensive study: Was Josip Broz playing a double role? (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Smilja Avramov, p. 232. Citing: AVII – ANJ, Contatti tra il Ministro croato Rustinov e il Tito, K. 58, Reg. No. 34/9-1) (IMG)

He sure was, as confirmed also by the German side. Regarding January 1943:

the visit of a three-headed Ustasha delegation in Livno is confirmed by the testimony of a German eyewitness. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 400) (IMG)

'The German Reich citizen Franz Leinschutz', said Schmider referring to the eyewitness, 'gave the following statement on the record':

When I was in Livno last week, I saw an Ustasha officer in uniform, but without weapons. The partisans told me there were two more here. All three, according to the partisans, had come to Livno for negotiations. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 400. Citing: BA/MA, RH 26-118/42 718. ID Abt. Ic, Vernehmung (25.1.1943).) (IMG)

Although pro-Soviet communists still formed a majority in the YCP, the slaughtering of thousands of Yugoslav communists and progressives had weakened the communist faction enough to render the YCP into a force susceptible to a full-on alliance with the Nazis. Via several intermediaries, only some of which were the Nazi German officials with whom Tito's group spoke, the Berlin leadership was receiving signals to that effect. Note that Tito had told the Nazis that "it was necessary to bring about an understanding between Germany and Russia. Otherwise there would be the danger that England and America would eventually emerge victorious again, and the victory of these regimes would mean the

downfall and subjugation of the working peoples.” The communications with the Pavelic regime in Croatia were almost certainly along such lines as well. Tito’s group was thus indicating to the Nazis that the time was ripe for elevating the relations between the YCP and the Axis to a new level, to render the YCP, a Party by then decisively dominated by the fascist agents, into a force no longer to be decimated by the Nazis but to be embraced as an ally in the war against the Soviets.

On March 4, 1943, the partisans, which by then had too low a potential for a serious combat against the Nazis, surprisingly achieved an ostensible ‘victory’ over the Germans:

It was around nine o'clock when we reached the plateau at Gornji Vakuf, amid campfires and the roar of artillery. We walked among the soldiers, who were eating their supper around the fires. They recognized us and saluted with an easygoing seriousness. The commanders were stiffer, and terse and direct in their reports. The immediate surroundings of the battle area were as I had imagined them from novels and pictures. The battle had already been won, in the sense that the Germans had been pinned down, thus ensuring the wounded a successful retreat. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 225-226) (IMG)

The YCP ‘victory’ over the Nazis on March 1943 was highly suspicious. The behaviour of Tito’s group after this tactical ‘victory’ made it appear all the more so as a case of collusion. It would start with ‘prisoner exchanges’ as the mask for something far worse:

Some dozen Germans were captured in the Gornji Vakuf battles, among them a high-ranking officer by the name of Stoecker, a short man of dignified bearing. The idea came up in a conversation involving Velebit, Rankovic, Tito, and myself that a letter be sent to the Germans through the captured Major Stoecker, offering the captured Germans in exchange for our arrested comrades, especially since the Germans had agreed to such an arrangement in 1942. It was Tito who developed the idea – or rather, immediately sought ways of putting it into effect. He brought together the Central Committee members – Rankovic, Pijade, and me – in his water mill by the Rama River, and suggested that we send a letter to the Germans through Major Stoecker proposing, in addition to an exchange of prisoners, that the wounded and prisoners be treated according to international conventions, and demanding specifically that the Germans recognize us as a "belligerent force." We had been briefed before in detail on the issues of the "belligerent force" by Vlatko Velebit, who was a good lawyer. The covering letter bore the seal of the Supreme Staff, but Terzic’s signature, not Tito's. However, it was clear to the Germans that the offer had been made with the knowledge and approval of the supreme command: they knew that our movement was centralized. Our assumption was that the Germans would not easily agree to our proposal, and we phrased the proposal in a way that left room for negotiation. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 229) (IMG)

A Nazi German Major named Stoecker had easily been captured by Tito’s group – or much more likely, as the behaviour of Tito’s group afterwards indicated, the Nazi German Major was an undercover German negotiator dispatched by the Nazis to communicate with Tito’s group regarding the details of a YCP-Nazi alliance, all under the guise of a ‘prisoner’ ‘captured’ by the Partisans during a highly unlikely tactical ‘victory’. As mentioned by Djilas in the above excerpt, Major Stoecker was freed, permitted to leave the Partisan camp, and to go to the German- occupied camp and let the authorities in the latter know that the YCP leadership had been ‘centralized’ under Tito’s authoritarian rule and that the Germans should start treating the YCP in a much more favourable manner, as a ‘belligerent force’ respected in accordance to the Hague Convention. Tito’s gang sent a message to the Germans, and the latter responded positively:

we received an answer from the Germans within two or three days: the message that we could immediately send our negotiators was signed by an officer and sealed with an eagle. On the day the German reply came – March 9, 1943 – another meeting was held, attended only by Tito, Rankovic, and myself, to appoint a delegation and work out tactics to deal with a hypothetical German offer. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 230) (IMG)

The goal of these talks between the Germans and the partisans was not at all a prisoner exchange but rather the establishment of an alliance of a Titoist-dictated YCP and the Axis. Tito decided to entrench his own alliance with the Nazis by reducing the conflict between the Partisan troops and the army of the Third Reich:

It was now in the first days of March, in a mill-house over the River Rama, that Tito conceived the most daring and controversial stratagem of his long career. **He decided to make a truce, even an alliance with the Germans.**

In the battle at Gornji Vakuf during the first days of March, the Partisans captured a number of Germans including one Major Stoecker. Remembering how the previous year they had used the German civilian

Hans Ott to effect the release of some of their prisoner, Rankovic, Djilas and other suggested to Tito that they might reopen talks. On the face of it, this was simple offer to hand over some of the Germans, including Stoecker, in return for some of the Communists now in the gaols of the NDH, including Tito’s common-law wife Herta Hass, by whom he had had a child shortly before the Axis invasion. The Partisans also wished to be recognized as a belligerent force to ensure the proper treatment of casualties and prisoners.

In fact, Tito wanted very much more than this. His most pressing need was to break through the Chetnik

forces now blocking his way across the River Neretva and then to press on through eastern Bosnia- Hercegovina to the comparative safety of Montenegro and Sandjak. His long-term need was come to an understanding with the Germans by which, in return for ceasing attacks on their forces and lines of communications, the Partisans would be given *carte blanche* to destroy the Chetniks in eastern Yugoslavia. Tito was also willing to talk with the Germans on joint military action against the expected British landing.

Tito authorised Major Stoecker to send a letter through the lines suggesting talks about the exchange of prisoners. A reply came two days later giving the time and place for receiving a Partisan mission. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, pp. 148-149. Bold added.) (IMG)

The 'arrest' of Herta Haas (or Hass) by the Nazis was also extremely suspicious and seems to have born the same character as the 'arrest' of Stoecker by Tito's group. Recall that:


Ivan Srebrnjak (Antonov), an agent of the Soviet military intelligence, ... called the attention of the IKKI to the romance Walter had in Moscow with a certain Elsa, a member of the German Communist Party, who was suspected of working for the Gestapo. He also affirmed that the young woman who brought party correspondence from Yugoslavia to Paris and back (obviously Herta Haas) was also a Gestapo spy. For all these reasons, Srebrnjak felt that Walter needed to explain himself, underscoring his resemblance to Gorkic and inviting the IKKI to disband the CPY. (Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pirjevec, 2015, p. 38) (IMG)

In essence, Tito's plan was to 'give' to the Germans regions such as Serbia, Montenegro, and parts of Kosovo. These were strategic zones which the Germans surely could utilize as a launching pad for counter-offensives against the Red Army. Many parts of these territories were already under German control. However, Tito's gang would 'give' these territories by, at least for the while, not fighting for them. In 'exchange', the Gestapo agent Tito and his clique would divert the Yugoslav patriots to fight to death against Chetnik Yugoslavs in the less strategic Sandzak region. Both by giving such territories to the Nazis and by fighting the Chetniks, Tito's group was serving the Nazi agenda while getting nothing favourable to the anti-fascist forces in return.

By 1943, the MI6 had shifted its alliance network onto partnership with the Nazis again. Naturally, this resulted in a strategic partnership between the MI6-backed contingent in the Chetnik movement and the Nazis. The Chetniks thus became a generally Axis-collaborationist force. Nonetheless, Soviet support for the Chetniks had allowed Moscow to strengthen the hand of the progressive forces in the Chetnik movement. Therefore, not everyone from among the Chetniks was reactionary or Axis-collaborationist. After all, such was why, based on Djilas's personal experience during the March dealings:

The German officers spoke with contempt of the Chetniks.. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 235) (IMG)

Even if the Chetniks were so pervasively Nazi-collaborationist as to deserve a full-scale war, the strategy pursued by Tito's terror bands was reactionary and favourable to fascism. The Comintern emphasized that the communist parties must invite such MI6-backed right-wing fake 'anti-fascist' movements to cooperate against the Nazis. The objective was



A photo of the secret deal between Tito and his gang with the Nazi Germans in March 1943

that (1) if they, the fake 'anti-fascist' non-communist organizations, do accept cooperation, the communists gain a channel to surveil them and ensure that these right-wing parties really do fight against the Nazis, and (2) if they refuse to cooperate with the communists against the fascist occupiers, they only expose themselves, and (3) if they betray their deal of cooperation with the communists, the communists can then use the surveillance capacity which they gained through a cooperation agreement to expose the fascist-collaborationism of the MI6-backed right-wing movements. In this setting, Tito's continuation of the years-long policy of waging war against the Chetniks instead of the Nazis would have seriously harmed the anti-fascist movement. Furthermore, 'giving' the Nazis the more strategic parts of Yugoslavia was a grand betrayal.

Forming a military alliance with the Nazis against the Soviet-backed progressive elements amongst the Chetniks constitutes not only a proxy war for Nazism against Soviet socialism but also assistance to the Nazis in retaining and expanding their physical presence in Yugoslavia. Assisting the Nazis in retaining and expanding the number of their military and intelligence bases in Yugoslavia in turn constitutes a form of espionage for the Nazis. Undoubtedly, the phrase "Nazi spies" is a generous description of Tito and his terror band.

These facts set the context for the following remarks by Djilas in his memoirs:

The tactics to be followed in the negotiations could only be formulated generally, especially since Tito did not get into hypothetical situations and strategies. The Germans were not to know that our chief objective was to penetrate into Serbia, or that we intended to occupy northern Montenegro, Sandzak, and parts of Kosovo and southern Serbia. We were aware of German sensitivity with regard to Serbia as a central Balkan region with a strongly anti-German population and a sense of national identity. But we had to offer them something convincing: Sandzak was the most expendable, being our poorest and most backward territory, while the Chetniks were an enemy of ours of whom the Germans were also apprehensive – though they had not fought against one another in some time, but on the contrary were collaborating, as on the Neretva. In short, we were to name Sandzak as the future Partisan territory, and the Chetniks as our main enemy. (...). There was not a word about the cessation of fighting between the Germans and ourselves, but this too was understood. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 231) (IMG)

Djilas, while admitting many facts, was also distorting the picture in the above excerpt. Indeed, contrary to Djilas's remark in the memoirs, in their written agreement with the Nazis, the Titoist Yugoslav delegation promised to not fight against them and to instead concentrate on the Chetniks as their main foes. Below is the full transcript of the deal, translated from German:

Gornji Vakuf, March 11, 1943.

Written submission of proposals by the delegation of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, authorized by the high command of this army, on the basis of the letter from Major Barth dated March 10, 1943.

1) On January 2nd, Mr. Leinschutz was probed to Mostar to end the question of prisoner-of-war exchanges that had been already raised in earlier talks with members of the German Wehrmacht. He had to return by February 1, 1943 but has not yet reported. We believe that prisoner exchanges should finish sooner. The following can be considered for exchange:

a. The ethnic German prisoners from Jajce and the crew of the Croatian plane, which was replaced by Mr. Leinschutz.

b. Major Strecker, for whom we request Prof. Ivan Marinkovic from Karlovac in exchange. He himself is in the police prison in Zagreb.

c. 25 captured German soldiers who were caught in the fighting at Sitnica.

d. Around 100 officers, under-officers [German: Unteroffizier; Abbreviated: Uffz.] and officials of the Croatian Wehrmacht and the Croatian State.

e. 15 Italian officers.

f. About 500 Italian soldiers and under-officers.

2) We believe that the command of the German Armed Forces vis-a-vis the Yugoslav PLA in this respect gives full guarantee from this side that the rules are strictly observed.

3) The command the Yugoslav PLA is of the opinion:

a. That in the given situation, there is no reason that the German Wehrmacht's warfare against the Yugoslav PLA is in the interests of either side. However, it would be of mutual interest if the delicacy were discontinued. In connection with this, the German command and this delegation had to put forward their proposals about a possible zone and the directions of the economic or other interests.

b. The Yugoslav PLA considers the Chetniks as its main foe.

4) Throughout the duration of the sub-accumulations after all these functions, we put an end to the acts of war by the German troops and the troops of the Yugoslav PLA before.

5) This delegation is authorized to conclude preliminary negotiations, while a possible, final agreement had

to be confirmed by our high command. This delegation has hastily stressed that this delegation was to be closed by the higher command posts and asked the German command to approve authorized negotiators.

(Gornji Vakuf, March 11, 1943)

Koca Popovic, Vladimir Velebit, and Milovan Djilas were the three representatives from the YCP side in these March 1943 negotiations. However, only Popovic revealed his real name during the negotiations:

Tito regarded the matter as so delicate and important that he proposed that I be appointed to the delegation as a member of the Politburo. No one raised any objection, and I did not demur. I knew enough German to follow a conversation and get along somehow or other. After all, we didn't intend to discuss Goethe and Kant. Tito also felt that a senior commander should go; Koca Popovic was designated; he knew German fairly well. Vlatko Velebit's participation in the delegation was taken for granted; he had shown adroitness in handling the exchange with the Germans in Livno, and he knew German so well – he had studied it in Vienna – that the Germans thought he was Viennese. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 230) (IMG)

We had agreed that only Koca Popovic would give his real name: because he had introduced himself as the commander of the First Division, it made no sense to conceal it, and the Germans probably knew of him through prisoners. Velebit changed his surname to Petrovic, for fear of reprisals against his family, while I assumed a common name – one borne by a Montenegrin hero of long ago: Markovic. I was too prominent a figure to reveal myself, and too tempting a prisoner for the Gestapo in case the Germans reneged on their bargain. Later, when Velebit and I went to Zagreb to negotiate, I permitted Velebit to give his real name and to visit his family. The Germans in Gornji Vakuf took photographs of us by surprise, but I covered my face. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 234) (IMG)

In all likelihood, the reason why the Djilas group refused to disclose their names was to maintain secrecy from potential Soviet spies in the Nazi Wehrmacht. After all, the Nazis were well aware of Djilas's identity:

the German officers in Gornji Vakuf were not deceived by our secrecy. When I told them that I was the quartermaster of a division, the coarse major remarked with irony, "This one is their commissar!" On the morning of March 14 both officers wished Koca a happy birthday with cordially ironic expressions. Koca wasn't at all taken aback; he thanked them and added, "That was easy enough for you to find out: the Belgrade police have had a file on me for a long time." (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 235) (IMG)

'A few days later', said Walter Roberts, 'on March 17, the German Minister in Zagreb, Kasche, sent a telegram to Berlin in which, clearly referring to the German-Partisan talks,' he noted the possibility:

that Tito and supporters will cease to fight against Germany, Italy and Croatia and retire to the Sandzak in order to settle matters with Mihailovic's Cetniks. ('Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945', Walter R. Roberts, p. 109) (IMG)

Kasche added:

Under circumstances possibility exists that Tito will demonstratively turn his back on Moscow.. The wishes of the Partisans are: Fight against the Chetniks in the Sandzak, thereafter return to their villages and pacification in Croatian and Serbian areas; return of camp-followers to their villages after they are disarmed; no executions of leading Partisans on our part... It is my opinion that this possibility should be pursued since secession from the enemy of this fighting force highly regarded in world opinion would be very important. In fact, the Tito Partisans are, in their masses, not Communists.. I refer to previous written reports and also to my conversation with State Secretary von Weizsacker. Request instructions. In talks with Casertano [Italian Minister in Zagreb] and Lorkovic [Croatian Foreign Minister] I found that the above development would be treated positively. ('Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945', Walter R. Roberts, p. 109) (IMG)

Indeed, Tito had already turned his back on Moscow since long ago. The Nazi agent was never a friend of the USSR in the first place; nor were such deals with the Nazis particularly new for him, considering his history of collaboration with the Third Reich as their agent. In fact, Gestapo agents Tito and Djilas were very confident about the need for backstabbing the USSR:

Neither I nor the other Central Committee members [who were aware of these deals] had any pangs of conscience that by negotiating with the Germans we might have betrayed the Soviets, internationalism, or our ultimate aims. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)

We were in agreement on the course of the negotiations, though Tito was the least skeptical of all. I raised the question, "What will the Russians say?"

Tito replied almost angrily – in anger at the Russians, not me – "Well, they also think first of their own people and their own army!" (...). I was very pleased with Tito's reaction: yes, it was clear to me that we were beginning to differ with the Soviets over a very sensitive question – the most sensitive of all – and one that was vital to us. Had someone asked me then if this divergence from the Soviets agreed with our ideology, I would have replied, "Well, our struggle is also a contribution to the Marxist-Leninist teaching." In other words, as long

as life fits into the ideology – as long as the ideology makes possible a productive orientation – the ideology is alive. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 231) (IMG)

Here too, the widening rift between Tito's fascist clique and Moscow can be observed. Stalin, as implicitly admitted by the prominent US military and intelligence official Franklin Lindsay, would have strongly disapproved of any such deals between Tito's gang and the Nazi Germans. Referring to the matter, Lindsay wrote:

had [Stalin] known of the latter [i.e. Titoist-Nazi deal] he would have considered it high treason. (Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia, Franklin Lindsay, p. 334) (IMG)

As Djilas himself pointed out:

The negotiations were held in great secrecy. There were no differences among the top leaders.. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)

The Soviet leaders almost certainly had an idea as to the nature of the negotiations between Tito's terror gang and the Nazis, although they may not have necessarily known all the details. Note again that the Soviet intelligence service found Tito and his group highly suspicious since the 1930s, and, upon gaining the chance to hunt down Tito's girlfriend Elsa, had executed her during the Great Purge on the charge of espionage for the Gestapo.

Moscow expressed its suspicion of the treasonous Titoite-Nazi collaboration by asking on March 9, two days prior to the signing of the deal, whether Tito's clique would betray 'enslaved Europe' by ceasing 'the struggle against the worst enemy of mankind':

Besides, Tito had already received Moscow's reply. At the same time as the letter to the Germans, a dispatch had been sent to Moscow which mentioned only an exchange of prisoners. But this time Moscow was quick and discerning, and we received an immediate and angry reply, true to style: Is it possible that you who were an example to all of enslaved Europe – you who have until now shown such heroism – will cease the struggle against the worst enemy of mankind and of your people? (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 232) (IMG)

One needs not mention the fact that the phrase "you who were an example to all of enslaved Europe – you who have until now shown such heroism" in Moscow's statement to Tito's Gestapo gang was merely diplomatic rhetoric in which the Soviets themselves disbelieved. After all, the Soviets regarded Tito as a Nazi agent long before 1943. Tito's gang also promised to the Germans that the partisans would combat the British if they land in Yugoslavia:

We didn't shrink from declarations that we would fight the British if they landed. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 243) (IMG)

Again, by 1943, with Soviet victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, the balance had tilted in the favour of the Soviets, and hence the MI6 policy of bleeding the Soviets and Nazis out implied that the MI6 would ally with the Nazis – and with Tito's gang. Therefore, Tito's gang would not hold on to that promise of striking the British imperial forces, nor would their German spymasters want them to act on their promise. Therefore, it was only a matter of time before the MI6 would begin supplying the Third Reich's agents – in the case of Yugoslavia, the Gestapo agent Tito's clique – with all kinds of assistance in order to prop up Tito's gang against the Soviets.

By the time Djilas returned to the partisan base later in March:

I found Tito and the Supreme Staff in a village not far from Kalinovik. I made my report to Tito, but he didn't seem quite as interested as before: the Germans had, in fact, already called a halt to their drive, while our units had won a hard-fought victory over Pavle Djuric's Chetniks, and were penetrating into Hercegovina toward Montenegro and Sandzak. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)

For further negotiations:

Velebit and Djilas passed again through the German lines and were brought by a German military plane from Sarajevo to Zagreb on March 25, 1943. ('Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945', Walter R. Roberts, p. 109) (IMG)

It should not come as a surprise that the Germans allowed their own agents, Velebit and Djilas who served their top agent Tito, to travel through German lines on German aircraft. Djilas returned to the partisan base but was greeted with the skepticism of the Hero of Yugoslavia and top Yugoslav communist freedom-fighter, General Sava Kovacevic, who warned Djilas and Tito against collaboration with the Nazi enemy:

Sava was sprawled out by a fire, eating supper. He said to me, ... suddenly, with a sly smile, he added, "Don't you go making peace between us and the Germans!"

I felt trapped and confused, nevertheless I was on the offensive: "Don't be a wise guy! Don't you have any confidence in the Central Committee? This is an exchange of prisoners. And to protect the wounded from being killed."

"I do trust them!" Sava said, "but the army has just barely gotten started against the Germans. They're our worst enemies."

(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, pp. 238-239) (IMG)

The Tito-Djilas faction had serious disputes with Sava Kovacevic. As the reader may recall, the Soviets believed that the casualties of the Battle of Sutjeska, in which General Kovacevic was murdered by the Nazis, was a case of tactical sabotage in favour of the Nazis by the command of the Yugoslav "Communist" Party. In any case, by allying with the Nazi Wehrmacht, Tito's gang inevitably contributed to the murder of their and the Wehrmacht's Yugoslav communist foe, Kovacevic.

Upon returning to Tito's position in the partisan base, Djilas was welcomed by the 'overjoyed' Tito who claimed that the Germans maintained the 'spirit of chivalry' given their well-treatment of Djilas:

Tito and the Supreme Staff were up there by a cliff, deep in the forest.

Tito was overjoyed to see me. (...).

"And how did the Germans treat you?" Tito inquired.

"Correctly, very correctly."

"Yes, it seems that the German army has kept something of the spirit of chivalry," Tito commented.

I told Tito and the others of my impressions and experiences, talking until the afternoon, when Tito had to go on to Glavatitevo and I had to return to Bijela, to await word from Velebit.

(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 240) (IMG)

As mentioned previously, the deal with the Nazis was only nominally a prisoner exchange. In reality, it was not a prisoner exchange at all. Tito's gang unilaterally released Major Stoecker not in exchange for something from the Nazis but as a gesture of good will. The rest of the prisoners had already been allowed to escape. As Djilas put it in the following excerpt, 'there were no more' 'prisoners', and it was illogical to say that the Partisans could send those 'prisoners' back to the Nazis because those 'prisoners' were not really 'rounded up' at all in the first place. Djilas wrote:

Tito and the Supreme Staff were up there by a cliff, deep in the forest.

(...) I was convinced that the ... release of Major Stoecker and the other prisoners by us would be looked upon as a token of good will, so Tito approved this immediately. We sent Major Stoecker and my escort on their way to Konjic within the next twenty-four hours. As for the remaining dozen or so prisoners – there were no more – we couldn't send them yet because they weren't rounded up. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 240) (IMG)

The fact that these 'prisoners' were not really rounded leaves no doubt that those Nazi German officials 'captured' during the Partisans' implausible tactical 'victory' over the Nazis were not really captives at all. Rather, that Tito sent back Major Stoecker as an intermediary for alliance negotiations shows that these 'captives' were a delegation of negotiators and spies dispatched by the Nazi command to inquire about the conditions of the Yugoslav 'Communist' Party and to then be dispatched back by Tito's group to inform the Nazi authorities of the susceptibility of the Titoist-dictated YCP for a strategic partnership with the Axis. The fake 'exchange' of fake 'prisoners' was purely a cover for intelligence contacts with the Nazis.

On March 31, Kasche confirmed to Ribbentrop that:

the reliability of Tito's promises has been confirmed. ('Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945', Walter R. Roberts, p. 110) (IMG)

Indeed, Tito had strictly ordered his troops not to fight the Germans, and, as with the past, was able to 'escape' through a deal with the Gestapo:

The Yugoslav archives show that Tito wrote to the commandant of the 6th Bosnian Brigade, telling him to continue attacking the Chetniks but to avoid fighting the Germans on the way to the Sandjak. Similar orders, written partly in Spanish were sent to the 1st Bosnian Corps and the 1st Proletarian Brigade.

General Glaise von Horstenau personally made it possible for Velebit to deliver a letter from Tito to the Partisans in Slavonia. It seem that von Horstenau and local German intelligence officers favoured a deal with the partisans..

Meanwhile the 2nd Proletarian Division had scored a crushing victory over the Chetniks; and by early April the Partisans were standing upon the banks of the River Drina, preparing to cross to the Sandjak, Montenegro and, as they imagined, safety.

Tito's escape across the River Neretva, once hailed as a triumph of tactical feint and daring, was really made possible by a deal with the Germans.

(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 152) (IMG)

Through such cowardly 'escapes', the Nazis were intentionally making a hero out of him. On November 17, 1943, Velebit proposed to the Nazis to recognize the partisan units of Yugoslavia as a legitime and legal belligerent to be respected according to the Hague Convention:

The idea of this "equality" seems to have been so mature until the day of the prisoners' exchange (17 November) that one of the partisan negotiators, Agramer's advocate Dr. Vladimir Velebit, took this opportunity to formally propose to the German side the recognition of the People's Liberation Army as a legal belligerent power and a

mutual respect for the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 171. Citing: BA/MA, RH 26-114/14 Die kommunistische Aufstandsbewegung im Raum des ehemaligen Jugoslawien (30.10.1942). For Velebit interview, the author cites: Survey of Dr. Vladimir Velebit in Zagreb (9. u. 10.5.1998).) (IMG)

Usually, calling on the enemy forces to recognize one's own forces as legitimate is a correct policy, given it serves as a propaganda victory against the enemy. However, I need not mention that in this case, and in light of the history of the espionage and sabotage by Tito's gang on behalf of the Axis, this measure by Velebit can be seen as yet another instance of how Tito's gang aimed to retain the favour of the fascist forces. During March 1943, Tito sent Velebit to Croatia to prevent the partisans from engaging in combat against the Nazi Germans. However, the Croatian Communist Party leadership suspected Velebit of being an undercover agent:

Tito immediately approved Velebit's return to Zagreb, and stopped the operations of the Slavonian Partisans, particularly on the Zagreb-Belgrade railroad. Velebit carried out this assignment, taking quite a bit of time. He also brought Herta back. He told me that he had trouble in Slavonia: the Partisans suspected him of being a provocateur, and the supreme command in Croatia had to intervene. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)

Recall that the Soviets had accused Velebit of being a high-level Nazi spy. A Soviet Foreign Ministry had stated:

In [1941] Tito's colleague Velebit denounced members of the Central Committee of the Croatian Communist party who met at his villa. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol'stvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

Indeed, in Croatia, Tito's 'home', the conditions were rather different. There, by late 1942, with the defeats suffered by the Nazis in the Battle of Stalingrad, the real communist faction saw an elevation of its strength in correlation with the weakening of the Nazis and of the Nazis' agents, the Trotskyites. The communists of the 'Communist Party of Croatia' (KPH) were led by Andrija Hebrang who strongly agreed with the USSR on the merits of popular frontism. During the anti-fascist war, the communists of Croatia downplayed communist rhetoric and symbolism and strongly rejected such Trotskyite notions as (1) 'leaping' from fascist slavery to socialism, (2) imposing the Trotskyite 'socialist' mode of production on the masses of the Yugoslav workers and peasants, (3) pursuing left-sectarian policies, such as denouncing anti-fascist progressive bourgeois-democratic parties and overemphasizing 'socialist' symbols such as red flags. The KPH mainstream assessed that the attempt by Tito's Trotskyite-fascist gang to aggressively impose socialism on Yugoslavia would have only fed into the imperialist-fascist propaganda narratives that communists were dictatorial and that the USSR was an aggressive expansionist power:

"One has only to look at the 'ultraleftist' sectarian slogans on the walls of houses and on fences throughout the liberated territory, in the press, etc.," said one of the KPH's editorials, "to see how sectarianism – and phrasemongering, too, which is its complement – is blooming." Many Communists not only allowed various "ignorant fanatics to fly only red flags and to show 'leftist' sectarian slogans, but did the same themselves, though our audience is the masses of the people and our rallies [must be] national-militant and antifascist in character." Moreover, the ultra-left underestimated the firmness of the Soviet coalition with the Western Allies: "These comrades are falling for fascist slanders and carefully contrived fancies, which are designed to force a wedge between the Allies, weaken the coalition, and isolate the USSR, which would mean the weakening and isolation of the whole consistent antifascist movement throughout the world."

The social policy of the KPH was as moderate as its overall Popular Front approach. The KPH repeatedly stressed that economic life on Partisan territory was being conducted "on the basis of private ownership, private initiative, and freedom of trade." Croatian Partisans encouraged the free exchange of goods, except when shortages of such staple commodities as grain encouraged speculation and hindered military supply. Moreover, ZAVNOH and the Croatian headquarters staff declared in 1943 that the "national liberation movement is introducing no radical changes in regard to social life" and that it "recognizes the inviolability of private ownership as well as the broadest possibilities for the expression of initiative in industry and in other economic activities." (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, p. 87) (IMG)

Hebrang's call for a "true war against sectarianism" was meant to break the resistance of those KPH forces that were opposed to any appeal to the members of the Croat Peasant Party. He rightly suspected that such sectarian tendencies thrived in Dalmatia, where the influence of the KPJ Politburo was much stronger than in his Partisan "republic," the vast liberated territory "from the Kupa to the sea" – that is, in Baniia, Kordun, Lika, Gorski Kotar, and Hrvatsko Primorje. Hebrang claimed that "fear of cooperation with the Croat Peasant Party and its adherents (which is evident in some comrades) only reveals their own political weakness and insecurity." In short, his line was far closer to the coalitionist Soviet positions during the war than to the leftist stance of the KPJ. Small wonder that as early as November 1943 the KPH called for a "free, popular democratic, federative community in Yugoslavia and the Balkans " Small wonder, too, that Stalin and not Tito was cited as the only

[ideological] authority in the main organ of the KPH until September 1943.. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, pp. 88-89) (IMG)

‘Hebrang himself, remarked Banac, ‘tried to answer questions about the social order after the war in his rousing report to the Second Session of ZAVNOH October 14, 1943’ as such:

The first problem is the question of land for the peasants, because the land must belong to those who cultivate it without respite or compensation. Workers, too, have their demands and their rights. They must be guaranteed better work conditions, a better livelihood, and greater influence in public life. The middle strata, those small people who were totally exploited and oppressed by capital, also have their demands, which we shall take into consideration so that they can live in a more human way. In short, the position of the working masses must be thoroughly improved.... The Democratic Republic of Yugoslavia will clip the wings of capital, which will be supervised and will serve its people. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, pp. 87-88) (IMG)

Thanks to these policies, the communist-led anti-fascist partisan movement in Croatia, far from shrinking, dramatically grew:

By the summer of 1943 the Partisan movement in Croatia had scored some dramatic gains, in part because the KPH avoided many of the errors of Tito's supreme staff. The Croatian Partisans, well away from the Politburo's eye, followed their own dictates and imposed no rigid ideological restraints on the noncommunists in the movement. The organizational vehicle for their policy was the Zemaljsko antifascističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske (ZAVNOH, Land Antifascist Council of People's Liberation of Croatia), Croatia's equivalent of AVNOJ – that is, the highest representative body in the land, intended to evolve into the Croatian parliament (Sabor). From the beginning the members of ZAVNOH were plainly identified as adherents of separate parties – the Croat Peasant Party, the Independent Democratic Party (the main Serb party in Croatia), KPH, various popular associations and trade unions – or as independents. Though the Communists stressed that their party was the “leading force in the national liberation struggle,” the KPH increasingly used the language of Croat patriotism in its “mass line.” The goal and the meaning of the Partisan struggle, according to the Hebrang nucleus of the KPH, was the resolution of the national question. “The struggle that the Croat people are today waging for their national liberation, though this struggle contains a series of new developments and changes, is nevertheless a natural, logical continuation and the highest expression of the centuries-old national Struggle – to determine their own fate freely in their own home.” (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, pp. 84-85) (IMG)

The British Embassy in 1949 admitted:

On liberated territory Hebrang was most active in organising Z.A.V.N.O.H and promoting good relations and comradeship-in-arms between Serbs and Croats in Croatia and in bringing the Left wing of the Croat Peasant Party into the Partisan movement. He has also been frequent contributor to the Partisan press and secretary of the National Liberation Front for Croatia. Hebrang may perhaps be regarded as the most able and forceful Croat Partisan leader after Marshal Tito himself. (LEADING PERSONALITIES IN YUGOSLAVIA, R 8191/1012/92, No. 75, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Attlee, August 18, 1949; Received: , August 23, 1949, Foreign Office (Balkans, 1949) – Yugoslavia, p. 68. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1949) – Whole Book, p. 296) (IMG)

It is no wonder then, that:

By the summer of 1943 Hebrang's line was a source of much displeasure in the KPJ leadership. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, p. 89) (IMG)

As Tito was continuing his consistent betrayal of the national liberation cause, the KPH, in agreement with the Soviets, continued to pursue its anti-fascist popular front strategy:

In his famous speech at the Third Session of ZAVNOH, at Topusko on May 8, 1944, Hebrang declared that the “national liberation movement has been and is leading the struggle not for communism but ... for common popular aims – for national liberation and democracy.” The Topusko session also adopted a declaration that guaranteed to the peoples and citizens of Democratic Croatia the rights of ownership and property, of private initiative, of freedom of religion and conscience, and of speech, press, assembly, consultation, and association (the latter four within the framework of the Partisan movement for the duration of the war). Small wonder that Kardelj faulted the Slovene party leadership for publishing the “decisions of the Third Session of ZAVNOH, because we [the KPJ Politburo] do not agree with them in everything.” (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, p. 88) (IMG)

The strong presence of the fascists in Yugoslavia gave Tito the leverage through which to oust Hebrang, the agent of the proletarians, and demote him. Thus, as the Croatian ambassador Ivo Goldstein put it:

Disputes between Hebrang and other Communist leaders became more frequent in 1944 (his opponents accused him of insufficient ‘Yugoslavism’), and Tito decided to post him to Belgrade – where, however,

he and Tito continued to have disagreements. (Croatia: A History, McGill-Queen's Press, Ivo Goldstein, p. 150) (IMG)

And from then on:

Vladimir Bakaric (1912-83) became the leading figure in Croatia [since 1944] and so remained till his death. (Croatia: A History, McGill-Queen's Press, Ivo Goldstein, p. 150) (IMG)

And of course, Bakaric was:

Tito's close associate.. (Croatia: A History, McGill-Queen's Press, Ivo Goldstein, p. 150) (IMG)


Hebrang would later pay dearly for daring to disagree with Tito.

While Tito was accusing Hebrang of not being loyal to Yugoslavia enough, he was hypocritically also committing more and more betrayals of the cause. In 1944, Tito held discussions with the infamous fascist Pope Pius XII: on August 9, 1944, Josip Broz visited the Vatican in the strictest secrecy, as can be seen from the facsimile of the document presented here, and according to unofficial sources held talks with top officials and even with Pope Pius XII, which were never reported in Yugoslavia, either at the government level or in the party. (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Smilja Avramov, p. 233)

The following is the very brief report:

Following the news appeared in the press of a visit to Saint Peter of Yugoslav officials, I communicate that it has been confirmed in the Vatican that Marshal Tito along with his team of advisors has, naturally in cognito, visited ... St. Peter's Basilica. (Telegram N. 293/198, Visit to St. Peters of Marshall Tito Marshal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 14, 1944)

It is not known exactly what the Gestapo agent Tito and the fascist Pope discussed. By the time Tito and the Pope met, Italy had already been taken over by the Anglo-Americans and the fascist Vatican had become a hub for Anglo- American intelligence services. The essence of Tito's conversation with the Pope must have boiled down to a discussion on how to ensure the victory of fascism during the post-war years, in an alliance with the Anglo-American intelligence services, the patrons of the Axis, against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies.



Left Photo: (Telegram N. 293/198, Visit to St. Peters of Marshall Tito Marshal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 14, 1944). Facsimile in: 'Genocide in Yugoslavia' by Smilja Avramov.)

Right Photo: Tito (right) meets Pope Pius (far left, sitting on a chair) on August 1944 -

from the Italian Archives, uncovered by Smilja Avramov.

It is said that the Nazi German intelligence had not even known of such a Yugoslav leader with the name 'Tito'. That is a blatant lie. In fact, it is even well possible that the code name 'Tito' was given to Josip Broz by the Axis secret services. The name 'Josip Tito' is the Romanto-Yugoslav version of the name 'Josephus Titus'. The historical 'Josephus Titus' was a prominent Israelite general who was responsible for leading the war of liberation against Roman colonial conquerors of Eretz Yisrael – except that Josephus Titus was actually a traitor among the Israelites and turned out to be a saboteur and spy for the Roman colonizers. Josephus Titus provided the Roman colonizers with plenty of intelligence materials, allowing them to systematically decimate the Israelite war of national liberation. Considered by the Romans

as the 'good' Israelite, he further assisted the Romans in creating a new branch of Judaism called "Christianity," which later grew on to become its own separate religion. Christianity was promoted by him and the Romans in order to (1) smuggle Roman colonial Paganism into Judaism, (2) to utilize the Pharisaic Jews' texts, the genocide-supporting Old Testament, to support Roman colonial terror against the Israelites, and (3) to utilize the 'pacifist' capitulationist junk of the New Testament so to render the Israelites into pacified, submissive cheek-turners. The story of Josephus Titus had many parallels with the story of Josip Tito. In their propaganda, the Nazi Germans defined the war against communism as a 'war against the Jews'. Tito was the commander of the Communist Party's war of liberation and hence, from the perspective of someone who believes in Nazi propaganda, the 'commander of the Jews' – yet, he was a traitor to the communists and hence, if one is to use Nazi propaganda rhetoric, a 'traitor to the Jews'. He promoted Trotskyite savagery as a fifth column of the Nazis, just like how Josephus Titus promoted Pharisaic Judaism as a terrorist cultural idea that assisted the Romans in justifying terror activities against Israel. He promoted capitulation to international fascism just like how Christianity supported such pro-oppression capitulation. He smuggled fascist anti-communist ideas into the communist anti-fascist movement, just like Josephus Titus and his smuggling of anti-Israelite ideas into the culture of the Israelites. He was considered by the imperialists as the 'good Communist' just like the 'good Jew' Josephus Titus. Many Serbs rightly regard Tito as an agent of the Vatican, much as how Titus was an agent of Rome. By the way, the parallels go much beyond the time of the codenaming of 'Tito'; Josephus Titus strongly supported the Roman war of terror against the Israelites, much as how Tito's group later backed the Nazi Panzerwaffe and Horthyite troops that entered Hungary in 1956 (more on this in C20S13) and carried out numerous pogroms against the Yiddish proletarians there – the result of the Roman war was the dispersal of the Israelites, much as how the result of Tito's Nazi covert war on Hungary's Yiddish Israelite proletarians forced many of the latter to disperse and flee.

Whereas 'Josip' is a Yugoslav version of 'Josephus', the name 'Tito' is a Hispano-Italian version of the name 'Titus'. The name 'Tito' could have arisen for Josip Broz during the time of the growth of his intelligence ties to the Italian Fascists. It is however speculated by some scholars that the name came from his activities during the Spanish Civil War. Josip Broz's activities during the Civil War were suspicious. He was responsible for gathering the team of communists and progressives who would travel to Spain as volunteers. Onto a French ship the volunteers secretly got. Yet, information of the position of the ship and of the volunteers on board somehow ended up in the hands of an MI6-backed secret service in southeastern Europe and those volunteers were all hunted down by the police in just one move. Tito was suspected of having had a hand in this. As well, according to the prominent Slovenian pro-Titoist history scholar Jozef Pirjevec:

In another letter, sent the following day [in May 1944], Foreign Office diplomat M. E. Rose mentioned to Elizabeth Barker, who was active in British wartime propaganda, that word of crimes committed by Tito during the Spanish Civil War were circulating in London in the spring of 1944. (Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pirjevec, 2015, p. 36) (IMG)

Tito and his friends had many contradicting narratives on the origins of the codename 'Tito' for Josip Broz. One narrative is that the phrase 'Ti To' means 'You that' in Serbian, which could be used as an indication that Tito was authoritarian and used to ordering people and assigning people different tasks ('you do that; you do this'). Tito himself claimed that he adopted the name 'Tito', because, he claimed, it was common in the Kumrovec region. However, the 'Sir Wilfred Grenfell College' professor and scholar on Croatia, Tony Fabijancic, fact-checked Tito's claim by studying the Church records of the Kumrovec zone and spoke to the people there, and found that the name was not common there at all, with no one there knowing any 'Tito' beside 'Josip Broz' (see his book 'Croatia', p. 62). Of course, I have no proof for my theory that the name 'Tito' was inspired by 'Josephus Titus' but unavoidable are the parallels in their stories and the similarities of their names.

The years 1943 and 1944 were crucial years for Tito's foreign policy for the next 40 years. It was in this time period that the Nazi agent Tito would foster bonds with the Anglo-American intelligence services. As mentioned previously the gradual retreat of the Nazis since the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk had led the British into a covert full-scale alliance with the Third Reich against the Soviet Union. This Anglo-German alliance was also manifested in the MI6's support for the Gestapo agent Tito and his fascist clique. Klugmann, the very MI6 operative who is officially said to have convinced Churchill of the need for assisting Tito's gang instead of the Chetniks, said the following about the change in British policy:

At a certain time, and exactly how and when history still has to disclose, the British political and military leadership, on a very high and top-secret level, must have received information, some of which it may have had all along, that there were leading elements *inside the Partisan forces, inside the Yugoslav Communist Party*, spies and provocateurs, Gestapo elements, Trotskyites, who could be 'trusted' (from the point of view of British imperialism), and could be used to betray the Yugoslav people's liberation movement *from inside*, and carry out an Anglo-American imperialist policy.

This was the basis of the change of British policy from Mihailovic to Tito in the period of 1942-43. It was carried out with the maximum secrecy and with that great measure of cunning and deceit for which British

imperialism, with its long and unrivalled experience of cunning and deceit, has become notorious throughout the world. (From Trotsky to Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, Chapter 2) (IMG)

The MI6 officer Klugmann, unlike the other MI6 agents cited elsewhere throughout this book, was either a communist or a communist-coopted agent. His comments, which may appear as 'biased' in favour of the USSR, are completely corroborated by staunchly anti-Soviet sources not coopted by the communists

The imperialists, an article in the Soviet press – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – correctly assessed in 1950, correctly regarded Tito as Hitler's successor and acting as a bulwark against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies:

The imperialists rightly regard Tito as Hitler's successor. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol'stvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

Precisely for this reason did the British military support Tito's gang even though the latter viewed itself on the German side:

On 11 May the Yugoslav government in exile, probably under British coercion, instructed Mihailovic to make up his differences with the Partisans and to join the fight against the Germans.

Those Partisans who knew of the 'March Consultations' heard all this with private amusement. They still regarded themselves as on the side of the Germans against the British and the royalist exiles.

(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 153) (IMG)

And for this reason, the MI6 funded the Gestapo agent Tito even though the latter retained his connections to German intelligence:

During the summer of 1943, more British officers parachuted into the territory held by the Partisans, while the RAF started to drop supplies of clothing and food for the ragged and hungry guerrillas. Tito had not yet ... cut off his ties with German agents such as Hans Ott. Even in late November 1943, when Britain was pouring in arms and supplies to the Partisans, Tito's transport department obtained a herd of horses from the Germans, in return for allowing shipments of chrome to enter the Reich. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 163) (IMG)

Under the command of the blood-soaked Gestapo agent Tito, numerous Yugoslav communists and patriots had been killed at the frontlines of the anti-fascist war. It was necessary for Tito's gang to increase the number of its troops, so to appear 'popular' and 'powerful', and to infiltrate thousands of Nazis to become members of the Yugoslav Communist Party or army, as means of rendering the fascists in the YCP into a powerful minority if not a majority, helping to tilt the 'democratic' balance of power in the Party and army in favour of the Tito faction against the communists and democratic freedom-fighters. For the Nazi troops, in the face of the advancing Red Army troops, it was important that they join the Yugoslav Titoist army so to present themselves as 'anti-fascists' and save themselves from purges by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. This last point in turn would have given the British the excuse to covertly fund and arm the Nazis under the guise of 'anti-fascist' work. The combination of all of these factors was manifested in the fact that:

2,000 members of the SS Handzar division, joined the Partisans and formed Tito's "Sixteenth Muslim Brigade" in September 1943. (The War in Bosnia, 1992-1995: Analyzing Military Asymmetries and Failures, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Thesis Advisor: David Yost Co-Advisor: Donald Abenheim, Thesis Author: Gheorghe Anghel, June 2000, pp. 18-19) (IMG)

The Tito group's permission to thousands of Handzar SS Nazi-Ustase operatives to infiltrate the YCP, hence to access internal YCP documents, constitutes a form of espionage for the Nazis.

In the Soviet Union, the MI6-backed Gestapo agent Tito had a network of supporters. The Titoist network in the USSR was led by the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria:

My father also relied on the [fake 'anti-Nazi'] resistance fighters who had remained in their own countries [because the Nazis, having killed many of the actual anti-Nazi guerillas, had leniently allowed these fake 'anti-Nazi' 'resistance' fighters to stay in their own countries]. He thought that ... Hungarian Nagy, the Czech Slansky and the entire Yugoslav group of Tito, Djilas and Rankovic had endorsed his view.. (...). In Yugoslavia, my father's networks and those of the British had collaborated with Tito during the war. My father followed with attention the affairs of that country. One day, when the Yugoslav leader Kardelj complained to him about Tito's tyrannical character, he replied: 'Don't you think that we are all in the same boat?' He took care to add, however, that heads of state who mattered always had negative sides. Rankovic, the head of Yugoslav security, was more primitive than Kardelj, but Tito had total confidence in him, which was why he often acted as intermediary between Tito and my father. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 196-197) (IMG)

In contrast to the British, Roosevelt disagreed regarding Yugoslavia:

President Roosevelt wanted to rid the world of empires, whether that of the British in India or of the French in

Indo-China, and this attitude may have coloured his outlook on Yugoslavia. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 177) (IMG)

Indeed, the US President:

Roosevelt ... did not share Churchill's enthusiasm for Tito .. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 177) (IMG)

Roosevelt was a true friend of Stalin. Nonetheless, not much could be done by the democratically elected President of the United States, for he did not have many agents in the US military and intelligence bodies, whereas American finance capital dominated such means of violence. Hence, the clear gaps between the US intelligence service and Roosevelt can be observed as early as 1943, when the OSS began funding and arming the YCP partisans – by then a mix of Soviet-friendly Yugoslav patriots, democrats, and communists on the one hand and the anti-Soviet Anglophilic Nazis, Ustase, and jihadists on the other. Fighting alongside all these different factions within the YCP forces were the OSS officers who even commanded 600 Yugoslav Partisan forces. Joseph F. Jakub, a prominent US intelligence and diplomatic official, said:

The performance of the OSS team supporting the Partisans from Italy between October and December 1943 was a testament to the American's ingenuity and energy in moving huge quantities of captured Italian materiel in combat conditions to Yugoslavia. Indeed, it was in the best 'can-do' traditions of Donovan's organization. When OSS dispatched Sterling Hayden in November to Bari, he quickly established a base on behalf of Allied Forces Headquarters at the Italian port of Monopoli, which lay some 30 miles to the south, which became the principal operating base when Bari was bombed by the Germans soon thereafter. With 400 Partisans, 14 schooners, and assorted other vessels, Hayden directed the resupply of the Partisan-held island of Vis, mostly using Italian arms prized away from the British Command. OSS Bari, meanwhile, delivered 6500 tons of uniforms, food, medicine, weapons, and ammunition to the Partisans via a motley assortment of some 60 seagoing vessels between 15 October and 31 December. The Americans provided 150 000 gallons of petrol to a British torpedo boat facility in the Dalmatian islands that had been established at OSS Bari's request to protect the supply fleet, and delivered large amounts of diesel Oil, kerosene, petrol, and lubricating oil to Tito's forces. In conjunction with SOE's Force 133, OSS organized, equipped, and transported to Dalmatia a 'brigade' of 2000 fighters who had been recruited from among Yugoslavs interned in Italy. OSS assigned an officer to manage the Partisan supply facility on Vis and organized a shipping line between Bari and the three major Sicilian ports 'to assist in transporting 7000 tons of captured enemy material to Bari for trans-shipment to Yugoslavia ... By the end of December 1943 four Partisan bases at Bari, Monopoli, Molfetta, and Manfredonia were in full operation under the command of OSS officers with a staff of some 600 Partisans. ('Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-1945', Joseph F. Jakub III, p. 135) (IMG)

The OSS involvement marked the beginning of a decades-long relationship between Tito's fascist clique and the US intelligence. In the absence of an official 'Third Reich', it was inevitable that Tito would be recruited by the post-war era's most powerful fascism-friendly regime: the regime of the United States. The CIA was founded in 1947. However, by the late 1940s, Tito indeed consistently consulted the CIA. The prominent pro-Tito Yugoslav scholar and politician Joze Pirjevec said:

According to Dedijer, Tito himself frequently met CIA functionaries in Belgrade and together they planned common policy. This did not escape the attention of the Soviets. (Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pijjevec, 2015, p. 212) (IMG)

Note that Dedijer was the official biographer of Tito.

The above excerpt refers to the 'common policy' of Tito's gang and the CIA. Every policy of Tito's group was in common with that of the CIA fascists. Not wrongly did the Soviet press reports frequently emphasize that 'American imperialism bought the Gestapo agent Tito and his clique for a low price'. In fact, Tito's regime, arising from the comprador classes (kulaks, bureaucrats, comprador merchants, comprador bankers, etc.) allied to Anglo-American finance capital, was furnished with American imperialist financial and military supports of all kinds. Furthermore, as confirmed by the Cominform resolution of 1949:

The Tito clique transformed Belgrade into an American center for espionage and anti-Communist propaganda. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

The remarks by the Cominform are well-documented as correct, and more and more evidence of the correctness of the remarks will be presented throughout this book. However, some of the evidence will be presented here as well. A top American intelligence operative who parachuted into Yugoslavia to help Tito said in his memoirs:

As the tempo of the Cold War increased in 1948, driven by the ruthless installation of full Communist governments in Eastern Europe, I was asked to join in the creation of a new postwar secret operations organization. Known first as OPC (Office of Policy Coordination – a deliberately bland name), it later became

a part of CIA. Almost immediately we were directed to find ways to strengthen Yugoslav capabilities to remain independent of Moscow. (Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia, Franklin Lindsay, p. 336) (IMG)

By 1952, the prominent anti-Soviet US diplomatic official George Earle admitted that Tito was "our" (i.e. imperialist America's) "communist":

Tito ... was, after all, nothing but a murderous Communist. He happens to be our murderous communist.; so we get along with him. ("The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2208) (iMG)

The other Nazi agents who were the henchmen of Tito also participated in this relation with the CIA. The log of the director of the CIA is basically like the diaries or the daily memoirs of the high command of the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA director's log for December 13, 1951 states:

Chief, OS/Belgrade reports that Gen. Velebit has informed Ambassador Allen that all arrangements for liaison between CIA and the UDB in Belgrade will be complete within a week. The Yugoslav officer selected to conduct this liaison will be the direct representative of Interior Minister Rankovic but will sit in the Yugoslav Foreign Office for cover purposes and to avoid the precedent of allowing foreigners to go directly to the Interior Ministry. This procedure follows that proposed by CIA during the original conversations with Gen. Velebit. (DIRECTOR'S LOG, Top Secret, CIA, December 13, 1951, p. 208) (IMG)

The CIA cooperation with the UDB was since long before 1951. One of the intermediaries was the Joint Distribution Committee, the intelligence organization to which the Mossad was subordinated. However, according to the above quote, all arrangements for liaison between the 'former' Gestapo agent Velebit and Rankovic's fascist secret service and the CIA was to be fully completed within a week. Thus by late December 1951, the CIA's liaison with the UDB on all fronts was to be completed. Even before 1951, the UDB served the interests of the CIA, but 1951 smoothed such a relationship.

The cooperation between the Mossad and Tito's fascist secret service goes back at least to the mid-1940s. Aspects of this intelligence cooperation have been documented elsewhere in this book. However, to provide an introduction to this, here is some information. Uri Bialer, an official researcher for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, remarked: Yugoslavia had always been the location of one of the most important Mossad centers in Eastern Europe.

This situation was the result of the special relationship which the Yugoslavs had developed in the course of the Second World War and thereafter with representatives of the Yishuv who had operated in the framework of the British war effort. After the war, it seems to have been buttressed by ideological perceptions. As one of the Mossad emissaries in the Balkans phrased it: "The Yugoslavs saw in the [Mossad] an embodiment of the struggle against imperialism. The Yugoslavs ... as former partisans, ... felt an emotional affinity for the small nation struggling against an enemy that vastly outnumbered and overpowered it." (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 114) (IMG)

History would prove that Yugoslavia would continue to be the most important center of the Mossad activity in the bloc of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The ties of Tito's group to the Israeli military goes back to World War II, when Tito's group established liaison with Dan Lerner, a traitor to the 'Palmach', the Hebrew socialist military force that was later unfortunately subordinated to the IDF. Prominent Mossad official Ehud Avriel wrote in his memoirs:

The third and most spectacular assault was on the main radar station on Mount Carmel. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the Palmach, then stationed in the vicinity of Haifa, had received instructions in the beginning of November to prepare for the eventuality of the 'related struggle'. His name was Dan Lerner, although once it had been Ernest Loehner, the son of the exclusive Vienna shopkeeper, Rudolf Loehner, who at the last moment and by pure chance had been plucked from the doomed at Cladovo to accompany a small, lucky group of youngsters to Palestine. Since then he had served as a parachutist- liaison officer in Tito's headquarters during the Yugoslav partisans' war of liberation, and from a Palmach commander he was to rise to the rank of general in Israel's army. The young man who only a few years earlier had been an 'illegal immigrant' himself was now commanding an operation to help secure the arrival of what was left of the victims of Nazi Europe. ('Open the Gates!: A Personal Story of "Illegal" Immigration to Israel', Ehud Avriel, 1975, p. 230) (IMG)

No doubt during the period 1941 to late 1942, an alliance with the Israelis against the Third Reich was necessary. In the early stages of World War II, Israel – as the settler-colony of American imperialism – had to contribute some of its resources to engage in an intelligence war with Nazi Germany. Involving the "Jewish Agency in Palestine" into fighting the Nazis would have certainly been progressive in the first stages of the Great Patriotic War, (1) because it contributed resources to fighting the Nazis, and (2) because for fighting the Nazis, it was forced to reallocate some of its resources away from slaughtering the Arabs and onto helping in the fight against the Nazis. Of course, the Jewish Agency in Palestine contributed so little to the fight against the Nazis, but insofar as it did, it did a correct thing, for it shifted resources away from murdering the Arabs and onto fighting the Nazis. From late 1942 onwards, the Israeli regime ('The

Jewish Agency in Palestine’) began to sponsor the Nazis as a bulwark against the Soviets, and so from then on, Israel played a reactionary role. Hence, the Mossad (Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet) began to support Tito’s group after late 1942 – particularly in 1943:

Some 240 Palestinian Jews volunteered to parachute into the Balkans in 1943 and the British established training camps in Cairo and Haifa. The following year, 32 men and women were, in fact, dispatched in joint British-Allyah Bet missions into Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Slovakia, Austria, and Yugoslavia. (...). The most successful of the Palestinian agents, Yesheyahu Trachtenberg, better known as Shaik Dan, had a remarkable wartime and postwar intelligence career and is remembered as the savior of thousands of Romanian Jews. (‘CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001’, Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 7-8) (IMG{Israel})

In the later phase of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Red Army arrived in Yugoslavia and, in collaboration with Yugoslav communists, liberated Belgrade. The arrival of the Soviet Red Army in Yugoslavia partially undermined the lobbying power of the Titoist faction in the YCP while catapulting upwards the communist agents there. As such, the Soviet presence and the Yugoslav communists yet again emerged as a force with which the Gestapo agent Tito had to reckon. Once again, Tito needed to cause a leap from quantity to quality, to inflict a quantitative change so to yield a qualitative change. The consolidation of power in the hands of Tito and his gang thus required the elimination of hundreds of thousands of communists and the planting of Titoist agents at the critical positions in the ranks of Yugoslav state apparatus.

Tito’s gang on the other hand, sought to systematically exterminate numerous young Serbs so to deprive that nation of potential resistance to his fascist rule in the years to come, while also timing the massacre of the Serbs with the arrival of the Soviet Red Army so to render the arrival of the Soviets unpopular. Recall what the media of the Soviet foreign ministry had stated:

Thus the Belgrade hirelings of imperialist reaction, even before coming to power, destroyed by various means the finest sons of the Yugoslav people. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol'stvo (U.S.), p.

221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

Indeed, this clearly happened in the Srem front:

the majority of the Yugoslav people ... definitely will never forget that Tito mobilized thousands of youths, especially Serbs, immediately after the liberation of Belgrade, and sent them without training to be butchered in the front lines of the Srem front outside of Belgrade. In fact, the Serbs insist that Tito sent them purposely to be butchered as potential enemies of his regime. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive a vindictive Balkan, his hero-worshipping nature notwithstanding, looking upon his malefactor as a hero, particularly when this malefactor not only has done nothing to atone for his crimes, but even continued with his evil deeds. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

In an interview, respected Serbian historian Smilja Avramov stated:

His second order – and this was confirmed by many former elites and informers and members of intelligence services – the second order by Broz [Tito] was the liquidation of the ‘Belgrade Carsija’ [city center, i.e. elite]. (...). We know that in Belgrade a total of 3,000 people were killed without trial, simply killed on the spot, this was a tragedy. (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Dr. Smilja Avramov, 2/8) (IMG)

As a Nazi agent, Tito participated in Ustase’s genocide against the Serbian nation.

C12S2. Yugoslavia, Anti-Soviet Quantitative Changes for pro-American Qualitative Changes

*** IMG-All-{Titoist Yugoslavia}

As mentioned prior, the arrival of the Soviet Red Army in Yugoslavia reduced the lobbying power of the Titoist faction while catapulting upwards the communist agents in the YCP. As such, thanks to the Soviet presence, the Yugoslav communists yet again emerged as a force with which the Gestapo agent Tito had to reckon. Yet again, the campaign for the consolidation of power in the hands of the comprador classes represented by Tito’s gang necessitated a leap from quantity to quality, the infliction of a quantitative change so to yield a qualitative change – i.e. the elimination of hundreds of thousands of communists and the planting of Titoist agents at the critical positions in the ranks of Yugoslav state apparatus. One leading Soviet-backed communist oppositionist in Tito’s regime was Andrija Hebrang, Moscow’s most favoured for leadership in Yugoslavia. According to the MI6 operative Richard West:

Hebrang relied on plant and economic expertise from the Soviet Union, and came to be seen as Moscow’s man in the leadership. In 1945 he wrote a report for the Kremlin on differences in the Yugoslav Party. When he was dropped from the Politburo in April 1946, Hebrang looked to the Soviet Union for sympathy and support. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 221) (IMG)

By the year 1948, Tito's gang was ready to separate Yugoslavia from the camp of the socialist and progressive forces. This was not a very difficult thing for the Tito faction to do since Yugoslavia did not have as many proletarians, nor many kolkhoz peasants, hence keeping the pressure on Tito's gang low. At the same time, the regime that dominated Yugoslavia was made up mostly of Handzar SS units led by the band of Gestapo agents, Tito, Djilas, Velebit, etc. Years of savage terror against the population, and the Tito regime's praising of the USSR to the 'heavens', all served to link the name of the USSR in the minds of a significant minority of the Yugoslav public with the savagery of Tito's group. All of these, all such anti-communism which Tito's Trotskyite group was promoting, allowed for Tito's group to proceed ahead with moving Yugoslavia into the camp of Anglo-American imperialism. In "the first week of May," said a US National Intelligence Council document:

Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Zujovic were arrested and expelled from their party and government positions. Both men were Central Committee Members. Hebrang was minister for light industries and had recently been head of the more important Planning Commission. Zujovic was minister of finance.... Both men were eventually accused publicly of opposing the regime's ambitious Five Year Plan – a plan the Soviets also thought was too ambitious – and of being pro-Cominform. (Appendix A: Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, US National Intelligence Council, August 2006, p. 57. In: 'Yugoslavia: From "national Communism" to National Collapse, US National Intelligence Council, p. 683) (IMG)

Undoubtedly, it was necessary to centralize the Yugoslav economy over time. However, the Yugoslav regime was making Trotskyite leaps, swiftly expanding state control and swiftly centralizing the economy. This Trotskyite haste was condemned by the Cominform:

Recently, even after the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and fraternal parties had criticized the mistakes of the Yugoslav leaders, the latter tried to bring in a number of new leftist laws. They hastily decreed the nationalization of medium industry and trade, though the basis for this is completely unprepared. In view of such haste the new decision only hampers the supply of goods to the population. In a similar hurried manner they brought in a new grain tax for which the way is also not prepared and which can, therefore, only dislocate grain supplies to the urban population. Finally, only recently the Yugoslav leaders in loud declarations declared their love for, and devotion to, the Soviet Union, although it is known that in practice they are pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union. (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

Hebrang's views reflected the moderate views of the Cominform, which opposed the Trotskyite leap in the sphere of political economy:

Indeed Boris Kidric, the head of the Federal Planning Commission, indicted Hebrang and Djujovic, the previous economic bosses, for sabotaging and holding back the 'construction of socialism'. They were accused of attempting to check overambitious planning, and of insisting on the profitability of individual enterprises. The Second Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1949 prescribed 'greater boldness and a faster pace in setting up collective farms'. (...). The failure of [the phony] collective farms caused food shortages in towns. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 238) (IMG)

Hebrang, as Richard West correctly stated, was a supporter of the USSR. This was also confirmed by the Cominform, which stated:

The Information Bureau regards as disgraceful such actions as the expulsion from the Party and the arrest of the Central Committee members, Comrades Djujovic and Hebrang because they dared to criticize the anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and called for friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

The removal of Hebrang marked yet another step in the Titoist-fascist purges against Soviet-friendly elements. It was part of the anti-Soviet quantitative changes that were occurring in Yugoslavia, aimed at yielding a qualitative change in Yugoslavia's strategic orientation. The strategic orientation of states changes in the favour of the reactionary forces through the elimination of the progressive agents in the state and the elevation of reactionary agents as replacement. The elimination of Hebrang was that decisive step which allowed Tito's gang to reorient Yugoslavia strategically into the camp of American imperialism. As with almost every other issue, Tito did not consult the Central Committee on his decision to arrest Zujovic and Hebrang, even though both were prominent members of the Central Committee. As Djilas admitted:

The arrests of Sreten Zujovic and Andrija Hebrang were not discussed in the Central Committee either. Tito made that decision on his own. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 83) (IMG)

Regarding the fact that Tito's gang kept the Yugoslav Communist Party in the dark, the Cominform stated:

Unable to face the criticism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Central Committees of the other fraternal Parties, the Yugoslav leaders took the path of outrightly deceiving their Party and people by concealing from the Yugoslav Communist Party the criticism of the Central Committee's incorrect policy and also by concealing from the Party and the people the real reasons for the brutal measures against Comrades Djuiovic and Hebrang. (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

The fascist putsch against the communist elements in the Yugoslav Communist Party followed:

Expelling from the ranks of the Party those Communists loyal to proletarian internationalism, annihilating them, the Yugoslav fascists opened wide the doors of the Party to bourgeois and kulak elements. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

To be sure, the Yugoslav Communist Party already had numerous fascist agents of the reactionary classes dominating it, which was a key factor allowing Tito's gang to stay in power and to overthrow the communists in the first place. However, years of Red Army presence in Yugoslavia had given the communist faction in Yugoslavia some leverage, allowing it to plant communist agents in not insignificant positions in the Yugoslav regime. There still existed numerous communists who could have mounted resistance against Tito's fascist regime. In the June Resolution, it was also stated:

The Information Bureau considers that the bureaucratic regime created inside the Party by its leaders is disastrous for the life and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party. There is no inner Party democracy, no elections, and no criticism and self-criticism in the Party. Despite the unfounded assurances of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, the majority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is composed of co-opted, and not of elected members. The Communist Party is actually in a position of semi-legality. Party meetings are either not held at all, or meet in secret -- a fact which can only undermine the influence of the Party among the masses. This type of organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party cannot be described as anything but a sectarian-bureaucratic organization. It leads to the liquidation of the Party as an active, self-acting organism, it cultivates military methods of leadership in the Party similar to the methods advocated in his day by Trotsky. (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

The Party had been turned into a secretive conspirational network separate from the masses and devoid of democratic procedures. Even that Party, which had turned into a massive espionage hub, was not trusted by Tito, for sympathizers with the USSR existed in it, and the brief 1944-1948 period of Red Army presence had elevated the position of such communists. The fact that Tito made unilateral decisions without consultations with the Central Committee is further explained by Djilas who confirmed many of the statements of the Cominform in his memoirs:

Tito skipped over the Central Committee and his closest long-time comrades. In the Central Committee ... perhaps he suspected a strong resistance (or hesitation) at the top. (...). By nature, Tito was not morbidly suspicious, but he was vigilant and cautious. (...). Perhaps Tito was led to make his sudden, solitary decision -- this seems to me the most persuasive explanation -- by reports about the rising tide of Stalinists in the Party committees and among the army officers. (...). I suppose it can be argued that it was an incomplete Central Committee. It was elected in 1940 at the Fifth Party Congress but its Plenum did not meet until March 1948, and then to answer the letter of Molotov and Stalin that criticized the Yugoslavs for deviation.

In the notes to his official *Collected Works*, Tito maintains that the Central Committee could not have met because of the circumstances of war. This is nonsense. The time was three years after the war! There had indeed been plenty of time for leisure and hunting. Couldn't the Central Committee have met during the war, just as the Partisan assembly known as AVNOJ had met? The truth is that the Central Committee met when Tito needed its legal support. He needed its support against Stalin and wanted a full forum. Prior to that, the Politburo had met irregularly, with coopted members. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, pp. 82-83) (IMG)

The fact that 'Tito skipped over ... his closest long-time comrades', however, should not lead one to the delusion that Tito's decisions did not have the approval of Djilas, Rankovic, Kardelj, and other top-ranking members of Tito's clique. The belief in 'one-man totalitarian rule' is an inherently idealist belief; the fascist dictator Tito did not rule without the support of the fascist clique behind him, and Tito's fascist clique in turn were agents of Anglo-American and German finance capital. Anyways, the plots for setting up concentration camps against the communists were enforced through the anti-democratic 'National Assembly':

The arrests were already under way when a hastily drawn up law regarding the camp was pushed through the National Assembly. The wording was clumsy and naive. But it was functional in the use of a term, "socially beneficial work" .. Prison sentences meted out by the security forces usually amounted to two years, but the terms

could be extended in the camp. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 85) (IMG)

Meanwhile Hebrang was charged with all kinds of fascist slanders; denounced as an Ustase 'spy' allegedly 'collaborating' with the Nazis on the order of the Soviets, Hebrang was jailed. And rather than be tried, he was murdered in prison: Hebrang was assassinated by the political police in a Belgrade prison. The incident was presented to the public at the time as a suicide. Years later, at the end of the 1980s, the truth about Hebrang's politically inspired murder was revealed by historians and witnesses. (Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies, Oxford University Press, Reneo Lukic, Allen Lynch, p. 75) (IMG)

According to Ivo Banac, the date of his death was probably some time in 1949:

Hebrang was neither tried nor rehabilitated. He died in prison under highly ambiguous circumstances, probably in 1949. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, pp. 121-122) (IMG)

By the time of the Cominform's expulsion of Tito's gang, Tito's gang within the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) was confronted with the majority opposition of the communist faction, whom Tito's group labelled as the 'Cominformists'.

"Although the atmosphere was tense and poisoned by conspiratorial moods," Djilas remarked in his memoirs:

we were continuously surprised to learn that this or that high official was wavering, that he was expressing support for the Cominform. Stalinists were soon discovered in every institution of national life. Slanderous and threatening pro-Soviet propaganda addled the brains of many. Suspicion wormed its way into the souls of all who felt responsible for the state and the Party.

At the onset of the troubles, Rankovic said with great distress: "The worst thing is that you don't know who your enemy is! Yesterday's friend becomes today's enemy – the enemy in one's own house!" (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 82) (IMG)

Indeed:

It was common knowledge that there were federal ministers, deputies, members of the republican Central Committees, favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union and the Cominform. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 82) (IMG)

Judging public opinion in Yugoslavia, a CIA report stated:

There are many people in Yugoslavia today who believe that a majority of the Yugoslav Communists, particularly the hard core, are Cominformists. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The CIA itself agreed that the vast majority of Yugoslav communists opposed Tito's regime. Indeed, according to a US intelligence memorandum:

Tito, beside the implacable of hatred of the people, ... has against himself also the majority of the Yugoslav Communists. (Tito's True Face, Political Information (Analysis of Tito's Relationship with Stalin and the West, CIA, November 28, 1952, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

Furthermore:

Although the most outspoken and most militant Stalinists had been arrested, the Cominformists appeared to be multiplying. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 83) (IMG)

Experienced communists in the YCP formed the bulk of the 'Cominformist' struggle in Yugoslavia. These old Bolsheviks



Andrija Hebrang (right) and his wife Olga Hebrang (left).

Source: 'Hebrang', a documentary that utilizes the Yugoslav archives to uncover the circumstances of the murder of Hebrang. Photo in: Interfilm.hr

suffered Tito's counter-revolutionary purges the most:

Party "veterans", those who joined the Party prior to 1937, are not trusted by the regime because some of them, while living in Russia, became friendly with the leading members of the CPSU. Others belonged to party factions which opposed Tito. (...). The major part of these "veterans" cannot adapt themselves to the new Party line, e.g., abandon orthodox communist doctrine. Consequently, there is a tendency in the regime to remove them from their posts in the FCY [Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia] and the state administration. (General Political Situation, CIA, July 20, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

In the FCY and the state administration a great deal of attention is paid to the length of service of Party members. In general, the longer one has served in the Party the greater the privileges he is entitled to receive. However, most those who joined the Party prior to 1937 have disappeared, either through death or as victims of a Tito purge. (General Political Situation, CIA, July 20, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

The Cominformists were rather strong because of their deep ties to the working class, as well as their unmasking of the regime for its dictatorial behavior. As confirmed by the US intelligence:

The Cominformists do constitute an actual danger to the present regime because of their contact with the workers, their ability to mask their subversive activities from the UDB, and because of the inability of the present leadership of the Party to establish equal rights for all members of the Party, a situation which would be exploited by the Cominformists at the proper time. (General Political Situation, CIA, July 20, 1954, p. 15) (IMG)

The CIA document is a testament to the remarks of the USSR Information Bulletin, the media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry, which noted that the Yugoslav working class was overwhelmingly on the side of the Cominform:

Day by day the struggle of the working people in Yugoslavia against the fascist Tito regime is growing more intense. It is gaining a greater mass following, becoming better organized, and finding expression in new forms. All sections of the Yugoslav people, workers, peasants and intellectuals, youths and girls, men and women, are taking part in the heroic struggle. (The Yugoslav People's Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

The exposure of the Tito clique as a storm detachment of international imperialism has sharply changed the attitude of the Yugoslav people toward it. "Enemies of the Soviet Union and of the people's democracies are our enemies, too," say the peace-loving people of Yugoslavia, in whose name the fascist band of Belgrade rulers falsely claimed and still claims to be speaking. (Tito Clique Lacks Support of Yugoslav People, I. Livanov, August 11, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 15, p. 480) (IMG)

The 1949 Cominform resolution too stated:

The fascist ideology, and fascist domestic policy, as well as the perfidious foreign policy of the Tito clique, completely subordinated to the foreign imperialist circles, have created a gulf between the espionage fascist Tito-Rankovic clique and the vital interests of the freedom-loving peoples of Yugoslavia.

Consequently, the anti-popular and treacherous activity of the Tito clique is encountering ever-growing resistance from those Communists who have remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism, and among the working class and working peasantry of Yugoslavia. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

It was important that the communists would retain as much ground in the Yugoslav regime's means of violence, so that the way shall be paved for the overthrow of such a terror regime. Even among the members of the Yugoslav intelligence service (UDB), sympathies towards the Cominform were strong. In fact, some examples of serious dissent in the UDB are shown as follows by a 1949 CIA document:

In late May 1949, the entire District UDB of Gjurjevac escaped across the Drava River into Hungary. In June 1949, almost all the principal officials of the Central UDB for Montenegro attempted to escape to Albania. Several were killed and a larger number captured. It is not known how many reached Albania.

Stanko Cenica-Opacic, Minister of Forest Industries for the Republic of Croatia, and Marko Bellinic, President of the United Syndicates for Croatia, are suspected by the UDB of being pro-Cominform. Informant is certain that they are Cominformists and that they will break with Tito at the first opportunity.

Nova Borba and For a Socialist Yugoslavia have been smuggled in bottles and flasks floated down the Danubes Tomis and Tisa Rivers. The containers have allegedly been picked up by Cominformists in Yugoslavia and the newspapers reproduced on illegal printing presses and distributed throughout the country. (Reported UDB Defections and Cominform Activities in Yugoslavia, CIA, October 5, 1949, p. 1. Underline original) (IMG)

If possible, the 'Cominformist' UDB operatives should have stayed in the fascist UDB in order to foment subversion against the Titoist fascist regime from within, but some of the UDB officers were easy to hunt down by the Titoist fascist intelligence service. Hence, some of them needed to escape. Tito's gang also faced the resistance of the Yugoslav People's

Army. "If we take into consideration," Djilas remarked:

the fact that among army officers there was a substantial number of Cominformists, seven thousand, I believe, the possible danger to the system was not negligible. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

Therefore:

We had been afraid of pro-Stalin disturbance; (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 80) (IMG)

In such circumstances, Djilas argued, Tito's group could not have:

shown tolerance ... allowed the legalization of opposition within the Party ... compromised its defense against the .. pressure of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties within the Eastern European bloc – had the Party [leaders] allowed these, they might have led to the disintegration of the Party and to the ascendancy of pro-Soviet forces. It is the misfortune of dictatorial and particularly totalitarian powers that they cannot allow opposition without undermining their own survival. Besides, the pro-Soviet forces were more Stalinist than our own leadership. The ascent to power of those forces – and there could have been no doubt in anyone's mind about that – would have meant ... the removal of our present leadership and bloody purges within the Party.. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, pp.

84-85) (IMG)

Hence to prevent the fall of the fascist regime to the communist forces, it was vital for Tito's gang that anyone opposed would be exterminated, tortured, and/or brainwashed. In that famous 1949 resolution of the Cominform and its member parties, it was stated:

The Information Bureau, consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Rumanian Workers' Party, Working People's Party of Hungary, United Workers' Party of Poland, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, and the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist Parties, having considered the question: "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the power of murderers and spies", unanimously reached the following conclusions: (...). Thousands of Yugoslav patriots, devoted to Communism, have been expelled from the Party and incarcerated in jails and concentration camps. Many have been tortured and killed in prison or, as was the case with the well- known Communist, Arso Jovanovic, were dastardly assassinated. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

As the Cominform resolution stated in the excerpt above, and as the publicly disclosed letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed, General Arso Jovanovic had been murdered trying to escape Tito's extermination campaign. Corroborating the remarks by the Cominform and the CC of the CPSU, the MI6 operative Richard West too admitted:

Arso Jovanovic and his friends had been shot attempting to escape in 1948. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 272)

Jovanovic, as may be recalled, was an anti-fascist freedom-fighter from the Yugoslav People's Liberation War, upon whom Tito's gang had blamed the casualties in the war, even though those casualties were the result of the anti - communist military sabotage of Tito and Milutinovic. As the Cominform statement noted, Yugoslav communists and progressives were 'incarcerated in jails and concentration camps. Many have been tortured and killed in prison or ... were dastardly assassinated.' Miron Rezun – a former elite Canadian combatant and a hostile anti-Soviet international news correspondent with close ties to every major Western intelligence organization – remarked:

Despite his earlier assertion that the Yugoslav revolution was not devouring its children, Tito embarked on a most ruthless wholesale de-Stalinization of the ... cadres.. Mass conversions to Titoism were carried out from above, by ... administrative persuasion, intimidation, expulsions, purges, incarceration, concentration camps, and torture. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

The CIA too stated:

The Yugoslav Government took strong measures against those who, after the break in 1948, still clung to a Moscow policy as the result of their political education. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

And:

many people were put into newly created internment camps. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Essentially, Tito's fascist gang, already having concentrated a significant amount of power into their own hands on behalf of the comprador classes allied to finance capital, decided to, out in the open, launch a fascist coup to overthrow the last remnants of democracy in Yugoslavia. As the 1949 Cominform resolution put it:

Due to the counter-revolutionary policy of the Tito-Rankovic clique which usurped power in the Party and in

the State, an anti-Communist police State -- fascist type regime -- has been installed in Yugoslavia. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

And:

The Yugoslav hirelings of imperialism, having seized leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, unloosed a campaign of terror against genuine Communists loyal to the principles of Marxism and Leninism and who fight for Yugoslavia's independence from the imperialists. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

As a first step, Tito's and Rankovic's:

purges, particularly in the UDB and the armed services, incapacitated the Cominformists from organizing. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Again, due to the absence of a quantitatively large proletariat in Yugoslavia, and owing to the petit-bourgeois mode of the bulk of the population, resistance against the regime was low, leaving the communists and progressives low leverage in the factional conflict in the UDB, while allowing the Tito-Rankovic faction to reassert control over the UDB. The control of Rankovic's UDB already extended to the Party; that is, rather than the Party controlling the fascist secret service, the latter controlled the former. In his April 1948 polemical letter to the CPSU Central Committee, Tito wrote:

the Organization Secretary in the CPY is also Minister of State Security.. ('Tito rejects the charges and defends his policies', April 13, 1948. In: 'Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey', Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 179. Clissold, the book editor who collected the document series, was a British intelligence officer.) (IMG)

In other words, the head of the secret service was also a chief of the Party, thus giving Rankovic's secret service tremendous influence over the Party as well. However, with the victory of the Titoist fascist faction through the purge of much of the communist elements in the UDB, nothing stood in the way of Rankovic and Tito. Having thus annihilated the communists in the intelligence and security apparatus, the regime went on to hunt down the rest of the Yugoslav communists. The following is an example case in Slovenia:

Among the many Cominformists arrested in Slovenia during January were Vito Zupanc, a prominent party member and Bogumil Kristan, an old-guard Communist. The letter was honored by the State following his liberation in 1945 from a Nazi concentration camp.

Dr. Lemez (fnu) and Dusan Kermauer (or Kermaner), pre-war Communists and functionaries of the Communist Party of Slovenia, are Cominformists. To date they have not been arrested.

Plevlje in Montenegro is the site of a concentration camp for Cominformists. At the penitentiary of Pozarevac in Zabal, 120 government officials, charged with Cominformism, are kept in solitary confinement. (Arrests of Cominformists Continue, CIA, March 2, 1949, p. 1. Note: FNU means First Name Unknown) (IMG)

During early February the UDB arrested at Pazin, Istria, Dusan Dimicic and Vlado (?) Stefanovic, who were former partisan officers, Political Commissars and prominent members of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party for Istria, on charges of Cominformism. At the same time Sestan (fnu), President of the Regional Committee, was appointed by UDB in Fiume. The arrests were preceded by a special session held in late January by the Regional Committee. (Arrests of Cominformists Continue, CIA, March 2, 1949, p. 1. Note: FNU means First Name Unknown) (IMG)

Upon their arrest in Slovenia, prisoners would undergo brutal torture in special chambers:

A building located in the Narodni Dom Arena garden, now serves as a UDB prison. Under the building the UDB constructed nine bunkers, six of which serve as cells for prisoners and three as torture chambers. The cells are for three persons each and are provided with beds made of cements. The torture chambers are one meter square and are equipped with hooks for tying people to be tortured. One of the most common practices is to fill the bunker with ice or hot water into which the prisoners are placed for hours. ('UDB Installations and Personnel in Ljubljana, Slovenia', CIA, December 13, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Another case:

Approximately 700 Cominform sympathizers were arrested during the last few days in the coal regions of Trbovlje, Hrastnik, Zagojje, Kocevje and Jesenice.

An extensive anti-Tito net was rounded up in the Trbovlje area by the UDB. The net seemingly had regular communications with Yugoslav Cominformists in Prague and was supported by collaborators in Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste. The ringleaders, among whom are prominent Tito officials (unidentified), will be brought to trial within the fortnight.

It is alleged that Minister Ivan Regent has been imprisoned on a charge among other things, of

communicating with Riko Malalan, the top Yugoslav Cominformist in Opicina, Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste. (COMINFORMIST ACTIVITY WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 10, 1949) (IMG)

Fascists of the previous regimes were employed by the Tito regime's espionage service to be used for torturing dissidents. An example is Nexhip Musa, who was:

the former body-guard of [Albanian Nazi] Xhafer Deva in Albania. ('DEVA, XHAFER', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 13) (IMG)

He lived in:

the camp of JESENICE (Yugoslavia).. ('DEVA, XHAFER', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 13) (IMG)

On behalf of the Yugoslav Regime, Musa worked as the:

commander of this camp and had formed his own team composed by former communist policemen of Albania. ('DEVA, XHAFER', CIA, p. 13) (IMG)

The defector Titoist policemen of Albania worked under the direction of Albanian Nazi Nexhip Musa. Under the local rule of Musa, they were:

responsible for the death of an Albanian in the camp of JESENICE (Yugoslavia) called Sulejman BEGEJA, killed on the 4 July 1952, and many tortures against albanians, hungarians, rumanians, and bulgarians living in the camp. ('DEVA, XHAFER', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 13) (IMG)

Nazi concentration camps were taken over by the UDB and were converted into Titoist-fascist concentration camps in which the emigres from the Peoples' Democracies were imprisoned, terrorized, enslaved, and shot:

The concentration camp at Zrenjanin was established during World War II by the Nazis and later taken over by the UDB. Its capacity is not known, although between February and November 1949, there were approximately 80 persons incarcerated there. At present the camp is used to hold refugees from Hungary and Rumania. The commandant of the camp is UDB Captain Joseph Tubic, who speaks Hungarian. (...). Outside these barracks are concrete bunkers, two and one-half meters deep and two and one-half meters long, inside which are wells in which prisoners sentenced to solitary confinement are kept in a crouching position. The entire camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence and guarded by troops of the UDB. New arrivals are told by Tubic that the camp is the end of their journey; that anyone who breaks the rules will be shot. (...). Treatment of the prisoners is very harsh; the daily food ration consists of tea, 400 grams of bread, and thin soup. Neither fuel nor blankets are issued during the winter months. The most minor infractions of the camp rules are punished by ten days' confinements in the bunkers. There is considerable corruption among the UDB guards who, in exchange for personal possessions, will obtain some food, mostly vegetables, for the prisoners. (...). Artisans among the prisoners work at their trades in Zrenjanin and surrounding towns; the remainder are forced to work on nearby state collective farms, under the supervision of UDB sub-lieutenant Djuro Grabic. (...). At various times during 1949, but especially in March, April, and July, an unspecified number of prisoners was taken to the border and forced back into Hungary and Rumania. During December 1949 and January 1950, an unspecified number of prisoners was sent to Dobroveni in Macedonia, where they were forced to work on a project to widen the Cerna Reka River. ('THE CONCENTRATION CAMP NEAR ZRENJANIN, SERBIA', CIA, July 24, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Not all the 'refugees' to Yugoslavia were genuine refugees; some were in fact kidnapped on the border:

Often officials and workers of both sexes are kidnaped and brought into Yugoslavia where they are interrogated by the UDB and released at a later date with the excuse of mistaken identity. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 14-15. Underline added.) (IMG)

Thousands of Yugoslav communists and progressives underwent physical and psychological torture, of kinds found in the Axis slave camps. The gang of the 'former' Gestapo agent Tito employed Gestapo experts and Ustase fascists in suppressing communist or progressive bourgeois-democratic dissent:

The most traumatic effect of the crisis was the victimization of the imprisoned Communist opposition. (...). In the development of the system, Titoist security men were assisted by Gestapo experts still in Yugoslav captivity and by those collaborators of the Nazis and the Ustasha who were serving time for crimes committed in enemy concentration camps during the war. These were reinforced by some common criminals who were instructed to pose as "Cominformists" in order to create divisions among the inmates and to act as provocateurs. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

The most infamous of all these torture camps was Goli Otok, also known as the Naked Island:

It was in the fall of 1948 that Tito made the decision to house the Cominformists at Goli Otok – without consulting the central Committee, [nor] the Politburo.. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 81) (IMG)

Richard West, the MI6 operative who landed in Yugoslavia to assist Tito's group against the USSR, remarked:

Tito set up the Naked Island camp through Rankovic.. According to Djilas, Tito was more than once heard to

explain in 1948: 'Off to jail with him! Off to the camp! What else can he expect if he works against his own Party?' (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 237) (IMG)

Richard West also noted that slavery was the mode of production in Goli Otok:

Tito ... sent thousands of Cominformists to slave in the camp on Goli Otok (Naked Island), opposite Senj in the north Adriatic. From autumn 1948 until well into the 1950s, about 12,000 men and some women as well were shipped to this inhospitable rock to quarry for marble. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 237) (IMG)

US intelligence also confirmed that at Tito's:

bidding, and under the guidance of Party Secretary Aleksandar Rankovic and State Secretary for Internal Affairs Svetislav Stefanovic, local "Cominformists" were rounded up for imprisonment on Tito's Adriatic Devil's Island, Goli Otok: 4,000 in 1949, over 3,000 in 1950, 2,500 in 1951, and over 1,000 in 1952; in March 1956 after the first Soviet Yugoslav rapprochement, the National Assembly was told that 15,800 "Cominformists" had been prosecuted between 1948 and 1955. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 3) (IMG)

Said to be the largest slave camp of Yugoslav communists, it was built by the slaves themselves:

Most [Cominformists] were sent to concentration camps on the Naked Island. (...). The worst Stalinist sinners were shipped off first, in great haste and without any technical and engineering preparations, to build the camps themselves and to welcome its steadily growing population. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

In his memoirs, Milovan Djilas described in detail the Sadistic dungeon and slave camp of Goli Otok:

Evil and shame – evil beyond compare, unending shame – is what lay in store for the prisoners in the camp. Never mind the foul food, the mindless and exhausting labor in the quarry, the prisoners were subjected to torture, the cruelty of which was matched by its perversity. (...). On boarding the boat to Goli Otok, prisoners were shoved head first into its hold, and, on landing, they were herded through a double row of security guards, who punched and kicked them. This practice, which is referred to in Isakovic's novel as the "principle of the frightened rabbit," was frequently tested on the so-called incorrigibles. There were lynchings, too. Those who would not repent were subjected to humiliating abuse, which could only result from the dogmatic fury and the ingenuity of those who had reformed. Prisoners had their heads plunged into pails of human excrement. They were forced to wear placards that read "Traitor." They were required to confess publicly their nonpolitical sins. All of this was carefully planned. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, pp. 85-86) (IMG)

Rezun adds:

The camps were said to be reeducation centers, where self-punishment became the norm. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

Goli Otok prisoners were forced to read imperialist publications against the USSR. A Western intelligence source confirmed:

The ideological reeducation of the Stalinists required that they read so-called imperialist publications denouncing the USSR and the Comintern. Some prisoners who resisted conversion were executed. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 102) (IMG)

Describing the results of the fascist brainwashing process, Djilas recalled:

There would have been no camp at Goli Otok. Even if there had been a camp, if the will of the leader and the intractable secret police had not dominated the Party, the regime in that camp would not have been such a monstrous combination of two right-minded groups, the security officials and the reeducated. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 89) (IMG)

Throughout Yugoslavia, in fact, the Tito regime was actively promoting an atmosphere of hatred towards the USSR:

The government has created a strong atmosphere of feeling against the Soviet Union. They even go back to the history of the war and say that the Soviet Union worked against the interests of Yugoslavia. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

It is important to note, however, that the success of the Yugoslav regime in promoting anti-Soviet propaganda was limited, and the Stalin-era Soviet influence in Yugoslavia was increasing.

The Tito regime was inflicting immense levels of force upon the slaves so to brainwash and forcibly 'convert' them into 'believers' in the regime's propaganda narratives. To mildly escape the brutalities, they would have to spy on one another:

The camp was, in fact, a source of information for further arrests: to betray an ally still at large was the best way to demonstrate one's own rehabilitation and repentance. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

The ‘repentant’ slaves would thereupon engage in slave ‘self-management’ in helping the UDB’s torture of other prisoners:

Tito even, in his speeches, boasted that we were reeducating the prisoners. The secret police recruited teams from the ranks of the penitent and organized them into “self-managing units” – that is exactly what they were called. These units then took over the task of reeducation, through violence. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 85) (IMG)

Djilas concluded:

The inmates were not provided with the protection of the law; nor were they allowed visits from their families. (...). Very few, if any, returned from Goli Otok unscathed. Not [as] much physically, perhaps, as psychologically and intellectually. Many were bitter, depressed, shattered. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

Richard West corroborated:

The camp was run on the principle of making the prisoners earn their release by breaking the will of those who had not yet made a confession and recantation. All new arrivals were made to run a gauntlet of beating, followed by constant physical and verbal abuse. The prisoners were not allowed visitors, and relatives were not even informed to the whereabouts of their loved ones; they were merely told that ‘Daddy has gone away on a business trip’. All those released from Naked Island were sworn not to talk about it, under pain of returning there. Even after the end of Communism in Yugoslavia, veterans of Naked Island were loath to speak of their hellish experience. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 237) (IMG)

The prominent Yugoslav regime official Dobrica Cosic, Djilas added, “had visited Goli Otok” and:

told me that the security service, the UDBA, had devised and applied corrective methods that were possibly the most diabolical in history. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 86) (IMG)

The Yugoslav leaders were all well aware of the situation in Goli Otok. Indeed, as Djilas admitted:

It is not as if no one in Belgrade knew what was going on at Goli Otok. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 86) (IMG)

By his own confession, Djilas himself was involved in the torturous mass-brainwashing of the communist prisoners: Although I was not involved directly in the organization and management of the camp, my ideological activity was not to be ignored. The sharpness and depth of my criticism of Stalin and the Soviet system contributed to the sufferings of the inmates. My positions were taken as official and prescribed. Those who were believed to harbor doubt were forced into self-criticism – in what ways, and with what results, one can only imagine. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

Nor was Djilas much regretful of the bondage of the communist political prisoners:

In retrospect, and with all the self-criticism of which I am capable, I must admit that we could not have avoided a concentration camp for the Cominformists. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 84) (IMG)

Hence both Djilas and Tito were involved in this historic crime:

Goli Otok ... is truly important in every respect. I cannot avoid it here, not only because of Tito’s involvement, but also because of my own.. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 81) (IMG)

The tens of thousands victims of the Goli Otok torture camp were the communists, democrats, and dissidents. Djilas said:

Approximately fifteen thousand Party members and sympathizers passed through the camp. A substantial number served time simply because of having expressed pro-Soviet sentiments among friends. Some were entirely innocent. There were also quite a few activists who spread propaganda and tried to organize the overthrow of the regime. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

One of the key “factors undermining the ... efforts at subversion,” noted a CIA document, was:

the support given [to] his regime by U.S. and U.K. Governments since 1949.. (National Intelligence Survey 21; Yugoslavia; Government and Politics, 21/GS/GP, CIA, April 1973, p. 44) (IMG)

Of course, the Anglo-American imperialists regarded such anti-communist and anti-democratic brutality as understandable:

While at the United Nations I observed that the official West viewed the persecution of the Cominformists with understanding.. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 88) (IMG)

Nonetheless, the outcry of progressive anti-fascists in Western societies could not be nipped in the bud. Thus, even in: the West ... there were humanitarian protests as well. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 88) (IMG)

Such international moral pressure:

urged [Yugoslav leaders] that some thought be given to dissolving the camp, that those who were guilty should be, instead, handed over to the courts. Kardelj was the first to oppose [these] recommendations. "We need the

camp now desperately!" If I remember correctly, Rankovic remarked that it would not be so easy to settle accounts with the Cominformists through normal procedures. Tito was silent, reflective, then he dismissed [the] proposal, probably on the ground that it was premature. And so we reacted in the typical fashion of politicians who are above public control – in pursuit of political goals, arbitrarily and without overriding concern for human conditions, human suffering. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 88) (IMG)

Regarding the casualty statistics of the communists in Yugoslavia under Tito's reign, pro-Cominform sources claim that: between 1948 and 1952, Tito expelled from the party some 200,000 Communists of whom 30,000 were imprisoned with lengthy prison sentences and several thousand were killed. Among the imprisoned there were 5,000 officers cumulatively sentenced to more than 50,000 years imprisonment. The expellees represented 50% of the total strength of the CPY and 75% of the leading cadres. (The Conversion from Stalinism to 'Titoism': Its Impact on the Yugoslav Communist Militants, Sava D. Bosnitch, pp. 50-51)

Such pro-Cominform allegations against Tito's regime have in fact been acknowledged as correct by Rezun:

Between 1948 and 1952, Tito expelled almost 200,000 Communists, of whom 30,000 were imprisoned and several thousands killed.

Those who were expelled represented 50 percent of the total strength of the CPY and 75% of the leading cadres. The Stalinists alleged that the true Marxist-Leninist CPY was liquidated. From its remnants, the so-called Communist League of Yugoslavia was formed. Its principal aim was to secure personal power for Tito and [his] clique by means of ruthless counterrevolutionary terror and suppression of all Yugoslav Communists with an internationalist outlook. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

Again, Rezun's remarks are corroborated by the already-cited US intelligence memorandum which stated:

Tito, beside the implacable of hatred of the people, ... has against himself also the majority of the Yugoslav Communists. (Tito's True Face, Political Information (Analysis of Tito's Relationship with Stalin and the West, CIA, November 28, 1952, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

According to the CIA, the Yugoslav Regime stated that it arrested more than eight thousand 'Cominformists':

Minister of Interior Rankovic stated in June that since the Cominform break in 1948, 8,403 Cominformists had been arrested. (Daily Digest, CIA, October 10, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

On the other hand, the CIA stated:

Rankovic ... rounded up the 15,000 "real" Cominformists.. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 4) (IMG)

Tito seems to have exaggerated the number of the 'spy centers' of the Cominform countries:

Tito's figure of 98 spy centers in the Cominform countries represents a considerably larger number than previously estimated. (Daily Digest, CIA, October 10, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

The exaggeration would have served his terrorist agenda.

As can be seen, Tito's gang formed a minority clique, criminally terrorizing the democratic majority in the YCP. The problem was that the structure of the YCP was not really so democratic, Tito's gang dominated the high command of the YCP. All of this in turn was due to the low number of proletarians in Yugoslavia and the high number of peasants there. This situation was vastly in contrast to what occurred in the CPSU, wherein – unlike in Yugoslavia – every phase of the purges involved the democratic majority of the Party conducting legal purges against the counter-revolutionary criminal minority.

What occurred in 1948-1949 was a hybrid coup, the combination of a soft coup and a hard coup. The Chancellor Hitler, through the Reichstag fire, launched a coup against the democratic forces in his state so to transition the state he led to a fascist dictatorship. In the same ways, Tito's gang launched a coup against the communist forces in the state it led, annihilated numerous communists, established a brutal fascist military dictatorship, and set Yugoslavia firmly on the side of the Anglo-Americans for covert and shadow warfare against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

C12S3. Setting Yugoslavia on the Path for War against the Peoples' Democracies / Slavery, not capitalism and not socialism, as the Main Mode of Production in Yugoslavia / Reign of Terror / Farcical Elections / Kulak-owned 'Collectivization' / Yugoslav Communist Resistance / Proletarian and Peasant Resistance

*** IMG-All-{Titoist Yugoslavia}

The 1949 Cominform resolution stated:

The Belgrade clique of hired spies and murderers made a flagrant deal with imperialist reaction and entered its service, as the Budapest trial of Rajk-Brankov made perfectly clear.

This trial showed that the present Yugoslav rulers, having fled from the camp of democracy and socialism to the camp of capitalism and reaction, have become direct accomplices of the instigators of a new war, and, by their treacherous deeds, are ingratiating themselves with the imperialists and kow-towing to them. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same

document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG) Indeed, as the Cominform noted, the Yugoslav regime had aggressive intents and was an accomplice to the Anglo-American effort for war against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Tito's gang literally enslaved large masses of Yugoslav people, forcing them to build infrastructure that would allow Yugoslavia to be a launching pad for an Anglo-Americans' invasion of the socialist and democratic camp. The British intelligence officer James Klugmann, himself having parachuted into Yugoslavia in order to aid Tito during World War II, wrote:

New roads are being built up and down the country with a specific military strategic purpose. It is one of the tragedies and ironies of history that the Belgrade – Zagreb highway, which began with the aid of the foreign Youth Brigades, has now been revealed as part of a general Western strategic plan to link Anglo-American military bases on the frontiers of the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe. It is now planned that this road should be so extended north and south as to link the Anglo-American base of Trieste through Zagreb, Belgrade and Skopje, to the Anglo-American base of Salonica in Northern Greece. The voluntary labour detachments, which had the willing support of youth and people in the emergency period immediately following Liberation, have been transformed into compulsory labour squads, and by such squads, unpaid and without proper equipment, this highway is now being completed. There are a whole series of airports situated along it. Several sectors of the road itself have been extended and surfaced with concrete for possible use as airstrips, and then camouflaged over with a thin layer of soil. It is remarkable that there is *already* rail contact between Trieste, Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade, whilst a transverse east-west road linking the richer areas of Slavonia and Vojvodina with the barren coast of Dalmatia is desperately needed but not being constructed. New highways are being planned, however, linking Yugoslavia with neighbouring People's Democracies, highways demanded by Western strategy such as the Nis – Tzaribrod project leading up to the Bulgarian frontier. (From Trotsky to Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, Chapter 4) (IMG)

Critics may show skepticism to the remarks by James Klugmann as 'too biased', given that Klugmann wrote his book in support of the Cominform's line. The remarks by Klugmann, however, are backed by declassified reports from the US intelligence. A 'Geographic Intelligence Report' by the CIA's 'Office of Research and Reports' confirmed that the 'Brotherhood and Unity Highway' was aimed to link Italy, Greece, and Turkey, all of which were the allies of American imperialism, and that the Highway would be an 'asset' 'in time of war':

The international Balkan Highway was planned to link Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. In general the Yugoslav portion of this road, the Bratstvo i Jedinstvo Autoput (Brotherhood and Unity Highway), follows the Sava-Velika and Juzva Morava-Vardar route.. It is the most heavily financed road project in the country and is now about 55 percent complete. When completed the Brotherhood and Unity Highway will extend from the Italian border near Trieste to the Greek border at Gevgelija.. It will connect Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and Skopje the capitals of the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia, respectively, whose combined populations form 78 percent of the total for the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Militarily, the Brotherhood and Unity Highway would be ... an asset ... in time of war. Yugoslav forces could be moved quickly along the highway to roads leading to any part of the country. (The Roads of Yugoslavia, Geographic Intelligence Report, CIA/RR GR 60 -3, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, December 1960, p. 3) (IMG)

An anonymous US intelligence agent cited by the CIA confirmed that for this project, the Yugoslav regime utilized forced labour, and that under the influence of what was believed to be Cominform 'propaganda', these slaves deserted their work. According to the CIA's rather "reliable informant" who was "an engineer of the Bor copper mines":

A great number of workers inducted for compulsory labor left their work and disappeared during the Fall of 1949. Most of these desertions occurred on the construction of the automobile highway from Zagreb to Belgrade and in mines.

The number of laborers who deserted the highway construction is estimated at 20,000. A managing official said that 21,800 new workers had to be employed to replace the deserters. The desertions are believed to be the result of Cominform propaganda. (Mass Desertions of Workers in Yugoslavia, CIA, Date of Content: Early January 1950, Date Prepared: May 1, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

These Anglo-American intelligence sources confirm the accusations made by the Soviet state media against Tito's fascist regime. A 1952 Soviet article stated that the construction of the Highway indeed involved workers taken as forced laborers:

Thousands of working people are compelled by force to work for the third consecutive year on building the Trieste-Zagreb-Belgrade-Skoplije strategic highway. (The Tito Clique Has Turned Yugoslavia Into a Military Camp, V. Nemchinov, June 9, 1952. USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 11, p. 352) (IMG)

However, another Soviet newspaper article confirmed:

Yugoslavia's working class decidedly refuses to put its head under the yoke to sweat out profits for foreign monopolies and riches for the Belgrade rulers. The Titoites' attempts to force the workers to accept conditions

of slavery ... are meeting with constantly increasing resistance. (The Yugoslav People's Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

In line with the information provided by the CIA, the Soviet press – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – claimed that the Yugoslav workers were indeed influenced by Cominform slogans:

Rallying to the slogan: "Let's Undermine the Economic Foundation of the Tito-Rankovic Fascist Regime," the workers of Yugoslavia are everywhere cutting down the productivity of labor, thus disrupting the fulfillment of plans. Output at mills and factories is constantly dropping. (The Yugoslav People's Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime press – cited by the CIA – admitted that numerous workers had deserted their mines: Recruiting in 1948 was not very successful. Some labor recruiting administrations attracted new miners by promising higher pay than the law allows, or by misrepresenting conditions at the mine. Those workers soon left. Over 1,200 recruits left the Zenica mine last year, 200 left Breza, 150 left Kakanj, and an average of 50 a day left Trbovlje over a period of several days. The situation is similar at the Dobra Sreca, Bor, Trepca, and especially at the Senje mines. ('Sociological – Labor Supply; food consumption; schooling', Where Published: Yugoslavia, How Published: Daily newspapers, Language: Serbo-Croatian, Date of Information: 1949, Date Distributed: April 4, 1949, p. 1. Citing: MINE RECRUITING OFF IN 1948, Politika, No. 13154, February 7, 1949) (IMG)

The Highway was by no means the only project for which the Yugoslav regime enslaved ordinary Yugoslav citizens. The Albanians of Kosovo, as mentioned in C12S6, were, in accordance with the settler-colonial plans of the regime, forced to desert the places they inhabited in order to work as slaves in the construction of infrastructure for Yugoslavia's war against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The Albanians of Kosovo were by no means the only ones enslaved. Every ordinary Yugoslav citizen lived under the menace of enslavement by the regime. This included Slovenia and Croatia, the 'racially privileged' provinces of fascist Yugoslavia:

On 25 July 1949, Zagreb security forces began a three day round-up of Yugoslav civilians for two months of forced duty in labor brigades. Forced recruitment apparently was necessary, because voluntary enlistments had fallen far short of current requirements.

On the first day of the round-up at all cafes and other public places within the city of Zagreb were canvassed and all of the city streets combed. On the second day similar establishments on the periphery of the city were canvassed. In all, some three thousand people were collected for the brigades. Of this number more than 1,500 were assembled on the first day.

The normal procedure of the round-up was as follows: Militia surrounded a cafe to prohibit anyone from leaving. and UDB (civilian) authorities entered the cafe and questioned every patron. Each was required to produce his documents. Those who could establish that they were employed in government offices and on critical industrial jobs were released. Others were ushered from the cafe into waiting trucks which transported them to the labor camp at Kraizerica, a suburb of Zagreb, directly across the Sava River.

There they were billeted in barracks and put to work on a large farming project.

It is also reported that close to 3,000 persons were similarly recruited for labor brigades in Ljubljana towards the end of July 1949. (Forced Labor Recruitment in Zagreb and Ljubljana, CIA, September 13, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

In 1952, Tito stepped up his efforts to present himself as 'pro-democracy', so to give the United States the excuse to fund the Yugoslav regime. Even then, the working class was living under the condition of outright slavery:

In connection with the working class ... the laborers are deeply dissatisfied. They feel that, with the exception of much cheaper rents (in itself not an unalloyed blessing inasmuch as they have no choice concerning their place of abode nor of their dwelling partners) they are much worse off than under the former Yugoslav regime, although they must work harder because of the norm system. In addition to this, they are not free agents. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 9) (IMG)

Similar to the workers, the peasants too were enslaved by the Yugoslav regime to do so-called 'voluntary' labour:

the peasants ... are forced to perform "voluntary" labor; ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

On the other hand, in this military dictatorship of the fascist type, in which Gestapo officers and Ustase commanders were the commanders of the Yugoslav regime's army, the army officers were privileged and could reap the profits of the enslavement of the Yugoslav people:

Army officers constitute a favored class. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 9) (IMG)

In fact:

they [i.e. army officers] are still given preference in drawing their rations ahead of the rest of the population, an

important advantage, considering the frequent shortage of rations. Complaints are frequent relative to the fact that, while other families are allowed only one cubic meter of wood for the entire winter, army officers are allowed one cubic meter a month, whether they need it or not, most of which they sell on the black market. Army officers, particularly those of higher ranks, receive cloth, house furnishings and a number of other commodities which, if they do not use, they sell on the black market. All of these things affect the morale and attitude of the Yugoslav people toward the regime. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 9) (IMG)

However, the Yugoslav people did not yield so much; they sabotaged the Yugoslav regime's plans for an imperialist war against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The workers were largely aligned with the 'Cominformists'. The proletarian resistance against the Titoist-fascist occupation forces of Yugoslavia took the form of industrial sabotage:

Yugoslavia's economy is receding as a result of passive resistance on the part of workers and peasants. The coal output has decreased, [and] electrification projects have been halted.. (Military, Political and Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, CIA, June 20, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Yugoslavia's toilers are not confining themselves to resisting the coercion and arbitrary acts of the present rulers; they are doing everything in their power to disrupt the production and export of strategic raw and other materials wanted by the instigators of a new war. (...). More than half of the miners refuse to dig coal. (The Yugoslav People's Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950.

In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime pursued the classic strategy of launching a pincer assault on collectivization; on the one hand, they forced 'collectivization' on the peasants, and on the other hand, they put the kulaks in charge of the fake 'collectives'. On the one hand, they opposed any real collectivization that would have brought de-kulakization and on the other hand, they forced their phony 'collectivization' on the peasants. In the words of the Cominform:

The compulsory pseudo co-operatives in the country-side are in the hands of the kulaks and their agencies and represent an instrument for the exploitation of wide masses of working peasants. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

The CIA corroborates the claims of the Cominform by confirming that the so-called 'collectivized' peasants – and the collectivization in Yugoslavia was fake and Trotskyite unlike in the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies – were horrifically enslaved:

The situation of peasants who are members of collectives, on the other hand, is even worse, if anything. Exorbitant taxes and virtual confiscation of their produce and livestock (fruit and vegetables were placed on the free list in July) have reduced the independent peasant to a state of unprecedented misery, yet he still feels that he is his "own boss" and has self-respect, whereas the collectivized peasants have been virtually reduced to robots. Not only do they own nothing, but they have even lost their quality as men and women and have become merely "radne snage" (labor force). The situation is, in fact, most accurately reflected by the determination of those who are out of them to remain out. No promise can induce the independent farmers to join the collectives voluntarily. On the other hand, there is a spontaneous, strong movement on the part of the collectivized peasants, albeit unorganized, to break up the collectives. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Indeed, the Yugoslav regime had pursued:

the forced collectivization, which the government launched in 1948-1949 in a misguided effort to disprove Moscow's charges that rural Yugoslavia was held in thrall by "kulaks." Since the rebels disseminated the most elementary propaganda ... the peasants took the message as a protest against collectivization. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 236) (IMG)

Those opposed to collectivization acted as its most extremist and terroristic pseudo-'advocates'. Kardelj was a case in point. Hence the regime pursued Trotskyite agricultural policies, terrorizing the Yugoslav peasantry:

Kardelj was opposed to collectivization, although he had delivered a report in favor of the collectives at the Central Committee Plenum in 1949. For many years there would have been no forced selling. Kidric, the chief economist, finally called forced selling a form of robbery. Yet that was not its most sinister aspect. I remember Kidric announcing at a Politburo meeting that sixty-five thousand freight cars of wheat had to be bought on a forced basis. While Rankovic was noting down the figure, he groaned: "Twelve thousand arrested!" These peasants were released after two or three months, but what an atmosphere those arrests and the accompanying brutality created! What despair and misery! (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, pp. 89-90) (IMG)

The peasants':

feeling of bitterness against the Tito regime was not the expression of transient anger but was a genuine and deep-rooted feeling. The peasants complained bitterly about their lot, which they said was going from bad to

worse, from year to year. The Yugoslav peasants looked miserable, and were as they described themselves “gol i bos” (naked and barefooted). An old Serb, lurching on black bread and green peppers, under a tree not far from Nis, after heaping abuse upon the regime (in which four or five other peasants present participated) for the multiform sufferings the regime has visited upon the peasants (which in his case reached the limit when “the government authorities took all my fat pigs and three lean ones”). (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Neither were the Titoites able to fulfill their plan for the export of food-stuffs. Despite the raging terror, the toiling peasantry stands shoulder to shoulder with the working class in opposing the Belgrade gang of traitors. Both autumn and spring plans were disrupted by the peasants, as a result of which more than 2,700,000 hectares of the 5,000,000 that were to be put under crops this year remained unsowed. (The Yugoslav People’s Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

The CIA emphasized:

The present regime has created a situation which affects every Yugoslav peasant deeply, spiritually as well as materially. It has brought a combination of privation and oppression which generates a feeling of hatred towards the regime that will be extremely difficult to eradicate, for it transcends nationalistic or patriotic pride. Any appeal to the Yugoslav population to rise in defense of such a regime would be an appeal to perpetuate its own slavery and misery. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

Numerous Yugoslavs who managed to escape to the Peoples' Democracies were able to describe the experience of the peasantry in Yugoslavia, and they wrote articles in many Cominform bloc journals about the crimes of Tito's regime against the peasantry.

The CIA, on the other hand, provided details about individual cases of peasants suffering under Tito regime yoke. Here is one case:

An old lady of seventy-five years of age told her most recent experiences with the [Titoist pseudo-]Communists. She said the “Communists” came to her and demanded 27,000 dinars in taxes. She protested that it was impossible for her to pay it. She had three pigs and they threatened to take them away from her. She went to every house in the village “except the Communist authorities”, and tried to borrow money. She said everybody knew her to be an honest woman and she would have no trouble in raising the money if the people had it, but she was able to raise only 5,000 dinars. Frantically (sic), she sought the president of the village committee and pleaded with him for a delay “so that one of the pigs could have a litter”, but her pigs were taken two days later by force when she was not at home and her daughter was too frightened to put up any resistance. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

As the case above shows, the Yugoslav regime terrorized the peasants through an extremely high level of taxation. There was another case:

About half-way from Nis to Belgrade, ... a young man ... was plowing a field and some farmers [were] working across the road. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Describing the condition of the young peasant man and the barbaric dishonoring of his wife by the Tito regime, the US intelligence document continued:

the Yugoslav authorities went to his house and demanded 14 kilos of wool from his wife. Since he has only 15 sheep, his wife protested that if she delivered this wool, the family would have to go naked since at the prevailing prices (7,000 dinars for one meter of the cheapest sort of woollen cloth) it was impossible for them to buy even one meter of material. Thereupon, they tied her hands behind her back and took her to the village committee position. Several days later, at a village “conference”, her son, a young man in his late twenties, ventured to say that his family could not deliver the wool, since they had nothing to wear and no money, and that a cheap shirt alone cost 2,600 dinars. He soon found out, the father said, that “things in this country had not changed, for he had to spend 20 days in jail, besides having to give up the wool”. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

No, the situation in that country had not changed much; Titoist Yugoslavia was no less infernal than Ustase-occupied Yugoslavia. The document continued:

the previous week the Yugoslav authorities had called on his wife and demanded delivery of one and one-half kilograms of wool “for last year”. She told them that she had no wool to give them, for the winter had been

severe and they had no money to buy clothes and she had used the wool to knit a sweater. Whereupon, she was warned that unless the wool was delivered in 15 days, her husband would go to jail. They still had no wool, but they would have to find some. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Or take the following example of Serbian peasants:

At Osiponica, just before entering Pozarevac, [there was] a group of peasants composed of an old man, a middle-aged man, two young men, three women and a baby, who were eating under the shade of a tree. The old man, a picturesque Serb ... went off into a vehement tirade against the regime, so intense and full of hatred, from deep down in his soul, that it fairly shook his frail body. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 7) (IMG)

The document continued:

not only had they not received any food of any kind, but ... the Yugoslav government took from the little that they raised. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 7) (IMG)

This old man was quite emotional, but so were practically all of the other persons ... even if they did not possess the dramatic talent of this old Serb. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

The situation of the Croatian peasants was not much better, if better at all. For example:

in Lika, Croatia, a farmer complained that out of 900 kilograms of wheat the government had taken 400 kilograms (at the recently reduced quotas of collection). "Of the 500 kilograms left [to] me", he said, "I need 200 kilos for seed; then how long do you think the remaining 300 kilos would last [for] my family of eight persons? Not much more than a month." He said that government pressure was still great but that at a particular village in Bosnia the pressure was greater and so was the "otkup" (government collection quota). ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Corroborating the Soviet media claims of Yugoslav peasants' resistance against the Tito regime's pseudo -collectivization enslavement projects, the CIA stated:

A considerable number of peasants in Serbia, and especially in Croatia, simply "abandoned everything" and left the collectives even before the three-year period had expired. In Macedonia, which is approximately 60 percent collectivized, the peasants were in a veritable state of ferment. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

So strong was peasant resistance, that the regime sent its fascist death squads to Novaci to terrorize the peasants, while the discontent was spreading to Macedonia as well:

200 militiamen had been dispatched from Bitolj to quell the "uprising" in a particularly brutal manner and that the leaders of the "uprising" had been sentenced to terms of eight to ten years' imprisonment. Strong and bitter peasant discontent against the collectives was not confined to the village of Novaci; from Bitolj to Kriva Palanka, peasant feeling ran high. Submittal of petitions to get out of the collectives appeared to be the order of the day in Macedonia. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

No real peasant rebellion in the form of an uprising took place, but peasant resistance in the covert form of under-fulfilling, under-performing, and sabotaging production, was widespread.

The situation in Yugoslavia resembled how, in the extreme heat of the summer, one would, for as brief a time as a second, wish it was an extremely cold winter, and in the extremely low temperature of the winter, one would for a second wish the old hot summer was near. The Nazis, just like their agent Tito, supported the Ustase, and the Ustase carried out a genocide against Serbs. Yet, the Tito regime's measures were so brutal that:

It is only when the situation is seen in this light that one can understand a Serb when he says: "I am really ashamed to admit it, but I would rather have the Nazis".. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

Similarly:

There is no hesitation on the part of the Croat peasants as to whether they would prefer the old Yugoslavia to Tito. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

In fact, although:

they were not particularly keen on King Peter, they would prefer anyone to Tito. This way one Croat put it in referring to old Yugoslavia in comparison to the present regime: "those were golden times". ('Political and

Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

Similar to the poorer peasants whose little incomes were stolen by the regime, the income of the urban artisans and shopkeepers was also stolen through the mechanism of extremely high taxes which they could not pay:

One of the small classes in Yugoslavia who have no love for the Tito regime are the "private" artisans, such as shoemakers, tailors, shirt-makers, hairdressers, et cetera. The taxes levied upon them are so exorbitant that they can scarcely eke out an existence; still they refuse to become nationalized. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

Here is one individual case documented by the CIA:

the shoemaker ... began to recite the woes of all small shopowners like himself under "this inhuman regime which does not hesitate to drive people into starvation in order to free them into the cooperatives". He said that he could not afford more than one helper, but the more helpers the greater the tax that had to be paid. As it is, he had been forced to sell one of his sewing machines during the previous year in order to pay his taxes, and this year, he expects to have to sell his radio. Nevertheless, he said that there were others who were even worse off than he was. He knew of one colleague who had only one sewing machine and no helper, and had a wife and four children to support. A few months before, he stated, "they descended upon him" for taxes and, as he could not possibly pay the taxes, they took away his machine, his one and only means of livelihood. "How was he going to support his family? They did not care. And now ... "would you blame him if he drew his gun (provided he had one) and shot them all dead?... But we will not join the cooperatives; we will not submit to daily indignities for a chunk of bread." a hairdresser who had a prosperous business before the war, but now both he and his business were indescribably run down. This hairdresser's mood was the same as that of the shoemaker. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

Many of these urban shopkeepers and artisans as well as some of the rural peasants remained partially petit-bourgeois, but also started to gain characteristics of state-owned semi-slaves, thus gaining a somewhat revolutionary potential. Tito pretended to be 'unaware' of the crimes of the 'local' officials that he planted throughout Yugoslavia. In the self-criticism sessions, he criticized the system for leading to oligarchic millionaires rising in Yugoslavia, even though it was he who created those millionaire oligarchs through decentralization, and even though he continued to strengthen those millionaire oligarchs through even greater decentralization. Tito's 'criticism and self-criticism' sessions superficially 'denounced' the brutalities of the intelligence officers, but it was the Gestapo agent Tito himself who had planted the Gestapo officers in charge of the intelligence bodies, knowingly sending thousands of 'Cominformists' to torture camps, knowingly enslaving countless individuals, knowingly collaborating with NATO for war plans against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, personally being involved in assisting the efforts of the Mossad and enthusiastically endorsing it. Tito's 'criticisms and self-criticism' sessions were festivals of monumental hypocrisy. The CIA reported:

In his speech at Knezica, Tito made reference to the much-advertized admission of Aleksandar Rankovic in his report to the fourth "plenum" of the many Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to the effect that many people had been unjustly prosecuted and jailed or given unjustifiedly severe sentences. Then Tito added, "This demonstrates our tendency and progress toward democratization in our country." Rankovic pointed out, indeed, the indignities perpetrated by the Security Police, according to the people; however, the latter maintain that, since none of those in jail were released, this affirmation on the part of Rankovic can hardly be said to point out any "tendency toward democratization". As further proof that legislation passed by the [Titoist pseudo-]Communists or promises made by them are of no value, an individual in Belgrade showed ... a new form of summons, recently issued by the UDB "to fool the foreigners". This summons provides for the name and address of the individual summoned, the reason for the summons (whether as a witness or as defendant), the nature of the charge or charges, and also provides a place for the signature of the chief of the UDB station concerned. Altogether, this would be a document showing a "tendency toward democratization" and respect of the rights of individuals, it were compiled with. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 11) (IMG) concerning the cooperatives, and referring to Tito's speech at Knezica, wherein Tito admitted that mistakes had been made and that these mistakes would be "amended" ... [the] responses of the peasants were always the same: "We are fed up with Communist lies"; or an impatient gesture indicating the same thing; "for years, we hear it everyday: 'It will get better', but instead it gets worse." The peasants' impossibility to rely on Tito's promises is pungently expressed by them in this manner: "Tito speaks of one thing, thinks of something else, does still something else, and we (the peasants) come last." With regard to Tito's theory that "Democracy is not a matter of decree, but a question of consciousness of the citizens. The more consciousness and the fewer enemies of socialism, the more

will our democracy grow”, if peasants did not dismiss the matter with a shrug of the shoulder, they answered to the effect that (as one peasant put it): “One cannot create any kind of consciousness by force.” (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, pp. 8-9) (IMG)

The promises of 'improvements' were phony:

The terror under which [the peasants] have been living ... is still there; they are still spied upon and fear to speak their thoughts, and go to jail if they fail to “conform” even if for the shorter terms than before. They are still compelled to attend “conferences”.; they are forced to perform “voluntary” labor; they are arrested without warrant’ detained without trial; sent to jail by administrative action; et cetera. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

Other important points are as follows:

A widely propagandized opinion is that the dissatisfaction of the Yugoslav people, and particularly the peasants, is actually directed against local Communist Party officials and not against Tito, who is looked upon as a hero and a great Yugoslav nationalist; that the people hated the regime, but that they admire and respect, if not actually love Tito. This is definitely not true. If this propaganda is believed then it must also be believed that the Yugoslav is too stupid to understand that the low-level officials of his village, especially in a [Titoist pseudo-]Communist regime, cannot do anything which is not sanctioned or ordained by the hierarchy. It is true, naturally, that some officials with whom the peasants come in direct contact are more brutal than others, and that the peasants realize this; however, the peasants have no illusions as to who makes the policy of which these village officials are the instruments and the peasants the victims. Frequently in conversations regarding the present Yugoslav regime, peasants would remark, “The fish rots from the head.” (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

The foregoing is not to deny that Tito’s new attitude toward the West and the subsequent [superficial] relaxation have ameliorated the difficult and tense situation in which the great majority of the Yugoslavs have been living since the liberation. It is to emphasize the fact that this amelioration is simply sugar over the pill and that fundamentally, no change has taken place. The Yugoslav people are aware of the situation, although they welcome the relief afforded them by the comparative “de-brutalizing” of the controls and pressures employed by the regime to force its “socialist state” on the people. Certainly, there is nothing in this change to justify the optimism of certain Western observers that slowly, but gradually, Tito is moving toward socialism or a western-type democracy, and that the Yugoslav people’s view of the regime has definitely become at least tolerant, if not quite benevolent. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 11) (IMG)

the majority of the Yugoslav people still regard Tito [as someone] who ... murdered, imprisoned, tortured and persecuted millions of Yugoslavs. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

According to the fascist Yugoslav regime’s main propaganda mouthpiece Borba, as cited by the CIA, the Yugoslav students avoided school:

In certain education centers in Tuzla Srez, as many as 25 percent of children required to take pre-military schooling do not attend regularly. Some rural centers have only incomplete records of the children.

At most enterprises, such as the Banovici mine, all children go to school; but of 1,300 required to attend at Kreka mine, only 400 attend regularly. (‘Sociological – Labor Supply; food consumption; schooling’, Where Published: Yugoslavia, How Published: Daily newspapers, Language: Serbo-Croatian, Date of Information: 1949, Date Distributed: April 4, 1949, p. 3. Citing: SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN BOSNIA, Borba, No. 34, February 9, 1949) (IMG)

The Yugoslav university students also arose against the regime, and were ‘greeted’ by truckloads of the regime’s terrorist death squads. The Croatian-American historian at Yale University, Banac described, in a research book published by the Cornell University Press, the situation as follows:

A few groups of university students functioned almost publicly: at the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Belgrade, "Cominformists were occasionally caught when they sang Soviet songs or when they held some of their secret organizational meetings late in the evening." In April 1952, a secret Cominformist organization at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade decided to show its strength at a public meeting called by the faculty council and the party bureau for the purpose of expelling three students branded as Western propagandists. Despite the [allegedly] diametrically opposed political sentiments of the accused, the Cominformists interrupted the proceedings with exhortations: "Comrades, how long are we going to allow Tito and his gang to expel our

colleagues from the university and deny them an education? We must openly fight against this." The wild brawl that erupted was stopped only by truckloads of armed militiamen. Injuries and arrests were extensive, and one student reportedly was killed. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, pp. 232-233. Citing: HIA-TC "Jugoslovenski Kominformisti," interviews no. 66, p. 84 and no. 56, pp. 117-118.) (IMG)

Anti-regime dissent was widespread across Yugoslavia's universities and so was the brutal suppression thereof:

At the University of Zagreb, the UDB-a uncovered several groups of *ibeovci* [i.e. 'cominformists']. The student Communist leaders at the Technical Faculty expelled their organizational secretary, the secretary of SKOJ, and three other leading members as Cominformists. Outspoken *ibeovci* were physically assaulted at the Forestry Faculty. Their colleagues at the Economics Faculty created a highly successful thirty-member secret organization, called the Young Bolshevik Faction, which disseminated large quantities of Cominformist newspapers and leaflets. The group was discovered and arrested late in 1948. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 233) (IMG)

The following excerpts of a CIA document in 1950 detail how Tito's regime enslaved the ordinary Yugoslav people and forced them to work on its projects, how the quality of the government 'services' were terrible, how the peasants, workers, students, etc. all stood against the Yugoslav regime and carried out sabotage in a passive form:

1. (...). Passive resistance ... is widespread, and in urban areas underground organizations exist which spread the news from abroad, and inform the population as to what is happening outside the country. Leaders of these organizations are mainly members of former political parties.

2. Passive resistance among the workers consists mainly of absenteeism because of feigned illness. Absence from work has lately increased to such proportions that government authorities have been obliged to resort to severe control measures, sometimes even dismissing the workers, or sending them out on forced labor projects.

3. Most active in resistance activities are the peasants. They cultivate their land only to such extent as will allow them to live. As a result, government authorities have been obliged to institute severe controls in order to increase crop production. Peasants sabotage governmental plans by sowing seeds in inadequate soil; as a result, the summer crop of 1950 is very poor. It is estimated that this year's crop will be 30 percent below that of 1949. The effects of this form of sabotage are particularly pronounced in the city markets, where vegetables and fruits have been hard to get even at the height of the season; and if available, were so costly that few were able to afford them. As a consequence, greater starvation than in previous years is anticipated.

4. Government employees as well as laborers are engaged in passive resistance through the tactic of absenteeism excused by illness. The absence of government employees from work has become widespread, and has caused a setback in the government plans. Various punitive measures have been undertaken by government authorities, such as dismissals and forced labor work; they have not proved satisfactory. Communist Party members, who are largely semi-literate and incapable of doing administrative work, replace the dismissed employees, and as a consequence, the government administration suffers increasingly.

5. The school-age youth is very active, and offers a strong element of resistance to the regime. Because of the large amount of sabotage carried out by students, the authorities have been obliged to send out entire school classes to forced labor projects.

6. Because of the increasing resistance among the population, government authorities have had to become more severe. This has created greater dissatisfaction in Yugoslavia.

7. Resistance by the broad masses manifests itself largely in the increasing avoidance of the people from the various political conferences and meetings of the regime. City block leaders are obliged to go from apartment to apartment and force the populace to attend meetings. When at such meetings Party members begin to explain to the population the feats of the government which have contributed to a better living standard of the working masses, the audience burst into laughter. The speakers find themselves in the awkward position of doing nothing or of having to arrest the entire audience. As a result, meetings of this type have become less frequent.

8. When in the spring of 1950, Tito made a speech in Split, government officials undertook all possible measures to increase the attendance. To this end, travel expenses and expenses for food and lodging in Split were paid for all those living in the outskirts of Split. Over 210,000 transportation tickets were issued, but in spite of all these measures, not more than approximately thirty thousand individuals attended.

(RESISTANCE TO THE REGIME IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, October 13, 1950, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

In spite of such overwhelming hatred against it, Tito's gang successfully maintained power through terrorism:

It may be taken for granted that the Tito regime is in no danger of being overthrown by the action of the Yugoslav population, not because the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav people are not dead set against it, but

because they are entirely impotent to do anything about it. The Yugoslav population has grown more anti-Tito and anti-regime than it was between 1945 and the middle of 1947. Physical power has become much more consolidated and widespread in the hands of the Security Police whose tentacles now reach as far as the community councils (opstinski odbor). ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

As the CIA confirmed, the Yugoslav population became more anti-Tito after the expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform and the fascist hybrid coup that Tito's gang launched in 1948. These remarks by American intelligence serve as evidence to the claims of the Soviet state media:

The present Belgrade Government is as alien to its people as the people's interests are alien to it. Nowhere else, if you please, is there a government so hated by the people as is the Tito clique in Yugoslavia, and everything points to the fact that the gap yawning between the usurpers and the people is unbridgeable. What, then, is the social base which the Belgrade gang, beset as it is by the hatred of the people, leans for support? Anyone who is at all familiar with the situation in Yugoslavia will say straight out that the band has no [popular] social base, that the Tito clique has no support whatever among the people. (Tito Clique Lacks Support of Yugoslav People, I. Livanov, August 11, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 15, p. 480) (IMG)

The social base of the Tito regime was limited to the comprador classes – the bureaucratic class, the parasitic elements of the intelligentsia, the kulaks, the lumpen-proletariat, comprador finance capital, and comprador mercantile capital – all of which were allied to, and backed by, Anglo-American and German finance capital.

The US National Security Council also confirmed, in reference to Tito's regime:

Power is in the hands of a small group of men [and women] who control all aspects of national life, including the armed forces and the security police, and who hold interlocking positions in the Communist party, the governmental apparatus and the main organization on a national as well as provincial level. The majority of the population is still opposed to the Tito regime. (NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, US NSC, 1954. In: "U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957", Nick Ceh, 2002, p. 404) (IMG)

The imperialist press depict Tito as the symbol of the embodiment of the 'Unity and Brotherhood' of the Yugoslav people. The Yugoslav masses found a common ground amongst themselves against the Yugoslav dictator. Even the conservative Serbian peasantry was drawn towards the Soviet Union for fighting Tito's regime. As the MI6-backed Cetniks minimized their anti-regime activity – they had no reason to seriously oppose an MI6-backed terror regime – the conservative Serb peasantry too was drawn towards supporting the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies:

even conservative nationalists in the Serb community relied on the Soviets as the only hope for an improvement in Yugoslavia's political climate. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

Tito and his gang remained in power solely through terror:

it is an error to contend that the Yugoslav people will support Tito against Soviet or Soviet-satellite aggression because, by comparison, the Tito regime is the lesser of the two evils. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The Cominform resolution of 1949 stated:

The top fascist rulers rely on an enormously swollen military-police apparatus, with the aid of which they oppress the peoples of Yugoslavia.

They have turned the country into a military camp, wiped out all democratic rights of the working people, and trampled on any free expression of opinion. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

Mass gatherings of the people protesting against Tito's regime was not the proper response under the conditions of fascist occupation; instead, guerrilla action was more effective. As a Yale University scholar Ivo Banac puts it:

But mass actions were not a good alternative in the circumstances, considering the effectiveness of the UDB-a and the Cominformists' reliance on bloc aid. Guerrilla engagements, which had to rely on mass support, and even occasional rebellions did occur from time to time, however. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

The Cominform had also stated:

The Information Bureau considers that the bureaucratic regime created inside the Party by its leaders is disastrous for the life and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party. There is no inner Party democracy, no elections.. (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

Insofar as 'elections' happened, they were under the conditions of fascist terror. The 'elections' by the Yugoslav regime too were also fundamentally undemocratic and under conditions of fascist terror:

Federal elections conducted in the same atmosphere of terror as prevailed during the November 1945 elections.

Each Central UDB (formerly OZNA) has a special section called "Election UBD" responsible for intimidation and terrorizing of the voters. (Internal Situation in Yugoslavia, CIA, Information as of November 1946, Distributed in March 4, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Over time, with the pressure of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies against the Yugoslav regime, resistance against the Yugoslav regime was becoming more organized among the proletarians of Yugoslavia. The 'Cominformist' communist activists were forming guerrilla units. As a result of Titoist oppression, many brave Yugoslav communists in Montenegro and Macedonia for example, rose up to defend liberty. The regime's response was to throw the guerrillas' family members into jail in the thousands:

The Tito Government represses guerrilla fighters by transferring into another locality and placing into camps all family members of those who have joined the underground, confiscating all their movable property.. The largest concentration camp of this type is the one in Zavidovic in Bosnia. It contains approximately eight hundred and fifty families, totaling over 6,000 people. The inmates, who are fed very badly, are subjected to forced labor, and the death rate among them is very high. Another concentration camp of this type is at Capljina in Hercegovina. (Resistance in Yugoslavia; Government Measures to Counteract Nationalists and Cominformists, CIA, December 21, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

In other cases, the family members of Cominformists were harassed, with many couples being forced to divorce:

The inmates' families were also targeted. Wives of inmates were ordered to divorce their husbands; other wives, out of loneliness, naively allowed themselves to be seduced by secret policemen. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 102) (IMG)

Contrary to the accusations of the Yugoslav regime, the Cominformists did not collaborate with the reactionary bourgeois-nationalist organizations. As confirmed by the CIA:

The Cominformists avoid all contact with nationalists.. ('Resistance in Yugoslavia; Government Measures to Counteract Nationalists and Cominformists', CIA, December 21, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

The Yugoslav communists and the Cominform were well aware of the fact that the 'nationalist' groups, such as the Ustase and anti-Soviet elements amongst the Chetniks, received the support of the MI6 during and after the Great Patriotic War and constituted a fake 'opposition' 'against', and served as spies for, the Tito regime. Tito's gang already collaborated with the German and Italian sponsors of the Ustase during the Great Patriotic War, and recruited many Ustase agents into the regime apparatus. For example, during the ethnocide against Macedonia, Tito's gang recruited the Ustase for this purpose (see C15S5). Collaboration with the fascist 'nationalist' fake 'oppositionist' terror groups would have exposed the Cominform-backed communist rebels to the agents of the Tito regime itself, rendering it easier for the regime to hunt down the socialist rebel cells.

Furthermore, certain terrorist activities, probably carried out 'thanks' to regime collusion, were, according to the Yugoslavs witnessing the events, conducted by non-communist groups but blamed by the regime on the communist rebels. As a Croatian Social Liberal Party politician put it:

The scope of Cominformist sabotage is difficult to assess. Other underground groups in Yugoslavia were committing terrorist acts at the same time. For example, though the authorities believed that arson in some six factories in Osijek (Croatia) was the work of the *ibeovci* [i.e. 'cominformists'], most citizens credited remnants of the and Chetnik groups with these actions. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

The Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies did not leave the Yugoslav communist resistance alone in the face of Tito's fascist regime. The CIA reported:

Cominform groups have been seen to operate in Montenegro and Macedonia.. The Cominformists ... operate principally along the Albanian border. (Resistance in Yugoslavia; Government Measures to Counteract Nationalists and Cominformists, CIA, December 21, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

At least in Montenegro, with the backing of the Soviet Union and People's Democratic Albania, the communists were striving towards an independent Montenegrin People's Democracy:

Pro-Cominform Communists in Montenegro, operating with the support of the Soviet Union and Albania, are believed to be attempting to establish an anti-Tito resistance movement. This movement would endeavor to establish an independent Montenegrin Provisional Government which would be fully subservient to the ... the Cominform. One of the bases from which this movement operates is Shkoder, in Albania, where a so-called Montenegrin Communist Committee has been established. (Anti-Tito Resistance Movement in Montenegro, CIA, December 8, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

For the longer-run, it was necessary that all of Yugoslavia would be liberated and then these independent nations of

Yugoslavia would establish a democratic peace and federate into a socialist Yugoslavia; however, as a temporary expedient, it was necessary that Montenegro would be separated from Serbia and other areas, and would then serve as an independent base for the overthrow of the Yugoslav regime in the rest of Yugoslav territory. The Soviet- Albanian plan was that in this scenario, if the Tito regime would be overthrown, Kosovo would reunify with People's Democratic Albania, Macedonia would unify with Bulgaria, and then all these Slavic nations of Yugoslavia would federate with each other and Bulgaria into a People's Democratic Balkan Federation. The historical evidence shown throughout this book in other chapters backs this assertion.

Anyways, what mattered was that the USSR and the Peoples' Democratic Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania were all major bases for 'Cominformist' guerrilla activity against the Yugoslav regime. For one somewhat famous case, Djilas recalled:

It was at the beginning of winter at that same time, 1948-1949, that eleven or twelve pro-Soviet regional and town officials in Bijelo Polje, led by the Secretary of the Regional Committee, Ilija Bulatovic, fled into the forest. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 80) (IMG)

Hence, in Montenegro, there were pro-Cominform:

Guerrillas led by one Bulatovic.. Outnumbered, the guerrillas retreated across the Albanian Frontier. (Arrests of Cominformists Continue, CIA, March 2, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

They allegedly engaged in a battle against the regime forces:

A battle between Yugoslav troops and Cominform guerrillas allegedly took place recently at Kolasin in Montenegro. (Arrests of Cominformists Continue, CIA, March 2, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

I cannot verify whether the battle took place and whether these guerrillas were real anti-Titoist resistance guerrillas; these kinds of regimes sometimes have their agents 'flee' from them so that these agents get hailed as 'heroes' of the resistance movement, thus being more able to infiltrate. Provisionally, one could say that the resistance in this case was genuine.

There were many cases of armed resistance against the Yugoslav regime, and many armed guerrilla cells were established. Banac provides more details:

The extent of Montenegrin Cominformist insurgency has already been noted. The rebellions in Montenegro continued in several waves. Mobile UDB-a forces suppressed the strongest outbreaks during the summer and autumn of 1948. The following year the security units of Komnen Cerovic destroyed the Cominformist strongholds in the Montenegrin portion of the Sandiak. Rebellions also broke out in the Zeta valley, between Nikic and Titograd, the capital of Montenegro; most party members there sided with the insurgents and fought alongside them. The participation of leading Cominformists from other areas – such as Stojakovic, former forestry minister in Bosnia-Herzegovina – indicates that some *ibeovci* [i.e. 'cominformists'] thought of Montenegro as a possible base area from which partisan warfare could spread to the other republics, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina and eventually Serbia. Nevertheless, despite its intensity, the Montenegrin movement was successfully halted. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234-235) (IMG)

Again, elements in the military defected to the side of the revolution:

Large groups of saboteurs eluded detection for several years after the Revolution. Major Krste Vukcevic, a Montenegrin and the commissar of the Messerschmitt regiment at the Zemunik air base near Zadar, organized some twenty officers from his unit and the technical battalion. They bombed twelve planes in Zemunik in 1951, although some were saved. All were arrested as *ibeovci*. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234)

(IMG)

The rebels were backed by the communist subversive cells in the regime military, cells working to sabotage the Tito regime's war on the Yugoslav people:

The secret Cominformist cells in the armed forces were especially dangerous, as they could threaten a military seizure (as in the aborted plot of the Popovic-Malsevic-Rodic group in Sarajevo and Novi Sad) and maintain channels for the escape of prominent *ibeovci*, especially air force officers, to the bloc countries. Some of these networks operated through Soviet agents in the JA [i.e. Yugoslav Army]. They were also skillful at sabotage, and that was their main activity. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 233) (IMG)

The continued presence of the communist spies and Soviet agents in the Yugoslav regime's military surely was helpful in facilitating the anti-regime guerrilla activity from below. According to a CIA report, a local section chief of the Yugoslav intelligence stated that the USSR had helped infiltrate teams of anti-regime guerrillas into Yugoslavia:

Bogdan Markovic, a section chief in the Ministry of Interior, asserted that he did not believe the Soviets would attack openly but would continue, as in the past, to infiltrate teams of guerrillas. (Meeting of Officers of the Ministry of the Interior, CIA, November 15, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

A CIA document confirmed;

In the Szeged and Papa Zones of Hungary, Yugoslav Cominformists are taking parachute training with Soviet equipment. (Troop Movement in the Balkans, CIA, July 11, 1950, p. 1) (IMG{Greece})

Then there was the mysterious Major Petar Subara, described as the communist 'Robin Hood'. "So little is known about Subara," Banac writes:

that his activities can be reconstructed only in the broadest of strokes. Even his name is not certain. Subara was a nickname inspired by his characteristic headgear. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235) (IMG)

According to Banac, the evidence shows that:

the group led by the mysterious Major Petar "Subara" (Fur Hat) was ... a more sophisticated Cominformist version of a sort of Robin Hood band.... (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235) (IMG)

As an anti-regime rebel guerrilla:

Major Subara mixed politics with traditional outlawry, relying on local accomplices (yataks) for shelter, food, and information. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235) (IMG)

A former guerrilla during the Yugoslav People's Liberation War, he reportedly rose up to rally the peasant masses against the traitorous regime of Tito:

It is certain, however, that he was a Serb from a village between Borovo and Vinkovci, in Slavonia, a major in the JA, and a Partisan veteran. After the Resolution he deserted with a group of followers and took to roaming central and eastern Slavonia, from the Papuk highlands to the Dalj collective farm, the former estate of the Serbian metropolitanate of Karlovci, on the banks of the Danube. His purpose clearly was to rouse the peasants by propaganda broadcast by his mobile radio station, by broadsheets printed on his small press, and by exemplary liquidations of party and security officials.

The peasants, especially the Serbs of the Dalj area, apparently responded positively and actively aided Subara's group. They were completely disaffected by the forced collectivization, which the government launched in 1948-1949 in a misguided effort to disprove Moscow's charges that rural Yugoslavia was held in thrall by "kulaks." Since the rebels disseminated the most elementary propaganda ("Brothers and sisters, rise up against the bloodsuckers of our people who steal and kill, etc.") the peasants took the message as a protest against collectivization. Observers reported that the slogan "Long live Subara" could be seen on the collective farms in the environs of Dalj and Bijelo Brdo. When asked about these inscriptions, the peasants replied that they referred to a man who would save them. Subara's band never incited a mass insurrection and it was finally liquidated, but before that happened his followers certified his reputation by attacking several UDB-a outposts and reportedly killing not only a handful of security officers but also a unit of six counterinsurgency specialists. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235-236) (IMG)

General Subara was able to recruit from among the peasants because those peasants were not really petit-bourgeois, but were rather state-owned semi-slaves/serfs, and unlike the petit-bourgeoisie who have small businesses to lose, semi-slaves barely own anything and thus have a high revolutionary potential. As well:

Some [guerrilla] units consisted largely of foreign Communist emigres, such as the Italian group formed in Rijeka by Alfredo Bonelli; (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 232) (IMG)

In Croatia and Bosnia too there were communist guerrillas rising up against Tito's fascist occupation:

Other instances of Cominformist insurgency took place in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Except for a small group of Slovene Cominformists, who took to the mountains only to be decimated by the army and the UDB-a, these outbreaks were but a continuation of traditional primitive rebelliousness. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235) (IMG)

Overall, the communist guerrilla operations:

detracted from the government's prestige, caused considerable damage, and generated further discontent. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

"The most successful of" the communist anti-regime guerrillas:

were based on a wide spectrum of grievances beyond the narrow Cominformist issues, usually wrongs that the peasants considered intolerable. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

Nonetheless:

however widespread, sabotage could not destroy the government. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

And the guerrillas:

were usually suppressed quickly.. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

Again, this was because Yugoslavia did not have a large class of proletarians, let alone also kolkhozniks. Some peasants were basically state-owned slaves and thus had revolutionary potentials, but some others were petit- bourgeois and thus unwilling to risk a struggle against the comprador classes ruling Yugoslavia.

C12S4. The Yugoslav Regime, a Trotskyite State

*** IMG-All- {Titoist Yugoslavia}

Sheng Shicai, as shown in C9S14, was the KMT commander who, in the 1930s, had risen to prominence in Sinkiang/Xinjiang, China, with the assistance of the Japanese fascists and its allied Islamic terrorist mercenaries. Upon overthrowing the Soviet-backed Sinkiang state, the Soviets imposed heavy pressure on him, leading to his cooptation by the Soviet intelligence service. Later on, with the Nazi invasion of the USSR, the Soviet intelligence presence in Sinkiang temporarily weakened, allowing Sheng Shicai to break the Soviet intelligence encirclement and cease the period of his cooptation. He rose to become the advisor to the CIA-backed KMT General Hu Zongnan, Chiang Kai-Shek's most trusted general and advisor. Committed to the KMT's anti-Soviet cause for the rest of his life, Sheng fostered numerous anti-Soviet slanders in his memoirs published in 'Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot' (1958). Due to his credentials as a Japanese-backed KMT agent, a temporary cooptee of the USSR, and later prominent official in the KMT, his memoirs, published almost two decades after he had successfully gone out of the period of cooptation by the Soviets, served as a valuable anti-Soviet source on the events unfolding within the Eastern Bloc. On Tito's break with the USSR, Sheng comments the following:

The Trotskyite influence also accounted for Tito's defection from the Stalinist camp. While many factors lay behind the rupture between the two leaders, it is undeniable that the most important one was the influence of the Trotskyites in the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) who painstakingly plotted to create cleavages within the Soviet world and to isolate the Stalin regime. ("Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?", Allen S. Whiting & Sheng Shih-ts'ai, 1958, p. 172) (IMG)

Djilas and Rankovic, as indicated by Ivo Banac and to some extent also by the memoirs of Djilas himself, were both former Trotskyite followers of the notorious terrorist Petko Miletic. So extreme-left fundamentalist Djilas and Rankovic were, that they were labeled as 'Wahhabis' in the Yugoslav Communist Party. They along with Yugoslavia's Trotskyite-in-chief Tito surely played a major role in seeking to isolate the USSR. When the rift between Tito's gang and the Cominform was publicly revealed, the Trotskyite Fourth International interfered in support of Tito. As Robert J. Alexander – a US State Department researcher on labour relations, a lifelong member of the well-known American imperialist think tank 'Council on Foreign Relations' (CFR), a consultant for the AFL- CIO trade union network, and a well-known author on Trotskyism – wrote:

The Trotskyists established contacts with the Titoites. The Fourth International had some relations with the Yugoslav Embassy in Paris. The International and the Embassy jointly arranged for sending work brigades of young French Trotskyists to Yugoslavia during the summer of 1950. ("International Trotskyism, 1929-1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement", Robert Jackson Alexander, 1991, p. 315) (IMG)

The Cominform expelled Tito's gang:

Only two months after the end of the Second World Congress of the Fourth International.. This event, ... had the immediate effect of arousing great hope and support in Trotskyist ranks.

The Secretariat of the Fourth International dispatched a series of open letters to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. These sought a rapprochement with the Yugoslav party. ("International Trotskyism, 1929-1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement", Robert Jackson Alexander, 1991, p. 315) (IMG)

Robert J. Alexander might not be a perfect source on this kind of an issue because Robert J. Alexander was a US State Department official linked to the Kennedy faction of the United States. The Kennedy faction, just like the Roosevelt faction, were the agent of the American proletariat within the US imperialist state and had an agenda of undermining the international weapons of American imperialism. They would have been against the Trotskyites and Titoists. Nonetheless, the remarks by Alexander are supported by the Trotskyite primary sources anyways.

Noting the "degeneration which you [Tito's group] now discern in Russia," the Secretariat of the Fourth International remarked:

Our organization, the Fourth International, originated in the Left Opposition of the Bolshevik Party, which 25 years ago already saw the germs of the degeneration of the Russian Communist Party which you are discovering..

(An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

As the letter of the Fourth International indicates, the Trotskyite view that the USSR had 'degenerated' was prevalent amongst Yugoslavia's leading circles. In its letter to Tito's gang, the Central Committee of the CPSU had stated:

We know that there are anti-Soviet rumours circulating among the leading comrades in Yugoslavia, for instance that 'the CPSU is degenerate', 'great power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR', 'the USSR is trying to dominate Yugoslavia economically' and 'the Cominform is a means of controlling the other Parties by the CPSU', etc. These anti-Soviet allegations are usually camouflaged by left phrases, such as 'socialism in the Soviet Union has ceased to be revolutionary' and that Yugoslavia alone is the exponent of 'revolutionary socialism'. It was naturally laughable to hear such statements about the CPSU from such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanovic, Kidric, Rankovic and others. However, the fact remains that such rumours have been circulating for a long time among many high-ranking Yugoslav officials, that they are still circulating, and that they are naturally creating an anti-Soviet atmosphere which is endangering relations between the CPSU and the CPY.

(...). Again, one might mention that, when he decided to declare war on the CPSU, Trotsky also started with accusations of the CPSU as degenerate, as suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers. Naturally he camouflaged all this with left slogans about world revolution. However, it is well known that Trotsky himself became degenerate, and when he was exposed, crossed over into the camp of the sworn enemies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive. ('Stalin complains to Tito of the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Yugoslavia and shortcomings of the CPY', March 27, 1948. In: 'Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey', Stephen Clissold, 1975, pp. 172-17) (IMG)

The remarks by the CPSU Central Committee's letter to Tito's gang were reflected in the joint statement of the Cominform parties against the Yugoslav Communist Party. The "leaders of the Community Party of Yugoslavia," the statement went:

have taken a stand unworthy of Communists, and have begun to identify the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers, behaving toward the Soviet Union in the same manner as they behave toward the bourgeois states. Precisely because of this anti-Soviet stand, slanderous propaganda about the "degeneration" of the CPSU(B), about the "degeneration" of the USSR, and so on, borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, is current within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. (From the Resolution "Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia," Passed at the Cominform Session of June 1948 in Rumania, in the Presence of the Most Responsible State and Party Leaders of the USSR and Eastern European Countries, Openly Calling Upon the Peoples of Yugoslavia to Rebel against, and Overthrow, their Legal Government. Retrieved From: The Yugoslav Exception, Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An Online Archive of Soviet Primary Sources) (IMG)

The equation of the USSR with the imperialist powers laid for Tito and his fellow Trotskyites the theoretical basis for conspiring to mislead the anti-colonial peoples into a confrontation against the USSR and unofficially in favor of the imperialist camp. As it was best for imperialist masters to lead astray the anti-imperialist risings, the Fourth International instructed imperialist agent Tito to seize the leadership of the anti-colonial struggles:

you would have to become the champion ... of all colonial peoples revolting against their imperialist masters; (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

By Tito's 'Third Force', the seeds of the Non-Aligned Movement were sown, so to seduce the anti-colonial peoples back into imperial bondage under the false slogans of 'neutrality' and 'independence' from the two Cold War camps:

the Yugoslav dictator backs up the so called "Third Force" and the neutral block; his activities are very intense in this field, and especially so among the Asiatic peoples. He holds up the bream (backs up) the labourist [i.e. Labour Party] dissident Bevan ... while his diplomatic mission to Tehran numbers not less than thirty persons. (Tito's True Face, Political Information (Analysis of Tito's Relationship with Stalin and the West, CIA, November 28, 1952, p. 13) (IMG)

In those countries strategically close to the anti-imperialist forces, the call for 'non-alignment' is the call for distancing away from the anti-imperialist camp and shifting towards the pro-fascist camp. In countries strategically close to the pro-fascist forces, the call for 'non-alignment' is the call for distancing away from the pro-fascist camp and shifting towards the anti-fascist camp.

In the context of Yugoslavia, therefore, the call for non-alignment was nothing but support for American imperialist objectives. Lest one forgets that such blatant Trotskyist-Titoist attacks on the Two Camps thesis objectively favored the US-led camp, pro-fascist camp, for they equated the just and the unjust, the anti-imperialists and pro-imperialists. The epoch in question was but the conflict between the forces serving fascism and the forces harming it. There exist no

alternatives to anti-fascism and pro-fascism. The ostensibly neutral forces objectively belonged only to either of the two forces of pro-fascism and anti-fascism, despite pretensions to the contrary (for a more in-depth discussion of the two camps thesis, see C1S3). In the case of Yugoslavia, the regime served imperialist-fascist secret services by infiltrating the anti-imperialist camp, under the cloak of 'non-alignment'. The Third Force was a reflection of such reactionary ideologies as 'Third-Worldism' or 'Third World Socialism'. The Third Worldists actively ignored the fact that the USSR was a war-torn country that had experienced a famine, not to mention the extermination of at least 27 million of its people by the Nazis, as well as the American imperialist plans to wipe it off the map through nuclear strikes as early as September 1945. Similar was the case of the peoples of the Peoples' Democracies who had suffered under the savage persecution of fascists and the newly arising Anglo-American imperialist nuclear threats. Brushing off the victimized USSR and the Peoples' Democracies as though they mirrored the US-led camp, the Third Worldists and the 'Third Force' advocated a supposed 'neutral' bloc when in fact they were objectively on the side of imperialist-fascist secret services and were actively working to drive a wedge between the peoples of the colonized world and the peoples of the liberated socialist or popular-democratic countries. The very concept of a 'Third World' is reactionary. It seeks to conceptually separate the anti-colonial struggles outside the territories of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies from the Soviet-led camp. At the same time, by not mentioning that most of such 'Third World' belonged to the 'First World' because of its domination by the Anglo-American imperialists, the term itself engages in colonialism denial. It is a pure propaganda term.

Though the 'Third-Worldist' concept is in-itself wrong, the idea could at times be used for progressive objectives, as a cloak for an anti-imperialist and anti-fascist agenda, for the 'Third World' nonsense plays the same function as the 'non-alignment' concept. Promoting 'Third World independence' rhetoric in a country aligned with the US-led camp would have served as a call for a shift away from the US-led camp, and promoting 'Third World independence' rhetoric in the Soviet-led camp would have meant support for a shift towards the US-led camp.

It is worth reminding the reader that Gamal Abdel-Nasser, the pro-communist leader of anti-imperialist Egypt, privately and unofficially rejected the concept of 'Non-Alignment' as well. In a conversation with Houari Boumediene, Abdel-Nasser declared:

non-alignment and impartiality has become empty talk, devoid of any truth! Because today, where is non-alignment to be found? We say be biased neither towards the East nor towards the West, but the West is standing against us and beating us! And we say 'we are neutral between East and West'? So how can I be neutral between the one who hits me and the one who does not hit me?! On the issue of neutrality and non-alignment, we are ready to reach [an agreement to] any extent, even to the point of making a joint defense agreement with the Soviet Union! (Minutes of the talks between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Algerian President Houari Boumediene, Qasr al-Qubba, Cairo, July 10, 1967, from: nasser.bibalex.org (the archives of Gamal Abdel-Nasser's life), p. 12) (IMG{October Revolution & Civil War})

The above quote is straight from the archival records of Gamal Abdel-Nasser's conversations with foreign leaders. Abdel-Nasser was 'Non-Aligned' in the name only. The title of 'non-alignment' was a useful means by which he was able to cover his anti-imperialism with the facade of 'friendliness' towards imperialists, and hence his pretensions of 'non-alignment' was a correct move in terms of intelligence work. There were indeed many other anti-imperialists who rightly disguised themselves as 'non-aligned' in order to pretend to be 'harmless' to imperialists. In countries dominated by Anglo-American imperialism, calls for 'neutrality' in the international conflict meant and continues to mean a shift away from the camp of the Anglo-American imperialists and serves as a smokescreen for an alliance with the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist enemies of the Anglo-American imperialists.

A US intelligence document written approximately two years after the Cominform resolution, confirms more explicitly that Tito's gang maintained the Trotskyite stances condemned by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies; firstly, Tito and his gang claimed that the Soviet state was a "degenerated bureaucracy" pursuing its own "imperialism" for "World domination" using the Communist parties as its "weapon." Secondly, they promoted the Kautskyite-Trotskyite notion of "ultra-imperialism" which sought to present imperialist powers as all engaged in peaceful alliances rather than engaged in inter-imperialist conflict (for a discussion of why this thesis is incorrect, see C1S2); in doing so, they also held the USSR responsible for causing the formation of such an ultra-imperial alliance. Thirdly, they argued that only through a "World Revolution" can communists "establish themselves in the Yugoslav population". The latter argument signified that solely by exporting "socialism" worldwide can socialism be built in Yugoslavia. The following are excerpts of the US intelligence document:

Yugoslav Communists publicly claim that their doctrine is the most accurate one for the strengthening of International Communism and for the creation of favorable conditions in other free countries for the ascent to power of the Communist regime. At secret Communist Party conferences (meetings) and in confidential conversations among Communists, the following ideas are mainly being propagated:

- The Soviet desire for World domination, and the Soviet degenerated bureaucracy becomes fatal with

regard to the spreading of Communism throughout the World because many socialists and supporters of Marxist theory in capitalist countries will not join Communist parties, the latter have become a “weapon of Soviet imperialism” to the World public.

- The mistaken diplomatic tactics and international policies of the current Kremlin leaders have caused a reaction in capitalist States in the West, have resulted in their coalition against Communism (the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, and others).

- The threats of revolution and war by the Soviet Union, no matter how they may be camouflaged, greatly damage and can easily compromise the Communist World Revolution, which is the ideal of Yugoslav Communists and through which only the latter can establish themselves in the Yugoslav population, according to their opinion.

- The campaign of Communism against the democracies, before the current Communist Governments are sufficiently strong economically, and sufficiently armed, is provoked by the degenerated old men of the Kremlin. This premature war will be a sure defeat of World Communism, particularly and primarily in Yugoslavia.

(Economic Situation in FNR Yugoslavia, CIA, p. 10) (IMG)

Unmistakably, such hostile anti-Soviet theses constituted tenets of Trotskyism. One more observation in the CIA document deserves attention: the YCP conferences, aimed at determining the Party’s ideological line, were held in a strictly secretive manner. In his letter to the CPSU Central Committee, Tito’s gang explicitly confessed and proudly defended the absence of transparency on the Party line and conferences. Soviet leaders, Tito arrogantly wrote: are not acquainted with the nature of the Front in Yugoslavia and criticize us for not publishing reports of Party meetings and conferences. All the important decisions, from those of the Federal Government down, regarding all questions of social and state life, are either decisions of the Party or made on the initiative of the Party, and the people understand and accept them as such. Therefore, we do not feel it necessary to emphasize that this or that decision was made at this or that Party conference. (‘Tito rejects the charges and defends his policies’, April 13, 1948. In: ‘Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey’, Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 180) (IMG)

In their letter criticizing Tito’s gang, the Soviets also mentioned:

We readily admit that every Communist Party, among them the Yugoslav, has the right to criticize the CPSU, even as the CPSU has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. But Marxism demands that criticism be above-board and not underhand and slanderous, thus depriving those criticized of the opportunity to reply to the criticism. However, the criticism by the Yugoslav officials is neither open nor honest; it is both underhand and dishonest and of a hypocritical nature, because, while discrediting the CPSU behind its back, publicly they pharisaically praise it to the skies. Thus criticism is transformed into slander, into an attempt to discredit the CPSU and to blacken the Soviet system. (‘Stalin complains to Tito of the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Yugoslavia and shortcomings of the CPY’, March 27, 1948. In: ‘Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey’, Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 172) (IMG)

By now, such remarks shall reveal no secrets to the reader. As mentioned previously, during the Great Patriotic War, the Trotskyite left-sectarianism of Tito’s group was concealed behind his ostensibly ‘pro-Stalin’ flattery. The creation of the Proletarian Brigades on the birthday of the Soviet leader serves as the case in point. And as demonstrated in the above letter Stalin was well aware of such Trotskyite flattery. The letter continued:

We do not doubt that the Yugoslav Party masses would disown this anti-Soviet criticism as alien and hostile if they knew about it. We think this is the reason why the Yugoslav officials make these criticisms in secret, behind the backs of the masses. (‘Stalin complains to Tito of the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Yugoslavia and shortcomings of the CPY’, March 27, 1948. In: ‘Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey’, Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 173) (IMG)

Such claims too were confirmed by Djilas, who admitted that the absence of public information and discussion led to the break with the ‘Cominformists’, the Yugoslav communists who supported the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies against Tito’s regime. In Djilas’s words:

In the state that Josip Broz Tito created and which created him, the absence of public notice, of public information and discussion, at least within the ruling Party, led to the crisis with the Cominformists [i.e. pro-Cominform Soviet-friendly communists]. It led to all kinds of excesses and aberrations. The ban on freedom of information is the source of evil.... This evil permeates society, seeps into its pores, prevents organic development, impels dictatorial authority to terror and violence.

If only there had been freedom of information, if only it had been possible to debate openly But that would have been a different Yugoslavia, a third Yugoslavia, of which, for the time being, we can only dream. (...). Even if there had been a camp, if the will of the leader and the intractable secret police had not dominated

the Party, the regime in that camp would not have been such a monstrous combination of two right-minded groups, the security officials and the reeducated. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 89) (IMG) During the YCP's Fifth Congress which occurred shortly after the Cominform's expulsion of Tito's gang, Tito continued to live the proof of the CPSU's line: that Tito engaged in hostile anti-Soviet conspiracies while hypocritically flattering the USSR and in particular, Stalin. As reported by the CIA:

At the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in July 1948, three weeks after Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Cominform, Tito ended his speech with the words "Long live the Soviet Union, long live Stalin!" This was neither so suicidal nor so naive as it appears. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 3) (IMG)

The CIA document continued:

Perhaps more important than neutralizing these actual or potential enemies was the need for a new myth, a new ideological framework. In justifying his closing words at that Fifth Congress, Tito noted, according to his biographer Dedijer, that loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union had been the myth which had supported the Partisan resistance, and that he could not drop it overnight. Yet he could not persist in encouraging so treasonous a loyalty. Thus he now needed the support of the workers and the republics against Stalin and the Soviet Union. The formulation which eventually emerged, "self-management," has become the touchstone of Yugoslav Communism. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 3) (IMG)

The 'self-management principle' emerged as the propaganda catch-phrase of the Titoist agents in the Soviet-led bloc. The promotion of the 'self-management' model by Tito's gang, a demagogical weapon for 'red'-washing decentralization, was upon the direct instructions of the Fourth International. The letter of the International Secretariat stated:

It is essential that the masses be induced to participate as actively as possible in the work of planning.. Complete sovereignty of the factory committees must be established in the plants, and genuine workers' control of production must be instituted. (...). In a word it is necessary to give the workers and poor peasants the clear feeling that they are the masters in the country, and that the state and the progress of the economy are in direct correspondence with their own interests. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

Officially:

"The Basic Law on Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by Working Collectives," the Magna Charta of Yugoslav self-management ... was adopted on 27 June 1950. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 4) (IMG)

Yet:

even the ostensible democracy of the workers councils did not extend beyond the framework of a single firm. The new system could not solve any of the key questions of society and the nation. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 4) (IMG)

Beside red-washing decentralization, a function of the 'self-management' concept was to combat the Soviets in the propaganda war. The Fourth International added that the Yugoslav trade unions must 'defend' the 'workers' against the supposedly 'anti-proletarian' USSR:

The trade unions must be granted their real function, which is to defend the interests of the workers, ... against the Soviet State.. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

For such anti-Soviet policy to succeed, the resistance of Yugoslav communists 'should' be broken, the Fourth International argued. This, the Secretariat stated, requires re-education programs to be set up against these communist cadres, a fact which would stir fierce Soviet criticism:

We do not at all conceal that such a policy will encounter very great obstacles in your country and even in your own ranks. A complete reeducation of your cadres ... would be necessary. Still less do we conceal that ... the present leadership of the Russian State would furiously attack your policy, for it would appear to them a mortal threat to their acquired positions. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

In agreement with the above statements, Tito would set up torture camps to 're-educate' the Yugoslav communists – as

the Secretariat predicted, the Soviet media fiercely condemned such policies. Anyone voicing dissent against the self-management propaganda campaign would be accused of being Soviet-friendly and hence rounded up for:

the mere suspicion of opposition to self-management has since merited the immediate charge of "Corninformism." (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

The establishment of worker self-management was a highly demagogical way to actually promote bureaucratic chaos and corruption, for worker self-management was decentralization under the cover of 'worker domination'. As has been mentioned in C1S6, economic decentralization is a means of proliferating bureaucracy. Decentralization minimizes, or increases the costs of, the coordination of the different sectors of the economy, thus causing the economic disintegration exploited by the bureaucrats for filling pockets. It also allows for numerous bureaus to form. Hundreds of times more difficult than surveilling and monitoring the activities of one bureau is the surveillance and monitor of the activities of numerous bureaus – precisely that is willed by the corrupt bureaucrats, for they seek to prevent the surveillance and monitoring of their corrupt activities. Decentralization, which multiplies the number of powerful bureaus, thus once again contributes to the growth of a powerful bureaucratic oligarchic class. Decentralization, by increasing the number of bureaus, also increases the costs of the maintenance of so many bureaus, a factor that reduces finances for production, precisely what imperialism seeks for achieving its objective of preventing the development of the productive forces in the areas it colonizes. This was indeed the situation in Yugoslavia. The CIA reported:

Decentralization of the Yugoslav economy has produced near anarchy and cut-throat competition between enterprises. Confusion and inefficiency are greater today than in 1948. Each firm strives by any means available to gain a position of monopoly over its republic or geographical unit by gaining the exclusive representation of some well-known foreign export house. For example, various Yugoslav firms exerted considerable pressure in the form of price concessions and outright blackmail on foreign representatives in order to secure an exclusive contract from the West German optical firm, Carl Zeiss. No holds are barred in attempts to discredit competitors and to show profits. This results in unbelievable cases of wire-pulling in Belgrade, canceled contracts and various other uneconomic practices.

Expediency, corruption and fraud, in the pursuit of personal gain, hold sway in the foreign trade field. (General Views on Yugoslav Situation, CIA, April 4, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

As further confirmed by the CIA, the economic decentralization assisted the corrupt bureaucrats; even the worker self-management model which the regime preached was but a demagogical tool with which to decentralize so to benefit the bureaucrats:

The decentralization law, for example, has only made it easier for top-level bureaucrats to evade responsibility; actually it has given no power or right of initiative to the workers or to the executive boards of enterprises. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

C12S5. CIA Support for the Titoist Current

*** IMG-All-{Titoist Yugoslavia}

While the Americans were actively preparing for World War III against the USSR and countries of People's Democracy, such a costly war was not their preferred avenue for liquidating Soviet power. Instead, the American imperialists aimed to (1) wage a shadow or covert war via proxy terror groups such as the UPA, OUN, AK, etc., (2) utilize the network of American imperialist agents within the governments of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies for combat against the socialist forces. The Titoist infiltrators and the fascist guerrillas would benefit each other, for the fascist guerrillas would provide the Titoists with the leverage and military backbone they need for a factional conflict against the communist factions in the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, whereas the Titoists would serve as the high-ranking officials that would stab the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies in the back from above, opening the 'gates' for the CIA-backed terrorists to carry out their operations.

CIA support for Titoism was discussed in bodies as high-level as the US National Security Council (NSC) of the US President and top American intelligence, military, and State Department officials. A document titled NSC 58 was written, an excerpt of which follows:

COURSES OPEN TO US

29. In seeking to bring about the elimination of Soviet power from the satellite states, two principal courses of action are conceivable. One is war; the other is measures short of war.

30. Resort to war as a course of action is raised in this paper solely for the purpose of making clear that it should be rejected as a practical alternative. This course is rejected, if for no other reason, because it is organically not feasible for this Government to initiate a policy of creating a war. It therefore follows that this paper is necessarily addressed to measures short of war. However, if war in Eastern Europe is forced upon us,

that is a different matter and one which would create a wholly new situation beyond the compass of this paper. It scarcely need be added that we should always be prepared for such a contingency.

31. There remains then the category of measures short of war. Before discussing them, we should at the outset have clearly in mind another set of alternatives between which we must make a conscious choice.

In attempting to cause an elimination of Soviet power in these countries, we obviously cannot expect a vacuum to result. The type of government which might succeed to power is intimately related to the removal of Kremlin influence and control. Therefore, should it be our aim to replace, as a first step, Kremlin authority with (a) governments immediately friendly to us or (b) any governments free of Moscow domination, even though they be Communist regimes?

32. Our ultimate aim must, of course, be the appearance in Eastern Europe of nontotalitarian administrations willing to accommodate themselves to, and participate in, the free world community.

Strong tactical considerations, however, argue against setting up this goal as an immediate objective.

None of the Eastern European countries, except Czechoslovakia, has ever known any but authoritarian government. Democracy in the western sense is alien to their culture and tradition. Moreover, the non-totalitarian leadership, such as it is, in the satellite states has been thoroughly fragmented and crushed.

It has little chance of coming to power save through armed intervention from the west. Were we to set as our immediate goal the replacement of totalitarianism by democracy, an overwhelming portion of the task would fall on us, and we would find ourselves directly engaging the Kremlin's prestige and provoking strong Soviet reaction, possibly in the form of war or at least in vigorous indirect aggression.

At best, we would find ourselves deeply enmeshed in the eastern European situation and saddled with

an indefinitely continuing burden of political, economic and military responsibility for the survival of the uncertain regimes which we had placed in power.

33. If, however, we are willing that, as a first step, schismatic Communist regimes supplant the present Stalinist governments, we stand a much better chance of success. Admittedly, it would be a difficult task to attempt to bring about a severance of satellite ties with the Kremlin. But it would not be nearly so difficult as challenging at the outset, not only the whole complex of Communist ideology and method, but also the long heritage of authoritarianism.

34. The more feasible immediate course, then, is to foster a heretical drifting-away process on the part of the satellite states. However weak they may now appear, grounds do exist for heretical schisms. We can contribute to the widening of these rifts without assuming responsibility. And when the final breaks occur, we would not be directly involved in engaging Soviet prestige; the quarrel would be between the Kremlin and the Communist Reformation.

(United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 50-51) (IMG)

As the above document clearly shows, Washington's goal in the Eastern bloc was to increase the leverage of the existing Titoist fifth column as means of reducing the influence of the proletariat in these states and paving the way towards the Titoization. The Cominform resolution of 1949 too confirmed:

The Yugoslav traitors, obeying the will of the imperialists, undertook to form in the People's Democracies political gangs consisting of reactionaries, nationalists, clerical and fascist elements and, relying on these gangs, to bring about counter-revolutionary coups in these countries, wrest them from the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp and subordinate them to the forces of imperialism. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

In supplementing the above, another document, NSC 5607, reaffirmed that Washington will continue:

To stimulate nationalism within the satellite countries by reviving the historic traditions of these peoples and by suggesting the great benefits which can be derived from a courageous policy of defiance of Moscow such as Tito exhibited. (104. National Security Council Report, Washington, June 29, 1956., NSC 5607, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EAST-WEST EXCHANGES) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

The Cominform also stated:

In this way the imperialists seek to undermine the Parties from within and subordinate them to themselves. They have succeeded in realizing this aim in Yugoslavia. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

The NSC 58 file made several other important points, worthy of highlight. Acutely aware of the scientific nature of communism and the danger which such science posed to imperial interests, American leaders sought to foster left- and right-deviationist tendencies so to subvert the communist labour movement from within. NSC 58 specified that “heretical communism” should be encouraged; it is no surprise, after so much revelations, that revisionism was to be fostered as American imperialism’s tool against the socialist bloc:

A course of encouraging schisms within the Communist world cannot be pursued without reserve because such a course is a tactical expediency which, however necessary, must never be permitted to obscure our basic long-term objectives a non-totalitarian system in Eastern Europe. The problem is to facilitate the development of heretical Communism without at the same time seriously impairing our chances for ultimately replacing this intermediate totalitarianism with tolerant regimes congenial to the Western World. (United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 53-54) (IMG)

Labelled as ‘dogmatic’, communism (‘Stalinism’) was an object of attack by Washington’s revisionist proxies in the Eastern bloc:

This course is intimately related to and partly dependent upon the third course of action open to us an attack on the ideological front, specifically directed at the Stalinist dogma of satellite dependence upon and subservience to the U.S.S.R. This key doctrine should be unremittingly attacked all across the board in its political, economic and cultural applications. On the positive side, the reverse of the Stalinist dogma nationalism should be encouraged. The offensive should be maintained not only on the overt but also the covert plane. (United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, p. 52) (IMG)

Akin to revisionism was the corruption of the bureaucrats, an ally of the United States and a phenomenon capable of liquidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and democracy. Corrupt officials, far from forming a national bourgeoisie who would for their own interests expand industrial production, actually represented (and represent) a parasitic class of money-capitalists fed off of sabotaging economic expansion. As such they would be hostile to popular advancement and socialism. In this regard, NSC 58 stated:

The Stalinist dogma undoubtedly had validity in the minds of satellite leaders when they were revolutionaries seeking power. At that time, there was little conflict between their interests and those of the Kremlin; they were wholly dependent upon Moscow and could hope to realize their revolutionary aims and personal ambitions only through subserving the interests of the U.S.S.R. But now that they have the appearance and considerable of the substance of power, subtle new forces come into play. Power, even the taste of it, is as likely to corrupt Communist as bourgeois leaders. **Considerations of national as well as personal interest materialize and come into conflict with the colonial policy pursued by the Soviet interests. When this happens, satellite officials may still remain, by force of other factors, Kremlin captives; but at least they are not entirely willing ones.** (United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 48-49. Bold added.) (IMG)

The above excerpt did not explicitly endorse corruption but by claiming that the corruption of ‘satellite leaders’ would cause them to confront Moscow, it was de facto implying that corruption should be promoted. Corruption, as the invisible hand of sabotage, yields chaos and inefficiency, separates the Party and state from the masses, and creates room for bribery and blackmail thus allowing foreign intelligence infiltration. Imperialist fifth columns grow well in corrupt countries, for the corrupt bureaucratic oligarchs serve as a comprador bourgeois counter-weight against the influence of the proletariat in the socialistic state. The corrupt bureaucrats then, by fighting the proletarian enemies of finance capital, facilitate the penetration of the intelligence agents of finance capital into the socialist or socialist-leaning countries. Precisely for these reasons did American leaders embrace potential corruption in the People’s Democracies and the fostering of a red bourgeoisie, comprador capitalists cloaked as ‘communists’, who would destroy socialism.

To conclude, the course of action called for in the NSC was:

46. Our over-all aim with respect to the satellite states should be the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of preponderant Soviet power from Eastern Europe without resort to war.

47. We should, as the only practical immediate expedient, seek to achieve this objective through fostering Communist heresy among the satellite states, encouraging the emergence of non-Stalinist regimes..

48. It must, however, be our fixed aim that eventually these regimes must be replaced by non-totalitarian

governments desirous of participating with good faith in the free world community.

49. More specifically, bearing in mind all of the qualifications set forth in the analysis of this paper, we should:

- a. Seek to bring about retraction of Soviet military forces behind the borders of the U.S.S.R.;
- b. Endeavor to cause an increasing isolation of the confirmed Stalinists from the nationalist elements of the party and from popular support in the satellite states toward the end that their power be reduced;
- c. Attack the Stalinist dogma of satellite subservience to the U.S.S.R. and encourage nationalism;
- d. Bring fully to bear on the Soviet-satellite relationship the economic forces which we control or influence.

(U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, PPS Documents, Washington, Top Secret, Policy Planning Staff Paper, August 25, 1949. In: GENERAL POLICIES AND PROBLEMS. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

And to be sure, all of these policies and plans were implemented upon US President Truman's personal order:

As of December 13 President Truman approved the Conclusions of this Report and directed that they be implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the government under the coordination of the Secretary of State. (Footnote section of: United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 48-49) (IMG)

For the victory of Titoism in the Peoples' Democracies to bear fruition, the Americans had decided to assassinate communists. Hence the Americans hatched a plot called 'Project X' which, according to the U.S. News stated:

"strong-arm quads would be formed under American guidance [and] assassination of key communists would be encouraged." (I Choose Peace, Konni Zilliacus, p. 212, citing: U.S. News) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

Under this plan, strong-arm squads would be formed under American guidance. Assassination of key Communists would be encouraged. American agents, parachuted into Eastern Europe, would be used to coordinate anti-Communist action. (From Trotsky To Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, citing: U.S. News)

To summarize, the American imperialist objective was the promotion of the corrupt bureaucrat, as the class allies of Anglo-American finance capital and as the basis for the Titoist mafia, in the Soviet-led camp. The rise of the corrupt bureaucrats would liquidate socialism and allow room for a massive network of fifth columnists to be established, paving the way towards the division and collapse of the Eastern camp. America's sponsorship of revisionism, particularly Titoism, was not exclusive to Eastern Europe; Titoism were and continue to be globally sponsored so to weaken the communist labour movement and advance the banners of the US-led bloc of imperialists. Titoists rose to power in the USSR, and they too liquidated socialism. Traitors as they were, they assisted other Titoists in the Eastern bloc to rise to power, liquidate socialism, roll back the influence of the proletariat in the state apparatus, and isolate the USSR as the US-led camp's top strategic foe. This topic, however, will be explored in detail in later chapters. Anyways, for the Anglo-Americans, a major strategic gain from the rise of Titoism in the Peoples' Democracies was that a camp of closely allied Anglo-American-backed Titoist-fascist regimes hostile to Soviet power could be established. In particular, the founding of a Greater Yugoslavia was the explicit purpose of the American regime. In the words of the NSC document, the US-sponsored rise of Titoism:

could conceivably grow to the point where there would be **two opposing blocs** in the Communist world a Stalinist group and a non-conformist faction, either loosely **allied or federated under Tito's leadership**. A situation of this description might eventually provide us with an opportunity to operate on the basis of a balance of forces in the Communist world and to foster the tendencies toward accommodation with the West implicit in such a state of affairs. (United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, p. 51) (IMG)

In line with Anglo-American objectives, the Trotskyite Fourth International instructed to Tito on July 1948 the following:

You would have to develop and sharpen your propaganda in favor of the Danubian Federation by giving it its classical communist form and by launching the slogan for the Balkan Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics among the workers and poor peasants of neighboring countries, who would take it up with enthusiasm. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

The Danubian Federation – named after the Danube River which crossed through Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,

Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria – was envisioned to revive the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a bulwark against Soviet power. “[T]he idea of Vienna's becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation,” Churchill wrote to Roosevelt: has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which Stalin is strongly opposed. (Dismemberment of Germany, Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Else), Top Secret, Truman Papers, 1945. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin, Vol. 1, 1945, p. 454)

Churchill's geostrategic agenda was also reflected in the objectives of the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria. Sergo Beria, the son of Lavrenti, wrote in his biography of his father:

My father wanted an economic union of the Balkan countries, led by Yugoslavia, which would later join up with a unified Germany and a free Austria. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 209)

(IMG)

My father ... saw no reason why Yugoslavia should not annex Albania. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 209) (IMG)

One of the MI6 agents who had collaborated with the MI6-backed network of the Gestapo agent Tito since 1943 was none other than Lavrenti Beria:

My father also relied on the [fake 'anti-Nazi'] resistance fighters who had remained in their own countries [because the Nazis, having killed many of the actual anti-Nazi guerrillas, had allowed these fake 'anti-Nazi' 'resistance' fighters to stay in their own countries]. He thought that ... Hungarian Nagy, the Czech Slansky and the entire Yugoslav group of Tito, Djilas and Rankovic had endorsed his view.. (...). In Yugoslavia, my father's networks and those of the British had collaborated with Tito during the war. My father followed with attention the affairs of that country. One day, when the Yugoslav leader Kardelj complained to him about Tito's tyrannical character, he replied: 'Don't you think that we are all in the same boat?' He took care to add, however, that heads of state who mattered always had negative sides. Rankovic, the head of Yugoslav security, was more primitive than Kardelj, but Tito had total confidence in him, which was why he often acted as intermediary between Tito and my father. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 196-197) (IMG)

In line with MI6 plans (which also had the CIA's backing), what Lavrenti Beria envisioned was the establishment of a Polish-led Intermarium (headed by the Gestapo agent Gomulka) plus a Titoist Balkan Zone that would later become a part of the German-led pan-Europe. Sergo Beria recalled:

My father would have liked to form two blocs, uniting the neutral countries of Central and Eastern Europe – one around Poland, the other around ... Tito's Yugoslavia. In his mind this arrangement should be completed by a unified and non-socialist Germany. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria also aimed to establish close ties to the local bases of the fascist Vatican mafia in Poland, the same Vatican mafia which collaborated with Nazi Germany. Beria also aimed to cultivate an alliance with Nazi Germany and its helpers in Poland:

My father wanted to see a strong Poland, possibly because he had many agents there. He cultivated relations with the Polish Catholics in the hope of reaching, through them, the Catholics of Germany. He tried to use Prince Radziwill and put him into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had saved the Prince's life and hoped to make him an agent of influence. Rich and noble, Radziwill had excellent relations with the Germans and the Americans, including business contacts with Harriman. However, Stalin did not agree. Neither did the British, because the Prince had compromised with the Germans. There was also Gomulka, who fell into disgrace in 1949. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 197) (IMG)

Indeed, upon the establishment of the Danubian Federation, the next step would have been for its subordination by Germany's colonial Pan-European efforts. According to the Anglo-American Cold War agenda, the Nazi Underground which ruled West Germany was to economically re-conquer Europe towards an anti-Soviet continental 'alliance' (see chapter 11). In line with such goals, Tito, at the 6th Party Congress, declared:

A revision of the imperialistic division and occupation of German and Polish territory committed by the Soviet Union, should be made in such a way that the national interest of German and of Polish peoples should be fully protected ... we want the German people to become united, having their own life as they please, and with the kind of democratic organization that would enable them to become a pillar of peace and cooperation not only in Europe, but in the entire world. ('Politics, Culture, and Economics: Reassessing the West German Guest Worker Agreement with Yugoslavia', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 4, Kaja Shonick, October, 2009, p. 724. Citing: VI Kongres KPJ, Kultura, Belgrade, Josip Broz Tito, 1952. Tito's speech was cited in: 'Yugoslav German Relations to be Normalized?', Radio Free Europe Research, Communist Area Yugoslavia: Foreign Relations, January 19, 1967, Open Society Archives (OSA), pp. 77-1-35) (IMG)

As demonstrated in C11S12, the 'Atlanticists', to which the French imperialists by the way eventually did not belong, had consistently rejected the Soviet call for jointly ending the military occupation of East and West Germany and for

allowing a unified democratic German government with its own military. Washington and its satellite Bonn preferred a divided but US-occupied Germany over a united and democratic Germany. Unification, the American imperialists and their West German puppets held, was to be pursued through the takeover of East Germany.

Hence, Tito blamed the supposedly 'imperialistic' Soviet Union – the country that launched entire campaigns to block imperialist efforts to the partition of Germany – for the partition of Germany. The fascist tyrant also lied about the USSR's 'imperialistic division' of 'Polish territory', a myth debunked in C3S3 and C9S5. In doing so, the CIA agent Tito declared his support for the imperialist American and West German propaganda line on the German partition plan:

Tito ... supported the FRG's goal of German (re-)unification. ('Politics, Culture, and Economics: Reassessing the West German Guest Worker Agreement with Yugoslavia', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 4, Kaja Shonick, October, 2009, pp. 723-724) (IMG)

In its letter to Tito's gang, the Fourth International instructed Yugoslavia's Trotskyite rulers to call for an end to war reparations and military occupations with specific reference to Germany and Austria:

you would have to proclaim to the world the conditions for a just peace, without annexations or reparations; (...).

With one blow you will gain the sympathy of the Austrian and German masses who today feel themselves deceived and betrayed by all parties. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

The bulk of the war reparations were to rightly go to the USSR, the country with the greatest sacrifices during the Great Patriotic War. The demagogical call for ending reparations payments was a Trotskyite attempt at economic sabotage against the war-torn USSR. While Yugoslavia should as a first step gain control over the Balkans in an anti-Soviet alliance, the Trotskyite International argued, the second step to pursue would be Yugoslavia's subordination to a German-dominated Pan-Europe. This would be done through cooperation with pro-Trotskyite or pro-Titoist networks in the German and Austrian labour movement so to create a '**central axis**' for spreading Trotskyite 'socialism' to the world (including the allegedly 'degenerated' USSR). The Secretariat of the Fourth International wrote to Tito:

And finally it would be necessary to incorporate this propaganda within the concrete framework of propaganda for the SOCIALIST SOVIET UNITED STATES OF EUROPE; to convoke a conference at Belgrade of the trade-union and workers' representatives from all the countries of Europe, including Germany and Austria; to draw up with them a plan for the economic reconstruction of the continent ... and to make this socialist plan the central axis for revolutionary propaganda in Europe and in the world. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

The call for an anti-Soviet 'United States of Europe' of which Yugoslavia would be a member, resonated with Washington's leadership. "I am coming to believe," wrote US President Eisenhower in his June 11, 1951 diaries: that Europe's security problem is never going to be solved satisfactorily until there exists a United States of Europe, to include all countries now in NATO: West Germany and (I think) Sweden, Spain, Yugoslavia, with Greece definitely in if Yugoslavia is (if necessary, the United Kingdom could be omitted). (The Eisenhower Diaries, Dwight Eisenhower, Edited by: Robert Ferrel, 1981, p. 194) (IMG)

If Danubian 'Federalism' and German-dominated Pan-Europeanism were the first two steps towards directly subordinating Yugoslavia to the US-led bloc, the third step was Atlanticism itself: joining the Atlantic Pact also known as NATO. Tito's alliance with monarcho-fascist Greece and Turkey, the two countries not to be in the Danubian Federation, was the pathway towards that third step. As a US intelligence memorandum titled 'Status Report on the Greek, Turkish, Yugoslav Military Alliance' stated:

Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia has accepted the principle of liaison between the projected tripartite alliance and NATO.. ('STATUS REPORT ON THE GREEK, TURKISH, YUGOSLAV MILITARY ALLIANCE', Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, June 29, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Israel was to be added to this military alliance of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece. Yugoslavia pushed vigorously for Israel's inclusion into the anti-Soviet 'Balkan Pact' alliance. As a matter of fact, as confirmed by Jacob Abadi, a professor of history at the US Air Force Academy, in 1954:

In his conversation with Ezra Yoran, Israel's Minister in Yugoslavia, a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official argued ... that his country was willing to support Israel's candidacy to the Balkan Alliance.

(Israel and the Balkan States, Middle Eastern Studies, Jacob Abadi, 1996, p. 298) (IMG{Israel})

In this anti-Soviet Balkan alliance, Yugoslavia achieved important aspects of step one – the creation of an anti-Soviet alliance in Eastern Europe – and moved towards steps two and three – alliances with the rest of Europe and North America. "There is also reason to believe," said a US National Security Staff study:

that through this association Tito hopes inter alia to gain some of the advantages of NATO membership .. Tito

has clearly manifested a desire for firmer ties with other nations which would give him a feeling of security beyond that entailed in previous military arrangements. (...). The “Balkan Entente” has to some extent given him the political ties he desires, and in this way his confidence in and willingness for military planning with the West has been bolstered. (NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, US NSC, 1954. In: “U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957”, Nick Ceh, 2002, pp. 401 -402) (IMG)

It must be remembered that the Yugoslav regime’s shift towards an alliance with NATO occurred at a time in which Tito’s fascist gang had already been thoroughly exposed and unmasked by the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. The rise to power of the Titoists in Moscow in 1953, however, meant that the project to unmask Tito’s group was to almost cease, and hence Tito’s group could re-mask itself as ‘socialist’ and ‘anti-imperialist’. In such a circumstance, the Belgrade fascists aimed not to carry forward with the original plan to overtly join NATO and instead just went back to playing their old game of presenting themselves as ‘neutrals’ lying in between the pro-fascist and anti-fascist camps.

Tito had no choice but to declare that he did not intend to join NATO. “Despite this desire for political assurances,” the NSC document continued:

for the moment Tito probably means what he says when he publicly denies any intention to seek membership in NATO. At present he has almost no alternative to this position.. (NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, US NSC, 1954. In: “U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957”, Nick Ceh, 2002, p. 402) (IMG)

Nonetheless:

Tito has gone far in parallel directions to assure Yugoslavia the benefits of NATO. (NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, US NSC, 1954. In: “U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957”, Nick Ceh, 2002, p. 402) (IMG)

Naturally, NATO, as the bigger historical-material force, reaped far greater benefits than the smaller force, Tito’s fascist regime. During a 1954 North Atlantic Council session, the representatives of the Kingdom of Greece:

Stated [that the] alliance committed Yugoslavia to be on our side if attack made on other NATO power without formal commitment to Yugoslavia by NATO. (Subject: NAC Discussion Balkan Alliance, July 29, 1954. In: 760.5/7-2954: Telegram, The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State, Top Secret, Paris, July 29, 1954, p. 1. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, United States Department of State, p. 671) (IMG)

All of these were for the purposes of joining the NATO for its war on the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. Again, note that imperialist France was a rogue state within NATO, in the sense that French imperialism aimed to form an alliance with the progressive anti-imperialist forces in the struggle to break up the Anglo-American-German imperialist alliance, the rivals of French finance capital and the mainstream of NATO.

Anyways, a document written by the Israeli foreign minister Moshe Sharett, in his message to Eytan, discussed how Israel could join NATO in the fight against the USSR. In this document, the case of Yugoslavia was regarded as a historical precedent which Israel could follow in terms of forming the military bonds with the US-led camp. In the midst of mentioning the case of Yugoslavia as a precedent for Israel to follow, the document by Sharett nonetheless confirmed Yugoslavia’s anti-Soviet WWII alliance with the NATO:

the Yugoslav Chief of General Staff visited Washington and met with the Chiefs of Staff, and Tito declared that Yugoslavia would fight with the West. (M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan, September 29, 1951. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 6, 1951, Edited by Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, p. 293) (IMG{Israel})

Many Titoists in the Peoples’ Democracies were indeed purged, however, rendering more difficult the pursuit of the American imperialist agenda. As explained by NSC 174:

NSC 58/2 laid down a policy of fostering communist heresy among the satellites and encouraging the emergence of non-Stalinist regimes as temporary administrations even though communist in nature.

However, as was noted in the third Progress Report on implementation of NSC 58/2, dated May 22, 1951, the Kremlin and its local agents have been successful in warding off any trend in the satellites comparable to that which led to the break between Moscow and Yugoslavia. In fact, in none of the satellites have there developed the capabilities such as rendered Tito’s defection successful. (No. 51 Report to the National Security Council by the National Security Council Planning Board, Washington, December 11, 1953., top secret, NSC 174, Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe) (IMG)

American intelligence has consistently corroborated the fact that the Soviets planned no invasion of Yugoslavia. A search through the US intelligence archives will bring about countless volumes of CIA documents serving as testament, but only

two of such documents will be presented as follows:

An attack upon this country by regular Soviet forces would almost certainly result in starting another world war. If Russian armies could succeed in shortly crushing Yugoslav resistance, the establishment of a Soviet Stronghold in the area of Trieste with its menace to Italy and the Mediterranean would heighten the tension to an intolerable degree. STALIN knows this and will refrain from an open attack as long as he is the dominating figure in the Politburo. (Implications of the Tito-Stalin Conflict, CIA, November 14, 1949, p. 2) (IMG)

Although Satellite military, economic, and propaganda preparations indicate that a Satellite attack upon Yugoslavia is possible, it is unlikely that the Kremlin will launch such an attack within the period of this estimate. The risk of general war, made clear by US support of collective security and the provisions of US economic and military aid to Yugoslavia, will probably deter the Kremlin from this course of action, unless it is ready to accept general war. ('NIE-51: PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK UPON YUGOSLAVIA, THROUGH 1952', (FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE BOARD)., CIA, November 30, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

Should a war break out, Tito and his staff would have retreated to the islands of the Adriatic, to be protected by the US military. As confirmed by a CIA memorandum:

If the war breaks out before Stalin's death or before the conclusion of an accord between Tito and Moscow, ... all [Tito's] activities are dominated by prudent provisions which shall secure to himself and his faithfuls a safe and undisturbed retreat toward the Adriatic coast. To this end, magazines of food stuff, arms, and munitions, as well as fortifications on the Islands of Korcula, Vis, Cherso ... are already prepared for Tito and his intimate friends; they intend to take refuge there, under the protection of the American fleet. (Tito's True Face, Political Information (Analysis of Tito's Relationship with Stalin and the West), CIA, November 28, 1952, p. 11) (IMG)

A top official of the Yugoslav intelligence also confirmed in a conversation with American intelligence units, that the Soviets would not invade:

Bogdan Markovic, a section chief in the Ministry of Interior, asserted that he did not believe the Soviets would attack openly.. (Meeting of Officers of the Ministry of the Interior, CIA, November 15, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Tito personally corroborated the CIA's account. While constantly spreading anti-Soviet slanders and fostering the fear of a Soviet assault on Yugoslavia, Tito had full knowledge that neither the USSR nor the Peoples' Democracies planned an invasion of Yugoslavia. In what became a notable example of diplomatic double-standards, Tito explained the strategic conditions in detail in the conversation with his friend Charles Peake, the British ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time. Charles Peake, the British ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time, wrote in a report to London: Marshal Tito received me this morning prior to my departure for London.

2. I began by asking him his views about the Yugoslav dispute with the Cominform and how he thought the present situation was likely to develop. He said that he did not think it likely that there would be much change over the new few months. He was still firmly of the opinion that Stalin would not risk an act of overt aggression against Yugoslavia. He had no shadow of pretext for doing so. Yugoslavia was not a neighbour of the Soviet, and never had been, and so there could be no trumped-up case of territorial claims. If, therefore, the Soviet were to invade Yugoslavia, she would brand herself in the eyes of the whole world as an aggressor, and he expected that peace propaganda would be shown up as a sham and as being no more than a cloak for her predatory designs. This in itself, he thought, might be the strongest deterrent to the Kremlin. I said I was inclined to agree, but that Hitler had shown the world that a would- be aggressor would always trump up a case if his mind was bent on conquest. Tito replied that this was certainly so, but that he thought Stalin had more political wisdom, and a greater sense of reality than Hitler.

3. I told Marshal Tito in this connexion that I had been much disturbed to see in the Yugoslav press and in speeches of Yugoslav Ministers an assumption that an attack by the Soviet on Yugoslavia would necessarily bring about another world war. While I had no express instructions to speak to him on this subject, I was quite clear about your own views, and I must therefore tell him that it would be the height of unwisdom to put any confidence in such a prediction. If Yugoslavia should be the victim of aggression she would have the right and perhaps the duty of bringing the matter before the Security Council, but what would happen after that it was impossible to say. I could not but feel that it was most unwise to encourage the public to indulge in speculations about the outbreak of a new war. Marshal Tito said that this was very likely so, but that it might be a deterrent to the Soviet Government, if, in fact, they did harbour such designs, to believe that they would not be allowed to pursue them unmolested. However, though it would also do no harm to Yugoslav morale for people to believe that they would not be left alone if they were attacked, he agreed with me that it was impossible to say what would happen if there was Soviet aggression, and he himself was indulging in no false hopes. I said that I was relieved to hear this and I should certainly report it to you. The Soviet Government were presumably able to take their own view of the situation, and I thought it would be most dangerous to threaten them with some action

which in the end it might not be possible to perform. Complete silence about a future situation which no-one could predict seemed to me the only wise policy at present. (R 10502/10338/92, Yugoslav-Soviet Relations, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Secret, November 2, 1949, Received: November 3, 1949. In Yugoslavia 1949, British Foreign Office, pp. 49-50. In: British Foreign Office (Balkans; 1949), pp. 277 -278) (IMG)

In speaking how the situation might develop, Marshal Tito repeated that while he did not believe in the likelihood of overt action against his country by the Soviet Government, he thought that Yugoslavia's present situation would be made more difficult for her by her neighbours. He thought it likely that guerrilla activity similar to recent Hungarian incident reported in my telegram No. 1018 would continue throughout the winter. It would not in itself be serious, but would of course be designed to provoke some Yugoslav reaction which could be represented as provocation. (R 10502/10338/92, Yugoslav-Soviet Relations, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Secret, November 2, 1949, Received: November 3, 1949, p. 50. In Yugoslavia 1949, British Foreign Office, p. 50. In: British Foreign Office (Balkans; 1949), pp. 278) (IMG)

In speaking of Hungary and Roumania Marshal Tito said that information available to the Yugoslav Government did not suggest that Soviet troop concentrations in those countries were such as to constitute a direct military threat to Yugoslavia.. (R 10479/10321/92, Relations with Hungary and Roumania, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Secret, November 2, 1949, Received: November 3, 1949. In Yugoslavia 1949, British Foreign Office, p. 50. In: British Foreign Office (Balkans; 1949), p. 278) (IMG)

A 1949 CIA document confirmed:

Kremlin plans do not include direct Soviet and/or Satellite military aggression against Yugoslavia for the duration of 1949. (ESTIMATE OF THE YUGOSLAV REGIME'S ABILITY TO RESIST SOVIET PRESSURE DURING 1949, CIA, June 20, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Tito, as shown above, knew full well that the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies planned no aggression against Yugoslavia, and yet he was viciously spreading the myth of Soviet invasion plans in his media. The purpose of this is obvious: to launch an invasion of the Peoples' Democracies in collaboration with the Anglo-Americans if feasible and to portray the Soviets as the aggressors. The US knew that the Soviets had no invasion plans and yet the US armed Yugoslavia precisely for a war against the Peoples' Democracies. Tito formally asked for US military support, turning Yugoslavia into an American military base. John Lampe, the director of the Eastern European Program of the CIA front think tank 'Wilson Center', wrote:

The perceived threat of a Soviet-led military attack on Yugoslavia reached its peak in 1951. Border incidents exceeded 1,000. Yugoslavia's troop strength was increased from 450,000 to 600,000. (Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II, John Lampe, Russell Prickett, Ljubisa Adamovic, p. 40) (IMG)

Within barely one month of a Yugoslav request for raw materials for the army, President Truman had again used his executive authority over 10 percent of the MDAP funds to grant Yugoslavia \$29 million in needed supplies. On June 28 President Tito presented a formal request for military aid to Ambassador Allen. This led to the establishment of an American military mission (MAAG) in Yugoslavia the following year. At Yugoslav insistence the MAAG remained under the authority of the American ambassador. Under terms crafted to avoid both congressional and Soviet criticism, the Military Assistance Program expended \$296 million in Yugoslavia by mid-1953.. (Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II, John Lampe, Russell Prickett, Ljubisa Adamovic, p. 40) (IMG)

The British spy Tito shared so much intelligence material with the MI6 operative. Again, in another case, Tito continued to provide secret military intelligence on Bulgaria to the MI6 operative Sir C. Peake:

Conversation with Marshal Tito: Bulgaria.

I asked Marshal Tito whether he thought the Bulgarians were harbouring specially aggressive designs against Yugoslavia and what was his appreciation of the military situation there.

He said that according to his information some arms and ammunition were coming into Bulgaria from the Soviet [Union] via Roumania, but that he did not think the amounts were large. There was also a probable building up of troops along the South-West frontier of Bulgaria between Custendil and Petric.

Here, again, guerrilla activity was to be anticipated, but he did not think it would be worse than that. He had every confidence that the Yugoslav army was well able to take care of the situation, and he did not think the Bulgars would be very keen to embark on active operations. The last was still something more than a memory to them. (R 10482/10392/7, YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS, Telegraphic, No. 1034, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Bevin, November 2, 1949, Received: November 3, 1949, In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 63) (IMG)

Tito's group treated the Anglo-American diplomatic corps so favorably while insulting the Soviet diplomats headed by ambassador Lavrentiev even prior to Tito's expulsion from the Cominform. The Soviet ambassador, Tito's group declared, had no right to obtain any information from anyone about the policies of Tito's regime. In their letter to the CC

of the CPSU, Tito's gang stated the following in reference to Soviet ambassador:

We consider that he, as an ambassador, has no right to ask anyone for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business. This information can be obtained by the CC of the CPSU from the CC of the CPY. ('Tito rejects the charges and defends his policies', April 13, 1948. In: 'Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey', Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 179) (IMG)

Thus, once again Tito favoured the Anglo-Americans by furnishing the British diplomat with strategic intelligence assessments, while viciously insulting the Soviet ambassador and hypocritically declaring the latter as unworthy of obtaining even the slightest information from anyone in Yugoslavia.

Many people foster the incorrect view that Tito's gang were problematic because they were 'nationalists' and wanted a capitalist system. For start, such a 'class-neutral' concept as 'nationalism' bears no material existence. Tito's gang promoted what is referred to as 'bourgeois-nationalism'. Bourgeois-nationalism promotes the supremacy of the ethnicity which it ostensibly represents, but also betrays it. People who think that the supporters of bourgeois-nationalism – not to be confused with anti-imperialist patriots and national-bourgeoisie – ever truly care about the respective nations, are deeply wrong. In order to achieve their objectives, supporters of bourgeois-nationalism both promote settler-colonialism in favour of a nation and at the same time terrorize that nation. Superficially, this appears self-contradictory, when in reality, these measures are dialectically correlated, serve the same class interests, and mark merely a new manifestation of the old secret service strategy of pincer assaults. Zionists have supported a Greater-Israeli Empire but/and have launched numerous terror attacks against Israelites, Beria promoted Georgian separatism but/and also sought to terrorize the Georgians through the widespread corruption and the Nazi takeover attempts, Saddam the non-Kurd barbarically terrorized the Kurds while also promoting the establishment of a Greater Kurdish Empire, and Hitler the German supremacist anti-Polish chauvinist was closely and openly allied with the Polish supremacist anti-German chauvinist gang of Pilsudski, etc.

The history of Tito's regime fully demonstrates their fanning of bourgeois-nationalism. The Tito-Rankovic group systematically fomented inter-ethnic hatred, promoting the supremacy of each ethnicity against the other. By carrying out a genocide against the Serbs during the Great Patriotic War, the Tito group helped the 'Croatian supremacist' Ustase and the Bosnian Handzar SS units which the Tito group welcomed. Tito and his gang, the promoters of Croatian supremacy against the Serbian nation, also supported Serbian settler-colonialism in Kosovo, carrying out a policy of systematic ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Albanians there. As for the Croats, suffice it to say that the Croats preferred the years of the Serbian bourgeois-nationalist Yugoslav monarchy. They tortured the Slovenes but/and promoted Greater Slovenia (especially regarding Trieste), they pauperized the Bosnian people but/and supported the Handzar SS (which was trained by the Palestinian terrorist leader Haajj Amin Al- Husseini), they barbarically oppressed Macedonians while also promoting Greater Macedonia, they handed Greece over to anti-Greek butchers while also siding with the proponents of the Greater Greece Empire project against Albania, etc. Tito's gang savagely oppressed the adherents of Islam but also promoted 'Islamic' fundamentalism against Muslims and Christians. Tito's gang supported Zionism but also were the agents of the perpetrators of the extermination of millions of Ashkenazim. The Titoist Yugoslav intelligence service pervasively collaborated with the Arab supremacist Saddamite Iraqi regime. To put it simply, Tito's gang did promote supremacy for certain ethnicities but also savagely terrorized the peoples of those ethnicities. Tito's gang had mastered the concept of the 'Alliance of Chauvinisms', supporting the alliance of the chauvinisms of different ethnicities against the proletarians of those ethnicities so to foment division among the proletarians and foster unity among the anti-proletarian reactionaries.

Another misconception of the 'nationalism' of Tito's gang is that Tito's gang allegedly represented Yugoslavia's national-bourgeois interests. Bourgeois-nationalism is fundamentally different than the national bourgeoisie. Had Tito's group been agents of a Yugoslav national industrial capitalism, communists would have had a duty to support them, because in that case, Tito's group would have represented the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. This, however, was not the case in Titoist Yugoslavia. On the contrary and in fact, the Yugoslav regime was not serving the national-bourgeois interests, and the Yugoslav economy was not capitalist in the typical, industrial, sense of the term. The Yugoslav regime was a comprador fascist state that betrayed the 'national' interests of Yugoslavia, including, notably, the 'national' interests of Croatia and Serbia. The Cominform publicly stated:

Whereas, in June 1948 the meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties noted the change-over of the Tito-Rankovic clique ... to bourgeois nationalism, during the period that has elapsed since the meeting of the Information Bureau, this clique has travelled all the way from bourgeois nationalism to fascism and outright betrayal of the national interests of Yugoslavia. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

The Cominform states' media had repeatedly noted the fact that the Tito-Rankovic gang had been fascists long before 1948, but in the above excerpt, they meant that the Tito-Rankovic gang had, by 1949, successfully advanced the character

of the Yugoslav regime from a bourgeois-nationalist state seeking to conquer the Balkans with the support of the Anglo-Americans, to a regime that was openly comprador fascist, further serving the interests of the Anglo-Americans. Indeed, the Cominform resolution clarified:

The change-over of the Tito clique to fascism was not fortuitous. It was effected on the order of their masters, the Anglo-American imperialists, whose mercenaries, it is now clear, this clique has been for long. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949, MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

To be clear, Tito's gang needed no 'orders' from the Anglo-American imperialists in such a shift of Yugoslavia into their camp, for Tito's gang would have transformed Yugoslavia along such fascist lines anyways, without 'orders' from 'above'. Tito's gang were indeed foreign agents but so is it also true that they represented the comprador classes, the slave-owners, the kulaks, the bureaucrats, and all of these comprador classes aggressively pushed for the conquest of Yugoslavia by these reactionaries; the reactionary classes of Yugoslavia saw the partnership with Anglo-American finance capital not as a 'submission' to but as a partnership with finance capital. To put it simply, there was no need for 'orders' to be received.

Furthermore, by definition, the national-bourgeoisie and national industrial capitalist development require there to be a movement for the independence of Yugoslavia, which was clearly not the case in the Tito regime, because that regime represented the interests of the comprador classes allied to Anglo-American finance capital. Hence, the Cominform continued:

Recent events show that the Yugoslav Government is completely dependent on foreign imperialist circles and has become an instrument of their aggressive policy, which has resulted in the liquidation of the independence of the Yugoslav Republic. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

Another misconception that exists is that Titoist Yugoslavia was a capitalist state. It was 'capitalist' in the sense that the Anglo-American finance capital as well as the corrupt bureaucratic oligarchs and kulaks as comprador bourgeoisie governed Yugoslavia. However, the word 'capitalist' in describing Yugoslavia often misleads people into thinking that Yugoslavia was a dictatorship of the national industrial bourgeoisie, which was clearly not the case. It is important to mention that in reality, feudalism and slavery – not national industrial capitalism – were the predominant domestic modes of production and the Cominform were very clear in stating this. There were many quotes from the Cominform states' media confirming this, but just to repeat one of them, here it is from the USSR Information Bulletin, the media organ of the Soviet Embassy in USA:

The Titoite's attempts to force the workers to accept conditions of slavery ... are meeting with constantly increasing resistance. (The Yugoslav People's Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

There were CIA documents, excerpts of Djilas memoirs, and Soviet Foreign Ministry documents, previously cited, that confirmed that slavery was the mode of production in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a 'capitalist' country only in the sense that Anglo-American and West German finance capital, as well as Yugoslavia's own parasitic mercantile bourgeoisie, kulak bourgeoisie, corrupt bureaucrat oligarchs, drug cartels, enslavement businesses, extermination market competitions, and settler-colonial businesses were running the show. Beyond such parasitic form of corrupt, comprador, and/or colonial capitalism, Titoist Yugoslavia was not a capitalist country, but was rather feudal and slave-owning. Inevitably, communist pressures did weaken the comprador bourgeoisie in Yugoslavia, allowing for some extremely limited rooms of operation for the national bourgeoisie, but all of that was thanks to communist support for anti-colonial progressive bourgeois-democratic struggles and in spite of Titoism. The Cominform stated: The Yugoslav rulers demagogically and insolently deceive the people, alleging they are building socialism in Yugoslavia.

But it is clear to every Marxist that there can be no talk of building socialism in Yugoslavia when the Tito clique has broken with the Soviet Union, with the entire camp of socialism and democracy, thereby depriving Yugoslavia of the main bulwark for building socialism and when it has subordinated the country economically and politically to Anglo-American imperialists.

The State sector in the economy of Yugoslavia has ceased to be people's property, since State power is in the hands of enemies of the people.

The Tito-Rankovic clique has created wide possibilities for the penetration of foreign [finance] capital into the economy of the country, and has placed the economy under the control of [finance] capitalist monopolies.

Anglo-American industrial-financial circles investing their capital in Yugoslav economy, are transforming Yugoslavia into an agrarian-raw materials adjunct of foreign capital.

The ever growing slavish dependence of Yugoslavia on imperialism leads to intensified exploitation of the

working class and to a severe worsening of its conditions.

The policy of the Yugoslav rulers in the countryside bears a kulak-capitalistic character.

(Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA.

The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

C12S6. Titoists unleash Serbian Settler-Colonialism and Apartheid against Kosovar Albanians

*** IMG-AII- {Kosovo}

The Serbs were by no means the only victims of genocide by Tito's group. Starting from 1944-1945 onwards, Tito's gang, ever the masters of fomenting inter-ethnic division, also began to support Serbian settler-colonialism in Kosovo, and enforced a campaign of ethnic cleansing and systematic extermination against the Albanians of Kosovo as well. In mainland Serbia, the Serbs were to be the victims of a genocide, and in Kosovo, the Serbs were to be used for settler-colonization on the corpses of Albanians – such was the Titoist plan. At the same time, while ethnic cleansing against the Albanians of Kosovo was being pursued, Albanian 'Islamic' fundamentalist ultra-reactionary enemies of the Orthodox Christians, were placed in charge of the local Kosovar Albanian regime collaborating with the Serbian settler-colonizers. The anti-Serb chauvinists and Serbian chauvinists were allied and closely collaborative. As mentioned before, the 'Alliance of Chauvinisms' was something that Tito's gang were masters at; they supported seemingly 'contradictory' chauvinisms simultaneously, albeit in differing geographic zones, as a method of preventing popular unity and 'perpetuating' colonial rule. The Yugoslav regime was a pan-chauvinist terror regime.

What follows is a documentation of the ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Albanians of Kosovo, and the promotion of settler-colonialism against them, using documents from the archives of the USSR, People's Democratic Albania, CIA, US Congress, etc. Both the Cominform bloc media and US-led bloc sources confirm that a policy of ethnic cleansing and systematic extermination was pursued against the Albanians of Kosovo during this period, although the Cominform bloc media puts the scale of the genocide at a higher level than the CIA does.

Referring to Vaso Cubrilovic's 1937 memorandum, Joseph J. Dioguardi, a Republican Congressman and anti-Soviet scholar, admitted, in a briefing to the US Congress's Committee on International Relations, that one of the:

ultranationalist demons [who] were spawned by this paper, [was] Aleksandar Rankovic.. (The Future of Kosovo, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 2003, p. 57) (IMG)

Thus, the Yugoslav intelligence chief was directly inspired by Vaso Cubrilovic. The Soviet media too confirmed that the Yugoslav regime leadership had researched into the archives of the previous regimes in order to foment inter-ethnic tension and hatred:

In their endeavour to undermine the unity of the peoples and to strengthen their domination in the country, the Belgrade fascists are fanning race hatred and chauvinism to the utmost. They have extracted from the archives and put into action all the features of the chauvinism of Greater Serbia, which is spearheaded against the Bulgarian, Albanian, Hungarian, Romanian and other national minorities within Yugoslavia. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

The following excerpts from the 1937 memorandum by Cubrilovic indeed served as the blueprint of the actions of Tito's gang against Kosovo:

Without doubt, the main cause for the lack of success in our colonization of these regions was that the best land remained in the hands of the Albanians. The only possible means for our mass colonization of these regions to succeed is for us to take the land away from them. This could have been achieved easily during the rebellion after the war, when the insurgents were active, by expelling part of the Albanian population to Albania, by refusing to legalize their usurpations and by buying up their pasture land.

Here, we must refer once again to the gross error committed in our post-war strategy, that of the right to own land. Instead of taking advantage of the strategy used by the Albanians themselves for ownership of the land they usurped (scarcely any of them had deeds issued by the Turks, and those who did, got them only for land purchased), we not only legalized all these usurpations to the detriment of our state and nation, but worse still, we accustomed the Albanians to western European attitudes to private property. Prior to that, they could never have understood such concepts. In this way, we ourselves handed them a weapon with which to defend themselves, keeping the best land for themselves and rendering impossible the nationalization of a region of supreme importance to us. (The Expulsion of the Albanians – Memorandum, Vaso Cubrilovic, 1937. Retrieved from: Albanian History, Robert Elsie) (IMG)

Agitators, especially from Turkey, must be found as quickly as possible to promote the evacuation, if Turkey will provide them for us. They must laud the beauties of the new territories in Turkey and the easy and pleasant life to be had there, and must kindle religious fanaticism among the masses and awaken pride in the Turkish state. Our press can be of colossal assistance by describing how gently the evacuation of the Turks from Dobruja

took place and how easily they settled in their new regions. Such information would create the requisite predisposition for the masses of Albanians to be willing to leave.

Another means would be coercion by the state apparatus. The law must be enforced to the letter so as to make staying intolerable for the Albanians: fines, imprisonment, the ruthless application of all police regulations, such as the prohibition of smuggling, cutting forests, damaging agriculture, leaving dogs unchained, compulsory labour and any other measure that an experienced police force can contrive.

From the economic aspect, this should include the refusal to recognize old land deeds. The work of the land registry should be accompanied from the start by the ruthless collection of taxes and the payment of all private and public debts, the requisitioning of all public and municipal pasture land, the cancellation of concessions, the withdrawal of permits to exercise an occupation, dismissal from government, private and municipal offices etc., all of which will speed up the process of evacuation.

Health measures should include the harsh application of all regulations, even within homes, the pulling down of encircling walls and high hedges around private houses, and the rigorous implementation of veterinary measures which will result in a ban on selling livestock on the market, etc. All these measures can be applied in a practical and effective way. The Albanians are very touchy when it comes to religion.

They must therefore be harassed on this score, too. This can be achieved through the ill-treatment of their clergy, the demolition of their cemeteries, the prohibition of polygamy, and especially the inflexible application of the regulation compelling girls to attend elementary school, wherever they are.

Private initiative, too, can assist greatly in this direction. We should distribute weapons to our colonists, as need be. The old form of Chetnik action should be organized and secretly assisted. In particular, a mass migration of Montenegrins should be launched from the mountain pastures in order to create a large-scale conflict with the Albanians in Metohija. This conflict should be prepared and encouraged by people we can trust. This can be easily achieved since the Albanians have, indeed, revolted. The whole affair can be presented as a conflict between clans and, if need be, can be ascribed to economic reasons. Finally, local riots can be incited. These will be bloodily suppressed by the most effective means, though by colonists from the Montenegrin clans and the Chetniks, rather than by means of the army.

There remains one more method Serbia employed with great practical effect after 1878, that is, secretly razing Albanian villages and urban settlements to the ground.

(The Expulsion of the Albanians – Memorandum, Vaso Cubrilovic, 1937. Retrieved from: Albanian History, Robert Elsie) (IMG)

In view of all that has been said, it is no coincidence that in our examination of colonization in the south, we hold the view that the only effective means of solving this problem is the mass expulsion of the Albanians. Gradual colonization has had no success in our country, nor in other countries for that matter.

If the state wishes to intervene in favour of its own people in the struggle for land, it can only be successful by acting brutally. Otherwise, the native, who has his roots in his place of birth and is at home there, will always be stronger than the colonist. In our case, we must keep this fact very much in mind, because we have to do with a hardy, resistant and prolific race which the late Cvijic described as being the most expansive in the Balkans. From 1870 to 1914, Germany spent billions of marks on the gradual colonization of its eastern territories by purchasing land from the Poles, but the fecundity of Polish women defeated German organization and money. Thus, Poland regained its Poznan in 1918. Our above-mentioned statistics of the 1921-1931 period show that it was the fecundity of Albanian women which defeated our colonization policy, too. We must draw our conclusions from this, and we must do so quickly while there is still time to correct matters. (The Expulsion of the Albanians – Memorandum, Vaso Cubrilovic, 1937. Retrieved from: Albanian History, Robert Elsie) (IMG)

From 1944 onwards, Tito's gang pursued the Trotskyite economic policy of superficially 'leaping' from feudalism, fascism and slavery straight to 'socialism'. The regime established rapid agricultural 'collectivization'. Given the absence of good quality machinery in Yugoslavia, and the extreme poverty of the peasants, this policy resulted in severe impoverishment. The collectors from the regime would come and steal almost all of the personal products of the Albanian peasants while offering very little in return. This was in vast contrast to the Soviet policy which gave agricultural machinery and technical instruments to peasants in exchange for grain collection (see C5S3). Prisons in Kosovo were filled up with poor starving Albanian peasants whose entire property was confiscated simply because they were too poor to pay their taxes to the regime (just like in the case of the Serbs). Numerous others were jailed simply because their relative was in jail. Still, others had the fruits of their labour confiscated upon false charges of lacking permits to sell their products, when in fact it was the regime itself which told the Albanian peasantry that they can sell their products. Excerpts of a CIA document on the topic are as follows:

In line with [Trotskyite] Communist economy, the Partisans began in 1944 with the establishment of collective farming or cooperatives. This contributed greatly toward the impoverishment of the population. The

peasant who formerly had enough to live on eventually became quite poor, and consequently lost interest in his work or labor. He became indifferent to whether the crop was good or

poor, since the State took all but the prescribed minimum for his own needs. Agricultural products and cattle were merely taken away from peasants by members of the local board of the Communist Party. Families with enough bread even on holidays were rare, for the State took away wheat from the Albanian peasant, and gave only a little corn in return. In addition to this, there were voluntary loans contributed to by the peasants, and organized by regional committees of the Party. In this regard a campaign would be launched, and the citizens called upon to compete in offering to the State the surplus of their crop in the form of grain, wool, meat, honey, or similar products. Collectors would then proceed from house to house seizing the property of undesirable persons such as those who were not Party members, ... or persons who had relatives in prison. Under such circumstances, how could one expect the peasant to work with zeal. He was obliged to sell all he had at home, and all the yields of his crop, or go to prison.

This is the reason that there are so many Albanians in the penitentiaries of Gnjilane, Ferizaj, and Nis. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 11) (IMG)

When the Government had sequestered its share of the foodstuffs and crops of the peasants, it would issue a proclamation that they were free to sell their products on the open market. Only then could one note a handful of peasants coming to town to sell a few meager items and to purchase others. Usually the first day at the market would pass calmly. On the second or third day, however, the militia would appear, take the name of the sellers, and seize their goods on the grounds that they lacked permits to sell the merchandise in question. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 11) (IMG)

At the same time, the Yugoslav regime plotted the annihilation of the communists of Kosovo, obstacles to the Titoist agenda. A prominent figure among these Kosovar Albanian communists was none other than Miladin Popovic. In a 1989 interview with the Yugoslav regime press, Nijaz Dizdarevic, a prominent lifelong Yugoslav foreign affairs official under Tito, rendered a remarkable confession on the relations between Tito's gang, with which Dizdarevic officially identified, and Miladin Popovic. Dizdarevic said:

Popovic over-identified with the Albanians. He showed unsatisfactory firmness on some strategic questions, especially Kosova. Miladin caused problems and difficulties, making contact between us and the Albanian leadership difficult. Miladin was very close to Enver Hoxha, much closer than some individual members of the Albanian politburo. However, Miladin was killed so that he could not give his view of those relations. He suddenly began to speak about the Albanian Party being independent. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, p. 157. Citing: Interview with Nijaz Dizdarevic, Nin, January 29, 1989, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

Indeed, as Dizdarevic said, because Tito's group wanted to prevent Popovic from giving his view of those relations:

On 14 March 1945, Haki Taha, a teacher, assassinated [Miladin] Popovic in Pristina. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

The assassination was almost certainly carried out upon the orders of Tito's gang. Miranda Vickers of the ICG think tank agrees:

Miladin Popovic ... was most probably killed by the Yugoslavs, due to his intimacy with the Albanian leadership – which as Dizdarevic says, made dealings with the Albanians at that time difficult. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, p. 266) (IMG)

In 1945, the Albanian Communist Party went along with the Yugoslav regime's narrative on the murder of Popovic. Later, when Albania grew independent of the Yugoslav regime, they clarified that Yugoslavia was responsible for murdering this hero of the anti-fascist liberation war, Popovic. Enver Hoxha too believed that Miladin Popovic was murdered by the Titoist Yugoslavs. After the assassination of M. Popovic, the death was in turn utilized by the Yugoslav regime as a pretext to annihilate another 1,600 Albanian communists from Kosovo:

The Slav Communists took revenge for the death of Popovic by shooting 1,600 Kosovar members of Communist brigades stationed at Bar, Montenegro. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

One gets the feeling that the Titoist regime was inspired by the lies and slanders against Stalin concerning the Kirov assassination – that Stalin supposedly 'ordered' the murder of Kirov, and then used that as an alleged 'excuse' to exterminate 'millions' of 'good' CPSU members.

Anyways, in a 1950 article, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's media reported that during this time period, as many as '10 times more Albanians' were slaughtered under Tito's regime than the overall death toll of Albanians under the rule of Yugoslavia's infamously anti-Albanian 'Karadjordje dynasty':

With the seizure of power by the Tito-Rankovic clique, however, the position of the Albanian national minority became even than under the monarchy. While the war was still going on Tito's agents began persecution of the Albanian population – The Titoites killed 10 times more Albanians between November, 1944, and March, 1945, that is, in half a year, than perished in the 30 years of the reign of Karadjordje. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of

Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha too wrote:

It emerges from the testimony of witnesses and documental facts that more than 40,000 innocent persons fell victim to the bullets, bayonets and poison of Tito's secret service during the years 1944-1948. ('WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?', Zeri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG)

Indeed, as the Soviets rightly claimed, Tito's gang launched a war of extermination on large segments of the Albanian population in Kosovo. Tito's gang, as the Soviets rightly asserted, cruelly terrorized the Albanian population to the point that the Greater Serbian chauvinist Yugoslav monarchy appeared moderate compared to the new Titoist Yugoslav regime:

The Tito fascist gang is also subjecting the Albanian national minority of 900,000 to cruel terror. Before the war the Greater Serbia chauvinists mercilessly exploited the Albanians, seized their lands, and did not give them the opportunity to live in one place. During the war Albanians took an active part in the national liberation struggle, hoping that Yugoslavia's liberation from the fascist invaders would bring them a happy life and freedom. With the seizure of power by the Tito-Rankovic clique, however, the position of the Albanian national minority became even worse than under the monarchy. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha wrote:

After the publication of the Resolution of the Cominform in 1948 in which Tito's betrayal of Marxism-Leninism and the cause of socialism was denounced, the Yugoslav revisionist leadership stepped up its savage all-round oppression of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia, who during the years 1948-1950 and again in the period from 1951-1966 were subjected to a wave of killings, arrests and inhuman tortures.

The Titoites use every means to incite fratricide among the Albanians, they not only revive the old blood feuds but also create new ones through various manoeuvres. To increase these feuds, the UDB officers, through their agents, organize the kidnapping and rape of Kosova girls and women, and then incite the Albanians to kill each other, while the laws envisage light sentences for these crimes, in order to encourage them. ('WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?', Zeri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG)

The details provided by a US intelligence document serve as a testament to the facts presented by the Soviets. Countless Albanians, as the CIA report stated, were forced to participate in demonstrations in order to provide the Yugoslav regime an aura of 'popularity'. Those who refused to demonstrate in support of the regime were subjected to brutal physical and psychological torture. Countless Albanians were falsely framed as counter-revolutionary, were assassinated, or disappeared without a trace. These facts are backed by a US intelligence report:

Immediately after the [Titoist] Communists seized power in the Kosovo, they launched an active propaganda campaign, distributing leaflets throughout the region and organizing indoctrination courses which was compelled to attend. Those who were absent without justification were accused of sabotage, arrested, beaten, and then paraded through the streets under the supervision of OZNA officials. The populace was obliged to demonstrate by following them, and anyone who did not interrupt his work to follow the demonstration was also beaten and taken along with the prisoner to share his fate. The latter known as the UDB, was particularly active in 1946. Numerous persons were assassinated or simply disappeared. (...). No specific law existed providing for the punishment of individuals dissatisfied with the newly created situation, and OZNA was therefore obliged to frame them as political criminals. If this was not possible, individuals considered to be undesirable were accused of belonging to some political group and sentenced by the local People's Court to from six months to one year of heavy labor. Presidents of these courts were confidential agents especially appointed for this purpose. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 10) (IMG)

Note that Kosovo was a province of the 'Republic' of Serbia in Yugoslavia. Although the Serbs formed the majority in the Republic of Serbia, the prisons of this territory were disproportionately filled with the Albanians of Kosovo:

The situation of the Kosovars had never been dangerous and as serious as it was between 1944 and 1948 when their only alternatives were prison, suicide, or humble acceptance of the [Titoist] Communist and Slav yoke. During this time there were at least three times as many Albanians as there were Slavs in penitentiaries of the Republic of Serbia. Every town had two or three OZNA sections, and each section had its own prison, guarded by the Army. Even the militia had its own prisons. The prisons of the Kosovo, where there were never less than six thousand prisoners, were crowded with Albanians. The largest penitentiary in the Kosovo Region, where there were never less than a thousand prisoners, is located in Pristina. Currently the construction of a prison with a capacity for two thousand prisoners is under way in this city. The largest penitentiary within the Republic of Serbia is in Nis. It contains approximately five thousand prisoners, four thousand of whom are Albanians. Here,

where the soul of the prisoner is shaped by tortures to the body, the most refined methods are applied to break the patriotism of the Kosovars through "re-education". The prison has two departments, one known as "Hell", and the other as "Purgatory". The latter contained four thousand convicts in 1946 to 1948, 2,500 of whom were Albanians. In the prisons of Mitrovica, Pozarevac, and Kragujevac, four-fifths of the convicts were Albanians. One-half of the inmates in the Idrizov penitentiary of Skoplje are Albanians from Macedonia who are mistreated by the guards in the same manner as the Kosovars. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 10) (IMG)

These remarks by the CIA confirm the Soviet state media claim that:

Fierce fascist terror is reigning now in the Albanian villages of Yugoslavia. Thousands of peaceful and innocent [Albanian] citizens have been driven into concentration camps. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

The massacres of the Albanians of Kosovo goes back to the days of the Great Patriotic War. For example, in 1943, the MI6-backed Chetniks and the MI6-backed Titoist 'partisans' carried out a massacre against Albanians:

In the winter of 1943 there were large-scale massacres of Kosovars in Rozaj. Five hundred men were killed by knives and machine gun fire in the attacks first by the Chetniks, and later by the Partisans. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha on the other hand referred to the massacres that occurred in 1944:

The Albanian population in Yugoslavia will never forget the tragic event of autumn 1944 when the Tito-Rankovic gang arrested 10,000 Albanians in Tetova and shot 1,200 of them out of hand without trial, not to mention those who died in the prisons. Cynicism, savagery and fury to exterminate the Albanians have always characterized the actions of the Titoite bandits. When a group of Albanian patriots protested to the Titoite command about these crimes, General Apostolski, the then commander of the First Macedonian Brigade, answered: «This is nothing, we are just doing a clean-up. Those that were killed had to be got rid of.» And Vukmanovic-Tempo who was present at that time ordered: «Are you still holding people in camps? Those you have to get rid of, clean them out quickly.» This order from the personal representative of Tito was carried out with great zeal. In November 1944 thousands of innocent Albanian peasants were shot down in the streets in Macedonia, burnt to death, or deliberately infected with typhoid which killed them.

Generation after generation the Albanian people in Yugoslavia will remember with irrepressible hatred for the bloody Titoite clique, the massacre of Drenica in winter 1944 when the Yugoslav divisions, under the pretext of cleaning up enemy elements, surrounded the liberated zone of Drenica and massacred about 30,000 Albanian men, women and children. The event at Drenica was sheer butchery, a systematic organized annihilation of the population of Albanian nationality in these regions. ('WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?', Zeri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG)

To kill the Albanians meant not just the physical destruction of Albanian individuals but also the destruction of the Kosovo Albanians' sense of nationhood, the spread of rootless cosmopolitanism among the Albanian populace. Hence, Tito's gang pursued some of its preliminary steps towards the ban on the Albanian language. Between 1944 and 1948, the Albanian language was technically not banned by the regime; however, some steps were taken towards an eventual ban. As will be shown later, this fact was described in 1950 by the Soviet press. For now, however, some of the details confirmed by the US intelligence will be presented here. Initially, in post-war Kosovo, the:

official language was Albanian, but this concession suffered various obstructions in March and April 1945. Thus for example, the [settler-colonial] Serbs pretended that Albanians lacked technical terms corresponding to those in Serb, especially in the field of administration. They also averred that the creation of special schools would be necessary, if the Albanian language were to be used, and this involved a great loss of time and great expense. As a result, the Serbs tried to persuade the Albanians that the existence of Albanian alongside Serbian was futile, since the Kosovars understood the latter. Gradually, the Serbian language replaced Albanian both in civilian and military offices, although some traces of the Albanian language could still be found in public offices until the latter part of 1945. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 12) (IMG)

In schools, the Yugoslav regime prevented the Albanians of Kosovo from being educated about their history. Those Albanians who knew the history of their country were being compelled to accept the blatantly revisionist historiography of the Serbian settler-colonists, who dared to openly question the Albanian ethnicity of Skanderbeg:

As was the case before the war, Albanian history was still not taught in the schools. Any student who knew any facts of Albanian history had learned them through his own patriotic initiative. The Serbs dared even to dispute the origin of Skanderbeg. Whenever the story of Skanderbeg came up for discussion, Party officials would declare that the problem had not as yet been solved. Its solution was finally entrusted to Dusan Mugosa. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 13) (IMG)

The poor-quality education for Albanians helped compel them to adopt Serbian as their language:

The schools continued to maintain correspondence in the Albanian language with the educational centers to which they were subordinate, but even this procedure went out of practice when necessity demanded a greater speed and efficiency in dealing with Communist officials. Translating into Serbian took time and rendered the work more laborious. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 12) (IMG)

Albanian textbooks for reading and arithmetic were published in 1946 and 1947, and were used in the first, second, and third grades of elementary schools. The speller was published at the same time. The reader and geography book for the fourth grade of elementary schools were likewise published in 1947. The science book for the first grade of high school was published in 1947, with the exception of the speller, all the above publications had been translated from Serbian. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 13) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime authorities also employed various excuses to deprive the Kosovar Albanians of the opportunity to present cultural events in their own language:

When a group of Albanians desired to present a play in their own language, all types of excuses were fabricated to prevent them from renting a theater for this purpose. In response to requests, the Party would state that the principle and desire were legitimate, but that various difficulties were involved such as lack of Albanian costumes, lack of appropriate furniture, decorations, scenarios, et cetera. These replies were as often as not delayed. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 13) (IMG)

With the expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform, the ruling fascist group in Yugoslavia unmasked itself ever more. The regime cruised with full force towards the settler-colonization of Kosovo. As stated by the Soviet press – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – the Yugoslav regime depopulated the Albanian villages of Kosovo by enslaving their population. Referring to the situation in Kosovo, a Soviet press article stated:

Many villages are deserted since all the able-bodied population has been driven off to forced labor in the mines. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, pp. 320-321) (IMG)

Decades, prior, Leon Trotsky had openly advocated for the 'militarization of labour' – the establishment of conscripted compulsory labour brigades, an extremely unpopular and reactionary idea aimed at enslaving the masses (see C5S1). Yet again, Trotsky's idea was implemented in Yugoslavia. The CIA confirmed:

A large number of young people from the Kosovo were compelled to work on construction projects such as canals, roads, and railroads, or on the reconstruction of Belgrade. Whatever construction projects were carried out in the Kosovo were not for the benefit of the Kosovars. New buildings erected were meant to quarter Serbian and Montenegrin officials. Likewise, in the interests of the Slav colonists, new homes were built, lands made fit for cultivation, factories constructed, roads laid down, and forests exploited; but the manpower for such work was provided by the Albanians. Albanians had to be satisfied with hard labor and a morsel of dry bread. Serbians and Montenegrins on the other hand were not to be seen at this type of work since more lofty jobs were reserved for them in government offices, within the militia, or in other supervisory capacities. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 11) (IMG)

This zone, populated overwhelmingly by Albanians, was openly ruled by non-Albanian settler-colonial Titoist bureaucrats who composed the ethnically privileged Slavic minority in Kosovo:

Yugoslav Communists upon assuming power, did not desire to find themselves in open contradiction to promises made to the Albanians in 1945 by leaders of the National Liberation Movement, and kept many senior officials of the Albanian minority in the Government. The majority of these officials demonstrated great flexibility in adapting themselves to the new situation. From 1950 on, however, the trend was to turn over the better positions to Serbians and Montenegrins. The Montenegrins in particular became easily assimilated with the population of the Kosmet. Gjoko Pajkovic from Berana became chief of the Regional Council, while numerous subsidiary, councils were headed by other Montenegrins. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 27) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime exploited the suffering of the Serbs under the Nazi yoke as a pretext to oblige the Kosovo Albanians to accept Serbian settlers in their houses at terribly low rent prices, hence even forcing entire Albanian families to live in a single room to make way for the Serb settlers:

Albanians are obliged to take in Serbian employees coming to the Kosmet, as roomers. There have been cases when entire families were assigned to a single room to make way for the newcomer, who need only pay an illusory monthly rental of 150 dinars per room. This sum will not even cover the electricity consumed by the tenant. On the other hand, homes of Montenegrins and Serbians are not registered with the housing office. This is alleged to be done as a compensation for their suffering during the past war. In recent times, Serbians have been known to rent their rooms for a monthly profit of from 600 to 1,500 dinars. (Albanian Minority in

Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 28) (IMG)

The fascist 'law' enforcement agencies of Tito's criminal gang cruelly discriminated against the Kosovo Albanians, crushing them with higher taxes and payment obligations, starving them with higher grain contributions, and repressing them with excessive application of the 'laws':

Albanians in Yugoslavia are not treated in the same way as are the Montenegrins and Serbians. Proof of this is in the excessive application of the laws when dealing with the Albanians as opposed to the Montenegrins and Serbians; also in the higher quotas which they must meet in grain contributions to the State, in higher taxes, and in higher payments for other obligations demanded by the Government. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 28) (IMG)

Deliberately, the regime made food very expensive for the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. From the starvation of the Albanians, the regime profited:

A common laborer or simple employee with family was allotted the following daily supplies for his ration coupons: 1 kilogram of corn, 750 grams of meat, 250 grams of sugar, 250 grams of butter, 1,250 grams of potatoes, 1 kilogram of onions, 250 grams of oil, 2 kilograms of cabbage, 1 kilogram of eggs, two apples, et cetera. Such individuals could never pay for the entire ration from their meager daily salary of from 100 to 120 dinars. The prices for these foods are exorbitant considering the fact that these foods are obtained in the form of gifts from the producers, and cost the Government nothing. The Government will not allow free market prices on food products because of the huge profits it makes through fixed prices. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 18) (IMG)

Let there be no doubt that such profits obtained by the regime were invested not in Kosovo (also known as Kosmet):

Kosmet area is not a direct recipient of aid.. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 18) (IMG)

As can be seen, the Trotskyite economic policy of Tito's group – the ban on market prices even though they were cheaper – rendered the Albanians extremely miserable, paving the way for the reduction of the number of Albanians inhabiting Kosovo. Trotskyite economic policy was aimed at perpetuating the settler-colonial fascist apartheid project.

In Kosovo, many Albanians were poorly dressed because the textiles were even more expensive than food:

Materials and textiles are even more difficult to obtain than foodstuffs because of the extremely high prices for such items. It is a rarity to see anyone wearing a new suit, and if an individual is seen sporting such a garment, he is invariably suspected of black market activities at the expense of the population. The purchase of textiles and other merchandise is rendered difficult through lack of currency. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 18) (IMG)

Economically, Tito's group was not consistently Trotskyite left-opportunist, however. So long as economically right-deviationist policies were useful to the settler-colonial ethnic cleansing project, they were adopted. Thus, unemployment among the Albanians in Kosovo was particularly high and was only on the increase. After being viciously exploited by their fascist bourgeois bosses, the Albanian workers, if injured during work, would be fired and left to starve; under the apartheid regime, many Serbian settler-colonial doctors would refuse to treat these handicapped Albanian workers:

The somewhat improved economic conditions in the Kosovo area have not alleviated the problem of unemployment, which appears to be steadily increasing. A brief visit to any of the towns in the Kosmet region, such as Pec, Kosovska Mitrovica or Pristina, will be sufficient to give the onlooker an idea of the situation. Here in public squares large groups of Albanian peasants will be seen waiting from dawn to dusk for some kind of manual labor. Speaking to each one of them will reveal a story of misery. They are starving perhaps because of having lost a limb in the mines of Serbia and having, as a result, been abandoned to a tragic fate. In many cases, Serbian doctors refuse to tend to them. It is of little assistance to be supplied with documents certifying to disability incurred in an industrial accident. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 19) (IMG)

High unemployment was valued by the Yugoslav regime, for it helped to increase the number of lumpen-proletarians instead of proletarians. The lumpen-proletarians constitute a reactionary stratum of individuals, who, having been extremely immiserated and devoid of contact with the productive forces, begin to resort to banditry. The lumpen-proletarians thus become useful recruits for international terrorism. Oppressed and poor as they have been, they become allies of the oppressors who got them into such a state, and serve as their terrorists. The pan-chauvinist Yugoslav regime, the regime of the parasitic classes above all finance capital, had every interest in under-developing those areas, preventing the rise of a proletarian class that would have resisted the regime in Kosovo. They opted for the lumpen-proletarianization of large segments of the population.

Why did the Albanians of Kosovo not rise up to resist such large-scale oppression? Surely, there was some resistance, but the bulk of the population failed to mount a resistance against the regime, and it was not just because the UDB was mighty; the reason why the bulk of the Kosovar Albanian population, just like most of the other peoples of Yugoslavia,

failed to stand up against the regime was that years of colonialism had rendered those areas devoid of a high development of the productive forces, and hence devoid of a large 'army' of proletarians having nothing to lose but to stand up against finance capital. Instead, the bulk of the population was petit-bourgeois, and the petit-bourgeoisie – unlike the kolkhozniks and the grand bourgeoisie who are capable of taking risks thanks to the cushion provided by their large businesses – are unwilling to risk losing their small businesses by fighting against finance capital. The predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie in addition to the lumpen-proletarianization of portions of the population rendered resistance against the fascist Yugoslav regime, weak. This is much like how, with the exception of proletarianized cities such as Jenin, the bulk of the Palestinian Arab population in the West Bank has historically been unwilling to resist Zionist oppression even though they have much more economic resources than Gaza, and during those times in which they have 'resisted', most of these 'resisters' 'resisted' through terrorism against civilians in Israel proper instead of targeting the IDF terrorists. Insofar as is concerned the failure to resist, the situation in Kosovo was not entirely different than in the West Bank.

Anyways, in this right-deviationist terror struggle against the Albanian people, the bourgeois class and the religious priests became the allies of Tito's group:

Individuals who were discriminated against in 1945 such as businessmen whose property was confiscated, and other persons who were prohibited the practice of their religious functions were now being favorably approached.

(Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 24) (IMG)

The Trotskyite leaps made during the mid-1940s were not progressive either; at the time, Kosovo needed an NEP; the confiscation of the properties of medium-sized businesses and the ban against religious priests was an extremely toxic left-sectarian measure. After a period of Trotskyism, when the communist revolutionary forces in Kosovo had been eroded in strength enough, the Tito regime was embarking on the right-opportunist course of installing the priestly stratum and the bourgeoisie in charge. The Tito regime, which had waged a Medieval-style campaign against Islam in Kosovo, began to support terrorist Muslim fanatics in that region. Tito's group deliberately employed terrorist Muslim fanatics as a force in pursuit of its settler-colonial objectives. As confirmed by a CIA report:

The main aim of Yugoslav internal policy in Kosmet, is to transform the Moslem Kosovars.. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

And:

Men without conscience are chosen from among fanatic Kosovar Moslems ... and placed in the employ of the Serbian Government, either in administrative posts in the Kosovo, or in offices for public education. The purpose is to weaken the nationalist sentiments of the Kosovars. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

Thus, contrary to the depiction of Tito's clique as a group inspired by secular Enlightenment values, the fascist gang launched the struggle against Islam out of Medieval chauvinism. Supporting the terrorist 'fanatic Kosovar Moslems' in Kosovo gave Tito's clique the means to conduct terror attacks against Albanians. The regime's funding of jihadists worked to foster religious conflict between the Christians and Muslims and served the chauvinist drive to eliminate Yugoslavia's Muslim 'problem':

To separate Albanians of the Moslem faith from the Catholic Albanians, and thereby to do away for all time with the problem of an Albanian Moslem minority; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

All of these "Yugoslav policies in the Kosmet region, the application of which Dusan Mugosa is largely responsible," said the CIA document, were a part of the larger Titoist-fascist effort:

To take advantage of hostile dissensions among the population in order to eliminate Albanian nationalism. Thus in the event of a war, large-scale nationalist movements would be prevented at the very incept without the need to resort to much bloodshed, since one must keep in mind that in the event of hostilities, Albanian nationalists would not lack the support of the Albanian Government; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

Having colonized the Albanians of Kosovo, and deprived them of basic living standards, the Yugoslav regime not only refused to sanitize the Kosovo region with its enormous medical supplies, but also deployed teams there to film the poorer regions of Kosovo, using these films to propagate the narrative among the non-Albanian Yugoslav public that the Albanians are incapable of achieving a higher standard of living:

A group of fifty sanitation officers came to the Kosmet in the summer of 1950 equipped with medical supplies of all kinds. Instead of alleviating human suffering, they gave lectures on socialism, and took films in the very poor homes of the gypsies. These films were later shown to the Yugoslav public under the title of "Life in the Metohij". Not a single two-story building was shown, nor for that matter, any of the picturesque castles of the region. The purpose of this type of propaganda was to convince the Communist public of the incapacity of the Albanian people to rise to a higher social plane, and of the prodigious efforts undertaken by the regime to improve the life of these semi-primitive people. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 28)

(IMG)

Tito's gang propagated rootless cosmopolitanism, seeking to wipe out the Albanian language and culture in Kosovo. As the Soviet press – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – rightly reported:

In many villages and districts where the population speaks only Albanian, as in Gornaya Reka or in Kichevsk Uyezd, teaching in the native tongue is not permitted. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

One of the goals of the Tito regime was:

To smooth the way for a census in the Kosmet in order to convince the interested Powers that the Albanians do not represent 85 per cent of the population but rather less than 50 per cent; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, pp. 26-27) (IMG)

The goal of this propaganda was to break the hope of the Albanians of Kosovo and to prevent them from resisting the Titoist-fascist regime's oppressive rule. In pursuit of this settler-colonial project, the ruling gang initiated a policy of ethnocide against the Albanian population of Kosovo. The US intelligence provided details supporting the Soviet claims:

Details of the plan to denationalize the Albanian minority were discussed at numerous secret meetings held in the Inspectorate for Education in Pristina, at Communist Party meetings, and in the home of Gjoko Pajkovic. In this regard, three meetings are known to have been held by Pajkovic, two by Dusan Mugosa, one by Petar Stambolic, president of the Republic of Serbia, one by Mosa Pijade, and one by Aleksis Aksentijevic, former finance minister in the Serbian Government. The result, of all these meetings was the decision to take positive action against any Albanian "chauvinists" who dared raise their voices to question those who pretended that their mother tongue was the Turkish language. The first two prominent men to oppose such measures were individuals whose patriotic records were by no means immaculate. Perhaps after seven years of numerous criminal deeds they rose to the defense of their people as a result of a guilty conscience! Fadil Hoxha was dismissed from his position as president of the Regional Council for having argued that such procedure was not included in the Party directives. His release was effective upon the orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and only because of his past Partisan services was he given a purely formal position of Inspector within the Communist Committee for Serbia. Xhavid Nimani, the other to succumb, was released from his position in the Economic Directorate of the Region. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 24) (IMG)

Although Turks represented a rather tiny minority in Kosovo, a program to forcefully Turkify the Kosovo population was initiated. Initially, in order to deceive the Albanian masses, the program began through persuasion and government sponsorship rather than brute force and terror:

Prior to 8 March 1951 when Turkish schools were established in the Kosmet upon the wishes of the Yugoslav Communist Party, a propaganda machine to campaign in support of same was put into action under the direction of Alush Gashi. Members of the Communist Party in the Kosmet are amazingly successful in interpreting even the slightest desires of the Central Committee communicated to them either by voice or letter. During a meeting of the Regional Committee on 12 March 1951, Gjoko Pajkovic, Secretary General of the Party, said that the Government was ready to give full support to all those speaking their mother tongue, the Turkish language at home, and who hoped to educate their children in this language. It is in this manner that the Yugoslav Government is firmly resolved to solve the question of anti-Slavism in the Kosmet. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 24) (IMG)

Then:

The 8th of March, 1951, a festivity day for the Anti-fascist Women of the Communist World, was chosen by the government authorities as the opening day for the Turkish language schools in the Kosovo. Presiding at the inauguration was Xhavid Nimani, member of the Communist Central Committee, and the address was delivered by Shaqir Ali, and a member of the Communist regional committee. On the morrow of the festivities, the latter stated that he would prefer to be a gypsy rather than to again consider himself as of Albanian origin. In his speech he said that socialism had a tendency to march with gigantic and dynamic steps toward cultural heights, and that the Albanian language, by nature poor, could not maintain the rhythm required to reach these lofty summits, and that consequently, it was necessary to study the Turkish language in order to get there. The 8th of March was planned in all its details by Communist supporters such as Boro Milatovic, member of the Committee for Public Education in 1944, Mita Milkovic, formerly president of the same committee, later Serbian minister for public education Jagosh Gjilasi, a Montenegrin, currently an instructor, Nikola Vojdovic, and Nikola Jasicic assisted by Alush Gashi, member of the Inspectorate for Public Education, and by Stathi Kostari. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

Not much less disgraceful is the following fact mentioned in the above quote: "Shaqir Ali, and a member of the [Titoist] [pseudo-]Communist regional committee ... [o]n the morrow of the festivities ... stated that he would prefer to be a gypsy

rather than to again consider himself as of Albanian origin.” Tito’s gang, the agents of the perpetrators of the Holocaust, fanned chauvinism against the ‘Roma’ or ‘gypsy’ people.

Anyways, from then on:

Parents are advised to send their children to the Turkish school, and on the opening day attendance is called on the basis of the list drawn up by the commission. In this manner, parents find themselves in a fearful dilemma, not knowing whether to bow down to force or to follow their own conscience and desires. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

Shortly after, the language of the government authorities became Turkish as opposed to Albanian:

In order to further their own interests, a portion of the city-dwelling population adopted the Turkish language for commerce and dealings with the government. With time, however, many families came to feel that Albanian should only be used to talk to uneducated persons. A purely worldly reason led several Kosovar families to speak Turkish, in much the same manner as in certain mundane drawing rooms there is a craze to speak in French rather than the mother tongue. After thirty years of Serbian domination, however, the Turkish language spoken by this group has been corrupted by an admixture of Albanian and Slav words. Even giving instruction in the Moslem faith in Turkish has become difficult for the Kosovars. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

The teachers in Kosovo were instructed to promote the Turkish language over Albanian. ‘Among basic themes developed at such meetings in Prizren’ said the CIA report, ‘the following ... taken from a teacher’s notebook’ is significant:

Tactics to be employed in order to achieve the desired result are [to tell the Albanians] that the Albanian language is not as well developed as the Turkish language, and that it is not possible to continue to maintain a slackened pace in cultural development; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

Another point made in the teacher’s notebook was that Enver Hoxha and his communist line were denounced as ‘Albanian chauvinist’, ‘Ballist’, and associated to fascist dictator Xhafer Deva. The point was as follows:

Avoid Albanian chauvinism which cannot benefit you, and endeavor to uncover the “Ballist” followers of Enver Hoxha and Xhafer Deva; and ... your children should be educated in Turkish schools. The Government will assist you in this end. Albanian chauvinists to date have done nothing for you. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

However:

Albanian instructors were quite naturally opposed to the loss of their students and some were brave enough to voice their opposition. As a result approximately one tenth of the teachers and instructors in Albanian were either imprisoned or lost their position while others were expelled from Yugoslavia on 30 July 1951; the latter were instructors, who upon their dismissal were invited to take out Yugoslav citizenship but declined. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

Hundreds of:

teachers ... became destitute after the closing of Albanian schools in 1951-52. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

The numerically declining high-quality Albanian language teachers in Kosovo were transferred to the villages and the poor-quality Albanian language teachers were promoted in the cities; the purpose of this was to promote the Turkish language in the cities until at a later time, the language would also be extended to the villages. As confirmed by the CIA:

Another method employed by the Yugoslav Communist Party to weaken the Albanians was to transfer capable instructors from the large cities to smaller ones. Teachers who were less qualified were appointed to their posts and the excuse proffered was that it was imperative to send the capable instructors to smaller backward areas where they would be instrumental in helping to raise the cultural level. The truth of the matter is that since Turkish schools were located in the larger cities, it was in the interest of the Government that Albanian schools should exist among inferior conditions so that the population would be attracted to Turkish schools. Serbian and Turkish schools received ample government support, while Albanian schools had great difficulty in obtaining even a small financial assistance, and even their premises and classrooms were taken away from them. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

Much the same was happening to the Albanian language students. The UDB canvased Albanian houses in Kosovo and forced families to enroll their students in Turkish-language, rather than Albanian-language, schools:

A commission made up of two UDB officers and various zone representatives, community councillors and members of the Regional Committee, is in charge of recruiting the youth for registration in Turkish schools. This is done by a door-to-door canvas. The campaign is carried out with great vigor in Pristina and Prizren, whereas the drive is somewhat more reserved in Kosovska Mitrovica, Pee, Vucitrn and Chjilane. An arbitrary list is drawn up of the prospective pupils. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

As such:

Approximately 500 students, largely of the elementary grades, but also including numerous students of the gymnasium level, were obliged to abandon Albanian schools and enroll in Turkish schools in the 1951-52 semester. This number includes students attending schools at Manuse, Stanovci, Vucitxm and two other areas in the district of Pristina, where Turkish is largely spoken because of its Circassian population. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

The data provided by the CIA indicates that between 1950 and 1952, more than 2,000 Albanian students in Kosovo were forced to go to Turkish language schools.

The overwhelming majority of Albanian students in Kosovo – 60% of prospective and 40% of continuing students – were barred from pursuing their post-secondary education:

Recent laws stemming from a reorganization of the public education system in Yugoslavia demand that 40 per cent of the Albanian high school graduates be barred from further pursuit of their studies. In connection with this steps were taken in 1951 to eliminate as many as 60 per cent of the students at the examinations required for higher learning. It is alleged that the doors of the law faculty are barred to Albanian students so that they may not be in a position to defend their rights. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 27) (IMG)

Scholastic Year

<u>1950-51</u>	<u>1951-52</u>
Prizren : 97	800
Pristina : 63	350
Mitrovica : 90	200
Pec : 70	120
Gnjilane : 34	100
Vucitrn : 26	83
<u>380</u>	<u>1,653</u>

‘The [above] is a partial list of statistics covering Albanian students forced to attend Turkish schools;’
(Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

The scholarships of the Albanian students was taken away from them:

In the early part of July 1951, the Committee of the Serbian Communist Party called together a group of Albanian students.. Upon this occasion the students were informed that 50 scholarships granted by the State had been reduced to 15. Of the officials present, Dusan Mugosa, Mehmet Hoxha, and Fadil Hoxha are listed among other Communist personalities. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 27) (IMG)

In spite of the countless obstacles they faced in Tito’s settler-colonial fascist apartheid regime, the Albanians of Kosovo managed to be as educated as the non-Albanians:

University students of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia have been able to achieve an intellectual level equal to that of the [non-Albanian] students. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

Among the:

Yugoslav policies in the Kosmet region, the application of which Dusan Mugosa is largely responsible.. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

was:

To keep the Albanian minority at a low cultural level; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

In order to keep the Albanian masses at a low cultural level, the Yugoslav apartheid state continued its policy of creating obstacles for Albanian cultural and artistic presentations in Kosovo:

It is customary during any Albanian artistic or cultural, and particularly dramatic presentations, to commence with a long speech in praise of Tito and the Communist Party for their deep understanding of the arts, and to express appreciation for the permission accorded Yugoslav writers to present their work to the public. All presentations given in the Albanian language are translations from the Serbo- Croat. As such they are deprived of interest, since they are already known to the theater-going public in their original versions. At the end of the presentation, agitators who customarily attend all Albanian cultural showings whistle or mock the actors in order to provoke the Albanians and to uncover among the audience those who voice their protest. Albanian actors are

advised by the Communist Party to be well prepared, since an unfavorable reaction on the part of the public would make it necessary to discontinue the performance. Various methods are employed to provoke and rouse Albanian artists, and thus to prevent them from further appearing in public. In the summer of 1951, six prominent actors in the Kosmet were expelled from the theater and replaced by practically unknown actors. The intention was to convince the public that the Albanians can not act. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 27) (IMG)

To sum it up, the:

Current Yugoslav ambitions in the Balkans are seriously opposed to demands ... for [the] recognition of the rights of the Kosovar people. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 22) (IMG)

With 'considerable brutality', reported another CIA document, the UDB 'repressed' the 'Albanians in Yugoslavia': Concentrated in Kosovo, the Albanians in Yugoslavia were repressed by the [fascist] Serbian-dominated Yugoslav secret police, under Rankovic's command, with considerable brutality. (National Intelligence Survey 21; Yugoslavia; Government and Politics, 21/GS/GP, CIA, April 1973, p. 44) (IMG)

As confirmed by an anti-Soviet Republican Congressman active in the US Congress's Committee on International Relations:

Aleksandar Rankovic ... killed many, many Albanians in the 1950s and 1960s.. (The Future of Kosovo, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 2003, p. 57) (IMG)

All of the above facts – the Trotskyite economic policy of mass-starvation, extermination, torture, and enslavement of the Kosovo population – are a testament to the settler-colonial intents and deeds of the fascist apartheid regime of Tito's clique. As previously stated, Tito's terror gang, the UDB command, knowingly and willingly implemented the genocidal settler-colonial agenda of Vaso Cubrilovic, with a brutality unparalleled in Kosovo's modern history. They slaughtered anywhere between 1,600, an extremely conservative estimate that is unfair in favour of Tito's gang, to tens of thousands. Such a mass-slaughter was known for being a part of a broader policy of ethnic cleansing, apartheid, and settler-colonialism. In addition to the mass-slaughter, Tito's gang also caused serious bodily harm or mental harm to the Albanians of Kosovo, and deliberately inflicted on the Albanians conditions of life known to bring about the physical destruction, in whole or in part, of the Albanians of Kosovo. They also minimized health standards. All of such policies of the Tito regime were a part of a broader effort towards ethnic cleansing, apartheid, and settler-colonialism against the Albanians of Kosovo. Hence, the policies of the regime of Yugoslavia can be justly labelled as a 'genocide'. The UN's Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defined the term 'genocide' as:

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

(Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN, Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII. No screenshot.)

The Soviet media – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – confirmed the fact of genocide carried out by Tito's fascist regime. To give an example, on August 1950, the Soviet media explicitly stated that to 'please' Tito's gang, a Nazi-collaborationist official working for the Yugoslav intelligence service continued the campaign to 'annihilate' the people of Kosovo:

With this in view, the Tito clique frees from jail all those who during the occupation collaborated with the German or Italian fascists and gives them jobs. Thus, before the recent elections to the Narodna Skupshtina, 7,000 hardened war criminals were released from jail long before the expiration of their sentences. These people, who assimilated the German fascists' methods in murdering Yugoslav patriots, are just the men for Rankovic. One of these is Sergeant Sergeni Sima. Formerly he served in the gendarmery, then he was with Mikailovich's Chetniks, and he collaborated with the Germans. After releasing him from jail, Rankovic gave him a police and an officer's rank. To please his bosses Sima does his best to terrorize and annihilate the populations of Kosovo and Metokhia. (Tito Clique Lacks Support of Yugoslav People, I. Livanov, August 11, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 15, p. 480) (IMG)

Recall that after the bloody murder of Popovic, the Yugoslav regime massacred 1,600 Kosovar Albanian communists, and embarked on the systematic expulsion of Albanian teachers, both to undermine Albanian culture and as a method of

ethnic cleansing:

The Slav Communists took revenge for the death of Popovic by shooting 1,600 Kosovar members of Communist brigades stationed at Bar, Montenegro. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

Albanian instructors were quite naturally opposed to the loss of their students and some were brave enough to voice their opposition. As a result approximately one tenth of the teachers and instructors in Albanian were either imprisoned or lost their position while others were expelled from Yugoslavia on 30 July 1951; the latter were instructors, who upon their dismissal were invited to take out Yugoslav citizenship but declined. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

The fascist tyranny of the CIA agent Tito and his spy ring unleashed an unprecedented war of extermination upon the Albanian masses of Kosovo. At the time of writing, however, not a word is said about this genocide in the likes of the CNN, Washington Post, New York Times, BBC, etc. Of course, little can be expected of the media of the US- led bloc, the bloc whose Titoist agents were responsible for turning Kosovo into a slaughter-house. Why is it that a shockingly tiny number of sincere anti-imperialists and progressives have even heard a word about this genocide? There was a time when the press of the Cominform-affiliated organizations provided extensive coverage on the settler-colonial project of Tito's fascist regime against the people of Kosovo. However, by the late 1950s, Albania had become one of the very few states to provide a significant coverage of the genocide in Kosovo. Why? As will be explored in greater detail in the next few chapters, a network of Titoist agents led by the MI6 agent Beria and his henchmen Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Mikoyan, on behalf of the Anglo-American intelligence services and the corrupt bureaucrats in the Soviet Union, successfully launched a hybrid coup against the USSR and some of the Peoples' Democracies, de facto decriminalized imperialist espionage and sabotage, and as such, 'legitimized' the regime of the CIA agent Tito and his ring of Anglo-American spies. With the launching of the Titoization program in the USSR and most of the Peoples' Democracies, the genocide against Kosovo was successfully covered up. This is why so few are aware of the Tito regime's genocide against Kosovo. This is why the construction of bunkers throughout Albania, a policy aimed at defending Albania against an Anglo-American-backed genocidal Yugoslav invasion, has been so ridiculed.

In light of all of Tito's genocidal war of extermination against the people of Kosovo, it should not be a surprise that: Eighty percent of the Albanians in the Kosmet area do not like the Yugoslav regime. (...). They live in the hope of reunion with Albania. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

Hence existed the popular base for Kosovo's national-liberationist action against Tito's crime band. In Kosovo:

Many out of despair have joined the resistance, operating in groups. Such clandestine nationalist groups seriously worry government authorities, who fear that mere arrests will be insufficient to eliminate such activity. Every possible repressive measure is utilized to achieve results. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

The Kosovo people seriously needed assistance in liberating themselves from the fascist yoke. People's Democratic Albania was too weak to defend itself against Anglo-American-Yugoslav aggression, let alone significantly fund Kosovo national liberation struggle. As such, in 1948, upon the invitation of the Albanian government, the Soviet Red Army forces entered Albania to assist that country.

As early as 1947, Stalin had personally supported Kosovo seceding from Yugoslavia and joining Albania. As confirmed by the well-known Serbian scholar and pro-Milosevic politician Smilja Avramov:

On April 19, 1947, a delegation headed by Edvard Kardelj was received by Stalin in Moscow. On that occasion, Kardelj announced that Yugoslavia intended to cede Kosovo and Metohija to Albania, a plan which received Stalin's backing. (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Smilja Avramov, p. 195) (IMG)

The Soviet Red Army supported the anti-colonial liberation of the Kosovo people from the fascist yoke of Tito's gang. Thus:

With the arrival in Tirana of the Soviet military mission, headed by General Feodor Artemovic-Kovpak, the following stipulations were placed before the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party: (Split in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, CIA, March 15, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

According to a report which the CIA deemed as 'reliable', the Soviet Red Army made an agreement with Albania regarding a strategic alliance against Yugoslavia. Among the stipulations of this agreement was the call to:

Foster an irredentist move in Albania hostile to Yugoslavia which would claim incorporation with Albania of the Albanian minority regions of Kosovo and Methohija (Yugoslavia). (Soviet Activity in Albania, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Hence:

In Tirana, a secret "Kosovo committee" was formed to act as the "guiding spirit" in the fight for action on the

Metohija-Kosovo territory. Any such action will be carried out under the supervision of the Soviet military mission in coordination with the aid of other committees in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, to be established by the Cominform. (Split in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, CIA, March 15, 1949, p. 2) (IMG)

Because the Albanian military had not been sufficiently developed, it made sense for the USSR to supervise the Kosovo Committee for the purpose of the national liberation of Kosovo. The formation of the Kosovo Committee also served as a strategic response to the Yugoslav regime's aggressive-subversive terrorist activities against People's Democratic Albania. Hence:

After 1948, Moscow ... continued to work for revolution on the borders of Albania and Bulgaria. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Years later, the Moscow Titoists headed by Beria and later on the Malenkov-Khrushchev group seized power and showed a highly favorable attitude towards the Yugoslav regime. This apparently further emboldened the Yugoslav regime, allowing it to step up its genocide against the people of Kosovo. At least according to Hoxha:

Tito charged Rankovic personally and formed a staff to which the people most notorious for their barbarity, the most rabid chauvinists, hardened criminals whose hands were stained with the blood of the Albanian people of Kosova, were appointed to carry out the criminal operation to the letter and direct the punitive expeditions. This staff was led by Dusan Mugosa, Gjoko Pajkovic, UDB colonel Cedo Mijovic, Cedo Topalovic, Xhavit Nimani, Xhevdet Hamza, and others. ('WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?', Zeri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG) Hundreds died under torture by the UDB executioners or a few days later. Many others, unable to withstand the tortures for a second or third time, tragically took their own lives. Thousands were left crippled and unable to work and are suffering to this day from the injuries caused at that time. And to cap their activity of hangmen, the Yugoslav authorities issued a categorical order that the Albanians injured during the tortures of the years 1955-1956 were not to be admitted to the hospitals for treatment. ('WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?', Zeri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG)

However, back in the 1940s and early 1950s, the USSR showed a favorable attitude to the people of Kosovo and helped mount the patriotic resistance against Titoist-fascist yoke.

Chapter 13

C13S1.1. The People's Liberation War in Albania

*** IMG-All-{Albania}

Tito's gang alleged that the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP), not Hoxha and his comrades, founded the Albanian Communist Party. The lie fabricated by this bully and his clique was in turn picked up and further propagated by the Anglo-American press. In reality, as a 1958 US intelligence document confirmed:

Hoxha founded the Albanian Communist Party in 1941, and he immediately began making positive plans for Communist take-over of the country. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 1) (IMG)
Another US intelligence document confirmed that Hoxha (sometimes written as 'Hodja', 'Hoca', or 'Hodza') was the founder of the Albanian Communist Party:

HODJA, founder of the present Communist Party in Albania, made a name for himself as an underground resistance leader during the war. (POPULARITY STRUGGLE BETWEEN HODJA AND SHEHU, Information Section, XI Stockholm 268, 3628, CIA, October 15, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

High-ranking US military figures noted that Hoxha was:

the founding First Secretary of the Albanian Communist Party. (Albania – Observations on a Changing Nation, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Volume 4-08, By Professor Bernard F. Griffard, Colonel William R. Applegate and Colonel Patrick O. Carpenter, April 2008, p. 1) (IMG)

In addition:

Hoxha, a former schoolteacher who became first secretary of the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) in 1941, was a prominent wartime resistance leader and was largely responsible for the success of the communists in achieving a position of political dominance towards the end of the war. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 172) (IMG)

The US intelligence staff agreed that Hoxha:

has considerable personal charm and is an excellent orator, with a rather appealing platform manner. He also has a marked capacity for leadership. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

The attempt to build a popular front was of course, upon the recommendations of the Comintern, which encouraged communist parties to foster broad alliances of both proletarian and progressive-bourgeois forces against fascism. A US intelligence document stated:

During a period when his countrymen were attempting to repel first the Italian and then the Nazi invaders, Hoxha set as his task the maneuvering of non-Communist and anti-Communist factions in Albania into fighting for the Communist cause under the [banner] of nationalism. He formed the National Liberation Front as a rallying point for Albanians determined to liberate their country. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

The Federal Research Division of the US government acknowledged that this course of action by the Party boosted its popularity among the Albanian masses. The people of Albania viewed the Party as a committed non-sectarian anti-fascist force. Indeed:

party leaders increased their popularity by ... muffl[ing] their Marxist-Leninist propaganda and call[ing] instead for national liberation. In September 1942, the party organized a popular front organization, the National Liberation Movement (NLM), from a number of resistance groups, including several that were strongly anticommunist. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 35) (IMG)

However, the document by the Federal Research Division of the US government, not free from its bourgeois pro- Titoist bias, falsely claims that the formation of the popular front by the Albanian Party was upon:

Tito's order.. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 35) (IMG)

That is certainly a lie, because in fact, as previously quoted from US intelligence, Hoxha, not Tito, 'set as his task' the formation of the popular front and it was he who 'formed the National Liberation Front'. Of course, in this regard, General Hoxha was assisted by his comrades in the Albanian Communist Party. However, clearly, Hoxha, not Tito, played the main role in the founding.

The popular front, while being communist-led, was of course not communist:

For example, a proclamation issued on July 10, 1943, stated: "All Albanians must understand and brand as foreign propaganda the anti-national propaganda campaign which alleges the movement of National Liberation is a Communist movement." (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

Popular fronts are non-sectarian front of communist and non-communist organizations aiming to combat finance capital and the latter's allied parasitic classes. The formation of popular fronts is beneficial to the proletarian movement as it mobilizes the anti-imperialist progressive national-bourgeoisie into an alliance against the great imperial menace.

In this midst existed a feudal movement known as the 'Balli Kombetar' ('National Front'). The feudal class opposes the rise of an anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and thus naturally allies with finance capital. It was all the more natural, then, that the Balli Kombetar would strategically partner with the German fascists. The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress reported:

A nationalist resistance to the Italian occupiers emerged in October 1942. Ali Klissura and Midhat Frasherri formed the Western-oriented and anticommunist Balli Kombetar (National Union), a movement that recruited supporters from both the large landowners and peasantry. (...). The Balli Kombetar's leaders acted conservatively, however, fearing that the occupiers would ... confiscate the land-owners' estates. The nationalistic Geg chieftains and the Tosk landowners [who were the support base of the Balli Kombetar] often came to terms with the Italians, and later the Germans, to prevent the loss of their wealth and power. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 35) (IMG)

Yet, for demagogical purposes, the Albanian feudal movement presented itself as 'anti-fascist' movement, 'aiming' to 'liberate' the Albanian homeland from the Axis occupation. In reality, the Ballists were the allies of the Axis. In this midst, in early August 1941, the Albanian partisans led by General Hoxha launched an alliance offensive against the feudal party Balli Kombetar: the Albanian revolutionary rebels invited the Ballists into a common front against the Axis forces, as a means of discrediting the Ballists. As James Klugmann, an MI6 officer with rhetoric sympathetic to the USSR, put it, the Balli Kombetar:

formed and guided by the ... Albanian feudal nobility, presented itself as a national liberation movement, but in practice was holding the people back from joining the People's Liberation Army (Albanian Partisans) in resistance to the Axis occupationists. But in the ranks of the Balli Kombetar were many honest but misguided Albanian patriots.

The aim of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communists was to try, in the first instance, to win the genuine patriots in the Balli Kombetar away from their reactionary leaders. (From Trotsky to Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, Chapter 2) (IMG)

To undermine the Ballist leadership:

On 1-2 August 1943, the exponents of "Balli Kombetar" gathered at Mukaj [Mukje], where they met the leaders of the National Liberation Movement (Communists) to decide about the policy to follow in connection with future military operations against the Italians.

It was then that the "Committee for National Salvation" was formed and was given full power to wage war. (A Survey of Albania, 10M/6, 621.01, .U517th CIC Detachment, CIA, January 29, 1951, p. 22) (IMG) Regarding the status of Kosovo as a part of Yugoslavia vs. Albania:

The delegates at Mukaj agreed that a plebiscite should be held in Kosovo to decide the matter; (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 36) (IMG)

However, at the point in time, the more important matter was the unity of all the anti-fascist forces in the armed struggle against the Axis occupation. The Albanian communists, aware of the Axis-collaborationist Balli Kombetar's demagogical self-branding as an army of struggle 'against' fascism for the liberation of Albania, aimed to expose the treachery and hypocrisy of the Balli Kombetar, by launching an 'invitation offensive' or alliance offensive (see C1S2) against the Balli Kombetar. Essentially, this boiled down to the Albanian communists inviting the Balli Kombetar to establish an alliance for a struggle against the Axis occupation forces, such that the Albanian communists would have means of monitoring whether or not the Balli Kombetar really fights against the Axis or not. Should Balli Kombetar have refused, they could then be exposed in the eyes of the public as the fake 'anti-fascist' right-sectarian movement which they were. Should they have accepted the establishment of such an agreement, they would have been coopted and obliged to materially aid the anti-fascist cause by deploying troops and participating in battles. Should they have betrayed their agreement with the Albanian communist-led popular front, the Albanian communists and progressives could then use their monitoring capabilities, gained through such an agreement with the Balli Kombetar, to obtain evidence of such collaboration and distribute it widely.

In his memoirs, Hoxha wrote that he explained to a Yugoslav Titoist, the purpose behind the deal with the Balli Kombetar as such:

Irrespective of its true aims, the Balli Kombetar, which was created later as reaction against the National Liberation Front, for purposes of demagogy and deception, came out with slogans of the 'war', 'independence', 'ethnic Albania, etc. Naturally, some people were deceived by these slogans. The heads of the Balli Kombetar also formed a few betas' [i.e. fighting units] and are trying to form others. Of course, they have not carried out any action against the Italians and will not do so, but their demagogy has not failed to have some effect. This being so, if we had risen against them with the rifle right from the start, this would have had grave and unpleasant consequences. I'm not talking about the possibility of losing ten or twenty of the heads of the Balli Kombetar. As far as we are concerned, they were gone from the beginning, they have never been and never will be with us. But our concern is with that part of the population that is deceived, as well as with a number of elements of the middle strata who associated themselves with the slogans of the Balli Kombetar and whom we must win over at all costs. Had we taken the axe to the Balli Kombetar from the start, we would have created erroneous views among these people and antagonized them. How then can you call this stand wrong? (The Titoites, The Naim Frasher Publishing House, Enver Hoxha, 1982, pp. 65-66. Prepared for the Internet by: David Romagnolo, 1999)

That quote from Hoxha explained, in essence, what was illustrated in the tree diagram. Sometimes, especially when evil-doers are hypocritically portraying themselves as the force of good in the struggle against fascism, a way to weaken such evil-doers is to publicly invite them to uncomfortably do good.



Such was the strategy of Albania's communists and progressives. As one might have expected, the Balli Kombetar accepted the deal but were not very inclined towards abiding by it. The communist-led LNC partisans aimed to be as non-sectarian as possible. However, clearly, it was difficult to imagine how the feudal warlords and the LNC could get along for far too long. The US intelligence official William Griffith wrote:

The Albanian Communist partisans' program of social and economic revolution so antagonized the nationalistic Geg chieftains and the Tosk landowning beys that these two elite groups became inclined if necessary to come to terms with the Italians and later with the Germans to prevent the loss of their wealth and power. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 14) (IMG)

In fact, it was:

The Balli Kombetar group ... who opposed the merger of Nationalist and Partisan resistance groups during the War.. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

In the end, the feudal Balli Kombetar went on to collaborate with the Axis powers. John Prados, a senior research fellow at the US National Security Archive confirmed:

Albanian leaders, those of the Balli Kombetar, or National Front, centered in Rome and Athens [after the war], had collaborated with the Germans and Italians in the war.. (Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA,

John Prados, September 14, 2006, p. 61) (IMG)

The feudal landlords had no incentives to participate in the struggle of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the proletariat against fascism; fascism itself fed from and fought for backwardness, the state which the feudal landlords of Albania too desired. For all practical purposes, the Albanian communist 'alliance' with the Ballists served as a channel for Albanian communist intelligence penetration into the Ballist network and the obtaining of evidence of Ballist collaboration with the occupiers.

In September, the Italian forces were defeated in Albania. The communist-led anti-fascist guerrilla forces defeated the Italian occupation forces:

With the overthrow of Mussolini's fascist regime and Italy's surrender in 1943, the Italian military and police establishment in Albania buckled. Albanian fighters overwhelmed five Italian divisions, and enthusiastic recruits flocked to the guerrilla forces. The communists took control of most of Albania's southern cities, except Vlore, which was a Balli Kombetar stronghold, and nationalists attached to the NLM gained control over much of the north. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 36) (IMG)

Once the Italians left Albania, fighting broke out between the communist-led guerrillas and the:

Balli Kombetar forces, igniting a civil war that was fought for the next year, mostly in southern Albania. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 36) (IMG)

And the Albanian LNC partisans did their best to expose the criminal treasons of the Balli Kombetar ('National Front'):

One device employed by Hoxha to discredit the National Front was to attribute to it the ruin of every village burned by the Nazis. Another was to portray National Front members as Fascists in the pay of Italy. The National Front was unable to withstand Hoxha's all-out attack and, with its disintegration, Hoxha turned his attention to the army. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

This strategy of the LNC, as expected from the tree diagram, proved effective and expanded the popular base of the Albanian communist-led guerrillas.

The Gestapo agent Tito's Trotskyite-fascist gang aimed to sabotage such an invitation offensive so to benefit the Balli Kombetar and the Axis occupation forces. According to Klugmann:

The first stage of Titoite intervention into the affairs of the Albanian patriots was the accusation of opportunism made against the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, headed by Enver Hoxha, in connection with their attitude towards the nationalist organisation, the Balli Kombetar.

(...). The Titoites, who demanded immediate and direct action against the whole Balli Kombetar, a seemingly 'left' policy, in actual fact did nothing but aid the Italian Blackshirts who were trying to push it into direct action against the Yugoslav Partisans. (From Trotsky to Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, Chapter 2) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha too mentioned this in his 'The Titoites'. The reader can refer to that book for more details. Klugmann's and Hoxha's works would be accused of harbouring anti-Titoist and pro-Soviet biases. However, their remark is also confirmed by the US intelligence which states that the Titoist Yugoslav agent Vukmanovic, denounced not just by Hoxha but also by KKE leader Zachariadis as a stabber in the back of the anti-fascist liberation struggles, dissolved the Mukaj agreement that embodied the invitation offensive, thus wasting the lives of the Albanian communist-led anti-fascist forces and the naive followers of Balli Kombetar by pitting them against each other into a fratricidal war:

Following instruction from high and official sources in YUGOSLAVIA, VUKMANOVIC dissolved the agreement reached at Mukaj and created a strong antagonism within the Albanian forces, which at that time, were struggling among themselves. (A Survey of Albania, 10M/6, 621.01, .U517th CIC Detachment, CIA, January 29, 1951, p. 22) (iMG)

At the same time, the Nazi Germans invaded Albania to 'fill the vacuum' left by the Fascist Italians:

Germany occupied Albania in September 1943, dropping paratroopers into Tirane before the Albanian guerrillas could take the capital, and the German army soon drove the guerrillas into the hills and to the south. Berlin subsequently announced it would recognize the independence of a neutral Albania and organized an Albanian government, police, and military. The Germans did not exert heavy-handed control over Albania's administration. Rather, they sought to gain popular support by backing causes popular with Albanians, especially the annexation of Kosovo. Some Balli Kombetar units cooperated with the Germans against the communists, and several Balli Kombetar leaders held positions in the German-sponsored regime. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 36) (IMG)

The collaboration of the Balli Kombetar has also been confirmed by Prados who stated:

One [Balli Kombetar] leader had been interior minister under the Germans, directly implicated in a February

1944 massacre. Another had been justice minister for the Italian occupation government. (Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA, John Prados, September 14, 2006, p. 61) (IMG)

Over time, and with the assistance of the Soviet Red Army, the Albanian communist-led guerrillas were able to destroy their Axis foes. Referring to the Albanian Communist Party, the CIA stated:

By October 1944 their "People's Army" had liberated three-fourths of the country, their "National Liberation Councils" were in effective local political control of the liberated areas.. In November 1944 their "Democratic Government" moved into Tirana..

The popular themes of the resistance movement continued to be emphasized through the election of December 1945, in which the National Liberation Front, the only party permitted to participate, succeeded in turning out an impressive vote in favor of its nominees. Only after this vote had been recorded did the regime ... [pursue] its specific program, which it preceded to put into effect as in response to a popular mandate. (Albania, CIA, August 15, 1947, p. I-2 to I-3) (IMG)

The Balli Kombetar lost its base among the masses by 1947:

Its membership early in 1947 probably did not exceed 300. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

By contrast, the Albanian Communist Party was very popular. Referring to the Albanian Communist Party, the CIA confirmed:

the popular support it enjoyed at the time of the 1945 elections. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

The CIA confirmed that the Albanian communists enjoyed popularity among the poor peasantry, who formed the majority in Albania:

The Communist take-over in Albania was greatly facilitated by the promises made by the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front during World War II of basic economic and political reforms which would grant the people "freedom, bread, and land." The program for political independence from foreign rule and the improvement of social and economic conditions had a dynamic appeal, particularly among the intellectuals, youths, and poor peasants in central and southern Albania where living conditions were wretchedly poor and systematic exploitation by the local feudal land-owners was the rule. (ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), No. 10-58, submitted to: Director of Central Intelligence, concurred in by the: Intelligence Advisory Committee, CIA, March 4, 1958, p. 7) (IMG)

The intellectual youth of the southern and central regions of Albania were different than the intelligentsia of many other parts of the world, in that such intellectuals came from impoverished family backgrounds and were attracted to anti-feudal national-bourgeois and progressive programs. Hence, they, unlike most of the intelligentsia, supported the communist-led popular front.

Another point that deserves to be mentioned regarding the Albanian people's liberation war is with regards to the assistance that Albania provided to the Yugoslav partisans. Remarkably, unlike Tito's band which did nothing for the Albanian anti-fascist partisans but claimed all the credit, the Albanian partisans did much for the Yugoslav partisans, but never received the due credit. In fact:

During the war, Albanian partisans in the strength of two divisions once rescued TITO's trapped forces. (Popularity Struggle Between Hodja and Shehu, Information Section, XI Stockholm 268, 3628, CIA, October 15, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

And yet, Tito's group claimed that they liberated Yugoslavia entirely on their 'own', 'without' the assistance of the Soviet Red Army or of the Albanian revolutionary partisans.

C13S1.2. Titoist Conspiracies against People's Democratic Albania

*** IMG-All-{Albania}

The settler-colonial ambitions of Tito's group were not confined to the official boundaries of Yugoslavia; Tito and his gang dreamed of the conquest of the entire Balkans, starting from Albania and Bulgaria. A 1950 article by the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry, reported:

Inspired by the imperialists, the Belgrade fascists, as is known, tried to carry out their dastardly plans to liquidate people's democracy in the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe and set up a so-called "Balkan federation," or Greater Serbian empire. But the vigilance of the peoples doomed these criminal plans to disgraceful failure. The trials of Yugoslav spies in the people's democracies have revealed the Titoites to the entire world as enemies of peace, democracy, and socialism as a storm detachment of the warmongers. Lies and slander have always been the weapons of traitors. And the Belgrade rulers are committing monstrous acts of provocation against Bulgaria, Albania, and Hungary. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration

Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

Indeed, as the article stated, horrifically aggressive provocations were carried out by the Yugoslav regime against the Peoples' Democracies for the goal of the establishment of a Greater Serbian settler-colonial empire in the Balkans. In the ranks of the communist movement of Albania, the Titoist Yugoslav intelligence service had a number of agents, Koci Xoxe and Mehmet Shehu among them. In Albania's communist movement, the proletariat had the upper hand. However, the enemies of the proletariat inevitably existed and constituted a not insignificant contingent in the Albanian communist movement. All of this was reflected in the configuration of power inside the Albanian leadership. The upper hand of the proletariat was reflected in the fact that Enver Hoxha was the leader of People's Democratic Albania'; the strength of the anti-proletarian reactionaries, which had a powerful minority stake in the Party, was manifested in the fact that the Titoist Yugoslav agent, the traitor to Albania, Koci Xoxe was at the helm of the Albanian intelligence service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with his henchman Mehmet Shehu as his deputy in the Ministry. On behalf of Tito's gang, Koci Xoxe would soon foment the Titoist subversion aimed at defeating the communist faction of the Albanian Communist Party, led by Enver Hoxha. As stated by the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress:

Yugoslav control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ran deep in the years immediately following World War II.

Its chief, Koci Xoxe, was part of the pro-Yugoslav faction of the party and a rival to Hoxha. (Domestic Repression under Hoxha. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

With the aid of the Xoxe-Shehu gang in charge of the Ministry of Interior, Tito's gang extended its influence over the Albanian People's Democracy and embarked upon an aggressive campaign for the settler-colonial conquest of Albania, employing all types of economic projects in pursuit of its annexationist objectives. These ranged from financial entanglement, to the 'joint' exploitation of minerals, to the attempt to turn Albania into an agrarian appendage for Yugoslavia. Describing the situation favourably towards the Yugoslav regime, a report based on the US Federal Research Division stated:

The Yugoslav government clearly regarded investment in Albania as investment in the future of Yugoslavia itself. Joint Albanian-Yugoslav companies were created for mining, railroad construction, the production of petroleum and electricity, and international trade. Yugoslav investments led to the construction of a sugar refinery in Korçë, a food-processing plant in Elbasan, a hemp factory at Rrogozhinë, a fish cannery in Vlorë, and a printing press, telephone exchange, and textile mill in Tirane. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

Note that the Yugoslav investments were made primarily on light industries and agriculture, as opposed to heavy industry and the economy's commanding heights. All of this was in spite of the fact that Albania was extremely resource-rich and had plenty of natural petroleum. These 'free lunches' by Tito's group gave Tito's gang the economic claims and political leverage over Albania, pressuring the latter to divert its budget into the less critical sectors of the economy and thereby preventing the rapid development of the Albanian industry. To use the words of a memorandum by the British Embassy in Belgrade, such economic projects by Tito's group were nothing but an attempt to perpetuate the:

fiction of Albanian independence. (R 6105/514/90, Yugoslav Control Over Albanian Economy, Mr. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Belgrade, May 11, 1948; Received: May 20, 1948, No. 111, Confidential. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948), p. 311) (IMG)

The memorandum further described the financial integration of Albania with Yugoslavia, which was paving the way for an exploitative EU-style currency union between Albania and Yugoslavia:

Under the Yugoslav-Albanian Economic Agreement signed in Belgrade on 26th November, 1946, Albania was required to adapt her currency, price and tariff systems to the Yugoslav model. In particular she was to equalize the value of her currency unit, the Albanian lek, with that of the Yugoslav dinar within three months of the date of signature. After that date the currency circulation in Albania was to be kept proportionately equal to the currency circulation in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile both the price system and the actual prices existing in Yugoslavia were to be introduced into Albania. Finally a Yugoslav-Albanian customs union was to be established within a month of the signature of the agreement on the basis of the customs tariffs and tariff system already in force in Yugoslavia. (Memorandum on Yugoslav Control Over Albanian Economy, Enclosure in No. 10. Part of: R 6105/514/90, Yugoslav Control Over Albanian Economy, Mr. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Belgrade, May 11, 1948; Received: May 20, 1948, No. 111, Confidential. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948), p. 311) (IMG)

One US intelligence document commented:

On 27 November 1946 Albania forfeited its economic independence by signing an all-inclusive pact with Yugoslavia. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. II-2) (IMG)

Referring to Albania, a CIA-funded researcher, who would later work for Zbigniew Brzezinski, admitted:

It did not, for example, participate in Cominform meetings; it was represented in them by the Yugoslavs. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 14) (IMG)

These measures, the US intelligence confirmed, made Albania 'a complete dependency of Yugoslavia:

During this period a series of political, social, economic and military "agreements" was concluded between Yugoslavia and Albania which in effect made the latter a complete dependency of the former. Yugoslav "advisors" and technicians came in considerable number to Albania to assist in the utilization of the material aid which their Government provided, and no occasion was lost by the [Titoist] Albanian leaders to extoll the virtues of their Yugoslav "friends and allies". (Country Plan Albania – 0029, OBOPUS BG FIEND, Vol. 1, CIA, June 15, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

Assessing the matter, Charles Peake, the British pro-Titoist diplomat in Belgrade and an MI6 handler of the British spy Tito (see C12S5), told UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin:

I find it difficult to believe that Italian control over Albanian economy before Mussolini's annexation of Albania ever approached the extent of the control now exercised by the Yugoslav Government. (R 6105/514/90, Yugoslav Control Over Albanian Economy, Mr. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Belgrade, May 11, 1948; Received: May 20, 1948, No. 111, Confidential. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948), p. 311) (IMG) However, over time, resistance against Titoist oppression began to mount, as the anti-Titoist faction spoke out:

The head of Albania's Economic Planning Commission and one of Hoxha's allies, Nako Spiru, became the leading critic of Yugoslavia's efforts to exert economic control over Albania. Tito distrusted Hoxha and the other intellectuals in the Albanian party.. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Divison of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

In response:

Tito ... through [Koci] Xoxe and his loyalists, attempted to unseat them [i.e. anti-Titoists in the Albanian Communist Party]. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Divison of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

And:

In 1947 Yugoslavia's leaders engineered an all-out offensive against anti-Yugoslav Albanian communists, including Hoxha and Spiru. In May Tirane announced the arrest, trial, and conviction of nine People's Assembly members, all known for opposing Yugoslavia, on charges of antistate activities. A month later, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia's Central Committee accused Hoxha of following "independent" policies and turning the Albanian people against Yugoslavia. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Divison of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

Then:

On January 26, [1948,] Tito formally requested from Hoxha a base for the Yugoslav divisions at Korce, opposite Grammos, [ostensibly] so that the Yugoslav units would be able to intervene quickly in case of Greek nationalist provocation. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 40) (IMG)

Yugoslavia was trying to utilise the fear of Greek warfare against Albania to militarily occupy the country. Thanks to Hoxha, Stalin was well-informed of such Titoist schemes:

Convinced that the Yugoslav occupation of Albania was imminent, Hoxha secretly, on his own authority, appealed to Stalin for protection. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 40) (IMG)

In a conversation with the Yugoslav delegation in Moscow, Stalin condemned the Yugoslav plans for a military occupation (and coup) in Albania. This is confirmed by Griffith, a CIA-funded American professor who became the advisor to NSC chief Zbigniew Brzezinski. Griffith wrote:

Stalin protested the Yugoslav plans to send army and air force units to Albania as support for the Greek Communist rebels.. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 20) (IMG)

On February 1948, the agents of the Yugoslav regime in Albania stepped up their campaign against the communist faction. Authoritarian as the Titoists were, they even forced Hoxha to self-criticize and to criticize Nako Spiru:

There Xoxe (with Belgrade's support) launched an intensified offensive to overthrow Hoxha and to bring the Albanian leadership totally under his (and Yugoslav) control. At the Albanian Eighth Plenum in February-March 1948 Hoxha was forced to make self-criticism for allegedly supporting Spiru (although he did not lose his position as General Secretary. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 20) (IMG)

By now Tito was seriously endeavouring to consolidate Yugoslavia's special influence on the other East European states, independent of the Soviet Union. Under Tito's orders, Xoxe accelerated his drive to overthrow

Hoxha and to bring the Albanian Party once and for all under Yugoslav control. And so the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party sent an emissary, Savo Zilatic, to Albania to assist Xoxe in the convocation of a Central Committee meeting intended finally to overthrow his opponents. The Eighth Plenum duly met on 26 February 1948, and its proceedings reflect the extent to which the Xoxe faction nearly succeeded in ensuring a long-term Yugoslav presence in Albania. Hoxha was forced to perform self-criticism and to join in the condemnation of Spiru in order to maintain his post as secretary-general. The Plenum expelled Spiru's widow, Liri Belishova, and demoted the Chief of the Albanian General Staff, Mehmet Shehu. The Eighth Plenum also approved Xoxe's proposals to merge the Albanian and Yugoslav economies and armed forces. Because Hoxha's position within the ACP leadership was now very weak, he stayed discreetly in the background at the height of all this factional strife. Following the Eighth Plenum, Hoxha's position was further weakened. However, fortunately for him plans were already being made in Moscow to dismiss Yugoslavia from the Cominform. In March, Stalin launched his offensive against Tito in a series of letters accusing the Yugoslavs of every imaginable Leninist deviation. (The Albanians: A Modern History, I. B. Taurus and Co. Ltd, Miranda Vickers) (IMG)

Moscow was alarmed:

A recent study of events in Yugoslavia and Albania in late 1947 and early 1948 indicates that the dispute between Tito and the Kremlin was reflected in Tirana almost as soon as it began. The Kremlin clearly intended to ... prevent Tito from carrying the little country out of the Soviet orbit. (Country Plan Albania – 0029, OBOPUS BG FIEND, Vol. 1, CIA, June 15, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

On April 1948, Xoxe and his fellow Albanian collaborators officially:

proposed appealing to Belgrade to admit Albania as a seventh Yugoslav republic. (The Albanian- Yugoslav Tensions, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, editors. *Albania: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994.)

These moves by Albanian Titoists would have doomed Hoxha to:

a firing squad. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

By July 1948, Tito and his group had exposed their bloody hands not only to Albania but also the other Peoples' Democracies and the communist parties in Europe. Details on how Tito's gang had engaged in monstrous conspiracies against the communist parties outside of Albania will be provided later. However, in July of 1948, Tito's gang were expelled from the Cominform, upon the consensus of all the communist parties and popular fronts. This had a vigilance-raising effect on communists worldwide, precisely the objective of the Soviet leadership. In a letter to the Czechoslovak leader Gottwald, Stalin wrote:

I have to say that we Muscovites have not been and are not counting on so early a defeat of Tito's group. Our objective in the first stage was to isolate it in the eyes of other Communist parties, and to reveal its shady machinations. We have attained this objective. The second stage will be a matter of gradually detaching Communist-Marxist groups within the Yugoslav Communist Party from Tito and his group. This takes time and we have to be good at waiting. I see that you lack patience. But I advise you to arm yourself with patience, for there is no doubt that Marxism-Leninism will in time prevail in Yugoslavia. (Stalin letter to Gottwald, July 14, 1948. In: The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 4) (IMG)

The condemnation of the Yugoslav regime in public gave an excellent opportunity to all the communists in the communist parties to purge the Titoist fifth column among them, while helping them who were unaware of the crimes of Titoism to wake up to it:

Accordingly, when the dispute erupted, the Albanian Ministers lined up promptly on the side of the Kremlin, joined shrilly in the recriminations directed at Tito and his ilk, and promptly abrogated all the agreements which had bound them to Belgrade. The Yugoslavs in Albania were unceremoniously ejected, and the border between the two countries closed. (Country Plan Albania – 0029, OBOPUS BG FIEND, Vol. 1, CIA, June 15, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

Xoxe was exposed by the Hoxha faction, the communist faction, in the Party. Subsequently Xoxe:

was arrested, convicted in a secret trial, and executed. (Domestic Repression under Hoxha. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

There is no doubt that since Xoxe was a Tito-Rankovic agent and since the Tito-Rankovic group were CIA-Mossad spies (C12S1), Xoxe was a CIA agent as well. Nonetheless, the following quote regarding Xoxe and the "CIA's third force" is also interesting:

In all the major purge trials the communists give top billing as "villain" to Dulles and his so-called CIA "dirty tricks" department – Xoxe in Albania, Gomulka in Poland, Slansky in Czechoslovakia, Kostovo in Bulgaria.

Plainly, CIA's third force is hitting the Russians where it hurts. (THE MYSTERIOUS DOINGS OF THE CIA: America's Secret Agents: Part Two, The Saturday Evening Post, Richard Harkness, Gladys Harkness, November 6, 1954, p. 68. In: CIA archives) (ImG{GDR})

The expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform helped Hoxha's faction:

Had the break not occurred, Hoxha's ... days were numbered; Stalin probably saved [Hoxha] from Xoxe's firing squads. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 20) (IMG)

Stalin's cooperation with the Albanian communists won him Hoxha's gratitude. Subsequently, Titoist agents within the Albanian Communist Party lost momentum and were purged:

Albanian Communists [Titoists] who had become too compromised by blind devotion to Tito were, of course, purged. (Country Plan Albania – 0029, OBOPUS BG FIEND, Vol. 1, CIA, June 15, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

Some Yugoslav regime agents remained in the Party of Labour of Albania, but the Titoist fifth column lost its mighty hand since the time of the Xoxe purge. The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress reported: Albania entered an orbit around the Soviet Union, and in September 1948 Moscow stepped in to compensate for Albania's loss of Yugoslav aid. The shift proved to be a boon for Albania because Moscow had far more to offer than hard-strapped Belgrade. The fact that the Soviet Union had no common border with Albania also appealed to the Albanian regime because it made it more difficult for Moscow to exert pressure on Tirane. In November at the First Party Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor (APL), the former Albanian Communist Party renamed at Stalin's suggestion, Hoxha pinned the blame for the country's woes on Yugoslavia and Xoxe. Hoxha had had Xoxe sacked as internal affairs minister in October, replacing him with Shehu. After a secret trial in May 1949, Xoxe was executed.

The subsequent anti-Titoist purges in Albania brought the liquidation of fourteen members of the party's thirty-one-person Central Committee and thirty-two of the 109 People's Assembly deputies. Overall, the party expelled about 25 percent of its membership. Yugoslavia responded with a propaganda counterattack, canceled its treaty of friendship with Albania, and in 1950 withdrew its diplomatic mission from Tirane. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

Tito's regime, in collaboration with Anglo-American imperialism, hatched new plots for a settler-colonial war against Albania. In 1947 at least:

no organized resistance movements remain in the country [i.e. Albania].. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

The only major militant subversive organizations in Albania during 1947 were a 'few hundred bandits' operating in the mountains:

The few hundred bandits still operating in the northern mountains would probably resist any Central Government and are not motivated by any ideological opposition to Communism. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

One of the thousands of ways in which Tito's gang backstabbed Albania was to harbor a prominent Albanian anti - communist guerrilla:

Bajraktari took part in guerrilla actions against the Albanian Government forces up until June 1947, when he was wounded and forced to take refuge in Yugoslav territory. ('BAJRAN BAJRAKTARI, ALBANIAN RESISTANCE LEADER, RELEASED', CIA, February 8, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

A prominent Albanian anti-communist guerrilla leader, Bajram Bajraktari was the brother of the Albanian Nazi-collaborationist commander Muharrem Bajraktari (see 'Deva, Xhafer', CIA, March 15, 1955, pages 3 & 6) who had covertly colluded with the Third Reich's military command as well as the Albanian Nazi leader Xhafer Deva. Until mid-1947, Bajram Bajraktari was conducting military operations against the Albanian People's Democracy. However, once he was defeated, he took refuge in Yugoslavia.

The Red Army-backed Kosovo Committee marked Albania's attempt to counter the Yugoslav efforts for fascist overthrow, while intensifying the class war in Yugoslavia. The expulsion of Tito's group led the Yugoslav fascist terrorists to unmask its criminal face ever more. The Tito Regime's collusion with Bajram Bajraktari's band became all the more clear on October 1948 when the gang got Bajraktari to establish a committee to 'liberate' People's Democratic Albania:

On 3 October 1948, the Yugoslav Government released from prison Bajram Bajraktari, a former Albanian anti-Communist resistance leader and brother of Colonel Muharrem Bajraktari, also an anti -Communist leader. Upon his release he was sent to Prizren, Yugoslavia, to organize Albanian refugees into guerrilla bands for operations against the Albanian Communist Government. ('BAJRAN BAJRAKTARI, ALBANIAN RESISTANCE LEADER, RELEASED', CIA, February 8, 1949, p. 1)

(IMG)

When exposed, the Titoist fifth column of the Albanian military defected to Yugoslavia and thereupon joined the Yugoslav intelligence service, the UDB:

Albanian officers have been particularly well received of late and met at the border by Montenegrin officers. Many of the officer refugees currently occupy important positions, and 70 per cent of them in the Kosovo are to be found either in the Army or in the UDB. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 15) (IMG)

Albanian Titoist emigres of course escaped to Yugoslavia:

Since 1948 all Albanian Communists seeking refuge from Enver Hoxha's dictatorship have been welcomed in Yugoslavia. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 15) (IMG)

These individuals were in turn trained by the UDB to be sent back to Albania to carry out intelligence operations against the Albanian People's Democracy:

Koci Xoxe followers are furthering pro-Tito propaganda in Albania. Groups of such men are sent into Albanian territory from Yugoslav frontier posts and entrenchments. They maintain contacts with Albanian citizens, direct propaganda activities and assist dissatisfied Albanians to escape from their country. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 14) (IMG)

Training courses headed by loyal UDB officials are given in Yugoslavia for Albanian party ... leaders and agitators for the purpose of replacing the government of Enver Hoxha (at some time in the future when Yugoslavia that this regime will be overthrown) with a pro-Tito man who will be favorable to the inclusion of Albania as an additional republic in Federated People's Republics of Yugoslavia. The training center in Danilovgrad, Montenegro, is headed by Capt. Pero Musanovic and Lt. Vido Ivanovic. The center at Gucij, which is approximately seven kilometers from the Albanian border, is headed by Capt. Gjoka Masalari. The center in Djakovo is headed by Hysea Prisha, and the currently six trainees. The center in Titograd has currently 19 trainees. Guerrilla warfare is taught at Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina, Prizren and Ohrid. Courses for parachutists are likewise given at Kosovska Mitrovica. (Attitude of Yugoslav Government Towards Albania and Albanian Refugees, May 14, 1952, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

Much the same was done with the nationalist anti-communist terror groups whom the UDB trained, armed, and sent back to Albania:

Much propaganda was likewise disseminated during 1948 by Yugoslav authorities to persuade Albanian nationalists to come to Yugoslavia(...). It was only in the latter part of 1949 that Albanian refugees were received in the capacity of emigres. Some among them were even armed by the Yugoslavs and sent back to Albania to fight in the resistance against Hoxha. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 15) (IMG)

The Prizren Committee served as the Tito regime's tool for pursuing a fascist shadow war against Albania:

The role of the Prizren Committee is a political one. They have no independence of decision or action and are a frontier for Yugoslav activities. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a- vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p.

3) (IMG)

As part of the fascist terror campaign launched by the Yugoslav regime against People's Democratic Albania:

Koci Xoxe followers are furthering pro-Tito propaganda in Albania. Groups of such men are sent into Albanian territory from Yugoslav frontier posts and entrenchments. They maintain contacts with Albanian citizens, direct propaganda activities and assist dissatisfied Albanians to escape their country.

Often officials and workers of both sexes are kidnaped and brought into Yugoslavia where they are interrogated by the UDB and released at a later date with the excuse of mistaken identity. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 14-15. Underline added.) (IMG)

A 1953 US intelligence document confirmed:

The Yugoslav policy on Albania may be summarized as follows: Liberation of Albania and attachment to her of the districts of Kosove and Metohijes and the incorporation of Albania as the 7th Republic in the Federated People's Democracy of Yugoslavia. (Albanian Refugee Organization in Yugoslavia, CIA,

May 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

With the backing of the Anglo-Americans, the Yugoslavs hatched further plots to aggress Albania and to present it as a 'revolution' and a 'civil war':

In the event that Hoxha troops should put up an unexpectedly strong or extended resistance or that Soviet troops should intervene, the Albanian formations would break down into minor units and conduct guerrilla warfare in an attempt to establish a state of revolution and civil war in the country. (YUGOSLAV PLAN FOR THE INVASION OF ALBANIA, CIA, July 23, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

All of these were of course done in coordination and collaboration with the US intelligence. In mid-1949, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the covert special operations wing of the CIA, began Operation FIEND:

On 22 Jun 1949, OPC initiated implementation of a project, whose ultimate objective was, and remains, the overthrow of the Hoxha regime in Albania and the substitution thereof of a representative type government oriented towards the Western Powers. The operation was undertaken with the approval of the Departments of State and Defense. (OBOPUS BGFIEND VOL. 14 (BGFIEND OPERATIONS)_0046., p. 1, CIA, September 27, 1949)

As always, the Anglo-American imperialist special operation involved employing the remnants of the Axis forces from Albania against the People's Democracy:

The first phase of the combined project involved the formation of a national committee or council which would (1) be parallel in structure to other national committees operating in the United States and would include representatives of major and relatively untainted Albanian groups currently in exile.. (...).

Initial exploratory conversations were undertaken in the Mediterranean area by OPC representatives in April and included contact with ex-King Zog and Midhat Frasherri. Detailed and complicated negotiations began in early July with the arrival of a full time OPC. (OBOPUS BGFIEND VOL. 14 (BGFIEND OPERATIONS) 0046., p. 1, CIA, September 27, 1949)

On May 29, 1951, Yugoslavia threatened to invade Albania:

[T]wo Yugoslav Army divisions have been recently transferred to the Northern Albanian border. One has established headquarters at Podgoric and the other, a mortised division, is located at Skopije. A regiment of the motorized division had been stationed between Dibra and Ochrid.

Albanian Government authorities are said to be obviously alarmed; as a result, they arrested 150 persons in the border zone whom they considered dangerous or suspect.

Members of the DMP [stands for: People's Defense Division] and the Communist Party, in a panic, allegedly have approached the families of political refugees and so-called "reactionaries" and have cautiously given them help of various types, apparently as reinsurance, in the event that the present regime should be overthrown.

Government propaganda, inspired by the USSR, has reported tried to make the Albanian people believe that the Anglo-Americans have planned an invasion of Albania and the division of the country into three zones, to be occupied by Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy, respectively.

(YUGOSLAV TROOPS ON ALBANIAN BORDER: ALBANIAN REACTION TO RUMORS OF INVASION, CIA, May 29, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

Perhaps the goal of this was less so military warfare, but more so psychological warfare – to terrorize the population of People's Democratic Albania, and to feed the Titoist agents inside the Albanian state with the excuse for supporting a policy of capitulationist 'negotiations' with the Yugoslav regime. In any case, the presence of the Soviet Red Army acted as a deterrent against the invasion plans. In 1952, the Yugoslav regime took some steps for cooperating with the exile Albanian monarcho-fascists led by King Zogu and his collaborators. The Tito regime representative was:

Colonel Cedo Mijovic ... in the Yugoslav Ministry of Interior. (Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Mijovic, the intelligence agent of the Gestapo agent Tito, did not conceal his fascist sympathies. In this dialogue:

The Albanian delegation [of King Zogu] took note of the open sympathy and great interest shown toward the fascist groups especially by [the Yugoslav Titoist delegate] Mijovic who commented favorably on Markagjoni, Mirakaj, and others. (Meeting of Representatives of King Zog and Marshal Tito, CIA, October 23, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Having engaged in a conversation with Tito's representatives, the delegates of King Ahmet Zogu stated that their intention was the expulsion of Albania from the Cominform, and that they did not mind the rise of a Titoist regime in Albania:

Suddenly, Colonel Mijovic asked what King Zog and his lieutenants think about the Albanian Communists. Ohri [King Zog's representative] replied that the Albanian Communists [of the Titoist type] are close brothers to Albanians of other political persuasions and that King Zog has no intention of avenging himself against them. The King's only desire is to see Albania rid of the Cominform, after which the Albanian Communist Party and all other Albanian parties will be able to defend themselves freely before the court of public opinion. (Meeting of Representatives of King Zog and Marshal Tito, CIA, October 23, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

By 1954 Cedo Mijovic had become a leading figure in the Prizren Committee, the committee founded by Tito and the Bajraktaris for a fascist war against People's Democratic Albania:

General Dusan Mugosa is not only so-called "responsible" for the Albanian refugees, but is in charge of organizing refugees from all of Moscow's satellites. Colonel Cedo Mijovic also is engaged in the direction of Albanian affairs from his office in the Yugoslav Ministry of Interior. Both Mugosa and Mijovic are Montenegrins and speak Albanian fluently. (Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Headquartered in Prizren, Kosovo, the Prizren Committee was a camp in which Albanian Titoist refugees resided. Those Albanians who escaped to Yugoslavia were all forced by the UDB to participate in fascist shadow war efforts against People's Democratic Albania. Refusal would have assured brutal torture:

Every Albanian who flees to Yugoslavia is forced to join the Prizren Committee. If he refuses to do go he does not receive an identity card, nor food and clothing ration cards. If he is between the ages of 15 and 60 he is put in a concentration camp where use of the whip not unknown. In the case of women, children, or old men, those who refuge to join are left to their own devices, without food and shelter. Anyone, therefore, who does not wish to die of hardships is forced to join the Committee whose entire organization and direction is in the hands of UDB officers. (Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Rights of the Albanian members of the Committee are limited to those of spying on each other. Its UDB (Yugoslav IS) officers use all available means, including bribery, threats, flattery, and torture in order to penetrate their Albanian charges thoroughly. Corruption has reached such a point as to seriously weaken the emigration and render it less effective for Yugoslav purposes than it would be if its morale were higher. (Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Mijovic and his fascist friends were training the Albanian Titoist refugees in the Prizren Committee. The Yugoslav intelligence utilized the refugees for espionage and subversion against People's Democratic Albania:

Those Albanian refugees who are physically fit and who have had experience in their country's background are forced by the UDB to undertake intelligence and operation missions back into Albania.

The following are the objectives of UDB in this connection:

- a. Information concerning Albanian fortifications, troop movements, and morale of local populations.
- b. Attempting to learn the location in Albanian territory of Cominform, anti-Tito Yugoslav organizations which are given hospitality and encouraged by the Albanian government.
- c. Information concerning the identity of Albanians favoring and those opposing the programs of Tito's Yugoslavia.
- d. Dissemination of Yugoslav propaganda leaflets.

(Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

The intelligence activity against People's Democratic Albania would be done in active collaboration with the CIA. Though the Yugoslav junta was already dominated by the CIA agent Tito and his Anglo-American fascist agent ring, full-scale collaboration between the UDB and the CIA for a fascist war against Albania was yet to be established. In 1953, the Yugoslav intelligence agreed to facilitate the movement of CIA units into Albania:

[T]he Yugoslav UDB agrees "in principle" to collaborate in intelligence work regarding Albania, to facilitate the movement of CIA agents into and out of Albania, to provide small amounts of Albanian currency, and to a meeting between CIA and UDB Albanian experts to discuss questions of mutual interest. It was further specified that the time and place of the meeting and the number of persons to participate would be decided by General Rankovic within the next ten days. (OBOPUS BFIEND VOL. 24 (BGFRIEND OPERATIONS)_0004., CIA, Date of Information: January 1, 1953, Written: February 5, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In the settler-colonially occupied Kosovo, the Yugoslav regime was training 50,000 Albanian terrorist contras for the invasion of Albania. Plan R-7, it was called. A CIA document titled 'Yugoslav Plan for the Invasion of Albania' reported:

The Yugoslav Military program concerning Albania was drawn up over a year ago by Generals Peko Dapcevic, Svetozar Vukmanovic, and Kosta Nadj. It is known as Plan R-7 and its general outline provides for a conquest of Albania mainly by [exile and subversive] Albanian troops with the aid of some Yugoslav Kosovar elements. (...). In connection with this plan, the Yugoslav Communist Party estimates that the organized Albanian force would be able to increase its strength to approximately 50,000 during its march on Tirana, and that it would be able to complete mission within a very short time. It is also that once Tirana fallen, the Soviet troops in Albania would fall back to Saseno Island where they could be evacuated. (YUGOSLAV PLAN FOR THE INVASION OF ALBANIA, CIA, July 23, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

C13S1.3. People's Democratic Development in Albania

*** IMG-All-{Albania}

People's Democratic Albania embarked on centralizing the economy so to minimize economic chaos and reduce bureaucracy. Albania also laid emphasis on heavy industry for its development. Miranda Vickers, a scholar for the Soros-sponsored International Crisis Group (ICG), wrote:

The Albanian regime faced perhaps the most difficult internal situation of any of the socialist states because of

the relatively backward conditions and low standard of living. The communist leadership attempted to deal with this situation by adopting the standard Stalinist model of a highly centralized planned economy, with strong emphasis on self-sufficiency in heavy industry. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

A campaign for the electrification of Albania began, in addition to the development of consumer goods to meet the needs of the population:

emphasis was increasingly concentrated on the development of industry. The two-year economic plan from 1949 to 1950 laid the foundation for the subsequent five-year plans. During this plan large projects were begun, such as the Lenin hydro-power plant to meet the needs of the Tirana district, the Stalin textile mills and the Maliq sugar refinery. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

Again, producer goods were prioritized over consumer goods. The USSR provided aid for the industrialization of People's Democratic Albania during this period. The CIA reported:

The amount of Soviet credit extended to Albania is not known. The first reported credit arrangement was signed in February 1951. Within the framework of a 4-year trade agreement, Albania was to receive industrial equipment and technical aid to be repaid over a number of years. Subsequent reports indicate that industrial equipment and technical assistance have been received for the construction of various industrial installations including a hydroelectric plant, a tanning extract plant, an oil refinery, a textile combine, a sugar mill, and a woodworking plant. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 13) (IMG)

Unlike the Yugoslav regime which sought to colonize Albania, the USSR established favorable currency conditions wherein Albania would provide the Dollars and the USSR would take a loss in rubles:

The Albanian Government has little use for dollars, except to buy other foreign exchange, since Albanian commerce with the United States and Canada is practically non-existent. The Soviet offer to take a loss on rubles in order to acquire dollars cheaply doubtless proves quite satisfactory to both parties. (ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN ALBANIA, CIA, April 17, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

Furthermore, as confirmed by the US intelligence official William Griffith:

The USSR bought the exports of Albania at doubled price. Imports from the Soviet Union were to be delivered at half prices. Furthermore, the USSR renewed all the credits previously given by the Yugoslavs. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 21. Citing the Munich-based 'Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Sudosteuropa' (WDSOE), 1958, No. 3, p. 43) (IMG)

This fact could indicate again that the Yugoslavs had been exploiting Albania by purchasing its goods for half the price. The same author had stated:

Until 1948 Albania remained a Yugoslav ... satellite. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 14) (IMG)

Furthermore, prior to the 1948 Yugoslav-Albanian break:

Relations between Albania and Yugoslavia declined, however, when the Albanians began complaining that the Yugoslavs were paying too little for Albanian raw materials and exploiting Albania through the joint stock companies. In addition, the Albanians sought investment funds to develop light industries and an oil refinery, while the Yugoslavs wanted the Albanians to concentrate on agriculture and raw-material extraction. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

The Albanians were complaining that the Yugoslav regime was paying too little, and after the break the USSR did indeed purchase Albanian goods at a doubled price. All of these are indications of the Yugoslav regime's colonial agenda against Albania.

Regarding the situation with the supply of goods and services in the economy of war torn Albania, the Soros agent Vickers added:

In January 1949, a new system of procurement and supply was introduced by the Central Committee to improve economic relations between the town and countryside. The state guaranteed market-supplied goods at fixed prices to working people on the basis of ration cards; the barter market supplied peasants with industrial commodities in exchange for their agricultural surpluses; and the free market served those in urban towns and rural areas whose needs were not met by the other two markets, either because they were not supplied with ration cards or were not engaged in cooperative agricultural production. Prices in the free market were much higher than in the others, and in this way it was hoped that money accumulated by the country's richer elements would be gradually mopped up. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

The CIA reported that the Albanian People's Democracy brought tax benefits, financial grants, and farming machinery so to incentivize the collectivization of agriculture:

In addition to the propaganda in favor of the Kolkhoz and the great benefits to be derived from the system of collective farms, the grants of money made by the government to the Kolkhozes and the reduction of taxation on them (amounting to about 40 percent, as well as the furnishing of farm machinery), constitute a strong inducement for farmers to enter the collectives. In spite of all this, the farmers are slow to change, and the collectivization has made little progress this year. According to one report, only 5 percent of the total farm population has joined the collective farms. Such farms are to be found only in the plains around the urban centers. (ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN ALBANIA, CIA, April 17, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

However, as with the rest of Eastern Europe in the 1950s, collectivization and agricultural production in general suffered due to poor climate, which is why, as stated above, the pace of collectivization was slow. Nonetheless, the state provided relief programs for the farmers:

The objective of the first five-year plan was to prepare the ground and create conditions for the rapid development of collectivization. The resulting dislocation, accentuated by two consecutive very dry years, 1951 and 1952, cut grain production, as well as cattle, sheep and goat populations, between 10 and 25 per cent, and caused very acute food shortages which threatened to jeopardize the whole plan. Stopgap measures – such as a temporary halt to further collectivization, the drastic reduction of compulsory delivery quotas, the cancellation of quotas in arrears, and the free distribution of grain to peasants — had no lasting effects. Grain production continued to be erratic and always fell below target, as did the numbers of cattle, sheep and goats. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011 (IMG)

When Albania's collectivization needed to slow down, Mehmet Shehu, an agent of Yugoslav officer Koci Xoxe who pretended to oppose Xoxe, advocated the Trotskyite-style aggressive pursuit of the collectivization program, so to sabotage agriculture, to make collectivization unpopular, and to drive a wedge between the peasants and the state:

If an occasion ever arises for eliminating Shehu, Hoxha has two charges he can bring against him: first, his [i.e. Shehu's] wartime brutality; second, in 1952 or 1953 while Hoxha was away on a trip to Moscow, Shehu publicly announced an intensification in the collectivization program which was promptly repudiated by Hoxha on his return. ('1. ALBANIAN REACTION TO GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION 2. NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 3. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

However, as the CIA document above stated, Hoxha prevented Shehu from advancing his sabotage agenda. Nonetheless, Shehu continued to live on with his criminal life until the three decades later when he was duly demoted. Where there were state crimes committed in Albania's Popular-Democratic development, they were typically committed by the enemies of the communist faction – i.e. by such people as Mehmet Shehu, who was also later purged during the Hoxha era. Shehu's brutality is also confirmed by the CIA. Referring to Shehu, the CIA stated:

As Minister of the Interior since 1948, he has been the man primarily associated with the regime's repressive activities.. (SITUATION IN ALBANIA, CIA, May 8, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Indeed, even as late as the 1970s:

Through his power base in the Sigurimi, Shehu had managed to consolidate his grip on the mechanisms of the state. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Party of Labour of Albania embarked upon a project of increasing the share of the blue-collar elements inside the Party, even though Albania was not an industrial country:

The social strata in the Party are as follows: prior to the 1st Congress, no accurate returns on the strata were available, because social origin was confused with social status, and origin itself was misinterpreted. At present, the party members and candidates of working class social origin constitute 8.08 per cent, and those of working class social status make up 11.5 per cent of the Party's effective. Of the total number of workers engaged in production, 9.73 per cent are organized in the Party. As can be seen, the number of worker party members or candidates is small. This has been influenced by the fact that our working class is new and small in numbers, and now it is growing and becoming stronger parallel with the development of industry. Notwithstanding this, the growth rate of the Party with working class elements is not satisfactory, though there are improvements in this respect. After the 1st Congress, the workers admitted to the Party constituted 28.06 per cent and the candidates of working class origin made up 21.28 per cent. This growth in such a short period is not bad, indeed it is encouraging, if the period of suspension of admissions because of the verification period is taken into account. (REPORT AT THE 2nd CONGRESS OF THE PLA, Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha, March 31, 1952. In: Enver Hoxha Selected Works, Vol. 2, The "8 Nentori" Publishing House, Tirana, 1975, p. 211. MIA)

The relative increase in the blue-collar elements certainly strengthened the position of communists in the Party, against the likes of Shehu and other bureaucrats who exercised influence in the Sigurimi.

The people of Albania sympathized with communism. For start, the Albanian people were opposed to Anglo-American imperialism ('free world'). As confirmed by the US intelligence, as late as May 1958:

the Albanian people have been persuaded to believe that the whole of the free world has sinister designs on their little country. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 5) (IMG)

Furthermore, as late as 1958, the Albanians regarded Stalin as a hero:

Albanian youth looks to Moscow for cultural and ideological guidance. Despite the downgrading he has undergone in his own country and elsewhere, the late Soviet dictator Stalin is still a hero to Albanians. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58 -193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 5) (IMG)

C13S2. Titoist Regime Oppression in Bosnia

*** IMG-All- {Titoist Yugoslavia}

Every ethnic group in Yugoslavia was terrorized by Tito's fascist gang. The 'economic development' projects that Tito's group initiated in Bosnia were for the purposes of building up the military-industrial backbone for a potential imperialist-fascist assault on the Peoples' Democracies. The income that Tito's group generated went not for the Bosnian people but for the imperialist aggression schemes. This is why Bosnia too was an extremely poor province:

However, the extent of military-related investment in the 1950s and 60s proved to be a mixed blessing. Because of the volume of investment, Bosnia was long treated in official policy as a "developed republic" and denied the civilian investments channeled into Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, even though it remained objectively one of the poorest parts of Yugoslavia. Bosnia's development fell further behind the other republics. In 1953, it had a per capita income of 74 percent of the Yugoslav average; by 1971, this had fallen to 53 percent. By 1971, only 1 percent of the population had completed university training and 36 percent had less than three years of primary education (Ramet 1992). (Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ten Years After Dayton, Berghof Research Center, Martina Fischer, 2007, p. 13) (IMG)

While impoverishing and economically terrorizing the people of Bosnia, Tito's group also, as noted previously in C12S1, promoted the Handzar SS, the notorious Nazi 'Islamic' army of terror that officially worked for the Vatican-sponsored 'Islamic State' of Bosnia headed by the Pagan warlord Pavelic (see C9S18). Tito's group accepted the entry of 2,000 Handzar SS terrorists into the ranks of the Yugoslav 'Communist' Party and the Yugoslav regime army. Tito's group, as mentioned in C12S6, placed Islamic extremists in charge of the administration of Kosovo. The simultaneous recruitment and elevation of 'Islamic' fascists on the one hand and the impoverishment of Bosnia by Tito's group was a godsend to the NATO-sponsored Al-Qaeda death squads that emerged in Bosnia and Kosovo years later.

C13S3. The Massacre at Katyn

*** IMG-All- {Katyn}

In September 1951, the American regime began questioning the facts on Katyn, casting doubts on the so-called 'Soviet narrative', leading the US Congress to 'reinvestigate'. The investigation by the Congress coincided with the completion of the CIA's special study, in cooperation with the Office of the Chief of Military History of the Pentagon, on the Soviet treatment and interrogation of war prisoners. Dated and published in September 1951, the American intelligence service's study presented a picture that starkly contrasted with the Nazi 'facts' which the Congressional 'investigators' planned to hear. Hereby follows an excerpt of the US intelligence document:

B. Soviet Instructions Issued in 1940

A set of instructions concerning the collection, interrogation, and evacuation of prisoners (or deserters) was issued by the Deputy Peoples' Commander of Defense in February 1940. The Germans found a copy of these instructions in Poland in the captured files of a Russian tank unit. (...). Many of the 1940 instructions apparently remained in force, at least in principle, throughout the war.. (Russian Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel World War II, CIA, the Office of the Chief of the Military History, US Department of the Army, Kermit Stewart (Major, Infantry, US Army), Orland Ward (Major General, USA Chief), September 1951, pp. 138-139, underline original) (IMG)

The CIA-Pentagon document added:

Article 13 of the instructions stated that "all military personnel must be generous to an enemy prisoner and render any assistance in order to save his life." In keeping with this general rule, Soviet military personnel was specifically forbidden to take from or exchange with a prisoner the latter's gas mask, personal (toilet) kit, uniform, underclothing, footwear, belt, personal belongings, and money. Collection and search of prisoners during battle was to be carried out in terrain protected from enemy fire. (Russian Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel World War II, CIA, the Office of the Chief of the Military History, US Department of the Army, Kermit Stewart (Major, Infantry, US Army), Orland Ward (Major General, USA Chief), September 1951, p. 141) (IMG)

Elsewhere the American intelligence document stated:

While the killing of prisoners was tolerated by lower echelon commanders it would appear that the Soviet high command disapproved from the beginning. A directive (No. 1798) of the Soviet Government, dated 1 July 1941, reiterated humanitarian aspects of the 1940 instructions and categorically ordered: "It is prohibited to insult and maltreat prisoners." A general order issued in December 1941 revealed that the supreme command was dissatisfied with interrogation results, that it censured military personnel because so few prisoners ever arrived at array head-quarters for interrogation and prohibited the killing of prisoners by combat troops. (Russian Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel World War II, CIA, the Office of the Chief of the Military History, US Department of the Army, Kermit Stewart (Major, Infantry, US Army), Orland Ward (Major General, USA Chief), September 1951, p. 161) (IMG)

While writing in probabilistic terms, the document nevertheless stated that the 'Soviet high command disapproved from the beginning' 'the killing of prisoners' and that as early as '1940', these 'instructions ... remained in force'. Citing 'a copy of these instructions in Poland in the captured files of a Russian' which the 'Germans found ... in Poland', the US intelligence arrived at the conclusion that the '1940 instruction' contained 'humanitarian aspects'. Writing in definitive terms, the CIA stated that the 'general rule' for the 'Soviet military personnel' was to not take actions that would lead to the death of the prisoner and to abide by 'Article 13' which called for generosity towards the prisoners. Thus, while not explicitly mentioning Katyn, the author of the US intelligence document, who based his research off of numerous CIA and German intelligence documents, practically agreed – at times with a dose of probabilism and sometimes in a definitive form – that the Soviet high command was opposed to mistreating prisoners. Among the most important pieces of evidence is that the bodies of the individuals arrested by the Nazis had been found at Katyn. A US Congress report – which blamed the Soviets for the Katyn massacre – nonetheless admitted:

in several instances families were officially informed by the Germans that bodies of people who ... had been arrested during the German occupation had been found at Katyn. (FACTS AND DOCUMENTS CONCERNING POLISH PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED BY THE U.S.S.R DURING THE 1939 CAMPAIGN. In: "The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 1738) (IMG)

It goes without saying that finding the bodies of individuals whom the Nazis captured shows that the Nazis, not the Soviets, were the forces handling the fate of those captured individuals: death in Katyn.

In his intelligence report (written in an abbreviated way) from the US Embassy in Moscow to the US State Department, the prominent anti-Soviet Cold Warrior Averell Harriman remarked:

[It] Appears [that the] Soviets [are] conducting very detailed examination [of] each body by autopsy and by examination [of] clothing, remaining personal effects, and papers. Evidence which made greatest impression to strengthen [the] Russian case was:

(One) Most soldiers exhumed to date were enlisted men rather than officers, as Germans claimed.

(Two) Methodical method of execution, each having been killed by one shot at base of skull.

(Three) Dates of papers exhibited from November 1940 to June 1941.

(Four) Testimony by witnesses re[garding] unsuccessful attempt to evacuate Poles at time of German breakthrough to Smolensk and re[garding] Poles engaged [in] road work in area for Russians and Germans in 1941.

("Telegram From United States Embassy", To: President and Secretary of State, by: William Averell Harriman, Strictly Confidential, Moscow, January 25, 1944. In: "The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2124) (IMG)

Though Harriman was a Roosevelt-era US official affiliated with the Democratic Party, his vehement anti-Sovietism and anti-communism is well-documented and not disputed. Stanley Meisler, the former deputy director of the Office of Evaluation and Research in the US intelligence front 'Peace Corps', wrote:

Walter Lippmann, the influential columnist, believed that the United States was deliberately and dangerously humiliating the Soviet Union. The American delegates, Lippmann believed, had fallen under the sway of the hard-line anti-Soviet views of Ambassador Harriman. When Harriman told a news conference in San Francisco that "our objectives and the Kremlin's objectives are irreconcilable," Lippmann walked out. (United Nations: A History, Stanley Meisler, 2011) (IMG)

It is worth noting that the remarks made by Averell Harriman, the anti-Soviet Cold Warrior, were in no way under the pressure of the fact of the official 'alliance' between the USSR and the USA. The following excerpts of the conversation between Harriman and another well-known anti-Soviet US official O'Konski are instructive:

Mr. O'KONSKI. The reason why I ask that is that it leads up to the second question I have.

All during this time that you were the Ambassador, there were some 15,000 Polish officers murdered, and

our Government here in Washington did not show enough interest to request you to find the essential facts concerning the case; is that correct? Not once were you communicated with for information. They did not care what happened to those officers; did they?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I cannot say they did not care, but it is a fact they did not ask me to do it. (...).

Mr. O'KONSKI. If the answer is not that they did not care, the other answer is that they were so afraid they might learn the truth about who murdered them that again they might get afraid of that great big thing; that Joe Stalin might get mad at us and make a separate peace with Hitler.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don't think that would be the case at all. I never saw any evidence of that. There was a constant effort on the part of the United States Government to protect the interests of the Poles insofar as it was possible to do so.

("The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2124-2125) (IMG)

Averell Harriman's claims regarding the massacre at Katyn are backed up by the report of his daughter. In her intelligence report for the US Embassy in Moscow and the State Department, the American intelligence operative and diplomat Kathleen Harriman Mortimer stated:

it is my opinion that the Poles were murdered by the Germans. The most convincing evidence to uphold this was the methodical manner in which the job was done, something the Commission thought not sufficiently important to stress. (Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn in January 1944, [Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow]. In: "The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2133) (IMG)

Again, Kathleen Harriman Mortimer was not under pressure to reach any of her conclusions throughout her report, either:

Mr. O'KONSKI. (...). Did anybody exert any pressure or any force or any hint to you at all in arriving at your conclusion?

Mrs. MORTIMER. No.

("The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2147-2148) (IMG)

The method of execution alluded to by Kathleen Harriman was, as Averell Harriman also stated, the one shot at the base of the skull. This fact about the method of Nazi execution has also been corroborated by Paul Sturman of the 'Foreign Language Service' of the US government's 'Office of War Information' (OWI). In a letter to Alan Cranston of the OWI, Paul Sturman described the "shot in the nape of the neck" as:

a method practiced by Nazi executioners. (Letter by Paul Sturman to Mr. Alan Cranston. From Washington D.C. to 12370 Hilltop, Los Altos, Calif. November 5, 1952. In: "The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2180) (IMG)

Reporting to Washington during the Second World War, the US State Department official John Melby remarked:

On balance, however, and despite loopholes, the Russian case is convincing. ("The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2124-2125. Note the Select Committee was citing an excerpt of the report by Melby.) (IMG)

Melby denied that he was under pressure for making such a report:

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Melby. did you discuss your visit to Katyn, and what you saw there, with the Soviet officials on your way back to Moscow?

Mr. MELBY. I don't remember talking about it to the Soviet officials. There were one or two people from the Foreign Office who escorted us, and I don't remember any others. I don't remember discussing it with them.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did any Soviet official suggest to you that you might come up with the conclusion that it was the Germans that did this!

Mr. MELBY. The Commission themselves that investigated it.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I mean on the train, in personal conference.

Mr. MELBY. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did you feel at the time you wrote this report ... [the] conclusion that the Germans did this – did you feel that possibly was the answer your superiors in the State Department and Washington would prefer?

Mr. MELBY. No; I had not reason to have any idea as to what kind of answer they would want.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You had no reason?

Mr. MELBY. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Nevertheless, you knew that there were very close relations at that time between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Mr. MELBY. Yes sir.

Mr. PUCINSKI. And did you feel that might be somewhat putting yourself in an unfavorable light if you drew your conclusions on the basis of your reasoning and the rest of your report, and concluded the Soviets did this?

Mr. MELBY. No sir; not at all.

Mr. PUCINSKI. There was no such fear in your mind?

Mr. MELBY. No, sir; not at all.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long were you there, Mr. Melby?

Mr. MELBY. We arrived early one morning, 7 or 8 o'clock, and were there in the area until about 2 a.m. the following morning.

(...). Mr. PUCINSKI. And you are certain that nobody asked you to voice a conclusion on your visit to Katyn?

Mr. MELBY. Absolutely certain.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long were you in Russia before you went to Katyn?

Mr. MELBY. I arrived there in May 1943.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How many months before?

Mr. MELBY. It would have been about 7 months.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long were you there after you went to Katyn.

Mr. MELBY. Until April 1945, a little over a year more.

(“The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2152-2153.) (IMG)

When the Eisenhower Administration ascended to power, John Melby was demoted on charges of close relations with the Soviet intelligence service. Therefore, it is possible that he may have been ‘biased’ in favor of the USSR. Nonetheless, his remarks are supported by the remarks of the viciously anti-Soviet Averell Harriman and his daughter Kathleen.

The Anglo-American media claims that, behind the scenes, Roosevelt agreed that the Soviets were responsible for the Katyn Massacre. Not true. In fact, when George Earle presented ‘evidence’ of Soviet responsibility for the massacre, Roosevelt, as quoted by Earle himself, responded:

George, this is entirely German propaganda and a German plot. I am absolutely convinced the Russians did not do this. (“The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2204) (IMG)

The pseudo-‘evidence’ presented by the Nazi Germans is documented by American intelligence to have been obtained through torture and terror. The viciously anti-Soviet American intelligence operative Harriman Mortimer reported:

In the spring of 1943 the Germans published stories in the three quisling local papers telling of the murder of Poles at Katyn during March and April 1940, by the NKVD. (...) Next the Germans searched out witnesses to confirm their story. We saw three men who had been questioned and beaten by the Gestapo, one of whom was the Gnezdov station master, the two others peasants. All three were tortured into signing documents, the contents of which they did not understand. (Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn in January 1944, [Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow]. In: “The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2137) (IMG)

3. Documents found on the Polish Corpses: The final act of the Germans was to route out and either kill or deport any person who might have information proving the whole Polish incident was a fake. They caught all but a few of the men they had beaten into signing false evidence and the three girls who had been servants at the Goat Hill datcha.

Despite the thoroughness of the pocket ripping by the Germans, out of the seven hundred corpses the Commission have so far investigated, 146 items have been found. The earliest date was found on a postcard — March the latest — an unmailed postcard dated June 20, 1941. We were shown all these documents and trinkets and the most important and significant ones were translated for us. They included letters from Warsaw and Moscow dated in the winter of 1940, receipts for valuables dated in the Spring of 1941 and numerous newspaper clippings dated from early 1940 through early 1941. (Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After

Visiting Katyn in January 1944, [Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow]. In: "The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2138) (IMG)

As further confirmed by K. Harriman Mortimer, the Nazi Germans also looted, from the pockets of as many Polish units as possible, the documents dated later than April 1940 so to 'prove' that the massacre was carried out in April 1940:

As they were dug up, the Germans tagged each corpse with a metal number, slit open the pockets and removed all papers they could find that bore dates later than March and April 1940 and looted the pockets of any money and valuables. They imported a corpse specialist called "Butz" from Berlin to make an investigation and to prove scientifically that the bodies found were buried in the Spring of 1940. (Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn in January 1944, [Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow]. In: "The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2137-2138) (IMG)

Again, none of these remarks in the report by K. Harriman Mortimer, the henchwoman of Averell Harriman, were under the pressure of the official 'alliance' with the USSR.

A document published by the Yale University Press through researching the archives of Poland stated that in the killing field:

two calibers of firearms were used in the executions: in the overwhelming majority of cases, smaller than 8-mm, that is, 7.75 mm or less; in a lesser number, larger than 8-mm, that is, 9-mm. (Katyn: A Crime without Punishment, Yale University Press, Head Office of State Archives in Poland, Federal Archival Agency of Russia, Wojciech Materski, p. 321) (IMG)

The only two German pistols listed, the Parabellum P08 and the Walther P38, are both 9 mm. (Europe Central, William Vollmann)

The Soviet military did not have access to 9 mm pistols until long after the Second World War, as the following table from the CIA suggests:

TCS 444 11/11/63

For Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100140011-4

ITEM	25X1B4d	Documentary Sources		Collateral		First Visual Sighting		
		Earliest Date	Earliest Date	Defectors and Repatriates Earliest Date	Other Sources Earliest Date	In Groups of Forces	USSR	With Forces of Other Bloc Countries
Mortars								
82mm M1937 M43 Mod		1947	-	-	1946?	1945	1945	1952
120mm M1938		1943	-	-	1946	1946	1945	-?
120mm M1943		1947	-	-	1946	-	-	-?
160mm M1943		1950	-	-	1947	-	-	-
160mm M-60		1958	-	-	1953	1957	-	-
240mm M-240		1958	-	-	1953	-	-	-
Antitank Recoillless								
82mm B-10 (M-51)		1958	1955	1958	-	-	-	-
107mm B-11 (M-50)		1957	1956	1956?	1958	-	-	-
AT Launcher RPG-2		1961	1956	-	-?	-	-	1955
AT Launcher M62-(?)		-	-	1962	1964	-	-	-
Infantry Weapons								
9mm Pistol Makarov (PM)		1956	1954	1957	-?	-?	-?	-?
9mm Machine Pistol		1959	1955	1957	-?	-?	-?	-?
Stetchkin (APS)		1949	1948	1949	1954	-	-	-
7.62mm Carbine SKS		1952	1949	1954	1954	-	-	1958
7.62mm Assault Rifle AK-47		1953	-	1952	-?	-	-	-
7.62mm Assault Rifle AKM		1956	1952	1954	-?	-	-	-
7.62mm Machinegun RPD		1952	-	1950	-?	1961?	-	-
7.62mm Machinegun RPK		1952	-	1947	-?	-	-	-
7.62mm Machinegun RP-46		1958	1956	1955	1958	-	-	-
7.62mm Machinegun SEM		1957	-	1955	-	-	-	-
12.7mm Machinegun DChK M1938/46		1958	1954	1954	1956	1957	-	-
14.5mm SPU-2 & ZPU-4		-	-	-	-	1957	-	-?

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(‘Production of Soviet Land Combat Equipment<Sanitized> 1944-1962’, CIA, NSA, 1962-1963, p. 61) (IMG)

There is also pseudo-‘evidence’ presented by Mikhail Gorbachev during the era of Perestroika ‘proving’ Soviet responsibility for Katyn massacre. “‘Who is thy witness?’ they asked a fox. ‘My own tail’, the fox replied” – so goes a Persian proverb. Never mind that the ‘documents’ presented by the Gorbachev group have been seriously challenged as having been fabricated. As I have documented in C24S4, Mikhail Gorbachev himself admitted in his post-1991 memoirs that he was a British spy providing top secret nuclear-military intelligence to Margaret Thatcher. In the context of Katyn, the conflict of interest implies that MI6 spy Gorbachev and his ‘evidence’ or ‘documents’ were not reliable on Katyn. It is also regrettable, though not in the least surprising, to see that a revisionist author like Domenico Losurdo sided with Gorbachev in supporting such anti-Soviet propaganda. Like Khrushchev, the reactionary intellectual Domenico Losurdo played the role of the token ‘communist’, the anti-communist disguised as a useful ‘confessor’ from an ostensibly

'communist' viewpoint in the favour of the reactionary forces. Not just over the issue of the Katyn massacre, but as well on a number of other important issues, Losurdo worked to mislead progressive-minded individuals. Citing Losurdo or Gorbachev for their anti-communist 'confessions' is analogous to citing the pro-communist 'confessions' of a pro-Soviet official in the US government, such as Harry Hopkins. Throughout this book, even when I cited James Klugmann, the MI6 officer tasked by Britain's Communist Party to write an anti-Titoist book, I addressed the involvement of a pro-Soviet 'bias' in his works and ensured that the claims for which Klugmann's work was cited would be backed up by anti-Soviet sources from anti-Soviet intelligence services. Or when I cited Yehuda Bauer, Yad Vashem's and IHRA's Mapam-affiliated Holocaust researcher with likely pro-Soviet views, I made sure to address the potential presence of a pro-Soviet 'bias' in his works, and used anti-Soviet sources to back up all the major claims for which Bauer's work was cited. I had initially cited the work of the Kennedy-era Chief of US Special Operations Command, General Fletcher Prouty, but later deleted that excerpt cited, precisely because of the affiliations of Prouty with the Kennedy faction. For the same reason, I deleted most of the excerpts I cited from the works of Gar Alperovitz, because he too had ties to the Kennedy team. I had cited Kennedy-era and Carter-era US State Department official George Ball on Yugoslavia's role in the 1956 reign of terror in Hungary, but decided to delete that cited excerpt as well. Much as how the socialist forces had their own Khrushchevs and Gorbachevs, there were officials in the US and Israel who, while officially condemning the socialist forces, secretly had pro-communist views – and depending on the case, I either did not cite them at all, or minimized my citation of those individuals, or backed up any citation of those individuals by citing confirmed anti-Soviet intelligence service sources. Contrast this strict and meticulous methodology with the Anglo-American imperialist methodology; the latter relies on the "fox's own tail" for 'proving' anti-Soviet accusations: Gorbachev and his followers.

C13S4.1 The Home Army (AK) was funded by Nazi Germany's Japanese Fascist Allies / The AK was an Anti- Semitic Group that did Not fight the Nazis

*** IMG-All- {Poland}

In Poland, there was a non-communist 'resistance' organization that was called the Home Army (AK). The Anglo-American media outlets claim that the Home Army was combatting the Nazi German occupation forces and that it was 'unjustly' 'persecuted' by the Soviets. To the pro-Soviet individuals and to many Ashkenazim who have lived, or have relatives, in Poland, the Nazi-collaborationism and anti-Semitic terrorism of the Home Army would be a common-sense intuition. However, to date, the pogromism and Nazi-collaborationism of the Home Army has not been well-studied minus in a number of works by Ashkenazi authors and in the Soviet and People's Democratic archives. It goes without saying that probably for the first time, the fascist Nazi-collaborationist, and anti-Semitic pogromist character of the MI6-backed Home Army will be exposed in detail throughout this section and the subsequent ones, using not 'biased' pro-Soviet archival sources but, as always, using mostly anti-Soviet intelligence sources.

The Home Army, whose high command was based in London, was a front for the British intelligence service, and thus the activity of the Home Army reflected the interests of the MI6. For this reason, much as with the MI6 itself, the period of the activity of the Home Army in Poland is divided into three main phases: (1) 1939 to late 1940 or early 1941, (2) 1941 to late 1942 or early 1943, (3) 1943 and beyond. During the period 1939 to late early 1941, the MI6 regarded the Nazi Germans as unofficial allies against the USSR, and hence the 'Polish Underground' – also known as the Home Army – was allied with the fascists. According to the Nazi German intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg, as early as 1940, the Polish Underground was actively and covertly collaborating with Japanese diplomatic channels:

the Secret Service of the Polish resistance movement was working in collaboration with the Manchoukuoan Embassy, which was the same thing as saying the Japanese Embassy. In other words, they were obviously working with the Japanese Secret Service. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 138) (IMG)

Based on intelligence gathered by the Germans:

it was plain that the Japanese were availing themselves of this organization [i.e. Polish Underground] and the extensive information network that was being built up there. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 140) (IMG)

Imperial Japan provided financial support for the Polish AK:

the Japanese Secret Service had taken notice of the organization and methods of the Polish resistance from a very early point of its development. At first the resistance consisted not so much of fighting units of officers and soldiers, but of loosely organized resistance centers with an extensive information service. The Japanese decided to provide this movement with financial aid, as it could be of use to their own intelligence organization. The Japanese almost always availed themselves the services of nationals in those countries in which they were operating. Poland was an especially interesting field for them, as it could be used for intelligence work in two directions, against the Germans and [more importantly] against the Russians. They supplied the Poles with financial support, technical equipment and specially trained couriers, and even went so far as to naturalize their

Polish agents and supply them with diplomatic passports. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 142) (IMG)

As one may expect, the Japanese did not utilize the Polish Underground state as much against Germany as against the Soviet Union. Indeed, as Schellenberg put it, in using these Polish Underground, the Japanese were mainly engaged: in the construction of a Secret Service net against Russia.. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 143) (IMG)

It should come as no surprise that according to a document by the Cambridge University Press:

One leaflet distributed in 1941 characterized the PPR leaders and their ideas as simply spokespersons of the Soviet government. "The aim of the Polish Worker's Party [PPR]," the leaflet stated, "is the struggle against the Polish Government, the Polish Army, and the Polish Nation.. The PPR is preparing the fifth partition of Poland." (The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945, Cambridge University Press, [Joshua D. Zimmerman](#), June 5, 2015, p. 120) (IMG)

In 1941 came the second phase of the activities of the Home Army, when the MI6 genuinely turned against the Nazi Germans, and hence the Home Army too turned against the Nazi Germans. The vast majority of the weight for fighting the Nazi Germans was again placed on the Polish communist-led popular front and the USSR. Nonetheless, one can at least be grateful for the fact that the AK did not outright ally with the Nazis against the communists and the USSR, even though elements within the AK continued to carry out hostile anti-Soviet activities in favor of the Nazis.

In the meantime, at the behest of the MI6, the Polish government-in-exile negotiated a treaty of alliance with the USSR against Nazi Germany. Stalin, calculating that the promotion of MI6-backed elements would be useful for combat against Nazi Germany, engaged in such an alliance and released the Polish regime military' commanders from prison. These military commanders, among whom was the infamous Menachem Begin, formed an MI6-directed military force known as the 'Anders Army', which would in turn be, shortly thereafter, responsible for strategically commanding the Home Army units in Poland. Naturally, the MI6 agent Beria conspired to use this Polish-Soviet alliance as means of promoting those pro-MI6 generals in the Polish Army and of establishing the 'Intermarium' a Polish-led confederation of Central Europe envisioned by General Pilsudski (see C3S3):

The formation of a Polish army in the USSR was approved, but Stalin was extremely reluctant when it came to equipping this army. My father showed no surprise at this attitude. He had even expected it. Eventually, since this army seemed destined never to be used, my father interceded for it to be allowed to leave the USSR in spring 1942. (...). Merkulov nevertheless asked Anders to leave behind a group of officers whom my father planned to introduce into the Polish Communist army led by Berling. Anders would not hear of this, and he made a mistake there, for his men would have occupied high positions in Poland. Later he was to admit his mistake.

At that time my father regarded Poland as very important. He wanted that country to be the nucleus of a confederation of Central European states which would include the Baltic states. (...). My father, however, thought that there was nobody more suitable than a Polish patriot like Anders to carry out the plan for a confederation. He hoped that this belt of states, more advanced than the USSR, would contribute to our development and 'get the cart of the Communist economy out of the rut it was stuck in.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 73) (IMG)

Beria's behaviour was also reflected in the involvement of the Georgian Menshevik military officers in the Underground Polish State. In the words of the scholar of Beria's biography, Françoise Thom:

This may be explicable by the close links that existed between the emigre Mensheviks and the Poles. In 1920 Georgia had signed a military alliance with Poland. In 1921, after the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Georgia, Poland welcomed several hundred Georgian officers who were between the Paris Mensheviks and the Georgian officers in Poland. Several of these officers joined Anders' army. The writer of these notes [Françoise Thom] is grateful for this information to Akaki Ramishvili, the son of Noah Ramishvili, the Minister of the Interior in the Menshevik Government of Georgia. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 326) (IMG)

During 1941, the Nazi Germans expanded their already-existing network of agents within the Home Army. Referring to a German intelligence officer Hans Hermann Merz as the 'SUBJECT', the CIA reported that the German intelligence officer was able to infiltrate the Polish Home Army's high command early on in the war. Some time in 1941 or 1942:

SUBJECT succeeded in penetrating the Armia Krajowa (Home-ARMY – AK) central coordinating headquarters. (MERZ, HANS_0017, USAREUR Central Registry (Prov), 513th INTC Group, APO 154, US Forces, April 17, 1963, p. 1) (IMG)

The CIA document cited allegations that in 1942, Merz and a Polish Home Army General 'Albrecht worked out a plan whereby AK would cease its partisan activity':

Allegedly, in 1941 or 1942, SUBJECT succeeded in recruiting and vetting, as an informant, a Colonel fnu Albrecht, not further identified, formerly with the Polish Army, later chief of staff of the underground partisan movement, Zwiasek Walki Zbrojny (Union of Armed Battle – ZWZ), within the AK. It was further alleged that SUBJECT and Albrecht worked out a plan whereby AK would cease its partisan activity in return for a German guarantee of Polish national independence, a larger proportion of Poles in the central government of Poland and easing of the occupation costs and restrictions placed upon the Poles. (MERZ, HANS_0017, USAREUR Central Registry (Prov), 513th INTC Group, APO 154, US Forces, April 17, 1963, p. 1. Note: ‘fnu’ stands for ‘first name unknown’.) (IMG)

The plan that Colonel Albrecht and Merz allegedly envisioned was indeed implemented by the Nazi Germans and the Home Army. Indeed, until 1944, the Polish Home Army refused to engage in any significant combat against the forces of the Third Reich. In an article for Haaretz, Shlomo Avineri – Israel’s former Director General of Foreign Affairs and currently a Fellow at the Munich Centre for Applied Policy Research – posed the following rhetorical questions:

The first question concerns the timing of the Polish Warsaw uprising, in August 1944, when the Soviet Army reached the Vistula. (...). Why did the Armia Krajowa, the Polish underground, controlled by the Polish government-in-exile in London, strike at this particular moment, when the Germans were already retreating, eastern Poland was already liberated and the Soviet army was about to liberate Warsaw itself? (...). Why did the Polish underground not rise against German occupation over the preceding four years? Why, for example, didn’t Armia Krajowa strike against the Germans during the Jewish Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in April 1943? Why did the Polish underground not try to disrupt the Germans’ systematic extermination of three million Jews, all Polish citizens?

One sometimes hears arguments about how many guns the Polish underground sent – or did not send – to help those participating in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. But that is not the critical question. The question is why did the Polish underground just stand by when the remnants of the 300,000 Jewish residents of Warsaw rose against the German occupation? German suppression of the ghetto uprising took weeks, and on the “Aryan side,” the Polish population of Warsaw saw and heard what was happening in their own city – and did nothing. It is difficult to know what would have happened if the Polish underground had joined the uprising – not only in Warsaw but all over occupied Poland, where it had prepared thousands of its members in numerous cities and villages for a possible revolt. Had this taken place, it would certainly have made it more difficult for the German SS troops to liquidate the Warsaw Ghetto. Moreover, had Armia Krajowa joined what was seen as a “Jewish” uprising, it would have been a powerful proof of solidarity with the Polish Jews.

It is a tough question. But is it totally unjustified to raise the moral dimension involved in deciding to start an uprising in order to prevent Warsaw from being liberated by the Soviets – but not doing anything to prevent the organized murder of three million Polish Jews or to help the ghetto uprising? (Quo Vadis, Poland?. Ha’aretz, Shlomo Avineri, September 3, 2016) (IMG)

Shlomo Avineri had been promoted by the Yitzhak Rabin cabinet. Rabin himself was a crypto-communist and his team had many Mapam activists. The Mapam was rooted in the Hashomer Hatzair, the ‘Socialist Zionist’ movement that was involved greatly in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. For more information on the Mapam, see C16S6. By the 1940s, the Hashomer Hatzair emerged as a major pro-Soviet ‘Socialist Zionist’ movement; Shlomo Avineri’s links to the Rabin team could perhaps result in accusations that he may have had a ‘pro-Soviet’ bias. Nonetheless, the claims made by Avineri are well-documented. Timothy Snyder, a leading anti-Soviet professor of history at Yale University and an important member of the CIA’s Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), acknowledged:

Warsaw Home Army commanders had strategic concerns that militated against giving the Jews any weapons at all. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 284) (IMG)

Yitzhak Zuckerman had been a commander of the Yiddish rebels in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. He was a traitor to the uprising he led and betrayed the Yiddish fighters. He later served as the viciously anti-Soviet American intelligence agent responsible for promoting Zionist mass migration from Poland. This American intelligence agent, describing the attitude of the Armia Krajowa (AK) towards the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, admitted the hostility and anti-Semitism of the AK towards the Yiddish freedom-fighters:

They knew about the negative attitude of the AK (Armia Krajowa) to us and advised us. The smaller force of the PPR underground, which was understanding and sympathetic to us, had few weapons and, despite its good will, caused us a serious crisis when a group of our fellows who had gone to help them, to join the partisans near Lublin, was captured by the Nazis.

Armia Krajowa (AK), the major force in the Polish underground, not only suspected us but was even hostile to us. Externally, it was disbelief. Instead of saying: "I hate you," it was easier for them to say:

"I don't believe you; you don't defend yourself." Later, after the January Uprising, they had another excuse: that is, we were pro-Soviet. After the first Uprising, we heard a lot of praise; then this political pretext of "pro-

Soviet" came up. But at this time, it was easy for them to say: "We don't believe you, and we don't have many weapons either; you didn't defend yourselves and went like sheep to the slaughter." The only thing we asked them for was weapons. We told them that, if they gave us weapons, we wouldn't go "like sheep to the slaughter."

Furthermore, Arye Wilner came back to the ghetto and reported to us soon after that his friends in the Scouts had told him that the representatives of the AK wouldn't talk to him because they didn't consider He-Halutz, Dror, and Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir partners for negotiations, but only a youth movement. (His friends in the Scouts could only have been Hubert Kaminski, who later played an important role in the Polish underground and was the editor-in-chief of the AK newspaper, Information Bulletin.) If that was how we looked to them, the whole thing could be dead. They pretty much said: You don't really represent the Jews, since you're nothing but "members of a youth movement," and the Delegatura, that is, the representatives of the Polish Government-in-Exile, do not talk with youth movements. If they didn't want to give us weapons, they could also use this excuse. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 219 -220) (IMG)

Zuckerman himself was not pro-Soviet and in fact was anti-Soviet as he admitted elsewhere in his memoirs (see C16S6). However, the martyr Mordechai Anielewicz, the Hashomer Hatzair 'Socialist Zionist' revolutionary who was the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, was staunchly sympathetic towards the Soviet Union. The AK was not really hostile to Zuckerman himself either, but was definitely very hostile to the Yiddish rebels whose post-Anielewicz commander, Zuckerman, was betraying. Still elsewhere Zuckerman, by 1993 a veteran CIA agent, once again admitted to the hostile attitude of the AK towards the Yiddish rebels:

I don't know how many weapons the Poles of the AK had. I don't think the PPR had many weapons, as I learned in the Polish Uprising. What was our argument? What did we talk about with the AK? Did we ask them to give us thousands of weapons? Altogether we asked for a few score, and they didn't give them to us. That was their crime! After all, they probably had them. They had grenades, too, and they could have given us some. In January, they claimed they didn't trust us, because "Jews didn't defend themselves"; and when we came and said we wanted to defend ourselves, they didn't believe us. Afterward, they claimed that we were nothing but a branch of Moscow. They always saw us as a foreign body.

I'm talking about the AK (Armia Krajowa), the regular, dominant force, which had weapons. Most villagers were members of AK, the priest was a member of AK, the former officer was a member of AK, since there were no Communist officers. You couldn't buy in the black market. We had more than ten pistols (weapons we got from the AK), but in those days, too, what we bought during the Great Aktsia wasn't bought from the AK, but in other places I don't know about because I wasn't involved in it. Every pistol, every grenade we got was hidden somewhere, so we couldn't test whether they were in working order. They might have given us defective grenades. At any rate, we only had a few weapons, and all the talk about dissension over the distribution of weapons is absolutely meaningless. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 254) (IMG)

The AK engaged in many pogroms and picked up the mantle of the Nazis in this respect:

Aharon Carmi's story of how he was integrated into the militia after the Liberation is also interesting. (I still remember him in the uniform of the UB, the Polish Security Service.) That's the story of our fighters in the partisan unit. And that's not the whole story of Jews in partisan units. We're talking only about the partisans connected with us. Some of them, for example, those in Konieczpol, hid because they could have been murdered, and ceased partisan activity because of the Polish hostility. Apparently, the murderers weren't members of NSZ, but of AK who were wandering around Wyszkwow. The only ones who survived were those in contact with the Soviet partisans. But these were only a few individuals. And that was probably not a solution for hundreds or thousands. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 477-478) (IMG)

But we didn't get to the people; we don't even know how many survived the Polish Uprising. After that, everyone lived on his own. When the Poles left Warsaw, the Germans stayed and searched for Jews.

Many Jews, like many Poles, were killed in bombings. But many Jews were also murdered by AK soldiers; even in our own neighborhood.

That's the story of Jurek Grossberg, Luba Gewisser's boyfriend, who was killed by the AK at the start of the Polish Uprising, when many Jews thought salvation had come and left their hideouts. Jurek had a gun, he shot out the door of his hideout, and was immediately picked up by AK members on Komitetowa. He tried to call on Hubert Kaminski, but his captors ignored his explanations and killed him. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 479) (IMG)

In many North Atlantic countries, to say that the Home Army was an anti-Semitic terrorist organization would lead angry hordes to immediately bring into question one's sanity. The MI6-backed media has the audacity to openly glorify the

Home Army as a consistently 'pro-democracy' 'anti-totalitarian' force 'fighting' oppression, be it Nazi oppression or Soviet 'oppression'. On the question of Nazi-collaborationism, there exists a spirit of Polish exceptionalism in Anglo-American historiography in the academia.

For portraying themselves as freedom-fighters to the Western liberal audience, the AK terrorists cited the cases of their 'inclusion' of the Yiddish fighters into their ranks, but the truth was that the AK utilized these Yiddish fighters as pawns, low-ranking soldiers to be wasted in war:

The Polish Uprising began in August 1944. During the Uprising, when the Poles freed the prisoners in the Gesiowka jail in Warsaw (hundreds of Jews from Hungary and Czechoslovakia were freed there in an attack by the AK), the Poles didn't know what to do with them and those Jews had a very hard time. They were saved by the AK, who would send them to the barricades as cannon fodder against the German tanks. I got interested in their fate and asked Sak to deal with civilian matters, including their case. He contacted the AK and the AL; most of the Jews were under the AK command but for a very short time. The AL offered us generous help. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 469) (IMG)

Not only did the communist-led popular front organization PPR and its military force AL provide generous aid to the Warsaw Ghetto rebels, the PPR/AL had leading positions throughout the conflict.

According to a book published by the Cambridge University Press, the Home Army commanders, representing the MI6 were concerned about the rise of the communist-led popular front in Poland, the PPR, and thus established Section K to eventually combat the communist-led popular front:

By July 1942, Gen. Rowecki sent a note to his commander in London, expressing concern that the communist partisan underground was active and gaining influence. If nothing were done, the Home Army would likely lose members to the communists, he concluded. The formation of the PPR led to the creation of a separate division within the Home Army dedicated to combating communist influence. Although it was not formally established until November 1943, a precursor functioned in 1942 under the name of Section K. The section that came to be called "Antyk," a subdivision of BIP, distributed anti-Soviet and anti-communist leaflets in 1942 as well as filed intelligence reports on PPR activities. From its inception, Antyk was preoccupied with Jews as perceived communists. In the first report in March 1942, the anti-communist division discussed communist influence in the Warsaw ghetto. Jewish youth in the Warsaw ghetto, it claimed, "are undoubtedly the element most susceptible to communist slogans." The concern was not without a basis in fact. In the early summer of 1941, it has been estimated that out of a total of 900 members of the PPR in Warsaw, 500 lived in the Warsaw ghetto. In May 1940, approximately fifty fighters of the PPR's military wing — the Gwardia Ludowa (GL) — were residents in the Warsaw ghetto as well. (The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945, Cambridge University Press, [Joshua D. Zimmerman](#), June 5, 2015, pp. 119-120) (IMG)

The author further states:

On July 4, 1942, Rowecki received a communication from Sikorski regarding the necessity of Home Army readiness in the case of a Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. "The Home Army has to be strong," Sikorski wrote, "in particular in the east where Vilna and Lwow must be held." Rowecki agreed wholeheartedly, writing subsequently that it was vital that the Polish uprising against the Germans take place first in the northwest and southwest, and then gradually following the German withdrawal. (The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945, Cambridge University Press, [Joshua D. Zimmerman](#), June 5, 2015, p. 121) (IMG)

Referring to the activities of the Polish Home Army, the book published by the Cambridge University Press stated: any communist organization that emerged was from the outset to be viewed by all other organizations as a Soviet creature. This suspicion, even before Soviet military victories brought the Red Army closer to Polish territories, determined the nature of debates within the underground. (...). Another leaflet, "To the Polish Nation," similarly appealed to ethnic Poles, warning that the PPR was composed of Soviet agents whose aim was the permanent annexation of Eastern Poland. "Only the Polish Government and its Government Delegate in the Homeland, as well as the Prime Minister and the Commander of the Home Army, can distribute commands. The Nation decides on Polish, issues — never foreign agents." A leaflet titled "Two Totalitarianisms. Two Enemies," portrayed Soviet Russia as an enemy equal to the Germans. It ignored the fact that there had been a German invasion of Soviet Russia and the restoration of Polish-Soviet diplomatic ties. (The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945, Cambridge University Press, [Joshua D. Zimmerman](#), June 5, 2015, pp. 119-120) (IMG)

The core of the Home Army units were not to actively and materially mobilize against the PPR until late 1942 or early 1943, for until then, the Nazi Germans were regarded as the greater menace to British imperial interests, whereas from late 1942 or early 1943, the Soviets were triumphing in Stalingrad, the USSR was growing to pose the bigger threat. Activity against communists by the AK units prior to late 1942 would have been anti-MI6 sabotage by Nazi infiltrators in the AK command. Therefore, it could not have represented the core of the AK. Rather, the AK was to leave almost all of the work on the communist-led popular front, so that the latter and the Nazis, supposedly representing the 'two

totalitarianisms', would be eroded in combat against each other.

In contrast to the AK, which did not actively combat the Nazi German occupation forces, the communist-led popular front actively engaged in the struggle against the Axis. A notable source in this regard is Halik Kochanski, who studied:

Modern History at Balliol College, Oxford and then completed a PhD at King's College London. She has taught at both King's College London and University College London and presented papers to a number of military history conferences. She has written a number of articles and is the author of *Sir Garnet Wolseley: Victorian Hero* (1999). She is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. She has been a member of the councils of the Army Records Society and Society for Army Historical Research and remains a member of both societies. She is also a member of the British Commission for Military History and the Institute for Historical Research [not to be confused with 'Institute for Historical Review']. (*The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War*, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

Halik Kochanski has taught at both King's College London and University College London. She is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and a member of the British Commission for Military History. (*About the Author(s)*, *The Eagle Unbowed*, Harvard University Press)

Kochanski herself did not admit that the Polish Home Army refused to combat the Nazi Germans, nor did she admit that the Polish Home Army instead attacked the Yiddish citizens of Poland. Nevertheless, she acknowledged that 'Jewish historians' 'agree with' the claim 'that only the GL-AL and Soviet partisans undertook armed action against the Germans':

Historiography has further confused the matter: for post-war political purposes, the communists claimed that only the GL-AL and Soviet partisans undertook armed action against the Germans. Jewish historians tend to agree with this claim, adding that the AK not only failed to attack the Germans but concentrated on killing Jews. (*The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War*, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

Polish communist partisans represented a strong tendency amongst the Warsaw Ghetto rebels. Snyder wrote:

After September 1942, the Warsaw ghetto was essentially a Jewish labor camp inhabited predominantly by young men. Fathers who might earlier have feared to endanger their families no longer had that reason for restraint. Left-wing politics came to the fore. The Jewish Left in prewar Poland had been divided over a number of fundamental issues: whether to leave for Palestine or stay in Poland, whether to trust or distrust the Soviet Union, whether to agitate in Yiddish or Polish or Hebrew, and so on. The most radical form of left-wing politics, communism, reappeared among Warsaw Jews at this time. (*Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, Timothy Snyder, p. 283) (IMG)

Referring to the members of the Polish communist-led movement, Snyder added:

Some of its Polish-Jewish activists ... smuggled themselves into the Warsaw ghetto, where they urged armed resistance. (*Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, Timothy Snyder, p. 283) (IMG)

Even the Polish Home Army acknowledged that:

the Soviets, and thus the Polish communists, were urging the local population to take up arms immediately against the Germans. The Soviets wanted to provoke partisan warfare in Poland in order to weaken the Germans.. (*Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, Timothy Snyder, p. 284) (IMG)

By contrast, the Menshevik 'Jewish Labour Bund' refused to engage in combat against the Third Reich. As Snyder pointed out:

The largest Jewish socialist party, the Bund, was much less inclined to use violence. (*Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, Timothy Snyder, p. 283) (IMG)

The USSR provided plenty of support for Poland's anti-fascist partisans throughout the War. In this regard, the Foreign Technology Division, now called the 'National Air and Space Intelligence Center', of the United States published a 1983 report, examining the military equipment of the Polish resistance forces during the Great Patriotic War. The military intelligence document details the extent of Soviet military aid, the various tanks such as T-34 and T-70, to the Polish resistance groups including the Communist-led 'Polish People's Army' (LWP), whose origins:

can be traced principally to the First and Second Polish Armies organized by Moscow on Soviet territory in 1943. (*THE POLISH ARMED FORCES: WARSAW PACT RELIABILITY IN QUESTION*, Naval Postgraduate School, Michael Edward Duffy, December 1983, p. 19) (IMG)

as well as the Soviet-organized anti-fascist 'Tadeusza Kosciuszki First Infantry Division' (1 DP).

Below is an excerpt of the mentioned US military document exploring the extensive aid provided by the Soviets to the Polish resistance:

The division and units of the Polish People's Army formed during World War II were equipped with Soviet battle equipment. The Soviet Union produced then tanks and light, medium and heavy self-propelled armored guns. On the whole, 23 varieties of tanks and armored guns were produced during this period. The range of types in the field of battle vehicles was caused by the need for their rapid improvement and adaptation to the actual

demands of war. The principle of building battle vehicles on the base of those vehicles already recognized as successful was taken into the developmental design.

During 1943 3 types of battle vehicles existed: the T-70 light tank, the T-34 medium tank and the KW heavy tank. These made up the basis for the building of even better armored equipment. Light self-propelled guns were built on the chassis of the T-70, medium type tanks and self-propelled armored guns on the chassis of the T-34 and heavy tanks and self-propelled led guns on the KW tank's base.

The main directions in the development of battle vehicles were: increasing the power and firing unit and the armor's resistance to enemy armor piercing weapons while maintaining a sufficient mobility. In evaluating the quality of the design, production and battle worth of the armored equipment of those days, it is necessary to ascertain if that was high class equipment.

During World War II, the Soviet Union had at its disposal 26 types of heavy vehicles and tractors, which were not produced in sufficient quantity to entirely satisfy the need. Despite these difficulties, the Soviet Union obligated itself to equip the divisions and tactical and operational units of the Polish Armed Forces.

On May 15, 1943, the Tadeusza Kosciuszki First Infantry Division (1 DP) was formed at Sielci nad Oka. It consisted of 3 infantry regiments, one tank, light artillery and fighter plane regiment each, two mortar units and a student and women's battalion, as well as specialized subunits.

The First Heroes of the Westerplatte Tank Regiment, formed within the framework of the 1 DP's organizational structure, was the embryo of the Armored and Mechanized Forces of the Polish People's Army. The 1st tank regiment was composed of the following battle subunits: 3 T-34-76 medium tank companies, one T-70 light tank company, a rifle Company and an anti-armor gun company. This regiment's weaponry consisted of 32 medium tanks, 10 light ones and 3 BA-64 armored cars.

On August 19, 1943, the formation of the First Corps of the Polish Armed Forces (KPSZ) was begun.

The Armored Brigade entered into the framework of the corps, formed on the basis of the first Tank Regiment. The 1st Brigade's striking forces consisted of 3 T-34 medium tank battalions. From its organizational make up, the 1st KPSZ was composed of a possessing a types of a powerful, tactical force, possessing all types of units. The Polish Armed Forces was able to further expand on the basis of individual types of units. The decision taken on April 1, 1944 led to the " transformation of the 1st KPSZ into the 1st Polish Army.

The organization of the First Armored Corps was foreseen in the plans for the formation of the 1st Army.

The Armored and Motorized Forces Division was appointed to the General Staff in order to facilitate the formation of armored and motorized units. The armored and motorized forces, growing in number and quality, began to play a more important role as a fighting unit. Evaluating the import of these forces,

Order #053 of May 17, 1944 created the Armored and Motorized Forces Command. In this way a new type of force was created in the Polish Armed Forces.

The liberation of the eastern part of Poland in the second half of July created the conditions for the expansion of the Polish Armed Forces. On July 22, 1944, the Polish National Liberation Committee announced its Manifesto, in which it emphasized that the principal task of the Polish people is to effectively increase its contribution to the country's total liberation, as well as defeating Hitlerite Germany. The High Command of the Polish Army in order #8 from August 28, gave instructions for the formation of the 2nd Polish Army.

With regard to the personnel difficulties, the 2nd corps was limited to 4 infantry divisions, one armored brigade, one heavy tank regiment, one armored artillery regiment, one heavy artillery brigade, an antiaircraft artillery division, a mortar regiment, an engineering brigade and security units. As a result, the 1st Polish Army, in comparison with Soviet armies, by its organizational structure, resembled an infantry corps, powerful in its infantry formations, but at the same time dependent upon the support of armored and artillery forces of a higher grade.

The armored forces of the 2nd Army were composed of: 16 armored brigades, 4 heavy tank regiments and 28 armored artillery regiments. The armored forces possessed a total of 65 medium tanks, 21 heavy tanks, 21 medium armored guns and 5 armored cars.

At the same time, the difficult process of creating the 1st Armored Corps continued. At the end of December 1944, the personnel state of the corp reached a permanent status. In January and February 1945, the armored corps received a full complement of armored equipment and a significant part of the anticipated permanent automobiles from the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the formation of the corps was completed with success. The 1st Armored Corps possessed newly produced armored equipment and was made up of powerful tactical units of armored and motorized forces. It possessed 273 tanks and armored guns, 78 armored cars and transports as well as powerful artillery, including 8 M-13 rocket launchers. Moreover, 804 various motor vehicles were found in the corps.

In the first half of March, the 1st Armored Corps was subordinated to the 2nd Army.

The battle divisions of the 2nd Army, at this time, had a total of 341 tanks and armored guns, 86 armored

cars and transports, 2157 motor vehicles of various kinds as well as around 190 motorcycles. The Corps' command possessed 3 U-2 airplanes. The 2nd Army became a powerful tactical force.

At this same time the 1st Polish Army increased the number of vehicles in its battle units to 2288.

A comparison of the equipment of the 1st and 2nd Armies when they obtained complete battle readiness, shows a quantitative and qualitative change in the development of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Army. Stress was placed above all on the development of armored and motorized forces. This development led in two basic directions: the increase of fire power by the introduction of a new type of fighting equipment with larger caliber weapons; the increase in mobility by equipping battle units with motor vehicles. (THE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S ARMY, 30 YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT, DTIC, Foreign Technology Division, H. Latos, December 20, 1983, pp. 63-67) (IMG)

The anti-Soviet media often claims that the AK was larger than the LWP/AL, as supposed proof that the AK was more popular. However, according to a paper by Canada's Department of National Defense, by:

May 1945 the total strength of the LWP was 400,000 men. (WARSAW PACT: THE QUESTION OF COHESION PHASE II – VOLUME 2 POLAND, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND ROMANIA, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Canada Department of National Defense, Teresa Rakowska, Harmstone Christopher, D. Jones Ivan Sylvain, November 1984, p. 43) (IMG)

'Rivalling' the Polish People's Army (LWP) was the British proxy organization known as the 'Home Army' (AK). According to that same paper by the Department of National Defense, in 1944, the Home Army:

was the largest of all European Resistance formations; (WARSAW PACT: THE QUESTION OF COHESION PHASE II – VOLUME 2 POLAND, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND ROMANIA, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Canada Department of National Defense, Teresa Rakowska, Harmstone Christopher, D. Jones Ivan Sylvain, November 1984, p. 16) (IMG)

In reality, as confirmed by the top Polish Home Army General Stanislaw Tatar (nicknamed 'Tabor'), by 1944, the Polish Home Army had only 250,000 units, of which only 32,000 were armed for active combat. John Erickson, the high-ranking anti-Soviet British military official wrote:

General Tabor struggled to win more support for the Armija Krajowa; at a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 12 June the general presented a full report on the strength of the AK – approximately 250,000 men (6,500 platoons) of which only twelve percent, or 32,000 men, were armed.. (The Road to Berlin, John Erickson) (IMG)

The AK is said to have numbered 250,000 in 1944. The LWP numbered 400,000 in 1945. Although there is a year of difference, the manpower statistics are nevertheless drastically different. This has major implications. In Poland, the communist-led people's resistance movement was by far one of the largest in Europe, if not the single largest. This strength of the pro-communist tendency in Poland can be explained by the demonstrable seriousness of the Soviet-backed Polish communist-led partisans in fighting fascism; in the face of German settler-colonial plans for genocide against the Polish people, the commitment of the Red Army and the Polish People's Army won the masses over to their side against the settler-colonial fascist occupation. The people of Poland were supportive of the communist-led popular front troops. In the words of Snyder:

The People's Army did have some popular support.. Polish politics had shifted to the left during the war, as was the case throughout occupied Europe. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 310) (IMG)

Although the majority of the Polish people were non-communists, they bore sympathies with the communist-led initiatives, nonetheless.

The third phase of the activities of the Home Army began precisely during the Battle of Stalingrad, in late 1942 or early 1943. From then on, the Home Army (AK), an MI6 front, unleashed waves of terror almost unmatched, assisting the Nazi German occupation forces and the UPA criminals who carried out a genocide against the Polish people in Wolyn. Gestapo spies who had infiltrated the ranks of the communist movement assisted the MI6-sponsored Nazi-collaborationists of the AK, by murdering those AK-affiliated individuals who, as a rogue current, aimed to combat the Nazis rather than to collaborate with them.

C13S4.2. The Gestapo Spy Spsychalski, with Gomulka's Support, Denounces the Communists and Non-Communist Anti-Fascists to the Nazi Secret Service

*** IMG-All- {Poland}

Anti-fascist work, as stated many a time before, requires that communists ally with non-communist anti-fascist forces. To expose the yet-unexposed Nazi-collaborationists, communists must launch invitation offensives (see C1S2) against the Nazi collaborationists – that is, by inviting the Nazi collaborationists to join the fight against the Nazis, and upon the refusal of the Nazi collaborationists, the latter is exposed in the eyes of the public. This would have been the

correct course of action for the communist-led anti-fascist resistance to undertake in Poland. However, the Spychalski-Gomulka clique ensured that this does not occur.

The Nazis were aiming to strengthen the pro-Nazi tendency in the AK, while undermining the communist-led anti-fascist resistance. They used the Gestapo spy Spychalski for this purpose. To begin with, Spychalski's suspicious ties to the Gestapo have been documented by the CIA already. Mieczyslaw Walczak and Piotr Mankiewicz were:

Two wartime members of the party.. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 42) (IMG)

whom:

Spychalski supported ... in their advance within the ranks of the PPR. According to [Polish defector to CIA,] Swiatlo, both had indeed been in contact with the Gestapo during the war, but on the express orders of PPR central committee member Jerzy Albrecht, a fact which was known at that time by other PPR leaders. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 42. Note: Jerzy Albrecht is not to be confused with Colonel Albrecht of the AK.) (IMG)

Via Hryniewicz, Spychalski held top level meetings with Nazi German intelligence officials and Nazi-collaborationist Russians. This has been well-documented by the Soviet and Polish intelligence officers' interrogations of Spychalski after he was arrested in the post-War years for his Gestapo espionage. However, this has also been confessed by Robert Spalek, a prominent historian and employee of the Branch Office of Public Education of the current anti-communist Polish state's Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw. Spalek wrote:

At the end of September 1943, Hryniewicz told Spychalski that he was making contact with the German police "in order to decipher the section of anti-communist work there". Spychalski decided that the plan was "very bold" but worth implementing. (...).

In the fall of 1943, Hryniewicz met with Abwehr's associate Włodzimierz Bondorowski and Gestapo officer Wolfgang Birkner. These characters are by all means interesting. Tsarist second lieutenant Bondorowski was one of the "white" Russians working for the Abwehr. Lieutenant Birkner, on the other hand, was a specialist in preparing police provocations and an expert on the Polish underground. The fragmentary records in the historical literature allow him to be identified as an officer of the IV-N Gestapo Division in Warsaw, who had been staying here since October 1939. This department had at its disposal intelligence networks that dealt with matters of particular importance.

There are many indications that on July 3, 1941, Birkner, as the head of Department IV-N, left for Biafystok to support the Einsatzgruppe B, 28-person unit of the Biafystok Commando, operating there.

"For over a month, Birkner" cleared "the area of Biafystok and Bielsk Podlaski, mainly murdering Jews, writes historian Edmund Dmitrow ("Wokół Jedwabnego", Warsaw 2002).

During the meeting, Hryniewicz, Bondorowski and Birkner agreed that the Gestapo would support the still existing Sword and Plow by providing members of this organization with weapons, passes and money. In return, the Nazis demanded help in combating leftist organizations. Hryniewicz together with Władysław Byszczek, a member of the new management of Miecz and Plug, received money from the Germans three times – a total of about PLN 2 million. He met with Birkner and Bondorowski "mostly late in the evening for dinners, which were expensive." They were founded by Birkner – convinced that Hryniewicz is a loyal collaborator of the Gestapo.

Also with lieutenant (later captain) Bondorowski, chief of intelligence in the staff of the ROA (Russian Liberation Army, a collaborative formation fighting alongside the Third Reich), Hryniewicz contacted regularly from the spring of 1943 to August 1944. According to information, the MBP carried out many robberies together. ... Hryniewicz did not hide this acquaintance from Spychalski, telling him that "tsarist Bondorowski, who is organizing the ROA on behalf of the Wehrmacht, has contacts with the Gestapo."

Spychalski took note of Hryniewicz's contacts with the Germans. Moreover, in order to make his agent credible in this environment, he provided him with information and materials that were of little importance from the point of view of the PPR or were already "burned". Spychalski gave him – for Birkner's use – the numbers of the communist press, the already known Gestapo (according to his information) the text of the agreement between the GL and the PAL (Polish People's Army, established in April 1943), representing the fragmented socialist and democratic circles that did not comply The Government Delegation), information on the course of the first meeting of the National Council of the National Council, a list of "reactionaries and doubles" who were presented in the information as communists, as well as the address of the Home Army printing house. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. – 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

Further evidence of Spychalski's activities for the Gestapo is provided in the following:

Kupeccki offered Hryniewicz a job at his place – initially "as technical assistance, and after a trial period, when [this candidature] was approved by the delegation, as an official of the delegation, Kupeccki's associate".

Hryniewicz communicated with Spsychalski and obtained his consent along with an order to "collect data on the anti-communist action (...) select the names of communists from Kupecki's materials and pass them on to Spsychalski."

Kupecki thought of Hryniewicz as a man who, after being under the Soviet occupation after 1939, learned the hard way what communism is. He also believed that thanks to him it would be possible to subordinate the Sword and Plow to the Home Army. Initially, he was assigned purely office tasks consisting mainly in rewriting various data into the files. After some time, he began to entrust him with more responsible tasks.

Hryniewicz had so much work that at the beginning of 1944 he ceased to cope with the gathering of information – "there was no way he could write down at least some of the names worked out by the Communist Delegation". Then he presented Spsychalski with a plan to kill Kupecki and take over the archive – with the hands of the Gestapo. The matter was so urgent that Hryniewicz found in the file a photo of Spsychalski along with a copy of his data from a false ID card. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. – 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

To keep their hands 'clean', and to foster infighting and splits among the anti-Nazi forces, the Gestapo sought to utilize Spsychalski's Titoist gang for launching the assault on the AK archives:

For a long time, Birkner had no interest in the contents of the Delegation's archives. In order to change this, Hryniewicz used a trick and accused Kupecki of complicity in "liquidating" the Germans. Nevertheless, the Gestapo officer did not want to involve his people in this action. According to Hryniewicz, he did not intend to come into conflict with "Mr. Eugeniusz" – Kupecki's superior. "Mr. Eugeniusz" is Eugeniusz Gitterman, deputy head of central intelligence at the Delegation's Security Department. According to many historians, he was an agent of the Gestapo. On May 13, 1943, Gitterman provided the head of the Sonderkommando IV AS in Warsaw with a list of 89 communists. In May 1945, he was shot – according to some reports, on the order of Stefan Korbonski's government delegate. Birkner suggested to Hryniewicz that he should take over the archive of Kupecki by the forces of the people from Sword and Plow. This, however, could not entrust the MiP-men a matter so important to the communists. The problem was partially solved by Bondorowski, who was present at the discussion.

He offered Hryniewicz "two, maybe three people". ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. – 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG) Obviously, such an operation by Spsychalski was a Trotskyite sectarian policy line which aided the Nazis, destroyed the AK's healthy elements with whom there was room for communist cooperation, while further strengthening the reactionary pro-Nazi elements in the AK. According to declassified documents uncovered by the nationwide 'centrist' (by year-2007 Polish state standards) Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, Spsychalski's group:

wrote in September 1943 a letter to the Gestapo .. (Komonistyczny donos do gestapo, Rzeczpospolita, Archiwum, May 5, 2007) (IMG)

This:

letter contained a list of about 50 people described as "acting directly or eminently sympathetic and agitating for communism." The ... denunciation [campaign], of which the letter was a part, was directed by Marian Spsychalski, the future marshal of the PRL, and his then companion (both in private and organizational life) Stanislaw Sowinska. In the autumn of 1943, they headed the intelligence service of the militia – the People's Guard. (Komonistyczny donos do gestapo, Rzeczpospolita, Archiwum, May 5, 2007) (IMG)

Thus, Spsychalski committed treason against the Polish people's liberation movement by naming and identifying communists for the Gestapo. Sowinska was well aware of the fact that the names of the AK forces were to be drawn and handed over to the Gestapo:

Only in the fall of 1943, in the presence of another employee of the PPR intelligence service, Romy Romanowicz Spsychalski, told [Sowinska]: "We will have to start the work of extracting the real names and addresses of Home Army activists and adding fictitious functions in the PPR and GL to these names and addresses, sending these letters to the Gestapo, supposedly as communists, in the form of anonymous, with the indication that these letters were sent by the enemies of communism." The list was to contain from a dozen to thirty some names. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. – 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

As a cover for espionage work for the Nazis, Spsychalski was adding the 'fictitious functions in the PPR and GL' so that upon capture by the PPR counter-intelligence, he would have the excuse to claim that he was 'fooling' the Nazis. In reality, the main part of his espionage work to which to pay attention was that he provided the real names and addresses of the AK activists.

Sowinska extensively collaborated in the plot to assist the Gestapo. As such:

Sowinska and Romanowicz independently chose the names for the list. (...). Spsychalski set an exact date for

them and ordered that the envelope with the list be thrown "into the box by the door of the private apartment of one of the Gestapo directors". He gave the name and address of the Gestapo man. He obtained them earlier from Hryniewicz, who was well-known in these circles. After a few days, he approved the content of the anonymous, and Romanowicz threw it into the Gestapo's mailbox. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. – 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

Contrary to the pretensions by Spsychalski's gang though, the list provided to the Gestapo was a list of real names. Indeed: The Gestapo received a list with the real names of members of the independence underground. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. – 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

Hence to summarize the role of Hryniewicz:

On February 17, 1944, one of the archives of the Home Army was attacked. The action was attended by: a Gestapo officer, two soldiers of a collaborative Russian formation and two partisans of the People's Guard. The action was led by Boguslaw Hryniewicz – a Soviet spy cooperating with the Polish Workers' Party.. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. – 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

Through this operation, Spsychalski and his gang successfully assisted the pro-Nazi tendency in the AK to eliminate the anti-Nazi resistance fighters, the healthy elements, in the AK. This was in addition to Spsychalski's espionage against the communists in the PPR. No, the targets of the Spsychalski network were not just the AK but certainly also, likely even more so, the communists and pro-communists of the PPR. All of this was done under the guise of combatting anti-communist reactionaries in the AK. Evidence to Spsychalski's own close collaboration with the Gestapo tendency in the AK is in the fact of Spsychalski close association to Marshal Rola-Zymierski, a prominent commander in the Polish army before World War II, and a Gestapo agent. A reliable source on Zymierski's agency for the Gestapo is Frank Gibney who:

studied at the Navy's Japanese Language School at the University of Colorado. He served in the Pacific as an intelligence officer, and was stationed in Japan during the postwar occupation by the United States. (Frank Gibney, 81, Writer and Authority on Asia, Dies. The New York Times, Margalit Fox, April 14, 2006) (IMG)

According to the US intelligence officer:

In the immediate pre-war days, [Spsychalski] was the effective force behind Marshal Rola-Zymierski, the cashiered pre-war General.. (The Frozen Revolution, Frank Gibney, 1959 p. 76) (IMG)

whose:

pre-war service as Vice-Minister of National Defense was climaxed by a six year jail sentence for corruption in office. (The Frozen Revolution, Frank Gibney, 1959 p. 76) (IMG)

And:

During World War II, [Zymierski] offered his services to the Home Army.. He ultimately became a double agent, working for the Gestapo and Soviet intelligence, and performing good service for both. (The Frozen Revolution, Frank Gibney, 1959 p. 76) (IMG)

As can be seen, Zymierski was a Home Army and Gestapo infiltrator into the Soviet secret service.

Another evidence of Spsychalski's fostering of close ties to the very AK whose healthy elements he assaulted, is in the following case. Referring to:

W. Lechowicz ... and A. Jaroszewicz.. (Stalinism in Poland, 1944-56: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995, written by: Krystyna Kersten, edited by Richard J. Hill, p. 90) (IMG)

Krystyna Kersten, a vehemently anti-Soviet Polish historian, wrote:

Both [W. Lechowicz ... and A. Jaroszewicz] ... during the war had worked, on the recommendation of Marian Spsychalski, in intelligence and counter-intelligence for the Polish underground state [i.e. the Home Army]. (Stalinism in Poland, 1944-56: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995, written by: Krystyna Kersten, edited by Richard J. Hill, p. 90. Krystyna Kersten is a 'Polish historian and publicist. She worked in Institute of History of Polish Academy of Science. Her field was modern history of Poland, especially years 1944-1956'. (Goodreads, Krystyna Kersten)) (IMG)

Such close ties between the Gestapo spy Spsychalski and the Home Army serves to expose the vast network of imperialist-fascist secret services in Poland. What is more important perhaps, is that Gomulka was well aware of the fact that Spsychalski was a Gestapo agent, but he covered up Spsychalski's crimes, emerged as Spsychalski's closest ally and friend, and actively promoted him throughout the power struggles. In the words of Spaiek:

In February 1944, when Spsychalski continued his plan to denounce political opponents to the Gestapo, the Germans closed down the communist printing house at pl. Grzybowski in Warsaw and arrested two PPR men

working there. Spychalski learned about it from Hryniewicz. It was shocking for him, as he had previously provided Hryniewicz with the address of this printing house as the Home Army printing house in order to be smashed by the Germans. (...). Spychalski understood that he had unwittingly poured out his companions. Now he was threatened with provocation and betrayal, and even with a bullet to the head. (...). In this situation, Spychalski put everything on one card. Besides, he had no other choice. At the end of February or the beginning of March 1944, he goes to Gomuika's apartment to tell him about his over half a year of cooperation with Hryniewicz, and through him – about his contacts with Germany. About the attack on the Delegation's archive in Kupecki's apartment, about the fratricidal denunciation of political opponents, and finally – about the consequences of this action, i.e. the unexpected mishap of the guards' printing house.

Gomulka remembered that Spychalski came without an announcement. He considered the loss of the printing press his fatal mistake. He intended "by renouncing this action to seek some forgiveness" of the new party leader. All the more so as Jozwiak started accusing him of a deliberate provocation. (...). Taking this self-criticism at face value, it must be remembered, however, that Spychalski says this in the second year of his stay in the prisons of the Ministry of Public Security. Characteristically, he does not blame Jozwiak, although the Chief of Staff of the GL could have been an "equal" co-creator of the idea of denouncing Home Army activists to the Germans. However, in 1951, Spychalski was imprisoned, and Jozwiak was a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and chairman of the Central Party Control Commission, one of the militant accusers of Spychalski and Gomulka. In this situation, casting any suspicions on him would be a suicidal step for Spychalski.

In 1944, after talking to Spychalski, Gomulka considered him a naive who could be led by the nose. According to his letter to Bierut, Gomulka "could not imagine that the Gestapo would agree to Hryniewicz taking documents [from Kupecki's archives], especially those relating to the communists, without first acquainting himself with it, to discredit and discredit the PPR". Gomulka banned Spychalski from further actions of this type and **"said that he would bring the matter to the Central Committee"**.

However, this did not happen. In the face of the problems with installing the communist government in Poland, the problems associated with the occupation soon became irrelevant. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. – 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007. Bold added) (IMG)

Anyways, Spychalski helped the Gestapo in eliminating the PPR freedom-fighters as well as the rogue agents, the affiliates of the anti-Nazi tendency, within the AK. Spychalski, at the same time, fostered close ties to the pro-Nazi tendency in the AK. The pro-Nazi tendency grew very dominant over the organization as a whole. The Nazi Germans enforced such an alliance with the Home Army (AK) through using their agents in the communist-led Polish anti-fascist resistance movement. The key Nazi agents in the Polish communist-led resistance movement were Marian Spychalski, Wladyslaw Gomulka, and their close associates in the movement. Through having the fake 'communists' as the culprits of the murders of anti-Nazi elements in the AK, the Nazis on the one hand assisted the MI6 and the pro-Nazi AK terrorists in presenting the real communists as traitors, and on the other hand, systematically assisted the AK terrorists in dominating their death squads. Needly to say is that Spalek, a staunch anti-communist, had every motivation to present Nazi-collaborationism as though it was emanating 'primarily' from the PPR, when in fact the main force of Polish Nazi-collaborationism was the AK. Forget not that in the AK, anti-Nazism was a rogue current, whereas in the PPR, Nazi-collaborationism was the rogue current.

C13S4.3. The AK Receives Arms from the Nazi Germans, Italian Fascists, and Hungarian fascists / AK Anti-Semitic Terrorism

*** IMG-All- {Poland}

From 1943, when the MI6 turned in favor of the Nazi Germans, the Home Army became for the most part a fascist death squad pretending to be opposed to the Nazi Germans. Instead of fighting the Germans, the Home Army criminal bandits engaged in anti-communist guerrilla operations throughout Poland – and in so doing, they of course received the support of the Nazi Germans. Stefan Korbonski, a founder and head of the Polish Underground State, recognized that the weapons of the Home Army came from the German forces:

Weapons that the Home Army had at its disposal came from four different sources: arms buried by the Polish armies on the battlefields of the September campaign; arms **purchased** or captured **from the Germans**; arms manufactured by the Home Army; and arms received from the air drops. (The Polish Underground State: A Guide to the Underground, 1939-1945. Stefan Korbonski, p. 34. Bold added) (IMG)

This, by the way, was the case well into mid-1947, with the majority of the weapons of the Polish Underground guerrillas being of German origin. According to the CIA:

The Partisans are universally well armed, mostly with automatica and semi-automatic weapons. Most of these

arms are of German origin, but many of Soviet manufacture have been captured from the Soviet and Polish military forces. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Korbonski added that the Hungarian and Italian armies also provided arms to the Polish Home Army:

Transactions with Italian and Hungarian branches stationed in Poland, which they were happy to sell, were easier to deal with in the Polish underground. (The Polish Underground State: A Guide to the Underground, 1939-1945. Stefan Korbonski, p. 35) (IMG)

These weapons were specifically handed to the Polish Home Army to help them combat the Soviets. For instance, according to the British military researcher Kochanski, certain branches of the AK showed a:

favourable response to the suggestion by the Germans in the Nowogrodek and Wilno provinces that the AK should accept arms and supplies from the Germans in return for engaging in anti-partisan warfare. On 9 December 1943, days after the bulk of his unit had been disarmed by the Soviet partisans as described above, Captain Adolf 'Gora' Pilch signed an agreement with the Germans and began to receive supplies from them, as did Lieutenant Jozef 'Lech' Swida in Lida and Aleksander 'Wilk' Krzyzianowski in the Wilno area. All these agreements were condemned by AK command and by General Sosnkowski in London. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

The 'condemnation' of the Polish Home Army branches' collaboration with the Nazi Germans by General Sosnkowski was hypocritical, since that man had been a Nazi-collaborationist long before World War II. Rolf-Deter Muller – the scientific director of the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office, the official research wing of the military of the Federal Republic of Germany – noted the 1930s interaction between Polish General Sosnkowski and the notorious Nazi German General Goring for an alliance, supposedly 'defensive' in nature, against the USSR:

On his hunting trip, Goring initially spoke to General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, the army inspector responsible for the eastern border area Polesia. It seems evident that they discussed options for defence against the Soviet Union. Sosnkowski, who was standing, as it were, directly opposite the Red Army, had explained a few days beforehand to the French ambassador and his military attache that any kind of cooperation between France and the USSR was undesirable from a Polish perspective. It would be insane to imagine that, in the event of a Franco-German war, thousands of Soviet bombers would attack Berlin to help the French citizenry. In the case of a Polish-Soviet war, which Sosnkowski expected within two or three years, German military assistance would be extremely desirable – and how would France be able to help Poland in that case? The Polish general was thinking above all of a defensive battle, because a joint assault on the USSR would entail enormous dangers and, even if it were to succeed, it might well be that the Ukrainians would 'prefer to work for the king of Prussia. (Enemy in the East: Hitler's Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union, Rolf-Deter Muller, 2014, pp. 51-52) (IMG)

Another example of Nazi-AK collaboration is given by the military historian and British military's medical officer Prit Buttar:

Krzyzianowski held negotiations with German officials, including Seidler von Rosenfeld, a local SD officer, and Julian Christiansen, the head of the local branch of the Abwehr (German military intelligence) in January and February 1944 respectively. Christiansen suggested a detailed protocol, in which Germany offered to arm Krzyzianowski's men, including with light artillery, in exchange for a cessation of hostilities between the Home Army and German forces, and Polish cooperation with the occupying authorities in terms of economic production. (Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II, Prit Buttar, p. 191) (IMG)

As such:

Krzyzianowski ... came to an arrangement with Christiansen whereby the Germans would ensure that weapons and supplies were left in weakly guarded areas, where they could easily be captured by the Home Army and used against pro-Soviet partisans. (Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II, Prit Buttar, p. 191) (IMG)

The CIA reported:

The AK ... included all political groups except the Communists.. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Having included 'all political groups' implies fascists as well. The AK went on to merge with the Polish fascist 'National Armed Forces of Poland' (NSZ), which in its official party newspaper confessed their true aims, namely to combat the communists and to leave off the anti-Nazi struggle for later (read: for never):

It is time to awake and commence with the systematic liquidation of centres under the command of the Communists, and as soon as territory is cleared in this fashion to undertake the planned struggle with the German occupier. The sincere joint work of Polish military and civilian organizations will certainly make it possible for us to pull out the Bolshevik weeds and cleanse the terrain. The PPR, Peoples' Guard, and various 'red' partisans must vanish from the surface of the Polish land. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012; citing the NSZ newspaper 'The Rampart') (IMG)

In other words, the National Armed Forces would have refused to launch a campaign against the Nazis so long as Poland had communists – and Jews. Beside the Nazis, the:

principal perpetrators of anti-Jewish violence in the name of anti-communist activity were units owing allegiance to the right-wing NSZ.. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

They also actively collaborated with the Nazis, handing over the Yiddish sons and daughters of Poland to the German military occupation:

The NSZ was quick to take up the sword. On 22 July 1943, they destroyed a GL-AL unit Warynski at Stefanow near Kielce in retaliation for a GL-AL attack on the NSZ earlier that year. The most notorious clash between the two groups came on 9 August 1943, when a NSZ detachment ambushed and murdered 26 GL-AL partisans and 4 civilians near the village of Borow in Lublin province. The NSZ was openly anti-semitic and would kill Jews in the forests or betray them to the Germans. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

The NSZ was made up of Polish pre-war fascist commanders, the disciples of Pilsudski's gang. As a 1947 CIA document stated:

The leaders of Partisan bands – particularly NSZ groups – are frequently professional officers of the old Polish Army, with long experience in guerrilla fighting. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

The American intelligence officer Curt Riess predicted:

Certain countries, or forces in those countries, will undoubtedly become the logical allies of the Nazi underground – the Finnish circles around Baron von Mannerheim, for instance, or the Polish colonels' clique, which once so ardently fought for everything the Nazis fought for and which, except for the fact that it was thrown out of its own country, has not changed at all. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 192) (IMG{Nazi Underground})

The “Polish colonels' clique” was the regime that handed Poland to the Nazis in 1939 and formed the London-based Polish government-in-exile that formed the Polish Secret State, the military force of which was the Home Army. In 1944, the Nazi-collaborationist NSZ and the AK merged. In the words of Kochanski:

the right-wing NSZ ... remained outside the structure of the AK until March 1944.. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

The merger of the AK with an openly anti-Semitic anti-communist Nazi-collaborationist terror army is itself explanatory of the character of the AK. The AK had allied with the Nazis against Soviet power. Approximately five months later, top SS commander Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski initiated attempts to entrench the German alliance with the Home Army against the Red Army. Snyder remarked:

Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski did show signs of wanting to recruit the Home Army as a future ally in a final struggle against the Soviets; he ... agreed to negotiate with the Home Army command as with a defeated adversary in late September. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 308) (IMG)

More evidence of the AK's Nazi-collaborationism will be presented in the next series of sections.

C13S4.4. The Warsaw Rebellion of 1944, a Case of AK Collaboration with the Nazis in the Desertification of Poland / Soviets Wanted to, but were unable to, Assist the 1944 Warsaw Rebels

*** IMG-All-{Poland}

By August 1, 1944, the Soviet Red Army troops:

were ... only 10 kilometers away from the [Warsaw] city in the outskirts of Praga, which was held by little more than a single German division. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, pp. 153-154) (IMG)

Several communist-led uprisings in the Polish capital had occurred in the years prior. However, for the first time in 1944, the AK launched its rebellion against the Nazi occupiers in Warsaw. It has been widely alleged, however, that the Soviets ‘ignored’ the AK rebel attempts to coordinate with the Red Army. This could not be farther from the truth. According to the Historical Division of the US Air Force, for the Warsaw rebels:

it had been impossible to establish communications with them [i.e. Soviets]; (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 154) (IMG)

It was unlikely that the AK had been physically unable to establish communications with the Red Army; rather, the AK leaders refused to establish connection with the Soviet leaders because Soviet assistance to the AK in the struggle against Nazi Germany would have been utilized by the Soviets as a channel for elevating Soviet agents in the high ranks of the AK, thus rendering that organization into one under Soviet intelligence influence at the high levels.

In addition, although the Red Army was in the proximity of the Polish capital, the time for a popular revolt against the Germans was not yet ripe – and the AK high command well knew this. This has been confirmed by revelations from the Polish archives studied by the staunchly anti-Stalinist Polish fellow at Oxford University named Dr. Alexandra Richie, who:

received her DPhil at St. Antony's College, Oxford, and was later a Fellow of Wolfson College [in Oxford]. She has lectured on international politics and history across the world, from Warsaw University to the Getty Museum in Los Angeles. She lives in Warsaw with her husband and two children. (About the Author (2014), 'Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Google Books) (IMG)

Days prior to the uprising, the AK high command was informed of intelligence reports that the Germans were mobilizing their troops to Warsaw. The AK commander:

Osmecki made one of the most important revelations of the days leading up to the uprising. 'There is new unverified information that fresh Panzer units, as yet unidentified, have appeared on the right side of the Vistula in the forests between Wyszkw and Jablonna. Also, parts of the Hermann Goring Division, one of the best units of the German army, have arrived in Zyrardow. According to our intelligence the Hermann Goring Division was withdrawn from the Italian Front and moved by train to Warsaw. The first units have been moved in secret into the forests by Wyszkw and Jablonna.' ('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, p. 169) (IMG)

However, certain individuals within the AK high command ignored these highly critical intelligence reports. For instance:

General Okulicki ... confidently declared that the new forces were of no importance, because the tanks 'are simply there to protect the retreat of the 2nd Army'. Osmecki countered with a new piece of information. Intelligence had informed him that the 'German headquarters in Warsaw had demanded from the railway office the immediate dispatch of 2,000 empty wagons to remove factories from the city'. However, rather than simply send the empty trains from Berlin to Warsaw, as might have been expected, the headquarters announced that 'a few thousand wagons of ammunition and equipment will be sent in the nearest future to Warsaw' in those same trains. The wagons were to be unloaded, and only then sent back to Germany with the dismantled factories. 'A few thousand wagons of supplies and ammunition,' Osmecki said, 'suggests that the Germans are going to defend themselves.' Again Rzepecki and Okulicki downplayed the idea, and referred to the attempt on Hitler's life the previous day, concluding: 'The German army could fall apart at any time.' ('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, pp. 169-170) (IMG)

AK General Okulicki – who, as will be evidenced later, was a staunch supporter of Nazi Germany – actively pushed for an uprising 'against' the Germans. This, though appearing paradoxical, is not surprising. A foundational strategy of warfare is: attack the foes where they are weak, avoid assaulting them where they are strong, and continuously strike them from where they are weak so that they will be deprived of their capability to uphold even their strengths. To sabotage a military force, advocate an assault on the enemy forces' strong points and prevent strikes against their weak points. As a pro-Nazi commander within the Polish Home Army, Okulicki encouraged the AK to attack the Nazi Germans where the latter were strong, thus systematically wasting the Polish people's resistance potential, inflicting heavy casualties on a Polish people which, at the opportune time and with Soviet assistance, could well rise up against the Nazis and inflict great damage upon the Axis forces. The deliberately inopportune timing of the uprising was the act of strategic sabotage committed by the Home Army command in favour of the Nazis. As the people of Warsaw were inevitably going to rebel against the Nazi German occupiers at some point, much 'better' it was, from an AK Nazi-collaborationist perspective, to have the rebellion occur at a time when the Nazi forces have not disintegrated and when they have the military capability to crush the Polish rebels. The premature and poorly-timed rebellion helped the Nazis repel the Polish people's resistance where the Nazis were stronger and the resistance was weaker, It gave the Nazi agents of German finance capital the excuse by which to obliterate much of Warsaw, a city which would soon become an ally of Soviet power, so to reduce the strength of a future Soviet ally. The Home Army, vehemently anti-communist, supported this Nazi project and thereby assisted the occupiers in levelling off the city. The pro-Nazi saboteurs, appealing to Polish bourgeois-nationalist emotions, excused such tactical and strategic sabotage against the resistance by stating that the AK's takeover of Warsaw would help them be the 'hosts' of the Soviets, thus giving Poland greater leverage in negotiations with the Soviets:

The guiding thought was to ... greet the Soviets as "hosts." Szostak later reported that he had presented several operative misgivings about this sudden change of course—the Warsaw AK was too weak, and first there had to be guaranteed a substantial air support by the Allies – but Pelczyfiski and Okulicki apparently ignored these objections. (The Warsaw Uprising of 1944, Włodzimierz Borodziej, p. 63)

(IMG)

Of course, this 'greet the Soviets as hosts' thesis was a mere Polish bourgeois-nationalist cover and excuse for helping the Nazis destroy a city that would soon come under the influence of the communist-led anti-fascist forces. We know for

a fact that Okulicki and Bor-Komorowski, the supreme commanders of the AK rebels in Warsaw, were allied to the Nazis. This will be revealed in more detail later.

The intelligence report 'that fresh Panzer units, as yet unidentified, have appeared on the right side of the Vistula in the forests between Wyszki and Jablonna' were thus deliberately ignored by Okulicki, but turned out to be correct. One day prior to the start of the rebellion, the Germans launched a major counter-offensive against the Red Army on the outskirts of Warsaw. As Richie wrote:

The third decisive event was Field Marshal Walter Model's counter-offensive, which began only hours before the start of the uprising. It was the only major offensive launched by the Germans against the Soviets in the summer of 1944, and it too would have far-reaching consequences. On 31 July the people in the countryside around the pretty town of Radzymin, thirty-five kilometres east of Warsaw, felt the earth shaking underfoot as if in an earthquake. Smoke and dust filled the air as countless tanks rumbled across the sandy fields and into position. The battle against the Soviets was about to begin.

Model and Guderian had amassed some of their best troops for the attack: the Waffen SS Viking Panzer and Totenkopf Divisions, the Luftwaffe's Hermann Goring Division, General von Saucken's 39th Panzer Korps and the 4th and 19th Panzer Divisions. It was a formidable force, and it slammed into the unsuspecting Red Army as it made its way towards Warsaw, changing the course of the war.

Like Bagration itself, these battles are now largely forgotten, but they were titanic clashes, with the loss of hundreds of tanks. The Battle of Wolomin was the largest tank battle fought on Polish soil in the entire war, and it saw the German Panzer divisions crush the Soviet 3rd Tank Corps and maul the 8th Guards Tank Corps. Fierce fighting raged for weeks throughout the area; indeed, the Soviets would succeed in finally pushing all of the German forces over the Vistula only in January 1945. One consequence was that even if Hitler had wanted to send regular troops in to retake Warsaw there were simply none available; all were needed at the front.

(‘Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising’, Alexandra Richie, p. 11-12) (IMG)

This has also been confirmed by other anti-Soviet, highly scholarly sources including Norman Davies, who, from 2000 to 2006:

was a Supernumerary Fellow at Wolfson College, [in] Oxford [University].. (Biography of Norman Davies, Norman Davies Official Website) (IMG)

Afterwards, until 2008, he was:

a Visiting Fellow [in] Cambridge at Clare Hall and Peterhouse. In Cracow, he holds the position in the UNESCO Chair of Translation Studies and a part-time lectureship in the Oriental Institute. In Warsaw, he presents periodic lectures at the European College in Natolin. In 2011, he returned to St. Antony's College, Oxford, where is an Honorary Fellow. (Biography of Norman Davies, Norman Davies Official Website) (IMG)

Davies confirmed:

Even as the AK were taking their guns from their hiding-places, and gathering in cellars and warehouses, the German Ninth Army was moving across the Vistula bridges to launch a counter-attack against the Soviets. (Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland's Present, Oxford University Press, Norman Davies, 1984, New Edition in 2011) (IMG)

Another source is Włodzimierz Borodziej who is a:

Professor for Contemporary History at the University of Warsaw. Chairman of Academic Committee of Imre Kertész Kolleg, Jena; since 2003 editor in chief of *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne*, published by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (24 volumes). Chairman of Academic Committee, House of European History, Brussels. (Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Włodzimierz Borodziej, University of Vienna)

Borodziej describes the military situation as follows:

On July 30 the battles in the east could be heard more clearly in Warsaw than on previous days. The Second Tank Army now moved north and took the whole area east of Warsaw. (...). The military problem of the Red Army in late July 1944 – like that of its predecessor twenty-four years before – was that the victories of the last weeks had taken the advancing troops far from their supply units; problems with fuel and munitions especially made it hard for the tank units of the Second Army. They operated in a constantly expanding area and pursued the goal, which only a few weeks ago had been a very abstract one, of crossing the Vistula, possibly even near Warsaw. According to this latest plan, the Second Tank Army was set to attack Praga on July 30, but on that day, its commander warned his superior Rokossovskii: "I'm running out of breath." In fact, the Second Tank Army now came upon an unexpectedly strong counterfront: east of Warsaw five German tank divisions, including the Fourth SS Tank Corps ("Viking" and "Deaths Head" Divisions) as well as the elite "Hermann Goring" Division stood at the ready. Even if the German troops were as weak as the tank corps of the Second Army, they were still strong enough to force the Soviets into an immediate battle on July 31. On August 1, at 4 A.M., the Second Soviet Tank Army went on the defensive. Of the 810 tanks it had on July 18, only a third could

still be deployed on August 4. (The Warsaw Uprising of 1944, Włodzimierz Borodziej, pp. 70-71) (IMG)
The most important source in this regard is Colonel Glantz. The following is a brief description of his credentials in the US military:

Colonel Glantz earned degrees in modern European history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute, the US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and Eastern European Studies, the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. His over 30 years of service included field artillery assignments with the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Europe and II Field Force artillery in Vietnam and intelligence assignments with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in US Army Europe. He also served on the faculty of the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY; the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the US Army War College, Carlisle, PA. During his last eight years of service, he founded and directed the US Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He has authored many articles and books and is now the editor of *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*. (The Soviet-German War 1941 -1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs, Clemson University, A Paper Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture, David M. Glantz, October 11, 2001, p. 2) (IMG)

Glantz confirmed that the Soviet attempts to reach Warsaw were stalled as a result of a German counter-offensive:

On 24 July Rokossovsky's forces captured Lublin and pushed on westward towards the Vistula River south of Warsaw. By 2 August, the 1st Belorussian Front's left wing armies seized bridgeheads over the Vistula River at Magnuszew and Pulawy and commenced an almost two-month struggle with counterattacking Wehrmacht forces to retain these vital bridgeheads as launching pads for future, even larger-scale offensives into heart of central Poland toward Berlin.

During the advance by the 1st Belorussian Front's left wing to the Vistula River, the Polish Home Army staged an insurrection in Warsaw. Only days before, the Stavka had ordered Rokossovsky to dispatch his 2nd Tank Army in a dash toward Warsaw's eastern suburbs, protected on the right by a cavalry corps (the 2nd Guards) and the 47th Army. The tank army reached the region east of Warsaw on 29 July, but before the 47th Army could reach the region, from 30 July through 5 August, two panzer corps (XXXIX and IV SS) delivered a counterstroke against the tank army and forced it to withdraw with heavy losses.

At the time, the bulk of the 1st Belorussian Front's center and right wing were struggling to overcome German defenses north of Siedlce on the approaches to the Narew River.

(The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs, Clemson University, A Paper Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture, David M. Glantz, October 11, 2001, p. 79) (IMG)

'In fact,' said Glantz, adding more details:

in late July 1944 the *Stavka* ordered its 2nd Tank Army to race northward to Warsaw with the 47th Army and a cavalry corps in its wake. After encountering two *Wehrmacht* divisions defending the southern approaches to Warsaw, the tank army tried to bypass the German defenses from the northeast but ran into a counterstroke by four *Wehrmacht* panzer divisions, which severely mauled the tank army and forced it to withdraw on 5 August. During the ensuing weeks, while the Warsaw uprising began, matured, but ultimately failed, the forces on the 1st Belorussian Front's right wing continued their advance against Army Group Center northeast of Warsaw. For whatever motive, however, the forces on the 1st Belorussian Front's right wing focused on defending the Magnuszew bridgehead south of Warsaw, which was being subjected to heavy German counterattacks throughout mid-August, and the forces on the *front's* left wing continued their advance to the Bug River north of Warsaw and attempted to seize crossings over the river necessary to facilitate future offensive operations.

Throughout the entire period up to 20 August 1944, the 1st Belorussian Front's 47th Army remained the only major Red Army forces deployed across the Vistula River opposite Warsaw. On that date the 1st Polish Army joined it. Red Army forces north of Warsaw finally advanced across the Bug River on 3 September, closed up to the Narew River the following day, and fought their way into bridgeheads across the Narew on 6 September. Lead elements of two Polish divisions finally assaulted across the Vistula River into Warsaw on 13 September but made little progress and were evacuated back across the river ten days later.

Political considerations and motivations aside, an objective consideration of combat in the Warsaw region indicates that, prior to early September, German resistance was sufficient to halt any Soviet assistance to the Poles in Warsaw, were it intended. Thereafter, it would have required a major reorientation of military efforts from Magnuszew in the south or, more realistically, from the Bug and Narew River axis in the north in order to muster sufficient force to break into Warsaw. And once broken into, Warsaw would have been a costly city to

clear of Germans and an unsuitable location from which to launch a new offensive.

(The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs, Clemson University, A Paper Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture, David M. Glantz, October 11, 2001, p. 84) (IMG)

Due to the German counter-offensive, the Red Army, while having arrived in the outskirts of Warsaw, was not able to immediately liberate the Reich-occupied Polish capital and to thereby assist the Warsaw rebels. Nevertheless, the next day, without any coordination with the Red Army:

On 1 August 1944, Polish partisans under the command of Lt. Gen. T. Bor-Komorowski seized several key areas in the Sadyba district of German-held Warsaw. The object was to keep control of the old city section until the Russian forces driving west could take Warsaw; (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 153) (IMG)

The rebellion brought joy to the Nazis. Thanks to Okulicki's efforts, Hitler and Himmler now had an opportunity to raise all of Warsaw and cause massive casualties:

'Mein Fuhrer,' Himmler said, 'the timing is unfortunate. But from a historical point of view it is a blessing that the Poles are doing this. We will get through the four or five weeks [it will take] and then

Warsaw, the capital city, the brain, the intelligence of this sixteen – to-seventeen-million-strong Polish nation will have been obliterated. This nation, which has blocked our path to the east for seven hundred years and since the first battle of Tannenberg, has always been in the way. Then the historic problem will no longer be a major one for our children, for all those who come after us, or for us either.' Hitler, ever the opportunist, agreed.

He and Himmler drafted the Order for Warsaw that evening. It stands as one of the most chilling documents of the war.

Warsaw was to be razed to the ground – 'Glattraziert' – so as to provide a terrifying example for the rest of Europe. Himmler passed the order on to General Heinz Reinefarth personally. It read: '1. Captured insurgents ought to be killed regardless of whether they are fighting in accordance with the Hague Convention or not. 2. The part of the population not fighting, women and children, should likewise be killed. 3. The whole town must be levelled to the ground, i.e. houses, streets, offices – everything that is in the town.'

In one evening Himmler and Hitler had decided that the entire population remaining in one of great capital cities was to be murdered in cold blood. Then the city — which Himmler referred to as 'that great abscess' — was to be completely destroyed. Hitler had often talked before about the utter destruction of cities — Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk — but this was the first and only time he was actually able to put his insane ideas into practice. Tragically, this order was largely fulfilled.

('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, p. 3) (IMG)

It was not just Warsaw's industrial or strategically important zones which the Nazis were after. The Hitler gang had the grand agenda of finance capital. Finance capital wills to roll back the development of the productive forces in many areas it colonizes, for with the advancement of productive forces comes the advancement of progressive classes and with the roll back of the productive forces comes the roll back of the progressive classes. Hitler and his fascist gang, as agents of finance capital aimed to desertify the areas they conquered, as desertification is the climax of the destruction of the productive forces and will thus yield the maximum rollback of the progressive classes. In the absence of progressive classes that would promote a progressive culture, the humans that would grow up in the non-urban desert areas would be totally deprived of a civilized psyche. They would be like the humans in nomadic Arab tribes of the non-urban desert areas or the Mongol barbarians of the deserts – Pagan savages fiercely resisting a civilized life, focusing their lives on spilling blood and setting fire, and capable of becoming good humans only if militarily crushed ruthlessly. The Nazis, a radical Pagan movement committed to cultivating inter-tribal hatred and mass destruction, envisioned the desertification of much of the world so to bring into being such barbaric sanguivorous tribal societies. Hitler's idea of levelling off Warsaw, with the assistance of his friends in the Home Army high command, was not 'insane'. It was strategic sanity of a kind in service to finance capital, as finance capital benefits from promoting the kinds of barbarians in the non-urban desert areas. Finance capital benefits from humans similar to Mongol barbarians or the kinds of Arabs vehemently denounced in Quran's Surat el-Towbeh verses 97 -102. Behold the great services that the non-urban nomadic desert tribes of Arabia have provided for Anglo-American finance capital. While in the past, they formed a major base of the sanguivorous Pagan barbarians, today they generate the Wahhabi current. Assisted by these desert barbarians, Anglo-American imperialism conquered the oil resources and thereupon exported Wahhabi fascist terror. The destruction and obliteration of much of the world brings the strategic gain of desertifying the world as a material base for the desert barbarism of the kind seen in Saudi Arabia. Imperialism thrives through desertification and barbarization.

One aspect of the rebellion that certainly helped the Nazis was the AK's lack of coordination with the Red Army. Any uprising without coordination with the Red Army would have been amateurish at best. This reality, however, did not stop the AK high command from taking adventurist action and leading many brave patriotic Polish fighters into death at the hands of the Germans. In a letter to Churchill, Stalin remarked:

I am convinced that the Warsaw action represents a reckless and terrible adventure which is costing the population large sacrifices. This would not have been if the Soviet command had been informed before the beginning of the Warsaw action and if the Poles had maintained contact with it. (Message from Josef Stalin to Winston Churchill on Aug. 16, 1944. Allied support for Warsaw: Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin communications. Selected documents, From: Warsaw Uprising 1944, August 1 – October 2) (IMG)

While large portions of the Viking SS, Death Head SS, and Hermann Goring SS divisions of the German army were deployed to fighting the Soviets, other wings of the same SS fighters were deployed to fighting the Warsaw rebels:

The German garrison in Warsaw was strengthened by the dispatch of the SS Viking Panzer Division, the SS Herman Goering regiment, by units of military police, and by the infamous Dirlewanger and RONA Brigades. This force, commanded by General von dem Bach-Zelewski and containing a strong admixture of penal battalions, convicts, and desperate ex-Soviet Volunteers, was given the chance of smashing the Rising in isolation. (Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland's Present, Oxford University Press, Norman Davies, 1984, New Edition in 2011) (IMG)

Against the will of the AK command which was to assist the Nazis in desertifying Warsaw, the Soviet Red Army maximized efforts to assist the Warsaw rebels, not to help the AK command but to save the Polish people from the desertification of their civilization. As the rebellion was taking place:

Pressure was soon brought to bear on the British and Americans by the Polish government [AK's political command] in London to furnish supplies to the Warsaw underground, and on 13 August negotiations were started for the Eighth Air Force Warsaw supply drop, which was first called FRANTIC VI but was finally executed on 18 September as FRANTIC VII. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155) (IMG)

According to the US Airforce, the Anglo-Americans consulted the Soviets on dropping supplies to the Warsaw rebels. In response, the Soviets:

stated that they did not object to American and British planes dropping supplies to the Poles.. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155) (IMG)

In fact:

the Soviet[s] ... requested a coordinated Anglo-American-Russian plan for the drop.. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155) (IMG)

of arms supplies to the Warsaw rebels. However:

no representatives were sent to Russia by the British or the Americans to draw up a plan; they apparently considered the invitation superfluous when Russia agreed to the Eighth Air Force drop. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 156)

The AK mercenaries of the MI6 were unwilling to cooperate with the Soviets since they knew that military cooperation with the Soviets would serve as the channel for Soviet intelligence penetration into the top ranks of the AK, and the gradual cooptation of the AK by the Soviets into a force that genuinely combats fascism rather than kill the Yiddish citizens of Poland. Furthermore, the AK command sought to destroy Warsaw, because such destruction was the a priori destruction of a capital city that would be allied to the USSR in just a few years to come.

Thus, it was the Anglo-Americans, not the Soviets, that refused to step up aid for the Warsaw rebels. Nonetheless: The Russians ... on 10 September consented to American and British use of Russian bases. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155) (IMG)

The Soviets should have been cautious so as to not permit the Anglo-American air forces utilize their presence in Soviet air bases as a channel of anti-Soviet espionage.

As well, the Soviets themselves provided military supplies to the Warsaw rebels. The US Air Force confirmed:

the Russians themselves started dropping supplies to Warsaw and indicated to Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, head of the American Military Mission in Moscow, that they would continue to do so as long as a need existed. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155) (IMG)

Finally, after approximately two months of fighting and having allowed the genocidal destruction of Warsaw, the Polish

Home Army leadership decided to capitulate to the Germans, as their leadership defected to the side of the Third Reich. The leadership of the AK rebels in Warsaw did not have positive intentions, nor were they sympathetic to the cause of the Polish people. For one, as will be shown later, Okulicki was secretly pro-Nazi. For another, as previously stated, German intelligence had infiltrated the top ranks of the Home Army. Furthermore, General Bor-Komorowski, the main commander of the AK rebels in Warsaw had a dubious background. The German General-Lieutenant:

Hans Kallner, like Fegelein, had been a professional tournament rider and had made friends with General Bor. ('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, p. 663) (IMG)

Hermann Fegelein was listed by Guderian as a member of:

Hitler's Intimate Circle.. (Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian, 1950) (IMG)

So close was Fegelein to Hitler that the relationship between the two men was also reflected in Fegelein's marriage to Eva Braun's sister.. (Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian, 1950) (IMG)

Eva Braun was the official 'girlfriend' and supposedly the future 'wife' of Hitler. In addition:

Fegelein ... was an SS-Brigade Leader, [and] Himmler's permanent representative.. (Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian, 1950) (IMG)

In the words of the prominent Nazi commander Heinz Guderian:

Bor-Komorowski was an old acquaintance of Fegelein's whom he had frequently met ... before the war. (Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian, 1950) (IMG)

Thus, General Bor-Komorowski had a history of friendship with the German General-Lieutenant Hans Kallner and had won the deep admiration of Fegelein. With Komorowski's enthusiastic blessing, the Home Army began negotiations for capitulation to the Third Reich.

Fegelein's influence on the uprising came about in part because of his skill as a horseman. Before the war he had competed in a number of events on the international circuit, and had even created the equestrian facilities for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. One of his long-time competitors, and a man he admired, was a Polish cavalry officer named Count Tadeusz Komorowski, who trained the Polish eventing team which won a silver medal at the Olympics. What Fegelein did not know that Brigadier-General Bor-Komorowski, as he was now known ('Bor' being his wartime code-name), had, a few months before the lavish wedding party, been appointed commander of the Polish Home Army based in Warsaw. Even as the SS cavalry officer was quaffing champagne and flirting with Eva Braun, General Bor was planning the uprising that would link the two men once again. ('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, p. 24) (IMG)

Even on early October of 1944, after much of fighting between the Polish rebel forces and the Nazi Germans, Fegelein described Komorowski as a:

"A fantastic guy! (...)." ('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, p. 582) (IMG)

The consequence of the Home Army's lack of thorough coordination with the Red Army was the Nazis' genocidal burning of Warsaw as a city. After much of the city was already in flames, the Home Army forces led by German-linked commanders Komorowski and Okulicki began signing the deals for a full-on defection to the German side, under the guise of 'surrender'. An agreement was signed between the two parties on early October. The following is an excerpt of the agreement provided by UNESCO official and prominent anti-Soviet scholar of history, Norman Davies:

Capitulation Agreement between the German Army and the Home Army

(Translated by Wanda Wyporska)

On 2 X 1944 an agreement was reached in Ozarow on the cessation of military operations in Warsaw.

The authorized contracting party for the German side is the Commander of the Warsaw area, SS-Obergruppenfuhrer und Gen. der Polizei, von dem Bach. The contracting parties for the Home Army are authorized on the basis of a power of attorney issued by the commander of the Home Army, General Komorowski (B6r): 1) Certified Colonel Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki (Jarecki), and 2) Certified Lieutenant Colonel Zygmunt Dobrowolski (Zyndram).

The agreement reads:

1) On 2 X 1944 at 20.00 hours German time (21.00 hours Polish time) military operations will cease between German forces and all Polish military units fighting in the city of Warsaw area. All Polish formations tactically subordinated during the fighting, to the Home Army Commander from 1 VIII 44 up to the date of signature of this agreement, are to be regarded as Polish units. Henceforth they will be called 'Home Army Units'.

2) The soldiers of the Polish units mentioned above will lay down their arms ..

(Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw, Norman Davies, Appendix 29) (IMG)

The Home Army command was already an accomplice of the Third Reich. The Nazis and the AK only aimed to further these bonds into the development of a full-scale alliance. It was at this time that German General Bach, who was in charge of the negotiations with the Home Army, was aiming:

to recruit the Home Army as a future ally in a final struggle against the Soviets; (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 308) (IMG)

What Komorowski did after the surrender to the Nazis, therefore, should not come as a surprise. Citing German intelligence, Dr. Alexander Perry Biddiscombe – a University of Victoria history professor and a noted scholar on Nazi terrorism – stated:

Gerhard Teich, the chief intelligence officer of ‘Zeppelin’ and a man in a position to know about the nature of German intrigues along the Eastern Front, later described Komorowski as having ‘deserted to the Germans after the fall of Warsaw’. (Teich int., 21/1/46, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. CSDIC/WEA Final Interrogation Reports 1945-47, RG 338, NA. Cited in: The SS Hunter Battalions: The Hidden History of the Nazi Resistance Movement 1944-45, Perry Biddiscombe, 2006) (IMG)

Komorowski, the man embraced by the Anglo-Americans as an ‘anti-fascist’ ‘resistance’ champion, defected and began full service to the Axis. After Komorowski’s treason, Okulicki became the head of the Polish Home Army.

According to a German intelligence report cited by Dr. Biddiscombe, General Okulicki, the leader of the Polish Home Army, in his New Year’s Address in 1945 declared:

Today the Polish people are threatened with absolute annihilation from the East. Therefore, we must direct our attention in this direction. I am no soothsayer, but the moment approaches in which the AK will emerge from the underground and serve as a Polish Army, side-by-side with Germany, against the Bolshevik wave, the centuries-old foe and enemy of Christendom. Since political matters are still momentarily unresolved, I ask you, AK soldiers, to avoid all unnecessary sabotage against Germany because no one knows whether today’s enemy will be our friend tomorrow. (C/Auswertung 101: Neujahrsrede Niedzwiedzki (Niedzviadek), February 13, 1945, T-78, r. 566, fr. 389, NA. Cited in: The SS Hunter Battalions: The Hidden History of the Nazi Resistance Movement 1944-45, Perry Biddiscombe, 2006) (IMG)

Thus, the Home Army led by the pro-Nazi Okulicki, officially proposed the formation of an alliance with the Third Reich. The Nazis of course welcomed this. In another German intelligence report cited by Biddiscombe, Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the German intelligence in the Eastern Front, noted:

According to impressions that seem certain, the intelligence service and the Polish resistance movement are prepared – with the official approval of the emigre government – to enter into cooperation against Bolshevism without political conditions. They are also prepared, if the need exists, to supply the necessary weapons for battle-worthy Agenten-Aufklärung. It would therefore be possible... to get a foothold in broad form with a Frontaufklärung agent net in all of Poland. Since the London Polish Government has officially disbanded the resistance movement, it will secretly reconstruct it in the Soviet-occupied sector. (Vortragsnotiz uber zur Aktivierung der Frontaufklärung, Reinhard Gehlen 2/1930, February 25, 1945, BMA. For offers of ‘anti-communist collaboration’ by the Polish legation in Lisbon, see ULTRA/ZIP/ISK 131826, 17/1/45, HW 19/222, NAUK. Cited in: The SS Hunter Battalions: The Hidden History of the Nazi Resistance Movement 1944-45, Perry Biddiscombe, 2006) (IMG)

The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin personally informed the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the active collaboration of the Home Army with the forces of the Third Reich. In his memoirs, Churchill pointed to a letter by the Soviet leader, dated May 5, 1945. An excerpt of the letter was as follows:

I must comment especially on [another] point of your message, in which you mention difficulties arising as a result of rumours of the arrest of fifteen Poles, of deportations and so forth.

As to this, I can inform you that the group of Poles to which you refer consists not of fifteen but of sixteen persons, and is headed by the well-known Polish general Okulicki. In view of his especially odious character the British Information Service is careful to be silent on the subject of this Polish general, who "disappeared" together with the fifteen other Poles who are said to have done likewise. But we do not propose to be silent on this subject. This party of sixteen individuals headed by General Okulicki was arrested by the military authorities on the Soviet front and is undergoing investigation in Moscow. General Okulicki's group, and especially the General himself, are accused of planning and carrying out diversionary acts in the rear of the Red Army which resulted in the loss of over 100 fighters and officers of that Army, and are also accused of maintaining illegal wireless transmitting stations in the rear of our troops, which is contrary to law. All or some of them, according to the results of the investigation, will be handed over for trial. This is the manner in which it is necessary for the Red Army to defend its troops and its rear from diversionists and disturbers of order.

(The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 436) (IMG)

The joint Anglo-German support for the Home Army yet again exposed the covert collaboration of Britain with the Third Reich. This collaboration was of course for strategic reasons. Throughout its history as a maritime imperial power, Britain had always pitted one side in European conflicts against another. That the British were collaborating with the Nazis was a natural manifestation of Britain’s objectives for strategic balancing and bleed-out in Europe. Britain was helping

Germany prevent the further advance of the Red Army westwards.

C13S4.5. The AK Steps Up Nazi-style Anti-Semitic Pogroms

From 1945 onwards:

The right-wing A.K. (Armja Krajowa) and the fascist NSZ (Narodowe Sily Zbrojowe) resumed their armed activities, this time with the object of driving the Soviets and their Polish allies out of the country. An era commenced of what in fact was civil war. Soon only the larger towns were in the government's hands, whereas the countryside generally and the Carpathian mountain range in particular were controlled by the insurgents. The old A.K. had dissolved, and the successor organizations assumed various names, such as WIN. Despite the existence among them of some moderate social democratic or liberal elements, these organizations were predominantly right-wing, and they tended to continue the old, violent and bloody prewar Polish anti-Semitism, fortified and barbarized by the example set by the Nazi conquerors.

The Jews were now an easy target indeed. Having dwindled to an insignificant percentage of the population, they were completely dependent on the protection afforded by the government.

(Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, pp. 113-114) (IMG)

Referring to the Yiddish members of the PPR, Bauer continued:

the fact of their Jewish origin served as a butt for attacks of the WIN and fascist NSZ on the regime.

Jews and Communists were equated in right-wing propaganda in the well-worn Nazi manner. The Jew-hatred of many Poles, and especially among the peasantry, was now whipped up [in vain] for anti-government attacks. This of course tended to make the Jews even more dependent on the government, and their situation became difficult in the extreme. (Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, pp. 114-115) (IMG)

On behalf of the London-based so-called Polish government-in-exile, a new wave of anti-Semitic terrorism was launched by fascist extreme-right organizations:

The first serious anti-Jewish outbreaks occurred in Cracow. On August 11, riots occurred and a Jewish school was burned down. This followed the distribution of leaflets by the underground forces chiding Cracow for not activating its anti-Jewish committee. The WIN leaflets declared that the riots had been instigated by Jews and the "perpetrators were the Jews themselves and the NKVD [Russian secret police]." Several Jews were killed, and similar though lesser outbreaks were recorded in Radom and Czestochowa. Contemporary reports relate how members of the right-wing groups went through villages where individual Jews or small groups tried to maintain a foothold and encouraged actions against the Jews in the name of the London government-in-exile of the anti-Communist Poles. (Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, p. 115) (IMG)

Although Professor Bauer himself was affiliated with the Mapam, a pro-Soviet political party in Israel, and may have had a pro-Soviet view, his claims are voluminously supported by the overwhelming evidence of AK-Nazi collaboration provided from anti-Soviet Zionist intelligence sources such as Yitzhak Zuckerman (cited previously) and the CIA-Mossad JDC operative Ruth Gay.

Another case of AK terrorism against the Yiddish people was reported by Pat Frank, a member of the US government's Office of War Information responsible for promoting official US government propaganda. Frank described the case as such:

Luba Zindel of Cracow, was having a baby at the hospital when the train departed. I talked to her at Camp Karlov. This is her story: With her husband and an earlier child, she had spent three years in the Nazi concentration camp at Lublin. After the Russians captured that city, the family was released. They returned to their home in Cracow on June 20 1945. On the first Saturday in August, while the family was attending services, the synagogue was attacked and stormed by uniformed AK troopers. "They were shouting, she told me, that we had committed ritual murders. They began firing at us and beating us. My husband was sitting beside me. He fell down on his face full of bullets." The widow was among those selected by the Jewish Committee in Krakow to be given a chance to escape to Czechoslovakia. She arrived here aboard the first of three trains". ('Patton Turned Back 600 Jews Fleeing Terror in Poland', Pat Frank. In: Brichah, William Leibner. In: jewishgen.org.) (IMG)

A US intelligence report in 1946 stated that "Stefan JANECZEK, former NKVD Captain and former Major in the Polish Security Troops" (p. 1), upon returning to Poland:

also began being informed of the many anti-Jewish manifestations fostered by the AK and the NSZ bands who were working against the present Government. ('SUBJECT: Interrogation Report of Michael PINES c. Stefan JANECZEK, former NKVD Captain and former Major in the Polish Security Troops', Office of Origin: Vienna, Austria, SCI/A, Headquarters of the US Forces in Austria, SSU, WD Mission to Austria, APO 777, Reference: Project SYMPHONY, Field Hq. File No. LVX 231, period covered: present, made by: DD 110, Date: May 9, 1946, p. 14. In: 'SYMPHONY VOL. 1_0033', CIA.) (IMG)

UN reports confirm the AK's terrorist activity against the Yiddish sons and daughters of Poland. One such report was cited by Ruth Gay, the editor of the 'JDC Review', a journal of the 'American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee' (JDC). The JDC or 'Joint', as will be shown in C16S1, was an American-Israeli intelligence organization, of which Ruth Gay was a leading figure. Citing a detailed report by the US-led 'United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency' (UNRRA), Ruth Gay remarked:

H.J. Fishbein, director of an UNRRA Team in Berlin, delivered a detailed report for the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, in which he gave more specific reasons for the flight: "The story of their experiences during the past six months," he wrote of the new arrivals, "is a monotonous one as it is repeated by all refugees coming out of Poland. They tell of letters received from a Polish organization known as 'A.K.' [Armia Krajowa] meaning Patriotic Army ... and in opposition to the present Government of Poland. These letters threaten the Jews with outright murder if they continue to live in that locality. They are usually given a period of 24 to 48 hours to leave. These letters are further confirmed by actual terroristic acts of pillage and murder by this organization, committed as recently as several weeks ago." It was a catastrophic moment to be a displaced person. (Safe Among the Germans: Liberated Jews After World War II, Ruth Gay, p. 183. The phrase "[Armia Krajowa]" including its square brackets is original to Ruth Gay's text.) (IMG)

Clearly, the narrative that the AK was engaged in pogroms is no 'Soviet propaganda'.

C13S4.6. The Conspiracies of the Polish 'Underground' against the New Poland / Home Army Terror and the Titoist Betrayals by the Gomulka-Spychalski Group

*** IMG-All-{Poland}

According to the report by Gomulka:

Up to the elections reaction thought that factories and heavy industry would pass after these into their hands and now there may be sabotage in production resulting in non-accomplishment of the three-year plan showing up PPR as inefficient. The blowing up of the Martin furnace in the Glivitz region is the first act of sabotage by underground men. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Referring to the above paragraph by the First Secretary, the CIA agent who had translated Gomulka's report re-emphasized:

this really happened.. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

That is, the CIA agent emphasized that the Underground's sabotage operation against the Martin furnace occurred for the purpose of depicting the 'PPR as inefficient' and that more of such sabotage operations may occur. The 'Underground', the term used for the various cells of the Home Army (AK), was engaged in combat against Poland's industrial production, so to render Poland weaker.

Throughout the next six years, several US intelligence reports frequently confirmed the criminality and exposed the fascist nature of the Polish Underground State. Note that unlike the foregoing report by Gomulka, which the CIA agent nevertheless acknowledged as 'truthful', the following intelligence documents were not translations of the public statements of Polish government and PPR officials, but were rather reports written and submitted by CIA agents themselves.

A 1947 CIA document confirmed that the 'Right extremists' held the upper hand in the Polish Underground guerrilla movement:

Politically, the Resistance includes all elements ranging from the anti-Stalinist to the reactionary groups. Generally, the extremists, particularly the Right extremists, are stronger among the Partisan formations, while the moderates and liberals are more likely to be found in the Underground. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

In particular, the fascist Nazi-collaborationist NSZ represented one of the largest, if not the largest, movement among the partisan bands in the Polish Underground:

The NSZ appears to be the largest of the organized Resistance groups. Politically it stands on the extreme Right, having developed chiefly out of such pre-war elements as ONR and Stronnictwo Narodowe (National Party) – now outlawed. Although the NSZ officially deploras mistreatment of the Jews, it has been responsible for anti-Semitic excess in a number of cases. The head of the NSZ in Poland is reliably reported to be Boleslaw Piasecki, successor to the late Stanislaw Piasecki (no relation). Its military head is reported to be Colonel Andrzej Rutkowski (not identical with Colonel Rutkowski, Chief of Informacja [i.e. Polish intelligence]). (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

The WIN, the second largest Polish Underground guerrilla movement after the Great Patriotic War, was 'similar politically' to the NSZ in that they too were fascist bandits:

Wolnosc i Niepodleglosc (Freedom and Independence)

Next to the NSZ (to which it is similar politically) WIN is considered the largest Partisan organization.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Both of these organizations were the bulk of the guerrilla bands and were headquartered in Poland:

The largest and most important groups ... [are] NSZ (National Armed Forces) and WIN (Freedom and Independence) ... [which] have their headquarters in Poland. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Of course, the ultimate headquarters of these terror organizations was in London.

Much as how some criminal gangs and syndicates are named after their godfathers and crime bosses, many of the Polish Underground guerrillas were named after their chiefs as well. Indeed, the WIN and NSZ were not coherent organizations, but were rather coalitions of fascist bandits. Both organizations were made up of godfather-named local gangs. Referring to the WIN and NSZ, the US intelligence document stated:

To these latter groups belong also their numerous guerrilla bands which owe allegiance solely to their own chieftains. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

This was of course the situation with other guerrilla bands as well:

In addition to these groupings ... there are numerous local bands, of varying strengths which are sometimes nameless, and sometimes identified only by the noms de guerre of their chiefs. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

The very name of a guerrilla movement matters much because it sheds light on the group's ideology or platform; the fact that the Polish Underground guerrillas were named not after a particular ideology, 'ideal', or slogan, but rather after their warlords and godfathers reveals the fascist cult-like mentality of the bandit 'movement'. Indeed, it is questionable if one could call these guerrillas 'partisans' at all considering their banditry. These:

pseudo-Partisan bands ... although they profess to identify themselves with one anti-Government or another, must be considered as purely bandit groups with no political objectives whatever. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (ImG)

The name 'Freedom and Independence' (WIN) and the 'National Armed Forces' (NSZ) were solely professional liberal names acting as propaganda cover for the banditry of the Polish Underground.

There of course were other smaller guerrilla organizations in Poland:

Polska Armia Wyzwolenia (Polish Army of Liberation)

The AW is a numerically insignificant group. Claims have been made that the AW has from 300,000 to 40,000 organized troops with reserves of over a million, and that it is the successor to the AK.

Comment: There has been no confirmation of these exaggerated estimates, and they seem to be the product of wishful thinking.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Wojska Powstancze (Insurgent Troops)

One of the smaller Rightist Partisan groups.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Some reasons for joining the Underground guerrillas were 'to escape the authorities', 'excitement and adventure' or to become mercenaries:

The composition of the ranks is heterogeneous. Although some join as a result of political conviction, some to escape the authorities and others for excitement and adventure, there are those attracted by mercenary considerations. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Another CIA document titled 'Polish Underground' provides more specific details about the character of the Polish Underground guerrillas. The document acknowledged that the 'great majority' of the Polish Underground were criminals:

A large percentage of underground members are common criminals such as speculators, black marketeers, smugglers, thieves, robbers and murderers. Another group in the underground is that of the "professional" resistance man who knows no other way of life. (...). The great majority of those who live illegally and who hide in the forests of Poland are, therefore, army deserters, common criminals, young men who have committed a misdemeanor, youthful war-time underground assistants – unwitting couriers, ammunition keepers and the like – who continued to associate with the underground and who, since the war have been either unwilling or unable to rehabilitate themselves. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

A smaller portion of the Polish Underground was made up of the 'lesser' criminals:

There are other elements of the Polish population which provide lesser numbers of men to the clandestine resistance forces. These include young persons who have no political or ideological motivation, but who have joined because they have committed some minor crime and because they dread the few months in jail.. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, pp. 1 -2) (IMG)

This category included such people as:

a youngster who may have drunkenly tried to molest a girl.. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

That is, the 'lesser' criminals were, at 'best' case scenario, rapists. The criminals were led by the wartime leaders of the Polish Underground:

These forest underground groups are almost always directed by experienced war-time underground members who now either live illegally under assumed names or who have managed to reappear as accepted citizens while concealing their present interest in ant-regime action. (...). Almost universally, the chiefs are motivated by political considerations such as hatred of Russia, Polish nationalism, hatred of Communism or personal political ambition. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The information presented by the CIA document clearly demonstrates that the Polish Underground did not respect freedom of opinion and expression and that they engaged in terrorist activity. The Polish Underground conducted terrorist operations against non-combatant communists:

These groups ... conduct actions against Communist agitators propagandizing collectivization and speaking for the USSR; (Poland: Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 2.) (IMG)

The Polish Underground guerrillas were literally bandits. They attacked trains and public warehouses to loot whatever material they needed:

The procurement of supplies appears to present no problem. Whatever cannot be obtained in any other way is gotten by holding up trains and looting public warehouses. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Attacks on infrastructure were common. The CIA document commented:

It is believed that the underground was responsible for the following incident: The flow of power to electric trains was suddenly cut off one day in the spring of 1952 for several hours. Trains running on the Warsaw-Pruszkow and Warsaw-Grojec lines halted. Because of this some 360,000 workers were unable to report for work that day. It is not definitely known whether the interruption was due to sabotage or to a technical breakdown. (Poland: Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

More tellingly, after the War, the Polish Underground attacked the farms, especially the collective farms. They attacked Gminna Spółdzielnia 'Samopomoc Chłopska' (Communal Cooperative 'Peasant Self-Help'), the Spółdzielnie Produkcyjne (Production Cooperatives), and Polskie Gospodarstwa Rolne (Polish Farms):

Communist collective offices, such as Samopomoc Chłopska, Spółdzielnie Produkcyjne and Polskie Gospodarstwa Rolne also provide targets for active opposition. (Poland: Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

Western propagandists have always alleged that the Polish Underground received the support of the majority of the Polish population. Not true. As the CIA confirmed, among the Polish people:

A certain feeling arose against the Partisans, based on the accusation that by continuing their senseless struggle they were only aggravating the serious economic condition of the country, causing needless bloodshed.. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

Furthermore, the CIA document was absolutely clear that behind these Polish Underground guerrilla was General Anders and his so-called 'Polish government-in-exile' in London:

At the same time, political alignments became clearer: Behind the Partisans stood General Anders and the "London" Poles, and behind them stood the British. In the minds of the Polish people, Anders and the London group are identified with the large capitalists and feudal landowners. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The deep ties between the MI6-backed group led by General Anders and the terrorists in Poland led to the overwhelming hatred of the Polish proletariat and peasantry at the time towards the so-called 'Polish government- in-exile':

it cannot be said that many Poles would want the London group in control of the Polish State. The workers and peasants especially feel that should the London group come to power it would mean a return to the intolerable conditions of 1939, with the ... distasteful dictatorship of the Right. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

Contrary to the reports of the CIA-backed press, the Polish people at that time despised the MI6-backed 'London Poles', after having experienced the harsh conditions prior to 1939, as well as the terrorism and treason of the Polish Underground guerrillas during and after the War. The Polish government's intelligence service:

are interested in the Resistance primarily because some of its [i.e. Resistance's] elements not only receive material support from abroad but provide assistance to foreign intelligence agencies [e.g. MI6] in their anti-Polish and anti-Soviet operations. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Many people ... deprecate [Partisan] activities on the grounds that they cause senseless bloodshed and will

accomplish no permanent good. In such regions as Rzeszow, Bialystok, Lublin, and the Swietokrzyskie Mountains – where Partisan activity is strongest – ... even those elements which otherwise would be inimical are kept in line by fear of the Partisans. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)
Those Poles located near the mountains or forests suffered the most, because those terrains best served the guerrillas leading to their mass concentration there:

There is Partisan activity of one sort or another throughout Poland, but it is concentrated in terrain which affords protection and concealment, i.e., in areas which are forested or mountainous or both. Thus, the Partisans are strongest in the northeast, the southeast, along the Polish-Slovak border, and in the Kielce area of central Poland. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

The extreme unpopularity of the Polish Underground guerrillas is also reflected in the relatively small number of recruits they had:

It is difficult to make even an approximate estimate of Partisan strength. On the basis of information at hand, however, it is felt that 40,000 to 50,000 men would be a reasonable approximation for the autumn of 1946. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

According to conservative estimates, the "Freedom Movement" has about 25,000 members, many of whom are armed with automatic weapons. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Note that the 'Freedom Movement' was simply an alternative term for:

Anti-Communist Underground activists in Poland.. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Compiling numerous reliable reports into one major study on Ukrainian fascism, a study by the US intelligence confirmed that the Anders group, which headed the military wing of the Polish Underground and the 'Polish' government-in-exile, closely collaborated with the Ukrainian anti-Polish fascist terror group, the OUN (which headed the UHVR), as means of combatting Soviet power and establishing an MI6-backed Intermarium. Indeed, the US intelligence reported:

Further, conferences were held between the Polish ANDERS Group and UHVR representatives at Bellagio (May 21, 1946), Rome (June 3-11, 1946), and Castelgandolfo in order to effect a rapprochement between the Ukrainian and Polish resistance movements and to conclude a close alliance in the struggle against the Soviets.

UHVR was represented by the OUN member and terrorist Nicholas LEBID, Secretary General of the Foreign Affairs Department, and by Alexis SOKIL, permanent delegate in Rome. Negotiations to coordinate Intelligence Services of the 2nd Polish Army Corps and the Ukrainian IS took place. The agenda also included such matters as the delimitation of frontiers, anti-Ukrainian propaganda in the Polish press, the INTERMARIUM CONFEDERATION (see above, PROMETHEUS MOVEMENT), and the formation of an anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. Political negotiations, however, were postpone pending study of reports and delimitation of Polish and Ukrainian zones.

It is significant that the UHVR, which can be traced back to the anti-Polish OUN, should now seek an alliance with the anti-Warsaw Poles. Both factions, of course, now have a common enemy in Soviet Russia and Communism.

(THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: AN INTERIM STUDY', US intelligence, authors: William Holzmann and Zolt Aradi, October 1946, p. 27) (IMG)

The report further added that the fascist NSZ and the UPA also closely collaborated:

some cooperation has been stipulated between UPA and NSZ.. (THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: AN INTERIM STUDY', CIA, authors: William Holzmann and Zolt Aradi, October 1946, p. 27) (IMG)

The strength of the counter-revolutionary partisan movement, therefore, ranged between 25,000 to 50,000 which, relative to the 400,000-strong Polish People's Army (AL) during the Great Patriotic War, was rather small. It also was far smaller than the 500,000 to 1,000,000 members of the PPR in 1947. As the Underground guerrillas served as the successor organizations to the Polish AK, their stronghold was also in Central Poland and they were led by General Szary:

Throughout the war [Gory Swietokrzyskie in Central Poland] was an AK stronghold, and it still is the headquarters of Szary, one of the most famous Partisan leaders in Poland. [According to the] former deputy to the UBP Commandant of the Kielce area, Szary's forces number between 7,000 and 80,000 men. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

According to conservative estimates, the "Freedom Movement" has about 25,000 members, many of whom are armed with automatic weapons. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

It is difficult to make even an approximate estimate of Partisan strength. On the basis of information at hand, however, it is felt that 40,000 to 50,000 men would be a reasonable approximation for the autumn of 1946.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

In Eastern Poland, the local partisan formations were far smaller. Nevertheless, they exaggerated their membership figures:

One report estimated Partisan strength in [Byalistok in Eastern Poland] at 10,000 but this is considered exaggerated. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

The suppression of the Polish Underground guerrillas was the job of Polish organizations:

Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (International Security Corps)

The burden of anti-Partisan operations in the field falls on the KBW, a well-equipped and politically reliable elite formation which resembles ... the MVD Internal Troops. The KBW is organized in motorized regiments and independent battalions strategically stationed throughout Poland.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Milicja Obywatelska (Police) and Ochotnicza Milicja Obywatelska (Voluntary Police)

The MO and OMO perform ordinary police functions and have no authority in political matters. They are therefore, only occasionally involved in anti-Partisan operations..

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

After the War, given the shortage of the military cadres, the Polish government accepted some of the old military commanders into the Army. For this reason, the Army was somewhat unreliable and needed a thorough purge. Hence:

The Army takes part in anti-Partisan fighting only as a last resort in cases where Partisan strength is too great to be dealt with by the KBW or [Polish intelligence]. One reason for not committing the army against the Partisans except when absolutely necessary is the questionable political reliability of the rank and file, who often sympathize with the Resistance and allow themselves to be disarmed without a struggle. To discourage this practice the General Staff issued an order prescribing the death penalty for those who surrendered their arms to the Partisans. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

The Polish government's crackdown on the guerrillas proved to be quite effective:

The high point of Partisan strength in Poland was reached in the winter and spring of 1946. Since that time it has been steadily declining, partly because of the Government action.. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 8) (IMG)

Soviet Red Army involvement in the fight against the Polish Underground guerrillas would have been a massive propaganda boost for the terrorists as it would have depicted the conflict as one between the 'Russian imperialists' and the 'Polish freedom movement'. Since the AK-affiliated terrorists intensively propagated the narrative that Poland was a Soviet 'colony', direct Red Army involvement would have boosted such propaganda. As such, to the extent possible, the Soviet Red Army avoided direct involvement in the conflict:

Soviet units in Poland are forbidden to participate in battles against the Partisans. Only if they are attacked may they defend themselves. Even when the Polish authorities call on the Soviets for help, the answer is always, "without specific instructions from Moscow we cannot join you"; this, in spite of the fact that many members of the Soviet Army, among them high officers, have been killed by the Partisans. Such special units as the MVD have greater authority and a freer hand to engage in anti-Partisan combat, but even they rarely become involved.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

Note that the MVD specialized in cracking down on terrorists and fostering internal security. Of course, because the Soviets were not directly involved in the military operations, the Titoist infiltrators in Poland could reverse the narrative and argue that the 'Red Army is not directly involved in the war against the terrorists! The Polish guards are being used as Russia's cannon-fodder!' or words to that effect. Later on, when only fewer and fewer fascist bandits remained and the fight against the guerrillas became less important, the Soviet government did directly engage the partisans; however, again, to prevent a propaganda boost for the guerrillas, Red Army general Rokossovsky, himself ethnically Polish, was involved in the conflict with the assistance of the Soviet intelligence service MVD:

It may be assumed that "Freedom Movement" activities are a reason for Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky's appointment to Poland, and it is believed that he has been given the task of eliminating members of this resistance group. Rokossovsky's handling of this assignment will probably prove to be a test of his ability and, should he fail, it is believed that the Cominform will remove him from Poland. To combat the "Freedom Movement", Rokossovsky has been given about 2,000 MVD agents who are to penetrate the Polish Underground. As far as is known, the Underground is aware of the assignment. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

However, added to the Underground fascist guerrillas were their Titoist agents, the traitors to the proletariat, in the top ranks of the Polish People's Democracy who stabbed the communists in the back. On the one hand, there existed the Underground guerrillas; on the other hand, allied to them were the 'conspirational Underground' which aimed to infiltrate the government:

The resistance movement in Poland can be divided roughly into two groups: the Partisans, who favor direct, armed resistance to the Government through guerilla warfare; and the conspirational Underground, a broader but loosely organized movement which prefers to act indirectly through propaganda and infiltration of government agencies. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Prior to the 1947 elections, the PPR-led popular front promised to the people amnesty to the partisans and increased internal stability:

Amnesty and internal stability were the pre-election slogans which secured a victory for the [communist- led] bloc. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

As the CIA confirmed, the amnesty issued by the PPR was for the purpose of revealing and hunting down the Home Army terrorists:

The amnesty is used by the PPR solely as a means for revealing and exterminating the Underground. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1)

There is no evidence that the amnesty offer was a promise to be broken, upon mass surrender by the terrorists. After accepting the amnesty offers, the Underground guerrillas would then turn themselves in and be integrated in the rest of the society, disarmed, identified, and easier to surveil. Such ex-guerrillas could well live a normal life if they behaved as good citizens. However, should the ex-guerrillas plot to launch the slightest sabotage against the progressive forces, they could be hunted down and purged by the Polish counter-intelligence which had been surveiling them all along. Amnesty to the guerrillas was the efficient way of engineering a split among the terrorists, to facilitate the identification and surveillance of such ex-terrorists who would return to the mainstream of the Polish society.

The Anglo-Americans and their PSL stooges wanted German settlers to continue to occupy Polish territories:

Wide public interest in the Moscow Conference was stimulated by two questions in the Polish mind: would the western frontiers be confirmed? Would there be peace or war? Secretary Marshall's demand for revision of the western frontier in favor of Germany spread fear among the transferred people. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Anglo-Americans acted against the Polish people, who in turn naturally grew hostile to the Anglo-Americans. By contrast, the Soviets and the PPR were the champions of Polish socialist patriotism, and advocated the expansion of Poland's boundaries westwards.

As these repatriates, brought from the East, find themselves about to be ousted from the West, suspicion and even hatred is replacing their friendliness and goodwill toward Anglo-Saxons. This growing hatred is nurtured by Soviet propaganda which blames the Anglo-Saxons for Poland's plight. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

All of these factors led the PPR to gain the support of the Polish masses. The January 1947 elections brought the PPR to government with a landslide.

The reason why the partisans were promised amnesty was not so much that the PPR was soft on terrorist guerrilla activity per se, but rather the goal was to cause splits in the ranks of the terrorist guerrillas, so to more easily surveil these counter-revolutionary elements and purge them off.

After the elections:

the amnesty was widely publicized and the UB and MO [Polish intelligence and security services] were told to stop their activities during the amnesty period.. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Although on the surface, the policy of amnesty may appear as a sign of weakness, in reality it was to be:

used by the PPR solely as a means for revealing and exterminating the Underground. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

That is not to imply that the promise of amnesty would be broken. Rather it meant that the counter-revolutionary forces would be disarmed and compelled to resort to so-called 'civil' means of counter-revolutionary opposition. They would be surveilled, and, later on, upon continued counter-revolutionary activity, would be purged – that was the plan. That is why the policy of amnesty faced the opposition of the PSL:

The PSL was striving to eliminate the amnesty. There also existed other currents to the same end. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

The PSL and the fascist Underground were deeply linked:

The strength of the Fascist underground will fall if the PSL (the Polish Peasant Party) is disintegrating. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

As a result of the amnesty:

Underground elements are starting to crumble. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee

Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Thus, the PSL and the former Partisans had to resort to intelligence activities against the Polish government by joining the conspirational Titoist Underground:

The ex-Partisans and former AK men have channeled their hostility to the Government into the Underground. Thus, as the Partisans have become weaker, the Underground has become stronger. Now that Mikolajczyk's "legal" opposition has been "defeated" in the recent elections and an amnesty proclaimed for the Partisans, it can be expected that this process will continue, and that the PSL as well as the ex-Partisans will increasingly turn to the Underground as the only remaining possibility of actively continuing resistance against the Government. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 8) (IMG)

The Titoist conspirators in Poland were initially organized as individual cells.

The usual form of organization in the [conspirational] Underground is that of the small cell. These are found throughout Poland, but are concentrated chiefly in the cities. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

However, over time, the network of Titoist conspirators took shape. The CIA reported that the conspirational Underground:

are becoming more closely-knit as their number increases, and eventually may form a tightly organized, long-term clandestine opposition. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The Titoist 'Underground', Gomulka reported with 'absolute' 'truthfulness', aimed to conduct industrial sabotage against People's Democratic Poland:

The lack of props at the mines, motors covered with coal dust, sabotage, laziness – all is the fault of the managers and the foremen. These must be removed and disciplined. At each mine 200 workers are used for private tasks, 200 are on leave and in social work, 200 are sick, and 400 do not come to work. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

In response, the Polish government initiated a program of surveillance over the factory management teams:

there will be in each shop a triumvirate of PPR's who will watch out for efficiency, output, and completeness of work done. In case of finding sabotage or deficiency in work, they will immediately notify the industrial sections of the UB (secret police). Decisions taken by the PPR cell are decisive for the personnel section. Each mine or foundry must get 4 such cells of 3 PPR's each. Once a month conference of the technical organization will be held. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

However, sabotage was not the only aim of the Titoist Underground. It would be wrong to think that the conspirational Titoist Underground, which did not engage as actively in guerrilla warfare, was not violent. Indeed, assassination attempts were a goal of the anti-communist forces. In the speech whose content was presented by the CIA as absolutely truthful, Gomulka noted:

Reaction has not given up the fight and will continue to hunt our more important [Party or government] members. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Unlike the guerrillas which were frequently engaged in fighting, the conspirational Titoist Underground practically served as an intelligence service infiltrating the government, assassinating officials, blowing up statues, etc.:

The Underground envisages a long period of planning and preparation before it will be in a position to act decisively. At present, therefore, the chief concern of the Underground is the development of its organization. At the same time, great emphasis is placed on infiltrating the PPR [Polish Workers' Party] and governmental agencies with reliable men on the widest and highest levels.

As distinguished from the overt operations of the Partisans, the [conspirational] Underground's operations are clandestine. Occasionally a Soviet statue is blown up or a prominent official is assassinated, but this is done mostly for morale purposes, and not as a result of general policy. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 8) (IMG)

To destroy People's Democratic Poland, the conspirational Underground:

also embraces, however, anti-Communists from the Polish Socialist Party, and renegade Communists from the Polish Workers' Party. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The plan was that an MI6-backed Titoist coup would be staged. It was to be led by Gomulka and his henchman in the military, General Spychalski. Andrew Michta – a prestigious US military scholar at the US Naval War College, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hoover Institute and Harvard University – wrote:

General Tatar was a prewar officer, a lecturer in the Higher Military School, and an artillery commander during the 1939 German invasion. Captured by the Germans in 1939, Tatar managed to escape and between 1940 and 1943 was placed in charge of operations within the underground Home Army General Headquarters in Poland.

In 1944, Tatar was moved to London, where he became deputy chief of staff for home operations to the commander in chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the West. ('Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988', Andrew A. Michta, pp. 47-48) (IMG)

Tatar was a staunch supporter of Titoism. In the words of a scholar at the British Commission for Military History, the Polish Home Army General Tatar:

espoused a form of national communism for Poland, free of the Soviet Union.. ('Poland Alone: Britain, SOE and the Collapse of the Polish Resistance, 1944', Jonathan Walker) (IMG)

Obviously, in the vocabulary of Anglo-American imperialism, the phrase 'national communism ... free of the Soviet Union', as if to mean that the USSR had colonized Poland, in reality meant 'Titoism ... hostile to the Soviet Union'. Furthermore, in the vocabulary of the Anglo-American imperialists, 'national communism', as if the Soviet-friendly Polish communists were not Polish socialist patriots, is a euphemism for a pro-MI6 and pro-CIA pseudo-communism, i.e. Titoism. For instance, the CIA stated that in the 1920s, before even the birth of Titoism, the:

"national" Communists ... were the forerunners of Titoism. ('Bagirov, M D/Beria, L P', CIA, August 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG{Iran})

In 1947, as the commander-in-chief of the 'London Poles', Tatar tried to smuggle large sums of dollars and silver into Poland:

Tatar returned to Poland in July 1947; shortly thereafter he traveled several times to London and brought back with him the silver and dollar deposits of the Fund of National Defense; ('Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988', Andrew A. Michta, p. 48) (IMG)

Such funds were to be used for financing the bribe-and-blackmail operations required for orchestrating such a coup. According to the official press of People's Democratic Poland, this was part of a group of top-ranking:

Polish generals' conspiracy against the Polish state. (Miscellaneous Polish Army Information, CIA, April 30, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

A 1953 CIA document accused Spsychalski, Mossor, Tatar, and 'others' of involvement in the conspiracy mentioned above:

Generals SPYCHALSKI, MOSSOR, TATAR, and others ... were involved in the conspiracy which was uncovered in 1948. (Miscellaneous Polish Army Information, CIA, April 30, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The CIA agent reporting stated that he/she first heard of the case of these conspirators in the Polish newspapers. That, however, does not mean that the source used above was the Polish state media; the CIA agent evaluated the matter on his/her own and stated in the definitive sentence form that the above generals listed were involved in the conspiracy.

The claim of the above-mentioned CIA document matched the claims of the Polish government, though the latter provided more details. During:

the General Tatar trial of 1951, ... high Polish army officers, including four generals, were accused of espionage relations with the US Embassy, Titoism, and preparation of an armed coup to seize power for the "Gomulka-Spsychalski clique." (Situation Summary, CIA, Officer of Current Intelligence (OCI), January 21, 1955, p. 6) (IMG)

In addition:

The indictment of nine former senior Polish Army officers on trial in Warsaw emphasizes their alleged efforts to create a "Titoist Fascist regime" in Poland.. (Daily Digest, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, August 2, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

It remains a fact, confirmed directly by the memoirs of the Mossad operative Yitzhak Zuckerman (see C16S2 for more details), that Spsychalski was an American-Israeli spy providing top secret military intelligence on communist military presence in Eastern Europe. There is no doubt about the above claim by the Polish government. Spsychalski was a former Gestapo agent, whereas Tatar was the head of the MI6-backed Nazi-collaborationist Home Army. Spsychalski was on the team of the Titoist Gomulka, and Tatar aimed to establish a Titoist state 'free of the Soviet Union'. As confirmed by the CIA, Spsychalski, Tatar, Mossor, and their top-ranking collaborators in the Polish military aimed to create a fifth column so to combat the Polish government. Using Tatar's financial aid, they were conspiring to eventually establish their Titoist fascist rule.

Spsychalski's plots reflected the aims of Gomulka as well. The fact that the CIA cited one report by Gomulka as absolutely truthful and reliable should not blind one to the treacherous character of Gomulka. Perhaps quite the opposite – the fact that the CIA regarded Gomulka's report as reliable may itself be an indication of Gomulka's treachery.

In the words of the CIA, Marian Spsychalski, the commander who conspired against the Polish state, 'reflected [Gomulka's] outlook completely':

Gomulka ... had also built up a personal staff among the ... party leadership, who reflected his outlook completely. That group by this included Zenon Kliszko, Marian Spsychalski, Wladyslaw Bienkowski,

Alexander Kowalski, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, Mieczyslaw Moczar, Marian Baryla, Ignacy Korczynski, and others. Several of them had charge of important spheres of activity in the party – Spychalski, for example, in the armed forces, Kliszko in party cadres, Kowalski in youth organizations, Moczar in the police and Bienkowski in the cultural sphere. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 23) (IMG)

Indeed, the Polish government also accused Gomulka of deliberately harbouring these conspirators:

The indictment accuses former Polish Communist Party Secretary Gomulka ... of protecting these officers. (Daily Digest, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, August 2, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Gomulka aimed for a power grab to establish a corrupt authoritarian regime, a dictatorship of the corrupt bureaucratic class allied to Anglo-American finance capital. A CIA document stated that Gomulka's deeds were 'indicative' of his dictatorial manners, that 'the charge' against him was 'justified', and that Gomulka's dictatorial manners were indeed 'common knowledge in the party':

Gomulka was accused of having a dictatorial attitude "contrary to the precepts of a united action leadership" and also was taken to task for "his irritating and non-party-like attitude toward criticism and his complete lack of all self-criticism." Gomulka's failure to obtain prior clearance from the politburo of his speech to the central committee plenum in June was indicative of the characteristics that justified the charge. Gomulka's dictatorial behavior was common knowledge in the party. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 38) (IMG)

Gomulka was surrounded by a team of anti-Polish and anti-Soviet counter-revolutionaries – one of these was Zenon Kliszko, who as mentioned above had a prominent role in the Party and in Gomulka's team. In late 1949, the CIA reported:

Polish Government officials, who have been mentioned in international press reports on the current reshuffling of the Polish Government, seem to be linked with the "Freedom Movement" ... and some have been removed from their posts for failure to neutralize this movement. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Again, the so-called 'Freedom Movement' was simply another term for the Polish Underground, be they guerrillas or the conspirational networks. The CIA reported that Zenon Kliszko, the Polish Vice Minister of Justice and the close friend of Gomulka 'who reflected his outlook completely', 'seem[s] to be' too lenient on the fascist Underground:

Government charges against Vice Minister of Justice Zenon Kliszko of having issued inadequate instructions to the law courts on methods for handling anti-Communist cases, seem to be justified. Kliszko has also been criticized by his Communist Party superiors for failure to intimidate members of the "Freedom Movement". (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. (IMG)

There were many more cases of Gomulka surrounding himself with dubious characters. The CIA agent Swiatlo confirmed to his American bosses that Wanda Podgorska who, after the War, was:

Gomulka's former secretary.. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 42) (IMG) had been a member of the AK during the War: According to Swiatlo, she was indeed a member of the AK during the war.. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 43) (IMG)

The Gestapo agent Gomulka fanned anti-German chauvinism, in part to drive a wedge between People's Democratic Poland and the German Democratic Republic:

Gomulka's hostility to the Germans, as a result of his wartime experience and as a result of his having supervised the expulsion of Germans from the "recovered territories" immediately after the war, was exceptionally strong even for a Pole. This quality made it difficult for him to become reconciled to any Germans – even Communists – and undoubtedly affected his relations with the East German Communists. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 35) (IMG)

The virulent anti-German racism which the Nazi agent Gomulka was busy promoting could help him in weakening the government of East Germany, which by the way was the state that constituted the first line of defense against Nazi German anti-Polish terror:

The [East] Germans will be supported by their Communist allies in East Europe, and Germans and Poles will fight side by side against the Neo-Nazis. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Gomulka opposed the creation of the Cominform and clashed with Zhdanov on the question of collectivization:

As Secretary general of the party, Gomulka issued invitations and acted as host to the delegates who attended the founding session of the Cominform in western Poland in September 1947. He later admitted that he had been opposed to [Cominform's] creation and implied that, despite the fact that the Polish party had been the official host, the initiative for the meeting had come from another quarter. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and

Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 25) (IMG)

According to Vladimir Dedijer, Gomulka at this meeting openly opposed the establishment of the Cominform, but later yielded with the request that its establishment remain secret. He also clashed with Zhdanov at the meeting on the question of collectivization in Poland. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 25) (IMG)

By 1951, Gomulka and many others in his network were hunted down. Interrogations against them began. During the period of his arrest, Gomulka was well-treated and faced no torture, as confirmed by the CIA:

Gomulka was finally arrested in July 1951. (...). Gomulka was imprisoned in a special villa maintained by the security apparatus in a suburb of Warsaw and during the period of his imprisonment (from July 1951 to December 1954) he was reasonably well treated. Little, if any, physical violence was used on him. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 45) (IMG)

Unfortunately, the turn of events would later result in the release of Gomulka from prison and his installation as the fascist head of Poland.

By 1952, with the purge of the Slansky group at its highest point in Czechoslovakia, the interrogations allowed for some of the elements belonging to Slansky's network to be found in Poland. As such:

It was at this time that the Soviet advisor to Department X of the MBP [i.e. Poland's Ministry of Public Security] SIGACHOV, began making inquiries as to how the Zionist affair stood in Poland. (JEWISH PURGE IN POLAND, CIA, date of distribution: March 22, 1954, p. 2. The date for the information is some time around 1952.) (IMG)

Hence, referring to the anti-Zionist purges in Poland, the CIA reported:

The chief of Department X was given instructions to formulate a project against Zionists. Shortly afterwards, a raid was conducted against the Joint Distribution Committee and on the basis of documents, uncovered, the first Jewish arrests began. The early victims were Jakub EGIT, leader of AJAP, a Jewish Communist organization in Lodz; Gittel BARSKI, secretary-general of the Joint Distribution Committee; and General KOMAR, chief of O-2. (...). The KOMAR case was given special handling. The affair did not quiet down until widespread purges were completed, especially in the Polish Army. (JEWISH PURGE IN POLAND, CIA, March 22, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

In this midst:

Jakub BERMAN himself was accused of pro-Zionist tendencies.. (JEWISH PURGE IN POLAND, CIA, March 22, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Documents from Poland indicate that Berman was accused of harboring the Joint Distribution Committee, the infamous CIA-Mossad front. I cannot confirm if the accusation against him was true. Through his secretary Anna Duracz, who was later arrested for her CIA crimes against Poland, Jakub Berman established an intelligence connection with the infamous CIA spymaster Noel Field (see C15S2), knowing that such a connection with Field would be dangerous:

The eleven were soon joined by a twelfth, Anna Duracz, who had fought together with Tonia Lechtman in the Polish communist underground in France. There, she met Noel Field and his wife, Herta, who supported the Polish comrades in their fight against the Nazis, and they established a line of communication linking the Poles in exile in Switzerland and in France. After the war, Duracz became the secretary of the head of security, Jakub Berman. In February 1949, Noel Field came to visit her in Warsaw to ask Berman to put him in touch with an old acquaintance, P. F. Yudin, then the Soviet representative in the Cominform. Field was trying to clear up doubts regarding his wartime activities and to disperse, once and for all, the distrust he encountered everywhere in the satellite countries. Berman made sure not to see him, but let him know that he could leave a letter for Yudin with Duracz and that he could expect a reply on his next visit to Warsaw. (Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954. George H. Hodos, 1987, p. 142) (IMG)

The intelligence connection with Field was made, even though Berman himself knew that it was dangerous to make any contacts with Field, which is why Berman's contacts with Field were covert, through Anna Duracz. A CIA memorandum for the FBI summarized the findings of an Anglo-American-German intelligence agent and vehemently anti-Soviet scholar on the subject, Karel Kaplan. Referring to Field's efforts to travel to the Peoples' Democracies and to gather intelligence ('research') on them, the attached file containing Kaplan's findings in the CIA memorandum for the FBI stated:

[Noel Field] hoped to get all this without difficulty in the East. He made the rounds of friends he had made during the war, all of them now holding down important jobs. He considered as beginning, settling down for a while in Prague and writing a book for Western readers about the people's democracies. He had already begun gathering the necessary data. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG)

In Poland, too, [CIA operative] Field asked his old friends for help. He made contact with Jakub Berman, a member of the Politburo, in charge of intelligence, and then the number-2 man in Poland. Berman promised to help him. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 9) (IMG{GDR})

Having said that, it is worth noting that Berman did help in the efforts to purge Gomulka. Essentially, Berman was a Polish version of Malenkov. Like Malenkov, Berman was a Mossad-linked Titoist, but was the kind of a Titoist who frequently spoke in favor of the communist and anti-Titoist faction.

As in elsewhere, some Zionists in Poland pretended to 'oppose' the MI6-backed elements such as Gomulka, and had left-deviationist colorations. This was in spite of the fact that the Mossad agents in Poland were covertly allied to Gomulka through the MI6-backed Gestapo spy and CIA-Mossad agent Spsychalski (see C16S2). As such, these CIA-Mossad agents were coopted against the Gomulka-Spsychalski faction. This is why:

STALIN allegedly told BIERUT that a better balance was necessary and that the [Zionist] Jews whom BIERUT would release as a consequence should be given corresponding posts in other government departments. The purges were to be effected so as not to lose the loyalty of those removed in order that the UB could re-employ them if the need arose. (JEWISH PURGE IN POLAND, CIA, March 22, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Needless to say – the allegation that Stalin was chauvinistically targeting the Yiddish officials is an anti-Semitic slander, for it depicts as 'anti-Semitic' the commander who liberated the Yiddish people from the Nazi annihilation camps and fought for Israel's independence from British colonialism and Palestinian pogromism. The above document already indicated that it was referring to the Zionist agents, and not mere 'Jews', in the Polish state apparatus.

However, the important part of the above quote is regarding the phrase 'better balance' and the notion that the Polish intelligence 'could re-employ' 'those removed' 'if the need arose'. While the word 'allegedly' is used to describe Stalin's remark to Bierut, the allegation is nonetheless very credible, for Stalin's strategy of combat against the comprador agents in the socialist state apparatus was to allow for two comprador-dominated parallel unofficial intelligence networks, one left-opportunist and the other right-opportunist in rhetoric, and to pit these comprador-dominated intelligence networks against each other, even though, behind the scenes, these two parallel intelligence networks were covertly allied and would form a bloc, a pincer assault with a left-opportunist flank and a right-opportunist flank, against the Stalin faction. Stalin pursued this strategy with the Trotskyite left and the Bukharinite right, the left-opportunist Yezhov network and the right-opportunist Yagoda network, the right-opportunist Beria network and the left-opportunist Malenkov network. In each round of the fight, the Stalin faction would ally with comprador network 1 so to decimate, but not annihilate, the comprador network 2, and thereupon the Stalin faction would encircle comprador network 2 and coopt it against comprador network 1, and the cycle would go on so forth. Again, the two comprador networks are secretly allied, but, because they seek to launch a pincer assault on the communist centrist part of the spectrum, they divide themselves into two flanks, the left-opportunist flank (e.g. Trotsky, Malenkov) and the right-opportunist flank (e.g. Bukharin, Beria). The Stalin-led network would utilize these ostensible 'hostilities' between the covertly-allied left-opportunist and right-opportunist networks so to compile dossier against each of them, demote their members, erode their strengths, and thereby push for a gradual purge of all such comprador agents. To moderate the 'heat' of revolutionary transformation, the left-opportunist and right-opportunist networks would be used to respectively heat up and cool down the revolutionary transformation, like two components of a thermostat. The rhetoric of 're-employ[ing]' 'those removed' 'if the need arose' would make sense in this light.

C13S5.1. Economic Growth in the New, People's Democratic Poland / The Communist-Led Forces in Poland were Popular during and after 1947 Elections

*** IMG-All-{Poland}

The 1947 elections in Poland involved the victory of the communist-led PPR popular front. Progressive politics had a strong social base in Poland. It must be remembered that as confirmed by Timothy Snyder of the CIA's Council on Foreign Relations:

Polish politics had shifted to the left during the war, as was the case throughout occupied Europe. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 310) (IMG)

As such, in 1946, the majority of the Polish voters voted 'yes' to all the three questions in the 1946 referendum and voted for the PPR in the 1947 elections. The PPR, not a communist organization but a communist-led progressive anti-fascist organization, had demonstrated great initiative in the war against the fascist occupation. This had a great propaganda advantage for the communist-led progressive Party, winning many Polish voters to its side. Moreover, referring to the PPR, the CIA had reported:

Amnesty and internal stability were the pre-election slogans which secured a victory for the [communist-led] bloc. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Anglo-Americans and their PSL stooges wanted German settlers to continue to occupy Polish territories:

Wide public interest in the Moscow Conference was stimulated by two questions in the Polish mind: would the western frontiers be confirmed? Would there be peace or war? Secretary Marshall's demand for revision of the western frontier in favor of Germany spread fear among the transferred people. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Anglo-Americans acted against the Polish people, who in turn naturally grew hostile to the Anglo-Americans. By contrast, the Soviets and the PPR were the champions of Polish socialist patriotism, and advocated the expansion of Poland's boundaries westwards.

As these repatriates, brought from the East, find themselves about to be ousted from the West, suspicion and even hatred is replacing their friendliness and goodwill toward Anglo-Saxons. This growing hatred is nurtured by Soviet propaganda which blames the Anglo-Saxons for Poland's plight. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

All of these factors led the PPR to win the trust of the Polish masses.

Contrast the PPR with the Mikolajczyk and his 'Polish People's Party' (PSL). After the War, the Nazi-collaborationist AK militants either joined the guerrilla groups, the infiltrators, or the legal opposition led by the PSL. The CIA reported:

The AK ... no longer exists as an organization. Its members have joined other Partisan or Underground groups, associated themselves with the legal opposition parties, or gone over to the Government. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Indeed, a disproportionate number of the PSL supporters, the CIA confirmed, were made up of the veterans of the Nazi-collaborationist AK terror organization:

The Underground includes all elements, but its chief support is among the moderate, middle-of-the-road groups akin to the PSL. A great many members of these are former AK men. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The program of these AK veterans was very close to the PSL led by Mikolajczyk:

the Underground ... is closer politically to the moderate socialist and land reform program of Mikolajczyk and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). There are innumerable exceptions to and variants from this general pattern.. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Unfortunately, in the 1947 election, Mikolajczyk and his 'Polish People's Party' (PSL) were able to participate. It is well known that Mikolajczyk and his 'Polish People's Party' (PSL) were the representatives of the Polish government-in-exile and the Anders Army. Note that as previously documented, the Anders group was a terrorist organization heading the military branch of the Polish government-in-exile and collaborating with the Ukrainian anti-Polish terrorist OUN as early as 1946. Mikolajczyk and his PSL were the electoral wing of the Polish government-in-exile and Anders group. There was absolutely no right whatsoever for the Mikolajczyk group, the agents of the sworn enemies of the Polish nation, to participate in the elections. The mere fact of their right to participate was a violation of not just democracy but also sanity. Nonetheless, at the time, the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans were still ostensibly 'allied' to one another. To maintain the facade of such an 'alliance', and in the face of Anglo-American lobbying pressures, the Soviets were compelled to accept the participation and candidacy of the Mikolajczyk group in the 1947 elections. Hence, that the Soviets and communist Poles allowed these renegades to participate in the elections was not really owing to communists' 'generosity' – the Soviets and Polish comrades were not generous towards criminals. Nonetheless, the Soviets and Polish comrades were involved in arresting many of the politicians in the Mikolajczyk camp, something that was ferociously condemned by the Anglo-American media as 'evidence' of the 'unfair', 'unfree', and 'farcical' character of the 1947 elections.

Anyways, they won the election in 1947. In terms of political development in Poland, it must be noted that the communist-led anti-fascist resistance movement in Poland had 400,000 members during the Great Patriotic War. The numbers only increased after the War. A 1947 CIA document presented a translation of a report by Gomulka, the First Secretary of the Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR). The CIA agent, who sent the copy of Gomulka's report, stated that Gomulka's report was absolutely truthful and reliable:

This is an evaluation of the internal situation in March 1947 and directives for action in various sectors. The truthfulness and reliability of this report is absolute. Changes have only been made in the form of presentation if you compare this with instructions by Central Committee PPR and is especially reported for the lower ranks of PPR and adapted to the territory where they are binding. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Party's popularity, Gomulka said with 'absolute' 'truthfulness' in that report, kept growing. The PPR:

now have 500,000 members and by the end of [19]47 ... will have 1 million. On the 1st of January 1947 there were 120,000 [PPR] members in Silesia alone. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Note that the Party leadership denounced and discouraged any attempt to coerce the masses into joining the Party. Regarding PPR recruitment, Gomulka's report stated with 'absolute' 'reliability' that Party leaders:

don't want coercion.. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Thus:

the PPR increased its membership ... to 800,000 in the spring of 1947. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 21) (IMG)

The new constitution of Poland, also known as the 'Little Constitution' or the 'Small Constitution' ushered in a new era of rule by 'democratic spirit'. Gomulka reported with – in CIA's words – 'absolute' 'truthfulness' when he said:

The March constitution was one which gave the basis for a Fascist and big landowner expansion. The small constitution will us to rule in a democratic spirit. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

By 1949, Poland too began the process of establishing heavy industry and centralizing the economy. According to a paper by the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress and sponsored by US Department of the Army:

In 1945 the Polish economy was completely disorganized and urgently needed reestablishment of its prewar industrial base. The initial central planning organization that began work in Poland in late 1945 stressed [libertarian] socialist rather than communist economic goals: relative decentralization, increased consumer goods production to raise the standard of living, and moderate investment in production facilities. In 1949, however, that approach was scrapped in favor of the completely centralized Soviet planning model. During the 1950s, planners followed Stalin's requirements for a higher growth rate in heavy industry than the overall industrial rate and a higher growth rate in the steel industry than that of heavy industry as a whole. This approach neglected the other economic sectors: agriculture, infrastructure, housing, services, and consumer goods. The sectors that were emphasized were all capital-, fuel-, and material-intensive. (Country Studies: Poland, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Sponsored by US Department of the Army, Glenn E. Curtis, October 1992) (IMG)

Anti-communist sources propagate that the Polish electorate 'continued' to be vehemently anti-communist, were 'supportive' of Anglo-American imperialist efforts, and 'regarded' themselves as 'captives' of the USSR. A CIA document that parroted such propaganda nonetheless admitted:

Soviet propaganda has quite cleverly exploited some popular sentiment in favor of a variety of social reforms which are loosely described as socialism. Whereas the Soviets have had a hard time finding acceptance of collectivization among all but the most rabid Polish Communists, the widespread program to establish health resorts for workers and peasants, state care for children, establishment of village libraries and other steps designed to eliminate illiteracy, and similar measures have been rather popular. Soviet propaganda insists that the US would eradicate every trace of this program if it gained any influence in Polish affairs, and would establish the influence of foreign [finance] capital as a means of exploiting Poland. The ... attitude of the average Pole is no complete protection against such propaganda claims.. (COMMENTS ON POLITICAL SITUATION, CIA, October 18, 1950, p. 2) (IMG)

Hence, the Poles were indeed influenced by the pro-Soviet line, thanks to the popular measures enacted there. Furthermore, the people of Poland regarded the VOA unfavorably:

It has been implicit from some of the foregoing [remarks in this intelligence report] that the Voice of America is not very favorably received in Poland. (COMMENTS ON POLITICAL SITUATION, CIA, October 18, 1950, p. 3) (IMG)

Agricultural collectivization too began in a highly cautious manner. The high level of caution in Poland was necessary since Poland did not have as much industry to provide the machinery to farmers as incentives for joining kolkhozes. Furthermore, rather than force the peasants into kolkhozes, the communists in Poland used the mechanism of persuasion, in the form of propaganda as well as the incentive of settling in the newly liberated lands that Poland acquired from Germany:

The Soviets used two methods of establishing collectivization. In central Poland they tried persuasion by pointing out to the farmers the advantages of collective farming and that it would be a big step forward in scientific agriculture. ('STATUS OF THE PRPZ / THE CHURCH / LIBERATED TERRITORIES OF POLAND', CIA, November 8, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The Polish government has proceeded cautiously in its collectivization program. In order to obtain support for, or at least avoid strong opposition to collectivization, a drastic land reform to distribute the lands of the large

estates among the needy peasants, particularly in Old Poland, was launched. The peasants in Old Poland have stubbornly resisted collectivization, and up to 1951 the government has not seen fit to invite a showdown in this area. In the newly acquired German territories, however, the resettlement of groups of Polish peasantry has been made contingent on collective cultivation of the land made available to them, and a large proportion of existing collectives are found in these former German territories.

Early in 1951, new collectives in Poland were being created at a rate of a little more than 160 a month, slightly less than the monthly rate in early 1950. There are about 2,500 small collectives in Poland, representing about 2 percent of the arable land. Only about half of the collectives are modeled after the Soviet kolkhoz, the remainder differing in terms of ownership and remuneration. The area of grain land cultivated collectively is too small to have any appreciable effect on acreage or production in 1951.

(THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX: PART I: INDIVIDUAL SATELLITE COUNTRIES: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES: POLAND, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), July 10, 1951, pp. 34-35) (IMG)

Another CIA document stated:

The postwar program of the PPR stressed the subordination of socialist to national goals, repudiated collectivization in agriculture, and maintained that private enterprise would enjoy a ... role in the economy. It also played down any conflict with religion.

Between 1944 and 1947 the Soviet government encouraged this policy. In fact, certain statements by Stalin even lent it public support, by implying that Soviet institutions and methods would not be desirable or likely to succeed in Poland. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 19) (IMG)

The Polish policy of mechanizing and collectivizing agriculture, concurrently with the growth of industrial machinery, was correct policy and should not have caused problems in agriculture. However, Poland had poor luck, as, much like most of the Eastern European Peoples' Democracies, the weather was unfavorable to agriculture for at least two years:

1. Northern Area (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia)

A drought in the fall of 1951 (September and December) reduced the sown acreage and adversely affected germination of winter-sown grains (wheat and rye) throughout most of the area. Poland probably suffered more than East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Deep-plowing plans were not fulfilled: that is, official Czech statements claimed that the machine-tractor stations (MTS) had completed only 50 percent of their work as of 6 December 1951.

Spring plowing and planting operations were delayed by snow, rain, and cold weather in February, March, and the first part of April. Favorable planting weather prevailed from 15 April to approximately 17 May, when an abnormal 2-week period of cold and rain with frost swept over most of the area. The frost damaged early vegetables and fruit crops and returned the growth of cereals.

Incomplete weather data indicates normal and below-normal amounts of precipitation for the months of June and July, respectively. Although low precipitation and high temperatures in July were favorable for late-planted vegetables (some replanted as a result of May frost), corn, forage, and root crops. Poland, as of 30 July, had experienced a 5-week period of little or no rain.

Grain yields probably will be slightly less than in 1951 because of the unfavorable planting and growing season for winter grains. Should the present dry spell continue into August, a severe reduction in yields of corn, potatoes, sugar beets, and foreign crops will occur.

(CROP CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), September 15, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

A. Northern Area (Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia)

In the northern area of the European Satellites the fall of 1952 was characterized by above-normal precipitation, with the result that fall plowing and sowing of grains for harvest in 1953 were considerably hampered. Despite the fact that spring plowing and sowing were aided by favorable weather over most of the area, it is believed that the over-all acreage of bread grain will be less than prewar, because of failure to fulfill the fall sowing plans for winter wheat and rye.

Available weather information and reports from the American Embassy in Moscow indicate that cold and lack of rain characterized the spring much of Poland, although more abundant rainfall appears to have occurred in June. Favorable conditions for spring work were reported in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Rainfall appears to have been gradually adequate to abundant in the late spring and summer months, and in July heavy rains were reported to have caused harvesting difficulties for grain and cultivation difficulties for root and vegetable crops.

(‘CROP CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET BLOC, 1953 (RR IM-379)’, CIA, Office of Research and

Reports, September 23, 1953, p. 4) (IMG{GDR})

The result of all of these was that on the one hand agrarian Poland began to industrialize and had a high level of growth in that sector, whereas the poor weather conditions caused a decline in agriculture, and hence a decline in consumer goods, in spite of the correct policy pursued in agriculture. The following table from a CIA document shows the large level of growth in heavy industry or producer goods, and the decline in consumer goods:

Sector and Gross National Product Indexes for Poland
1938 and 1948-53

	Value-Added Weights	1938	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
(1950 = 100)								
Gross national product		106	85	92	100	101	103	107
Industry	29.4	80	77	88	100	105	115	123
Producer goods	18.7	69	78	88	100	107	123	137
Consumer goods	10.7	99	76	88	100	103	100	97
Agriculture	30.3	119	80	89	100	92	86	86
Transport and communications	5.6	79	78	91	100	118	132	145
Construction	3.0	114	87	96	100	114	118	131
Services	15.7	126	96	98	100	102	104	106
Trade	15.7	117	103	100	100	102	101	99

(CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ACCOUNTS,
CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), April 15, 1955, p. 21) (IMG)

C13S5.2. Soviet Economic Aid to Poland in Exchange for Polish Coal

*** IMG-All-{Poland}

The USSR had a major role in assisting Poland in the latter's People's Democratic development. The CIA-MI6 propaganda bullhorns trumpet the narrative that Poland, an alleged 'colony' of the USSR, was tasked by its 'colonizer-in-chief Stalin to supply the USSR with the coal that the Soviets 'needed', and that the USSR 'forced' Poland to reorient its trade towards the Eastern bloc. The reality, as acknowledged by the CIA's Intelligence Memorandum is that the Polish provision of coal to the USSR was just part of the normal trade between the two countries, in which the strategically generous USSR provided emergency shipments of grain to the much-impooverished post-war Poland, as well as funds for Poland with which to purchase capital goods from the West, a fact which debunks the myth that USSR was 'forcing' Polish trade to be oriented away from the West to the East. The Intelligence Memorandum reported:

During the period 1947-48, Poland received from the USSR a loan of \$28 million in gold and a commodity credit valued at \$36 million. The gold loan was to be used by Poland to import raw materials and capital goods from the West and was to be repaid in Polish raw materials, mainly coal. The commodity credited provided, in part, for emergency shipments of 800,000 tons of grain, which was to be repaid over a period of years in Polish commodities (such as coal and agricultural products) and by adjustment of transit charges owed by the USSR to Poland. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG)

Undoubtedly, it was strategically necessary for Poland to shift its trade away from the West and reorient to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies so to minimize the economic leverage of Anglo-American finance capital in Poland, hence to minimize the lobbying power of the CIA-MI6 agents in Poland. The Soviet-backed communists in Poland did pursue the plan to reorient Polish trade towards the USSR and other Peoples' Democracies, but the Soviet state did not 'colonially' 'impose' such a reorientation.

The CIA reaffirmed that Poland's provision of coal to the USSR was in exchange for the large-scale amounts of Soviet economic aid in the form of machinery, credits, and equipment for promoting Poland's industrialization. Under the heading 'Loans and Credits for Economic Development', the CIA's Intelligence Memorandum stated: The first and most important credits issued to Poland for economic development was extended in 1948 in the amount of \$450 million for Soviet machinery and materials to be delivered during the execution of Polish Six Year Plan (1950-55). This large credit was extended for Soviet deliveries of equipment for a new iron and steel mill, power plants, and chemical and cement plants. The agreement stipulated that payment for this equipment was to be made by Poland over a period of 9 years beginning at the date of delivery of the given item, and room the output obtained from these installations. In 1950

this credit was increased to \$550 million, and the period for deliveries was extended to 1958. Repayment was to be made in coal and textile deliveries in installments over a 10-year period with the first payment on each loan to be made at the time of the first delivery.

In recent years the USSR has provided equipment for more than 40 Polish factories, plants, mines, and electrostations. A major investment in Poland during its Six Year Plan was the \$200-million Lenin Metallurgical Plant near Krakow, for which the USSR may have supplied as much as 85 percent of the machines and installations. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 11) (IMG)

The 'Problems of Communism', which was the publication of the US government's 'US Information Agency' (USIA), also reported:

Polish coal deliveries to the USSR in "exchange" for Soviet shipments of German reparations to Poland constituted the most prominent example of what may be called political exports – that is, exchange of economic considerations for political favors or advantages. (Problems of Communism, No. 1, Vol. VI, January-February 1957, p. 17) (IMG)

The USSR is often criticized by the Anglo-American press, as it is said that Moscow took Polish coal for cheap and then distributed it to its other Eastern European allies. However, the CIA reported:

In 1946, Poland exported to the USSR, beside the regular delivery, 5,700,00 tons of coal, plus 2,300,000 tons [of] which went on the USSR' account to other countries of the Eastern bloc, including East Germany. In each of the years 1947-1950 there was to be delivered, in the same manner, 13 million tons of coal (in 1947 changed to 6,500,000 tons annually), and thereafter 12 million tons (probably also changed) annually so long as East Germany remained occupied by the USSR.

These deliveries, which took place at very low prices, were to be regarded as a kind of payment for the turning over by the USSR to Poland of the entire Upper Silesian industrial region. (POLAND'S STEEL AND COAL PRODUCTION AS OF MID-JUNE 1952, CIA, May 19, 1953, p. 16) (IMG)

Thus, according to the CIA, a large part of the deliveries of cheap coal to the USSR were in return for the fact that the USSR turned over the entire Upper Silesian industrial region. Since Germany was directly occupied by the Soviet and Anglo-American militaries until 1946, the USSR was obviously in charge of providing the coal deliveries to Eastern Zone of Germany until 1946. Note also that the Soviet access to German machinery was due to the agreement on reparations payments to the USSR.

C13S6. The Nazi-Backed Terror Gangs in the Baltics

*** IMG-All- {Baltic-Finland}

The role of the Baltic anti-Soviet guerrillas as fascist terror organizations has rarely been studied, beside a number of articles that rely on Soviet and pro-Soviet sources. It goes without saying that most likely for the first time in scholarly history, this section uses anti-Soviet intelligence sources to shed light on the role of the Baltic anti-Soviet guerrillas as Nazi-collaborationist terror organizations.

As the forces of the Third Reich were retreating, they also laid behind them fascist terrorist partisans that would fight off the Red Army for the coming years. In the Baltics, the Germans had established the 'Forest Brothers', an army that had many other closely related names. The translator of a book by a leading Estonian 'Forest Brother' partisan noted:

The Forest Brothers, called Metsavennad in Estonian, had a number of names – partisans, members of the Green Battalion, guerrillas, men of the Green army, and woodsmen. The Soviet authorities called them "bandits." These names are used interchangeably throughout the text, but refer to the same group of people resisting Soviet rule. (War in the Woods: Estonia's Struggle for Survival, 1944-1956. Mart Laar, Translated by: Tina Ets, p. XIX)

A 1954 CIA document confirmed that the 'Green Brothers' were guerrilla forces created to support the army of the Third Reich against the USSR. The document added that the Green Brothers engaged in terrorist activity against the collective farms:

Zelenyye Brat'ya Movement (Green Brothers)

This movement was organized during World War II in the Estonian SSR by patriots. The specific aim was to aid Germans in driving out the Soviet army and Soviet officials. After the war its organized units devoted most of their efforts to attacking army units, warehouses, and collective farms. In some cases, they even carried out assassinations of government officials. In 1949, Soviet MVD and army units wiped out all active organized resistance in Estonia, including the Zelenyye Brat'ya movement. However, a train had been attacked by partisans in the fall of 1952.

('1. Government Measures to Retain Popular Support 2. Resistance Activities and Potential', CIA. Date Distributed (CIA): August 31, 1954. Date Distributed to US Army: September 30, 1954. p. 4) (IMG)

In a US intelligence report on the interrogation of Eerik Heine, a member of the Estonian wing of the 'Forest Brothers', it was stated that theft was a 'common' practice among the anti-Soviet guerrillas:

HEINE claims to have been a member of the "Forest Brothers," an Estonian partisan unit belonging to the anti-Soviet underground. HEINE succeeded in joining this movement following his escape from the Tallinn prison camp together with another Estonian prisoner whose relatives were members of the underground. As a member of the partisan unit, HEINE states that he engaged in various activities common to this existence: he foraged for food to survive, he robbed and stole, he conducted minor forays against Soviet establishments or convoys. (Attached "Summary Analysis" of Eerik Heine, Memorandum for the Record, in: HEINE, ERIK, VOL. 3_0050, CIA, May 10, 1966, p. 10) (IMG)

In Latvia, it was much the same. Latvju Vards, an anti-Soviet newspaper cited by the CIA, stated that the Latvian partisans were equipped with arms from the German Army:

The partisans in Latvia are equipped with arms of the former German Kurzemes (Kurland) Army. Special MVD units for combating the partisans are located in Riga, Daugavpils, and several small cities of Latvia. The partisans recently attacked a fairly large MVD camp in Lilaste. All "Chekists" (secret police members) were killed and their quarters burned down. The attacking partisans were under the command of a colonel of the former Latvian Army. (Latvju Vards, March 2, 1950. Cited in: STOCKHOLM REPORT ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY IN WESTERN USSR, CIA, Date of Info: 1949 -1950, Date of Distribution: October 19, 1950, p. 3) (IMG)

That the Latvian partisans controlled German weapons in particular should not come as a surprise. The Latvian guerrillas in fact incorporated countless Nazi German military units. A 1949 article cited by the CIA and written by a Latvian nationalist newspaper located in West Germany stated:

Many German prisoners of war who hope to return to their country have joined the [Latvian] partisans. (Says Partisan Movement Revived in Baltic Countries. Newspaper Source: Latvija, No. 108, 1949. In: CIA, Date of Information: 1949, Date Distributed: December 12, 1949.) (IMG)

Another CIA report acknowledged the reality about the anti-Soviet Lithuanian guerrillas – that the leading 12% of the 'Lithuanian' anti-Soviet partisans were actually German Wehrmacht and SS officers who trained the rest of the guerrillas, and that another 10% of the partisans were deserters from the Red Army, who had joined the openly fascist and Nazi-collaborationist 'Vlasov Army'. The partisans, the CIA document added, utilized force to prevent collectivization from occurring. Below is an excerpt of the CIA document:

1. The territory of the Lithuanian SSR is only nominally under Soviet control and the Soviets can be said to be actually in charge of only such cities as Kaunas, Vilnius (Vilna), Alytai, Kalvariya, Virbaliai (Virballen), Ukmerge, Penevezis (Ponewesch, Ponovesh), Siauliai (SohauLen), Tauraje (Tauroggen), Klaipeda (Hemel), Palanga, Utena, Birzai anti Telsiai. In the country, the predominant social and political factors are the anti-Soviet guerrillas.

2. There are at present about 20,000 guerrillas in Lithuania. (...). The main object of the guerrillas is to prevent by force of arms the collectivization of the land. They seek to drive away the farmers who have been brought to Lithuania from the Soviet Union and sometimes even kill them. Farmers who escaped from East Prussia and took over abandoned farms in Lithuania are not molested.

3. On a percentage basis, the guerrillas are made up of:

70 percent Lithuanians

12 percent Germans – There are about 500 former officers of the Wehrmacht and SS who were trapped at the time of the German retreat. They are generally responsible for the good training the guerrillas have received in the use of arms and tactics.

10 percent Russians – Mostly from the Vlassov Army and the Auxiliary Volunteers who fought on the German side during the war. About 500 of them are former Soviet guerillas who operated in the Vilna area. In November 1944 they were incorporated, into the regular Soviet Army: in June 1945 they deserted because of harsh treatment by the Soviet military authorities. Their operational region is between Trakai (Stare Troki), Jeznas, (Y eznas) and Valkininkai. SW [Southwest] of Vilna.

(‘1. Guerrilla forces in Lithuania, 2. Soviet Troops in Lithuania’, CIA, Date Distributed: November 8, 1949, p. 1.) (IMG)

A paper by the CIA staff reminded that in 1949, the US intelligence had already confirmed the active collaboration of the Lithuanian partisans with the Germans:

By the end of the 1940s, the CIA's initial reluctance to use pro-Nazi Germans and Eastern European collaborators as intelligence sources and, indeed, as operatives had waned considerably. The wartime roles of many of these individuals and groups became a negligible factor as the CIA began active operations behind the Iron Curtain. The Agency downplayed accounts of the brutality of many of the Eastern European emigre groups and their collaboration with the Nazis. DCI Hillenkoetter, for example, responding to an inquiry from the chairman of the Displaced Persons Committee in the spring of 1949 about the status of certain groups, stated:

A curious anomaly has developed since the end of the war. Several of these organizations (for example, the

Melnik and Bandera groups and the Lithuanian Partisans) sided with the Germans during the war ... on the basis of a ... a strong anti-Soviet bias. In many cases their motivation was primarily nationalistic and patriotic with their espousal of the German cause determined by the national interests. Since the end of the war, of course, these opportunistically pro-German groups remain strongly anti-Soviet and, accordingly, find a common ground with new partners.

(Chapter Six: Common Ground with New Partners, Draft Working Paper 0007, CIA, p. 27. In: CIA and Nazi War Crim. And Col. Chap. 1-10.) (IMG)

The facts clearly demonstrate that the Nazi-aligned anti-Soviet partisans engaged in terrorist activity and banditry against the ordinary people of the Soviet Union. A late 1951 CIA document confirmed that in Estonia:

In order to obtain supplies, the partisans often raid the cooperative stores and dairies, seizing cash, foodstuffs, and other necessities such as clothing footwear, etc. Attacks are also made on cars carrying money. On one occasion in the late autumn of 1948 or 1949, a mail train was held up between Valga (E57-46N, 26-03E) and Voru (57-51N, 27-00E) and cleared of all valuables.

Civilians who may cross their path are not always molested by the partisans, except suspected Communists on whom the party card is found, or one who has a permit to carry firearms and is discovered armed. Such people are killed without further ado. Similar treatment is also applied to persons who have been active during deportations; and in various parts of the country it has not infrequently happened that militia informers have been "too keen" have disappeared, and later their bodies have been found with a note attached stating the "cause of death". (Partisan Activity in Estonia, CIA, December 13, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

Another CIA document emphasized that within the Latvian guerrilla movement, there were numerous 'criminals and adventurers':

The group of partisans were organized over the whole country. It is to be emphasized, however, that ... in the forests there were also criminals and adventurers. (The Latvian Resistance, CIA, June 17, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The US intelligence documented the looting and banditry conducted by the partisans against ordinary people:

In the winter of 1949-50 partisans robbed stores in many communities on the east coast of Kurzeme. the store in Valgaciems (N57-24, E22-58) was said to have been robbed three or four times; the store in Berziems was robbed three times. In Roja (N57-30, E22-49) the fishing artel storehouse was robbed, and among other items stolen were rubber boots. Other places, too, were robbed in the winter of 1950 -1951. This same winter the farmer who collected the milk quota from each farm was robbed three times between Upesgriva (N57-23, E23-00) and Kaltene (N57-28, E22-54). The robberies occurred in the morning between 0400 and 0500. Twice the collectors were found dead. The third time a woman was the collector, and she was robbed but not otherwise molested. (...). The stores in Mersrags (N57-21, E23-07) was also robbed this winter. The partisans took mostly clothes, dry goods, and sugar. Usually these men traveled by truck, loaded the loot onto the truck, and disappeared into the forest. Occasionally they traveled on foot. As the partisans shot some of the people who got in the way, the Latvians thought they were not real partisans but rather Soviet bandits. It was also said that they were not real partisans but rather Soviet houses the Communists lived and in which houses the non-Communists, and although the source could not cite specific instances it was generally believed that the Latvian partisans robbed not stores but private Communist homes. The Latvian partisans were believed to be supported by the population and therefore would not have had to resort to robbery. In two cases, one in the winter of 1949-50, one in the winter of 1950-51, the MVD captured Latvian partisans in the woods. The source heard of the first instance; the second she knew of more directly because she heard shots and saw blood in the woods later. In (N57-15, E22-35) and Lauciena (N57-14, E22-49), where the woods were very thick; there they captured about 30 partisans while they were eating. In the winter of 1950-51, shortly before Christmas, in the woods near Vandzene (N57-20, E22-48), the Soviets discovered and liquidated a partisan group of 11 persons, one of whom was a woman. The Soviets attacked the partisans as they were going from the woods to a house on the edge of the woods; source thought probably someone who knew of their plans to visit this house had alerted the Soviets. In this fight three or four MVD men and two or three partisans were killed. The fight could be heard as far away as Upesgriva. Six partisans were later sentenced to life imprisonment in Siberia. ('Conditions in Talsi, Mersrags, and Upesgriva', CIA, August 7, 1953, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The terrorist activity of the Baltic partisans can be explained by their kulak backgrounds. Many of the ethnically Baltic partisans came from kulak backgrounds, which is why collectivization harmed them the most. Having resisted the Soviet efforts to deport the kulaks, these individuals joined the Baltic partisans against the Red Army. Morgon Tidningen, the official newspaper of the anti-Soviet 'Swedish Social-Democratic Party' cited by the CIA, reported:

Partisan activity has been handicapped considerably in that the private farms have been replaced by kolkhozes. Previously, private farmers sympathetic to the partisans were able to provide them with food, that happens rather seldom now.. (PARTISANS ACTIVE IN BALTIC AREA, Morgon Tidningen, July 30, 1950. Cited in:

STOCKHOLM REPORT ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY IN WESTERN USSR, CIA, Date of Info: 1949-1950, Date of Distribution: October 19, 1950, p. 2) (IMG)

US intelligence also confirmed that Lithuanian:

Partisan activity was confined almost exclusively to small raiding expeditions on the kolkhozes, in order to obtain supplies. (General Information on Current Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, September 10, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

Listing the known sabotage operations by the Lithuanian partisans, the US intelligence document added:

during the period 1947-1948 ... railroad tracks located in the area of SIAULIAI-MAZEIKIAI were blown up. (General Information on Current Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, September 10, 1952, p. 6)

(IMG)

The partisans were also violently chauvinistic towards ‘all Russians’:

Partisan activities are anti-Russian and anti-Communist, directed against all Russians, all Communist Lithuanians, and against all informers and traitors. (General Information on Current Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, September 10, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

The Lithuanian partisans, another CIA document again confirmed, stole from the collectivist peasantry:

On the other hand, from farmers who sympathize Communists or who are activists, the partisans, after warning these persons, take everything they need. From the kolkhozy the partisans take pigs and other animals. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Under the bloody terror of the fascist bandits, the collectivist peasants (the kolkhozniki) had no choice but to ‘support’ the bandits in order to survive:

The kolkhozniki often support the partisans and give them what they need. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

In addition:

food was taken [by partisans] from warehouses. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

In addition:

the plundering of cooperatives [by the partisans] occurred frequently – mostly when the cooperatives supplied with goods or when some employee was going to the rayon bank with cooperative money. (...).

There were always judicial investigations after such plunders. Suspicious persons were arrested and were released only if there was no evidence against them. Money has been taken also from the smaller railroad stations. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Lastly:

Money has been taken [by the partisans] also from the smaller railroad stations. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

In the late 1940s, in what seemed to be one of their many coordinated attacks, the guerrilla bandits reportedly conducted sabotage operations against Soviet infrastructure:

According to a report from Riga to an Estonian weekly periodical in Stockholm, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian partisans, the so-called “Brothers of the Forest,” recently carried out an attack on the Riga-Pskov railroad line. (STOCKHOLM REPORT ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY IN WESTERN USSR, CIA, Date of Info: 1949-1950, Date of Distribution: October 19, 1950, p. 2) (IMG)

There also have been some absurd conspiracy theories stating that the entire Baltic terrorist guerrilla network was a fake opposition network created ‘by’ the Soviet intelligence service itself and that the Soviet government was ‘not’ really interested in combating the terrorists. One can rest assured that this allegation is not true, because as the CIA stated:

The Bolsheviks continually try to exterminate the partisans. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

In 1951 occurred the Soviet government’s deportations of the partisans and most likely their kulak support base:

In 1951, 6-7000 Lithuanians were deported to Krasnoyarsk, the Donbas, Mongolia, and Vorkuta. The deportations affected the following categories of Lithuanians:

a. all persons connected with the partisan movement, e.g. contact men, the relatives of partisans, partisan supporters

b. all those substantial farmers who had in any way manifested opposition to collectivization.

(‘1. Deportations and Arrests in Lithuania’, CIA, September 3, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The phrase ‘substantial farmers’ obviously referred to the kulaks who formed the base for the terrorist partisans attacking the kolkhoz peasants.

According to Hiden – a top consultant for the British defence and foreign policy ministries – and Patrick Salmon – the official chief historian for the Foreign Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom – the deportations of the Baltics during and after World War II indeed ‘deprived partisans of support among the rural population’:

For the Soviet authorities the elimination of opposition and the transformation of the Baltic economies went hand in hand. Deportations were a key instrument of Soviet policy. They both deprived partisans of support among the rural population and removed the chief opponents of the collectivisation of agriculture. Carried out between 1944 and 1952, the deportations involved much larger numbers and represented a more deliberate attempt to reshape Baltic society than those of 1940-1. After the initial Soviet takeovers in 1940, agricultural land had been confiscated and distributed among landless peasants and smallholders, with only a limited amount of voluntary collectivisation taking place. ('The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century', Routledge, John Hiden, Patrick Salmon, 2013) (IMG)

Note that the phrase 'only a limited amount of voluntary collectivisation [was] taking place' does not imply that only a small portion of the collectivization efforts in the Baltics were voluntary, and that the rest were forced; indeed, as confirmed by Stephen Kotkin of the Hoover Institute:

the USSR had refrained from forced collectivization in the Baltic states; (Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941. Stephen Kotkin, 2017, p. 1069) (IMG)

C13S7. Ukraine

The year 1943 also saw the expansion of Bandera's Ukrainian fascist organization and the development of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA):

Ukrainian underground movement has been the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The Army was formed initially during World War II from the merging of a number of partisan bands which had been operating in the western areas of Ukraine.. (...). However, in 1943 the Bandera organization began to expand its area of control in the Ukraine, until by force or persuasion it had absorbed under its authority virtually all the anti-Russian partisans. The name, Ukrainian Insurgent Army, was adopted and a Bandera supporter, Roman Shukevich, was appointed head of the Army under the pseudonym General Taras Chuprinka. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 23) (IMG)

Bandera's gangs engaged in terrorist activity:

According to an OSS report of September 1945, Bandera had earned a fierce reputation for conducting a "reign of terror" during World War II. (Cold War Allies: The Origins of CIA's Relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists, Kevin C. Ruffner, Central Intelligence Agency, p. 27)

Referring to Volhynia, the CIA reported:

The population is predominantly Ukrainian but there are important Polish minorities, and the two national groups have historically fought one another. It was here during World War II that Ukrainian- Polish rivalries were most strongly expressed. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 106) (IMG)

The CIA document puts the matter mildly at best; it fails to account for the important fact that in 1943, the UPA systematically carried out a genocide against the Polish population of Volhynia (Wolyn). According to Timothy Snyder of the US Council on Foreign Relations:

One of their major tasks as UPA partisans was the cleansing of the Polish presence from Volhynia. Poles tend to credit the success in this operation to natural Ukrainian brutality; it was rather a result of recent experience. People learn to do what they are trained to do, and are good at doing what they have done many times. Ukrainian partisans who mass-murdered Poles in 1943 followed the tactics they learned as collaborators in the Holocaust in 1942: detailed advance planning and site selection; persuasive assurances to local populations prior to actions; sudden encirclements of settlements; and then physical elimination of human beings. Ukrainians learned the techniques of mass murder from Germans. This is why UPA ethnic cleansing was striking in its efficiency, and why Volhynian Poles in 1943 were nearly as helpless as Volhynian Jews in 1942. It is one reason why the campaign against Poles began in Volhynia rather than Galicia, since in Volhynia the Ukrainian police played a greater role in the Final Solution. This links the Holocaust of the Jews and the slaughter of the Poles, since it explains the presence of thousands of Ukrainians in Volhynia with experience in genocide. But why did Ukrainian nationalists decide to eliminate Poles from Volhynia? How did people with such plans come to be in a position to order the ethnic cleansing of Poles in 1943? In 1942 Ukrainian policemen took orders from Germans to kill Jews; from whom did UPA partisans, largely the same people, take orders in 1943 to kill Poles? ('The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999', Timothy Snyder, p. 162) (IMG)

Through its genocide against the Polish population of Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was able to deploy Ukrainian settler-colonizers in Volhynia; the settler-colonizers were of course grateful to the fascist UPA/OUN. As such, the Banderite militants gained a strong popular and social base in Western Ukraine, especially in the areas that were settler-colonized. The movement grew among Western Ukrainians throughout the Second World War:

By the end of 1943 a central headquarters for the underground partisans had been set up, and the [Ukrainian Insurgent] Army had established itself as a para-military armed force with regular formations operating in some

areas and with a carefully defined organization. Throughout 1944 and the first part of 1945 the Insurgent Army continued to grow in importance: it operated openly against Soviet forces; it made no attempt to conceal its major centers; it controlled important areas of the Western Ukraine. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 23) (IMG)

A number of cities in particular became centers of Ukrainian fascist activity during the War:

For an important period of time the area bounded by the four towns of Kovel', Lutsk, Kostopol, and Vladimirets was completely dominated by nationalist bands.. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 106) (IMG)

However:

With the re-occupation of the Ukraine by Russian troops at the close of World War II, the nationalist partisans who during the war had fought ... against the Soviet forces were incorporated within the Soviet Union. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

The fascist partisans who were responsible for the settler-colonial occupation of territories inhabited by Polish civilians refused to go back to where they came from:

Many of the partisans were unwilling to accept Soviet rule and consequently did not return to their homes, but remained in the sheltered areas they had controlled during the German occupation and continued to oppose Russian forces. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

By 1945, the Ukrainian fascist forces were largely defeated:

in the spring of 1945 the Soviet Army inaugurated a major military offensive against the insurgents, and by the end of 1945 most units of the Insurgent Army had been defeated and perhaps fifty per cent of its troops captured. The remainder of the Army broke up into small units which operated in only inaccessible forested areas.. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 23) (IMG)

Nevertheless, it was the UPA:

which has been responsible for most post-war resistance activity. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

In the:

districts of Volynia and Galicia ... large numbers of the inhabitants ... began to support the partisans actively, providing them with food and supplies and offering them shelter. As a result, a solid base for opposition to the Soviet Union was established. An active resistance movement appeared, centered primarily in the Ukraine's Western, newly acquired districts, and dominated by Ukrainian nationalists. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

Such Ukrainian fascist had a top ally in the Kremlin: MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria. As confirmed by his son:

'There are two dominant forces in man: love and national feeling,' he [Lavrenti Beria] said to me. Any attempt to eradicate them would be a grave mistake. One should, on the contrary, base oneself on them. (...). After his post-war disappointment, when he realized that the Soviet people, while wanting an improvement in their standard of living, were incapable of demanding the conditions needed for that to come about, my father decided to wager on the non-Russian republics. He counted on both their national aspirations and the thirst for prosperity. (...). The Ukrainian nationalist movement might have been destroyed a hundred times. My father did not destroy it. He wanted to have all the nationalist movements on his side. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 294) (IMG)

C13S8. The 1946-1947 Polish and Soviet Deportations of some Reactionaries among the Ukrainians

*** IMG-All- {Poland}

After the War, in what became known as Operation VISTULA, the Polish and Soviet governments deported those elements they considered to be sympathetic to the partisan cause. This of course was deeply detrimental to the Ukrainian fascist terror network:

There is no question but that partisan warfare was carried on by the Ukrainians on a considerable scale against the Red Army and the Communist regime after Russian reoccupation of Ukrainian territory. The mass deportation of Ukrainian families by the Poles and Russians in the latter part of 1946 appears to have affected the UPA organization very seriously, and as a result of this move, the UPA had to adopt a decentralized organizational set-up and split up into small units. In any event since 1947 heavily armed Ukrainian partisans have been crossing in small groups into the American Zone from Czechoslovakia or Austria. (QRPLUMB, Vol. 1_0007, Chapter 11: The Ukrainian Element, CIA, p. 102) (IMG)

In Poland, along the CURZON line, the Ukrainian resistance has been severely impaired because of deportation; for this reason numerous followers of the resistance movement are now living in the guise of Poles in the former German provinces of SILESIA, East PRUSSIA, and POMERANIA. (Ukrainian Resistance, AERODYNAMIC, Vol. 11, Operations 0007, April 1953, CIA, p. 4) (IMG)

By July [1947], Vistula had reduced the [Ukrainian fascist] UPA to a small underground force. (MI6:

Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, Stephen Dorril, p. 237) (IMG)

The Polish government deported the Ukrainians that lived in the west of Poland. This was absolutely justified since the Ukrainians who lived in the west of the San River (east of the Soviet-Polish border) actively and materially supported the UPA fascist terror squads, the mass-murderers who carried out the genocide of the Polish people in Wolyn:

Ukrainians living on the right side of the San co-operate with those UPA bands by affording them shelter and protecting them from authorities and the Polish population. The Ukrainian population on the left of the San in Jaroslaw county is particularly terrorized by UPA bands and is anti-Polish. People in this area recently demonstrated their "lack of appreciation" by refusing to pay taxes. (MINORITIES IN POLAND, CIA, September 16, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

As such, it was critically important to prevent those Ukrainian terrorist-mind settler-colonial populations from living in that territory. Furthermore, the ones deported were the Boykos, Lemkos, and mixed-Polish-Ukrainians who lived predominantly in the mountainous area of western Ukraine. As in Chechniya, the mountainous terrain of that region had rendered the development of the productive forces weaker. As the progressive classes often advance concurrent with the productive forces, the progressive classes had not developed much in a mountainous zone not growing economically. As such, with the low level of the advancement of the progressive classes had come the low development of a civilized culture among the inhabitants of that mountainous zone, leading many of those inhabitants to be supportive of the UPA and allied fascist forces.

Beyond this exceptional zone in Ukraine, which represented a small minority of Ukrainians, the Soviet state did not face any popular hostility by the non-Russian Ukrainians. This was the case well until 1957:

Resistance in other parts of the Ukraine has appeared only sporadically and in a limited way, and apart from the nationalists, only small and unimportant bands of individuals have been involved. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

C13S9. Carpatho-Ukraine's People Join the USSR

*** IMG-All-{Czechoslovakia}

Of the regions inhabited by non-Russian Ukrainians, in fact one of the most welcoming to the Soviet Union was Carpathia. In 1944, the Soviet Red Army defeated most of the Axis forces in the areas bordering Western Ukraine. One area bordering Western Ukraine was the Carpathian region. Formerly occupied both by Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Carpathian people were very strongly sympathetic to the Red Army and chose to join the USSR. In the words of one US intelligence document:

Because of their disappointment with the Czechoslovak regime and their hatred for the Hungarian occupation, not only the Communist-supported partisans but also the Ruthenian nationalist underground viewed the Soviet Army as a liberation force in 1944. For the same reasons politically vocal elements among the Ruthenians favored the incorporation of the area subsequently known as the Carpathian oblast (Zakarpatska oblast) into the Ukrainian SSR. A public drive for signatures in favor of incorporating the Carpatho-Ukraine into the USSR was apparently quite successful. To understand this one must bear in mind the people's reaction to Hungarian misrule and the effectiveness of propaganda which at that time was or less echoed by Western information media. In November 1944 a council or rada was convened at Mukacevo and voted unanimously to join the USSR. (Past and Present Developments Concerning Carpatho-Ruthenia, CIA, May 12, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The area of the Carpathian oblast, located beside the Carpathian mountains, was relatively more fertile and had a significant potential for the development of the productive forces and thus of the progressive classes advancing concurrently with the productive forces. The influence of the progressive classes in that zone, coupled with the ethnic oppression of the people in that region, rendered the situation favourable to pro-communist and pro-Soviet currents. The popular support for the government is also demonstrated in the fact that:

initial reaction to collectivization in the Carpathian oblast was likewise favorable and ... there was no significant opposition to it as late as 1950. Large landholders, especially Hungarians and churches, had owned most of the land in Carpatho-Ruthenia prior to collectivization, whereas the majority of the people led a sub-standard existence. When the Soviets transformed the former estates into big collectives, many Ruthenians were therefore pleased. (Past and Present Developments Concerning Carpatho-Ruthenia, CIA, May 12, 1953, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

There is already a surplus of literature on the support enjoyed by the Soviet state from the Russians of Ukraine. After all, the Russians made up the largest portion of the partisan resistance against the Nazi occupation.

C13S10. Contact with Civilians Forbidden in Operation BAGRATION / Some Deportations from Latvia

IMG- All-{Baltic-Finland}

In June of 1944, the Red Army gloriously struck yet another devastating blow at the forces of the Third Reich in Byelorussia and other zones. Codenamed Operation BAGRATION, it is considered by many scholars to be the greatest

defeat ever suffered by the German armed forces. In case any doubts exist regarding the treatment of the civilian population during Operation BAGRATION, a paper by US Major Pirnie of the Analysis Branch of the US Army Center of Military History confirmed that contact with civilians was prohibited by the Soviet high command:

On 29 May, the Supreme High Command issued a directive to the fronts involved in Operation BAGRATION (1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian). According to this directive, all redeployment was to be by night marches. Movement during the day was limited to small groups during non-flying weather. Troops were to be camouflaged during the day and contact with civilians was prohibited. (Soviet Deception Operations during World War II, US Army Center of Military History, Analysis Branch, Washington DC, Major Bruce R. Pirnie, 1985, p. 10) (IMG)

In Latvia, the Germans had installed a puppet regime, which of course had its own police officials and guardsmen. Upon the liberation of Latvia, these Nazi-installed police officials were deported by the Soviet state in May 1945:

In May 1945, the Soviet authorities arrested and deported all police officials, home guardsmen, and people who were suspected of having cooperated with the German troops or occupation forces. Many of these deportees were put to work on the Stalin Canal, and, although some of them later returned to Latvia, they were deported again in later deportations. ('1. Partisan Activity and Deportations in Latvia 2. Economic Conditions in Latvia', CIA, May 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Chapter 14

C14S1. Beriaite-Nazi Activities in Georgia and the Stalin Faction's Purge of the Georgian Bourgeois-Nationalists

IMG-All-{The Georgia Purge}

Until May 5, 1942, countless cities and villages were recaptured and liberated by the Red Army, as the Nazis were retreating westwards. After May 5th, the Germans began to regain ground and opportunity. The German offensive against the Soviet Caucasus region resumed and the assault on Stalingrad began. Citing German intelligence, the CIA noted that: strongly nationalist movements were reported [by the German intelligence] in Georgia.. (Soviet Defections to the Germans in World War II, CIA, November 19, 1952, p. 31) (IMG)

This could be explained by the fact that Beria, who was in charge of the Caucasus region during the War, had used the opportunity to install anti-Soviet bourgeois-nationalist elements of his clan in the top ranks of the Georgian SSR, as well as the Soviet intelligence service. Beria supported separatist causes throughout the USSR:

‘There are two dominant forces in man: love and national feeling,’ he said to me. Any attempt to eradicate them would be a grave mistake. One should, on the contrary, base oneself on them. (...). After his post-war disappointment, when he realized that the Soviet people, while wanting an improvement in their standard of living, were incapable of demanding the conditions needed for that to come about, my father decided to wager on the non-Russian republics. He counted on both their national aspirations and the thirst for prosperity. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 294) (IMG)

Georgian bourgeois-nationalism nonetheless was one of the top separatist tendencies that Beria promoted because Beria had established close contacts with the MI6-sponsored Menshevik exiles as was shown in C4S4.

Beria therefore promoted such bourgeois-nationalist rhetoric:

When the nationalism of the Georgians or that of other peoples of the USSR was mentioned in his [Beria’s] hearing he never failed to observe that it was a reaction to the imperial policy of the ‘Russian chauvinists’ (he used that expression). (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 295) (IMG)

The US intelligence noted that Beria was:

a Mingrelian in origin. This Georgian national group, although it numbers only 150,000 people, has its own language, and its members in general are very ... predisposed to politics and political intrigues. Most Mingrelians are clannish and help each other to higher positions whenever they can. (The Beriya- Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

As a promoter of Mingrelian bourgeois-nationalism:

BERIA had never forgotten his clan and after this time [when he became NKVD head], he started promoting Mingrelians not only to local government and Party positions in Georgia but to positions throughout the USSR, especially to positions with the NKVD in Moscow. During World War II, BERIA was appointed Deputy President of the USSR Council of Ministers and Member of the national Defense Council. In this capacity he was entrusted with the organization of defense of the Caucasus, and he used his extraordinary powers to strengthen the Mingrelian positions in Georgia and in the national MGB. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Sergo Beria confirmed that as a result, well until the 1950s:

my father ... was strengthening his influence over a certain group. Stalin undertook to discredit him, first of all in the eyes of the Georgians, so as to destroy the support he enjoyed in that republic. The Mingrelians ... had acquired a dominant position in the [Georgian] republic. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 240) (IMG)

Loyal to Beria, the Mingrelian bourgeois nationalists had helped Beria create a wide network throughout the Soviet intelligence networks as well as the Georgian SSR. As a supporter of Georgian bourgeois-nationalism, Beria pursued nepotism, making sure that his close Mingrelian friends remained in charge – much the better for Beria if his friends were corrupt, because after all, corruption promoted the bureaucratic class at the expense of the proletariat in the Soviet state. The nepotism of Beria’s allies in the Mingrelian clan indeed resulted in:

many irregularities, cases of most shameless favoritism, numerous misappropriations, etc., going on in the Georgian SSR. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

These were cases which

STALIN personally discovered.. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

in his:

trip to Georgia in 1951.. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Subsequently a purge began in Georgia, known as the ‘Mingrelian Affair’. The CIA reported:

Following this trip, a large purge took place in Georgia in November 1951. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

In Georgia, Beria's top:

personal friend and henchman, [was] A. N. RAPAVA, the MGB Minister of the Georgian SSR.. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Sergo Beria confirmed:

Rapava was very close to my father, and his wife, a niece of the former [Georgian] Menshevik President Noah Jordania, was my mother's best friend. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

Beria and Rapava both had family connections to the exile Georgian Mensheviks.

However, during the War, the corruption of MI6 agent Beria's network in Georgia had not yet been exposed. As such, a network of Georgian bourgeois-nationalists serving Beria took shape in the Georgian SSR. And because it had been increasingly clear to Beria's British bosses that the Third Reich was losing the War, it made sense for Beria's group to negotiate a deal with the Germans such that an independent fascist Georgia hostile to Soviet power would replace the Georgian SSR, if the Nazis would take over that territory. A report by the US Congress pointed to reports that in the event of a German takeover of Georgia, the covert network of Beria's friend Rapava would take over fascist Georgia:

Men, especially sent as emissaries, went over to the Georgian Legion fighting on the German side and brought news that Georgia was ready to detach itself from Russia and that, indeed, a government was already formed and ready to take over. It is believed that Rapava, the Minister of the Interior of Soviet Georgia, headed this underground government. Rapava was a close personal friend of Beria, and it has been said that Beria knew of his negotiations with the Germans and even encouraged him. (Communist Takeover and Occupation of Georgia, Special Report No. 6 of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives – Eighty-Third Congress – Second Session under authority of H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438, Select Committee on Communist Aggression, 1954, pp. 28-29) (IMG)

Beria surely had contacts with the 'Georgian Legion', a German-made SS division made up of Georgian Nazis who had betrayed the cause of the overwhelmingly pro-Bolshevik Georgian people and had instead resorted to the advancement of the objectives of the Nazis. Multiple sources corroborate that Nina Beria's nephew was a prominent Georgian member of the Nazi SS. After the War, Lavrenti Beria saved Nina's nephew. Stalin reportedly found out about this only since 1951, when the conflict between him and Beria had intensified. The best source in this regard is Sergo Beria himself, according to whom, during the Great Patriotic War:

my cousin was also put to test. At the beginning of the War, Teimuraz Shaudia studied at the Podolsk Machine-Gun School. In the autumn of 1941, he was captured wounded, along with other combatants. When the Germans began to create a [Georgian] national formation, he joined one of these battalions. (My Father is People's Commissar Beria, Sergo Beria) (IMG)

Amy Knight, a scholar from the US Library of Congress and the Wilson Center, supports this claim, adding that in particular, Shavdia served in the Georgische Legion which was a German-created Georgian SS division. Knight wrote:

Nina Beria's nephew, Teimuraz Shavdia ... served in the so-called Georgian Legion, organized to combat resistance to German occupation forces. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 149) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria tried in vain to help Nina Gegechkori Beria's nephew. In the footnotes section of Sergo Beria's biography of his father, Françoise Thom – the French historian, sociologist and editor of Sergo Beria's book – wrote:

Nina Beria had also a nephew, Teimuraz Shadia, who, having been taken prisoner by the Germans, became a commander in the Georgian national legion which fought alongside the Wehrmacht. Later he joined the SS and combated the resistance in France. After the Liberation he was helped by Gegechkori and discreetly picked up in Paris in 1945 by Sharia [Beria's agent] on Beria's orders. (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 363. Citing: Stolyarov, Palachi t zherly, pp. 230-231) (IMG)

The British historian Mark Levene, in a book published by the Oxford University Press, confirmed that Shavdia was personally involved in Wehrmacht atrocities in France, and that he returned to the Soviet Union under "his uncle's protection":

Teimuraz Shavdia, Beria's own nephew by marriage, was involved in the putative formation of a German 'Georgian' Legion out of Soviet POWs like himself, and was personally implicated in Wehrmacht atrocities in France, but at the war's end was brought back to the USSR under his uncle's protection. (Annihilation: Volume II: The European Rimlands 1939-1953, Oxford University Press, Mark Levene, p. 476. Citing: Arkady Vaksberg, Stalin Against The Jews. trans. Antonia W. Bouis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), 275-276.) (IMG)

However, Beria conducted this operation in 1945 without Joseph Stalin's knowledge. In fact:

Stalin learnt of this from Rukhadze in December 1951 and had [Teimuraz Shadia] arrested (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 363. Citing: Stolyarov, Palachi t zherly, pp. 230-231) (IMG)

Thus, in 1952, Shavdia was thrown into jail, based on the Soviet state's correct accusations:

that Teymuraz changed his homeland [during the War], served in SD, had the title of unterscharfuhrer [SS corporal or sergeant], and they say that even the "great caring uncle did not save him from his deserved

punishment – under pressure, the traitor was sentenced to 25 years of correctional labour.” (My Father is People’s Commissar Beria, Sergo Beria) (IMG)

Note that the SS and SD were both German intelligence agencies and special operations forces.

However, years later, with the help of Nikita Khrushchev’s group, Teimuraz Shavdia

was released [from jail] in 1955.. (My Father is People’s Commissar Beria, Sergo Beria) (IMG)

Clearly, all of these facts demonstrate that Beria had established close contact with his prominent Georgian SS relative, and that therefore he had cooperated with elements belonging to the Third Reich as early as 1945. It is, however, likely that Beria had established direct contacts with the Third Reich even as early as 1943. Reports by unnamed Georgian refugees consulted by the US intelligence support this claim:

There were other reports from Georgian refugees to the effect that Beria and other Georgian leaders sent a representative to Berlin in 1943 to approach Hitler about the possible creation of an independent state of Georgia. (Purge of L. P. Beria, CAESAR-10, CIA, August 17, 1954, p. 17) (IMG)

Again, Beria’s actions in the Georgian SSR did not represent in any ways the Georgian people, who were overwhelmingly supportive of the Socialist Soviet state.

Beria sabotaged Stalin’s attempt to lure Evgeni Gegechkori, the notorious MI6 agent and former leader of Menshevik Georgia, back to the Soviet Union. Needless to say, had Gegechkori been lured back to his home country, the purges that would have occurred afterwards would have immensely damaged the Beriaite network in the USSR. Sergo Beria recalled:

Stalin tried to persuade Evgeni Gegechkori, my wife’s uncle, to return to the USSR. No need to say what would have happened to him! My father never, if he could manage it, sacrificed people who worked with him and were useful to him. He warned Gegechkori that he was going to be invited to come to Georgia and that he must on no account agree. He also sabotaged the repatriation to Georgia of the Menshevik leaders, and prevented the return to the USSR of all the Georgian national treasures which, he claimed, might be embezzled. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 241) (IMG {Titoist Coup})

After the Great Patriotic War, the campaign against the Beria-Rapava faction in Georgia continued. The CIA reported:

The first check to the practically sovereign power of BERIA in Georgia came in 1947 when his personal friend and henchman, A. N. RAPAVA, the MGB Minister of the Georgian SSR, was dismissed for misappropriation of several million rubles during the USSR currency devaluation reform. With BERIA’s assistance, RAPAVA escaped arrest and eventually was given a less important position in the Georgian Government, namely the position of Minister of Justice. The MGB Ministry of the Georgian SSR was given to N. M. RUKHADZE, who allegedly came from the Army and was not a BERIA man. Although a blow, this was not enough to shake BERIA’s position in the USSR Government, as he was supported by large numbers of adherents he had planted in Georgia and in the MGB agencies throughout the country. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Nevertheless, these anti-corruption purges:

marked the start of a campaign against BERIA’s sovereignty in Georgia. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Then:

In 1948 Stalin began to bring pressure to bear on Rapava, Georgia’s Minister of Internal Affairs, to provide him with a compromising dossier on my father. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

However:

Rapava did nothing [against my father].. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

As time went by:

Rumors of many arbitrary actions of [Beria-linked] Georgian officials and the creation of a “national bourgeois movement” the Republic became more and more persistent. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Purges were to begin against the corrupt leaders. For the purges to be carried out:

Ignatiev’s tool in Georgia was Rukhadze, who headed the local MGB. Stalin knew that this wretch hated my father and had chosen him for that very reason. Mgeladze was not against that policy but did not actively engage in it. Stalin sent for the Georgian leaders, including Rukhadze, and told them to compile a dossier. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 240) (IMG)

Those purged:

were charged with various crimes, each according to his official position.. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The Stalin faction:

appointed a new First Secretary for Georgia, Mgeladze. This man was not directly connected with the head of the State Security, Ignatiev.. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 240) (IMG)

However:

what was most significant, in addition to these individual crimes, all of them [officials] were accused of promotion of a "national bourgeois movement" [sic; meant bourgeois-nationalist movement] in the Georgian SSR. (The Beriia-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

In what became known as the 'Mingrelian Affair', the Stalin faction systematically purged thousands of the affiliates of this Mingrelian bourgeois-nationalist network, which it officially accused of collaboration with the Menshevik circles in France and the British intelligence service.

C14S2. Deportations of the Reactionary Kalmyks, Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, and Kabardinians

*** IMG-All-{{WWII Deportations}}{Titoist Coup}

Areas that leave little room for the development of the productive forces often end up being filled with low civilizational development in general and a high presence of ultra-reactionary tribes. The Chechniya region, with its mountains, and the desert parts of Mongolia and Saudi Arabia are cases in point. 'Daghestan', an area proximate to and politically associated to Chechniya, means the 'Land of the Mountains'. In Chechniya and the areas surrounding it, there were the Kalmyk, Chechen, Ingushis, and Kabardinian populations who lived very close to the mountainous areas, had experienced a low level of development of the productive forces, thereupon a low development of the progressive classes. Inevitably, they came under the immense influence of fascist reaction. For a long time, the Chechens were Pagan extremists; later on, upon conversion to Islam, they adopted Sufism as a liberal current that would allow continued Paganism albeit with an 'Islamic' appearance; (and much later on, Chechniya became a zone of Wahhabi terror). During the Great Patriotic War, the high ultra-reactionary presence there increased the sympathies of large segments of the population there with the Nazis. In particular, and in spite of the generous support that they had received from the Soviet state, including their statuses as Autonomous SSRs, the overwhelming majorities of the Kalmyk, Tatar, Chechen, Ingush, and Kabardinian populations had actively, covertly, and overtly collaborated with the forces of the Third Reich against the USSR. CIA documents have repeatedly confirmed this reality:

In the areas of the USSR overrun by the Germans during World War II, certain minority nationalities collaborated actively with the invaders. Notable among these were the Kalmyks, the Crimean Tatars, the Chechens, and the Ingushi. After the liberation of the areas inhabited by these peoples, the Soviet Government decided to punish them for their disloyalty by liquidating their autonomous governments.

To prevent them from aiding any future invader, it was decided to transfer these peoples en masse to the interior of Soviet Siberia. These secret decisions were taken by the Soviet Government in mid- 1943. (Forced Transfer of Soviet Minority Nationalities, CIA, March 18, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

In the Crimea, the tartars wanted to organize a volunteer unit to fight alongside the Germans.. (Study of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities on the Eastern Front and in Adjacent Areas during WW II, CIA, p. 10) (IMG)

One could call such deportations a 'punishment'. A punishment as it was, it also served as a reward. Populations that had been under the influence of the ultra-reactionary tribal cultures for so many years had a very slow development; moving these people out of the mountainous areas and onto flatter lands for work in collective farms was an advancement of these societies. Sure, deportations were individual punishments, but in the grand scheme of historical development, they were also collective rewards.

The following is an excerpt of a CIA document about the deportation of Kabardinians:

Beginning 4 March 1944, some fifty or sixty Kabardinian families from village of Kamennomost (Akhalshehi) [N 43-45, E 41-55] were loaded into trucks and deported to Siberia and Central Asia. These were families which had overtly collaborated with the Germans; however, many other families who had also collaborated were not deported because there were not enough trucks. This was the closest thing to a large deportation that occurred. ('1. Deportation of Kabardinians 2. Resistance in the Caucasus', CIA, Date Distributed: September 15, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Not every single member of these Caucasus nationalities was deported. A small minority were allowed to remain in their homeland either because they were too old, or disabled, or because they had not demonstrated pro-Nazi tendencies. For instance:

Some Kabardinians who were prisoners during the war have been returned to their native area by the Soviets. ('1. Deportation of Kabardinians 2. Resistance in the Caucasus', CIA, Date Distributed: September 15, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Nor was it the case that everyone in these populations was deported. No, the Soviet state, while aware that the vast majority of these peoples did support the Nazis, also showed awareness that there were many Chechens, Ingushis,

Kalmyks, etc. who were law-abiding citizens of the USSR if not also progressive or communist individuals. The many reactionaries among these ethnic groups were carefully identified and deported en masse onto the Soviet interior. The Soviet intelligence service meticulously collected the names of each and every single one of the individuals who collaborated or aimed to collaborate with the Nazis. Only those categories of individuals, and possibly some of their dependents, were to be deported. Below is an excerpt of a CIA document about these procedures or each nationality:

1. The first group to be affected were the Kalmyks. MVD (then NKGB) Colonel Mikhail Stulov, personally took part in this action. Towards the end of 1943, officers from various territorial offices of the then NKGB (oblastnye upravleniya NKGB) were detailed to a special task force which was sent to the Kalmyk ASSR. The job of this group was to prepare the ground for future deportation. For three months or so, they collected the names and addresses of the most anti-Soviet elements among the Kalmyks, studied the terrain, and, in general, made plans for the round-up operation. All of this activity was carried out in secret. In early 1944, detachments of the Special Purpose Division (DON-Diviziya osobogo naznacheniya) of the NKVD were moved into place and, under the guidance of the NKGB task force, carried out the simultaneous round-up of the entire Kalmyk population. The Kalmyks were packed into freight trains assembled for the purpose and shipped off to the Kazakh SSR.
2. The next operation was that involving the Chechen and Ingush minorities. NKGB officers from Siberia and Far East, detrained near Ordzhonikidze (N 41-22, E 69-22) in early February 1944. Here they were briefed on the job. First, they were told to take off their NKGB insignia, as they were to pass themselves off as engineer officers. They were divided into small groups and assigned to the various districts of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Each officer was eventually given an area for which he was solely responsible. The preliminary work consisted of establishing the names and addresses of the most anti-Soviet elements, determining the location of "bandit" groups, arms caches, names of all inhabitants, etc. Detachments of the DON were already in place, masquerading as regular soldiers assigned to local defense duties. Every day during early February 1944 the male population throughout the ASSR was assembled and marched out of the towns to dig trenches. This was done to accustom them to the idea of being assembled. The attitude of the local population towards the Soviet authorities was hostile. The throats of several officials were cut and no one ventured forth after dark. The actual round-up took place throughout the Chechen-Ingush ASSR on 15 or 16 February 1944. [A]ll the males were assembled on the town square as usual early in the morning. There were between 1,500 and 2,000 of them. Once they were assembled they were surrounded by soldiers of the DON detachment. [A] group (some 60 officers) then appeared before them and read the decision of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, according to which the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was to be liquidated and its population transferred to Kazakhstan. This news was received with tears and lamentation but no resistance was offered. All individuals were then passed through lines of soldiers, who searched them for weapons, checked their names against previously prepared lists, and escorted them to waiting trains. During the rest of the day the women and children and the aged and infirm were rounded up and also packed into the trains. They were kept separate from the men. Each household was allowed to take 30 kg of baggage. This meant that most of their possessions had to be left behind. By evening everything was silent; the only noise to be heard was the lowing of un milked cows and the howling of abandoned dogs.
3. On 23 February 1944, the youngest and fittest officers and a suitable number of troops were sent into the mountains to round up the inhabitants of remote villages. The same procedure was followed. In several cases, however, the inhabitants, who were now forewarned, resisted actively. Several were killed. Once rounded up, the population of each village was marched down to the foothills, where trucks were waiting to take them to the entraining points. After the main evacuation job had been done, most of the NKGB officers returned to their units. Special task forces (opergruppy) were left behind to clean up the "bandit" groups that were still holding out in the hills. The clean-up operation lasted another six months. During the evacuation there was a considerable amount of looting, especially on the part of local militia personnel. Russians from the central oblasts were immediately settled in the evacuated towns and villages.
4. (...).
5. Later in the spring of 1944, the same operation was carried out with the Crimean Tatars. [T]hey resisted actively and several months were required to complete the operation.
(Forced Transfer of Soviet Minority Nationalities, CIA, March 18, 1954, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Once they were resettled to the Soviet interior, they engaged in collective farming and mining. The CIA reported:

most of the deported North Caucasians in Kazakhstan work almost exclusively in kolkhozy or coal mines. ('1. Deportation of Kabardinians 2. Resistance in the Caucasus', CIA, Date Distributed: September 15, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Beria, by contrast, did everything to prevent the implementation of this plan. Referring to the deportation of these predominantly Nazi Caucasus nationalities in his biography of his father, Sergo Beria remarked:

My father [Lavrenti Beria] opposed it, orally and in writing. He had dealings with these peoples, and they had trusted him. He did not want to lose face before them by seeming to be a man who had failed to keep his word. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, pp. 95-96) (IMG)

C14S3. Beria Military Sabotage against Soviet Power / Communist-Coopted Beriaite Agent Abakumov Clashes with the Beria-Malenkov Network / Beria pursues an Alliance with Nazi Germany

*** IMG-All- {Beria betrayals during War} {Titoist Coup}

During the Great Patriotic War, Beria was sabotaging the Soviet military. General Voronov, the Red Army's Chief Marshal of the Artillery, remarked:

THE LEADERSHIP of the Main Artillery Directorate took energetic measures to ensure that new equipment quickly reached the points where new artillery formations and units of Supreme Headquarters reserve were being formed. Each artillery formation was a complex organism. In addition to a variety of artillery ordnance, it had also to be supplied with diverse engineering equipment, communications equipment, prime movers, automotive transportation, and much else. We were given effective help by the People's Commissariat of Defense. The most complicated matter was to obtain auto transport. Here we were confronted by many unexpected obstacles.

One day Stalin ordered a fully equipped artillery corps to be transferred immediately to one of the Army Groups.

"The corps is ready, but it cannot be sent. We have no auto transportation," I replied.

Stalin frowned. "How many trucks do you need?" he asked. I answered that 900 trucks were required, according to the schedule

Stalin turned to Malenkov and Beria. "Go and find out where to get them. And you stay," he told me. "Report on the progress of the new formations."

He was satisfied with my report.

When I left, I was met by Malenkov and Beria. "Take 400 trucks, and let's hear no more about it!" said Beria gruffly.

"Nine hundred trucks are needed for an artillery corps. That is the minimum," I replied.

The conversation became increasingly sharp. I was advised to limit myself to 450 trucks, then to 500- "I shall go back and report to the Supreme Commander in Chief that I cannot send the corps," I finally answered firmly.

"Where should the trucks be sent?" Malenkov then asked in quite a different tone.

I named the formation points. The next day, 900 trucks were there. Supreme Headquarters' urgent request was carried out. Such, at times, were the difficulties which accompanied the creation of new formations..

As a rule, once a month, N. D. Iakovlev and I (and when I was away, he alone) would report a draft concerning the distribution of armaments and munitions for the next month of war to Supreme Headquarters.

Once in the process of approving this list, Stalin's eye fell on the figures: "50,000 rifles for the NKVD."

He showered us with questions: Who, specifically, had made this request; why did the NKVD need so many rifles? We said that we too were surprised but that Beria insisted on it. Beria was immediately summoned. The latter attempted to give an explanation in Georgian. Stalin interrupted him ... and ordered him to answer in Russian [so that the Russian commanders present could understand what Beria was saying]: Why and for what purpose did he need so many rifles?

"They are needed to arm newly formed NKVD divisions," Beria said.

"Half - 25,000 - will be enough."

Beria began to insist stubbornly. Stalin made two attempts to reason with him. Beria did not want to listen.

Then, irritated to the limit, Stalin said to us: "Cross out what is written there and write in 10,000 rifles."

He then approved the list. When we left Stalin's once, Beria overtook us and said malevolently: "Just wait, we'll fix your guts!"

He hurled this phrase at N. D. Iakovlev and me more than once when he was dissatisfied with our reports or actions. At that time, we did not attach the proper significance to these words, considering this to be some kind of Oriental joke. Only later did we learn that this monster and traitor usually carried out his threats.

(Stalin and his generals : Soviet military memoirs of World War II, Seweryn Bialer, pp. 457-459. Originally

published: N. N. Voronov, "Podvig sovetskogo naroda," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1965, No. 4, pp. 21 -22; N. N. Voronov, *Na sluzhbe voennoi* (moscow, 1963), pp. 194-195) (IMG)

Citing Voronov, the US Library of Congress and Wilson Center scholar Amy Knight wrote:

Colonel General of Artillery N. N. Voronov was ordered by Stalin to transfer a fully equipped artillery corps to one of the army groups. In response to Voronov's request for nine hundred trucks to transport the troops, Stalin directed Beria and Malenkov, who were present at the time, to see about obtaining them. Outside Stalin's office, Beria and Malenkov had a sharp exchange with Voronov, trying (unsuccessfully) to force him into accepting only half the number of trucks needed. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 116. Citing: Seweryn Bialer, ed., *Stalin and His Generals. Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 457-459) (IMG)

Viktor Abakumov, a Beria agent, was coopted by the Stalin faction to combat the Beria mafia and was thus chosen as the head of the Counter-Intelligence Directorate (SMERSH) during the Great Patriotic War. Abakumov went on to uncover speculative business operations and thereupon arrest several allies of Beria and Malenkov. This included Shakhurin and Merkulov:

Early during World War II, Abakumov became chief of the Counterintelligence Directorate (Smersh) and was in constant contact with Stalin. During this period, his agentura disclosed a network of speculative [business] operations in the Ministry of Aviation Industry, which included the Minister himself, Col. Gen. A. I. Shakhurin, who was later dismissed and arrested. This disclosure reflected directly on the position of Malenkov, who was responsible for this ministry during the war as a member of the State Committee of Defense. In addition, this also undermined the authority of one of Beriya's closest friends, Army General V. N. Merkulov, Minister of Defense, who was removed from his position on orders of the Central Committee. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

Merkulov had always been an old associate of Beria:

Army General Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov, an old "Chekist", worked with Beriya in the Caucasus for a long time. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

However, after the Great Patriotic War, the Beria agent Merkulov was demoted from a security job to an economic job, and his agent Kobulov went there with him:

Merkulov was removed from the post of Minister, and Abakumov was appointed in his place. Several other responsible workers of the Ministry of State Security were removed simultaneously with Merkulov, including the first Deputy Minister, Colonel General B. Z. Kobulov. Merkulov was appointed Chief of the Chief Directorate for Soviet Property Abroad, which was sharp demotion. Kobulov turned up in the same department, as did other MGB members who had fallen into disgrace. This department was jokingly called "The Chief Directorate of Sinners." It should be noted that Beriya did everything possible to have Merkulov retained in his post; but, in spite of high regard for him, to everybody's surprise, he did not succeed for some incomprehensible reason. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Colonel General B. Z. Kobulov, an old "Chekist", worked with Beriya in the Caucasus. He was Merkulov's deputy, carrying out the immediate direction of the former Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence) of the MGB. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 6) (IMG)

As mentioned, Abakumov, an agent of Beria, had been encircled by communist agents and thus coopted to fight the Beria network:

After Stalin's death Abakumov told my father what had happened. He claimed that he had only been obeying formal orders from Stalin to complete a dossier against my father. Abakumov protested his devotion to my father and claimed to have done nothing about it. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergio Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

The communist-coopted Abakumov's clashes with his secret mafia boss Beria led the two to attack each other ferociously and without mercy:

From then on, the relationship between Beriya and Abakumov became strained, which caused much talk in the Ministry. It is noteworthy that the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sergey Nikiforovich Kruglov, and his deputy, Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, who were considered as men promoted by Beriya, likewise became unfriendly towards Abakumov, especially Serov. Serov openly dropped remarks of a very obscene character about Abakumov, and called him an "upstart", "humbug", "coward", etc. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

The Beria agent Serov denounced Abakumov on behalf of Beria. Serov himself later became the head of the KGB and opportunistically turned 'against' Beria as well on the overt level, even though his covert sympathies continued to remain with Beria.

Another official of the Soviet intelligence targeted by communist-coopted Beria agent Abakumov was the Beria

agent Goglidze:

Colonel General S. A. Goglidze, an old "Chekist", had worked for a long time with Beriya in the Caucasus. For more than ten years he was chief of the MGB for the Khabarovsk Kray, and at the same time held the post of representative of the Central Committee of the Communist of the USSR for the Far east. He was very influential in the central apparatus of the MGB and was close to Merkulov and Beriya. (...). After Abakumov's appointment to the post of Minister of State Security, the position and influence of Goglidze were considerably shaken. Abakumov considered him a rival and did everything possible to discredit him. This is illustrated by the fact that during the period from 1947 to 1950 a number of commissions were sent to check on the work of the administration of the MGB for the Khabarovsk Kray; this had not happened before Abakumov's time. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, pp. 5 -6) (IMG)

Other cases of sabotage of course occurred in Georgia. Beria was actively working to help the Germans destroy the Soviet defenses in the Caucasus region. In a 1960 article, General Ivan Tiulenev remarked:

IN RECALLING the defense in the foothills of the Caucasus I cannot pass over in silence the base role of the villainous enemy of the people, Beria. He arrived at the Transcaucasian front on August 22, 1942, as the representative of Supreme Headquarters, and stayed two weeks. Along with Beria came a large group of his "henchmen"- Kabulov, Mamulov, Piiashev, Tsanova, and others. Beria issued all his orders in the name of Supreme Headquarters and demanded that they be carried out without fail. On any grounds, and even without grounds, he and his closest aide, Kabulov, exceeded their authority and discredited generals of the Soviet army.

R. Ia. Malinovskii, thanks to his straightforwardness, was the object of special hostility on their part.

They heaped all kind of slander upon him and even threatened him with arrest.

When a particularly serious situation developed at the front, I posed before Beria the question of placing fifteen to twenty thousand NKVD troops at our disposal. In reply to this, he burst into foul abuse and threatened to break my back if I even tried to mention it again.

There were often instances when Beria and Kabulov issued instructions over the head of the Army Group's command, thereby organizing the work of headquarters. Taking advantage of his unlimited powers, Beria set up at Transcaucasian Army Group headquarters a parallel group for the defense of the chief Caucasus range and placed at its head his NKVD favorites, who were ignoramuses on military questions.

To ensure the successful defense of the Supreme quarters had planned to send us several units and formations regular troops from its own reserve. But Beria spoiled that, too. Instead of the reserves of Supreme Headquarters, there arrived in the new units of the NKVD, which could not be utilized in active combat.

When I was in Moscow on November 15, 1942, I again raised the question of subordinating to our command at least some units of NKVD troops stationed in the Transcaucasian zone. Stalin approved my suggestion, but Beria, who was present, objected sharply and, moreover, coarsely abused the Army Group command. He agreed to place a certain number of troops at the disposal of the Army Group only after Stalin insisted.

All during his brief stay at the front, Beria did not once display a serious interest in the defense system worked out by the Army Group military council and approved by Supreme Headquarters. Although saboteurs and spies were frequently dropped by parachute, Beria and his retainers Rukhadze and Kabulov did not take effective steps to catch and destroy them.

Beria's trips to the defense lines in the area of Makhachkala, Groznyi, Vladikavkaz, and Sukhumi boiled down to and noise, to the creation of a semblance of concern about the organization and consolidation of defense. As a matter of fact, by his criminal attitude and conduct he only disorganized, hindered, and essentially disrupted our work.

(Stalin and his generals : Soviet military memoirs of World War II, Seweryn Bialer, pp. 451-452. Originally published: I. V. Tiulenev, Cherez tri voiny (Moscow, 1960), pp. 196-197.) (IMG)

By damaging the Soviet Red Army's defenses especially in the Caucasus, Lavrenti Beria was serving the Third Reich. Sergio Beria stated that the British policy of support for the weaker Nazis against the more powerful Soviets from 1943 onwards was 'our own' (Beria's) policy:

Everybody was amazed at the Fuhrer's stupidity. He had let himself be made a fool of by the British! As for the latter, to them we ascribed the policy which had been our own: wait until the contending powers had bled each other white, then prolong the struggle by supporting the side that was about to succumb. Even Maisky, though pro-British, shared that view: 'When the Germans have given us a good thrashing,' he said, 'the British will decide it's time to lend us a helping hand.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergio Beria, p. 74) (IMG)

As was mentioned before in C9S3, Dekanozov had been a top-ranking intelligence agent of Beria in the Soviet intelligence service until late 1942. Dekanozov continued to remain as an intelligence agent but had been demoted to the position of deputy in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, engaged in subversive activities against the Molotov faction of the

Foreign Ministry:

After Dekanozov's transfer to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a number of very important operational telegrams to foreign representatives were found unsent in his personal safe. In spite of this and other serious shortcomings in his work, Dekanozov was not held accountable and, what is more, was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of personnel. According to the stories told by persons who worked with him in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dekanozov continued to act in the same way, and sometimes went so far as to get into arguments with Molotov, which, from the viewpoint of employees of all ranks in the Ministry, was completely unbelievable. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 5) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

To say that Dekanozov just disagreed is to put the matter lightly. Dekanozov is well-known for his Nazi German intelligence connections for 1943. Dekanozov was an agent of Beria and Beria was an agent of the MI6. In late 1942 or early 1943, the MI6 decided to ally with Nazi Germany and so did Beria and most likely his agent Dekanozov. There have been numerous reports of Dekanozov's suspicious ties to Nazi Germany in late 1942 or early 1943:

Dekanozov was also a key figure in the contacts which the USSR is reported to have attempted with the Germans in 1942-3. According to these reports, the USSR made contact with the chief of the Ostland Branch in the Main Political Directorate of the German Ostministerium in an effort to arrange meetings between German and Soviet officials in Sweden. One of the Soviet official was to be Minister Dekanozov, and the object of this meeting was said to be the arranging of a separate peace between Germany and [the Beria faction in] the USSR. (Purge of L. P. Beria, CAESAR-10, CIA, August 17, 1954, p. 17) (IMG)

There is no doubt that the Stalin faction could not benefit from a peace with Nazi Germany and that the plot for a peace with Nazi Germany was a Beriaite plot. On this matter, Pavel Sudoplatov has made an important confession. Sudoplatov was Beria's close intelligence associate, a so-called 'Beria man'. According to Amy Knight of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center:

Among the Beria supporters who remained in leading MGB posts throughout this period were ... Pavel Sudoplatov.. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 167) (IMG{Factional Conflict & Great Purge})

Sudoplatov agrees that the allegations that Stalin wanted to establish a separate peace with the Third Reich are unfounded:

However, in his memoirs, Khrushchev, who knew all these details, nevertheless preferred to adhere to the previous version that Beria was negotiating with Hitler about a separate peace, caused by Stalin's panic. In my opinion, Stalin and the entire leadership felt that an attempt to conclude a separate peace in this unprecedentedly difficult war would automatically deprive [the USSR] of power. Not to mention their truly patriotic feelings, of which I am absolutely sure; any form of peace agreement was unacceptable to them. (Special Operations: Lubyanka and the Kremlin 1930-1950, Pavel Sudoplatov, chapter 6) (IMG)

In the foreign ministry, Dekanozov also engaged in:

unbelievable romantic adventures.. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 5) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

Hence:

Dekanozov's behavior finally gave Molotov a chance to insist that Dekanozov should be removed from the Ministry. His unbelievable romantic adventures, some of which were scandalously publicized in the Ministry, served as a valid reason for Molotov to decide to dismiss him. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 5) (IMG)

Chapter 15

C15S1. Romanian Resistance against the Axis and the Monarchy / The People's Democratic Revolution in Romania / Class Struggles and Economic Development in Romania / From Trotskyite pro-Nazi Elements to Titoist agents of the Mossad; the Threat against the Romanian Proletariat

*** IMG-All-{Romania}

In Romania, upon the initiative of the Romanian Communist Party, the popular front of the anti-fascist parties formed: In June 1943 the National Peasants, National Liberals, Communists, and Social Democrats, responding to a Communist Party proposal, formed the Blocul National Democrat (National Democratic Bloc – BND), whose aim was to extricate Romania from the Nazi war effort. (Armistice Negotiations and Soviet Occupation, Country Studies, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress; from: Ronald D. Bachman, ed. Romania: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989.) (IMG)

As the Red Army was getting closer to Romania, King Mihai (or King Michael) could not but feel threatened. Thus, he set about to switch sides in the War. In the words of the Federal Research Division of the US government, on August 23, 1944:

King Michael, a number of army officers, and armed Communist-led civilians supported by the BND locked Ion Antonescu into a safe and seized control of the government. (Armistice Negotiations and Soviet Occupation, Country Studies, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress; from: Ronald D. Bachman, ed. Romania: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989.) (IMG)

Emilian Ionescu, a military general of the Romanian monarcho-fascist era, provided some details on the circumstances of Antonescu's downfall. According to a website that documents the biographies of all the commanders of World War II, Emilian Ionescu had the following positions in Romania during each time period:

1940-02-01 – 1941-01-10 Chief of Staff, Inspectorate-General of Motorized-Mechanized Units

1941-01-10 – 1944-03-16 Commanding Officer 1st Armoured Regiment

1944-03-16 – 1947-XX-XX Adjutant to the King

1948-01-01 – Retired

(Ionescu, V. Emilian. Generals.dk, The Generals of World War II) (IMG)

Inonescu's political fortunes, as the above evidence shows, rose in 1941 with the rise in strength of the fascists in Romania. His political fortunes fell and he was forced to 'retire' in 1948 when the monarcho-fascist regime was overthrown. The correlation of his rise and fall with the rise and fall of the fascist forces, along with the fact that he was a trusted agent of the king, are reflective of his political loyalties. In the late 1960s, the Romanian military commander Emilian Ionescu wrote an article for the Romanian Party press. Robert R. King, the senior analyst for the CIA's Radio Free Europe and former National Security Council (NSC) staff member under Brzezinski, quoted that article by Inoescu:

the party was described as "the initiator, organizer, and the leader of the action to overthrow the military- fascist dictatorship,". (A History of the Romanian Communist Party, Robert R. King, 1980, p. 42) (IMG)

Some may argue that the royalist military commander's article was biased given its publication by the Romanian Party press in the 1960s. Perhaps that is true for other aspects of his article, but what is for certain is that his claim that the ousting of the Antonescu regime was by the Romanian Communist Party is neither biased nor incorrect. In contrast to the CIA-MI6 propaganda narrative that the Romanian Communist Party played a marginal role in the overthrow of Antonescu and that King Mihai's group played the most important role, a 1974 US intelligence document acknowledged that Romania's 'pro-Nazi regime was ousted by the Communist[s]':

The Romanian Iron Guard was a political movement founded after World War I for the purpose of strengthening the economic conditions, eliminating semitism and foreign influence, achieving educational reform, boycotting industrial and government interests and promoting interest in peasantry. The movement was pro-monarchy, pro-Germany, and anti-communist, and was active in the 1930's and early 1940's when the pro-Nazi [Antonescu] regime was ousted by the Communist[s]. (Bishop Viorel Trifa The Romanian Orthodox Church In America, CONFIDENTIAL, United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters, Best Available Copy, declassified by the CIA, August 14, 1974, p. 8) (IMG)

Hence, the Antonescu regime was overthrown, and Radescu was installed as the chief of the Romanian state alongside the Romanian King.

From late 1942 onwards, the Anglo-American intelligence began to side with the fascist Axis and the Radescu movement followed along with the Anglo-Americans. This fascist agent of the Anglo-American intelligence services was the head of the Romanian state and had the backing of the King.

With the entry of the Soviet Red Army into Romania, the Romanian communist leader Gheorghiu-Dej was liberated:

When Frimu was shot in a strike of Rumanian railroad men in 1933, Dej became his successor as president of the trade union of railroad workers. When the Communist Party was banned in Rumania,

Dej went underground and lived illegally in the country until 1938. He was then seized by the Rumanian police and remained under arrest until his liberation by the Soviets in 1944. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

From then on, even though he was not the General Secretary of the Party, he nonetheless was its main organizer:

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej [was] the man with the “iron fist” who organized the Rumanian Communist Party in 1944. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, pp. 1 -2) (IMG)

The Romanian Communist Party operated freely and was thus able to attract supporters and quickly grow in membership. This growth in membership had many obvious benefits since it allowed the Romanian Communist Party to pursue its popular front agenda, and mobilize a larger base in Romanian society:

In August 1944, the Party was composed of only a few hundred members, most of them in prison including Gheorghiu-Dej. Since 1924, the party had existed illegally. In this interlude of twenty years, the small organization was filled with minor agents and members of questionable character. In a few weeks after the country’s [liberation] by the Russian Army, the Party membership was inflated to several hundred thousand and in four years to nearly a million. There is no similar growth even in Eastern Europe after 1945. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Many questionable members were added to the Party but the increase in membership of questionable elements in the Party was controlled, such that the Party would not be hijacked by its new members. At the time, the increase in membership was a useful temporary political measure with which to increase numerical strength in a controlled manner and with which to compile a larger count of Party activists for the purpose of regime change in Romania. The Anglo-American agent Radescu was in charge of Romania, and he was hardly democratic. Nonetheless, with the backing of the Soviets, the large Romanian Party was able to plant one of its top members in charge of the Romanian Ministry of Interior: Teohari Georgescu. Georgescu was an agent of Ana Pauker and therefore had connections of a treasonous and counter-revolutionary nature to imperialist secret services. Nonetheless at the time, even planting a disloyal, albeit communist-coopted, member of the Romanian Communist Party at the helm of the Ministry of Interior could serve as a channel for infiltrating the Party's loyal intelligence agents into the Ministry. Hence, the rise of Georgescu to the Interior Ministry was objectively beneficial for the Party, at the expense of the Anglo-American intelligence and the comprador Romanian regime which the communists sought to overthrow. As such, Radescu and his gang conspired to oust Georgescu from his position, thereby prompting large-scale communist- backed protests:

On December 8, 1944, Radescu presented his proposed list of the new cabinet members to the King who approved it. On the same day, the new cabinet took the oath of office. Radescu, besides being the Prime Minister, was also Minister of the Interior. A series of misunderstandings made Radescu oppose certain proposals made by the Undersecretary of State for the State Administration in the Ministry of Interior. Radescu requested Dr. Groza, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, to approve the dissolving of the Undersecretariate of State for State Administration. It was approved and Teohari Georgescu was attempted to be dismissed. This incident caused a misunderstanding between Radescu and the Leftist parties, which came to climax with the demonstration and shootings of February 24, 1945. (Confidential Biographic Data, Name: RADESCU, Lt. General Nicolae, OSS Post: Bucharest, Rumania, OSS, May 7, 1946, p. 1) (IMG)

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS – the central US intelligence agency preceding the CIA) provided a detailed account of the protests organized by the communist-led popular front known as the ‘National Democratic Front’ (FND) for overthrowing the Radescu regime:

The following account of the FND demonstration in Bucharest on 24 February 1945 and the ensuing disorders in front of the National Palace represents the combined information obtained by several members of our staff.. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 1. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

On February 24, 1945, an estimated 100,000 FND demonstrators marched in the streets calling for the overthrow of Radescu:

The demonstrators, organized in occupation groups with numerous banners, began arriving at the Piatza Natziunei shortly after 1300 hours [i.e. 1:00 PM]. The bulk of demonstrators marched from concentration points in the city area. Numbers however, were transported from outside the city limits by truck from points as far removed as Ploesti and as many as 2000 were reported as having arrived from other points in the country by train. The demonstration officially began with speeches at 1445 [i.e. 2:45 PM]. Preliminary estimate of the number of demonstrators in 75,000 to 100,000.

The following banners were most numerous:

“Down with Radescu!”

“We want an FND government!”

“Death to the Fascists!”

“Down with Maniu!”

“Down with the saboteurs in the government!”

“Long live the King, Chief of the army!”

“Long live the Rumanian Army!”

There were ... also pictures of Stalin (largest and most numerous), the King, Churchill and Roosevelt. Practically each group carried Rumanian, American, British and Russian flags, also a few French flags. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, pp. 1-2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

Under the guise of ‘supporting’ the Romanian King, the communist-led FND was overthrowing the King's agent Radescu. Under the guise of supporting the Anglo-American imperialists, who by then had become allies with the Axis, the communist-led FND was seeking the overthrow of the regime of Radescu, the agent of the Anglo- Americans. Hence, the pro-monarchist slogan of the communist-led FND protesters was a cover with which to drive a wedge between Radescu's and the King's supporters, further isolate the King, and pave the way for a democratic republic. The US intelligence further reported:

The temper of the crowd was mixed and enthusiasm appeared to be concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the speakers’ platform. The demonstration as a whole was quiet and orderly. No Rumanian police were observed at the scene but a few Russian patrols, in groups of two or three, circulated through the fringes of the crowd. In general, the contents of the speeches contained repeated sentiments of the placards. Teohari Georgescu, deposed Under-Secretary of Interior, was the principal speaker. The crowd began disbanding at 1600 hours [i.e. 4:00 PM]. The demonstrators, following instructions, proceeded in orderly manner to the square in front of the Royal Palace and the Ministry of Interior. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

A massive crowd began demonstrating in front of the palace and the Ministry of Interior:

Demonstrators began arriving in quantity at the palace area square about 1545 hours [i.e. 3:45 PM] and consisted largely of the organized demonstrators. It is estimated that 20-25,000 reached the palace area. About 1700 hours [5:00 PM] the demonstrators moved in large numbers toward the Ministry of Interior building. At 1710 hours [5:10 PM] several small calibre pistol shots were fired from the crowd, then shots of larger calibre were heard and the crowd panicked in front of the Ministry building. A few moments later there were several volleys of rifle and machine-gun fire over the heads of the crowd from guards on the upper floors of the Ministry of Interior. During the next hour, sporadic firing took place as the crowd dispersed and reformed intermittently. During this time, speeches and shouting were in progress. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR- 269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

According to the OSS, elements from within the crowds tried to get into the Interior Ministry building. If true, then the demonstrators were probably making a mistake since this would have provoked clashes. And clashes did occur. The guards shot at least 150 bullets and in response a reported 30 bullets were shot from the crowd:

The size of the active groups in front of the Ministry was estimated at less than one thousand and their intention was to gain entrance to the Ministry building. Two attempts were made to storm the door unsuccessfully. By 1900 hours [7 PM] the guards in the Ministry building had fired approximately 150 shots and the demonstrators had fired a minimum of 30 in return. Ascertainable casualties were one demonstrator and one soldier wounded. The guard at the Ministry had orders to shoot into the air and fire only when fired upon. The crowd began dispersing at about 1900 hours. By 2000 hours [8 PM] there were small groups of demonstrators left at the square totalling probably 200. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

To prevent further clashes:

According to one report, Gheorghiu-Dej, communist Minister of Communications, spoke to the crowd and urged them to go home, promising that the Russians would investigate the situation fully. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

Thus:

The Chief of Staff of the Soviet Military Command at Bucharest interviewed General Radescu at about 1800 hours [6 PM] in the Ministry of Interior building. General Radescu exhibited two bullet holes in the window of his private office which appeared to have originated from the crowd in the square. Radescu stated that he would not leave the building and would not turn over the country to mob rule. The Russian officer stated that General Moskvitan, military commander of Bucharest, had previously issued orders to the Russians not to interfere with the demonstration or with the Rumanian army. After the shooting started he informed General Teodorescu, Rumanian Commander of Bucharest, that firing against the crowd must cease immediately. General Moskvitan also stated that he was telephoning Marshal Malinovski to report on the happenings. Twelve Soviet guards were promised to Radescu to guard the Ministry building, and permission was granted to keep all the Rumanian troops in the building for the Ministry's protection. ('SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace', Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, pp. 2-3. In: 'RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050', CIA archives) (IMG)

Regarding the corroboration of the above report, the OSS document stated:

Persons at the Palace window facing the square during the entire demonstration confirmed the above statements concerning the events in the Palace square. ('SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace', Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 1. In: 'RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050', CIA archives) (IMG)

Also:

A report was given to the King at Sinaia that the FND had staged three other demonstrations simultaneously; at Craiova, crowds stormed the Prefecture and occupied it with no casualties since the guards had orders not to fire; at Caracal, the crowds stormed the Prefecture unsuccessfully because of army resistance and several persons were killed and wounded; at Brasov the National Peasants and FND rallies clashed.

At about 2045 hours [i.e. 8:45 PM], several hundred National Liberal and National Peasant supporters marched by the Palace in Bucharest singing the National Anthem and shouting "Long live the King", and "Radescu and order". Counter-demonstration lasted at least an hour and the crowd was last seen marching down the boulevard burning FND signs hanging from street-car wires.

('SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace', Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 3. In: 'RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050', CIA archives) (IMG)

At the time, three renegades in the communist labour movement, Patrascanu, Luca, and Pauker, had to pretend to be staunch 'anti-fascists', and thus, outwardly, played a positive role in the events. To promote the public image of these renegades and infiltrators in the communist movement, Radescu ferociously denounced them and presented them as his biggest enemies. In so doing, Radescu created a false polarity and wrongly depicted Pauker and Luca as 'communist' 'heroes' 'genuinely' 'opposed' to him. The OSS reported:

According to report from source close to the Palace, Patrascanu, communist leader, stated that the government was guilty of firing on the people and he requested the Marshal of the Palace to ask the King to come to Bucharest as soon as possible in order to solve the crisis.

At approximately 2200 hours [8 PM] General Radescu addressed the nation over the radio. He referred to events of the afternoon, both in Bucharest and in the provinces and attacked FND as the instigators of these disorders. He specifically blamed Ana Pauker, Moscow-trained [pseudo-]communist leader, and "Hungarian" Vasile Luca, secretary of the Communist party and stated that they were people without country and without God. He also stated at 2115 hours [9:15 PM] two persons were killed and eleven wounded in front of the Ministry of Interior by machine-pistol fired from a moving car. This followed the National Peasant demonstration mentioned in paragraph 4 above, but connection between the two incidents has not been established. He concluded by rallying the nation to support him and the army in maintaining order.

('SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace', Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 3. In: 'RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050', CIA archives) (IMG)

Following these large-scale protests, one major step towards regime change in Romania occurred, the fascist renegade Radescu was ousted, and the Romanian communists were able to plant their leaders in the top ranks of the government of Mr. Groza, the latter being a conservative pro-British politician that was more submissive to communists than Radescu was:

The result was that the cabinet and Radescu were dismissed, following pressure by Vishinski on the King

and the Groza regime came to power. Following this Radescu was taken under British protection and lived in their building for nine weeks until an agreement between the British and Russian Governments was reached, assuring the former that Radescu would not be harmed on returning home. He was placed under domicile, and only completely free early in 1946. (Confidential Biographic Data, Name: RADESCU, Lt. General Nicolae, OSS Post: Bucharest, Rumania, OSS, May 7, 1946, p. 1) (IMG)

Petru Groza, the former Prime Minister and present President of the National Assembly, was and is a tool for covering the power play behind the Rumanian Communist scene. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Over time, Petru Groza, another conservative element, was further demoted as well:

Now [Groza] is rewarded with a post of no political importance. Gheorghiu-Dej has become the Soviet head puppet in Rumania; but the real power in Rumania remains with the Central Committee of the PMR.. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Petru Groza, who had only served until now to smother and conceal the struggle between Gheorghiu-Dej, was finally shoved aside and as payment for his submissiveness he received the unimportant post of president of the National Assembly. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Hence, the political position of the Romanian communists in Romania's bourgeois government increased and a project for industrializing that country went forward:

Shortly thereafter Gheorghiu-Dej became Minister of Public Works, and in december 1945, Minister of Economy in the new government of Petru Groza. Gheorghiu-Dej's economic line from the beginning was that prescribed in advance by the Kremlin: advancement of the country through industrialization.

This was shown in his newspaper article and his speeches, which were published in brochure form in 1951. Industrialization and subsequent proletarianization of the country were the main goals of the five-year plan, according to his own words. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

In the first Rumanian government coalition, Dej was Minister for Industry and Trade. In 1946, he attended the peace conference in Paris as the Rumanian delegate. After the elections of 1946, Dej became Minister of Labor and, at the same time, deputy secretary general of the Rumanian Communist Party under Ana Pauker, who then was secretary general. Dej later replaced Ana Pauker as secretary general of the Communist Party and also became president of the Council of Ministers. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Besides [Dej's] work in connection with the first five-year plan, [Dej] applied himself to the program for the electrification of the country, for the realization of which he worked vigorously. In his "Articles and Speeches" he emphasized the lack of criticism and self-criticism among officials. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

The communist faction of the Party headed by Dej enjoyed popular support especially among the proletarians.

The CIA reported that Dej knew how to be popular among Romanians:

Gheorghiu-Dej has grown up in a hard school. He understands, in spite of his submissiveness to the Soviet power, how to remain a popular Rumanian Communist leader. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

As late as 1955, the CIA admitted:

Dej, a self-taught person of great will powers, enjoys a certain popularity among the Rumanian people.. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

In a 1952 report, the CIA admitted that Dej was always regarded as Romanian workers' true representative, unlike Pauker:

In contrast to Ana Pauker, Gheorghiu-Dej was always regarded as a true representative of the Rumanian working class. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Gheorghiu-Dej led the labor group and had for his chief lieutenants his fellow agitators who formed the core of leadership in the railroad strike of 1933. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The predominantly revolutionary-minded Romanian railroad proletarians held a prominent role in Romania's communist Party and supported Gheorghiu-Dej:

A prominent role is played by the railroad men who have always been the radical element of the Rumanian workers' movement. (...). Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the representative of the trade union of railroad men therefore plays a dominant role in the country, while the other trade unions have not sent representatives into the top leadership of the country. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA,

CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

The Soviets were well aware that Dej was popular:

In the new light of the Stalinist doctrine, [Dej] is a true son of the people as Moscow sees it. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Describing Dej's personality, the CIA stated:

he bends his entire energy and his innate intelligence to making himself an important party-fellow. He has always shown great eagerness to learn. His colleagues say he is slow ... but has genuine ability. He is not ashamed to show his ignorance in technical and economic problems and does not hesitate to let himself be instructed until he understands fully. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

According to Enver Hoxha (see 'The Titoites' and 'The Khrushchevites'), Gheorghiu-Dej was a favorite of the Stalin-era Soviets. They said many positive things about him. This is backed up by the CIA which states:

Gheorghiu-Dej has an excellent standing with the Moscow Politburo... (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Later on, that same Dej became a militant opponent of the Kremlin Titoists who seized power in 1953.

With the regime change in Romania and the ascent to power of the communist-led forces, Romania got into the path for the establishment of a communist-led bourgeois-democracy, the first state of People's Democratic governance. It was therefore high time that the Party of millions would gradually narrow down its broad popular front and purge members who would have been problematic in its ranks:

The troubles of the Rumanian Communist Party lie elsewhere. (...). The purge of the last years has eliminated some 180,000 members (about 18 percent) but the Party is still far from the desired cohesion and uniformity.

General Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej's statement that the Party is filled with anarchists, with rebels against Party discipline and with nepotists, is certainly correct. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Hiding behind the banner of a dogmatic (Trotskyite) interpretation of 'Leninism', Patrascanu was up against Lenin's pupil Stalin. Patrascanu, the Romanian Tito, was pursuing a hostile Trotskyite policy against the USSR, portraying the Soviets as degenerating Romania. He, who was a leader of Romania's Titoist movement, was duly purged. The US intelligence reported:

Patrascanu, formerly Minister of Justice, headed the intellectual group and adhered to a strict interpretation of Leninist Socialism. He became more and more critical of the Soviet spoilation of Rumania; he was, indeed, a Rumanian Tito before the advent of Titoism. Toward the end of 1947 he and his adherents were stripped of all political power and his ultimate fate is uncertain. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

At the plenary session of the Rumanian Communist Party Central Committee in July 1946, Gheorghiu-Dej attacked in sharpest terms the supposed nationaistic tendencies in Rumania and denounced the so-called "chauvinistic provocationism" of Patrascanu, who, charged with being an agent of Western imperialism, was dismissed as Minister of Justice and arrested. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

For this reason, even as late as 1952, the CIA stated:

Titoism has made no inroad in Rumania.. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The CIA also admitted:

Ana Pauker was unpopular in Rumania, in fact she was hated by the working class. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

This fact:

was known in Moscow.. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Ana Pauker knew that she was unpopular especially among the proletarians of Romania. For this reason, her best course for seizing power in the Party was through the violation of the principles of democratic centralism, and the formation of a counter-revolutionary bloc, a counter-revolutionary intelligence network aimed at overthrowing the Party's democratic pro-communist majority which supported Dej. Pauker, the Titoist agent of the Mossad, formed her bloc with Luca and Georgescu:

It is because Ana Pauker aspired to real influence within the Rumanian Central Committee that she was eliminated. She tried to form her own group with Luca and Georgescu in the Politburo. (...). The ambitious Luca and Georgescu wished to use Pauker's popularity [among revisionists] but were easily broken by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Pauker lacked Party discipline and failed to dismiss certain unnamed foreign service officials whose work was unsatisfactory to the Central Committee. (Reasons for Pauker's Dismissal from Politburo, CIA, July 2, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Dej's most dangerous antagonist was Vasile Luca.. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Romania's comprador classes, allied to Anglo-American finance capital, had as their commander-in-chief Ana Pauker, who, as revealed in C16S2, was an agent of the CIA and Mossad. Georgescu, the agent of Pauker, was the chief of the Ministry of Interior, the ministry responsible for counter-intelligence matters. "Teohari Georgescu," the CIA document added, was:

the former astute and dangerous Minister of Interior.. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Hence, through Georgescu, the comprador forces held some influence in Romania's counter-intelligence sector. Until 1950, Pauker's bloc in the Party advocated a terroristic Trotskyite-style forced 'collectivization' of agriculture, as a means of discrediting collectivization among peasants, and for driving a wedge between the peasants the Party, hence to undermine team Dej's position. The CIA reported:

Gheorghiu-Dej was charged with the supervision of the national economic plans for the first two years, 1949 and 1950. In his report to the plenary session of the PMR Central Committee (3-5 March 1949) he dealt with the problem of cooperation between the industrial proletariat and the peasantry. He recommended the retention of the middling peasant properties, which he viewed as the key to raising the conditions of the villages. He made from this formula a principle for realizing the "social construction" of agriculture. In this connection he emphasized, in opposition to the Ana Pauker group, the necessity of free consent of the peasantry to collectivization. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Dej supported collectivization, but was against such Trotskyite-style forcing of it, unlike Pauker's group. Unsurprisingly, the forced 'collectivization' policy advocated by the CIA-Mossad agent Pauker and her group systematically sabotaged Romanian agriculture. The United States Information Agency (USIA), an official propaganda and intelligence analysis organ of the US government, reported:

The effects of the 1950 collectivization drive were: (1) An exodus of the well-to-do peasants, who either left their land or were expropriated; (2) reduced activity among the recalcitrant middle peasants who preferred to produce only the necessary quantities to cover their personal needs and the delivery quotas in kind. As a result, the productivity of the collective farmers – in the kolkhozes and agricultural associations alike – barely reached the average of the remaining private farmers. The low agricultural output in 1950 could only be ascribed to the agricultural policy of the regime. ("New Course" in Rumanian Agriculture, Daniel Norman. In: 'Problems of Communism', July-August 1955, Number 4, Vol. 4, United States Information Agency, p. 40) (IMG)

After sabotaging agriculture and associating the image of collectivization with agricultural failure, Ana Pauker's group, the very network responsible for such failure, opportunistically flip-flopped and came out as the staunch opponents of collectivization, thus presenting themselves as the 'saviors' seeking to 'rescue' the peasants from agricultural failure. The USIA reported:

The leadership of the party split on future agricultural policy. Those who later were to be called the "right-wing deviationists," led by Vasile Luca and including his bosom friend Teohari Georgescu, as well as Ana Pauker, were in favor of a pause during the period of industrialization. Their argument was based on the limited capacity of heavy industry to produce tractors and agricultural machinery – hence they wanted to halt collectivization temporarily until the collectives, lagging behind for want of machines, were consolidated. The September 1951 resolution calling for a slowing down of collectivization reflected this point of view. ("New Course" in Rumanian Agriculture, Daniel Norman. In: 'Problems of Communism', July-August 1955, Number 4, Vol. 4, United States Information Agency, p. 40) (IMG)

As such, the left-opportunist Trotskyite group of Luca and Georgescu flip-flopped and reincarnated as right-opportunist Bukharinite opponents of collectivization. The CIA too acknowledged that these men were right-deviationists:

Ana Pauker's name is now disappearing from the Party indictments against the Rightist deviationists, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Against the right- and left-deviations of the CIA-Mossad-backed faction, the communist revolutionary leader Gheorghiu-Dej supported the development of the productive forces in conjunction concurrent with revolutionary changes in the property relations. The USSR supported Dej's line:

Moscow appears to understand that in Rumania a balance between the production of the country and the resulting development of Communism is necessary. This concurrence of Moscow's in the Gheorghiu-Dej point of view is quite remarkable; (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Opposing agricultural collectivization and forcing 'collectivization' were both revisionist lines opposed by team Dej. Dej, the committed supporter of the scientific socialist line of Stalin, fought against the left- and right- deviations and revisionisms:

Gheorghiu-Dej was steadily insistent on making the Marx-Lenin doctrine his own, but he did not forget, by his own words, to remain true to the new directive of "his beloved comrade Stalin." He showed himself a sturdy fighter against every deformation or deviation. And therein lies the explanation of his success. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Pauker's:

position was still more shaken in 1950, when a staged trial against Lucretiu Patrascanu was opened. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p.3) (IMG)

In other words, Pauker's survival depended on the strength of the Titoist agent Patrascanu in Romania. Nonetheless, so blatantly Trotskyite was Patrascanu that even Luca and Pauker, for the sake of their own political survival, felt compelled to take a stance against him:

Ana Pauker was the chief of the third group. The leadership of this faction was composed largely of Soviet trained Communists who resided in the USSR during World War II and a few militant Communists who started their Communist activities in the early 1930's when Ana Pauker was working in the Central Committee. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The fourth group was headed by Vasile Luca, another Soviet-trained Communist enjoying the confidence of Moscow. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The two Soviet trained factions [of Luca and Pauker] allied themselves with Gheorghiu-Dej in causing the collapse of the Patrascanu faction. The three victors then formed an alliance and when the Popular Republic was constituted Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca were given posts in the ministry and made vice premiers of the Council of Ministers. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The fact that Pauker's gang were compelled to denounce Patrascanu's Trotskyism though, obviously weakened the imperialist intelligence network in Romania, hence damaging Pauker's group itself as well. It is also worth noting that Pauker, while having resided in Moscow, was not a 'Stalin protege', nor was she really a loyal friend of the USSR. In fact:

Stories that Ana was Stalin's special protege are based on insufficient knowledge of the Communist hierarchy. In that hierarchy she belonged in the propaganda department and was never considered as a person of theoretical or political ability, which means that her presence or absence within a Party's leadership did not modify its political weight or color. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The CIA-MI6 media mercenaries propagate the image of Ana Pauker as the 'first Jewish communist woman leader', and claim that she was eventually purged in a series of supposedly 'anti-Semitic' 'misogynistic' purges. However, contrary to the CIA-Mossad propaganda narrative which accuses the Romanian communists of 'anti-Semitism', the CIA itself admitted:

It has been suggested that Pauker's collapse is an indication of a new anti-semitic vogue in the Rumanian Communist Party. This hypothesis has just been refuted, however, by the rise to power of the Bessarabian Jew, Joseph Chisinevski who is now second in command to Gheorghiu-Dej. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Ana Pauker's Jewish background has often blinded many to her anti-Semitic betrayals. A Titoist reactionary who would serve as an agent of the CIA and Mossad, Ana Pauker was, during the Romanian people's liberation struggle, a Trotskyite who promoted a left-sectarian policy in the face of the fascist occupation of Romania. She opposed communist cooperation with the bourgeois parties against Nazism. The Radio Free Europe reported:

When she arrived to Romania in 1944, she was -- as was later time and again brought up against her by both Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and post-Communist Romanian nationalists -- criticizing the "home Communists" headed by Dej for having collaborated with the "bourgeois" parties in the ouster and arrest of Romania's war-time dictator Ion Antonescu. The move, she believed, had hindered the immediate establishment of a Communist regime with Red Army support. ('Stalinism With A Human Face? Part 2: Ana Pauker And The Liquidation Of Lucretiu Patrascanu', Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), East European Perspectives: June 27, 2001, Volume 3, Number 12, Michael Shafir, June 27, 2001) (IMG)

Having a female from an ethnic minority background in a top position in the People's Democracy is ceteris paribus a progressive thing, albeit of tertiary importance. However, to this day, among Titoist circles, Ana Pauker, a Trotskyite traitor to the Yiddish people, is admired as the 'First Jewish Communist Woman' foreign minister of Romania. This was the case back then too. Pauker was overrated for this reason:

Ana Pauker's case is not a critical issue in the Communist World. Her importance has always been exaggerated because she was a colorful personality and one of the few outstanding [pseudo-]Communist women leaders. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Having said that, she does deserve credit for being the first female traitor-in-chief in the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. In terms of the command structure of the anti-Romanian intelligence network in Romania, she was at the top.

Malenkov, the Trotskyist-Titoist agent of Beria, lobbied in favor of the Mossad agent Pauker:

Malenkov intervened in the Rumanian purge and saved Pauker from confinement to her home in Bucharest by having her moved to the Crimea at the end of June 1952. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Of course, Malenkov lobbying in favor of Pauker may have been not an unfavorable outcome towards the Dej faction, because Pauker could provide weight against Chisinevski, another traitor to People's Democratic Romania. Chisinevski himself had been an agent of Pauker (see C23S1), but he opportunistically turned against Pauker on the overt level in order to save himself from the anti-Pauker purges. As such, while covertly allied, Chisinevski and Pauker were, on the overt level, 'enemies'. It follows that purging Pauker completely at the time would have been a strategically stupid move. Indeed, this is why:

Gheorghiu-Dej[']s] ... position is not threatened by Malenkov's action to save Ana Pauker. (Interpretation of Purge of Ana Pauker, CIA, September 11, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

By the time of the Doctors' Plot campaign, the Pauker faction again became the priority, and thus:

Ana Pauker was arrested in February 1953 and accused of serving as an agent of international Zionism. (Moscow's Surprise, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG{Israel})

In this midst, Chisinevski again emerged as the bigger threat to People's Democratic Romania. The case of the Trotskyite torturer Chisinevski will be explored in greater detail in C23S1.

Whereas the previous regimes had established a Romanian chauvinist reign of terror against the ethnic minorities, such as the Yiddish and the Hungarians, the new People's Democratic Romania pursued a policy of tolerance towards language and the non-religious aspects of culture. The MI6 station in Bucharest reported:

In previous reports and intelligence summaries I have mentioned agitation by Communist forces among the Hungarian and other minority populations in Roumania; I feel, however, that it may be of value if, following M. Luca's example, I choose this moment to summarize the present situation.

3. The Roumanian Workers' Party has from the outset made some play with the liberality of its minority policy. (...). It is logical from the point of view of the Roumanian Workers' Party, however, that the liberality shown to the minorities in matters of language and culture should not be extended to religion [particularly to Catholicism]. (R 13149/17/37, No. 21, COMMUNIST SOLUTION OF THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN ROUMANIA, Mr. A. Holman to Mr. McNeil, Bucharest, November 15, 1948, Received November 20, 1948. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948) – Romania, p. 55. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948) – Whole Book, p. 275) (IMG{Orthodox Church})

In the above-cited document, the MI6 official who wrote the report specified that the religion that was lesser tolerated by the Romanian authorities was Catholicism. For more details on the communist opposition to Catholicism, see C15S7.

C15S2. The Rajk Network; Yugoslav Intelligence and UDB Terror in Hungary

*** IMG-All-{Hungary}

The most important of the imperialist agents in Hungary's communist movement was Laszlo Rajk, who: came from a Saxon (German) family of Transylvania. He had two brothers. His original name:

REICH. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

The family's original name was congruent with their politics. In the late 1940s, Rajk declared himself as:

an Aryan, and a pure one, because I'm a Saxon on one side of my family. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan p. 29) (IMG)

His two brothers were prominent members of the Hungarian Nazi 'Arrow Cross' organization:

Rajk's two brothers both had been leading members of the Arrow Cross party. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 26) (IMG)

There were already great contrasts in the RAJK family. His brother was completely in favor of the Nazi ideology and has glorified Nazism. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

RAJK's brother was an active Nazi (arrow-cross).. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

The three Rajk brothers, these 'pure' 'Aryan' Saxons, were all fascists. Yet, one of them, Laszlo Rajk, would infiltrate the communist labour movement on behalf of his brothers.

Upon the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, communists and democrats worldwide heeded to the call of the Comintern and travelled to Spain as 'International Brigades' (C8S4) in order to defend freedom against the fascist rebels and Axis aggressors. This outflow of communists was undoubtedly for the noble cause of defending democratic Spain so to contain the Axis. Yet this mass-travelling of communists also presented a great opportunity for fascist police-spies to infiltrate this flow of communists, and hence to infiltrate the lines of and backstab the Spanish Republican forces.

Upon the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Laszlo Rajk and a number of other Hungarians who posed as communists 'volunteered' 'on behalf' of the Comintern in the fight against the Spanish fascists:

Approximately one thousand Hungarian volunteers joined the brigade, formed the so-called "Rakosi Battalion" and thus acquired paramilitary experience that was of major importance during WWII. The commander of the brigade was Ferenc Munnich, former officer in the Bela Kun army and by now a Communist of international reputation. Both Erno Gero and Mihaly Farkas reportedly were involved in the fighting, Gero allegedly as special representative of the Comintern. Among the ... leaders of the Hungarians was ... Laszlo Rajk, who performed ... as political officer of the Rakosi Battalion. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

It is worth reminding, however, that while he travelled to Spain officially as a Communist Party leader, Rajk was not really a communist:

The experiences in Spain formed a convinced communist of RAJK who before has not been completely communist in his belief. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

In Spain, the fake 'communist' Rajk was welcomed enthusiastically by Dr. Ferenc Munich, the political commissar of the brigade:

The young Rajk arriving from Hungary has been received with great enthusiasm and the commander of the Hungarian brigade ZALKA Mate immediately detailed RAJK to his side and here RAJK made a close friendship with MUNICH Ferenc Dr. the political commissar of the brigade. (...). First, MUNICH nominated RAJK as cell-trustee then later he received larger and larger political roles. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2. The bad spelling is original.) (IMG)

The commander of the Hungarian communist brigade in Spain was Bela Frankl, nicknamed 'Mate Zalka':

After the defeat of the 1919 revolution many Hungarians escaped abroad. One member of the Mateszalka directorium (local soviet) – Mateszalka is a small city about 3-40 Kilometers from Nyiregyhaza – also took the flight. His name, even today, is unknown in Hungary. This man emerged in the Soviet Union and under the name of ZALKA Mate (the city's name transposed Mate-szalka) [and] did some writings. The Hungarian communists living in Moscow designated him as commander of the Hungarian brigade operating in the Spanish civil war and he served there under the names of ZALKA Mate and general LUKACS. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

The big obstacle to Rajk's career as a fascist agent in the Hungarian brigade was indeed General Zalka himself, who unlike Ferenc Munich, did not trust Rajk as much:

General ZALKA also ... was somewhat reserved toward RAJK. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

The fascist infiltrators in the Communist Party murdered the anti-fascist martyr Zalka. Referring to General Zalka, the CIA confirmed:

The communists themselves eliminated him. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

Cui bono? Rajk's group, if not behind the assassination of Zalka, certainly benefited from such a murder by other fascist agents in the communist movement, as the elimination of Zalka and the relieving of his staff from their positions paved the way for the rise of Rajk:

As a matter of fact RAJK's carrier in Spain began after the death of general ZALKA. At that time, the staff of the brigade has been relieved and in the new staff RAJK already had a serious, leading role. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

At the end of the Spanish Civil War, Rajk and his group moved to France. Therein, they established contacts with the notorious American intelligence spymaster Noel Field.

There exists a far-fetched allegation that Noel Field was 'in reality' a Soviet spy who had infiltrated the OSS. This allegation is unfounded. The far-fetched claims are also seriously challenged by George H. Hodos who, after the Great Patriotic War, returned to Hungary as an editor of economic journals and a correspondent for western newspapers. He has been arrested on charges of espionage for the CIA and later on was able to flee to the US-led camp. He later taught East European history at the University of Vienna and served as a Scientific Advisor of the Yearbook of Historical Research about Communism at the University of Mannheim in Germany. Given his background as a scientific advisor for Yearbook of Historical Research about Communism as well as his ties to Western correspondents, Hodos's work is a valuable source. A staunchly anti-Soviet scholar, Hodos admits that Noel Field could not possibly be a double agent

working 'in reality' for the Soviets. As Hodos wrote:

During the war, a number of Soviet espionage agents were active in neutral Switzerland primarily, of course, in pursuit of military intelligence. (...). The Russians were not interested in Field, who had been aiding emigre communists. Had they asked him to provide information about fascists, Field would have aided them in good conscience, but the role of enlisted [Soviet] agent was totally foreign to his character. (Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954. George H. Hodos, 1987, p. 29) (IMG)

In addition, Hodos criticizes Stewart Steven for his book 'Operation Splinter Factor', in which Steven claims that Noel Field was a Soviet double agent.

At this point, Steven's report moves away from historical fact and introduces half-truths and distortions. He claims that Dulles felt he had been duped by Field, who was not a simple humanitarian but a devious communist, betraying his trust and embarrassing him severely in Washington by tricking him into actions that placed communists in power in Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Dulles, according to Steven, did not forget this and vowed revenge. (Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954. George H. Hodos, 1987, p. 30) (IMG)

Anyways, Rajk and his group not only were tied to Field, but also contacted certain Yugoslav leaders. In those: French internment camps, following the close of hostilities, a number of the participants in the Spanish Civil War were brought into close contact with representatives of Western relief agencies, including Noel Field, and with Yugoslav members of the International Brigade. During this period (1939-41), [in] these internment camps, Rajk and certain other Hungarians participated in discussions of Communist theory with Yugoslav leaders and apparently formed personal friendships.. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

Soon, Rajk was to return to Hungary and continue his fascist anti-communist subversion there.

Throughout the inter-war years, the Communist Party of Hungary had been the sole major anti-fascist resistance organization:

During the period between World Wars I and II the communists were the only subversive group in Hungary.. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, p. 1) (IMG)

With the onset of the Second World War, Hungarian communist-led anti-fascist resistance against Horthy's regime intensified. The Hungarian communist-led democratic resistance movement was:

Soviet-sponsored and [was] led by Matyas Rakosi.. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, p. 1. Citing: National Intelligence Survey 19, Section 57, September 1955, CIA, p. 3) (IMG)

The communist-led anti-fascist freedom-fighters resisted the Axis forces:

An orthodox Communist-dominated Committee of Liberation ostensibly under Smallholder Endre Bajcsi-Zsilinszky (subsequently arrested and executed by the Arrow Cross) was belatedly established to coordinate the activities of all resistance groups ten days after a pro-German coup [in Hungary].. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, p. 1. Citing: National Intelligence Survey 19, Section 57, September 1955, CIA, p. 3) (IMG)

Indeed, the communists were active in several front organizations. Two of the groups which:

participated in the resistance [were] the Students' Resistance Movement, the membership [of] ... which had a one-third orthodox Communist representation.. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, pp. 1-2. Citing: National Intelligence Survey 19, Section 57, September 1955, CIA, p. 3) (IMG)

and:

the Union of the Friends of the U.S.S.R., which was under orthodox Communist domination. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, p. 2. Citing: National Intelligence Survey 19, Section 57, September 1955, CIA, p. 3) (IMG)

In those days especially, every blow against the Axis, however small, was still significant. Many Hungarian communists and democratic freedom-fighters sacrificed their lives for the defeat of the fascists and thereby contributed to the Soviet victories on the Eastern Front.

By late December 1942, the Nazi army failed to achieve its objectives in Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and therein began to retreat. As mentioned in C11S2, this was the time in which Anglo-American imperialism commenced an alliance with the Axis. At this time, the OSS, through its top operative in Europe, Noel Field, transported Rajk to Hungary via Yugoslavia. Nigel West – the prominent British author on intelligence studies, the European Editor of the International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence and lecturer of the history of postwar intelligence at the intelligence think tank 'Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies' – wrote:

Field had indeed aided Rajk's return to Hungary in 1943, having arranged his escape from an internment camp in France, doubtless with OSS's help, but [took] his route through Yugoslavia.. (Cold War Counterfeit Spies: Tales of Espionage: Genuine or Bogus?, Nigel West, September 28, 2016) (IMG)

With the help of his new American intelligence handler, Rajk was released from the fascist internment camp and returned to Hungary. The OSS, led in Europe by Dulles, assisted Rajk's group to return to Hungary:

Field contacted Dulles, who agreed to furnish money, U.S. and Yugoslav uniforms, and letters of recommendation so that they could be smuggled through France, Italy, and Yugoslavia to Hungary. The other joint operation involved parachuting German antifascists into Germany to organize resistance against the disintegrating Nazi administration. The persons in the group included communists suggested by Field. (Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954. George H. Hodos, 1987, p. 30) (IMG)

Thus, by:

the beginning of 1943 RAJK ... is with KADAR Janos the leader of the Communist Party of Hungary. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Janos Kadar was a close partner of Rajk. Along with his partner Kadar, Rajk wormed his way up in the Party and became the de facto leader of the Hungarian Communist Party, fostering also a close partnership with his friend Gabor Peter:

Perhaps it might even be stated that already [Rajk] was the first person (of the party). Beginning from this time he was in close friendship with PETER Gabor who later became the head of the AVH. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Laszlo Rajk [was] leader of the underground communist movement.. (THE TANGLED WEB: Allied deception operations in Hungary. In: 'Studies in Intelligence: A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence', CIA, p. 32) (IMG)

During the People's Liberation War against the Horthy regime, Rajk had opposed the popular front policy of alliance with progressive bourgeois-democratic parties against fascism. Instead, Rajk had supported the Trotskyite view (held also by his comrade, Tito) that Hungary needed to leap straight to 'socialism' instead of undergoing the progressive bourgeois-democratic revolution. Geoffrey Swain of the BBC wrote:

Apart from Szonyi himself, the obvious target for suspicion was Laszlo Rajk. He had served in Spain, had been interned in France for three years, and he had returned to Hungary in 1941 to head the underground Central Committee of the Communist Party. While under his leadership the Party had operated the 'Titoist', '1919', popular front 'from below' strategy aimed at limiting the number of concessions made to 'bourgeois' parties, the policy that the returning Rakosi had confronted on his arrival from Moscow. (Eastern Europe Since 1945, Geoffrey Swain, Nigel Swain, 2018, p. 70) (IMG)

With the strategic triumph of the USSR in the Battle of Stalingrad, the tide turned, and the US began to strategically realign with Nazi Germany since late 1942, shortly after which Rajk returned to Hungary with the assistance of the pro-Nazi Allen Dulles. This meant that the US would also eventually enter into an alliance with the Trotskyite elements that had worked to the benefit of the Nazis – for example, Laszlo Rajk. Thus, on March 1944, American intelligence launched operation SPARROW in order to enter fascist Hungary into an alliance with the United States: On Monday, 13 March 1944, OSS Team Sparrow dropped from an RAF Halifax into Hungary, near the town of Nagykanizsa, close to the Yugoslav border. The team members had not been told that the Germans probably knew of their mission, but were instructed to establish contact with General Ujszaszy,

Chief of Hungarian Military Intelligence and Security, to negotiate for the Hungarians to ... join the Western Allies. (THE TANGLED WEB: Allied deception operations in Hungary. In: 'Studies in Intelligence: A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence', CIA, p. 31) (IMG)

One of the links between American and Hungarian intelligence services was the Rajk-Kadar group. Throughout:

1944 PETER Gabor, KADAR Janos, and RAJK Laszlo were hidden at the same place.. The place was the apartment of BABITS Antal, university professor, at the Deak Ferenc square, where a room has been walled in (and separated from the apartment) and the trio lived there. One might say, that at this time PETER and RAJK were the best of friends, in fact they spun the yarn of a dream that they will co-operate. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Even as Horthy's secret police 'continued its fight against the communists' and the anti-fascist democratic resistance, Rajk was busy backstabbing the anti-fascist movement by allying with and receiving funds from the secret police:

RAJK actually came into contact with the Hungarian counter-intelligence service which continued its fight against the communists. This happened in October 1944. Governor HORTHY already saw that the fight has been lost and wanted to save his position (power) somehow and first turned to the British for help .. Horthy then ... looked for connections to the underground, leftist elements. This job was trusted to UJSZASZY Istvan, major-general, head of the intelligence and counter-intelligence departments. In October 1944 ... UJSZASZY contacted RAJK, as the leader of the underground communist organisation. RAJK asked for arms and munitions, and UJSZASZY promised both. These meetings took place at the infamous Hadik Barracks (the counter-intelligence barracks), where RAJK and his former pursuer and persecutor [i.e. UJSZASZY] even contracted an alliance.

(Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Note that at this point in time, Rajk, Kadar, and Peter were living in the same place. Not surprisingly, a US intelligence document confirmed that Kadar was 'an associate' of the head of Horthy's secret service:

Ujszaszy and an associate, Janos Kadar, ... [took] part in SPARROW. (THE TANGLED WEB: Allied deception operations in Hungary. In: 'Studies in Intelligence: A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence', CIA, p. 32) (IMG)

Project SPARROW was the American intelligence project for an alliance with fascist Hungary. That Kadar, an associate of Horthy's fascist intelligence chief, took part in project SPARROW goes on to expose Kadar's loyalties. After the 1956 Red Army intervention in Hungary, Kadar, the topmost henchman of Imre Nagy, was planted at the helm of the Hungarian state with the lobby of Andropov, Khrushchev, and Tito, hence sabotaging the 1956 anti-fascist intervention in that Nazi-stricken country. Kadar went on to lead 'socialist' Hungary well until the 1988. More on this will be mentioned in C20S13.

Rather than get their spies to travel all the way to a directorate of the imperialist-fascist secret service, imperialist-fascist secret services instead officially 'arrest' their own spies and then interrogate them. The 'arrest' and interrogation provides a cover for getting those spies to travel all the way to the secret service office and provide full intelligence briefings or any other intelligence cooperation that the secret services wishes to have.

In late 1944, Rajk was 'arrested' by the Nazis. However, due to his anti-communist service for Horthy's secret police, his role in liaising American intelligence with Horthy's intelligence, as well as his family bonds to the Arrow Cross leaders, it would have been a serious strategic mistake on the part of the Nazis to purge this valuable asset of the American-German intelligence:

After the 15 of October 1944, RAJK's brother became "Arrow cross" (Hungarian Nazi) secretary of state. When RAJK Laszlo's case came up, charged with treason, before the military court – the judge has been DOMINICS Vilmos, military judge major – RAJK's brother appeared and participated in the trial in "Arrow Cross" uniform as secretary of state. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 5) (IMG)

According to a paper published by the research staff of the US Department of State – who operated under cover of researchers in Stanford University – Rajk was saved directly upon the intervention of his Nazi brother who as the Assistant Secretary of State in the Arrow Cross regime in Hungary:

In 1944 [Rajk] was ... captured by the Nazis and sentenced to death with the other leaders. Several of his brothers were however ardent Nazis and one of them was Assistant State Secretary. This brother was in office during the 1944 Nazi SZALASI REGIME IN Hungary. After Rajk was arrested, they saved his life and he was the only captured underground leader who escaped with a life sentence and was liberated in a few weeks. ('THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949', Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 285) (IMG)

In the end, this valuable asset was not purged by a Nazi secret service, which anyways was lenient towards its agent. Rajk then contacted Hungary's communist-led democratic movement:

Returning from German deportation RAJK naturally contacted the party immediately. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 5) (IMG)

According to the CIA, in 1945:

The anti-semitism was awakened in RAJK at the first time in this period. REVAY, GERO, and FARKAS strongly attacked RAJK, saying that the anti-Semite period is over in Hungary. (...). RAKOSI closed the discussion [by saying] that communism does not know denominations, does not know religion. This is how the REVAI, FARKAS against RAJK struggle started. GERO, knowing the [anti-Semitic] situation in Hungary, retreated on this ground. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 5. 'retreated' should have been written as 'retreated'.) (IMG)

In fact, Rajk had always been an anti-Semite, as evidenced by his collaboration with Horthy's secret service. Not surprisingly, Rajk's support base was predominantly from the remnants of the former Nazi regime as well as Trotskyite infiltrator elements in Budapest's labour movement:

Rajk's ... following contained diverse elements ranging from extreme left-wing of Budapest and other key centers of industry to former Arrow Cross members who supported the one outstanding non-Jewish leader of the party. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 27) (IMG)

Rajk, who received support from the left-opportunist tendencies as mentioned above, had held the Trotskyite view that communists should not ally with the progressive bourgeois-democratic parties – this is not surprising since Rajk himself was a Nazi agent. Rajk was a Trotskyite preacher of fanatical emotional behaviour. Contrasting the characters of the communist 'Stalinist' leader Rakosi, Erno Gero (the Hungarian version of Malenkov), and Laszlo Rajk, the US State

Department report stated:

While Rakosi had important features of “cooled down” wisdom of age and experience, Gero was cold machinelike soulless party fanaticism [sic; fanaticism] in itself, dry and without any appeal to the emotions; Rajk was full of emotions. He preached hatred.. (‘THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949’, Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 285) (iMG)

According to the Anglo-American-German intelligence agent Karel Kaplan, the CIA operative Noel Field asked Allen Dulles to sponsor Tibor Szonyi. ‘In April 1945, during the final weeks of the conflict,’ the Kaplan revelations presented in a US intelligence memorandum stated, Field sent to Allen Dulles:

a letter asking that backing be given to Tibor Szonyi, a Hungarian anti-fascist and communist.. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 7) (IMG{GDR})

The CIA-backed Tibor Szonyi was relied on by the Gestapo agent and Anglo-American agent Rajk to appoint Rajk loyalists onto Party cadres. Geoffrey Swain of the BBC wrote:

It was his communist contacts which, towards the end of the Second World War, aroused the interest of the American undercover organisation the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Field. Alan Dulles, the Head of OSS and brother of John Foster Dulles, future US Secretary of State, contacted Field to help organise the return of emigre groups of German and Hungarian communists to their respective countries. It was this Hungarian operation that was to be so controversial: in December 1944 money provided by Dulles was used by Field to organise the return to Hungary of a small emigre group headed by Tibor Szonyi. Field obtained surplus Yugoslav partisan uniforms and planned a return route via France, Italy and Yugoslavia, a partisan route run by the Yugoslavs. A Hungarian link between Tito and American imperialism had been established. (...). To make matters worse, after 1945 Rajk had often asked Szonyi, who became head of the Party's Cadre Department, to find jobs for various veterans of the Spanish Civil War. At the same time, at least this was the complaint of the Soviet representative on the ACC, he had systematically removed from positions of authority in the police service those officers who had spent the war years in the Soviet Union. (Eastern Europe Since 1945, Geoffrey Swain, Nigel Swain, 2018, p. 70) (IMG)

The rise of Rajk to power also led to the elevation of Janos Kadar as Rajk's deputy and associate. It also involved the appointment, almost certainly with the approval of Szonyi, of ‘former’ Zionist activist Horvath at the media sector:

In the general distribution of rewards to ... Communists, Rajk took over leadership of the Budapest party organization with Kadar as his deputy, pending Rajk's appointment as minister of the interior in March 1946. Marton Horvath, resistance leader and reputed former Zionist, became editor of Szabad Nep and members of the Debrecen Communist cell received important posts: Kallai and Losonczy were awarded key propaganda positions; Ferenc Donath was appointed to the Ministry of Agriculture; Sandor Zold to the Ministry of Interior and Szilard Ujhelyi to the Ministry of Social Welfare. Other local Communists were provided with seats in parliament or jobs in the party apparatus. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 21) (IMG)

In the meantime, with Szonyi in charge of the appointments of the Party cadres, and Rajk in charge of the counter - intelligence sector, the fascist intelligence network led by Rajk was able to freely release from internment camps many people who were openly Nazis, including Rajk's own Nazi brothers. Rajk then proceeded to install these Nazis in local positions in the provinces and to promote his own hatred towards the Yiddish proletarians. According to a document by the US State Department's external research wing:

His brothers fled to Germany with the Nazis, [but] some of them came back to Hungary later, [and] Rajk who by that time was already Interior Minister secured their releases from the internment camp and even helped them to obtain some small position in the provinces. In Hungary former “small Nazis” were considered a good ideological investment. The Communist Party gave a chance to tens of thousands of former Nazi Party members, rank and file, in that category to make good the errors of their past by entering the Communist Party. Rajk enthusiastically backed this Communist Party move. This and his extreme anti-semitism were well known facts in Hungary. (‘THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949’, Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 285) (IMG)

Rajk, the hateful anti-Semite, helped expel the Yiddish people from Hungary, thus stockpiling cannon-fodder for Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon. Furthermore, the Rajk era had seen an elevation of the ‘former’ Zionist elements in the media sector of Hungary. By contrast, Rakosi, a Yiddish-Hungarian, was the leading anti-Zionist purger in Hungary (see C16S2). The fascist spies in Hungary had as their base the comprador classes, such as the bureaucrats and kulaks. In any case, he CIA reported::

Peasants who had received farms under the land reform and joined the party may also have looked to Rajk as a possible opponent of Soviet-style collectivization. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 27) (IMG)

Given his Trotskyite credentials and emotional behaviour, what Rajk probably advocated was a combination of forced 'collectivization' in order to foster mass resentment towards collectivization, and at the same time a liberal economic policy in favor of the kulaks. This was the classic anti-collectivization pincer assault strategy used by the Titoists in the bloc.

Rajk was also a Yugoslav and American intelligence agent. A declassified US State Department and intelligence analysis document states clearly:

In February 1948, Rajk went secretly to Belgrade where Tito brought him into contact with the intelligence agents of the American embassy and he started to work for them from that time onwards. On that Belgrade meeting they also agreed on the establishment of a Southeastern European union independent of Moscow under the leadership of Tito and one of their officers in that organization would be the Bulgarian Kostov deputy prime minister. ('THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949', Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 290) (IMG)

Hence, by February 1948, Rajk was already an American spy, collaborating closely with Tito and his agent Traicho Kostov, Bulgaria's Deputy Prime Minister, towards Hungary's and Bulgaria's incorporation into a hostile anti-Soviet Greater Yugoslav Empire. Hungary and Bulgaria, not just Albania, were subject to Tito's aggressive ambitions. An excerpt of Rajk's conversation with a prison cellmate several months later is telling:

The impulse for the first campaign against Rajk followed Cominform's Yugoslav resolution, with which Rajk didn't completely agree, as he later admitted to a prison cellmate:

The truth is that I have a different opinion than Rakosi on some issues, for example concerning Yugoslavia. I never concealed that. I never believed that Tito was a traitor. I always believed this accusation would cause fateful disunity of the socialist camp. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 26) (IMG)

Having gained a foothold in the Hungarian government:

Rajk, who ... was obviously allowed latitude in selecting his subordinates, installed former Spanish Civil War comrades in important posts in the civil police.. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 26) (IMG)

Note that Rajk's friends in the Spanish Civil War had risen up in the ranks as a result of the murder of General Zalka, the anti-fascist commander opposed to Rajk. From 1948 onwards, Rajk formed a powerful Titoist fifth column in Hungary's police/security service.

First RAJK tried to place his own men into the key positions.. His political secretary of state, who had the power in his hands, was a former lawyer from Szeged, SZEBENYI Endre, the two chiefs of the police section were: EKES Istvan, lieutenant colonel and MARSCHALL Laszlo, colonel. RAJK's friendship with MARSCHALL dates back from France. MARSCHALL was the chief director of the police instruction matters. [The] press department was headed by CSERESNYES Sandor a former fighting comrade of his from Spain. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

Marschall – in the name of communism, so to discredit communism – engaged in Trotskyite-style anti-popular police terrorism against the Hungarian masses, with the aim of provoking mass resentment towards the Hungarian state, the USSR, and scientific socialism. Referring to Marschall, the CIA confirmed:

The organization of the interment (concentration) camps, the nightly disappearances, the unlawful arrests, the atrocities of the AVH all are connected with his [Marschall's] name. (...). Never, has so many men been in jail in Hungary than in his time. (...). At the same time together with PETER Gabor, he was the preparator of the Soviet military murders at the Octogon square which furnished the reasons to reinforce the AVH. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

While such terrorism did assist the Rajk group in fomenting unrest among significant segments of the population, especially the intelligentsia, the bulk of the Hungarian masses were against Rajk and held him responsible for the terror:

RAJK was less popular in parliament and in public ... because he was repeatedly mentioned as the director of the ... terror. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

He was already unpopular enough in public and the Hungarian parliament. A number of factors undermined the Rajk faction. Firstly, the denunciation of Tito's group by the Cominform raised vigilance against Titoism through the region, thus keeping in check the network to which Rajk belonged. This allowed the communist faction to move ahead and demote Rajk and his collaborators:

When RAJK Laszlo was removed from the heavy of the ministry of interior, the public opinion of the country

breathed a little more freely. Everybody believed that no worse, no more wicked, no more cruel a person could replace him. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 10) (IMG)

Eventually Rajk and his group were purged, with Rajk being executed for sabotage and espionage. The interrogation and trial of Rajk, during which Rajk stated his ties to Nazi German intelligence and his links to Tito's circle, further exposed the fascist character of the Yugoslav state. Karel Kaplan, a West German intelligence agent, remarked:

The political fallout of Rajk's trial was Cominform's second resolution on Yugoslavia, of November 1949, with the suggestive title, "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the Hands of Murderers and Spies." The trial and this resolution resulted in intensified persecution of "enemies" within Communist parties, and in escalating Soviet-bloc attacks against Yugoslavia. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 30) (IMG)

In that rather famous resolution, part of which has been cited previously, Tito, his gang, and his regime were denounced as 'fascist'. The Yugoslav intelligence service provided support for the Titoist networks whom Rajk headed.

Yugoslavia became the country hosting the MI6 bases for terrorist operations against the Hungarian People's Democracy:

A typical low-level agent, Gorka collected information on heavy industry, mining and transport for his MI6 contact in Vienna, 'Mr Thompson'. He carefully noted the types of Russian vehicles, armour and tanks and their number plates which enabled MI6 to compile a breakdown of the Russian units stationed in Hungary or in transit through the country. The group also provided details on the construction of the largest Russian military airport in eastern Europe.

Gorka claims that the group's most important intelligence-gathering coup was sight of Russian documents that detailed contingency plans for the complete takeover of the country and government by their Hungarian puppets in the event of the further deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia. Interestingly, Gorka reveals that once relations between Stalin and Tito had been settled to the satisfaction of the West, MI6 began using Yugoslavia as a launching pad for sending couriers and agents into Hungary. Yugoslav intelligence officers worked hand in glove with their MI6 counterparts. One Hungarian agent told Gorka about a meeting in Belgrade for an infiltration mission with a wartime SOE officer who had undertaken undercover operations into German-occupied Serbia. (MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, Stephen Dorril, p. 177) (IMG)

In mid-1950, a CIA report stated that several Hungarian and Romanian Titoist refugees to Yugoslavia, after being tortured by the Yugoslav regime's intelligence service, were forcibly sent back to Hungary and Romania:

The concentration camp at Zrenjanin was established during World War II by the Nazis and later taken over by the UDB. Its capacity is not known, although between February and November 1949, there were approximately 800 persons incarcerated there. At present the camp is used to hold refugees from Hungary and Rumania. The commandant of the camp is UDB Captain Joseph Tubic, who speaks Hungarian. (...). Outside these barracks are concrete bunkers, two and one-half meters deep and two and one-half meters long, inside which are wells in which prisoners sentenced to solitary confinement are kept in a crouching position. The entire camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence and guarded by troops of the UDB. New arrivals are told by Tubic that the camp is the end of their journey; that anyone who breaks the rules will be shot. (...). Treatment of the prisoners is very harsh; the daily food ration consists of tea, 400 grams of bread, and thin soup. neither fuel nor blankets are issued during the winter months. The most minor infractions of the camp rules are punishment by ten days' confinement in the bunkers. There is considerable corruption among the UDB guards who, in exchange for personal possessions, will obtain some food, mostly vegetables for the prisoners. (...). At various times during 1949, but especially in March, April, and July, an unspecified number of prisoners was taken to the border and forced back into Hungary and Rumania. ('The Concentration Camp Near Zrenjanin, Serbia', CIA, July 24, 1950, p. 1) (IMG{Yugoslavia})

The CIA pointed to reports by Hungaria – a Munich-based Hungarian anti-communist opposition newspaper, controlled by the Horthy-era head of the National Bank of Hungary, Baron Antal Radvanszky – stating that upon arrival to Yugoslavia, the Hungarian 'refugees':

were all captured by Yugoslav border guards, forced by OZNA (old form of UDB – Security Police) agents to enter the Titoist propaganda service and to return to Hungary.

Indoctrination of the refugees is directed by ex-Major Andrew Kenocze, former head of instruction of Hungarian secret police. At the time of the Rajk conspiracy, he managed to escape into Yugoslavia in time to avoid agents of the Cominform. Kenocze's friendship with Rajk and association with Yugoslav Communist partisans began in the days of the Spanish revolution. Every refugee is interrogated by Kenocze and his agents, who coerce the fugitives to return clandestinely to their country, bearing Tito's counterpropaganda pamphlets.

(FLEEING EVACUEES TURNED BACK, Hungaria, September 1, 1950. Cited in: HUNGARIAN

REFUGEES FORCED TO BECOME TITO AGENTS, CIA, Date Distributed: November 9, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

C15S3. People's Democratic Hungary; Economic Development

*** IMG-All-{Hungary}

Hungary, a country with a large peasant population, needed to collectivize its agriculture in order to get the petit-bourgeoisie out of small businesses and onto big collectively-owned businesses, so that these kolkhozes can – unlike the petit-bourgeoisie who do not have businesses big enough to provide cushion for the risk of confronting imperialism – take risks and serve as a class base for confrontation against Anglo-American finance capital. Hungary also needed industrialization obviously to increase the population of the proletariat, to mechanize agriculture, and to prepare its military-industrial backbone for combat against foreign aggression of fascist mercenaries through cross-border infiltration.

Mark Lundell – an economic historian on Eastern Europe, a prominent World Bank official with positions in Russia, China, Brazil, and Central Asia, as well as the World Bank Country Director for several African countries – basically confirmed that Hungary's agricultural collectivization program was not forced, by admitting 'private farming was still allowed':

The collectivization of Hungarian agriculture then officially began on August 13, 1948 with Decree 8,000 on Production Group Cooperatives. This decree supported collective field operations of any kind, although private farming was still allowed. The Agricultural Production Cooperatives (APC), which involved the joint cultivation of crops, began forming in the beginning of 1949. At end of 1949, 1,367 APC's were operated by 36,405 members. Three years later, after the definitive consolidation of Communist power in Hungary, 369,203 members worked in 5,110 APC's amount of land farmed by the APC's had increased eightfold from 1949 to 1952. A quarter of Hungarian farmers were collectivized in APC's by 1952. (Central and Eastern European Land Tenure Patterns: A Brief Historical Overview, Mark Lundell, September 1994, p. 10) (IMG)

At the same time, a greater emphasis was laid on heavy industry, which led indirectly, in the long-run, to the growth of light industry. The statistics provided by the CIA's Office of Research and Report (ORR) prove beyond doubt that upon the election of the communist-led popular front in 1947, Hungary's economy began to actually grow for the first time since 1938. Far surpassing the pre-war levels, Hungary's rapid economic growth, which the Anglo-American media has never called a 'miracle', was both in the sphere of consumer goods and in the industrial/producer goods. The CIA Economic Intelligence Report was as follows:

In August 1947 the economy began to operate under the Three Year Plan (1947-1949). Under this Plan, light industry reached 62 percent of its prewar level of production by the end of 1947 and 86 percent in 1948. The goals of the Three Year Plan were to restore industry to its prewar level and to achieve a greater degree of industrialization as a basis for ultimately improving the standard of living. (...). Although production by light industry was behind schedule in 1947-1948, by 1949 light industry had exceeded the Plan, reaching 116 percent of its prewar (1938) value of production and 29 percent of the gross value of Industrial production.


The Three Year Plan was completed 6 months ahead of schedule, and the First Five Year Plan, which followed, firmly established the trend started in the first year of the Three Year Plan. Increased industrialization, which was to be the basis for ultimately raising the standard of living, was the foremost goal of the planners, and the standard of living temporarily was subordinated to this increased industrialization. During the First Five Year Plan the development of heavy industry was stressed at the expense of light industry; and although production by light industry increased considerably, this increase was well below that of heavy industry.

(‘LIGHT INDUSTRY IN HUNGARY 1947-57’, Economic Intelligence Report, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, July 31, 1957, p. 8) (IMG)

The rapid economic development which Hungary, a country with a large petit-bourgeois peasant population, experienced as a result of the scientific central planning introduced a high level of development to a country that just like Germany, was once a hub of extreme reaction and barbarism:

The Five year plan promises new and never known chances in the everyday living standards – it offers it, however, to a new type of Soviet man.... (...). The people in villages will use the electricity and Health Centers and other material benefits which may reach them through the Plan. (...). As far as world community is concerned, the changes which may occur in the living standards of the population in Hungary the effects will be that broad masses, many of them for the first time, will get acquainted with civilization in the form of modern planning, electric light and household appliances. (‘THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949’, Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, pp. 305-306) (IMG)

HUNGARY
GROSS VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS AND PRODUCER GOODS
1938, 1948-57, and 1960 plan



Between the years 1948 and 1953, the screenshot of the CIA graph above shows, Hungary witnessed a steady economic growth both in the consumer goods and the industrialization, far surpassing the prewar levels. The post-1953 economic decline, resultant from a greater economic influence by the Titoists, will be explained in subsequent chapters.

See: ('LIGHT INDUSTRY IN HUNGARY 1947-57',
Economic Intelligence Report, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, July 31, 1957, p. 8) (IMG)

The prior absence of industry and the petit-bourgeois mode of the majority had allowed for fascism to easily reign in that land. The collectivization of agriculture, which transformed the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie into kolkhozniks, and industrialization, which transformed the petit-bourgeoisie into proletarians, strengthened the basis of the socialist forces in the population, and rendered weaker the backwards classes.

The CIA-MI6 media mercenaries charge that the USSR 'stole' Hungary's industry, once the Red Army 'occupied' Hungary. In so propagating, they distort the picture of the reality. According to the Hague Convention, the army which defeats its enemy force in a specific territory has the legal right to seize those enemy economic assets as a type of reparation (see C18S2). The USSR exercised this legal right. Furthermore, the Yalta Agreement reaffirmed this right of the USSR:

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(YALTA CONFERENCE AGREEMENT: DECLARATION OF A LIBERATED EUROPE, Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, February 11, 1945) (IMG)

After the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War and the defeat of the Axis forces in Hungary, the USSR took over the Nazi German assets in Hungary as part of reparation, and converted them into the USSR's stock companies (A/Os). The CIA admitted:

Prior to 1 October 1952, all former German industrial plants and other economic enterprises in Hungary which

were taken over by the USSR after World War II were united under so-called stock companies (aktsionernyye obschestva – A/Os). These A/Os were fully controlled by the Soviets and were directly subordinate to ... Moscow. This organization in Hungary was called the Directorate for Soviet Property in Hungary (USIV). (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 /

June 21, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

With the Soviets exercising their legal right according to the Hague Convention, the former Nazi German assets seized were fully subordinate to the Soviets:

All general directors and other key officials in these A/Os were Soviets. To all intents and purposes these A/Os were fully controlled and owned by the Soviets though the Hungarian Government may have owned a small percentage of the stock in some of the subordinate concerns. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

As with the rest of scientific central planning, the enterprises owned by the Soviets in Hungary would first draw up their own plans and would submit them to the central authorities in Moscow, so that the central authorities coordinate plans as part of the scientific central plan. The planning made with regards to the Soviet enterprises in Hungary would also be coordinated with the government of Hungary, such that the assets can be duly integrated into the Hungarian economy as well. As the CIA reported, information about the economic conditions in the Soviet-seized assets in Hungary would be collected and each enterprise would make plans:

such matters as yearly capital investment and yearly production plans for USIV enterprises ... were first drawn up by individual plants for the coming year and submitted to the A/O under whose jurisdiction they happened to be. Each A/O administrative staff would then review these plans and work out a joint plan for the A/O. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The central authorities of the A/O would:

then review these plans and work out a joint production and capital investment plan for all of USIV. After review ... in Moscow, these plans were returned to .. Hungary and had to be integrated with the economic plans of Hungary. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The CIA-MI6 mainstream media outlets propagate the narrative that the USSR utilized these joint-stock companies as means of importing cheap materials to its own economy. Such claims by media are debunked by the CIA, which not only admitted that the USSR coordinated its plans regarding its holdings in Hungary with the Hungarian government, but also admitted:

The majority of products manufactured by USIV plants were sold on the Hungarian internal market.

Only a relatively small proportion of the goods was exported to the West or to the USSR. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

The majority of the goods produced by USIV plants was also sold to the Hungarian government. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Furthermore, since the Hungarian government cooperated in integrating the Soviet enterprise plans with Hungary's economic plans, the goods sold to the Hungarian government by these assets were for extremely low prices: Industrial undertakings working for the Russians, mostly for reparation accounts, received all possible aid which the Hungarian government could offer, and the Russian military commanders, appointed for

each of the factories up on the first day of occupation, did their utmost to increase the intensity of work. Governmental aid was, however, calculated only to stimulate production, since financial aid accorded to the industrial companies was compensated by setting of very low prices and backlogs in payments for deliveries made on orders placed by State agencies. (Foreign Holdings in Hungary, CIA, October 4, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)

Throughout the time in which the Soviets maintained their holdings in Hungary, the Soviets invested heavily in improving the conditions of the plants, multiplying its production. USSR also provided all kinds of welfare benefits for the predominantly-Hungarian workers in the plants:

From the time they were taken over by the Soviet Government after World War II until they were sold to the Hungarian government in October 1952, a large amount of capital was invested in USIV plants.

On the average, the capacity of these plants was increased to double that of the prewar capacity by the construction of new shape and the addition of modern equipment and machinery. New living quarters for workers, nurseries for children of plant workers, rest centers, etc. were also constructed. In general these plants were more modern and better in every way than the average Hungarian plant. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Note that the vast majority of those employed in the Soviet Property in Hungary were Hungarians:

Altogether there were perhaps 200 to 300 Soviets and several thousand Hungarians employed in USIV. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

By 1952, the USSR turned over several of these USIV enterprises to Hungary, as part of its aid to the Hungarian Peoples' Democracy, and turned some of these USIV companies it owned into joint-stock companies wherein Hungary received 50% of the shares:

In October 1952, an agreement was reached whereby the enterprises in Hungary were turned over to the Hungarian government. Under this agreement the USSR received a sum of money for those plants and enterprises which were turned over but source did not know the specific terms of this exchange. At the same time the USSR formed four joint stock companies with the Hungarian government with the stock divided on a 50-50 basis. These four joint stock companies were composed of all former Soviet holdings not sold outright to the Hungarian government as well as Hungarian enterprises in the same economic field. In addition, USSR contributed a portion of perhaps all of the money received from the sale of their holdings in Hungary to this joint venture. These joint Soviet Hungarian companies were known as:

Maszolaj – the joint stock company which controlled the petroleum industry in Hungary. (...).

Mazobal – the joint stock company which controlled the Aluminum industry in Hungary. (...).

Maszovlet – the joint civil aid stock company in Hungary.

Meszhart – the joint stock company which controlled Danube shipping facilities in Hungary.

(SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 5) (IMG)

C15S4. Bulgarian Resistance

*** IMG-All-{Bulgaria}

When the Nazis occupied Bulgaria:

Scattered and apparently spontaneous acts of armed resistance to the Bulgarian government made their appearance .. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

Thus, the embryo of the Bulgarian people's resistance against the regime took shape in mid-1941. With Soviet backing:

In the summer and autumn of 1941 a number of Communist saboteurs were parachuted into northeastern Bulgaria or landed along the Black Sea coast in inflated rubber boats for the purpose of organizing sabotage and local resistance efforts. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

A few months later:

in 1941 or early in 1942 a pseudo-underground radio station, calling itself "Khristo Botev" after a famous Bulgarian revolutionist, went into action in the Crimea [i.e. in USSR] and broadcast repeated appeals to the Bulgarian people to unite against the regime. While appears that these first resistance efforts met with little success, the action of the USSR gave heart to subversive elements within Bulgaria and helped to provide the necessary impetus towards the formation of a national resistance movement. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

At the same time, an anti-fascist popular front of communists, progressives, and the anti-fascist right was taking shape in Bulgaria:

Matters took a different turn in the winter of 1941-1942 when representatives of the major opposition political parties – Agrarians, Communists, Social Democrats, and [the right-wing militarist-nationalist] Zveno – opened secret negotiations in Sofia. Out of these meetings came a coalition known as the "Fatherland Front" which henceforth was to dominate all organized resistance activity within Bulgaria. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

The case of the Bulgarian Communist Party's alliance with Zveno is particularly noteworthy. According to the prominent BBC journalist and advisor to the US and European governments Misha Glenny:

Zveno (The Link) ... maintained close ties with influential figures in the illegal Military League. (The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2012: New and Updated, Misha Glenny)

The organization had:

corporatist authoritarian tendencies.. (The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804 -2012: New and Updated, Misha Glenny)

However it also had:

strongly republican sentiment.. (The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2012: New and Updated, Misha Glenny)

Zveno had the appearance of the Italian Fascist movement but was anti-fascist. Furthermore, though it partially was elitist and held a spirit of authoritarian culture, it clearly had republican tendencies as well. Zveno became a partner of the

Bulgarian Communist Party in the fight against fascism. This historical case is a lesson against the left- opportunist currents, which treat all right-wing forces as inherently 'fascist' or as 'not' real partners against fascism. The alliance of the Communist Party with the progressive 'peasant organizations' and the anti-fascist right proved effective. According to their agreement, whereas Zveno and the Agrarians were tasked with mobilizing and activating the subversive elements in the army and the countryside respectively, the Bulgarian Communist Party was in charge of the guerrilla operations against the Boris Regime:

The clandestine work of the Fatherland Front was divided into three departments: active resistance, employing tactics of partisan warfare; passive resistance, with emphasis placed upon organization of the peasantry in order to secure failures in agricultural and infiltration of the government services primarily through the establishment of secret anti-German cells within the Bulgarian clear demarcation of interests was achieved between the members of the Front. The control of the partisans was left for the most part to the Communists, since they had most experience in this type of operation and could most effectively command support from inside the USSR. The Agrarians, with a long tradition of grassroots political organization in the countryside, worked principally with the peasants. Zveno, drawing upon its army associations, was most effective in establishing subversive cadres within the officer corps. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

The Fatherland Front had some initial successes. The militants:

excelled [in] the assassination of several leading pro-German politicians in Sofia during 1942. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

Nevertheless, there were major setbacks for the movement as well. In this fight, the Boris regime:

had all the advantages of superior equipment, police organization, and a highly developed system of intelligence. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 12) (IMG) Therefore, reported the CIA: The first partisan units put into the field by the Front were speedily isolated by the secret police and hunted down. In April 1942 the greater part of the central and local leadership of the Front was betrayed, with the result that only three members of the Central military escaped capture. There was a similar disaster early in 1943 when more members of the central committee were apprehended. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

The principal of the Fatherland Front in 1942 and the first months of 1943 was survival. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 12) (IMG)

In 1943, these setbacks culminated. The defeats experienced by the Partisans reached its highest level:

By the end of 1943 it was clear that resistance operations could no longer be directed from Sofia because of the danger of detection. The headquarters of the Front were shifted to Plovdiv.. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

The situation began to improve during:

the summer of 1943 when the death of Tear Boris and German reverses the Eastern Front opened the way for more extended resistance activity. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 12) (IMG)

From then on, the tide began to turn. The Germans and their puppet forces, in spite of the casualties they inflicted upon Bulgarian civilians and resistance fighters, were far more frequently struck by the resistance guerrillas:

From 1 September 1943 to 1 March 1944, according to captured German documents, no less than 1,118 resistance incidents were recorded in Bulgaria and in the Bulgarian-occupied sections of Macedonia. In clashes with resistance elements during the same period, the losses in killed and wounded amounted to 131 German army personnel, 418 Bulgarian army and police personnel, 197 insurgents, and 355 civilians. The government and the German forces struck back vigorously, but it is noteworthy that the number of reported resistance incidents mounted to 687 during the month of June 1944 alone.

German observers who studied the growth of resistance in Bulgaria make repeated mention of partisan bands which were beginning to establish themselves as major factor in the internal unrest. The German military attache, summarizing developments in the first quarter of 1944, declared that the improved organization and numbers of the partisans could be felt in their repeated attacks on heavily-defended military establishments. In Sofia the

government vainly attempted to allay the partisan menace by effecting a reshuffle of the cabinet, ousting obnoxious pro-Germans from the police force, and releasing from detention more than 15,000 political prisoners and relatives of persons in the underground. These measures were correctly interpreted by the Fatherland Front as a sign of weakness. By mid-August 1944 the estimated number of active partisans within Bulgaria had grown to between 3,000-5,000 persons, with an additional 6,000-8,000 partisans in Greek and Serbian Macedonia.

(Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

As the Soviet Red Army was reaching Bulgaria, the Partisans began to gain control over all of Bulgaria:

By the end of August 1944, with the German armies everywhere on the run and the Red poised upon the approaches to Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front decided to bring its full resources into the open. On 2 September 1944 a general insurrection was ordered. The partisans came down from their mountain hide-outs and joined forces with clandestine organizations in the villages and cities. By 3 September much of northeast Bulgaria was under partisan control; on 5 September Pleven fell; on 6 September Plovdiv was occupied; and on the night of 8 September the inevitable coup d'état occurred in Sofia. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 14) (IMG)

Upon achieving victory:

The new Fatherland Front government immediately opened armistice negotiations with the USSR, which had declared war on Bulgaria on September, and sent the Bulgarian Army to fight [along] with mission and Yugoslav forces against the retreating German. Meanwhile the Bulgarian Communists, following the pattern so successfully employed in other Eastern European countries, [attained] the vital Ministries of Interior and Justice in the new government.. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 14) (IMG)

C15S5. People's Democratic Bulgaria vs. Titoist Fascist Yugoslavia / The Yugoslav Regime's Plans for Conquest of Bulgaria / Ethnocide and Reign of Terror against the People of Macedonia / Bulgarian Communist Purge of the Gang of Kostov, the Agents of Titoist Yugoslavia / Yugoslav Regime Supports the Goryani Terror Network

Backed by the Anglo-American imperialist enemies of the USSR, the Gestapo agent Tito envisaged a Yugoslav colonization of the Bulgarian peoples, through a British-style 'divide and conquer' strategy, according to which the people of mainland Bulgaria would be separated from their coethnic brethren in Pirin Macedonia and Yugoslav-occupied Macedonia. And upon the division of these people into the three territories, they would all be conquered, colonized and ethnocidally victimized by the Greater Serbian Settler-Colonial Empire, a settler-colonial fascist entity to which Tito's group officially referred as the 'Balkan Federation'. In a document published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Craig Nation, the Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies, reported:

In early November 1944 the Yugoslavs brought dialogue with the Bulgarians to a higher level by sending a project for federation to Sofia by special courier. Between November and January an intense discussion was pursued, in the course of which a number of variants for association were exchanged. The Yugoslav side was in general more avid, posing the goal of a "unitary federal state" and suggesting the creation of a joint military command with Tito as commander in chief. The intention was to unite the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Macedonian regions (Pirin and Vardar Macedonia) as a single federal entity, with the remainder of Bulgaria joining the federation as a seventh republic, a "6+1" approach to federation building (the Titoists having already decided to recast the new Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics — Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia) that would advantage the Yugoslavs and reduce Bulgaria by separating it from Pirin Macedonia. The Bulgarian proposal emphasized the need for gradualism, refused to consider a transfer of Pirin Macedonia, and suggested a "1+1" approach in which Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would federate as equal partners. Despite intensive negotiations, these basic differences could not be resolved. ('WAR IN THE BALKANS, 1991-2002', Craig Nation (Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle), Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, August 2003, p. 59) (IMG)

The Soviets, whose sympathies lied with the Bulgarian side, supported the establishment of a liberated Greater Bulgaria. The CIA reported:

The Soviet Union wished to create a "Macedonian Republic" from the Yugoslav Macedonia (today the People's Republic of Macedonia), the PIRIN Macedonia (today in Bulgaria) and from the Greek Macedonia. This Republic was supposed to form a part of Bulgaria. Thus the Soviet Union wished to strengthen the Bulgarian Communist Party.. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

The North Macedonian communists too sided with the USSR:

The Macedonian Communist authority is pro-Bulgarian. (...). It tends toward Sofia. It is suspicious of whatever

comes from Belgrade. (...). The Macedonian Republic is the most unstable Tito's Republic. Her Communists are pro-Bulgarian. Their view of the Macedonian question is pro-Russian. Their cultural links with Sofia are stronger than those with Belgrade. The Macedonian Parliament is in a revolutionary mood. The first forceful quake will separate Macedonia from the remaining Republics. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 8) (IMG)

Even after the break with Yugoslavia, Dimitrov continued to publicly for the federation of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Why would the federation of the progressive states with fascist Yugoslavia be a good idea? In this context, federating these states was for the purpose of helping in the launching of a great purge against the Titoists.

Federation is not always an establishment of the 'loving unity and friendship' of two states. Sometimes it is used as a purge strategy. The Syrians called for Unity with Egypt in 1958 not for the pipe-dream of the 'unity of two Arab countries' that shared no borders but rather because Syria's military was heavily infiltrated by the CIA due to the series of coups, whereas Egypt was not as infiltrated, and so Egypt could help purge the CIA elements in Syria. The reactionary reverse of this was done as well. The Hashemites in Jordan and Iraq pursued a federation not at all for the 'loving unity' of the Iraqi and Jordanian peoples but rather for the purpose of having Jordan help Iraq in its purge of Nasserists. As early as the late 1940s, the MI6 had been hatching plots to establish a 'pan-Arab' and 'pan-Syrian' federation led by Hashemite Jordan. This MI6-led 'pan-Syrian' federation, eventually denounced by the pan-Syrian activist Antun Sa'adeh due to Jordanian royalist leadership thereof, would then subordinate Israel via the Ben-Gurion regime (see C16S7). Naturally, such a 'pan-Arab' 'federation' plan was radically different in intent than the Nasserist vision. The Hashemite vision was a pro-imperialist and anti-Arab vision whereas the Nasserist vision was anti-imperialist. The pan-Europe that Germany sought to establish had a similar reactionary nature and purpose. Hence, federation between states is not always an 'ideal' but is sometimes a strategy for diluting the fifth columnists' power and for launching a purge.

Indeed, people from the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies favored the Balkan Federation for the purpose of diluting Tito's power so to help the communists in launching a Balkan-wide purge of the Titoists; therefore, their vision of the Balkan Federation was diametrically opposed to the Titoist vision of the Balkan 'Federation', the latter being nothing short of a settler-colonial fascist apartheid state which Tito's gang sought to establish. The federation of a Greater Albania (Albania plus Kosovo) and a Greater Bulgaria (Bulgaria plus Macedonia) with Yugoslavia such that Greater Albania and Greater Bulgaria would have votes equal in power to that of Yugoslavia would have caused the pro-Soviet member states in this federation, Albania and Bulgaria, to jointly outnumber Titoist Yugoslavia, dilute Tito's power in this mix of states, and hence duly pursue the purge of Tito's gang. This is why, before the 1948 expulsion of Tito's group, Stalin and Zhdanov supported such a federation. And this is why Beria, a Titoist agent of the MI6, opposed the Stalin-Zhdanov plan for such an anti-Titoist Balkan federation, while supporting a Titoist fascist settler-colonial Balkan 'federation':

Zhdanov favoured [the] plan for a Balkan Federation. His conception of it differed, naturally, from my father's. He saw this federation as ... an extension of the Soviet state. My father wanted an economic union of the Balkan countries, led by Yugoslavia, which would later join up with a unified Germany and a free Austria. He hoped that Tito would come to renounce the monopoly of the Communist Party and agree to a people's-front-type government. On the other hand, he saw no reason why Yugoslavia should not annex Albania. From the summer of 1948, not long before his death, Zhdanov played a decisive role in the anti-Tito campaign. For this dogmatist, ... the people's democracies ought to be exact copies of the USSR. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, pp. 209-210) (IMG)

For the same reason, Tito tried his best to prevent the kind of a Balkan Federation which Dimitrov, Zhdanov, and Stalin advocated, and instead promoted bourgeois-nationalism. Even after the Cominform's expulsion of Yugoslavia, Dimitrov continued to publicly preach for a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation while he also denounced Tito's fascist gang:

Under the newly created domestic and international conditions, the vital interests of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav peoples made it imperative that both nations seek the closest rapprochement which would quickly lead to their economic and political unification – to the establishment of a federation of South Slavs. Such a federation, resting firmly on friendship with the USSR and fraternal collaboration with the other new democracies, could have successfully defended the freedom and independence of its peoples and ensured their proper development toward socialism. Within the framework of such a federation would have been solved correctly, all the old unsolved problems legated by the bourgeois- monarchic regimes regarding the unification of the Macedonians from the Pirin district with the People's Republic of Macedonia, as well as the return to Bulgaria of the purely Bulgarian Western Border Region which the Yugoslavia of King Alexander had grabbed after World War I. (...). Our Party has always advocated and continues to advocate, that Macedonia belongs to the Macedonians. True to the traditions of the Macedonian revolutionaries, together with all honest Macedonian patriots, we are deeply convinced that the Macedonian people will translate into reality their national unity and will ensure their future as a free nation with equal rights only within the framework of a federation of Southern

Slavs.

In the past, the unification of the South Slavs has always met with the stubborn resistance of German imperialism. Today the new pretenders for world domination – the American and British imperialists – oppose the unification and merger of the Southern Slavs. They have acquired worthy allies in the present Yugoslav leaders.

Assured of the support of the USSR, the new democracies and the world forces of democracy, the Southern Slavs will be able to smash the opposition of the imperialists and realize their vitally necessary unity. The main obstacle to the federation of the Southern Slavs are today the traitors to Marx-Leninism, the nationalist leadership in Belgrade and Skopie, the Titos, Djilases, Kulishevskys, Vlahovs. But history is marching on and sweeps aside everything which stands in the way of progress. The cause of the unification of the Southern Slavs, including the Macedonian people, will triumph.

(‘Political Report Delivered to the V Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party’, Georgi Dimitrov, December 19th, 1948, Sofia, 1949, p. 62, pp. 64-70. Dr. Vijay Singh of the Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India found and published Dimitrov’s speech under the title ‘The South Slav Federation and the Macedonian Question’) (IMG)

In order to materialize his goal of establishing a Balkan Empire wherein the Bulgarians and their Macedonian coethnic brethren would be separated from one another, divided, and colonized, Tito's regime tried to drive a linguistic wedge between the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages, two languages so immensely similar that many regard Macedonian as a mere offshoot or dialect of Bulgarian. It is obvious that this measure by Tito was a classic colonial divide-and-conquer strategy. Through driving this linguistic wedged, Tito could more easily separate the mainland Bulgarians from the Macedonian-Bulgarians hence to conquer both of them more easily. In a speech to the Bulgarian Communist Party’s fifth congress, summing up the situation in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations and regarding Macedonia, Georgi Dimitrov said:

The nationalist and chauvinist policy of the Titos and Kulishevskys, which is the other side of the coin of their anti-Soviet course, is not only directed against Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people but also against the Macedonian people. This policy has adopted the methods of the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalists and is sowing hatred among the Macedonian people, inciting one part against the other, resorting to terror and persecution against those who disapprove of the official course of the present Yugoslav leaders. In this way the realization of the age-old ideal of the Macedonian people – their national unification – is being artificially delayed. (...) We are well aware that the nationalist and chauvinist policy of the Belgrade and Skopie leaders of the Tito and Kulishevsky type do not have the approval of the majority of the Macedonian people who are convinced that their national unification will be built on an understanding between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, in cooperation with these peoples and with the powerful assistance of the USSR. (‘Political Report Delivered to the V Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party’, Georgi Dimitrov, December 19th, 1948, Sofia, 1949, p. 62, pp. 64-70. Dr. Vijay Singh of the Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India found and published Dimitrov’s speech under the title ‘The South Slav Federation and the Macedonian Question’.) (IMG)

The US intelligence reported:

Tito thought that by creating the Macedonian language he would win the Macedonian people, above all the weak Macedonian intelligentsia who were mostly educated in Bulgaria and thought pro-Bulgarian. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

Thus, Tito's gang

created the Macedonian language. All family names were altered. Books are printed in Macedonian, which the Macedonians do not understand. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

The Ustase criminals enthusiastically welcomed the colonial policy line of Tito's regime and tried to promote this artificially-engineered 'Macedonian' culture:

A Macedonian opera was founded. Joca SRKULJ, formerly director of the Belgrade Opera, was called to organise the new institution. The Macedonian Minister of Enlightenment demanded that all operas be sung in Macedonian. In vain SRKULJ argued the difficulty and unnecessary efforts linked with such undertaking. He argued that because of cadres and other Operas in the country it is far better that they are sung in Serbo-Croat. Yet “Cavalleria Rusticana” was sung in Macedonian. SRKULJ, in the end, refused to fight about with the new language, in spite of the high salary which he was offered, and returned to Belgrade. However, the Ustashi Colonel, and former martial band leader, Lovro MATAČIĆ, PAVELIĆ’s director of the Zagreb Opera, adopted the Macedonian language with “great zeal”. He is now the conductor of the Macedonian Opera. He went to Macedonia straight from the Prison. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE

MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

This was in line with the general policy of Tito's regime which was to use the Ustase not only for military and intelligence purposes but also for the realm of culture:

Deputy Leader Mile Budak, a writer of popular novels with a nationalistic and pious theme, provided the NDH with culture. He made it his business to win over fellow novelists, poets, artists and sculptors, especially those who had not been Croat separatists. Among those bullied or buttered up was the world-famous sculptor Ivan Metrovic, who was persuaded, after a few weeks in prison, to take an NDH art exhibition around Europe. The leading Croatian poet Vladimir Nazor eventually joined the Partisans, but in 1941 he composed verses very acceptable to Budak:

This is no time for music and mandolins
Now is the time for each of us
To live as wolves and lions,
In other words as Croats.

The country's leading surrealist writer, Miroslav Krleia, who had been a Communist in the 1920s and later supported the Tito regime, was allowed to remain in Zagreb throughout the war, thanks to Budak's protection. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West)

As mentioned, the people of Macedonia did not understand this colonially-engineered language:

The [Titoist] Communist attempt to create a "Macedonian Republic" proved a failure. (...) They created a language which nobody understands. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

Standing against the Ustase and Gestapo agent Tito, the communists of Macedonia opposed this newly created language colonially imposed by the Tito regime:

Many Communists oppose the new language. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 6) (IMG)

In addition:

Ceda MINDEROVIC, secretary general of the Yugoslav Writers League (Udruzenje Knjizevnika Jugoslavije), was resolutely against the Maedonian language as director of the publishing organisation of Serbia, "PROSVETA", and refused to print books in Macedonian. Meanwhile the idea prevailed that a Macedonian language had to be created and it is being created now.. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 6) (IMG)

The Macedonians who resided in Belgrade would have wished to return to their homeland as well, but decided not to, given the colonial conditions in their homeland:

The Belgrade Macedonians [i.e. Macedonians who lived in Belgrade] who worked and longed for a "Macedonian State" for years, did not go the newly created Macedonia. For them she remained alien and unfamiliar. They are afraid of her. Their emigree conception of Macedonia was different. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 4) (IMG)

The Cominform, however, sided with the people of Macedonia and Bulgaria; the Cominform did not leave the Macedonian communists alone in the face of Tito's project for a Balkan Empire. The Macedonian comrades were joyful for this fact:

The [Cominform's anti-Tito] Resolution was accepted with joy by the Communist authorities in Macedonia. The Macedonian Parliament (Narodno Sobranje) was ready to proclaim the cession of the People's Republic of Macedonia from Yugoslavia and its incorporation into Bulgaria. The Communist authorities in Macedonia believed that the time has come from the realisation of their idea and desire. Events proved that it was too early. Marshal Tito and his Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party were still going strong. The episode was concluded by the dismissal of a few Ministers of the Macedonian Government, a regular trial at SKOPJE, the dismissal of all suspected Communists. Some of them escaped to Bulgaria, among them Communist MPs from the Macedonian Parliament. Others, who publicly approved the Resolution, were arrested. The separatist idea, though not realised, is nursed secretly by ruling Macedonian Communists. At a favourable moment it will appear again (such are the statements of Ing. HARALAMOVIC, employed in a factory near SKOPJE; of Metodije BOSKOVIC, graduated lawyer, department head of the Executive People's Committee of SKOPJE. Both are Macedonians and reliable men [for the CIA]). (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 4) (IMG)

Against the Macedonian communist and Cominform resistance, Yugoslavia's fascist regime responded even more unscrupulously and launched a massive political cleansing project to eliminate anyone local Macedonian government officials who dared to stand up against the Balkan Empire agenda, and to silence the Macedonian people's resistance against this agenda:

All people, respectively Communists, with different ideas [than that of Tito's Central Committee] have been eliminated from the leading positions. The Macedonians do not show their attitude. They are quiet, waiting for the proper moment to realise their idea. They are afraid of Belgrade, because the Central Committees of the Yugoslav CP has other views. It believes that the Macedonian Republic should remain within Yugoslavia. Communists with views other than this are traitors to the Party. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 2) (IMG)

The terroristic elimination of the Macedonian patriots opposing the Greater-Serbian chauvinism of Tito's fascist regime was also confirmed by the Soviet state media which reported:

Tito's Belgrade gang fans chauvinism not only against the Albanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians and Slovaks. It is also intensifying its persecution of such peoples as the Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bosnians and Herzegovinians, who are putting up particularly active resistance to the fascist tyranny. In Montenegro, Bosnia, Vojvodina, Macedonia, and other national territories, the local officials are being squeezed out as "unreliable," and in their place are being put primarily Greater Serbia chauvinists, Titoite toughs from Belgrade and other towns of Serbia. Nor is there anything surprising in the fact that top-ranking posts in the fascist state apparatus are held by such prominent figures of the old regime and ideologists of Greater Serbia chauvinism as the royal diplomat, Simic, the publisher of a privately-owned reactionary newspaper, Ribnikar, and others. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

While the communists were suppressed, the progressive bourgeois democrats too were suppressed in this highly anti - democratic environment:

There are even less Socialists. These can be formed from a democratic atmosphere, in a future Macedonian Republic. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 8) (IMG)

Such was a fascist dictatorship, a 'republic' in the name only, established, suppressing the popular masses of Macedonia:

They created a State, alien to the citizens in it. The citizens are afraid of their State, they hate it. Only the name is reality, the rest is deceit. The Macedonians therefore did not greet the new Republic. They withdrew and wait. They think that the present situation is only a transition period. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

Hence:

The Macedonian citizens are suspicious of the [Titoist] regime. They do not like it. The activities of the Government have no appeal to them. They are foreign and unintelligible. They wish to get rid of the rulers at a favourable moment. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 8) (IMG)

The fascist character of the Titoist settler-colonial rule over Macedonia was exposed explicitly in Soviet state media:

The national minorities in Tito Yugoslavia are being subjected to unprecedented repressions and despotism. The same terror reigns today in Yugoslav Macedonia as did during the years of fascist occupation. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

In Titoist-occupied Macedonia, the mode of production was not as capitalistic as one may think. Rather, slavery was an important form of property relation there. As confirmed by US intelligence, in Titoist-occupied Macedonia:

The traces of slavery are still clearly visible. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 8) (IMG)

Nonetheless, thanks to the sanctions imposed by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, thanks to the covert and overt resistance of the communists, progressives, and anti-fascists of Yugoslavia:

the efforts of the Yugoslav Communist Party with regard to Macedonia, failed. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

The issue regarding Macedonia therefore became a thorn on Tito's side. Indeed:

The Macedonian question, a sore and touchy point for all Governments of old Yugoslavia, has become more so for the Government of "Marshal" Tito. It has become the first worry of the Communist Government. The differences on the Macedonian question between the Soviet Union and Marshal Tito have once again proved the nationalistic ideas of the Marshal. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

During the fascist repression of Macedonia, the Yugoslav regime also sponsored the Bulgarian contras whose aim was the fascist overthrow of the People's Democratic order in Bulgaria. It was known as the 'Goryani' terror network. Describing the Goryani terror network, Mihail Gruev who has been the chief of the Bulgarian State Archives Agency,

wrote:

Perfectly in keeping with folktales, the mountains were seen as a sort of parallel world, where one whose life was in danger could hide, save himself and wait for help from some external "superpowers." Thus, more than once the goryani would claim that, in fact, they were in the mountains "waiting for the Americans." The primary motivation — to save themselves for repression and terror — filled the forests with staid, middle-aged people with established livelihoods, families and children. They represented a wide variety of social backgrounds and ideological predilections (anarchists, agrarians, disappointed [i.e. Titoist] [pseudo-]communists, nationalists, fascists). ('Bulgaria under Communism', Authors: Ivaylo Znepolski, Mihail Gruev, Momtchil Metodiev, Martin Ivanov, Daniel Vatchkov, Ivan Elenkov, Plamen Doynov, 2019) (IMG)

The Goryani comprador terror network – a network of Tsarist-fascists, Titoists, and kulaks – had the support of fascist Yugoslavia:

By the early 50-ties, the Goryani had ... training camps in Yugoslavia and France. (International conference Crimes of the Communist Regimes: an assessment by historians and legal experts proceedings, Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, February 26, 2010, p. 246, 'The conference took place at the Main Hall of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (24-25 February 2010) and at the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic (26 February 2010)') (IMG)

The people of Bulgaria preferred friendly relations with the USSR, and opposed Yugoslav colonialism. Paul Mason, an MI6 operative and British diplomat to Yugoslavia, wrote to London:

The Bulgarians, in my opinion, prefer to continue their present pro-Soviet policy ... rather than to exchange it for a subservient position to Yugoslavia. This feeling is cleverly exploited by the present Bulgarian leaders and their Soviet masters. (N 11009/10124/38, INFLUENCE OF TITOISM IN BULGARIA, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, No. 279, Secret, Sofia, December 21, 1949, December 28, 1949, In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 65) (IMG)

Nonetheless, there was a Yugoslav agent in Bulgaria who pretended to be an anti-Titoist, but who also sought to drive a wedge between not only the Bulgarian People's Democratic government and the Bulgarian people, but also between the USSR and the Bulgarian nation, so to pull Bulgaria towards colonization by Tito's Balkan Empire; his name was Traicho Kostov. Kostov knew Tito as early as 1933 and was working towards a 'federation' of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This is backed up by a US intelligence report:

Traicho Kostov had known Tito since 1933 and continued to maintain relations with him and fought for a federation of Slavs of the South.. His trial, from 7 to 14 December 1949, was one against nationalism, Titoism, Yugoslav federalism, and interior resistance, fought in general, against the man who in 1940 was secretary of the clandestine Central Committee and who held that position until his arrest by Royal Police on 29 April 1942 in Sofia. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Kostov indeed was an agent of Tito, working in collaboration with the Hungarian Titoist Laszlo Rajk (see C15S2) towards the establishment of a Great Serbian Empire hostile to Soviet power:

In February 1948, Rajk went secretly to Belgrade where Tito brought him into contact with the intelligence agents of the American embassy and he started to work for them from that time onwards. On that Belgrade meeting they also agreed on the establishment of a Southeastern European union independent of Moscow under the leadership of Tito and one of their officers in that organization would be the Bulgarian Kostov deputy prime minister. ('THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949', Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 290) (IMG)

Kostov was under surveillance by the Bulgarian counter-intelligence units. When Kostov was on the verge of a purge, Tito publicly denounced Kostov so to discredit, and present as 'Titoist-backed', the anti-Kostov campaign. Nonetheless, his denunciation of Kostov does serve as a useful confession. Indeed, George Hodos, an anti-communist Hungarian journalist, remarked:

Tito ... in a speech in April 1949, ... delivered a shameful denunciation of his Bulgarian comrade just two months before Kostov's arrest. "Kostov was arrested during the reign of King Boris together with a number of other Communists. Although he was one of the main leaders of the party, his life alone was spared. Why?" Tito answered his own question. "Today we have proof that among some Communist parties, certain capitalist states infiltrated their own agents." ('Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954', George H. Hodos, p. 17) (IMG)

Within Kostov's intelligence network was:

General Trunski [who] as a student of Tito would be more in favor of being under Yugoalvia than having a real and true independence for Bulgaria; (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 6) (IMG)

General Ivan Mihailov [who] is well supported in Yugoslavia.. (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

Another person closely associated with Kostov was Anton Yugov. Prior to the establishment of the Bulgarian People's Democracy, Yugov had been a student of Tito. In fact, according to a 1956 CIA report:

Yugov ... in 1934 ... underwent two consecutive years of intensive training at the School of Marxism and Leninism (directed by Tito).. (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 3) (IMG)

Not surprisingly:

Yugov ... certainly is friendly with the Yugoslavs.. (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 3) (IMG)

A US intelligence document described Yugov as a:

Kostov supporter.. (DEMOTION OF BULGARIAN PREMIER CHERVENKOV, NSC Briefing, CIA, April 24, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

As the chief of Bulgarian police, Yugov engaged in terrorist action against the Bulgarian civilians, so to provoke anti-state unrest. This policy succeeded in turning elements, especially of the intelligentsia, against the Bulgarian communists. However, it fell short of rendering the bulk of the Bulgarian population against the communists. The campaign against Kostov and Titoism turned the tide and assisted the communists in re-canalizing the popular rage against Yugov himself:

The great masses of the Bulgarian people do not forget Yugov's connection with the murders of 1944 when he was chief of Police and it is remembered of him that "his hands are soiled with blood." (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 9) (IMG)

In the trial of Kostov in Bulgaria, many parts of the transcript of which I have read, Kostov's dogmatic left- deviationist sectarian line was strongly highlighted. These accusations against Kostov were absolutely correct. Even Paul Mason, the MI6 operative and British diplomat to Bulgaria, reported to the British foreign minister Bevin, that Kostov was a:

bigoted Communist in all matters of doctrine.. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 22) (IMG)

Since Dimitrov was ill, he left Bulgaria. Similar was the case of Kolarov. In this situation, Kostov took the lead. The MI6 confirmed that Kostov was the 'economic dictator' of Bulgaria:

the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party ... produced on 15th July a resolution [against Yugoslav regime].. Having seen this resolution safely through the party, Dimitrov retired to the Black Sea coast or to Russia (no one knows which) to recuperate, while Kolarov went off to take the cure at Karlsbad [in Czechoslovakia]. The business of Government was left to Kostov in virtue of his position as second ranking member of the Politburo (which was confirmed at the party meeting in December) and as virtual economic dictator. He remained in charge throughout the autumn of last year till the elder statesmen returned for the Communist Party meeting in December: and not long afterwards (on 30th January last) it was announced that Kostov was proceeding on six weeks' leaves of absence to recuperate from the strain of his exertions. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 23) (IMG)

Kostov was the autocratic head of the Bulgarian government in general and not just the 'economic dictator'. Indeed there was:

the autumn period when, as stated above, in the absence of the elder statesmen [such as Dimitrov,] Kostov was left in charge of the Government. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

No doubt the revolutionary transformation of Bulgaria necessitated a campaign against religion, a purge of the fascist or pro-feudal elements in the clergy. However, during this period, the Kostov faction of the Bulgarian government went too fast in attacking the Orthodox Church, hence driving a wedge between Bulgaria's religious peasant majority and the state, and at the same time, weakening the hold of the Soviet intelligence in Bulgaria since as mentioned in C15S7, the Soviets had coopted the Orthodox Church as a weapon against the fascist Vatican mafia. The MI6 stated:

Outwardly this period passed without event, though there is reason to believe that Kostov went faster than Dimitrov desired in attacking the Orthodox Church. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

Kostov was a Yugoslav agent posing as 'anti-Titoist', an anti-Soviet element publicly praising the USSR, a vicious anti-communist who undercut communism through Trotskyite-style dogmatism. He spoke in favor of the USSR and the

Peoples' Democracies but acted against them behind the scenes. He was very dictatorial in his behaviour despite being presented in the West as 'pro-democracy'. The MI6 station in Bulgaria further reported:

There is reason to believe that this meeting produced, not only the heart-searching enjoined by Moscow but also, in the course thereof, a good deal of antagonism within the local party itself. It is impossible to believe that in this friction Kostov himself was not a prominent element: it is not inconceivable that at this stage he may have given expression to criticism of Soviet policy on the lines indicated above and it is very likely that his normally masterful bearing may have aroused resentment and given rise to, or at least support to the ... charge ... that he was out to seize leadership. It is at least tempting, in the light of what has since passed, to note that the resolution passed by the Bulgarian Communist Party on that occasion [of condemning Titoism] condemned undue autocracy and individual action on the part of "individual leaders" without preliminary discussion in the Politburo itself. (...) In Dimitrov's absence it fell to Kostov to deliver the annual speech on the state of the nation on the eve of 9th September. In it he hit out in furious terms against the national elements in Yugoslavia, paid the normal tributes to the Soviet Union and boasted of Bulgaria's economic achievements. He could hardly have done less: yet it must have been during this period in charge that he was at the same time alienating the Soviet authorities by his non-cooperative attitude, and at the same time offending his rivals such as Chervenkov and [Kostov's covert ally but ostensible 'rival'] Yugov by his dictatorial attitude. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

In addition to the Cominform resolution which undermined the Yugoslav regime influence in Bulgaria hence weakening Kostov, Kostov's authoritarianism and heavy-handedness led Yugov – a Titoist, a Yugoslav agent, and a right-opportunist head of the Bulgarian intelligence service who was secretly allied to Kostov – to be compelled into joining Chervenkov in denouncing Kostov:

No doubt Kostov took every opportunity while in command last year to strengthen his claims: as I have said before, he is an ambitious man.. But in so doing he undoubtedly allowed rivals like Yugov and Chervenkov – rivals incidentally to each other – to engineer a successful move against him. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 24) (IMG)

The behind-the-scene story of Yugov and his counter-revolutionary affiliations will be exposed later in C20S19. With the downfall of Kostov, came the rise of Chervenkov, a man staunchly committed to the invincible theses of historical materialism and scientific socialism, and a communist fighter against the left-deviations and right-deviations. The following is how the MI6 spy and British diplomat to Sofia, Paul Mason, described Chervenkov:

It would be premature to discuss here how the succession struggle will develop with the removal of Kostov. I would only record my personal belief that the strongest candidate is the dour and forbidding Chervenkov, the arch-doctrinaire of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the former teacher at the Lenin school in Russia (where Tito is reported to have been a pupil of his), the son-in-law of Dimitrov, of giant physical and, I should say, of considerable mental stature. I have already had a talk with him and he gave me a far greater impression of complete certainty of aim and competence in action than any of the other Ministers I have met. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

Chervenkov and his faction, in an alliance with the Yugov group's right-deviation, undid some of the Trotskyite left-opportunist excesses of Kostov and brought NEP-like measures to Bulgaria:

This resolution was published in the press of 21st June, together with the full text of the massive report by Vulko Chervenkov, on which the resolution is based.

2. The resolution runs true to Marxist form in that it combines self-congratulation on the "brilliant victory" of the elections with a large amount of self-criticism. The self-criticism, however, in this case, is unusually lengthy and strong, and the decisions registered in the resolution indicate genuine changes of policy.

3. The first section, after the preamble, deals with economic policy in the countryside. It is difficult to see that the policy now envisaged makes economic sense, but it is certainly an attempt to alleviate the main causes of peasant discontent. The first of them is that too low prices are paid for grain. These are to be raised. Secondly, it appears that, even after fulfilling their quotas to the State, peasants have been compelled to dispose of further stocks through official agencies at official prices, e.g., by the granting of monopoly purchase rights to co-operative unions. The peasant is now to be allowed to dispose more freely of his surplus once his quota to the State has been met. It is apparently realised that the natural effect of these measures will be to raise prices for the consumer. It is, however, admitted that it is "of enormous importance for our national economy and for our goods turnover with foreign countries ... to lower the prices of agricultural products." The only way suggested

for meeting these conflicting claims is “to achieve a radical reduction in expenditure on middlemen’s services.” This is to be done by a campaign against bureaucratism and parasitism and by allowing “health[y] competition” between State and co-operative trading organizations.

4. This is tantamount to an admission that the attempt to organise distribution on a Socialist basis has been carried too far too fast. It is also difficult to see how the better prices and greater latitude now to be allowed to the peasant can fail to benefit not only the middle and poor peasants, but also the “kulaks” (who are, however, still the butt of propaganda). In other words the policy seems to be to slacken the pace which some party zealots have been showing in their attempts to socialise the countryside and to show that undue haste in this process is not only dangerous in its effects (because it alienates the peasants and prevents proper co-operation between workers and peasants) but is actually a serious error in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The pace of formation of co-operatives is also to be slackened by the reassertion of the “voluntary” principle and the “rectification of mistakes” made in numerous areas where too drastic measures had been taken to force farmers and peasants into the co-operative system. (COMMUNIST POLICY IN BULGARIA: Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee, Mr. Dunnett to Mr. Beving, Sofia, June 23, 1949, Received: June 28, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 29) (IMG)

Upon taking out Yugov, the Chervenkov faction was able to go after such Kostov allies and Titoist agents as General Trunski:

General Slavko Tr[u]nski, a friend of Marshal Tito, is not in the good graces of the Bulgarian Communist Party but continues to hold his Army command. He is a candidate for the position of Councilman for Sofia. (BULGARIAN OPPOSITION; CONTACTS WITH JAILED POLITICAL LEADERS, CIA, June 1, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

In the wake of these, the purge was to spread in 1950 and 1951 to all the former Communist partisan adversaries and other adversaries (particularly the first) of the policy of Chervenkov.. It was then that the following were released from the Army and excluded from the Central Committee, or were arrested: (...); General Slavcho Trunski, commander of 3 Army; (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Such purges reduced the influence of the comprador classes in the Bulgarian armed forces, thus allowing the proletariat to expand its share of influence over the Bulgarian means of violence. However, Yugov, another Yugoslav intelligence agent who had denounced his own ally Kostov so to remain in power and continue Kostov’s Titoist activity post-Kostov, continued to exercise influence in Bulgaria. Thus:

On the other hand, Yugov, returned in August 1952 to vice-presidency of the Council of Ministers and now occupies a choice position in the Politburo to which he was elected on 4 May 1954. Already a rival of Chervenkov’s in 1949, he is still a dangerous adversary, though he is hated in all Bulgaria because of the blood with which he covered himself as Minister of Interior after the Communists came to power in 1946. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

By contrast, even as late July 1954, Chervenkov was popular in Bulgaria. A 1954 CIA report confirmed:

Chervenkov ... is the brother-in-law of Dimitrov. He is young, supple, capable, and relatively popular. He is used to his position. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Referring to Chervenkov, the document stated:

A faithful servant and imitator of the Stalinian severity, he is ... the champion of anti-Tito policy. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Furthermore:

Chervenkov ... constitutes, by his very presence, a major obstacle to attempts to seduce Yugoslavia. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

The Bulgarian people, as the reader shall remember from the MI6 document cited previously, preferred friendly relations with the USSR and opposed subservience to the Yugoslav regime. Chervenkov, as the representative of this pro-Soviet anti-Titoist policy line, was naturally the choice of the Bulgarians.

One common propaganda narrative promoted against the friendly relations between the USSR and Bulgaria is that the USSR was colonizing Bulgaria, through control of specific assets in Bulgaria. In accordance to the Hague Convention (see C18S2), the USSR had the legal right to seize Nazi Germany’s military-industrial assets in the territories which its Red Army troops liberated (‘occupied’). The USSR exercised this right and established joint- stock companies in Bulgaria, hence actually splitting the shares with the Bulgarians. Referring to the USSR’s “shares in three joint-stock companies engaged in shipbuilding, construction and production of building materials, and civil aviation”, the CIA admitted:

The Soviet shares in these companies [were] largely acquired through Soviet contributions of German assets seized at the end of the war.. (‘SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS,

CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG)

The CIA-MI6 mainstream media portrays the USSR's turning of Nazi German assets into joint-stock companies as Soviet 'colonization' and 'theft' of Bulgarian resources. Yugoslav agent Kostov promoted this myth as well. In addition to the Hague Convention however, the Yalta agreement reaffirmed the right of the USSR to seize Nazi German assets:

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(YALTA CONFERENCE AGREEMENT: DECLARATION OF A LIBERATED EUROPE, Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, February 11, 1945) (IMG)

The Soviet state greatly assisted People's Democratic Bulgaria in the latter's development of heavy industry. The US intelligence also reported:

In 1947 the USSR granted Bulgaria an investment credit amounting to \$5 million, which was to be repaid by shipments of tobacco and other goods in 5 years. Among the projects toward which the credit was to be used were the following: the Stalin Chemical Combine in Dimitrovgrad, a combine capable of producing 70,000 tons of fertilizer per year; the Maritsa III Thermal Power Plant, with 50-megawatt capacity; a 30-megawatt hydroelectric station; and a 25-megawatt thermal-electric station. In 1948 a second credit was issued to be used in conjunction with the building of the Karl Marx Soda Plant, the Lenin State Metallurgical Plant, and two automobile repair shops. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 12) (IMG)

C15S6. Soviet Support for the Greek Communist-led Revolutionary Rebellion / Yugoslav Regime Stabs in the Back of Greece's Communists and Progressives

*** IMG-All-{Greece}

In building an alliance of working class and bourgeois-democratic anti-fascist parties, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), pursued the popular frontism strategy and replaced communist slogans with patriotic and progressive bourgeois-democratic anti-fascist slogans, thereby boosting the Party's image in public and challenging the Axis occupation. The archives of the OSS and CIA confirm this. The US intelligence reported:

[T]he people ... soon formed underground resistance groups. The leftist EAM (National Liberation Front), with its own army ELAS (National Popular Army of Liberation), became the largest of these groups.. (...). EAM was dominated by KKE (Greek Communist Party). By stressing patriotic motives and with the advantage of a well-integration organization, the Communists succeeded at first in enlisting the support of many liberals and republicans and even some of the clergy and royalists who saw in EAM the best means of resisting the common enemy. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

An attached memorandum prepared by Lieutenant Edmon of the Greek Desk in Cairo supports the belief that the most numerous and effective resistance organization in Greece is the EAM with its guerrilla force known as the ELAS (National People's Liberation Army). According to the Union of Democratic Control, a London organization informing the British public on resistance movements in forming the British public on resistance movements in occupied Europe, the EAM emerged following the German occupation of Greece in 1941. The nucleus appears to have been the Liberal, Socialist, Communist and Agrarian groups who led the opposition to the Metaxas regime. In any event, it is known to embrace today the only groups of organized labor in Greece, including the transport, dock, industrial, building and service trades, white collar, government and commercial workers. With these and other forces, EAM has directed a series of strikes aimed against the Greek quisling government and has also struck at German communications by destroying bridges, tunnels, etc. (Report on Labor Desk Activities in Middle East Theater Relative to Greece, Secret, OSS, 1944, p. 2. In: 'OSS - GREEK MISSION, GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE, 1944', OSS, 1944. In: CIA Archives.) (IMG)

Nonetheless:

Differences between the Government-in-Exile and the underground forces of resistance grew steadily.

In the summer of 1943, representatives of EAM and other resistance groups, including EDES, visited Cairo, where the government was then established, in an unsuccessful effort to secure representation in the government for the underground forces.. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

However, this was met with the:

persistent refusal of the King and his Cabinet to form a coalition government.. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

Among the Greek militant organizations, “all except EDES and a few minor groups,” said US intelligence: had in common their dislike of the Tsouderos government and the King. Most Greeks had not forgotten the King’s violation of the constitution in condoning a dictatorship. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

The widespread Greek mass hatred towards the exiled king also led the resistance movement to seek: to obtain from the King a promise not to return to Greece until the people had had an opportunity to express their wishes on the matter by plebiscite. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

Naturally, the British-backed Greek royalist government-in-exile, refused. Thus:

Shortly thereafter, EAM formed in Greece a Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) to counteract and dispute the authority of the Government-in-Exile. The persistent refusal of the King and his Cabinet to form a coalition government had led to general dissatisfaction, and eventually even to serious mutinies in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East. Finally the British, who had consistently supported the King and the government, assisted in the suppression of the mutinies and installed as Prime Minister the anti-EAM George Papandreou. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

Nonetheless, in the words of Allison B. Herrick who had years of experience working in USAID and authored the Area Handbook for Greece in the American University’s Foreign Areas Studies Division:

Papandreou met in Lebanon with delegates of EAM, and later in Caserta they signed an agreement which recognized the authority of the new Government and placed all Greek forces under British control. The Caserta Agreement allowed the British to land troops in Athens and take control of all ELAS forces **insofar as military operations against the retreating German Army were concerned**. (Area Handbook for Greece, American University (Washington D.C.), Foreign Areas Studies Division,

Vol. 550, Issue 87, Allison Butler Herrick, p. 41. Bold added.) (IMG)

Hence:

Papandreou set out to form a coalition as agreed upon in May 1944 in Lebanon, where representatives of all resistance groups from inside Greece had met with the Government-in-exile. Three members of the PEEA and two Communists joined the Cabinet. In September, the new government moved from Cairo to Caserta, Italy, and there in a formal agreement received assurances of collaboration from EAM and EDES, who placed themselves under the orders of the Commander of the British forces in Greece. The government entered Athens on 19 October 1944. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

Furthermore, as confirmed by a case study of guerrilla warfare in Greece, created under contract by the US Department of the Army:

EAM/ELAS honored the Caserta provisions in the main during the German withdrawal. No guerrillas entered the Athens area; there was no attempt to seize power. (Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II, American University (Washington D.C.), Special Warfare Research Division, Operating under contract with Department of the Army, Doris M. Condit, 1961, p. 89) (IMG)

The British, however, betrayed the agreement by ordering ELAS to give up arms. In response:

ELAS disregarded Scobie's order to lay down its arms, reminding him that his authority extended only to operations against the Germans. The EAM ministers resigned from the government and held a demonstration in Athens on December 3, 1944, to protest the British demand. The police fired into the crowd to disperse it, and that action set off a chain reaction of violence between government troops and ELAS.

The Battle of Athens – the second round in the civil war – lasted one month. The British, who intervened against ELAS, were compelled to withdraw two divisions from the Italian front to reinforce their hard-pressed forces in the Greek capital. The renewed fighting also had the unpleasant aspect of pitting Greek government forces, which now included some who a short time before had been active collaborationists, against men who had taken leading parts in the resistance. The United States Mission in Athens had been instructed to remain neutral.. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 30) (IMG)

The fact that the British and their allied comprador Greek regime utilized Axis fighters to combat the communist-led popular front once again exposes the covert WWII-era Anglo-Axis alliance against the USSR and Popular- Democratic forces. The British moved ahead with their agenda of disarming the Greek fighters:

Churchill temporarily defused the controversial question of the monarchy by persuading George II to appoint as regent the archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, a heroic figure during the occupation who was respected by both sides. Papandreou resigned as prime minister, and the regent appointed a republican to succeed him. The change

in government paved the way for a cease-fire. Thirty-three days of street fighting cost 11,000 lives and left sections of Athens in ruins. Under the provisions of the armistice ELAS laid down its arms, the KKE and the EAM agreed to reorganize as legal political parties, and parliamentary elections and a plebiscite on the king's future were scheduled to be held within the year. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 30) (IMG)

The damage inflicted by the MI6-backed forces against the KKE-led fighters rolled back the communist faction in the KKE and strengthened the capitulationist Titoist tendency led by Markos Vafeiadis. This increased the MI6 lobby in the KKE, allowing for a laydown of the arms by segments of the ELAS. However, the KKE/EAM/ELAS continued to retain large parts of their arms in secret, or else there was no way that they would be able to launch the rebellion later on.

Signed in "In ATHENS, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12th February, 1945," it was a deal between the "The Delegation of the Central Committee of EAM" and the "The Delegation of the Hellenic Government" and was known as the Varkiza Agreement. "ARTICLE IX" of the Agreement, titled "Plebiscite and elections," explicitly stated that the plebiscite was to be held prior to the elections, partly so that the Greek electorate would be assured that the King would no longer be able to violate the constitution and condone a dictatorship, as he had done before. It was as follows:

At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its genuineness a plebiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The Representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers. (868.00/3 -645, Agreement Between the Greek Government and EAM, [Translation], Athens, February 12, 1945. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, United States Department of State, p. 113) (IMG)

However, in a blatant violation of the Agreement:

In November 1945 a caretaker government, composed of a broad coalition that excluded the Communists, announced parliamentary elections for the following March. When a communist request for postponement of the election until after the plebiscite was denied, the KKE pulled out its candidates and asked supporters to abstain from voting. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 30) (IMG)

The Anglo-American-backed fascist regime in Greece created an atmosphere of fear among Greek voters. The unfree, unfair, and illegal elections held under the shadow of a Nazi-collaborationist state gave the pro-fascist candidates a 'plurality' of the votes:

An Allied commission monitored the elections, which were marked by a swing to the right.. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, pp. 30-31) (IMG)

Then occurred the illegal and phony 'plebiscite' which happened post-elections, against the Varkiza Agreement:

The plebiscite, held in September, returned a 69-percent majority in favor of George II's returning to Greece as king. He died the next spring and was succeeded by his brother, Paul.

During 1946 a series of isolated uprisings by leftists in various parts of the country escalated into a third round in the civil war. The KKE organized the so-called Democratic Army of Greece as ELAS' successor, and it conducted a classic guerrilla war against a static defense by conventional forces. The main guerrilla activity was in the Peloponnesus and in Macedonia and Epirus close to the sanctuary of the Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and Albanian borders, across which the communist forces could retreat to rest and regroup before returning to combat. Across these borders also ran the lines of supply for the Greek Communists.

The government imposed martial law, permitting arrests without warrants. In 1947 it outlawed the KKE..

(Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 31) (IMG)

As is well-known, General Markos was considered a Tito agent. Like most imperialist-fascist secret service agents in the freedom movements, Markos promoted the view that there was no need for strategic coordination with the friend of the Greek communist-led rebels, the USSR, that the Greek communists should jump straight to rebellion without such coordination:

according to the Yugoslavs, the second Greek insurrection of 1947 was undertaken by agreement between Markos and Tito without previous policy coordination in Moscow. (THE ZHDANOV-MALENKOV RELATIONSHIP, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), July 29, 1953, p. 14) (IMG)

Early on in the War, in addition to the Tito agent Markos, defeatist renegades such as Siantos and his group were up against the Zachariadis faction:

1. Georgios Siantos and other leaders who signed the Lebanon Agreement for the Greek Left-wing, are now fighting against Nikolaos Zachariades and Ioannis Ioannides in an effort to cause the abandonment of their "policy of illegality" and to bring about a surrender of arms in exchange for a policy of forming a legal party.
2. (...). Zachariades, however, still argues that a surrender of arms would mean being murdered at the hands

of the extreme Right. To support his stand, he cites the murders at Gythion and Sgala, the killing of the Salonika news-printers..

(SCHISM IN GREEK LEFTIST FORCES, CIA, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Anglo-American imperialists provided assistance of all kinds to the fascist regime in Greece:

By 1947 the British had reluctantly admitted their inability to continue substantial aid to the Greek government. In March of that year, by covering Greece in the Truman Doctrine – which set limits on American tolerance to communist expansion in the area – the United States replaced Great Britain as Greece's protecting power. American military and economic aid was crucial during the final phase of the civil war and would remain vital to Greece's subsequent recovery, reconstruction, and development. A joint American-Greek general staff in Athens directed the war effort against the Communists, and American military advisers assisted Greek government units in the field. American political and economic advisers also worked closely with Greek officials in planning and supervising programs financed by American aid. (...). Total United States military and economic aid from 1946 to 1975 amounted to US\$4.3 billion, more than 60 percent of it in military assistance and more than 90 percent in direct grants. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 31) (IMG)

The Anglo-American imperialists and comprador Yugoslav sources have perpetuated the myth that the USSR refused to provide assistance to the communist-led Greek democratic rebels. Once again, the imperialist and comprador media have been spreading lies. Of course, it cannot be expected that a country far more devastated than the Anglo-Americans as a result of the Great Patriotic War, would be capable of ‘showering’ the Greek rebels with weapons and training. Nonetheless, to the extent of its abilities, the USSR provided military and diplomatic assistance to the Greek rebels covertly through the Peoples’ Democracies. For start, the Soviets really desired the triumph of the Greek revolution:

In the hope of bringing about a Greek government less unsympathetic to the USSR, the Soviets will seek to weaken and discredit the present rightist royalist government by promoting insurgent activities in Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)

After all:

The guerrillas are useful in the Soviet war of economic attrition against the US. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)

Thus, the Soviets were expected to actively encourage the Peoples’ Democracies to support the rebels:

The Soviets ... will concentrate on intensifying the present dissatisfaction and unrest in Greece. To accomplish the purpose, they will provide clandestine aid to Greek leftists through their satellites.. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 13) (IMG)

Nor were Kremlin leaders by any means afraid to support the Greek Guerrillas:

There is no evidence that the Kremlin feels that, because of the strong US interest in Greece and current US assistance to the Greeks in the form of money, material, and advisors, it would be wise to defer further guerrilla action until US interest had waned.. It also seems unlikely that the Soviets would be deterred from supporting the guerrillas by any fear of UN action to seal Greece’s northern borders. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)

“The insurgents have a variety of arms,” said one CIA document, adding that among these arms held by Greek rebels:

Soviet arms ... have also been reported. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)

According to the 1947 CIA report, the “Soviets will ... continue to” provide “clandestine aid to Greek” rebels:

The Soviets will ... continue to work through their satellites (Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria) to intensify the dissatisfaction and unrest in Greece by providing clandestine aid to Greek leftists, disseminating propaganda against the Rightist Greek government, opposing the retention of British troops in Greece, and maintaining troops along the northern borders as a psychological threat. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

And precisely as expected by the American intelligence, the USSR indeed covertly sponsored the rebels through Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania:

Under Soviet direction, Greece’s northern neighbors – Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania – are conducting a drive which presumably has for its ultimate objective the establishment of a Communist Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)

William Donovan – the founder of the America’s centralized intelligence service, an agent of the MI6, and a mentor of CIA Director Allen Dulles – confirmed that the Soviets were behind the campaign of supporting the communist and progressive guerrillas in Greece:

Since the formal ending of World War II, under the threat of the Red Army, the Soviet Union by use of

penetration, domination of political groups, economic pressures, has in 5 years without firing a shot, set up between itself and the West, a bulwark of satellite South Eastern States which can be of great military and economic importance.

The Soviets sought to bring Greece within that group through proxy military invasion. Under the guise of civil war-organized guerrilla forces under Soviet trained leaders were placed in the mountains with light detachments sent out to burn, to pillage and to terrorize.

In Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, schools, hospitals, and supply dumps were established for replacements, indoctrination and training. In each of the countries, but especially Albania, were places of refuge for the Communist guerrillas when hard pressed.

(‘LECTURE BY WILLIAM J. DONOVAN ON PARTISAN WARFARE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, TEXAS’, CIA, William Donovan, January 11, 1951) (IMG)

An American imperialist secret service document cited a CIA informant connected to Tito’s secret service regarding information that the Soviet airfields in Yugoslavia were to provide supplies to communist-led Greek rebel forces:

The informant learned from a member of the Yugoslav Secret Information Service that the Yugoslav General Staff is continuing to furnish meteorological data to Soviet airfields (locations unknown) whose planes supply Markos troops. It is alleged that four air transports are sent to Rebel territory nightly from these fields. (GREEK REBEL CONTACTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

The USSR shipped weapons to the revolutionary guerrillas in Greece in part through ‘Split’, a city located in Yugoslavia, now in modern-day Croatia. By the middle of 1948, however, the CIA agent Tito (see C12S1) and his group, who secretly sided with the Greek monarcho-fascist regime, successfully expanded their influence in Yugoslavia at the expense of the Soviet-backed elements. Thus, even prior to the expulsion of Tito’s gang from the Cominform, the former stabbed the Greek rebels and the USSR in the back. Indeed:

Shortly prior to the Cominform rift considerable war materiel, sent by the Soviets from Odessa to Split for transshipment to the Greek rebels, was seized by the Yugoslav Army. This included 70 tanks since distributed among the Yugoslav forces. Subsequent attempts by Rebel delegates to negotiate with Marshal Tito for a return of these arms have proved to be in vain. (Yugoslav Aid to Greek Rebels Halted, CIA, July 19, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

After the expulsion, Tito’s betrayal of the communist-led Greek rebels intensified:

The following measures were taken by the Yugoslavs against the Greek Rebels in the recent past:

- a. Two camps in Bosnia (location unspecified), long used for basic training and as a rest centers by the Rebels have been closed.
- b. All foreign volunteers training in Yugoslavia for eventual incorporation into the Rebel forces have been sent to Greece, but their weapons and supplies were confiscated. Even those not desiring to go to [Greece] have been forced across the frontier.
- c. Wounded Rebel soldiers recuperating in Yugoslavia and Rebels inadvertently crossing into Yugoslav territory have not been permitted to return to their respective units.
- d. Two Rebel radio stations in Yugoslavia have been closed.

(Yugoslav Aid to Greek Rebels Halted, CIA, July 19, 1949, p. 1. Underline original.) (IMG)

Some Yugoslav anti-fascists and/or communists, whom the Yugoslav regime called ‘Cominformists’, dared to disobey the commands of the Titoist mafia:

Despite an order issued by the Yugoslav Government in February 1949 to all nationals fighting with Greek partisans to return immediately to Yugoslavia, approximately 450 Yugoslavs, mostly Cominformists, are still with the Rebel forces. (Yugoslav Aid to Greek Rebels Halted, CIA, July 19, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

So significant was the CIA agent Tito’s assistance to the Greek monarcho-fascists that the US intelligence stated:

The three main factors in the survival of an independent [read: pro-Western] Greece have been US-UK military aid, the Greek military effort, and Tito’s defection from the Cominform. (Current Situation in Greece, CIA, February 28, 1950, p. 3) (IMG)

Tito’s betrayals failed to stop the USSR from continuing its assistance to Greek rebels. Well into 1948, the CIA expected the Soviet Union ‘to continue to supply ... the guerrillas’, clearly implying that the USSR was already supplying the guerrillas:

Soviet intention of ultimately bringing Greece under Communist domination still obtains. For the following reasons the Kremlin may be expected to **continue** to supply Continuing and use the guerrillas.. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 2-3. Bold added.) (IMG)

The CIA, citing the Turkish diplomatic intelligence in Greece, stated that:

on 27 September 1948 Russian airplanes made drops of all kinds of war materiel to the guerrillas in various parts

of Macedonia and Epiros. ('Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos, Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas', CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

The Turkish Consulate, as cited by the CIA reported that:

The guerrillas of the Papades region are being supported quite openly by the Bulgarian military authorities on the Greek-Bulgarian border. ('Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos', Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas, CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

In addition:

The Turkish Consulate in Salonika [Greece] has reported to the Embassy in Athens that General Markos Vafiades ... is receiving war materiel of Soviet origin and will make new attacks on Western Macedonia. ('Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos, Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas', CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Hungary and Romania also provided military assistance to the Greek rebels:

The Greek Guerrilla training center formerly located in Siklos, Hungary has been moved to Pecs. (...). An unconfirmed report places the existence of an international brigade of 25,000 men near Szeged. A recruit training camp has been established in Rumania where 4,200 Greek Guerrillas are reported. (Troop Movement in the Balkans, CIA, July 11, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Following the large-scale purge of many Titoist elements in Albania, People's Democratic Albania was able to more closely align with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Albania's government was strengthened and, according to the CIA, became 'a Soviet supply base for the Greek guerrillas':

Despite Soviet attempts to strengthen Albania following the defection of Tito and the increasingly important role assigned to Albania in supplying the Greek guerrillas and resisting Tito, isolated Albania will probably one of the weakest of the Soviet Satellites. Gradual build-up of Albania into a full-fledged Satellite began in late 1948 with a purge of the nationalistic elements in Albanian government. Then, as a Kremlin favorite free from Yugoslav influence, Albania signed trade agreements with Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. More recently, a number of actions underlined the Kremlin's determination to strengthen Albania. An unusually ostentatious reception was given the Albanian delegation which went to Moscow to sign a trade agreement, and Albania was belatedly brought into the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance. However, it is still difficult to determine if these Soviet actions have accomplished anything more than to enable Albania to continue resisting increasing pressure from Tito and to serve as a Soviet supply base for the Greek guerrillas. (WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 47, CIA, April 22, 1949, pp. 7-8) (IMG)

The Greek regime posed a menace to the whole camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The monarcho-fascist leaders of Greece had territorial ambitions which the Soviet Union and its Popular Democratic allies sought to, and successfully did, block:

The Soviets [are] determined to prevent the expansion of Greece through territorial revisions at the expense of Albania and Bulgaria. So far they have been successful, since the Council of Foreign Ministers has not recognized Greek claims for boundary changes. (...). Accomplishment of this end would constitute an important step towards the ultimate goal. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)

"The Soviets," the CIA continued, "will":

continue to oppose the retention of British troops in Greece, and exert psychological pressure by retaining troops along the northern borders. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 13) (IMG)

The CIA also expected that the Soviets would:

disseminate propaganda to discredit the government.. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 13) (IMG)

Indeed, diplomatically, too, the Soviet Union pressured for the expulsion of Britain from Greece:

The USSR member, Andrei Gromyko, repeated these counter-charges and added that one main cause of all the troubles was the presence of foreign (i.e. British) troops in Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

The Soviets in fact constantly complained about the British occupation:

The Soviets are constantly protesting against the presence of the British occupation forces in Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 14) (IMG)

And they took firm diplomatic action in support of the revolution:

The USSR has been able to block any decisive UN action and probably feels confident that ... no UN member (especially the US) would be willing to send troops to Greece. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas,

CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)

C15S7. Destroying Christianity by Supporting 'Christianity'; Orthodox Christianity Coopted as a Tool of Soviet Intelligence / USSR support for Islam / Romanian Communist use of Orthodoxy, Judaism, and Protestantism against Catholic Church

*** IMG-All-{Orthodox Church}

An in-depth explanation of the history of the rise of Judaism and Christianity is beyond the scope of this work. However, a number of points will be briefly made to provide context. The Tanakh or 'Old Testament' preaches genocide and terror. Yet, tens of times more genocidal and terroristic than the 'God' of the 'Old Testament' was the 'God' of the 'New Testament', which covertly, shrewdly, foxily, and sneakily spread propaganda for the Roman colonizers. Christianity, an eclectic mix of Roman colonial Paganism and Judaism, was an evil genius work of the Roman conquerors for the aim of enslaving, expelling, and mass-incinerating the nation of Israel. Applied in the context of Ancient Israel, the eclectic mix Roman colonial Paganism and Judaism smuggled Roman colonial ideas into Israelite culture, whereas when promoted among the Roman Pagans, it smuggled Judaic monotheism into Roman culture in correlation with the rise of feudalism (as a replacement of slavery) in the Roman Empire. Thus, Christianity, an anti-Semitic invention for terror against Israel, played an ultra-reactionary role when preached among the Israelites and a progressive role when preached among the Roman Pagans.

Yet, in the post-feudal society, Christianity grew entirely vestigial. The objective of the Soviet socialist state was to cleanse the Earth from this religion, and from religion in general. The campaign to destroy this feudal, colonial, and pogromist religion called 'Christianity' required both a direct dialectical materialist denunciations thereof, along with the smuggling of a communist current into the religion. Such was why the Soviet state, a foe of the Church, coopted the Orthodox Church and began utilizing it as a communist intelligence weapon aimed at engineering splits and deepening schisms in the international Christian Church networks.

The cleansing of Orthodox Christian influence from the USSR, along with much the rest of the ideological campaign against religion, was a correct process that actually continued throughout the history of the USSR in its first 35 years. After the Bolshevik revolution, when all connections with Russia were severed, the Orthodox Church in the Levant faced the problem of finance and education. With no outside aid, the Church maladministered and misappropriated its rich religious bequests (awqaf) and, with Russian higher schools closed to them, the clergy fell into ignorance and laity, having few schools of its own and no colleagues, was forced to attend the numerous Catholic schools which enjoyed the support of the Latin powers. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Many of the Orthodox Christian priests were closely associated with the regime of the Tsar and thus had ties to British and Axis intelligence services. As such, there was much conflict between the Orthodox Church and the Soviet state in the early decades of Soviet power. The influence of the Orthodox Church on the country dramatically reduced, paving the way for the greater secularization of Soviet peoples, and the spread of the scientific socialist mindset. By the time of the Great Patriotic War, therefore, much of the hostile anti-Soviet elements in the Orthodox Christian Church had been isolated and weakened, whereas healthier elements of the Orthodox Church gained greater strength over the reactionaries. Many new priests, for example, came from kolkhoznik backgrounds, thus increasing the influence of the progressive classes in the Orthodox Church networks.

The Great Patriotic War presented new crises and opportunities concerning the role of Orthodox Christianity. By 1943, the MI6 had re-established its alliance with the fascist Vatican mafia, and the Anglo-Americans and the Axis had begun joint efforts for using the Catholic Church as a weapon against Soviet power. In this context, an excellent weapon for undermining the influence of the Catholic Church and the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia was the Orthodox Christian Church. The Soviets continued their campaign against religion in general, Orthodox Christianity included. However, in order to exploit intra-Christianity differences in a manner that undermines imperialist-fascist secret services including the latter's tool Christianity, the USSR began to sponsor the Orthodox Church as a weapon of the intelligence war. Lenin rightly condemned the infiltration of 'Christian socialist' ideas into the communist movement, for the smuggling of 'Christian socialism' into the socialist movement would pull the socialist movement away from socialism onto such a feudal, colonial, and pogromist religion as Christianity. By contrast, the 'smuggling' of 'Christian socialist' or 'Christian pro-communist' ideas into Christian circles is not only not reactionary, but is in fact progressive, for it smuggles the socialist current into the Christian movement.

The following conversation between Enver Hoxha and Stalin is instructive:

During the talk with Stalin I pointed out to him the stand of the clergy, especially the Catholic clergy in Albania, our position in relation to it, and asked how he judged our stand.

"The Vatican is a centre of reaction," Comrade Stalin told me among other things, "it is a tool in the service of capital and world reaction, which supports this international organization of subversion and espionage. It is a fact that many Catholic priests and missionaries of the Vatican are old-hands at

espionage on a world scale. Imperialism has tried and is still trying to realize its aims by means of them." Then he told me of what had happened once in Yalta with Roosevelt, with the representative of the American Catholic Church and others.

During the talk with Roosevelt, Churchill and others on problems of the anti-Hitlerite war, they [particularly the British] had said: "We must no longer fight the Pope in Rome. What have you against him that you attack him?!"

"I have nothing against him," Stalin had replied.

"Then, let us make the Pope our ally," they had said, "let us admit him to the coalition of the great allies."

"All right," Stalin had said, "but the anti-fascist alliance is an alliance to wipe out fascism and nazism."

As you know, gentlemen, this war is waged with soldiers, artillery, machine-guns, tanks, aircraft. If the Pope or you can tell us what armies, artillery, machine-guns tanks and other weapons of war he possesses, let him become our ally. **We don't need an ally for talk and incense."**

After that, they had made no further mention of the question of the Pope and the Vatican.

"Were there Catholic priests in Albania who betrayed the people?" Comrade Stalin asked me then.

"Yes" I told him. "Indeed the heads of the Catholic Church made common cause with the nazi- fascist foreign invaders right from the start, placed themselves completely in their service and did everything within their power to disrupt our National Liberation War and perpetuate the foreign domination."

"What did you do with them?"

"After the victory," I told him, "we arrested them and put them on trial and they received the punishment they deserved."

"You have done well," he said.

"But were there others who maintained a good stand?" he asked.

"Yes," I replied, "especially clergymen of the Orthodox and Moslem religion."

"What have you done with them?" he asked me.

"We have kept them close to us. **In its First Resolution our Party called on all the masses, including the clergymen, to unite for the sake of the great national cause, in the great war for freedom and independence. Many of them joined us, threw themselves into the war and made a valuable contribution to the liberation of the Homeland.** After Liberation they embraced the policy of our Party and continued the work for the reconstruction of the country. We have always valued and honoured such clergymen, and some of them have now been elected deputies to the People's Assembly or promoted to senior ranks in our army. In another case, a former clergyman linked himself so closely with the National Liberation Movement and the Party that in the course of the war he saw the futility of the religious dogma, abandoned his religion, embraced the communist ideology and thanks to his struggle, work and conviction we have admitted him to the ranks of the Party."

"Very good," Stalin said to me. "What more could I add? If you are clear about the fact that religion is opium for the people and that the Vatican is a centre of obscurantism, espionage and subversion against the cause of the peoples, then you know that you should act precisely as you have done."

(With Stalin, Hoxha, Meeting 3. Bold added.) (No IMG)

Contrary to the remarks of the Maoist revisionists and Khrushchev's group, the Stalin-era Soviet state did not stop the campaign against Orthodox Christianity. Rather, (1) it continued the campaign to undermine the reactionary priests, (2) it continued the campaign to penetrate the rank and file of the Church through the installation of Soviet intelligence agents as well as priests from kolkhoznik and proletarian backgrounds into the Church networks, (3) it continued to denounce religion in general as an 'opium of the masses', as indicated in Stalin's remarks to Hoxha, and, during Zhdanovschina, explicitly stepped up the campaign for dialectical materialist atheism at the expense of religion, (4) but also utilized a pro-communist current inside Russia's version of Christianity, the Orthodox Christianity, to wage the Cold War against the Vatican.

As with any other religion, the USSR was critical of Catholicism both because of the fact that it was a religion and because of its ideological content. However, the USSR, while opposed to the idea, bore not much more hostility to the Catholic ideology in-itself than to Orthodox Christianity in-itself. Rather, its particularly tough measures against the Catholic Church arose out of the fact that they worked as fronts for the MI6, the Nazis, etc. Had Italy been a socialist country and if the Vatican had been thoroughly purged of the fascists, then the Vatican could be converted into a center of intelligence activities for the socialist countries. In that kind of a hypothetical scenario, supporting the spread of the well-purged Catholic Church could have been an excellent soft power and intelligence penetration weapon, as a strategy of the longer-term goal of rooting out religion from the planet. However, at the time, the Vatican was controlled by fascist reaction. Hence, there was the need to promote a type of Christianity opposed to the Catholic Church.

Soviet intelligence/diplomatic archives too prove that the USSR utilized the Orthodox Christianity as a weapon with

which to combat Vatican influence. In a document that detailed the instructions for the Soviet Embassy in Israel to carry out military and political espionage against the Anglo-American imperialists in Israel, it was also stated that the Soviet Embassy must promote the Russian Orthodox Church in collaboration with the Jerusalem Patriarchate against the influence of the fascist Vatican mafia:

The legation must help the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in strengthening and spreading the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Palestine and in its struggle, conducted jointly with the Jerusalem Patriarchate, against the increased activity of the Vatican. (INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE USSR IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, Secret, Ershov. Part of: COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow), Moscow, 29 September 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", p. 538) (IMG{Israel})

The Soviet embassy operatives throughout the Levant did indeed act upon such instructions and promoted the Orthodox Church as a bulwark against Vatican influence. Regarding the role of the Orthodox Christianity in the Levant, a CIA document stated:

2. After the Bolshevik revolution, when all connections with Russia were severed, the Orthodox Church in the Levant faced the problem of finance and education. With no outside aid, the Church maladministered and misappropriated its rich religious bequests (awqaf) and, with Russian higher schools closed to them, the clergy fell into ignorance and laity, having few schools of its own and no colleagues, was forced to attend the numerous Catholic schools which enjoyed the support of the Latin powers.

3. A new era of hope opened for the Orthodox Church members of the Levant with the opening in 1944 of the Legation in Beirut by the Soviet Union, which had by then ... become the protector of the Orthodox Church. Soviet propaganda reached not only the Orthodox mission, far too ignorant to have any conception of the true position of the Church in the Soviet Union, but also those members of the Orthodox hierarchy of Antioch, Alexander Tahhan, a man of eighty-three, was influenced by the Soviet propaganda, but the only two men with sufficient education or prestige to succeed Tahhan as Patriarch are not considered pro-Soviet. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Surely there are and have been well-meaning anti-fascist Christian priests, be they Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, etc. And by all means, communists should cooperate with such priests wherever possible. To refuse an alliance with the crypto-progressive and crypto-secular religious leaders against imperialists and fascists is to pursue a sectarian left-deviationist line. Nonetheless, one must be wary of the fact that many of the priests who cooperated with Soviet intelligence and Soviet embassies, did so out of opportunism. Many of these priests had retained their connections to the remnants of the Tsarist intelligence and would have gladly cooperated with anti-Soviet intelligence organizations. However, since corrupt priests were representatives of the Orthodox Christianity and since the USSR had coopted Orthodox Christianity against the Vatican, the corrupt priests had little choice but to cooperate, or otherwise they would lose their position in the Orthodox Christian Church.

There was for instance an Orthodox Christian priest named Samahah who reportedly was distrusted by the Soviets due to potential links to the Tsarist networks, but was nonetheless willing to engage in some cooperation with the USSR. For example, according to a CIA report:

At the celebration of the 500th Anniversary of the Moscow Church, held in Moscow in July 1948, which the representatives of the Patriarch of Antioch attended with an eye to the reestablishment of the same direct financial assistance which Antioch had enjoyed under the tsars, Samahah proposed a toast to Stalin as the "defender of the Orthodox Church." Source states that the representative of the Patriarchate of Antioch evidently made a poor impression on their Russian colleagues. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

In spite of the poor impression he allegedly made, Samahah nonetheless cooperated with the Soviets:

Samahah has been reported by several sources of varying reliability to be engaged in propaganda and espionage activities for the Soviets. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Archimandrite Samahah's activities in supplying pro-Soviet articles to the Lebanese press have called forth a protest from the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and notables of the Greek Orthodox Community, who have requested Tahhan to recall Samahah. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

The Soviets provided him with funds and utilized their alliance with him as a means of pressuring Tahhan to line up into a pro-Soviet stance. The US intelligence reported:

1. [T]he recent visit of Archimandrite Basilios Samahah to Syria and Lebanon was made at the suggestion of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. The purpose of the trip was to obtain the financial support of Greek Orthodox Patriarch Alexandros Tahan of Antioch for the creation of a seminary in Moscow for Greek Orthodox

priests.

2. When Archimandrite Samahah's initial efforts to gain the Patriarch's support were unsuccessful, he appealed to the Soviet Legation in Beirut to bring pressure to bear on Patriarch Tahan. After referring the matter to Moscow, the Soviet Legation told Archimandrite Samahah that the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow was prepared to provide him with 300,000 rubles against a promissory note signed by the Patriarch Alexandros Tahan.

3. This project was successfully arranged, and Archimandrite Samahah left Damascus on 6 January to return to Moscow, via Iran.

(VISIT OF ARCHIMANDRITE SAMAHAH TO SYRIA AND LEBANON, CIA, February 27, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

In addition to these duties, source states that Archimandrite Samahah is acting as Oriental Advisor to the Russian Orthodox Church. His outgoing mail is routed via the Soviet Foreign office to the Soviet Legation in Beirut. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Another person named by the CIA was Archbishop Karam, one of those Orthodox Christian leaders funded by the Soviets:

Other Soviet supporters in the Church in addition Salibi are Archbishop Karam, Metropolitan of Mt. Lebanon, who source states, definitely takes money from the Soviets and Archimandrite Samahah, who is a Soviet Intelligence agent. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2)

Archbishop Karam has denied that he is pro-Soviet, but admits that he received three hundred pounds from Daniel Solod, Soviet Minister to Lebanon, for expenses toward his trip to Moscow. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Regarding the activities of Karam and Samahah, the US intelligence stated:

Archimandrite Basilios Samahah, who accompanied Ilyas Karam (the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Mount Lebanon) to Moscow in December 1947, has remained in Moscow. He is reported by a well-placed source to have been appointed by the Patriarch of Antioch to take charge of a monastery in or near Moscow that has belonged for many years to the Church of Antioch. Samahah also acts as Tahhan's representative in matters between the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches, according to source. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Karam, the CIA stated, cooperated with the Soviet Attaches in exploiting the splits that occurred in the Greek Catholic Church in Lebanon:

Fyodot Pissarenko and Aleksandr Sergeyevev, Soviet Attaches, are very much interested in the current internal dispute in the Greek Catholic Church. At Sergeyevev's request, Dikran Tosbath of the Beirut daily newspaper, Le Soir, and Tawfiq Wahbah of Dunya collect information on this subject. Comment: The interest of these Soviet officials in this dispute may have some connection with Archbishop Ilya Karam's attempt to exploit the discontent of the Greek Catholics and perhaps to win some of them back to the Orthodox fold. Karam sent Archimandrite Jammal, who was formerly a Greek Catholic, to make overtures to two of the leading malcontents, a Greek Catholic, to make overtures to two of the leading malcontents, Afif Sawaya and Yusuf Ilyas Riyashi. (ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LEBANON, CIA, December 8, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document stated:

1. The Holy Synod of the Antioch Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church met in Damascus, Syria, on 16 May 1961. The discussion at the meeting chiefly concerned the coming election of the "Regent," (executive assistant) to Patriarch Alexandros Tahan. The three candidates being considered for the post are Atanesios Skaf of Zahle, Lebanon; Malatios Suwayti of Damascus; and Ilyas Barbari of Beirut.

2. [T]he candidate favored by the Soviet Legation in Beirut is Ilyas Barbari. The Soviet Minister, Vasili Belyayev, discussed Barbari's candidacy with Archbishop Ilyas Karam of Mount Lebanon when the latter visited him at the Soviet Legation in Beirut on 15 May.

(GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH ELECTION, CIA, August 9, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

According to the CIA, the Patriarch of Antioch attended:

the celebration of the 500th Anniversary of the Moscow Church, held in Moscow in July 1948.. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

During this celebration, the CIA reported, resolutions against the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia were passed:

When the Russians began to present pre-arranged resolutions which were in conflict with the Greek members of the Church thought to be the real reason for the gathering ... the Greek members left the conference. The Antioch representatives, despite the warnings of the Greek members of the Church, then joined in anti-Papal resolutions.

The only material gain that Antioch received from the Soviets, however, was a promise of the revenue of one church in Moscow. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

Still, another figure cooperating with the Soviets was:

Ilyas Salibi, the Metropolitan of Beirut. (...). Politically, Salibi has made an alliance with Habib Abu- Shahlah, Greek Orthodox deputy from Mt. Lebanon and lawyer for Tapline, and Niqola Rizqallah, Muhafis of Beirut, which alliance source states has been advantageous to all three. Salibi proclaims openly that the Soviet Union is going to win the “coming war with the West,” and the Patriarchate of Antioch should “jump on the band-wagon.” Source states positively that Salibi do not take money from the Soviets but is following the Soviets line because he hopes that they will make him the next Patriarch of Antioch. He is spending considerable sums of money to ensure his election. Salibi has great influence over Patriarch Tahhan, who has been heard to echo Salibi’s statements on an eventual Soviet victory. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

Through its own Orthodox Church in Moscow, the Soviet Union also influenced Tahhan to increase Orthodox Christian influence in the Levant:

Alexis, the Patriarch of Moscow, is reported by a reliable source to have sent a sum equivalent to 1,500 pounds sterling to the Patriarch of Antioch, Alexandros Tahhan (who lives in Damascus), for distribution among the Orthodox refugees from Palestine. This sum is to be divided between Damascus, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, with an allocation of the equivalent of 250 pounds sterling for Armenian refugees. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Frank Roberts – the MI6 official, advisor to Churchill, anti-Soviet ambassador to the USSR, and a NATO hawk – corroborated the points made by the CIA regarding the USSR’s cooptation and promotion of Orthodox Christianity for influence in the Middle East. He wrote:

Traditionally, the main source of Russian influence in the Near East has been the Orthodox Church. In Tsarist days Russia vied with France as the protector of Christians throughout the Near East, and more particularly in the “holy places” of Palestine. There seems little doubt that one of the motives behind the new official toleration and even encouragement of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union is to promote Soviet influence abroad. The new Patriarch’s visit to Jerusalem and to other religious centres in the Near East, the earlier visit to Moscow of Orthodox Patriarchs from the Near East for the coronation of the Russian Patriarch, and claims not being put forward on behalf of the Moscow Patriarchate for the leadership of the Orthodox Church, coupled significantly with attempts to gain control of the Constantinople Patriarchate, are all signs of a renewed active Soviet policy in the Near East. This recalls the similar encouragement given by the lay French Republic in the early 20th century to French religious missions in the Levant, despite the expulsion of the same religious orders from France itself. The official propaganda line of the Armenian and Georgian Churches also fits this general pattern. (E 797/797/65, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, author: Frank Roberts, No. 30. Secret, Moscow, January 16, 1946, Received: January 25, 1946. In: British Foreign Office (1946), top pp. 16-17 / bottom pp. 22-23. Note: in the British Foreign Office documents book, there are two page numbers per each page. One page number is on the top and the other is at the bottom. The one at the bottom and the one at the top do not match each other) (IMG)

The prominent Syrian politician Akram Howrani, reflecting in 1946 on the attitude of the USSR towards ethnic minorities in the Middle East, wrote:

It is natural for the Soviet and Anglo-American policies in the East to be in complete contradiction, due to the different goals, interests, and objectives. The circumstances of the war allowed the visionary advocacy to freely undertake a great effort in the Arab countries that left some important traces. The Arab East continues to be the subject of great attention because it has become one of the main sensitive fields in the world that The Anglo-American and Soviet influences are wrestling face to face.

The Soviet policy, through its wide propaganda, aimed to establish focal points for its influence from religious and racial minorities in order to reach the same results that it reached in Iran. It strikes British influence and interests at the heart in appropriate circumstances. On this basis, she tried to establish special relations – in the name of **Orthodoxy** [Orthodox Christianity] – but it did not succeed against the sweeping nationalist trend. It also facilitated for this purpose the way for Armenian immigration.

(Akram Al-Howrani Memoirs, 2000, pp. 546-547. Bold added) (IMG{Israel})

However, contrary to what Howrani mentioned, the USSR did not succeed ‘against’ the sweeping Arab ‘nationalist’ trend because the Stalin-era USSR supported secular pan-Arabism (‘Arab nationalism’) as shown in C16S5. And, as Howrani correctly stated, the USSR facilitated the Armenian right of return to the Soviet Caucasus, decades after the genocide by Turkish fascist reaction.

Another religion to which the USSR aimed to coopt was Islam. The Quran was never as genocidal and colonial an

obstacle as Biblical scripture. However, it did promote misogyny, such as in Surat el-Nisaa Ayah 34, in which it explicitly tells men to 'idrabuhonna' – to beat women – if the wives dare disobey the husband, not to mention the Quran's frequent support for sex with 'ma malakat aymanikom' – 'those whom you most rightly own', the slaves. Hoxha famously denounced Islam for its inherently misogynistic character, and Stalin in private denounced it for being so 'outdated'. Yet, both Stalin and Hoxha supported the promotion of the progressive elements among the Muslim clergy. The Soviet state sought to coopt not just Orthodox Christianity but also Islam as a soft power tool and an intelligence weapon. Frank Roberts – the MI6 official, advisor to Churchill, anti-Soviet ambassador to the USSR, and a NATO hawk – reported to London:

But useful though the Orthodox and Armenian Christians may be to Soviet policy, the Soviet Union are unlikely to repeat the mistake made by Tsarist Russia and later by France of identifying themselves with Christian minorities in an overwhelmingly Moslem area. Although little first-hand information is available regarding those territories in the Soviet Union which were formerly part of Islam, there are signs that the Soviet Union, like Britain, also regards herself as a great Moslem Power. Islam now seems to be receiving within the Soviet Union the same relatively sympathetic treatment as the Orthodox Church, while Soviet foreign policy is groping its way towards improving Soviet connections with the Moslem, and particularly with the Arab world. The staffs of Soviet legations in Middle East countries include Moslem secretaries, and when the new Soviet policy of claiming separate international status for the Union Republics has been developed to cover the central Asiatic Republics, no doubt these will be encouraged to exchange separate diplomatic missions with Moslem States. This in turn would promote closer contacts, exchanges of visits, &c., between religious leaders of Islam within and outside the Soviet Union and Islamic studies will no doubt be encouraged in the Soviet Union. An important sign of the times is the recent pilgrimage of important Moslems from the Soviet Union to Mecca, for which air and other facilities were provided by the Soviet Government. (E 797/797/65, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, author: Frank Roberts, No. 30. Secret, Moscow, January 16, 1946, Received: January 25, 1946. In: British Foreign Office (1946), top p. 17 / bottom p. 23. Note: in the British Foreign Office documents book, there are two page numbers per each page. One page number is on the top and the other is at the bottom. The one at the bottom and the one at the top do not match each other) (IMG)

As for the myth that the USSR 'banned' pilgrimage to Mecca, the above excerpt already debunks such a myth. Regarding the conditions of the Church in Latvia and practice of religion in general in the USSR, the MI6 reported:

The practice of religion is free in Latvia, as it is in other parts of the Soviet Union, but in Riga church-going apparently does not carry with it inconveniences for officials and other outstanding people as it does in Russia. In Riga the churches which have not suffered war damage are in excellent state of repair, both outside and in, and churches in rural districts are bright with recent redecoration. (N 15687/ 8873/59, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, Moscow, No. 791 Confidential. October 29, 1945. Received: November 16, 1945. Enclosure in No. 26. Report by Mr. Sharman on a Visit to Riga. October 1945, In: Foreign Office (1945), p. 403) (IMG{National Cultures in the USSR})

It is also worth reminding that while the CPSU was to be made up of communist atheists, the Soviet government apparatus, not to be confused with the Party, employed both communist and non-communist (e.g. Christian) officials. One of the first zones in which the Orthodox Christianity weapon against Vatican influence was active was in Western Ukraine. The Soviets utilized the weapon of taxation against the Catholic Church in Ukraine. A 1946 US intelligence document claimed:

2. The Western Ukraine. In the western province, the official church is the Greek Catholic or Uniate, which combines Orthodox ritual and Catholic dogma and recognizes the leadership of the People. (...).

After the occupation of the Ukraine and White Russian territories (formerly Polish), the Soviets used excessive taxation as a weapon against the church; otherwise, the clergy continued their activities unmolested.

(APPENDIX A: THE UKRAINIAN CHURCH AND ITS RELATION WITH THE GERMANS, Patriarch Mstyslaw, p. 1. Note: 'Patriarch Mstyslaw' was a title for Stepan Ivanovych Skrypnyk who was a Ukrainian Church hierarch, a Nazi agent, and nephew of Petliura. In: 'THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: AN INTERIM STUDY', CIA, authors: William Holzmann and Zolt Aradi, October 1946, Appendix A, p. 1 (p. 35 of the PDF document)) (IMG)

Referring to the 'Banderite' bands in Ukraine, the British state media's consultant and specialist on British intelligence Stephen Dorril wrote:

Even though they remained a destabilising factor in Ukraine emigre politics, MI6 continued to back them to the hilt. Support also came from the Vatican, which lobbied the British and Americans to render material assistance to the Ukrainian nationalists, and the Uniate Church, which 'maintained intensive contacts with guerrilla leaders and secret representatives of the Vatican'. During the summer of 1947, MI6 moved to enlarge the ABN [Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations] into a body to co-ordinate and organise the activities of all the emigre groups it

covertly supported. (...). Not all the emigre groups joined the ABN because of the dominance of the Ukrainians and the OUN-B. (MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, Stephen Dorril, p. 237) (IMG{Poland})

As Dorril stated, the Uniate Church collaborated closely with the Anglo-American intelligence services, and Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalists.

During World War II and until 1945, the Soviets did not directly campaign against the Uniate Church, and mainly worked to undermine its supporters, the Axis powers. After the Great Patriotic War, however, the USSR began a large-scale campaign of purging Western Ukraine off of the Uniate Church and the Roman Catholic Church, which were espionage-sabotage front organizations for the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia and had collaborated with the Nazi agents in Ukraine. The Greek and Roman Catholic Churches were not outright banned, and not all the Uniate/Catholic priests were purged. Nonetheless, the crackdown was so heavy that it left little room for Catholic Church presence. Instead, the priests that remained helped form the new Orthodox Church movement in that region. The US intelligence reported:

Until 1945, the Soviets were correct in claiming that they did not bother the church, the clergy, or religious ceremonies in the Western Ukraine. However, 1945 marked the beginning of anti-church agitation and persecution of leading churchmen. The first anti-church articles appeared.. (...).

In an attempt by the Soviets to eliminate the Greek Catholic Church, a "Group for the Merger of the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches" was founded on 28 May 1945. (...). The group was officially recognized by the Soviet Government.

The group called a congress of bishops. Since [almost] all Greek Catholic bishops had been arrested, new ones were appointed.. (...). At the congress, ... the following resolutions were passed:

1. Annulment of the Berest Union of 1596.
2. Separation from the Church of Roma
3. Return to the Orthodox Ancestral Church.
4. Merger with the old Russian Orthodox Churches in the Soviet Union.

Heavy pressure was exerted by the NKGB on [formerly Uniate] priests to join the new church. An NKGB representative for Church matters, whose task was to supervise church services, was appointed for the area. Many [Uniate] priests fled, were deported, or retired to civilian life. The result was that hardly any [Uniate] priests were left. The new Orthodox church was boycotted by the population.

Anti-church action was undertaken against monks also. The monastery of the Order of Redemptionists, located in the suburbs of Lvov, was seized by the government and the monks were forbidden to hold services. (...). Convents also were disbanded. The nuns, however, continued to circulate as nurses in the Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and brought useful information back from their travels.

(...). Also in the fall of 1946, a trial was instigated in Kiev against the Greek Catholic archbishops. (...). A similar fate befell the Roman Catholic Church in Lvov. The ... Roman Catholic churches were closed. (SUPPRESSION OF CHURCHES IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE, CIA, September 2, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Still, another area of Soviet use of Orthodox Christianity was in China. It has to be remembered that the US has actively sought to spread its own Christianity in China since as early as the 1910s. Thus, a Soviet-dominated Orthodox Christianity could help undermine US influence. A US intelligence document stated:

Activities of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Peiping are under the complete control of Tichvinsky, Acting Consul General of the USSR Consulate in Peiping. Upon his instructions, Archbishop Viktor has separated the clergy of the mission into three categories: Soviet clergy, Chinese clergy and non -Soviet (? White Russian?) clergy. The last group has been excluded from the life and activities of the mission. All efforts are being made to indoctrinate the Chinese clergy with pro-Soviet sentiments. (POLITICAL INFORMATION: ACTIVITIES OF ARCHBISHOP VIKTOR, CIA, October 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

As shall be seen in C20S10, the British agent Khrushchev, in agreement with Mao Zedong, launched a devastating purge of the Orthodox Church as means of undermining Soviet intelligence.

The same kind of a policy was pursued in the Peoples' Democracies. Albania's case has already been briefly mentioned. People's Democratic Romania harboured attitudes similar to those of the Soviets. Due to the soft power influence of the communists over the Orthodox Christians and Jews, and because of the relatively progressive character of Protestantism, those religions were promoted by the Romanian communists as a force with which to confront the Catholic Church. The progressive religions were regarded as easier to penetrate using the communist intelligence service, whereas the Catholic Church was seen as less penetrable, thus facing a tougher communist stance. The MI6 station in Bucharest reported:

Churches have a hold over [many of] their followers which the all-pervading Roumanian Workers' Party is reluctant to tolerate. The long-term Marxist solution is of course to breed a population of atheists; the short-term

solution is to penetrate and control such Churches as are unable to resist infiltration and subsequent loss of independence. I have already reported the fate of the Roumanian Orthodox and Uniate Churches.

1. The attitude of the Roumanian Workers' Party to the minority Churches indeed reflects the party's estimate of their strength as an obstacle to communism. As reported in Chancery letter No. 116/58/48 of 18th September, the Minister of Cults classified religions as centrifugal and non-centrifugal, which being interpreted means impenetrable and penetrable respectively]. Into the penetrable non-centrifugal category he places the Orthodox, Jewish and Protestant Churches; into the impenetrable centrifugal category he places the Catholics and Neo-Protestants (i.e. Jehovah's Witnesses). It is on the Vatican and on the Churches acknowledging Papal supremacy, however, that has been turned the unbridled hatred and hostility of the party. That the overt attack fell first on the Uniate Church was due solely to its greater vulnerability. Its public capitulation under the ruthless intimidation of the Roumanian Government presents at once a useful elimination of a centre of resistance and a warning example to others. The fate of the Lutherans, Calvinists and other minor sects will depend on their spiritual resistance to dialectical materialism. Present indications suggest, however, that these Protestant Churches will be tolerated for the present in the hope that they can be used to undermine the strength of the Roman Catholic Church, whose members will be bribed, persuaded and coerced, like their [U]niate brethren, to forswear their faith.

(R 13149/17/37, No. 21, COMMUNIST SOLUTION OF THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN ROUMANIA, Mr. A. Holman to Mr. McNeil, Bucharest, November 15, 1948, Received November 20, 1948. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948) – Romania, p. 55. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948) – Whole Book, p. 275) (IMG)

C15S8. Czechoslovak anti-Axis Resistance / The Communist Proletarian Revolution in Czechoslovakia / People's Democratic Development / Soviet Economic Aid / Titoist Stabs in the Back

*** IMG-All-{Czechoslovakia}

With the assistance of the Soviet intelligence and the Red Army, the Czech anti-fascist resistance forces, at the forefront of them the Czechoslovak communists (KSC), coalesced to form a democratic popular front to combat the Nazi occupation forces. The Federal Research Division of the US Congress reported:

The democratic groups-ON, PU, and PVVZ-united in early 1940 and formed the Central Committee of the Home Resistance (Ustiedni vybor odboje domaciho – UVOD). Involved primarily in intelligence gathering, the UVOD cooperated with a Soviet intelligence organization in Prague. Following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the democratic groups attempted to create a united front that would include the KSC. Heydrich's appointment in the fall thwarted these efforts. By mid-1942 the Nazis had succeeded in exterminating the most experienced elements of the Czech resistance forces.

Czech forces regrouped in 1942 and 1943. The Council of the Three (R3), in which the communist underground was strongly represented, emerged as the focal point of the resistance. The R3 prepared to assist the liberating armies of the United States and the Soviet Union. In cooperation with Red Army partisan units, the R3 developed a guerrilla structure.

Guerrilla activity intensified after the formation of a provisional Czechoslovak government in Kosice on April 4, 1945. "National committees" took over the administration of towns as the Germans were expelled. Under the supervision of the Red Army, more than 4,850 such committees were formed between 1944 and the end of the war. On May 5 a national uprising began spontaneously in Prague, and the newly formed Czech National Council (Ceska narodni rada) almost immediately assumed leadership of the revolt. Over 1,600 barricades were erected throughout the city, and some 30,000 Czech men and women battled for three days against 37,000 to 40,000 German troops backed by tanks and artillery. On May 8 the German Wehrmacht capitulated; Soviet troops arrived on May 9.

(Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Ihor Gawdiak, Research Completed August 1987, published 1989, pp. 49-50) (IMG)

Slovakia was primarily agrarian and contained a large conservative-minded petit-bourgeois population, rendering anti-fascist work more difficult in that zone. Nonetheless, anti-fascist discontent was widespread enough in Slovakia. As the US Major Sean Judge acknowledged, the fascist Axis maltreatment of the Slovak people ripened the conditions for an anti-fascist guerrilla uprising led by the Democratic Party and the Communist Party of Slovakia:

The Tiso regime and its Catholic heavy handedness, ... alienated the Slovak protestant populace, who in the Czechoslovak construct. The progress of the war and allegiance to Nazi Germany began costing Tiso support, with the disaffection resulting in two primary resistance groups: the Democratic Party under Jozef Lettrich and the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS). (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 6) (IMG)

Communist Party members formed half of the anti-fascist resistance:

The opposition groups began cooperating in 1943 and consolidated their efforts into one movement under the Christmas Agreement of 1943, which created the Slovak National Council (SNC) with 50 percent membership from both groups. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

The Czechoslovak Titoist leader later slandered the Soviet Union for alleged lack of support to the Slovak resistance: Alexander Dubcek, [the] future leader of communist Czechoslovakia ... [who] put the blame for [alleged] lack of support squarely on the Soviets.. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 10) (IMG)

In contrast to Dubcek's lies, General Sean Judge, a Major in the US Air Force, confirmed in reference to Soviet aid to the Slovak rebels:

In contrast, the Red Army delivered lavish supplies to Slovakia.. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 10) (IMG)

The supplies were part of the Soviet effort to help the Czechoslovak resistance against the fascists:

The Soviet Union, in advance of its main force attack of the summer, had begun fomenting a partisan movement ... in Slovakia.. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 8) (IMG)

In addition, USSR provided funds, training, and equipment for the Slovak resistance. This is confirmed by the US intelligence officer Edward Hymoff who:

During World War II ... served in the Office of Strategic Services [OSS; CIA predecessor].. (Edward Hymoff, Goodreads) (IMG)

In a 1965 article, Hymoff wrote:

Soviet agents had helped ... two brigades of Slovak troops, trained and equipped by the Soviets.. (The OSS Revolt that Failed, Edward Hymoff, displayed in the CIA website, April 1965, p. 2) (IMG)

The Soviet-backed revolutionary rebellion against the Slovak Regime was so strong that it:

forced the Tiso government to appeal to Germany for assistance, resulting in German occupation of Slovakia beginning on 29 August 1944. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 8) (IMG)

By then, a total of at least 47,000 Slovak militants began to mobilize against the fascist occupation forces:

The initial breakdown of strength inside Slovakia showed 18,000 army troops with the uprising, ... and 29,000 reservists joining the revolt.. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 9) (IMG)

The resistance forces of Slovakia:

managed to seize a portion of Slovakia and fought gallantly to hold it while waiting for Allied, especially Soviet, support. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 9) (IMG)

In contrast to the Soviet Union, which aided the anti-fascist rebellion, there was a:

lack of large-scale aid from the West [which] is [often] generally forgiven or overlooked. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 10) (IMG)

In the meantime, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile led by Benes formed an alliance with the Soviet-backed Slovak National Council (SNC):

Motivations for the uprising created the strange bedfellows of Benes and the SNC. The exile government needed some form of overt resistance under the Czech banner to increase its legitimacy and negotiating power at the end of the war, while the SNC needed to justify its own claim to lead the Slovak people, so the two agreed to work together. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 7) (IMG)

A document by Richard Nyrop, an official of the US State Department, stated:

Czech forces regrouped in 1942 and 1943. The Council of the Three (R3), in which the communist underground was strongly represented, emerged as the focal point of the resistance. The R3 prepared to assist the liberating armies of the United States and the Soviet Union. In cooperation with Red Army partisan units,

the R3 developed a guerrilla structure.

Guerrilla activity intensified after the formation of a provisional Czechoslovak government in Kosice on April 4, 1945. "National committees" took over the administration of towns as the Germans were expelled. Under the supervision of the Red Army, more than 4,850 such committees were formed between 1944 and the end of the war. On May 5 a national uprising began spontaneously in Prague, and the newly formed Czech National Council (Ceska narodni rada) almost immediately assumed leadership of the revolt. Over 1,600 barricades were erected throughout the city, and some 30,000 Czech men and women battled for three days against 37,000 to 40,000 German troops backed by tanks and artillery. On May 8 the German Wehrmacht capitulated; Soviet troops arrived on May 9.

(Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, edited by: Richard F. Nyrop, April 1981, p. 42) (IMG)

Once again, these facts are testament to the reality on the ground: the Czechoslovak people emancipated themselves from fascist oppression thanks to the tremendous support of the Red Army.

As confirmed by the CIA, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) emerged from the Czechoslovak People's Liberation War with tremendous popular support:

The Czechoslovak Communist Party emerged from World War II with power and popular support.. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Communism had tremendous popularity among the Czechoslovak people, a population largely made up of proletarians. The CIA confirmed:

many Czechoslovaks favor friendly relations with the USSR, and are sympathetic with theoretical communism.. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Even the CIA acknowledged:

Czechoslovakia has considerable independence in the conduct of its internal affairs; (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Moscow could not and did not 'order' the Czechoslovaks to cancel Marshall Plan ties, for Czechoslovakia was independent in the conduct of internal affairs. Yet, the Marshall Plan 'aid' was rejected, for the class-conscious Czechoslovak proletarians already were well aware of the sanguivorously anti-proletarian character of Anglo- American finance capital and, using the mighty KSC, lobbied their government to not accept such imperialist 'free lunch'. Moreover, the CIA admitted:

The average Czechoslovak Communist is loyal first to his country and secondly to Moscow.. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Despite the conceptual distinction, no practical difference exists between commitment to the cause of the Soviet proletariat and to the cause of the Czechoslovak proletariat, for the cause of each country's proletariat is that of a world proletariat permeating across boundaries. That the Czechoslovak communists were loyal to the Czechoslovak proletariat 'first' means also that they were loyal to the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat and to the proletariat of the United States, Britain, Germany, etc. Nonetheless, an appreciable aspect of the above quote from the CIA is that it admits to the absence of a 'chain of command' according to which the KSC leaders would have been the 'satraps' of General-Secretary Stalin. Confessing to the independent thought of the Czechoslovak communists, the CIA thus implicitly debunks the myth that Czechoslovakia's communists were 'commanded' by the Soviet state. The Soviets would have increased pressure on Czechoslovakia to not accept Marshall Plan 'aid' had the Czechoslovak leadership aggressively pursued the acceptance of such 'aid', but thanks to the strong influence and class-consciousness of the Czech proletariat, a mighty homegrown movement against the Marshall Plan 'aid' had already developed anyways. Furthermore, as admitted by the CIA, in Czechoslovakia:

a freely operating parliamentary government rules the country. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Until 1948, Czechoslovakia was a Soviet-friendly bourgeois democracy, Soviet-friendly because the KSC, with such overwhelming popular support, won the largest votes and was able to install communist agents into key positions. The ascendancy of the KSC increased the power of the proletariat over the Czechoslovak state, for, the KSC, compositionally proletarianized in membership and ranks, was a socialist Party of the proletariat. Peter Hruby of the CIA media 'Radio Free Europe' confirmed:

The main [Czechoslovak Communist] Party organ then claimed.: "If in 1947 workers formed 50 per cent of the Party membership, then in 1967 the number of active manual workers represented only 26.4 per cent." (Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, Peter Hruby, 1980, p. 142) (IMG)

The popularity of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was reflected in the electoral victories of the Party during the May 1946 elections, which even the CIA rightly described as 'free national elections'. The Czechoslovak Communist Party

won the largest number and percentage of votes and seats, and by establishing an alliance with the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, gained a majority in the parliament:

The present National Front Government in Czechoslovakia was first established in March 1945, and in May 1946 free national elections were held. Five parties of major importance emerged: Communist (114 seats in Parliament), Social Democrats (37), National Socialists [not to be confused with Nazis] (55), Peoples (46), Slovak Democrats (43). The Communists became the strongest single party, and together with the Social Democrats gave the Leftists a slim parliamentary majority over the moderate parties. All parties agreed upon the broad principles of the government's domestic program, including extensive nationalization of industry, but lively controversy developed over the application of these principles.

The Communists have adhered until recently to parliamentary rules in their disagreements with the moderates and during the first year and a half under the present government, neither side gained any significant advantage over the other. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Thanks in part to this overwhelming popular support, the Czechoslovak Communist Party gained a large influence in all the major ministries of the Czechoslovak government:

In addition to Premiership, the key ministries of Interior, Information and Finance, and the Under Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs are held by Communists, who also control the Security Police and many local governing bodies in Bohemia and Moravia. Communist infiltration and effective control of the Army have been achieved through close collaboration with the USSR, a promotion policy favoring officers trained in the USSR and the appointment of top officials sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Communist Party wields effective control over labor through its domination of ROH, the national trade union organization. (...). On the propaganda front, too, the Communists have had a powerful weapon in their ability to point to the Soviet Union as Czechoslovakia's chief protection against a resurgent Germany. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, pp. 2 -3) (IMG)

Notably, Vaclav Nosek, a prominent KSC member, headed the Ministry of the Interior. According to the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress:

At the end of World War II, when President Benes established the first postwar government at Kosice, control of the Ministry of Interior was sought and obtained by the KSC. Party member Vaclav Nosek was appointed minister.. (CZECHOSLOVAKIA – A COUNTRY STUDY, US Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1987) (IMG)

In government, the KSC embarked on a large-scale media counter-offensive to expose and discredit the Slovak Democratic Party, which as the CIA confirmed, had 'many' members who "had questionable connections with Tiso's pro-German regime during the war":

The Slovak Democratic Party, organized only in Slovakia, is the focal point of Communist activity against the opposition. The Party is a logical choice as the Communists' first target because of its vulnerability.. Outspokenly conservative, and supported by the Catholic Church, the Slovak Democrats have not given whole-hearted support to the Government's program.. The Communists are exploiting the Slovak Democratic Party's lack of homogeneity which results from the strong antagonism between its Protestant and Catholic adherents. The Party has also become a refuge for rightist elements in Slovakia, many of whom had questionable connections with Tiso's pro-German regime during the war. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

A drought struck Czechoslovakia. Fulfilling the prerequisites for collectivization, the KSC proposed a millionaire's tax to fund the farmers suffering from the drought. The comprador ministers, including the millionaire Masaryk vociferously rejected the KSC proposal. The KSC, having overwhelming representation in the trade unions, struck back by denouncing all those officials opposed to the millionaire tax and threatened with a proletarians general strike:

The first crisis developed out of a Communist proposal for a millionaire's tax to provide funds for farmers who had suffered losses from last summer's drought. In the face of solid opposition by all non -Communist parties, the Communists launched a smear campaign against all Ministers who had voted against the proposal. So vicious was the attack that Foreign minister Jan Masaryk, who normally remains aloof from domestic issues, published a special statement identifying himself as a millionaire and recording his vote with the eleven other Cabinet Ministers who had voted against the Communists. The Communists threatened to call a general strike of all industrial workers to force acceptance of their proposal. Lausman, then Social Democratic Minister of Industry, submitted his resignation in protest against Communist party interference in nationalized enterprises and irresponsible provocation of strikes. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, pp. 8-9) (IMG)

The USSR furnished support for the Czechoslovak communist-influenced bourgeois-democracy in the face of drought and shortage of raw materials for industry. A week after the first cabinet 'crisis', another 'crisis' occurred:

About a week after the millionaire tax proposal, the National Front was again threatened when three leaders of the Social Democratic Party, ... signed a pact with the Communists reaffirming the “socialist bloc” within the National Front. The pact came as a complete surprise to most of the Social Democratic party leaders. The party executive approved the pact on the ground that having been signed it could not be disavowed, but emphasized that the pact did not constitute a merger between the Communists and the Social Democrats. Moderate Social Democrats, however, were strongly opposed and the National Socialists refused to join the bloc. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 9) (IMG)

Not to be confused with the Nazis, the Czech National Socialist Party was a right-wing bourgeois pro-Zionist party of which President Edvard Benes was a prominent member. The strengthening of the alliance between the KSC and the Social Democrats served as a propaganda blow against the Czech ‘National Socialists’:

The Communists hoped by this maneuver to ... embarrass the [Czech] National Socialists by forcing them to choose a more leftist policy or to face the accusation of deserting the cause of the working man as represented by the united Communist and Social Democratic parties. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 9) (IMG)

To assist the people suffering from the drought, there was:

the recent Soviet offer of grain. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 11) (IMG)

Indeed the Soviet Union rendered:

an emergency shipment of 600,000 tons of grain, in addition to sizable quantities of iron ore, manganese, and cotton. (‘Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc: Loans, Credits, and Grants’, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG)

A credit of \$23 million was provided to Czechoslovakia, which probably included the grain sent by the USSR:

In 1947 a credit of \$23 million was extended to Czechoslovakia for the purpose of financing imports from the USSR. (‘Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc: Loans, Credits, and Grants’, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG)

Finally on February 1947, KSC member Vaclav Nosek, who headed the Ministry of the Interior, stepped up the purge of the anti-communist personnel of the police:

Vaclav Nosek ... began the process of converting the security forces into arms of the party. Anticommunist police officers and officials were fired, noncommunist personnel were encouraged to join the party or its youth organization, and all were subjected to heavy doses of communist propaganda. (CZECHOSLOVAKIA – A COUNTRY STUDY, US Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1987) (IMG)

In Romania, the Minister of Interior Teohari Georgescu was a traitor to the proletariat. However, as he was accountable to the Party of the proletariat, the installation of Georgescu at the helm of the Ministry of Interior increased the influence of the Party of the proletariat in the Radescu regime, thus paving the way for the revolutionary ouster of the comprador agents in the Romanian regime. In Czechoslovakia, Nosek himself was no communist loyalist, but, as an infiltrator into the KSC, was nonetheless accountable to and coopted by his Party, the Party of the proletariat. Note again that the KSC membership was compositionally proletarianized and democratic centralist, thus compelling even traitors to the Party to be accountable to the interests of the class-conscious proletarian mass that made up the Party’s largest percentage membership. As such, the increased influence of Nosek implied the increased influence of the proletariat in the security and intelligence bodies, even if Nosek himself was not as loyal to the cause of the proletariat.

The increased influence of the communist agents of the proletariat in the security bodies marked the increase in the influence of the proletariat’s agents over the means of violence. This in turn translated into the proletarian agents’ increased capability to re-engineer the make-up of the cabinet, to find compromising materials on the comprador cabinet ministers so to force their resignations. The comprador ministers resigned ‘in protest’ and the KSC gleefully accepted their resignations:

It was Nosek's packing of the police hierarchy with communists that caused the protest resignation of anticommunist government ministers in February 1948.. (CZECHOSLOVAKIA – A COUNTRY STUDY, US Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1987) (IMG)

The resignation of a government official can at times be canalized to raise the vigilance of that percentage of the electorate which has supported the resigning official, so to agitate that part of the electorate into mass protests. As such, ordinarily, the resignation of such ministers could have sparked a street backlash by a significant minority of the Czechoslovak population. Yet, to bring about such protests, one must have incitement, agitation, and propaganda capabilities concentrated in the media. In all countries, the security and intelligence bodies have, and utilize, the bribe-and-blackmail capability to get the mainstream media outlets in line. As a law of history, the class struggle for dominance over the means of violence determines the outcome of the class struggle for dominance over the means of communication. To get the media in line, the fascist agents use bribes and terror threats. To get the media in line, the revolutionary forces provide

promises of 'promotion' and higher pay, as a legal form of a bribe, and use not terror threats but rather kompromat-finding, threats of demotion, and the placement of 'advisors' and 'assistants' (read: spies) into the person's office, for achieving the objective of getting the major media outlets in line. In Czechoslovakia in the late 1940s, having lost dominance over a critical security and intelligence body as the police, the agitation and propaganda capabilities of the anti-communist faction sharply declined, disabling them from inciting riots. Secondly, the opposition to the millionaire's tax further reduced the popularity of the comprador forces. With pro-communist opposition growing and the anti-communist forces disabled in the security and media spheres, the KSC, overwhelmingly represented in the trade unions, had the ability to mobilize proletarian demonstrations while facing minimal anti-communist counter-demonstrations.

Klement Gottwald, the leader of the KSC and Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, demanded the Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes to accept the resignation of these anti-communist government ministers. When Benes refused, massive communist-led protests swept the country, forcing Benes too to resign:

Twelve of the non-Communist ministers resigned in protest. The Communists arranged street demonstrations and called out of the pro-Communist workers' militia; Gottwald threatened President Benes with a civil war unless he accepted the resignation of the 12 ministers. (The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Foreign Intelligence, CIA, October 1960, pp. 19-20) (IMG)


Massive armed demonstrations led by the communist Party overtook the streets of Czechoslovakia. The result was the February Revolution of 1948. For the first time in history, a largely industrialized bourgeois-democracy had been overthrown by a popular revolution of the proletariat for the establishment of a socialist People's Democracy. Czechoslovakia's communist revolution was therefore under the condition envisioned by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The CIA's Senior Research Staff on International Communism remarked:


Among the European Satellites of the USSR, Czechoslovakia is in a class by itself, since it is the only one ... which was a highly developed industrial country, practically unscathed by the war. Czechoslovakia is, therefore, the best example of Communism in action under the conditions envisaged by Marx, although it misses being a perfect example because of the country's geographical proximity to the USSR. (COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)


Czechoslovakia was the first industrial bourgeois-democracy to transition to a workers' state, a dictatorship of the proletariat, through the launching of a proletarian revolution in 1948. Unlike the other Peoples' Democracies, Czechoslovakia could drastically shorten the period of the NEP-style capitalist mode of production and bourgeois influence in statecraft, and transition almost directly to socialism. Hence, People's Democratic Czechoslovakia, unlike the other Peoples' Democracies, swiftly emerged as a socialist state instead of being for long a first-stage People's Democracy, a communist-led progressive bourgeois-democracy. In spite of unmistakable facts of the revolutionary nature of the overthrow, CIA-MI6 propagandists were quick to call it 'The Czech Coup'.




Wenceslas Square, Prague, February 25, 1948








Wanceslas Square, Prague, February 25, 1948
A careful look at the photos will reveal to the reader, the flag of the KSC, which had the hammer and sickle





Old Town Square, Prague, February 21, 1948

A careful look at the photos will reveal to the reader, the flag of the KSC, which had the hammer and sickle

The proletarian revolution in Czechoslovakia was a devastating blow to the American imperialist presence in Europe, reducing industrial supplies to Washington's military allies, and inflicting great costs on the front industrial companies of American finance capital:

a communist Czechoslovakia would further curtail trade between Eastern and Western Europe, materially increasing the need for US aid to the European recovery program. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The next step was for the KSC to increase its membership, recruit the best of the working class, to educate the social-democratic workers towards scientific socialist thinking, and, in the process, to screen the new Party membership:

Membership rolls were further increased when the Social Democrats, led by pro-Communist Zdenek Fierlinger, joined the KSC en masse on 26 June 1948. By August 1948, total Party membership, including the Slovak Communist Party which merged with the KSC on 28 September 1948 and became a regional unit of KSC, was nearly two and a half million. This mass influx of members into the Party, however, was terminated by a resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSC passed on 15 August 1948. In conformity with this resolution, a screening, the Party's first, of all Party members and candidates for membership took place between 1 October 1948 and 31 January 1949. During this period, 2,418,199 members were screened, 76,638 were struck off the membership lists, 30,495 were expelled and 522,683 were demoted to the status of candidates for membership. A ban was placed on the admission of new members to the Party in November 1948 which remained in effect until the 9th Party Congress in May 1949 when Stakhanovites were allowed to enter. (The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Foreign Intelligence, CIA, October 1960, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

With the support of the progressives and communists among the proletarians, the Party of two and a half million embarked on the campaign of socialist development, further boosting its already-high international prestige. The CIA reported:

At a session of the Central Committee the following November, Gottwald announced as the Party's major tasks the limitation and repression of capitalist elements in the country and support of the cooperative movement in agriculture. The general of the 9th Congress of the KSC, which took place in the Industrial Palace in Prague on 25-29 May 1949, was the "building of socialism in Czechoslovakia". The Party was assigned the primary task of mobilizing all forces in the country to fulfill the first Five Year Plan which sought the large scale industrialization of Czechoslovakia. As a secondary task, the Party was instructed to socialize the villages and agriculture by collectivizing the farms. Other points stressed at the 9th Congress were the education of a working class intelligentsia, the National Front as the correct way to unite the working people of city and country, and close relations with the Soviet Union as a requisite to the building of socialism in Czechoslovakia. A record number of delegates attended the congress, 2346 in all, including 2068 voting delegates and 273 non-voting delegates. An indication of the extent to which the reorganization from local cells to factory cells had progressed is given by the fact that of the voting delegates, 1366 were members of factory cells and 702 were members of Local cells. There were 1766 men and 302 women. In addition, 31 delegates attended from the ... foreign parties [attended.] (The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Foreign Intelligence, CIA, October 1960, p. 20) (IMG)

People's Democratic Czechoslovakia would go on to arm the freedom forces across the world. Among these, by 1950, were the communist Parties of France, Italy, and Spain:

European Parties which need arms much more urgently, namely Italy, France and Spain to a lesser extent, are being supplied with arms and ammunition via contraband shipments. (Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

This was a part of the larger effort by the Cominform, mistakenly referred to by the CIA in the following document as the 'Comintern', to fund the communist-led popular liberation struggles. In fact:

A special branch was recently formed in the Comintern for the sole purpose of investigating means by which the Communist Parties of capitalist countries might be supplied with arms. This branch includes a Latin American department. (Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

To the Communist Party of Ecuador, the Czechoslovak state promised military assistance whenever possible:

It has recently been learned that before Nela Martinez Espinosa, prominent woman Communist of Ecuador, left Ecuador in April 1949 for an extended trip through Europe, she was instructed by Pedro Saad, who is the real director of the Partido Comunista del Ecuador (PCE) to investigate the status of the arms shipment which the PCE expected from Czechoslovakia. She was not told whom to consult in Czechoslovakia and therefore asked the advice of an influential Party member in whose home she lived in Prague. He made arrangements for her to see an official in the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Government and accompanied her to the meeting. The interview was private, however, except for the presence of an interpreter. (Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Martinez has stated that she spent more than an hour with the official. She said that he spoke very good English and said that he had lived in the United States for several years. He questioned her about the situation in Ecuador and South America and exhibited some knowledge of the history of Ecuador. After this general discussion he said that, he was aware of the purpose of Martinez' visit and that he had been authorized to inform her of the following:

a. Certain difficulties have prevented the shipment of combat arms to the countries of the American

continent.

b. One of the difficulties has been in assuring safe conduct for the shipments, since shipment via normal commercial channels has proved unsatisfactory in the past and will be avoided in the future, if possible.

c. Some Latin American Parties, especially the Brazilian Party, are very eager to obtain arms and they as well as the PCE, will be supplied when the current difficulties are overcome, although no effective arrangements can be made at the present time.

d. (...). The PCE should do nothing about securing arms until further information is received by it from the Comintern.

e. The parties which desire arms must give assurances of safekeeping until the arms are really needed for furtherance of the international movement. It is a definite policy not to supply arms to be used in routine internal uprisings; the arms supplied must be kept secret until the final battle.

1- The Latin American area has no immediate priority, but the Latin American parties will receive arms eventually and should realize that the main battle is being fought in Europe and Asia at the present time.

(Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, pp. 1-2)
(IMG)

As will be covered in greater detail in C16S5, the Czechoslovak government also provided military funding for the anti-imperialist Arab governments of Syria and Egypt during the 1948 War. The USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, aiming to establish a Hebrew People's Democracy in the territory of Israel, vigorously opposed the Palestinian pogromist objective of wiping out Israel but also opposed Israel's CIA-backed comprador regime. The progressive Arab forces dominating the military commands of Syria and Egypt were sympathetic to the views of the Stalin-era Soviets, and militarily confronted both the reactionary forces that dominated the IDF and the Nazi Palestinian terrorists led by Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini and Haajj Amin. However, throughout the Soviet-led camp, the Anglo-American agents, some via the comprador Israeli and Yugoslav secret services, covertly worked to partially sabotage the sponsorship of the Hebrew and Arab freedom struggle. A fifth column in the Soviet Union, even without the knowledge and against the will of such leaders as Joseph Stalin, got the Titoist agents within Czechoslovakia to fund the Ben-Gurion regime during the 1948 War. Some of these agents were later identified and duly purged. See C16S5 for more details.

In People's Democratic Czechoslovakia, the Trotskyist-Titoist intelligence network, which would go on to collaborate with the Mossad, held important ranks in the state apparatus and were led by the trio of Slansky, Geminder, and Koehler:

During the past period of Communist domination of Czechoslovakia it was obvious that the Party, and by it the whole country, was run by the all-powerful trio of the Central Committee: Rudolf Slansky, Bedrich Geminder, and Bruno Koehler. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Evidence of Slansky's Titoist tendency can be observed in the following quote which states that Slansky did not seem disinterested in being regarded by his interrogators as linked to Zilliacus and Tito's regime. In his book after the 1989 collapse of the Czechoslovak state, Karel Kaplan, a West German intelligence agent, admitted:

This important gap was to be bridged by a general concept of Slansky's and Zilliacus's shared objective of shaping Czechoslovakia in the image of Tito's Yugoslavia. Slansky seemed to like this. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 186) (IMG)

Amy Knight of the Woodrow Wilson Center, a think tank dominated by the US State Department and the CIA, wrote::

Although arrests of some high-level [officials] had been occurring as far back as 1949, the first sign that this might develop into a widespread purge came on 27 November 1951, with the arrest of Rudolph Slansky, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and his deputy Bedrich Geminder, both ... associated with Beria and the MGB. Indeed, acting with Beria's sanction, they [i.e. Slansky and Geminder] had made Czechoslovakia a center for funneling aid and weapons to Israel in its conflict with the Arabs after the war. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 169) (IMG)

In other words, Slansky and Geminder were agents of Beria and the Mossad. Again, more will be mentioned of their relations with the Israeli secret service, in turn a front for the American secret service, in C16S5. However, for the context of this chapter, their role in economic sabotage against Czechoslovakia will be explored.

The tide in Czechoslovakia had been in the favour of the communist faction, but the material bases of reaction had not yet been crippled, allowing the reactionary and comprador classes to catapult into leadership the Slansky ring, as a significant lobbying force impeding the advancement of socialism in Czechoslovakia. These imperialist-fascist agents led by Slansky carried out economic sabotage in Czechoslovakia. They set aside the economic and technical experts in industry, agriculture, and central economic planning, replacing them with incompetent individuals who had little technical qualifications, and often were bureaucrats loyal to Slansky's gang. Demagogical Yugoslav-style 'worker self-management' as well as Party management of industry was highly encouraged and widespread resulting in severe

mismanagement by the incompetent 'democratic management'. Excellent it would be for the Party to have a massive army of communist enterprise managers, especially from proletarian backgrounds, in charge of the economic enterprises. The task of a robust Party of the proletariat, furthermore, would be to expand the oversight of the Party over the economic bodies so to ensure proper oversight of the measures undertaken by the non-Party-affiliated non-communist managers, bureau chiefs, and technicians, to hunt down industrial saboteurs, and to maximize the accountability of enterprise officials and economic bodies to the Party of the proletariat and hence to the cause of the proletariat itself. The Party's task was not to put the incompetent Party officials with so little knowledge of the subject matter in charge of the details of the management. Unfortunately, the Slansky faction, saboteurs as they were, ensured to put those incompetent officials in charge. Under the influence of the Slansky faction, the skilled Stakhanovite workers lost their positions and were sent to schools. Progress in scientific research was deliberately impeded. All of these are confirmed by a declassified US intelligence document, which states:

In daily work in state agencies, and practically in all fields of national life, the definite Party directive No 1 was strictly applied "under all circumstances, in all operations, political considerations are to be given first priority". (...) Practically this meant to put in all, even lesser positions, only politically reliable individuals, or, putting it in the Party language, the "faithful sons of the workers' class", the thoroughly disciplined individuals who knew nothing except what they had been told and taught. This policy resulted in catastrophic losses to the highly developed Czech industry and economy. New "workers' cadres" were hurriedly educated in numerous "central workers' schools" and "workers' universities" in the basic economic alphabet. It soon happened that governmental departments, factories, distribution organizations, state and collective farms (JZD's) were run by people who had no qualifications for these jobs whatsoever. These examples show the extremes to which this went. Under the existing Party policy practically all positions were considered "responsible" and had to be occupied by "new cadres". An administrative director of a hospital naturally wanted to prove how responsible the clerical work was in hospital administration; high officials in the Ministry of Health wanted to show the importance of such work also. They decided therefore to put in these positions new "reliable" workers' cadres. This has resulted in a real hunt for the workers' cadres in factories and plants in order to get them into workers' schools. Most capable and skilled workers were thus taken off production and sent to schools, causing great damages to production in all fields of the national economy. After completing a brief education consisting mainly of political indoctrination, it happened, for example, that a ward from hospital for mental diseases became the actual boss of the famous Myslivecek psychiatric clinic. The new boss, in his position of "political secretary", decided that all work with "crazy" people was sheer nonsense and put an end to research work conducted in this scientific institution. Under the same policy [someone] originally in charge of the heating system in the Student Health Institute, became overnight a high official in the Ministry of Health, Cadre Department, and was put in charge of the assignment of doctors. A garage maintenance man in the Ministry of Foreign Trade became deputy section chief of the Cadre Department and an actual head of all personnel of foreign trade companies. These are but a few examples of the new policy which resulted in a general mismanagement in all fields of the Czechoslovak economy and administration. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Indeed:

This was at the same time the main cause of the rapid deterioration of the Czech economic situation within some thing more than one year. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Referring to the above sabotage policies, the CIA document makes it absolutely clear that:

The ill-famed trio: Slansky, Geminder, Koehler were the actual creators of the above policy.. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Slansky began the strike against the communist faction of the KSC, attacked Gottwald's comrades, and worked to undermine the central planning of the economy by, again, setting aside high quality specialists and replacing them with the incompetent. Referring to Slansky, the CIA document again emphasized:

he destroyed the economy. So in 1949 he abolished the so-called Narodohospodarska Komise (NHK) – Economic Committee of the Central Secretariat, headed by Ludvik Frejks, Dr. Goldman and Dr. Jung- Jancik. This committee was the right hand of Gottwald, and created the Two [Year Plan] and later the Five Year Plan. After the NHK was dissolved Gottwald took Frejka with him to the President's Personal Office; Dr Goldman was appointed Deputy Minister in State Planning Office in charge of statistics, and Dr. Jung-Jancik, who was in charge of all economic cadres with the NHK was given a minor position with the local Slovak Government in Bratislava. Instead of NHK, within the Communist Party a new organization was created, the so-called ... Department Industry, Finance and Commerce, with new people in charge. Many general directors of national corporations put in by the NHK under Frejka and Jancik were dismissed, regardless of their technical qualifications, and given some inferior positions; some even went to jail. New personnel were appointed to such

positions through the new General Cadre Department headed by Bruno Koehler, a German Communist who did not even speak fluent Czech. (...). The entire nation was becoming more and more disgusted by State propaganda methods. The national output decreased steadily as a result of the mismanagement of new bosses, deep apathy of the working masses, ever growing shortages of raw materials, and disorganization of the entire economic and administrative life of the country. Since propaganda drives had not brought forward any positive results, the ever-growing and quickening "turn-over" of employees had only added to the rapidly spreading general chaos in the country. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The correct policy towards the urban Czechoslovak petit bourgeoisie would have been to first encourage them to join cooperatives by generous state loans and technical equipment. When the technical progress of the shops were improved to the adequate level and the small shops became large enterprises, the government could then nationalize the enterprise. However, this was not the policy of the Slansky faction. Instead, they swiftly nationalized the shops and committed even greater economic sabotage by moving away the skilled workers of the shops to the factories as manual laborers. All of these were seriously detrimental to the economy:

The distribution system is very bureaucratic and works rather poorly, especially in the country. The former shop owners are made scapegoats for this failure and are usually blamed and even accused of sabotage. Late in 1950 many former shop owners, employed until that time in their nationalized shops, were transferred to other shops, and at the beginning in 1951 were completely removed from trade business and sent to factories as manual laborers. It was of course much easier for the Slansky' regime to break the resistance of the middle class than the resistance from the peasant class encountered in the collectivization drive. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

The volume of goods distribution rose rather substantially during the last year, but the rise was due solely to the sharp increase in consumer prices. Actually, though, consumption has dropped in most items, since the population cannot afford to buy the goods at the new, high prices. The increased consumption of basic consumer goods per capita promised in 1948 and 1949 was not realized. The reasons for this failure were: the administrative mismanagement, shortages of raw materials, ... and the growth of the Czechoslovak rearmament program. Outside of the State Planning Bureau, the real statistical data of production and consumption are known only to the top Party officials. On the average, the entire consumption is lower per capita than a year ago. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

The Titoist intelligence network in People's Democratic Czechoslovakia actually used more or less the same strategies employed by the Trotskyite bandits of the Gestapo agents Tito and Djilas. If the reader recalls from C12S1, Tito's Trotskyite bandits in Montenegro enforced left-opportunist measures, leaping onto 'socialism' and imposing it through terror on the masses, going so far as to call for the annexation of Montenegro by the USSR. Under the guise of 'friendship' with Soviet power, they were backstabbing it, portraying it as an oppressive and aggressive expansionist power seeking to enslave the Montenegrin people. Such extreme 'pro-Sovietism' and blatant anti-Sovietism were two masks of the same foe. The same strategy was pursued by the Slansky faction to drive a wedge gulf between the Czechoslovak public opinion and Soviet power, so to provoke and agitate anti-Soviet uprisings, and to pave the way for the rise of a Titoist regime in Czechoslovakia hostile to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The CIA stated that Slansky, Koehler, and Geminder were:

Communist ideologists [read: Trotskyites], being practically separated from the daily life of the country.. It was generally believed that Slansky was a Moscow man, placed by the Soviets in charge of the entire country. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The belief that the Soviets installed Slansky was a false one fostered by Slansky's group itself, the objective being the false portrayal of Soviet power as an 'aggressive' 'expansionist' state 'seeking' to devour Czechoslovakia, just as Tito's Trotskyite bandits advocated the conquest of Montenegro by the USSR.

The communist faction of the KSC, however, successfully raised vigilance against the true colours of the Slansky group. The communists spearheaded a secret service campaign against the Slansky group and exposed their Trotskyite reactionary role in the economic damage and terror sown:

Slansky's popularity among the Czechoslovak population was quite small because of his wholly pro-Soviet political orientation. Zapotocky, in one of his articles published in Prace prior to emphasized that although in building socialism in Czechoslovakia the examples and experiences of the USSR had to be followed, certain experiments could not be transferred blindly. He wrote that, in applying these principles, the specific conditions prevailing in Czechoslovakia had to be taken into consideration. Certain Party members of long standing blamed Slansky for not paying adequate attention to the special economic and political conditions existing in Czechoslovakia when applying Soviet methods, and felt that Czechoslovak production suffered because of this. This criticism was voiced by Dr. Velda Pihart, Deputy Minister of Industry; Eng. Dr. J. Jicinsky, director general of the Czechoslovak United Steel Works; Ing. K. Kabelle, coke industry specialist and director of the coke kilns

at Kladno; Dora Smolkova; and several others. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The author of a report for the US intelligence stated:

I have often heard that Dr Jaromir Dolansky, the Minister for State Planning and the best Communist economist in the country, was always in strong opposition to Slansky's methods and [believed] ... that no positive results could be expected in following a strict Communization policy with complete disregard for economic problems. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Dolansky belonged to the on the faction of:

Gottwald.. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

And:

Gottwald denounced Slansky ... as a Trotskyist.. (Gottwald's Position in the Arrest of Slansky, CIA, February 14, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Gottwald's accusation against Slansky was of course accurate, for although Slansky, just like Tito, officially denounced Trotskyism, he hypocritically was one himself.

Ota Sling was one of the prominent:

members of the Slansky group. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Sling was extremely unpopular owing to his Trotskyite measures imposing aggressive 'collectivization', high work norms, and dictatorial behaviour, among others. With the Soviet-backed communist faction of the Party resurging and raising vigilance, the growing popular rage was successfully canalized to raise vigilance against the Titoist faction, resulting in Sling's arrest:

Sling's attempt to build socialism rapidly and his failure to take into consideration the special conditions prevailing in the Brno region greatly contributed to his unpopularity. Sling's unpopularity was greatest among the farmers who were compelled by drastic measures to join the agricultural cooperatives (JZD) Even among factory workers, however, the position of Sling was not much better. He tried to introduce constantly higher labor norms, resulting in a decline of wages. These measures caused increasing unrest among the factory workers which resulted in several strikes in departments of Zbrojovka Brno, where Pliva was employed at that time. In several cases the KSC regional leaders in Brno were compelled to retreat from their position: because the KSC factory organizations and the trade union organizations, under pressure from their members, were opposed to the measures advanced by Sling. For this reason Sling's removal and arrest provoked no unfavorable reaction in the Brno region; on the contrary, the action was well received. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The first step in the decisive attack against Rudolf Slansky and his companions was the liquidation of Marie Svermova, Ota Sling, Viteslav Fuchs and other Party officials who were known to be members of the Slansky group. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Putting his personal interests above that of the Party, the administration, and the people, Slansky created a large bloc of his adherents within the Party, violating the principles of democracy, fostering a duplicate bureaucracy, the natural result of which was inefficiency. The American intelligence service pointed to:

the fact that Slansky and his group had seized most of the key positions both in the economic and political spheres, so that the Government was in a position inferior to that of the Party. This naturally damaged the prestige of the Government in the eyes of the public. Things had progressed so far that general managers of Czechoslovak nationalized enterprises, in order to settle important matters, did not conduct, their business with the ministry of the industry to which they were subordinate, but went directly to the Secretariat of the KSC, where the final decisions were made. (...). Kopecky, especially, criticized Slansky in this respect. It was the general opinion that the ruling power within Czechoslovakia was centered in the UV KSC [i.e. General Secretariat of the Party] and not in the Government. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 7) (IMG)

Along with Kopecky:

Gottwald denounced Slansky ... for his responsibility for the confusion in the Government and Party as a result of the duality of control.. (Gottwald's Position in the Arrest of Slansky, CIA, February 14, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Thanks to Slansky's lack of 'popularity among the Czechoslovak population', said the CIA:

Gottwald dared to make such a direct attack against Slansky.. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Finally, the economy was so heavily damaged by 1951 that the setting for the purge of the Slansky gang had already become ripe and the scientific economically-minded communist faction gained the upper hand:

And then, in the last moment, when the coal output and the agricultural production were getting dangerously

low and the general chaos in administration had reached a stage that nobody knew any more what was going on in the country, came the blow, the biggest shakeup in the Communist Party.. Rudolph Slansky was removed to an unimportant position, Geminder and Koehler simply vanished. An economically-minded group of individuals headed by Klement Gottwald came to power. It meant also the reinstatement of his Oxford-trained economic advisors, Dr. Goldmann and Ludvik Frejka. The new Ministry of State Control was put in charge of Karol Bacilek a Slovak Communist, known as faithful and blind follower of Gottwald. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Extensive discussions occurred in the Party meetings, a fact which also informed the public regarding the betrayal of Slansky's group:

The psychological preparation of public opinion for Slansky's arrest involved constant discussion at Party meetings of the cases against Svermova, Sling, Fuchs, and other arrested Party members, with emphasis on their connections with the West. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The purpose of these first arrests was to lay the groundwork for the arrest of Slansky and to test the reaction of the Czechoslovak public in the event of his arrest. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Subsequently, other Slansky agents were arrested:

After the arrest of Svermova and Sling, a number of Party officials in various regions were arrested. All of these officials were known as collaborators of Slansky, and it was obvious then that the net around Slansky and his closest collaborators, who held important posts directly in the Central Secretariat of the Party, was being tightened slowly but surely. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The Czechoslovak people, increasingly vigilant of the Trotskyite repressions of the villainous Slansky and his gang, did not view unfavourably the purge of the Slansky network:

People who were not Party members generally felt that with the removal of Slansky the worst "villain" in Czechoslovakia was gone, political persecution of non-Party citizens might decrease, and a partial detachment from the influence of Moscow would take place. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

From what has been said above it would follow that the general reaction to Slansky's arrest within the Party and among non-party citizens within Czechoslovakia was not as unfavorable as may have been assumed abroad. A psychological preparation of public opinion for the liquidation of Slansky and his adherents had been made. Thus, Slansky had not been arrested in September 1951, since it was necessary to ascertain first what public reaction should be expected in the event of his arrest. He was arrested only when it became obvious that his followers were a minority and that no grave political consequence would result from his liquidation, and this was followed by the systematic arrest of all those who were suspected, even slightly, of being in his camp. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

By the time of the arrest of these Titoist fifth columnists, however, the economy was already damaged. The CIA noted:

the failure of Czechoslovakia to fulfill the Five-Year Plan, especially in the realms of heavy industry and agriculture.. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The economic situation during the first half of 1951 could be characterized as a rapidly deteriorating one. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The economic problems certainly existed. However, the Czechoslovak people regarded the Slansky gang, not Gottwald, as responsible. In fact:

Gottwald ... today enjoy[s] a certain popularity within Czechoslovakia; [his] removal would do more harm than good. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

Thanks to his correct scientific communist stance, Gottwald continued to be viewed favorably by the Czechoslovak proletariat and peasantry. Indeed, along with the purge came a new policy for the economy:

The expected shakeup came and was followed by the most complete, thorough reorganization of the Czech economy since its nationalization under the Communist regime. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

New ministries were created :

First, two independent Ministries for Heavy and Light industry were created. Later on, they were divided into some more specialized ministries. This reorganization does not necessarily result in a larger bureaucratic machinery; (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

Note that the Slansky group had created economic agencies within the Party, agencies responsible not as much for

oversight and surveillance but more so for acting as ministries themselves. This had created a duplicate bureaucracy. Indeed, as the CIA suggested, the above-mentioned reorganization did not increase bureaucracy. Rather, it reduced bureaucracy by restoring the role and prestige of the government's economic ministries, while ensuring that these individual government ministries were unified, tightly knit, surveilled and oversighted by the KSC. This policy would have eliminated the extra agencies within the Party, while not diminishing the necessary guidance and role of the Party over the individual government bureaus. In other words, it practically merged the duplicate bureaucracies into one. This was reflected also in the emphasis on the expertise, rather than direct Party affiliations, of managers in state enterprises while simultaneously ensuring that the Party authorities maintained oversight over the performance of these managers. Akin to this was the elimination of the demagogical policy of worker self-management as advocated by Slansky's gang which would have made chaos and mismanagement an inevitability. Instead, the scientific Taylorist and Leninist policy of one-person management was introduced. The CIA reported:

in the mean time the collective workers' administration of enterprises were abolished, and the plants and other enterprises were put under the direct administration of a corresponding industrial ministry. It is to be expected that after the removal of Koehler more attention will be paid to actual qualifications in appointment of employees, and not only to political reliability as it was before. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Another trend has been to give full authority and full responsibility to one individual – the director of the plant – and to eliminate Communist Party and trade union interference in plant management. This does not mean, however, that the Communist Party organization at the plant has no influence. The director is now under the supervision of a higher CP officer, either district or regional, and reports to him. There is no interference by local workers in management affairs while an industrial plan is being fulfilled. In the past, management was more of a triumvirate: the manager and director, the trade union, and the Communist Party. (Industrialization of Czechoslovakia and Preparations for War, CIA, January 9, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The policies of Czechoslovakia under Slansky's clique had emphasized the formation of associations of production. In essence, this policy created very large national corporations that controlled several plants but did not function as ministries. The level of their management was more micro than those of the ministries and more macro than those of the individual state plants. They encompassed a smaller portion of the economy than the ministries typically would. At the same time, they encompassed several plants. Since a great role was given to these large state corporations, the role of the ministries was reduced and as such the economy was decentralized. The smart aspect of this economic sabotage, however, was that the control of a single corporation over several plants made it falsely appear as though the economy was centralized. In reality, given the diminished role of the ministries and the decentralization of their power to the relatively lower-level state corporations, the economy was decentralized, resulting in economic chaos. However, with the purge of Slansky's group, a greater role was given to the ministries and these corporations were broken up into individual plants.

There are constant reorganization changes occurring in Czechoslovak industry, and production of certain products is being transferred from one plant to another. (...). However, a recent trend has been to transfer production from the large national corporation plants to smaller production groups of one to three plants. (Industrialization of Czechoslovakia and Preparations for War, CIA, January 9, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Again, the transfer of production to these smaller production groups was not decentralization, for these small production groups were centrally planned by the economic ministries and other central economic bodies. To put it in an oversimplified form, this transfer to smaller groups implied that instead of having several factories be managed by one manager of one multi-factory state 'corporation', there would instead be one manager per each factory. This would render the day-to-day management of the factories more efficient since it meant that there would be a manager dealing directly with his/her factory instead of one manager having to deal with several factories at a time. At the same time, these managers and their factories would be accountable to the central economic bodies and ministries. In short, the Slansky-era existence of state corporations, more micro than the ministries and more macro than the individual enterprise units, pseudo-centralized the management of several individual enterprises into the hands of a few managers, while decentralizing economic planning away from a central ministry onto the level of a relatively more local corporation. The rise of the Gottwald faction and the reversal of this Slansky-era policy recentralized economic-strategic planning into the hands of the state ministries while handing the task of day-to-day management onto the enterprise managers themselves, the latter in turn being accountable to the central plan.

It is important that the reader self-familiarizes with the concept of the Slansky ring's method of sabotage in management. This technique used by the Slansky ring was a sneaky method of sabotage repeated, under different titles, by the Titoist saboteurs of other countries as a way of decentralizing under the guise of 'centralizing' the economy. Of course, after the formation of these state corporations, the next step that would have been pursued by the Slansky group was to fully decentralize planning onto the individual enterprise level, hence to eliminate all central planning in general.

Given the economic sabotage done by the Slansky faction as well as the Anglo-American imperialist economic sanctions against Czechoslovakia, there was a 'critical lack of imports of raw materials', to use the CIA's words:

It is now generally accepted in all government circles in Czechoslovakia that the state of the country's economy is chaotic. The economic events leading up to this state of affairs have all arisen from a critical lack of imports of raw materials for Czechoslovakia's basic engineering and rolling mill industries. This is caused by a current lack of purchasing currency and the curtailment of imports from the west. Holdings of foreign currency are now non-existent.. (General Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia, CIA, August 17, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

The fascist dictatorship (see C12S2, C12S3, C12S4, and C12S5) of the Gestapo agent Tito (see C12S1) did its part to damage Czechoslovakia by refusing to fulfill its trade obligations:

Yugoslavia, having recently sold 15 million dollars worth of copper has now abruptly reduced her export of raw copper to Czechoslovakia to 4,000 tons instead of the contracted 15,000 tons for 1949. Because of this, Czechoslovakia is now trying to purchase raw copper to renew her supply which was recently curtailed. (General Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia, CIA, August 17, 1949, p. 2) (IMG)

On the personal level, the Gestapo agent Tito was extremely rude towards the Czechoslovak communists. As admitted by West German agent Kaplan:

Moscow's most important problem was Yugoslavia, and its attacks focused on those who vacillated or might vacillate on this point.

In this respect, Moscow had complete trust in the Czechoslovak leadership. None of its members doubted for one second the correctness of the Soviet attitude toward the Yugoslav CP. Moscow also realized that the formerly professed Czechoslovak-Yugoslav friendship concealed a discordant trait: Czechoslovak politicians felt that the Yugoslavs held them in some disdain. "All we ever heard from them was criticism of our situation" (Slansky). Others complained that the Yugoslavs "systematically treated us with hostility and disloyalty" (Clementis). Moscow was also fully aware of Tito's critical, even condescending attitude toward Gottwald, whom he considered a sycophantic lackey of the Soviets, a politician without a will of his own. Gottwald's insistence ... that Tito be expeditiously removed only strengthened Moscow's confidence that Prague unambiguously supported the Soviet side on the Yugoslav issue.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

Gottwald went so far as to hope that a democratic majority in the YCP would overthrow Tito, not realizing that Tito had established a dictatorial rule in that Party:

This plan was going to be implemented in stages. The first two stages were described by Stalin on July 14, 1948, in his response to Gottwald's letter suggesting that Tito's leadership be removed:

I feel from your report that you're counting on the defeat of Tito and his group at the Yugoslav CP Congress.

I have to say that we Muscovites have not been and are not counting on so early a defeat of Tito's group. Our objective in the first stage was to isolate it in the eyes of other Communist parties, and to reveal its shady machinations. We have attained this objective. The second stage will be a matter of gradually detaching Communist-Marxist groups within the Yugoslav Communist Party from Tito and his group. This takes time and we have to be good at waiting. I see that you lack patience. But I advise you to arm yourself with patience, for there is no doubt that Marxism- Leninism will in time prevail in Yugoslavia.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 4) (IMG)

To assist People's Democratic Czechoslovakia against Yugoslav economic sabotage, the fraternal Soviet Union provided emergency economic assistance to Czechoslovakia by 1950:

A form of credit intermediate between short-term commercial credit and investment. is the emergency loan. Such loans have been granted occasionally to Satellite countries by the USSR to tide them over temporary balance of payments' difficulties. The \$25 million loan to Czechoslovakia in 1950 is an example, in this case designed to keep Czechoslovak industries operating by financing raw material imports from Western countries to which the Czechoslovaks were currently unable to make payments. (Institutions and Arrangements in International Trade and Finance Within the Soviet Bloc, Economic Intelligence Report, EIC-SR-3, Prepared Jointly by IAC and Other US Government Agencies, Economic Intelligence Committee, Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, CIA, June 30, 1955, p. 58) (IMG)

Contrary to the hostile anti-Soviet propaganda of the US-led camp, a CIA report clarifies that the USSR bore no economic control over Czechoslovakia:

With respect to control exercised by Soviets over Czechoslovak production and economy such control does not actually exist. A few Soviet advisors may be found in the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of National Security. (Industrialization of Czechoslovakia and Preparations for War, CIA, January 9, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

The Slansky faction had within it also a sub-network headed by Vladimir Clementis, an agent of the CIA and Mossad.

Clementis's intelligence connections and extensive treasonous collaboration with the CIA and Mossad have been documented in C16S5. However, it is worth providing details of his Slovak separatist activities as well. The CIA- Mossad agent Vladimir Clementis was also a leading figure of the Slovak separatist movement headed by Gustav Husak, and sought to partition socialist Czechoslovakia on behalf of Isser Harel's fascist secret service. Indeed, to Slansky's group belonged the Slovak separatists headed by Clementis, Husak, Novomesky, Okali and Smidke. The CIA confirmed:

Separatism in Slovakia has resulted from the opposition of the Slovak Communist leaders Husak, Clementis, Novomesky, Okali, [and] Smidke.. (Crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, CIA, December 10, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Unlike Czechia, Slovakia was not very industrialized. The population there was to a large extent agrarian petit- bourgeois. Unlike the proletarians, who have nothing to lose except their 'chains' in the struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie have small business which they may lose. At the same time, unlike the national bourgeoisie and the cooperative peasants who have big businesses with which they can take the risk of engaging in a struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie do not have such big businesses and therefore cannot afford to take major risks in the struggle against finance capital. The inability of the petit-bourgeoisie to wage a struggle against imperialism results in the areas populated by the petit-bourgeoisie to become easy prey to material domination by finance capital. Such was the reason that Slovakia was a channel through which the Nazi Germans were able to more easily dominate the territory of former Czechoslovakia. Such was the reason that Slovakia became a major hub for fascism. Such was the reason that after the Czechoslovak Revolution of 1948, Slovakia continued to be the major base of the Slovak bourgeois-nationalist agents of the CIA, MI6, UDB, Mossad, BND, etc. The communist faction of the KSC was:

Hindered by the increasing attacks of Slansky and his followers (Geminder, Frank and Koehler), and almost paralyzed in its activities by the dangerously growing Slovak separatism of the Husak group... (Crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, CIA, December 10, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Slansky drew his strength in part from the Slovak bourgeois-nationalist lobby. Undoubtedly, in any socialist or progressive country, the ethnic minorities deserve some level of autonomy, but the Clementis-Husak group went extreme with their demands for 'autonomy'. The network of CIA-Mossad agent Clementis promoted a very radical boost in Slovak 'autonomy', a kind that would have definitely paved the way for the partition of Czechoslovakia: Clementis and his adherents ... held to the conception of national and political independence of Slovakia, both toward Moscow and toward Prague. (...). Such a political autonomy with nationalist overtones did not conform to the conceptions of either the Moscow or the ... Prague leadership. However, it was not possible to liquidate Clementis and his group before the Communist Party seized absolute power in Czechoslovakia and fortified its position. The first task of the KSC was the liquidation of the so-called bourgeois parties, and to this end the collaboration of the KSS was needed. After that it was only a question of time when the liquidation of the leadership of the KSS, from Clementis down,

would be realized. (CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY: BACKGROUND OF THE CLEMENTIS AND SLANSKY PURGES, CIA, June 24, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Clearly, Gustav Husak and the Mossad agent Vladimir Clementis were Slovak separatists aiming to partition Czechoslovakia. However, Gottwald, drawing strength from the communist industrial blue-collar workers' contingent in the Party, was able to defeat this faction:

Gottwald was able ... to take action in the interest of vigilance and caution and of a real purge of all inimical elements in the Party. (Gottwald's Position in the Arrest of Slansky, CIA, February 14, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Notably, the Mossad-backed Husak was jailed for bourgeois-nationalist separatist activity. This fact is important and will be very relevant in the later chapters, when the advent of the Titoist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s would be explained.

Clementis also is documented to have had suspicious ties to the British Labour Party politician Konni Zilliacus. Zilliacus was unofficially an MI6 spymaster and wrote books in support of Tito against the USSR. He was well-known for his extensive contacts with many of the Kautskyite and Titoist elements in Eastern Europe:

Konni Zilliacus was a British member of Parliament and a leader of the Labour Party's left wing. After World War II he maintained contacts with left-wing politicians of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, particularly with Zdenek Fierlinger, who worked hand-in-hand with the Communists. Zilliacus also had close ties with various East European Communist leaders. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 183) (IMG)

Zilliacus and Clementis had met before, and then:

met once again; and in June 1948, Clementis received four documents, each several pages long, amounting to position papers of Zilliacus and his political associates on various United Nations issues. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 183) (IMG)

The 'position papers' which showed Zilliacus's ideological positions, were Zilliacus's 'humble opinions'. A liaison

officer's 'humble opinion' can sometimes be a cover for actual instructions by MI6 handlers given to their agents. Had Clementis not had a track record of agency for the Mossad and UDB, it would have been unethical to judge him merely by some 'opinion' documents handed over to him by MI6 spymaster Zilliacus. However, given Clementis's track record of treason, one should give oneself the right to suspect that Clementis received those letters for a treasonous purpose. Like Zilliacus, Clementis supported the Ben-Gurion faction in all ways. Also, during the Slansky Trials (the English-language transcript of which is available online in archive.org), Zilliacus was condemned as one of the leaders of the Clementis-Slansky intelligence ring.

In his book against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, Karel Kaplan, the agent of the West German Ministry of Interior, made important confessions regarding the vast network controlled by Noel Field in the Peoples' Democracies. The ties of the Beria and Mossad agent Geminder to this American secret service network is thusly further exposed. Some of Kaplan's remarks are as follows:

Cominform's first Yugoslav resolution of mid-1948 inspired the idea of staging a major Central European international political show trial with high Communist officials. Originally it was to have an anti-American orientation, but it soon acquired a strong anti-Yugoslav tinge as well. The American citizen Noel Field, or perhaps "the case of Noel Field," became the starting point—although not more than that—for constructing such a trial.

After graduating from Harvard, Noel H. Field became a left-leaning diplomat in the U.S. Foreign Service. In the early thirties he gravitated toward intellectuals with strong pro-Soviet sympathies, among whom the Soviet secret service sought collaborators. In 1933, Noel Field met the German anti-Nazis Paul and Hede Massing. They had arrived in the United States from Moscow, with the objective of building up a network of Soviet agents among influential left-wing personalities. Field was one of their recruits. In 1936, much to Moscow's dismay, he left the foreign service for the League of Nations in Geneva, where he worked first in the disarmament section and later was in charge of members of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War.

Hede Massing set up Noel Field with Ignatz Reiss and General Walter G. Krivitsky, who were in charge of Soviet intelligence in Switzerland. Soon after that, however, Reiss spoke out against Stalin's terror, and Moscow ordered him liquidated for this "betrayal of the USSR." In August 1937 Krivitsky appointed a new controller for Field. However, after the elimination of Reiss, Krivitsky also defected. Reiss's and Krivitsky's "treason" raised questions in Moscow about Noel Field as well: he may have influenced them or even helped turn them around.

These doubts subsided when in 1938, Noel and his wife, Herta, appeared in Moscow. They fulfilled their old desire to see the "promised land." In addition, Noel wanted to restore the broken intelligence link, and to join the CP USA.

He met with the Massings who helped him reestablish contact: he was given a password which his new controller would use in approaching him. Intelligence agencies did not consider his membership in the CP USA appropriate and instead recommended membership in the German CP, which would be secret, known only to two or three officials, and registered in a secret roster of the Comintern.

More than four years passed before Field's controller contacted him. After giving assurances that he was still interested in the work, Field was to review in detail his contacts with Reiss and Krivitsky, as well as his activities over the previous five years. Field complied but still didn't meet his controller face-to-face. He heard nothing more until after the war, and then in a manner which made him so suspicious and doubtful that he simply threw out the messenger. Moscow's misgivings mounted accordingly.

Since 1939, Field had been operating in France and Switzerland as the director of the Unitarian Service Committee (USC) for Europe. His job was to help victims of Nazism. In the process he met dozens of German, Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian, and other Communists whom he helped reach exile. He even operated as a courier among underground Communist groups. In Switzerland he contacted officials of anti-Nazi organizations, including Communists. All told, the services he rendered to the Communists and their resistance were very valuable.

One of his duties was to report to the USC headquarters in the United States about the political and economic situation and about resistance movements in Nazi-occupied homes of the exiles. He also supplied this information to Allen Dulles, the Swiss-based head of the American secret service, the OSS. In exchange Dulles helped out leftist resistance groups financially, materially, and logistically. Such cooperation was considered natural at the time, serving a common goal—the defeat of Nazism.

Two years after the war ended, in the fall of 1947, Noel Field lost his job with the USC. He decided to stay in Europe and to work as a journalist specializing in countries of the Soviet sphere of influence, writing for the U.S. press. Two considerations motivated him: on the one hand, he knew a number of Communist officials whom he had helped during the war and who now occupied high positions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary; on the other hand there was his "history with intelligence." Additionally, he had no place to stay,

and he wanted to get a residence permit in one of the Soviet-bloc countries.

In April 1948, Oskar Kosta and Evzen Klínger, Czechoslovak Communists working in Geneva, invited Field to Czechoslovakia. He intended to meet his wartime friends, collect material for a book on the people's democracies, and settle the residency issue. Suddenly, however, his name started appearing in reports of the Czechoslovak intelligence. Alice Kohnova-Glaserova, who after the war had been sent to recruit agents among American intellectuals, recommended Field. She had known him from wartime, but being ultracautious, she demanded that he be further investigated. The case was taken up by Josef Sindelaf, deputy head of the Czechoslovak intelligence, who was in charge of U.S. recruiting. He turned to Switzerland for information. Max Hornigacker, an official of the Swiss Communist party, recommended Field, whom he knew very well. So did Artur London, a Czechoslovak Communist who with Field's help was receiving medical treatment in Switzerland. London also passed on to Sindelaf a letter by Field dated April 13, 1945. It was the French original, addressed to Hornigacker. It read as follows: "Dear Sir: Attached please find a copy of the letter for Mr. Dulles which I promised you this morning. Yours sincerely, Noel H. Field."

In August 1948, the Fields left Prague to visit Poland. There they learned that Hede Massing and her husband had left the Communist movement and were testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee in Washington, D.C. Field wondered whether his name might be mentioned and whether he'd be able to return to the United States. Right away he raised the issue with Jakub Berman, a high official of the Polish Communist Party, "who promised help in solving his problem."

After returning to Prague in September, Field multiplied his efforts to get a long-term residence permit in Czechoslovakia. The matter became even more acute when on October 16, 1948, the New York Herald Tribune published a report on the extensive testimony that Whittaker Chambers had given to the House Un-American Activities Committee. (...) It was imperative that he get a residence permit in Eastern Europe. He knew that his influential friends would help, as would proofs of his Communist party membership and solving the misunderstanding with Soviet intelligence.

On September 15, Leo Bauer, an old friend and a leading Communist in West Germany, passed on to Field a message from a leader of the East German Communist party (the SED) who said he had no objections to resolving Field's party matter. In October, Czechoslovak officials including Vilem Novy, Rudolf Margolius, Karel Markus, Alice Kohnova, and Gisela Kischova recommended that Field be granted the residence permit he sought. They approached Bedrich Geminder, head of the international department of the CC KSC secretariat. On November 13, Gisela Kischova delivered to the Czechoslovak party leadership a letter from the CC SED, in which Paul Merker and Franz Dahlem, two of its leading officials, requested that Field be allowed to stay in Czechoslovakia for the time being. Soon after that Field complained in a letter to Bauer that he had "used all levers to get a residence permit in Czechoslovakia ... but in vain."

All these measures did have one effect: they incited the interest of security authorities, particularly of party security. Karel Svab headed the records department of the CC KSC secretariat, which was in charge of party intelligence. He asked Antonin Jandus from the Office for Party Defense to put Field under surveillance. Jandus gave the job to Alice Kohnova and received detailed information about Field's contacts in Czechoslovakia. Svab was suspicious of Field's efforts to get a Czechoslovak residence permit. He therefore asked the State Security (StB), the Czechoslovak secret service, to investigate the matter, to interrogate Field, and to follow Field's contacts. The interrogation took place on November 19, 1948, in Jandus's presence.

On the same day, Venceslav Wehle, the commander of Czechoslovak intelligence, signed a report "On Field's connection with J. F. (should read: Allen) Dulles." Wehle saw proof of this connection in a letter from Field to Dulles, containing data on the resistance strength and political conditions in Nazi-occupied territories. It must have originated from the same source as the earlier letter which Sindelaf received from Artur London. Participants of the interrogation learned about Field's earlier work with the Soviet intelligence and heard out his request to be put in touch with the Moscow security center. The Czechs refused to mediate this but did approve his residence request because "having interrogated N. Field one can state that he is of the socialist persuasion." The residence permit was good until May 1949.

In December 1948, Field and his wife left for France and Switzerland to settle personal matters. Czechoslovak security meanwhile held up their mail, which was being forwarded to Kischova. In France, Field met with Artur London, who was getting ready to return to Prague, and asked him to arrange contact with Soviet intelligence in order to clarify past misunderstandings.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, pp. 19-23) (IMG)

Whereas, quite suspiciously, Czechoslovak security chief Vesely refused to arrest Noel Field, Gottwald eventually ordered Field's arrest upon receiving information from his Hungarian and Soviet comrades:

Czechoslovak security advised Budapest about Field's arrival. Szucs immediately went to Prague and requested

that Field be arrested; however, Jindřich Veselý, StB Chief, refused for lack of grounds. On May 9, Gottwald received a radiogram from the leader of Hungary: "To Comrade Gottwald. Please comply with our request and detain Field, who has just arrived in Prague. [Matyas] Rakosi." The Soviet General Belkin, masterminding the Field case from behind the scenes, also insisted. Gottwald agreed and explained his acquiescence to Veselý: "If even General Belkin has looked into this and supports it, let them have their way." Field was arrested and handed over to Hungarian security personnel on May 11. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 24) (IMG)

Gejna Pavlik-Politzer, another member of the KSC named as a Jewish bourgeois-nationalist during the Slansky trials, had maintained contacts of an espionage character with the CIA spymaster Noel Field:

Who was Dr. Gejna Pavlik, fifty-five, and why did he attract the attention of Prague, Budapest, and even perhaps of Soviet security? He was a Slovak intellectual with leftist, pro-Communist leanings since his youth. After World War I he fought in the Red Army and was a member of the Soviet CP. Then he was sent to the battlefields of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic. After its defeat, he settled in Slovakia as a lawyer and worked closely with the Communist party. In 1939 he left with his wife Charlotta for Switzerland, where he met Noel Field who provided some support, and Tibor Szonyi of Hungary. These acquaintances became fateful.

Field appointed him head of the Unitarian Service Committee's Czechoslovak chapter. This charitable organization provided assistance but in return expected information about the social and economic situation in the receiving area. (...). During his short employment with the USC – the job ended in mid- 1946 – Pavlik sent the USC four reports. Later he worked as secretary of the Parliamentary Club of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), and in October 1948 was appointed director of Cedok, the state travel agency. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 40) (IMG)

In some Eastern European countries, [Noel Field] even managed to get a communist onto the USC board. In Czechoslovakia, for example, the job was held until 1946 by Gejna Pavlik, a veteran communist activist who had taken part in the October Revolution in Russia, and one of his jobs was to provide Field with information as to the country's economic and social situation. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG{GDR})

Another person directly collaborating with the American spy Field was Vilem Novy:

Novy ... in 1939 helped Field organize the transfer of Communists from Poland to Britain.. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 59) (IMG)

Back in 1939, the American imperialist secret service was still hostile to the USSR, allying with the latter only in 1941. The American spy Noel Field plotted to go to the Peoples' Democracies to obtain intelligence on those countries. Referring to Noel Field, the revelations of Karel Kaplan, as presented in a CIA memorandum for the director of the FBI, stated:

[Noel Field] hoped to get all this without difficulty in the East. He made the rounds of friends he had made during the war, all of them now holding down important jobs. He considered as beginning, settling down for a while in Prague and writing a book for Western readers about the people's democracies. he had already begun gathering the necessary data. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG{GDR})

Slansky, Novy, and Margolius – among others – were behind the invitation of the American spy Noel Field to Czechoslovakia:

Among the people Field saw in Prague was Vilem Novy, a member of the Party CC, a member of the parliament, and editor-in-chief of RUDE PRAVO, Rudolf Margolius, who in 1949 was to be named deputy minister for Foreign Trade and in 1952 was to climb the scaffold with Rudolf Slansky, Karel Markus, Alice Kohnova, and Gizela Kischova. All gave him letters of recommendation for a sojourn permit. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG{GDR})

Another person with suspicious ties to Noel Field was Artur London, who was later released during the Titoist New Course:

Furthermore, immediately after the war, and still in contact with the European communist leadership groups, Field was able to meet in Switzerland with several of the foremost figures in the Czech CP, among them Arthur London, the future deputy foreign minister and one of the three acquitted among the 14 on trial in the Slansky case, Evzen Klínger and Otto Kosta, both high ranking officials in the Ministry of Information. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG{GDR})

To survive the purges, Zapotocky jumped on the side of the anti-Slansky team. On the overt level, he supported the communist blue-collar faction of the Party headed by Gottwald in the purges of the Slansky group. Officially:

Zapotocky supported Gottwald in this action. His reasons, however, were quite different from those of Gottwald. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Behind the scenes, Zapotocky was fighting on the same side as the Slansky group was – fighting for the Mossad, which back then was a CIA front. In fact:

Meanwhile, further arms negotiations had started in March. Czechoslovakia suffered a dire shortage of hard currencies and offered Haganah a considerable additional amount of hardware from its own surplus, valued at about \$18 million. One of the main instigators of this project was Antonin Zapotocky, then a deputy premier. He discussed the possibility of additional weapon sales with Mordechai Oren, an officer of the left-leaning socialist Mapam party. Zapotocky even promised to train Israeli fliers and paratroopers in Czechoslovakia. The government presidium had Reicin negotiate details of the arrangement with Avriel, who represented the Haganah. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, pp. 239-241) (IMG)

As a matter of fact, the author of the CIA report agreed that it was questionable if Zapotocky himself seriously agreed with the arrest of the Slansky group:

It is open to question if Zapotocky fully agreed with the arrest of Slansky and his followers as agents of the West since in the case of Vladimir Clementis he had suggested that a less drastic measure be taken. The fact remains that it was Zapotocky who signed the warrant for Slansky's arrest. This fact, however, does not constitute sufficient proof that Zapotocky agreed with this measure of Gottwald's.. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 7) (IMG)

Zapotocky was trying to save himself by opportunistically pretending to be 'against' the CIA-MI6-Mossad network, to which he actually had been a covert accomplice.

There was Colonel Jan Bojko who was a close collaborator and accomplice of General Reicin. Reicin, as mentioned above, had assisted the top CIA-Mossad operative Ehud Avriel in the conspiracies against People's Democratic Czechoslovakia and against the Arab states. Bojko, seeking to escape the purges, fostered the myth of his 'death' so to delude his opponents into not searching for him, so that he could buy time to escape to Yugoslavia, the Eastern European country harbouring the CIA and Mossad bases. In this escape operation involving the classic tactic of fake 'death', Bojko was taking with himself several top secret intelligence documents from Czechoslovakia so that they fall into the hands of the CIA-Mossad-UDB authorities. However, he was arrested on his escape route, and the Soviets believed that Bojko had ties to Zapotocky:

Bojko was a close collaborator of Gen. Bredich Reicin, executed during the purge of the Slansky group. Bojko, a Slovak, generally believed dead, had actually been concealed by Slansky's followers and was detected trying to reach Austria on the way to Yugoslavia with important documents.

His capture revealed a conspiracy involving the highest circles of Communist leadership and increased Soviet suspicion with regard to Czechoslovak unwillingness to purge unreliable elements. Soviet authorities have placed the responsibility on Dr. Stefan Reiss, a former Minister of Justice, a Hungarian Jew by birth, but considered a Slovak. He is a protege of President Zapotocky. (Investigation of Czechoslovak leaders, CIA, February 15, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

C15S9. East Germany / The German Proletariat's Support for Communist anti-Nazi Underground / The Removal of German Industries / Soviet Aid / Class Struggles and Economic Development in People's Democratic East Germany / Economic Development / The German Democratic Republic

*** IMG-AII-{GDR}

Approximately a thousand Germans participated in communist-led anti-fascist popular front committees for the liberation of Germany. The KPD was the main leader of the extra-regime German anti-fascist struggle. The CIA reported: Free Germany movements had sprung to life in Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, and France, drawing upon sizeable German emigre communities of anti-Nazi communists, socialists, and social democrats. Comprising nearly one thousand members, the Free Germany committees served as popular front organizations under the more-or-less open leadership of German communists. They supported the Allied war effort ... by calling for Germans to rise up and overthrow Hitler. (The OSS and the London "Free Germans", CIA Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 46, No. 1, Johnathan S. Gould) (IMG)

It is said that the SPD was the most popular 'anti-Nazi' 'opposition' political party in Germany during the Great Patriotic War. The US intelligence, however, believed otherwise:

6. The SP and trade union leaderships are probably the most discredited leaderships of any German democratic organization. The SPD and the trade unions wielded power – the CP not. The SPD ruled Prussia until July 20, 1932; it continually boasted of its strength. (...). The Weimar Republic may even be considered the creation of the SPD. And yet it failed completely to adopt Its policy to the new requirements. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section,

August 6, 1943, p. 20) (IMG {Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

By contrast, according to that same OSS document which cited the Psychological Warfare department of the US intelligence, the KPD/CP was the most important opposition organization in Nazi Germany:

Ps/W [i.e. Psychological Warfare department] interrogations indicate:

- a. that the CP underground still is the most important organization;
- b. that the Communist Youth Organization is still the most active youth underground;
- c. that, however, Gestapo agents have found entrance into the CP underground.

While the CP thus is the best organized and strongest underground group in Germany, the appeal of Russian Communism has not increased..

5. The esteem for Communism among the German workers rose considerably during the Spanish Civil War – a crucial period in Europe; it declined sharply during the German-Russian non-aggression pact, and climbed steeply with the decline of Germany's military fortunes on her Eastern Front. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 19) (IMG {Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

As the above document shows, the German workers were not as wholeheartedly on the side of Nazi Germany as the liberal media claims. During the Spanish Civil War, the German workers actually were oriented towards the USSR and communism, whereas during the Nazi-Soviet Pact era when the Soviets and the Nazi Germans appeared to be 'allies', the appeal of communism and the USSR reduced in Germany. The rollback of the Nazi German forces in the USSR reduced the propaganda power of the Third Reich while increasing the leverage of the KPD Underground among the German proletarians, the above document indicates.

Note, furthermore, that the 'Hitlerite majority' in Germany was primarily concentrated in and emanating from the agrarian petit-bourgeois areas, located mainly in southern Germany, unlike in East Germany which was industrialized, proletarianized, and historically a zone of anti-Hitlerite uprisings such as the Stennes rebellion (see C10S7). Hitler's lieutenant, Hermann Rauschning, recalled:

Hitler's nature was incomprehensible to the North German. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 165) (IMG {Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

The East Germans, located in Germany's northeast and primarily made up of proletarians, were never really so Hitlerian, unlike the petit-bourgeois majority of the Germans concentrated in the south.

The Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 between the Anglo-American Allies and the USSR provided the latter the right to reparations in kind through the removal of physical capital and production from East Germany, so long as the reparations payment would leave sufficient economic resources for the subsistence of the German population:

The Potsdam Agreement (of August 1945) provided claims that the reparations claims of the USSR should be met by removal of capital equipment and current production from the zone of Germany occupied by the USSR and by seizure of appropriate German external assets.

The Potsdam Agreement provided further that payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. (PROBABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1955, CIA, February 1954, p. 9) (IMG)

The Potsdam Agreement provided that Soviet reparations claim should be met by removal from the Soviet Zone of productive capacity in excess of that required to meet approved German peacetime needs. ('Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany', ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

And the USSR pursued the policy of the removal of German industries:

Substantial progress has been made in the removal of industrial facilities.. (Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany, ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

In 1945 the Soviet occupation authorities ordered more than 200 of the largest and most important factories in East Germany transferred to Soviet ownership and management as a partial reparations payment. ('Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc: Loans, Credits, and Grants', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 8) (IMG)

However, upon reaching relative sufficiency in reconstruction, the USSR began to return half of the physical capital by 1950 and much of the rest by 1952 in exchange for compensation to be paid, as a part of the broader strategy of expanding the industrial backbone of the Peoples' Democracies:

In 1947 and 1950, approximately 100 plants were returned to East German ownership. The remaining companies were organized in 30 holding companies called Soviet-Owned Joint Stock Companies (Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften – SAG's). In 1952, 66 SAG's were returned to East Germany, for which compensation

had to be paid. ('Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc: Loans, Credits, and Grants', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 8) (IMG)

The consequent interruption of production, however, and the deterioration of facilities reserved for removal and in transit have caused the USSR to seek more immediate benefits from the current production of plants retained in the Soviet Zone, despite objections to the principle of taking reparations from current production. ('Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany', ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

With a view to both immediate benefits ... the USSR has obtained control of some 200 key industrial establishments producing the greater portion of the current industrial output in the Soviet Zone (for example, some 85 percent of current metallurgical production), largely on the basis of their reliability to removal as reparations. To control these industries the USSR has established a gigantic trust, the Sowjetische Industrie A.G. ('Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany', ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

Thus, the USSR returned East German physical capital to boost the latter's production, while continuing to receive the reparations.

Some hold the mistaken view that as East Germany was already mostly industrialized, it did not have to expand its heavy industry. This view is incorrect, because (1) East Germany needed to rebuild its wartorn economy and heavy-industrial development was necessary to this end, (2) there was still much room for the development of heavy industry especially in light of the covert or direct wars that could occur, (3) the development of heavy industry would have actually given a massive long-run boost to the development of light industry and consumer goods, and (4) even if East German heavy industry was highly developed, it still needed to upgrade its heavy industry, and for that it needed the prioritization of scientific advancement in engineering and technological advancement geared towards heavy industry, for such upgrades to occur. This is why:

the principal Soviet economic objectives for East Germany for the next few years are:

a. To expand East German industry, particularly those heavy industries equipped to contribute directly or indirectly to armament production or capable of early conversion to armament production. (...).

b. (...).

(NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 11) (IMG)

Obviously in light of the experience of the Great Patriotic War, for some time, East German scientific research in the military sector was firmly controlled or supervised by the Soviets. Nonetheless, scientific research in the field of heavy industry development was particularly emphasized in East Germany:

Scientific research in East Germany since 1945 has been primarily in the applied fields, as distinct from basic or pure research, and has concentrated upon the development of substitute materials and the improvement of processes in heavy industry. Research upon the most important military items, such as the V-2 rocket, was transferred to the USSR in 1947 and 1948. The scientific research upon military items now [in 1952] being conducted in East Germany is under direct Soviet control, while the planning and direction of all other research are the responsibility of the GDR. (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 19) (IMG)

A 1954 CIA document admits that many of its conclusions, predominantly with anti-Soviet bias, are provisional. However, regarding the effects of the Soviet policies in East Germany, the document acknowledges one fact as 'sufficiently clear': that the USSR successfully managed to simultaneously boost the East German production to levels higher than that of West Germany, while taking large levels of reparations from East Germany. It states:

The principal Soviet policies were, however, sufficiently clear. During the first 3 years of the occupation, the USSR tried to restore East German industrial production as rapidly as possible at a time when little attention was given to such development in West Germany. At the same time, however, the USSR was quickly removing as much war booty as possible, such as livestock, raw materials, automobiles, tractors, and other valuables, as well as reparations in the form of industrial equipment. The Russians met with considerable success in each of these seemingly contradictory endeavors. (PROBABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1955, CIA, February 1954, p. 7) (IMG)

Another CIA document, this one definitive and devoid of any 'provisionally' to its conclusions, states:

In its desire to obtain immediate benefits from German production, the USSR has pressed vigorously the industrial rehabilitation in the Soviet Zone. The level of production is still well below former standards, but, despite the disruption occasioned by plant removes, significant progress has been made. ('Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany', ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

In accordance with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement, and contrary to Anglo-American propaganda, the

reparations paid in kind by Germany focused not as much on the civilian sector of the economy, but rather the war materials. Indeed, as confirmed by the US intelligence:

A significant proportion of the Soviet take from German current production is in the form of war materials. It is well established that war plants and research facilities in the Soviet Zone had been continued in operation, producing such ... items as guided missiles, jet-propelled aircraft, tank treads and armor plate, optical instruments, synthetic fuel, and synthetic rubber. ('Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany', ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

During the early years of the Soviet occupation, the foundations for a democratic government in East Germany were laid. Contrary to the Anglo-American depictions of East Germany, in fact, a multi-party bourgeois-democracy, not a 'socialist' 'single-party' state was formed in that land. Germany's legislative assemblies were in fact made up of non-SED bourgeois parties:

In 1946, half of the deputies in the Landtage still belonged to the Liberal and Christian Democrats (LDP and CDU) and various non-party peasant organizations. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Upon the establishment of the foundations of democratic statehood in the Eastern Zone, neither the USSR nor the SED could purge all those Germans who served the Nazi regime, because a large minority of the East German population (and a majority of the unified-German population) were ideologically oriented towards Nazism. Only those directly responsible for crimes were purged. Thus, in the immediate post-war period, the 'old civil servants' who did not directly involve in committing crimes and instead only served the German government continued to maintain their position for a while, until new cadres of potentially more reliable experts were trained:

The administration was, until recently, still composed of too many of the old civil servants. Thus, in Communist parlance, East Germany was a ... country with a bourgeois administration. Meanwhile, a new Socialist civil service has been trained in the Walter Ulbricht Academy in Forst Zinna, and many new people will take the places of the purged, a process facilitated by the administrative re-organization of the states (Länder) into districts (Bezirk) of which Berlin will become the fifteenth. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Many of these 'old civil servants', as one may expect were not politically reliable. One such individual was Georg Dertinger, who had a long history of ties to various reactionary Nazi-collaborationist organizations. A former member of the German National People's Party, a right-wing German bourgeois-nationalist organization not to be confused with the Nazi Party, he had helped Franz von Papen in getting the Vatican to bless Hitler's Reich. Since 1934, he worked as a 'journalist' in Berlin for a newspaper. He had not been openly a full-scale Nazi, but was rather one of the 'staff members or 'civil servants' who 'only' served the German Empire, be it Nazi or otherwise. Thus, in the initial years, Dertinger was not identified as a Nazi to be purged, and thereby continued to serve in the East German government. Even then, Dertinger did not hide his ties to the US-led bloc:

Dertinger had not expected his arrest. He believed he had high enough protection in Moscow and made little effort to hide from the public his contacts with the West. The arrest of Dertinger is a possible preliminary to action against those Russian delegates who have one too far in their contacts with the West. (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

He did indeed have the support of a certain faction in Moscow. In particular, Dertinger worked for the MI6 agent Beria:

Dertinger was ... functioning under the authority of Beria.. (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Not surprisingly, Dertinger was convicted as a British spy and duly sent to the corrective labour camps.

Dertinger lied outside of the KPD. There were, however, comprador agents within the KPD. One of those Trotskyist-Titoist agents in the German communist movement was Paul Merker, who had belonged to the hostile anti-Soviet faction within the KPD:

Paul Merker, a veteran of the German Communist Party, was, prior to 1933, systematically disposed towards the anti-Moscow wing, and for this reason was eliminated in 1931 for some time from a part of his party functions. He was considered to be a Remmele-Neumann man. Remmele was a Reichstag deputy who disapproved of Stalin's German policy in 1932, went to Moscow as a German Communist refugee, and was executed there in 1937, together with his comrade, Heinz Neumann. In 1941, Merker escaped from occupied France and went to Mexico City where he published a paper, Freies Deutschland, and organized a number of Communist fronts there and in other parts of Latin America. (...). Merker, who has been loudly denounced as a Trotskyite, belongs to a group of ... European Communists, who believed for a time that the European Communist Party and regimes would assure for themselves a greater degree of independence from Moscow. (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

His departure to Mexico was the beginning of his long relationship with US intelligence. Merker's relationship with the

American spymaster Noel Field stretched back to 1942 when Field had helped him move to Mexico:

Field had helped [Merker] to escape to Mexico in 1942.. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 9) (IMG)

The above is a quote from the revelations by Karel Kaplan referred to by the CIA in a memorandum for the FBI. During his tenure in Mexico, Paul Merker collaborated with American-Israeli intelligence:

Paul Merker ... is accused [by Moscow] of having favored cooperation with Zionist organizations during his stay in Mexico City, and especially with J. P. Warburg, who was assistant director of the German department of the United States Information Service in Mexico for some time during Merker's sojourn there. (...). Moscow's statements concerning this cooperation are true, and it is equally correct to say that the Moscow ... authorities were unable, from 1933 on, to supervise all their own branch organizations, nor were they prepared to do so at that time. (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

In a book published by the Oxford University Press, Rachel McCleary of the CIA front think tank 'Hoover Institute' confirmed also that:

Edward M. Warburg [was] chair of the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.. ('Global Compassion: Private Voluntary Organizations and U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1939', Oxford University Press, Rachel M. McCleary, 2009) (IMG)

As such, Merker had cooperated with the American-Israeli espionage organization, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). For more information about the JDC's intelligence and special operations activities for the American imperialists and the Mossad, see chapter 16. During the post-war years, Merker maintained his connections with the US intelligence through the spymaster Noel Field as well as Czechoslovakia's 'Slansky group' – a clique of agents and saboteurs working for the intelligence services of Yugoslavia, Israel, Britain, and the United States. As confirmed by the CIA:

Merker [is] linked to Noel H. Field and the Slansky group in Prague.. (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

A 1977 US intelligence memorandum written for the FBI chief attached open source texts with some background information on the Field case. To provide information on the Peoples' Democracies, Noel Field:

had already begun gathering the necessary data. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG)

He would do this under the guise of:

settling down for a while in Prague and writing a book for Western readers.. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG)

Full quote:

Field ... hoped to get all this without difficulty in the East. He made the rounds of friends he had made during the war, all of them now holding down important jobs. He considered as beginning, settling down for a while in Prague and writing a book for Western readers about the people's democracies. He had already begun gathering the necessary data. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG)

For the purpose of gathering intelligence:

In September [Field] contacted Leo Bauer, an important official in the German CP, who gave him word from East German leader Paul Merker, whom Field had helped to escape to Mexico in 1942, word that there would be no obstacles to his joining the Party. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 9) (IMG)

In other words, Merker continued his intelligence contacts with Noel Field through Leo Bauer, to the point of even trying to help him to infiltrate the SED for collecting data on the Peoples' Democracies. Not surprisingly:

Merker was also openly tied to Tito.. (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Thus, just like the 'Slanskyites' of Czechoslovakia, Merker was an agent of American intelligence, and a willing accomplice of Yugoslavia's fascist dictatorship. Even as late as the 1950s, said a prominent German historian:

Paul Merker had deviated from Stalin's 'anti-Zionist' policy [which was] directed against the state of Israel.. ('Germany: The Long Road West: Volume 2: 1933-1990', Heinrich August Winkler, p. 142) (IMG)

Some would argue that the fact that Merker had cooperated with the American-Israeli espionage service in 1942, the year in which the American imperialists and their Dayanite henchpeople in Israel were genuine rivals to Nazi Germany, shows that Merker was being 'pragmatic'. Certainly, had Merker's cooperation with American-Israeli intelligence services been limited to the period between 1941-1942, his deeds would have been justified since it would have assisted in the fight against the Axis forces. However, the fact that Merker continued to favor the regime of Israel well after 1942, and continued to foster bonds with the CIA, as well as with the Yugoslav regime shows clearly that his cooperation with the American-Israeli intelligence services was for the purpose of assisting American- Israeli espionage efforts in general, and was not limited to fighting the Axis.

Up until early 1952, the East German government, despite its many merits on other issues of economic policy, pursued a reactionary left-deviationist policy line on wages. There was little wage differentiation in the economy, causing skilled workers dissatisfaction for the little pay they got for their hard work. Stalin, in a comradely manner, criticized the East German policy in his conversation with Walter Ulbricht. The following is an excerpt, from the Soviet archives, of an April 1952 conversation that took place between Joseph Stalin and the East German leaders Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, and Otto Grotewohl:

Comrade Stalin says that he has [some] questions. Last time it was found that in the GDR, the ratio of workers' salary to the salary of engineering and technical personnel was 1:1.7. It is absolutely incorrect.

It will doom your entire industry. Maybe you started from the assumption of what Marx and Engels said in the period of the Commune – that an engineer should not be paid more than a well-qualified worker. Maybe it was correct then, but it is absolutely incorrect now. The engineer is engaged in intellectual work. He must have an apartment, decent furniture; he should not be chasing a piece of bread. He should enjoy a standard of living appropriate for a person who is engaged in intellectual work. He has to have a library, comfort, so that he could sit down and read a book undisturbed, or write something. If you do not do it, not only will your old engineers leave, but even the young ones will run away. In our country, an engineer gets two to three times more than a worker and in some spheres even four times more. Academicians get 12 thousand rubles monthly. It is impossible to work and grow without it. Therefore, you should discard your old views on this issue. The technology has become so complex compared to the times of the Commune, that engineers, and even high-level workers, must study a lot to master this technology. An engineer must have an opportunity to constantly grow, read books, write – there can be no engineer without it. (...). Comrade Stalin says that he heard that in the GDR well-qualified workers get only slightly more than the manual workers.

Comrade Ulbricht says that they do get more, but the difference is not sufficient. Therefore, they plan to introduce pay rate charts.

Comrade Stalin says that we [Soviets] went through the same experience in the first years of the Soviet government. Communes were organized on the plants, which brought together engineers and manual workers, who pulled all their money together and then divided it equally. It was stupid. White-collar workers did not have any incentive to raise their qualifications, while blue-collar workers did not have any incentive to grow to the level of white-collar workers. As a result, both categories lost. In the old time, some people were saying that such an approach was a proletarian, socialist one. But there is nothing socialist or proletarian about it. It is a simple peasant leveling of all. Any proletarian will tell you that if he gets more money, he would try to raise his skills, otherwise he will not. A skilled worker should be paid more than an unskilled worker, and an engineer—much more than a skilled worker. It should be done regardless of how much it costs. In our country, we did it 25 years ago, and that is the only reason why it works so well. Skilled workers have their prospects--many of them took exams to become engineers, and became good specialists. The peasant leveling of all should be buried. Comrade Stalin asks if the German leaders agree with this and adds that it is the genuine Marxist approach.

Comrade Pieck says that is correct

(‘Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership’, Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, pp. 3-4. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07,

1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis’ (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

Indeed, the East German leaders accepted Stalin’s criticism. Hence, the conditions in East Germany soon began to change for the better. The living standards rose. For their achievements, the best of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals were rewarded with prizes and privileges forming the East German ‘elites’. The word ‘elite’ in this context refers not to the corrupt bureaucrats, the bourgeoisie or aristocrats, but rather, to the high achievers among the proletariat and peasantry, the German equivalent of the Soviet Stakhanovites. As confirmed by a late 1952 CIA report:

There is much satisfaction with improvement in living standards, the greater range of goods offered, and the somewhat easier work tempo. A great number of special privileges are given to the working intellectuals, to labor heroes and master peasants, and the prizes or orders these person get are accompanied by material, cultural, and educational privileges. The great number of vacation homes for these elite and their children were mentioned most approvingly, and the division of the population into the followers of the regime, enjoying these privileges, and the others, the loafers and idlers has been very well adapted to German mentality. A point of pride is the new housing projects in East Berlin, especially the Stalinale. All new apartments will be reserved for the elite, and this is an attractive form of social pressure. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The rewarding of East Germany’s hardworking ‘elites’ was a very positive step in that country’s political economy. As

the CIA document stated above, the German people were very much satisfied with the rise in living standards, the high amount of production, and the relative ease. Another US intelligence document confirmed:

The regime has gained some support in the last two years as the result of the ... the slow but steady rise in the standard of living.. (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

To much of the German youth, especially the ones from the proletarian families of the industrialized zones, Nazism represented the scorched earth policy of the Hitler gang which caused them the tremendous uncalled-for suffering. By contrast, the East German government at that time represented the steadily improved life standards of the population. It also had paid special attention to fighting Nazi propaganda and to educating the youth with progressive democratic ideas. Indeed, as the CIA stated:

The regime has made efforts to win over the youth (age group 6 to 25), who comprise more than a third of the population.. (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

Until early 1952, the time in which the above CIA document was written, the government had not yet introduced the wage differentiation policy and as such, the 'elite' workers had not been sufficiently rewarded. Nonetheless, even in early 1952 and despite the left-opportunist equalization measures of the East German government, the CIA stated:

The regime has gained some support in the last two years as the result of the Communist education upon the youth.. (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

Many changes occurred in Germany in the months subsequent to the date of the CIA report. The scientific policy of wage differentiation and the promotion of the 'elite' workers was likely the factor that led to in an even greater support for the state among the East German youth in the months after the CIA report. This was manifested in the fact that the:

the young people are eagerly volunteering to enter the army, so ... many of the applicants have had to be put on the waiting list. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Worth emphasis is that the German youth were eagerly and voluntarily joining the army. As for the older generation of the German working class, the conditions were somewhat complicated. As mentioned prior, the KPD formed the most important underground resistance movement against the Nazi regime and enjoyed a level of popularity among the German workers, as reported by the OSS. Naturally, as a result of years of propaganda by the Nazi Reich, a significantly large minority of the German proletarians certainly harboured anti-communist views.

For the standard of living, the high time had come for Germany to collectivize its agriculture, as means of boosting its food production. Until 1952, the German Democratic Republic had not undergone any agricultural collectivization, as confirmed by the US intelligence as well as the conversation between Stalin and East German leaders:

There has, for all practical purposes, been no collectivization of agriculture. (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

He, Stalin, understands that the GDR has no collective farms at all, and the machine-rental stations serve only private peasant farms.

Comrade Ulbricht confirms that and adds that they even prohibited organization of collective farms where the peasants wanted it, trying not to harm the movement for united Germany.

(‘Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership’, Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 4. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis’ (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

Ronald A. Francisco, an anti-Soviet political economist and a fellow at the CIA front think tank ‘Wilson Center’, admitted that in Germany, the:

failure in private farming became a significant impetus for collectivization. (The Political Economy of Collectivized Agriculture: A Comparative Study of Communist and Non-Communist Systems, Pergamon Press, edited by Ronald A. Francisco, Betty A. Laird, Roy D. Laird, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

Furthermore, a drought had hit Germany recently, creating an even greater need for the SED to boost agricultural production. In face of the conditions of drought, Joseph Stalin strongly suggested to the SED leaders that they do not attack the kulaks, and instead, encircle them through the creation of collective farms:

The kulaks should be encircled, and you should create collective farms around them. In our country, organization of collective farms was going on simultaneously with expropriation of the kulaks. You will not need to do it this way. Let your kulaks sit tight, leave them alone. (‘Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership’, Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 4. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to

Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

Indeed, a purpose of the policy of collectivization is to amalgamate the agrarian small businesses into employee-owned bigger businesses capable of competing, undercutting, and besieging the kulak-owned businesses.

The CIA reported:

Ulbricht has stated that no action will be taken against the Grossbauern [i.e. kulaks] as a class but only against individuals who break the law. (Effect of Slansky Trial on Jews in East German Government, CIA, March 1, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Anglo-American finance capital has propagated the false narrative that as a result of the collectivization efforts, the East German government's 'terrorism', 'warfare', and 'mass arrests' against the German people 'suddenly' increased. Not true, as evidenced by a late 1952 CIA report:

There are no mass arrests going on as in the early years of the occupation; concentration camps exist, but they represent only a modern form of the forced labor usual for criminals in German jails. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Even as late as March 1, 1953, a source for the US intelligence stated that he/she does not believe any direct action against the kulaks will be undertaken in East Germany:

Source does not believe that there will be a concerted campaign against the large farmers (Grossbauern) because any such action would mean that the State would have to take charge of overseeing the farms. (Effect of Slansky Trial on Jews in East German Government, CIA, March 1, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

In his conversation with the SED leaders, Stalin also advised that Germany should pursue collectivization as means of reducing unemployment, improving the conditions of agriculture by teaming up peasants for larger land, backed by generous aid and benefits from the state:

How many peasant farms join a production cooperative – 5, 10 or 15 – that does not matter. What matters, is that they will be organized. Currently poor peasants do not have any machines, do not have enough seed, and do not have necessary knowledge and experience in the economy. That is why their harvest is so poor. In such a situation, poor peasants will ruin themselves and will join the ranks of the unemployed. However, if you organize small collective farms and show them how to manage their farms, then peasants would start thinking, what is better – to join collective farms or to live separately. (...). You should give production cooperatives some privileges, as it used to be in our country some time ago. You should sell them machines cheaper, help them with seed and advice. If you need instructors for organization of collective farms, we will give them to you. Of course, if the bloc of parties objects to it – that would be a different case. But the bloc will not object if the peasants want to organize production cooperation, and if you help your peasants to do it, what can be bad about it? You will see for yourself that peasants will visit those collective farms and watch how life will unfold in a new way. (...). Do not force anybody to join, if they want to, good. If they do not, do not force them. Peasants will join production cooperatives voluntarily. You could send good people from the city unemployed to organize such cooperatives in the village. Comrade Stalin says that in the Soviet Union, we were able to get rid of unemployment for two reasons; first of all, because we expanded the production and, secondly, because peasants settled on the land. It used to be that every year between 23 to 25 million hungry peasants would come from villages to Russian cities and undermine the price for labor force. Now we do not experience it any more, because the peasants are interested in working in the villages. Today we do not have unemployment in the USSR, and our problem is that we do not have enough workers. We mobilize young peasants and send them to work in the industry. This is how we defeated unemployment from both ends. Do not economize on assistance to collective farms; it will pay back later. Then gradually you will have a union of workers and peasants, and it is difficult for workers to stand alone without peasants. You need help on the part of the peasants. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, pp. 4-5. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

Part of the program that Stalin had advised was already in place. As late as January 1952, the government allocated: seed and fertilizers, the Machine Lending Stations, the Farmers' (Mutual Aid Society).. (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 9) (IMG)

The government would use the above as instruments to encourage voluntary collectivization. As confirmed by Ronald Francisco, a former Fellow at the CIA think tank Woodrow Wilson Center, the collectivization:

drive ... was genuinely positive and designed to encourage voluntary membership. Collectives were made to look economically attractive. Heavy state subsidies flowed to them through investment credits; and they were given priority access to machinery, fertilizer, and other farm equipment. Life for individual collective farmer

also had economic attractions. Taxes were significantly lower, minimum incomes were guaranteed, and almost all indebtedness from farming for the year preceding membership was cancelled by the state. (Agricultural Collectivization in the German Democratic Republic, author: Ronald A. Francisco. In: 'The Political Economy of Collectivized Agriculture: A Comparative Study of Communist and Non-Communist Systems', Pergamon Press, edited by Ronald A. Francisco, Betty A. Laird, Roy D. Laird, 1979, p. 65) (IMG)

A very scientific step-by-step approach to collectivize agriculture was undertaken. Francisco further wrote:

These incentives were coupled with a tantalizing variety of collective farm structures. This was perhaps the most original plank in the GDR's package, and it disarmed a great deal of resistance. The idea was very simple.. No matter how attractive collective life seemed to be, it remained for the private farmer an uncertain and intangible life. Hence, why should the state insist upon a sudden and full transformation from traditional private farms to collective farms? Why not make the process less unpleasant by making it less abrupt and more gradual? The GDR did precisely this by creating three separate types of collective farms. Type 1, which most preferred, allowed a farmer to retain nominal title to his land when he made it part of the collective. Nothing was required beyond this; each farmer maintained independent ownership and control of all of his machinery, livestock, and buildings. Type 2 differed from Type 1 only in its inclusion of machinery in collective ownership; livestock and buildings remained private property. Type 3 was a collective farm of the Soviet type; all property was transferred, with the exception of a private plot of one-half hectare and a limited number of livestock.

This was a carefully thought-out and well-presented program of collectivization, and it achieved immediate results. A large number of farmers enrolled in the first year, most of them voluntarily. The bulk of these consisted of men who had not been able to operate efficiently as independent farmers on the meager parcels of land distributed by the state. Hence, the ulterior motive of the ideologically questionable land reform seemed to pay off.

(Agricultural Collectivization in the German Democratic Republic, author: Ronald A. Francisco. In: 'The Political Economy of Collectivized Agriculture: A Comparative Study of Communist and Non -Communist Systems', Pergamon Press, edited by Ronald A. Francisco, Betty A. Laird, Roy D. Laird, 1979, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

As an inevitable result of this policy, a large portion of the German kulaks would have become refugees to West Germany. Actually, Joseph Stalin already expected and celebrated this fact, as it would free East Germany from its parasitic kulak class, allowing the East German government to take over kulak land:

Comrade Stalin says that we will give you one or two instructors, but you should not engage in expropriation simultaneously with collectivization. You can leave your kulaks alone for the time being. Comrade Ulbricht responds that we do not need to touch them at the present time, because when production cooperatives are starting to organize, a part of kulaks will immediately escape to the West. Comrade Stalin asks, what is bad about that? [The state] will take their land. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 8. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiisskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

So long as deprived of their wealth, the kulaks could turn into an excellent weapon of the People's Democracy, for they could be sent off to West Germany as a Weapon of Mass Migration, with which to increase the West German population, and hence to force the West Germans to spend money accommodating those refugees rather than spend money for funding Nazi terror gangs that would attack East Germany. The kulak threat could thereby be converted into the kulak opportunity.

